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A political career as a ladder to the corporate elite
A study of the revolving door lobbying mechanism in the Netherlands
Master Thesis – Final Version January 29, 2016
Lukas Baars 10081356
MSc Political Science, International Relations
Study Project: Advocacy in EU and world politics: Who is represented (and who is not)? University of Amsterdam
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Table of Contents
Introduction
5-6
Theoretical Framework
7-13
I Lobbying: ‘Who you know versus what you know’ 7-9
II The revolving Door 9-11
III The problem 11-13
Methodology
14-18
I Research Design 14 II Hypotheses 15-16 III Variables 17-18Results
19-42
I Hypothesis A 19-22 II Hypothesis B 23-27III Revolving door Lobbying 28-33
- Examining the correlation of lobbyist and corporate elite positions
- Gender
- Age
- Sectors worked in before political career - position in political climate
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IV Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after careers in
government, the Senate and the House of Representatives 34-36
V Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after
careers in the Senate and the House of Representatives 37-39
VI Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after
careers in the House of Representatives 40-42
Conclusion
43-44
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Introduction
When politicians move from the public sector to the private sector, and possibly back to the public sector again, this is called the ‘revolving door’. The revolving door mechanism is an increasing problem in the Dutch political system. If ex-politicians are offered a job in a sector they were responsible for during their function in politics, this is seen as a conflict of interest and a potential source of corruption. The politician can start working in the sector he helped create legislation for. In the Dutch political system, the examples of the revolving door
mechanism are in abundance. Gerrit Zalm was Minister of Finances four times until 2007, after which he became chief economist of the DSB-Bank. The Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management from 2007 until 2010 was Camiel Eurlings. One year after that, Eurlings became member of the board of KLM, the biggest airline carrier in the Netherlands. These career moves generated a heated discussion concerning the transparency of lobbying. Even if Zalm and Eurlings never engaged in any lobbying activity whatsoever, the suspicion alone can be damaging for public trust in institutions and politics. In December 2015, ‘De Volkskrant’ published an article called ‘Is it time to close the revolving door in the Netherlands?’ (Huisman, 2015: 1), questioning the integrity of the Dutch lobbying sector and its influence on the Dutch political system. The article represents a surge of attention for the revolving door mechanism amongst media and NGO’s. Transparency International, a renowned non-governmental organization that monitors corruption, deemed the Dutch lobbying system ‘non-transparent’ (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 5). Also, the risk of corruption because of the revolving door mechanism was one of the only critiques of the European Commission anti-corruption report of 2014(European Commission, 2014: 1-41). If we want to counteract the revolving door mechanism, however, we have to penetrate the non-transparency of the Dutch lobbying sector.
This research sets out to generate a scope of the revolving door mechanism in the Netherlands. However, creating a clear image of the lobbying sector in the Netherlands is easier said than done. Simply measuring the amount of registered lobbyists and consultants in the Netherlands is not enough to analyze the revolving door. This research analyzes the career information of
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Dutch politicians in order to gain insight in the size and transparency of the revolving door mechanism. Specifically, by examining the relation between political careers and elite corporate positions, the research strives to generate an understanding of the form of the mechanism. The research question is as follows: ‘To what extent does revolving-door lobbying occur in the Netherlands in the form of government officials gaining corporate elite positions?’
Primarily, the relevance of this research lies in understanding how the revolving door works in the Netherlands, and gaining insight in the size of the mechanism. The literature on this subject focuses mainly on the revolving door in the United States, while the revolving door in the Netherlands is rather underexposed. This thesis aims to broaden the knowledge about the revolving door mechanism and its effect on the Dutch political system.
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Theoretical Framework
Among the population in the Netherlands, lobbyists seem to have a bad reputation. In general, people often do not know what their work entails, and how they earn their money exactly. It is not easy to explain the day to day business of a lobbyist, because a large part of the lobbying activities take place during private conversations or encounters behind closed doors. Simply put, lobbyists attempt to influence government or business leaders to promote their clients’ interests. Often this takes the form of attempting to influence legislation or certain activities. However, this is not the only purpose of lobbyist organizations. There is an extensive academic debate concerning the possible benefits and disadvantages of lobbying firms for society. Among the benefits is the provision of information and specific policy knowledge that lobbying firms supply politicians with, on which will be elaborated below.
I: Lobbying: ‘who you know’ versus ‘what you know’
This research will focus specifically on the so-called revolving Door aspect of lobbying,
‘whereby individuals move from serving in public office to being employed as lobbyists’ (Blanes I Vidal, Draca, Fons-Rosen, 2010: 2). Public officials can be effective lobbyists because of the policy expertise they have acquired during their employment in the government. Also, their government employment has often left them with a network of former colleagues in legislative positions. This network, if it contains the right people, can be a major asset for a lobbyist.
As mentioned above, one of the advantages of the lobbying industry is the provision of information. As LaPira and Thomas state:
‘Interest groups supply important information and subject-matter expertise to government so that it can do its job. Interest groups are normatively justified if citizens are equally represented and their interests are faithfully communicated in a way that minimizes rent-seeking and maximizes deliberation. Consequently – defenders of the revolving door point out – lobbyists with valuable policy subject-matter expertise that comes with government experience are better suited to supply the information that policymakers need to make well-reasoned decisions’
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If the population is equally and faithfully represented, interest groups are suited, perhaps even needed, to enable policymakers to make well-reasoned decisions. In the case of the
Netherlands, if the government were to acquire the information provided by the lobbying industry through government officials, the already large government apparatus would have to be substantially larger.
However, critics of the revolving door mechanism argue that it is not so much the policy expertise that makes a lobbyist effective, but the lobbyist’s network and insider knowledge. LaPira and Thomas convey this as following:
‘When organized interests are heard solely because they hire those with the right connections – not because they have the best ideas – the democratic process suffers’ (LaPira & Thomas, 2014:
5).
It seems only logical that policymakers would base their decisions on the ideas and information provided by the most resourceful lobbying firms that have the most access to the political process. However, in theory, these lobbying firms could feed the policymakers a biased or incomplete information supply that benefits their client’s interests the most. This would create disproportional influence of lobbying firms on the policymaking process. Cain and Drutman strikingly describe this as the balance between the importance of ‘’who you know’ and ‘what you know’’ (Cain & Drutman, 2014: 29). If ‘who you know’ is most important for a lobbyist, hiring the lobbyist with the best connections or the largest network is the most effective way to influence policymaking processes.
‘It implies that decisions and actions are being taken for reasons other than merit or political
responsiveness, resulting in democratic loss and potentially policy inefficiency’ (Cain & Drutman,
2014: 29).
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lobbyists. If lobbyists are hired as policy experts, used for advice and a supply of information, their clientele should match their policy expertise. If revolving door lobbyists have a wider variety of clients, LaPira and Thomas assume they are hired more for their network and ability to get a foot in the door than their policy expertise.
Concerning the ‘what you know versus who you know’ debate, Bertrand et al argue that lobbyists change the issues they are involved in when the legislator they are connected to change positions as well. This strongly suggests that lobbyists themselves are more dependent on their network than on their policy expertise. The research examines the issues lobbyists focus on, and the way they are connected to legislators (campaign donations, for example). The article states:
‘We do see evidence of lobbyists’ prior knowledge and expertise driving whom they decide to connect to, maybe a sign that connections are needed for efficient communication between informed lobbyists and time- and attention-constrained lawmakers. But we do also see evidence of lobbyists’ job assignments being driven by whom they know rather what they know’
(Bertrand et al, 2011: 33).
II: The revolving Door
The revolving roor is one of the most criticized forms of lobbying, because the movement of individuals from government employment to the lobbying sector emphasizes the importance of insider knowledge. Although the research of Blanes I Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen focuses mainly on the United States, their understanding of the revolving door is applicable to the phenomenon in Europe as well. They state their considerations as following:
‘The existence of the Revolving Door raises several concerns. Firstly, career concerns in the lobbying industry can potentially affect the actions taken by serving government officials. Secondly, the prospect of post-government monetary windfalls can change the type of people that are attracted to public service. Thirdly, the existence of a disparity of access and influence over elected representatives creates ethical issues and perpetuates the impression that
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Washington is controlled by a tightly knit elite, thus undermining popular support for democratic institutions’ (Blanes I Vidal, Draca & Fons-Rosen, 2010: 3).
Regarding the first two concerns, the idea that politicians let future career options influence their decision-making process is disconcerting. However, there is no definitive evidence that this is the case. The notion that individuals might be attracted to public service because of the prospect of a lucrative career in lobbying afterwards seems hard to confirm as well.
Nonetheless, Blanes I Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen do establish a link between salaries of lobbyists and their connections to important policymakers in office. They state:
‘We interpret our main finding as evidence that the existence of a powerful politician to whom the lobbyist is connected is a key determinant of the revenue that he or she is able to generate. We argue, in other words, that lobbyists are able to ‘cash in on their connections’, since
connections are an asset with separate value to their experience, human capital or general knowledge of how government works’ (Blanes I Vidal, Draca & Fons-Rosen, 2010: 4).
Although the actual influence of a potential future lobbying career on policymakers is hard to prove, the link between revenue and access to the decision-making process is established. The ‘what you know’ versus ‘who you know’ debate is important for the revolving door
phenomenon especially, because revolving door lobbyists seem to thrive when they have an extensive and up-to-date network. The question remains whether this influences the
democratic process. Also, the notion that a valuable network is worth money and that a
lobbyist or politician can ‘cash in’ on connections, could mean that a valuable network is worth other things as well. For example, could a valuable network mean that a lobbyist or politician can acquire a job through his network? Or, in other words, could it mean that an individual can be hired because of his or her network?
The third concern, regarding the image of the decision-making process being controlled by an elite group, is relevant both in the United States and Europe. Although the population’s
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opinions of the decision-making process might differ, the ethical difficulties that arise with disparity of access and influence over elected officials will surely have a negative impact on the population’s confidence in policymakers. This, in turn, is likely to augment division and conflict. An interesting study concerning the movement of personnel among elite positions in business and government during the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations concluded that there is evidence that ‘government service can serve as a conduit for joining the ranks of the corporate
elite’ (Etzion & Davis, 2008: 5).
This study further examines the idea that a politician establishes a network during his or her political career, which enables this individual to acquire an important position in the private sector after the political career. Etzion & Davis argue that connections make these politicians valuable for the private sector. Although a study of two administrations in the U.S. cannot generate conclusions for the corporate elite in the Netherlands, the premise is interesting and relevant to consider when examining the revolving door. An interesting study was done by González-Bailon et al which looked at post-career rewards of high-ranking public officials in Britain. The analysis shows that there is a connection between service in parliament or British government and levels of connectedness and remuneration in the corporate world (González-Bailon et al, 2013: 870). However, this research does not involve possible lobbying activities.
III: The problem
There are several reasons why extensive research on the revolving door in the Netherlands is needed. First of all, there appears to be a lack of transparency and regulation concerning lobbying in the Netherlands. One might argue that moving from the public sector to the private sector or vice-versa is simply a smart career move, fitted to the individual’s capabilities and credentials. Also, public officials in the Netherlands pledge an oath emphasizing their integrity and resistance to corruption. However, institutional mechanisms should be in place to ensure transparency and clear regulation of the lobbying sector, and especially the revolving door. In March 2015, Transparency International released a report which said the following of lobbying regulation in the Netherlands:
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‘In 2001, the largest association of lobbyists (BVPA, Beroepsvereniging voor Public Affairs),
introduced a code of ethics for its members, and, in 2012, the House of Representatives installed a ‘’Lobbyist Register’’. Both initiatives are limited in their effectiveness, however, due to their voluntary nature, their (practical) applicability and shortcomings in enforcement’ (Scheltema
Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 6).
The registration of lobbying firms is voluntary, and only the registered firms can be enforced to obey the code of ethics and Lobbyist Register rules of conduct. The report reads that ‘around
90 lobbyists are on the list’, although ‘all interviewees for the report agree that at the very least around 400 lobbyists are active at the House of Representatives and Senate’ (Scheltema Beduin
& Ter Weele, 2015: 34), which indicates a lack of transparency. It should be noted, however, that the report places a nuance respecting the actual scope of lobbying in the Netherlands, stating that
‘the fact that Netherlands scores quite low – though not excessively low when compared to
other European countries – is due to the lack of statutory regulations. These scores have no bearing on the factual lobbying activities that take place in the Netherlands’ (Scheltema Beduin
& Ter Weele, 2015: 66).
The ‘score’ refers to the report’s research, which examines a country’s lobbying sector with respect to its transparency, integrity and equality of access (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 66).
Secondly, the revolving door presents possibilities for conflict of interest. When moving from the public sector to the private sector, individuals can find themselves in a position where they are lobbying their former office concerning the policy they created while working for the government. Also the other way around, when former lobbyists become policymakers in sectors their former employer has high stakes in. This study wants to make clear that, despite the possibility of financial payoffs, a career switch from the private sector to the public sector does not automatically has to bring about unconscionable lobbying. But, as the Transparency
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‘The risks are however real and even the perception of impropriety may be damaging for public
trust in institutions’ (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 32).
Thirdly, there is relatively little empirical research on the scope of revolving door lobbying in general. LaPira and Thomas, for example, have important insights concerning the revolving door, but they argue that ‘what is missing, though, is sound empirical evidence about how
widespread the practice is, and how it affects interest representation in Washington’ (LaPira &
Thomas, 2014: 6).
This research, as well as a large part of the academic debate, focuses on the United States Congress. In the Netherlands, revolving door lobbying is even more under-exposed. Transparency International’s report claims that ‘Dutch society has little insight on who is
lobbying whom, with what means and to what end’ (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 5)
and that ‘the discussion on the desirability of lobbying or regulation of lobbying is often bogged
down in platitudes’ (Scheltema Beduin & Ter Weele, 2015: 5).
This thesis sets out to examine the extent of the revolving door in the Netherlands and to gain insight into whether it presents risks for the Dutch political system or not. I realize that focusing on the revolving door in the Netherlands limits the generalizability of the research, but I am convinced the relevance of the topic and the absence of sound empirical evidence in the academic debate validate the endeavor. As Thomas and LaPira state in their article:
‘If indeed the revolving door significantly distorts the representation of interests before
government, then we need to know more about how the already well represented seek entrance by hiring those who hold the right keys.’ (LaPira & Thomas, 2014: 25)
If we want to formulate an answer to the problems of the revolving door in the form of policy or increased transparency, we first have to know the size of the revolving door and to
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Methodology
I: Research Design
This thesis relies on a quantitative research design, using statistical analysis to answer the research question. The aim is to create a dataset that enables the analysis of the current status of the revolving door in the Netherlands. The analysis will aim at the movement of personnel from the public sector to the private sector, particularly focusing on positions in the corporate elite or lobbying sector. The dataset consists of career information of Dutch politicians.
Specifically, the personnel movement from the public to the private sector amongst members of the Dutch government and parliament over the course of five years. The government officially consists of the prime minister, the ministers, the state secretaries and the king. In this research, the king will be kept out of the sample, as the ‘employment’ of the king can hardly be measured to change. The parliament consists of the Senate (Eerste Kamer, or First Chamber) and the House of Representatives (Tweede kamer, or Second Chamber). The House of
Representatives is elected at least every four years through direct national elections. It is mainly engaged in day-to-day politics and consists of 150 full-time politicians (TI, 2015: 16). The Senate consists of 75 members, some of which hold other positions as well (TI, 2015: 16). The prime role of the Senate is revision of draft legislation.
The gathered career information of politicians will be from 2007 until 2012. This timeframe is set to include different political parties in government while still being feasible to research. If more recent data is used, the chance for missing data would increase at a certain point, due to possible ‘cooling-off periods’, before public servants can work as lobbyists.
The main tools to gather career information will be the online professional networking service ‘LinkedIn’ and the biographical database of the parliamentary documentation center of the University of Leiden. Networking is a useful tool for politicians as well as lobbyists, and LinkedIn is a socially accepted, easy-to-use networking tool. However, the use of LinkedIn is not
mandatory, which means missing data cannot be ruled out. The biographical database of the University of Leiden contains detailed information of both career information and personal data.
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II: Hypotheses
The theoretical framework generates a number of questions underscoring the research question concerning the revolving door in the Netherlands. To answer these questions, the analysis aims to confirm or reject two hypotheses. The relatively private nature of lobbying renders it difficult to research content or frequency of lobbying activities. However, this research aims to track revolving door lobbying by the movement of employment amongst politicians. The second hypothesis concerns the importance of a person’s policy expertise versus a person’s network.
Hypothesis A: Politicians who have worked in government are more likely to acquire corporate elite positions than politicians who have worked in parliament.
Hypothesis A concerns the use of a political career as a conduit for joining the ranks of the corporate elite. To examine this hypothesis, this study will look at the relationship between political careers and the position individuals acquire when they switch to the private sector. By researching hypothesis A, this thesis aims to gain insight into the question how much influence a specific position in government or parliament can have on a potential career in the private sector.
Hypothesis B: Politicians will acquire corporate positions more often in sectors fitting to their policy expertise than in sectors they have little experience with.
Hypothesis B involves the importance of a person’s policy expertise compared to a person’s network. This hypothesis examines the ‘what you know versus who you know’ question. To delve into this question, the politician’s background and policy expertise has to be compared to the career moves he or she makes.
Concerning the validity of the research, some difficulties have to be acknowledged. The importance of networking and lobbying cannot easily be measured. When researching the importance of a high profile position in government with respect to a future career in the
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private sector, one could argue that a prime minister has earned this position through competence, and therefore also has ‘earned’ a position in the corporate elite. This could be true, but does not take into account the prime minister’s lobbying and networking activities or possibilities.
III: Variables
The dataset consists of the career information of 512 individuals. The focus lies on their political career between 2007 and 2012, and their occupation directly before and after their political career in this timeframe. The research relies on 10 variables to map out the career moves of politicians in the Dutch political climate. I would like to emphasize that in this research the occupation directly before and after the political career is taken into account. If an individual, for example, works in management for a year directly following his or her political career, and then becomes a lobbyist afterwards, the research will not consider this individual a lobbyist. Even if this individual becomes a lobbyist for a longer period, and clearly makes this his or her main occupation. This is a disadvantage of this research, but the statistical method has to be strict. Otherwise, picking the career moves after political careers would become subjective, and cherry-picking data that is most favorable for the research is undesirable.
1. ‘Person’
This variable is simply the list of units of analyses, which in this research amounts to 512 individuals.
2. ‘Gender’
The second variable is the gender of the units of analyses, used to divide the research population in ‘male’ and ‘female’.
3. ‘Age’
The age of the units of analyses is measured at the time they make a career move after their political career between 2007 and 2012. In some cases, this will be the moment the politician
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switches to the private sector. If a politician does not switch to the private sector, but stays in politics instead, the measurement will be the moment they start their current position in politics.
4. ‘Type of Organization’
This variable indicates the type of organization a subject works for directly after their political career between 2007 and 2012. The values of this variable are 10 types of organizations. For example, a firm, a lobbyist organization or an NGO.
5. ‘Sector after political career’
This variable marks the sector a subject has worked in after their political career between 2007 and 2012. The 20 values of this variable are different sectors, which are used to generate an oversight of the varied sectors the politicians work in after their political careers.
6. ‘Function’
This variable indicates the function an individual occupies within an organization after their political career. The values range from a supportive position to an elite corporate position like CEO, director or board member.
7. ‘Political position’
This variable indicates the position of an individual within the political climate. The three values are ‘Government’, ‘House of Representatives’ and ‘Senate’. This division is useful to determine whether different positions in political careers can be linked to different career moves and possibilities.
8. ‘Political party’
This variable shows the subjects’ memberships of political parties. The values of this variable are the political parties in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2012.
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9. ‘Ministry’
This variable marks the ministries individuals have worked for, mostly in the case of politicians who have worked in government. The values are the eleven ministries in the Netherlands, in addition to an indication when an individual has not actively worked for a ministry.
10. ‘Sector before political career’
This variable specifies the sector the subject has worked in before their political career between 2007 and 2012. The values are similar to those of the ‘Sector after political career’, with the exception of the value ‘Retirement’, which is not added in this variable.
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Results
Hypothesis A
The data provides insight into the question whether a political career can serve as a conduit to acquire a corporate elite position. Also, the research checks if there are differences between careers after a position in government or a function within the Senate or the House of Representatives, in an attempt to confirm or reject the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis A: Politicians who have worked in the government are more likely to acquire corporate elite positions than politicians who have worked in parliament.
The hypothesis expects politicians who have worked in government to be more likely to acquire a corporate elite position when switching to the private sector. Compared to a position in parliament, a minister or a state secretary has increased responsibility. He or she has to be able to justify their acts by answering the parliament’s questions. A minister or state secretary also requires in-depth policy expertise regarding their ministry and portfolio. The experience with specific policy areas and dealing with sensitive issues and increased responsibility make politicians who have worked in government candidates for corporate elite positions. Also, working in government can enable an individual to establish a network of influential politicians. This is, for some corporate positions, seen as an important asset.
Firstly, this study looks at the positions subjects acquired after 2012. Although ‘management’ can be considered a relatively powerful position, this can differ greatly depending on the size and nature of organizations. The title ‘manager’ has a great range of meanings, depending on the division, team or section a manager is operating. Therefore, solely the value ‘Board/CEO’, containing board members, CEO’s and directors, will be considered a corporate elite position. Table 1 shows that 31,7% of the subjects did not switch from the public to the private sector after 2012, and remained in politics. The value ‘None’ mainly accounts for retirees, and the data shows that 20% of the entire sample of politicians gains a corporate elite position after their political career. 20% is quite a high percentage of politicians entering influential corporate
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Table 1: Positions within organizations subjects acquired after 2012
Position within organization Frequency Percentage
Supporting 61 11.9% Producing 11 2.2% Selling 1 0.2% External/PR 7 1.4% Lobbyist 13 2.5% Consultant 38 7.4% Management 53 10.4% Board/CEO 102 20.0% None 63 12.3% Politician 162 31.7% Total 511 100%
positions when switching sectors. This highlights the ease at which politicians can flow into the private sector. If we subtract the percentage of individuals that stay in politics and the ‘None’ value of mostly retirees, we are left with 56% that switches to the private side. Considering 20% of this 56% acquires an influential position, a political career seems like a strong career move in the long run.
By comparing the political careers of the 20% that gained a corporate elite position, the results show that there are differences between positions in government, the Senate or the House of Representatives. Of the politicians in the House of Representatives, 8% gain a corporate elite position and for members of the Senate this percentage is 23.6. For politicians who have served in government, however, 55.3% acquired a corporate elite position after their political career, which is significantly higher. It appears that serving as a minister or a state secretary greatly increases the chance to gain a powerful position within an organization in the private sector. The data seems to confirm the argument that serving in government comes with increased responsibility and policy expertise in comparison to serving parliament. A more substantial legislative role can partially explain the relatively high percentage of corporate elite positions amongst politicians who have served in government. To form an idea of the influence of experience, the variable ‘Age’ is used.
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Table 2: Positions in political climate compared to corporate elite positions acquired after 2012 Position within Political climate Not CEO/ Board member CEO/
Board member Total
Government 44.7% 55.3% 100%
House of Representatives 92% 8% 100%
Senate 76.4% 23.6% 100%
The age of an individual does not necessarily indicate more experience in politics, as a relatively old person could be in politics for a short amount of time. However, in general, one can assume that an older person has more professional experience than a younger person. In this case, the population is divided in three age groups, namely: under 35 years old, between 35 and 50 years old, and over 50 years old. Of the youngest age group only 2% acquires a corporate elite
position. The group containing the population between 35 and 50 years old has a rating of 14.5%, and the third group has a rating of 27%. This clearly indicates that the age of a person, as an indicator of experience, plays a large role in acquiring a corporate elite position as well. Now, if the politicians who served in government had a significantly higher percentage in the value 50< age cluster than the Senate and the House of Representatives, the relatively high percentage of corporate elite positions in government positions could partially be contributed to age. However, when comparing the three age clusters to positions in the political climate, the results show that this is not necessarily the case. Politicians in government do have a high percentage of individuals who are over 50 years old (67,1%), but this percentage is even higher for members of the Senate (78,1%). The gender of politicians does not seem to play a
significant role in the career paths. In this research, 21 percent of the male population gained a corporate elite position, whereas the female population scored slightly lower with 18.2 percent.
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As a result of these findings, hypothesis A can be confirmed. Politicians who have worked in government are more likely to acquire corporate elite positions in the private sector than politicians who have worked in parliament. Also, taking this a step further, another comparison strongly suggests that government is in many cases used as a conduit for corporate elite
positions. When comparing the position of subjects in the political climate and the sector they work in after 2012, the data show differences in the amount of politicians that stay into politics. Of the politicians in government, only 7.9 percent stays into politics or a semi-governmental function after 2012, whereas in the House of Representatives this is 50.4%. Of the politicians who have served in the Senate, 11.2% stay in politics. However, the low score amongst the third group can partially be explained because a large number of these subjects are serving in the Senate part-time, while serving in government or the House of Representatives is fulltime. Also, 78.1 percent of the politicians in the Senate are over 50 years old, whereas for the House of Representatives this is ‘only’ 35.8 percent. This could indicate that a relatively larger part of the politicians in the Senate are categorized as ‘retired’ when looking at the sectors worked in after 2012.
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Hypothesis B
To be able to confirm or reject the second hypothesis, this study has to examine whether subjects gain a position after their political career in the sector they have experience in or not. Naturally, a politician acquires experience and policy expertise in the field he works in before and during his or her political career. One would expect this to be the single most important factor to determine in what sector a politician starts working when he or she switches to the private sector. However, the debate concerning ‘what you know versus who you know’
suggests that there could be other factors playing a role in career choices of politicians. Namely, their network, which often comes with lobbying potential, which some organizations see as an important asset when attracting an ex-politician. Hypothesis B serves to examine which is more important: ‘Who you know or what you know’. If politicians acquire corporate positions more often in sectors they have experience with, this indicates that they are hired for their policy expertise. If politicians are often hired in corporate positions in sectors they do not have experience in, this indicates that they might be hired more for their network than their policy expertise. However, these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive.
Hypothesis B: Politicians will acquire corporate positions more often in sectors fitting to their policy expertise than in sectors they have little experience with.
To examine the premise of this hypothesis, a comparison of the specific positions of politicians during their political careers with the sectors they work in after their political careers is needed. In this research, the ministries the politicians worked for is used as an indicator of policy
expertise. The expectation is that politicians who have worked for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, for example, would be inclined to work in an economic sector. Table 3 shows the 5 ministries with the highest amount of politicians employed between 2007 and 2012 in this sample. The sectors have been divided over 7 groups, indicating sectors we would expect politicians who have worked for a certain ministry to switch to. For example, the value ‘economic sectors’ contains the sectors Finance, Accountancy, Banking, Transport, Industry, Energy and Unions’. The table shows that 66.7% of the politicians in this sample who worked
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for the Ministry of Economic Affairs started working in an economic sector when they switched to the private sector. This is the group of sectors with the highest score for the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as expected. For the Ministry of Education, the highest scores would be expected in governmental or semi-governmental positions (educational institutions) or social sectors. These are indeed the highest scores, with 50% in the government sector and 20% for social sectors. However, the group of sectors ‘semi-government/politics’ also includes the politicians who stayed in politics and did not switch to the private sector. With that in mind, this group of sectors could be considered surprisingly low, as semi-government covers a large part of educational institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the highest scores in
Government, followed by semi-government/politics. These results are not unexpected, just like the high percentages in Government and Science/Environment/Law of the Ministry of
Infrastructure and Environment. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom relations has the highest percentages in semi-governmental sectors and consultancy, which indicates a relatively high number of consultants and lobbyists among politicians who have worked for this ministry in government.
The results of this table, however, are only the politicians who have served in government and worked for a ministry. This means this comparison does not reflect the entire population, and therefore it is hard to draw conclusions of significance from this table. The table shows that the sectors the politicians switch to generally follow the line of expectation, but it is not enough to reject or confirm the hypothesis for the entire population.
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Table 3: Ministries politicians worked for during their political career compared to sector groups they worked in after 2012
Another way to test whether politicians work in sectors they have experience with after their political career is to compare the sector before their political career with the sector after their political career. In table 4 the percentages of individuals who started working in the same sector after 2012 as in the sector they worked before their political career are shown. The group of sectors called ‘semi-government/politics’ has the highest percentages for every
comparison of sector groups. This is because this includes the subjects who do not switch to the private sector, but stay in politics. In the first column the results show that 16.7% of the
politicians who worked in an economic sector before their political career, started working in an economic sector after 2012 as well. This is the third highest, after semi government/politics (33.3%) and government (19%). For social sectors, this is even lower, as 9.1% of the politicians who have worked in social sectors work in social sectors after their political career. For the sector groups ‘government’ (29,7%), ‘Science, Environment, Law’ (21.5%) and ‘Consulting’ (25%) these percentages are considerably higher. The average percentage of these 5 sector groups of subjects that return to the sector they have worked in before their political career is
Ministries Economic Sectors Social Sector Government /Politics Science/ Environment/ Law
Retired Consultancy Semigovern ment/ politics Ministry of Economic Affairs 66.7% 0% 0% 11.1% 0% 0% 22.2% Ministry of Education 10% 20% 50% 0% 0% 10% 10% Ministry of Foreign Affairs 14.3% 7.1% 35.7% 7.1% 0% 14.3% 21.4% Ministry of Infrastructure And Environment 15,4% 0% 38.5% 23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 0%
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom relations
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20.51. The average percentage of these 5 sector groups of individuals that stay in
semi-governmental functions or in politics is 36,462. However, there is no significant statistical
correlation between the two variables. Hypothesis B has to be rejected, because the data does not prove a significant correlation between the two variables. This means that the sector the subjects of this research worked in before their political career between 2007 and 2012 has no significant impact on the sector they work in after 2012. This, in turn, indicates that the policy expertise gained in the sector before a political career plays a smaller role in career moves after a political career than one might think. The question remains which factors do determine the career moves after the political career between 2007 and 2012. Based on the theory, the relatively low influence of policy expertise in acquiring a corporate elite position indicates a high influence of extended networks and lobbying potential. However, to prove this, this study has to examine the impact of our relevant variables.
1 16.7 + 9.1 + 29.7 + 21.5 + 25: 5 = 20.5 2 33,3 + 41.8 + 35.1 + 29.9 + 42.2: 5 = 36,46
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Table 4: Sector groups politicians worked in before their political careers compared to sector groups they worked in after 2012
Sector groups worked in after 2012 Economic Sectors Social Sector Government Science/ Environment/ Law
Retired Consultancy Semigovern ment/ politics
Total
Sector groups worked in before political career Economic Sectors 16.7% 4.8% 19.0% 2.4% 11.9% 11.9% 33.3% 100% Social Sectors 12.7% 9.1% 12.7% 7.3% 9.1% 7.3% 41.8% 100% Government 9.7% 4.9% 29.7% 2.2% 13% 5.4% 35.1% 100% Science/Environment/ Law 7.5% 2.8% 13.1% 21.5% 18.7% 6.5% 29.9% 100% Consultancy 4.7% 6.3% 10.9% 4.7% 6.3% 25% 42.2% 100% Semi government/ Politics 0% 12.5% 31.3% 6.3% 0% 6.3% 43.8% 100%
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Revolving door lobbying
Examining the correlation of lobbyist and corporate elite positions
The statistics show that 10% of the subjects of this research become consultants or lobbyists after their political career between 2007 and 2012. This is the third biggest sector in this sample, after staying in politics or semi-governmental functions, working for government, or retiring. When comparing this to the sector subjects worked in before their political career, the sector ‘consultancy’, which entails consultants and lobbyists, is 12,5%. At first sight, these results suggest that less politicians enter the consultancy sector after their political career, and that in this case the revolving door lowers the amount of lobbyists. However, the sector
‘consultancy’ consists of registered lobbyists and consultants, whereas the amount of active lobbyists might not simply be measured by counting registered lobbyists. Lobbying activities are not the exclusive preserve of registered lobbyists. I am not arguing that every ex-politician in a powerful position in the private sector is lobbying, but a powerful position within an
organization could mean increased potential for lobbying activities. There are several variables to look at when trying to explain the number of lobbyists in the population of this research. In this case, the research compares the variables that influence the career paths leading to
lobbyist and consultant positions, and corporate elite positions. In other words, if the factors of importance for becoming a lobbyist are the same as factors of importance for gaining a
corporate elite position, similarities between the circumstances needed for becoming a lobbyist or entering the corporate elite might prove a link between the importance of a network and corporate elite positions. Firstly, descriptive statistics are used in the form of crosstabs to examine this link.
Gender
Amongst the entire population of this research, the percentage of individuals that become lobbyist or consultant after 2012 is 11.1 for males and 8 for females. The gender of subjects does not have a significant influence on becoming a lobbyist or consultant. For individuals that become CEO or board member after 2012, the percentage for males is 21 and the percentage for females is 18.2. Consequently, gender does not play a significant role in entering the
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corporate elite after political careers either. As a side note to this information, when comparing gender to sectors subjects work in after their political careers, the data shows that economic sectors have a slightly higher percentage for males, while social sectors have a slightly higher percentage for females.
Age
When trying to measure the impact of experience on lobbying and corporate elite positions, variables will have to be used as indicators of experience. By examining hypothesis A, the results show that age plays a significant role when acquiring a corporate elite position. When comparing the three age clusters to individuals who become lobbyists or consultants after 2012, the data show that there are no significant differences between individuals between the ages 35-50 and the ages over 50(Table 5). The value ‘under 35’ is extremely low for both lobbyists as corporate elite positions, because this sample contains little to none examples of individuals who become lobbyist or CEO after a political career while still under the age of 35. Thus, experience plays a role of importance for acquiring a corporate elite position, but not for becoming a lobbyist after a political career.
Table 5: Age clusters compared to Lobbyist/Consultant positions and corporate elite positions
Age in ordinal groups Not a Lobbyist
Lobbyist Total Not CEO/Board CEO/Board Total
Age under 35 96% 4% 100% 98% 2% 100%
Age between 35-50 89.2% 10.8% 100% 85.5% 14.5% 100%
Age over 50 89.4% 10.6% 100% 73% 27% 100%
Sectors worked in before political career
Another variable used to compare lobbying and corporate elite positions is the sector
individuals have worked in before their political careers. This variable is used to see if lobbyists and CEO’s, board members and directors generally come from the same sectors. The
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certain sector, a person’s network might be an important asset for this sector. If this study is able to prove that lobbyists and the corporate elite mostly come from the same sector, lobbying activities or an individual network can be considered as increasingly important. In Table 6, the sector groups are compared to lobbyist and corporate elite positions acquired after 2012. Contrary to what one would expect, Table 6 shows that the sector groups with the
Table 6: Sector groups politicians worked in before their political career compared to lobbyist/consultant positions and corporate elite positions
Sectors worked in before political career
Not Lobbyist/ consultant
Lobbyist/ Consultant
total Not CEO/ board member CEO/board member Total Economic Sectors 88.1% 11.9% 100% 81% 19% 100% Social Sectors 90.9% 9.1% 100% 72.7% 27.3% 100% Government 96.2% 3.8% 100% 77.8% 22.2% 100% Science/Environment/ Law 83.2% 16.8% 100% 82.2% 17.8% 100% Consultancy 85.9% 14.1% 100% 84.4% 15.6% 100% Semi-government/ politics 87.5% 12.5% 100% 93.8% 6.3% 100%
highest percentages are different for lobbyists and corporate elite positions. ‘Consultancy’ (14.1%) and Science/Environment/Law’ (16.8) are the sector groups with the highest
percentages of individuals that became lobbyists after their political careers. ‘Social Sectors’ (27.3%) and ‘Government’ (22.2%) are the sector groups with the highest percentages of individuals that acquired a corporate elite position after their political career. In fact, the two sector groups with the highest percentages for corporate elite positions have the lowest percentages for lobbyists. Concerning the sectors individuals work in before their political career, the data does not prove any significant similarities between lobbying positions or corporate elite positions. These results go against the theory that similar circumstances, in this case the sector one has worked in, lead to lobbyist positions and corporate elite positions. Table 6 also shows that the sector ‘Consultancy’ does not have the highest percentage of
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percentage (16.8). This, however, can partially explained when comparing the sectors individuals work in after their political career with the position they acquire within an
organization. Some of the politicians that switch to the consultancy sector after 2012 become CEO because they start their own consultancy or lobbyist firm. These founders appear as a corporate elite position in the statistics, while they are lobbyists or consultants in practice. Therefore, in reality, there might be slightly more lobbyists and consultants in relation to corporate elite positions in the consultancy sector.
Position in political climate
The importance of a political career in government, the House of Representatives or the Senate, in respect to a corporate elite position became clear with the results of hypothesis A. When comparing these results to the relation between lobbyists positions and the political career, differences are noticeable. Table 7 shows that there is no significant difference between a position in government, the House of Representatives or the Senate and a lobbyist or
consultant position after 2012. Moreover, politicians who have been ministers or state-secretaries are slightly less likely to become registered lobbyists or consultants after their political career than politicians who were members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. In case of the government, the lower number of lobbyists can partly be explained by the significantly higher number of corporate elite positions among politicians who have worked in government.
Table 7: Positions in political climate during political careers compared to lobbyist/consultant positions and corporate elite positions
Position in Political climate
Not Lobbyist
Lobbyist Total Not CEO/ Board member CEO/ Board member Total Government 92,1% 7.9% 100% 44.7% 55.3% 100% House of Representatives 91.2% 8.8% 100% 92% 8% 100% Senate 87% 13% 100% 76.4% 23.6% 100%
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What is being examined here are possible similarities between lobbyist and corporate elite positions. However, as Table 7 shows, the impact of the position in the political climate during on corporate elite positions is contrary to the impact it has on lobbyist and consultancy positions.
Political affiliation
The last potential similarity between lobbyist and corporate elite positions examined here is political affiliation. The values of the variable ‘Political Party’ are used to indicate political affiliation. The variable consists of all the political parties in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2012. These parties are then divided in three groups: left-wing parties, centered parties and right-wing parties. Political affiliation has a significant correlation with both lobbyist and corporate elite positions. However, we want to know if the correlation is similar for both positions. Table 8 shows the percentages of left-wing, centered, and right-wing politicians that become lobbyists or acquire corporate elite positions. If they are compared in ascending order, the data show that lobbyist and corporate elite positions have the same order. Most positions come from centered parties and least positions come from right-wing parties. However, the gaps between these percentages are different for both positions. For lobbyist positions, the outlier is the percentage of right-wing affiliated politicians, which is significantly lower than left-wing and centered parties. The percentages of left-left-wing parties and centered parties that become lobbyists or consultants after 2012, however, differ only 0.3%. For corporate elite positions
Table 8: Political affiliation compared to lobbyist/consultant positions and corporate elite positions
Political affiliation Not Lobbyist Lobbyist Total Not CEO/ Board member CEO/ Board member Total Left-wing parties 88.1% 11.9% 100% 83.7% 16.3% 100% Centered parties 87.8% 12.2% 100% 72.7% 27.3% 100% Right-wing parties 95.6% 4.4% 100% 83.9% 16.1% 100%
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the percentage of centered parties is the outlier. 27.3% of politicians affiliated with a centered party acquire a corporate elite positions, while the left-wing and right-wing parties have
significantly lower percentages. Again, the percentages of the other two values differ little, only 0.2%. Centered parties have the highest percentage and right-wing parties the lowest
percentage for both positions. However, the corporate elite positions have significantly higher percentages overall, and the outliers differ too strongly to be able to speak of a similar
influence of political affiliation on lobbyist and corporate elite positions.
The consultancy sector in this research consists of registered lobbyists and consultants.
However, the large amount of ex-politicians in elite corporate positions suggests a potential of lobbying that is neglected in the statistics. In theory, these ex-politicians have a motive for lobbying activities because of their important positions in the private sector. Also, their network enables them to engage in lobbying activities with former colleagues. However, when
comparing the variables in this research to lobbying positions and corporate elite positions, a significant connection cannot be proved. The similarities between circumstances leading to lobbyist positions or corporate elite positions are either absent or too small. To examine the significance in detail and enable us to generate conclusive results, a regression analysis is needed.
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Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after careers in
government, the Senate and the House of Representatives
The regression analysis executed here examines the impact of the position in the Dutch political climate, age, political affiliation and sectors worked in before political careers on acquiring a lobbyist or corporate elite position. Table 9 shows the results of this analysis. The models of this analysis assume both lobbyist positions as corporate elite positions as positions with ‘lobbying potential’. Model 1 explores the impact of the variables on corporate elite positions (marked as ‘CEO’) and lobbyist positions combined. Model 2 probes the results for lobbyist positions alone, and model 3 does so for corporate elite positions. The first value of each variable is the
reference value (ref.). The coefficient of a value displays the relation of this value to the reference value. For example, in Model 1, the House of Representatives has e coefficient of -0.443, which means individuals who were member of the House of Representatives are 44.3% less likely to acquire a lobbyist or corporate elite position than individuals who have served in government, which is highly statistically significant. Members of the Senate, with a coefficient of -0.291, also acquire significantly less lobbyist and corporate elite positions than former members of government. Model 2 and 3 display the values of the position in the political climate for lobbyist positions and corporate elite positions separately. The data show that a position in government, the House of Representatives or the Senate is insignificant for future lobbyist positions and highly significant for corporate elite positions. Apparently, it doesn’t matter much what position you had in the political climate if you want to become a lobbyist after your career, which is surprising. However, if you want to enter the corporate elite after a political career, a former position in government appears to be crucially important.
The variable age has different correlation with lobbyist positions and corporate elite positions. Whereas for lobbyist positions most individuals are between 35 and 50 years old, for corporate elite positions the largest group is over 50 years old. For corporate elite positions, the results of an upward trend are as expected, although the P value of CEO’s over 50 years old (0.077) is not
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Table 9: Regression analysis of the influence of the position in political climate, age, political affiliation and sectors worked in before political career on lobbyists and corporate elite positions Model 1 CEO+Lobbyists Model 2 Lobbyist Model 3 CEO
Variables Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Government
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
House of Representatives
-0.443*** 0.057 0.001 0.040 -0.443*** 0.049
Senate -0.291*** 0.061 0.025 0.042 -0.316*** 0.052
Age <35 (Ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Age 35-50 0.123 0.068 0.070 0.047 0.053 0.059
Age 50< 0.165* 0.049 0.058 0.049 0.106 0.060
Right wing party
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Left wing party 0.109* 0.047 0.080* 0.033 0.029 0.041 Centered party 0.155** 0.049 0.075* 0.034 0.079 0.042 Government
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Economic Sectors 0.077 0.056 0.074 0.039 0.003 0.048 Social Sectors 0.133* 0.065 0.042 0.045 0.090 0.056 Science/ Environment/Law 0.092 0.052 0.118** 0.036 -0.025 0.045 Consultancy 0.098 0.062 0.107* 0.043 -0.009 0.053 Semi-government /Politics 0.085 0.112 0.090 0.078 -0.005 0.097 Observations 510 510 510 R² 0.1725 0.0508 0.1890 * = P < 0.05 ** = P < 0.01 *** = P < 0.001
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significant when using a border of 0.05. The value political affiliation is divided into left-wing parties, centered parties and right-wing parties, with right-wing parties as the reference in this analysis. Surprisingly, the data demonstrate that both left-wing parties and centered parties generate more lobbyists and corporate elite positions than right-wing parties. Model 2 shows that compared to right-wing parties, both left-wing parties and centered parties produce significantly more individuals in lobbyist positions. This is surprising, as right-wing parties are predominantly considered liberal parties. Historically, liberal parties have always been
champions of free-trade and civil liberties. Also, traditionally, liberal parties have had support from sectors like the banking sector, journalism and entrepreneurs. Economic sectors and the media are thought to be highly sensitive to lobbying. Therefore, one would not expect liberal politicians to be least inclined to become lobbyists.
When looking at the sectors the individuals have worked in before their political career, we see that there are two sectors that produce a significantly high amount of lobbyists compared to the sector ‘government’. For the sector ‘Consultancy’ (0.107*) this is not unanticipated, as people who have worked in consultancy have worked as or experienced lobbyists and consultants. Logically, these individuals are more likely to return to the sector they have experience with when they switch to the private sector. For the sector group
‘Science/Environment/Law’, however, the table shows an even higher level of significance (0.118**), which is somewhat surprising. There are possible explanations for the relatively high amount of lobbyists that have worked in these sectors. Possibly, it can be explained by the environment sector. The environment sector can be considered prone to lobbying due to the high amount of lobbyist organizations and activist NGO’s. Another explanation could be the ‘Science’ sector. Long periods of research in specific areas creates specialist knowledge. A specialist position can enable one to become a consultant. Therefore, employment in the sector ‘Science’ could also indirectly explain a relatively high amount of lobbyists coming from this sector group, as lobbyists or consultants would be contracted for their specialist knowledge or skills acquired through a research position.
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Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after careers in the
Senate and the House of Representatives
Between 2007 and 2012, the Netherlands had governments consisting of different parties. In February 2007, ‘Balkenende IV’ was appointed, which consisted of Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), The Labour Party (PvdA) and the ChristianUnion (CU). From October 2010 until April 2012, the government consisted of the Christian Democratic Appeal and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). These political parties are unevenly divided into left-wing, centered and right-wing parties. Because the difference between a position in government, the Senate or the House of Representatives is important for this research, the composition of the government could have a disproportionate impact on the results. Therefore, the influence of the variables of this study are analyzed for the Senate and the House of Representatives,
without government. To prevent disproportionate statistics because of the composition of
government, this research checks if the results are similar when leaving out government positions. In the next chapter, the results will be checked when leaving out the Senate as well, examining solely the House of Representatives.
Table 10 shows the results of the analysis of the variables used. Again, in this table, the politicians that served in government are left out of the analysis. The data shows that for lobbyist positions, there is little difference between a former position in the Senate or the House of Representatives. For corporate elite positions, however, a career in the Senate
increases the chance for a corporate elite position significantly (0.131**). This can be explained by various reasons. First of all, in many cases a position in the Senate is part-time, enabling members to have a career besides serving in the Senate. This could increase the chances of acquiring a corporate elite position, as members of the Senate can already be involved in the sectors they switch to when fully switching to the private sector. Secondly, the results
demonstrate that age (as an indicator of experience) has a significant impact on the chance to acquire a corporate elite position. 78.1% of the members of the Senate fall in the age category
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Table 10: Regression analysis of the influence of a position in the Senate or the House of Representatives, age, political affiliation and sectors worked in before political career on lobbyists and corporate elite positions
Model 1 CEO+Lobbyists Model 2 Lobbyist Model 3 CEO
Variables Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
House of Representatives
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Senate 0.170*** 0.046 0.039 0.033 0.131** 0.037
Age <35 (Ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Age 35-50 0.151* 0.067 0.080 0.049 0.070 0.055
Age 50< 0.140* 0.069 0.046 0.050 0.094 0.056
Right wing party
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Left wing party 0.135** 0.050 0.079* 0.036 0.055 0.041 Centered party 0.144** 0.053 0.060 0.038 0.084 0.043 Government
(Ref.)
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Economic Sectors 0.082 0.059 0.089* 0.044 -0.007 0.049 Social Sectors 0.128 0.067 0.046 0.049 0.082 0.055 Science/ Environment/Law 0.090 0.055 0.088* 0.040 0.001 0.045 Consultancy 0.114 0.064 0.096* 0.047 0.017 0.053 Semi-government /Politics 0.075 0.110 0.082 0.080 -0.006 0.090 Observations 434 434 434 R² 0.1011 0.0438 0.0729 * = P < 0.05 ** = P < 0.01 *** = P < 0.001
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of ‘over 50 years old’, whereas for the House of Representatives this percentage is 35.8. The age difference could indirectly explain the increased percentage of corporate elite positions among former members of the Senate compared to the House of Representatives as well. However, as an upward trend in importance of age for acquiring a corporate elite position is visible, the value here falls short of statistical significance with the borders used for P-values in this research.
Another interesting trend can be seen in the impact of political affiliation on acquiring lobbyist or corporate elite positions. Right-wing parties still produce the lowest percentage of lobbyists when leaving out the government value. Interestingly, the value of centered parties producing CEO’s is on the verge of statistical significance (P = 0.053). The lowest border of statistical significance used here is ‘P < 0.05’. Statistical significance cannot be claimed, but the trend suggests that politicians affiliated with the middle of the political spectrum are more likely to acquire a corporate elite position. Possibly, the cause of this trend could be explained by looking at the nature of politicians affiliated with the middle of the political spectrum. An ideology inclined more towards compromises and pragmatism could be a reason for these politicians to be more suitable for corporate elite positions.
Finally, by leaving out the politicians who have worked in government, the results show that economic sectors now produce significantly more lobbyists than politicians who have worked in the sector government before their political career. This difference is rather difficult to explain. The statistical results lead us to conclude that the government contained politicians less
inclined to work in economic sectors than the parliament. Possibly, the composition of government between 2007 and 2012 led to less members of government entering economic sectors as lobbyists. This could explain economic sectors producing a significant amount of lobbyists when former members of government are left out of the equation, whereas the amount of lobbyists coming from economic sectors was not significant when taking into account former members of government.
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Regression analysis of lobbyist and corporate elite positions after careers in the
House of Representatives
The final regression focuses on the members of the House of Representatives. To check for the differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives, the results of Table 11 are compared with those of Table 10.
The influence of the age groups on the chances of members of the House of Representatives gaining lobbyist positions or corporate elite positions holds no surprises. Table 11 shows that the value ‘over 50 years old’ does increase the chance to acquire a corporate elite position significantly. For Lobbyist positions, however, there appears to be no difference between the values ‘between 35 and 50 years old’ and ‘over 50 years old’.
Considering political affiliation, Table 11 shows that in the House of Representatives centered parties produce a significantly higher amount of lobbyists compared to right-wing parties. This could be caused by the composition of the parliament and the government in this timeframe. A different explanation could be ideological differences. However, as explained earlier, right-wing parties would be expected to be more inclined to become lobbyists due to their political values. Nonetheless, the image of politicians affiliated with the middle spectrum as ‘bridge builders’ and pragmatist could help in forming a trustworthy reputation as consultant.
Regarding the sectors in which the members of the House of Representatives worked before their political careers, this seems to have no significant impact on acquiring a corporate elite position. Considering the impact on lobbyist position, however, the data shows that economic sectors have a stronger significant impact compared to the government sector and that the ‘consultancy’ value and ‘Science/Environment/Law’ value are no longer significant. Perhaps this can partly be explained by the lower number of lobbyists overall in the House of
