Hegel's Conception of Substance

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Hegel’s Conception

of Substance

Faculty: Humanities

Course: Research Master Philosophy

Name: Jaap Embregts

Student number: 11155574

Email address: jaap.embregts@student.uva.nl

Supervisor(s): Prof. Dr. P. Cobben (1

st

_{), Dr. Jacques Bos (2}

nd

₎

Date of completion: 13/08/2017

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Before you lies a work that could be considered the fruits of a labor, which encompasses my entire philosophical development up to this point. Already in the first year of my Bachelor’s study, systematic philosophy in general, and more specifically the systematic philosophies of Kant and Hegel, drew my attention. Hegel’s works have always been an object of glorification and of vilification. And although there does not seem to be a middle way, I can relate to both views. The vilification probably has to do with the notorious difficulty of his philosophical writings. The Phenomenology of

Spirit (1807), the subject matter of this research master’s thesis, forms no exception1_{. However, I}

hope to be able to demonstrate, that if one is willing to make the effort, the Phenomenology of Spirit is an extremely rich and rewarding work. It is extremely rich and rewarding because Hegel conceives of his philosophical standpoint, not simply as the negation of previous philosophical positions, rather he explicates it as their result. He invites us readers, to critically engage ourselves with the entire tradition of Western philosophy, and in that sense, his conception of philosophy is essentially

dialogical. The Phenomenology

of Spirit is concerned with the age-old question of Truth, and as such, it is first and foremost an

epistemological project. Can we know reality as it Truly is? In the tradition of Western philosophy, there are two major epistemological perspectives that have dominated this debate; empiricism and rationalism. The first two chapters of the Phenomenology, Consciousness and Self-consciousness, respectively represent Hegel’s reception of the empiricist and the rationalist tradition. Of course, Hegel would not be Hegel if he did not explicate the internal unity between these distinct positions. In that sense, he has a predecessor in Kant. However, our exposition will show that Hegel is in fact rather critical of Kant’s undertaking. The aim of this research is to analyze the Consciousness and the Self-consciousness chapter by means of a close-reading, and therefore by consequently referring to the primary text as their main source. The Phenomenology of Spirit should be assessed in terms of its supposed immanent and logical necessity. A lot of the secondary literature, except for a few

important commentators, strikes me as too hermeneutical; the logical structure of the work is, for the most part, neglected. I have therefore primarily focused my attention on explicating this logical structure, which requires a tremendous amount of effort, instead of providing a systematical exposition of the secondary literature, although I will, of course, comment, on what I think, are the most important interpreters. It is my thesis, that these first two chapters already contain, albeit in a particular form, the entirety of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Furthermore, I hope that the labor that 1 I will refer to the Meiner edition of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1996), and will not be making use of translations. For one, every translation already reflects an interpretation. And secondly, in my opinion, the English translations are not accurate enough. They would therefore needlessly complicate matters. Someone once told me, Hegel is not difficult because of his extraordinary use of the German language, but because it is Hegel. I agree.

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went into writing this master’ thesis, will have served as a thorough preparation for writing a (possible) dissertation.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT Preliminary remark

Because of the nature of the investigation that is to follow, a preliminary remark must be made. In paragraph 1 and 2 it is my intention to lay bare the goal (§1), namely the attainment of Truth, but also the methodology (§2) of the Phenomenology of Spirit. For both purposes, an introduction to Hegel, is complicated by the fact that a formal indication of truth, but also of the methodology for attaining it, is difficult, if not impossible. What truth is, and even the methodology for reaching it, must be developed and justified in the course of the project itself. We cannot immediately claim truth, for we are not in possession of Divine knowledge. And since the methodology must express truth as its content, it cannot be applied as a form that is external to the content that it must demonstrate. Rather, the form of the methodology must allow for expressing truth as truth, i.e. the content as it is

in-itself. On the other hand, we cannot do without an introduction, for we must at least anticipate

what lays ahead, if we are to fully understand it. It is therefore preferable to start off with a formal introduction, even though it can only be vindicated by thoroughly analyzing the content of the project itself (chapter 2 and 3). I must therefore ask the reader for some patience.

§1: On the question of Truth

In the first sentence of the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel refers to the subject proper of all philosophy, as the actual knowledge of what Truly is (das wirkliche Erkennen, dessen,

was in Wahrheit ist, PdG, 57). Philosophy is thus the search for truth. Posed as a question, this remark

allows us to reformulate the question of truth in the following manner, whilst at the same time defining it: is it possible for us to know that which Truly is? That which Truly is, is Absolute, i.e. it exists unconditionally, independently of our specific point of view. In that case, also the knowledge of that which Truly is, must be Absolute: ‘‘Diese Konsequenz ergibt sich daraus, daß das Absolute allein wahr, oder das Wahre allein absolut ist‘’ (PdG, 59). Therefore, the question of truth entails the question of

the possibility of Absolute knowledge. The question

of truth, or the possibility for-us to know that which Truly is, hides a fundamental presupposition, we might even say contradiction. For this question presupposes our finitude: we are related to

otherness by means of the receptivity of the senses, i.e. we are related to an externally given

content2_{. This mediation seems to make knowledge only a subjective point of view. How then, would}

2 The question of truth would be meaningless for a Divine intellect, since it would not relate to otherness in the strict sense (to an externally given content). In Kantian terms, we are not in possession of an intellectual intuition that would spontaneously bring forth what it thinks, thereby immediately knowing (intuiting) its own content as a mental content (it can ‘perceive’ unity). Kant (1974) p. 92. ‘’Wir könnten uns wohl eine

unmittelbare (direkte) Vorstellungsart eines Gegenstandes denken, die nicht nach Sinnlichkeitsbedingungen, also durch den Verstand die Objekte anschaut‘‘.

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it be possible for-us to know this otherness as such, or as it is in-itself3_{? Posed in this manner, the} question of truth leads to an immediate contradiction which underlies the whole of the

Phenomenology of Spirit, and which constitutes its driving force; we want identify otherness as it is in-itself, but we are only able to know otherness in as far as we relate to otherness in a specific way,

by which we do not know a thing-in-itself. It seems that if we want to be able to identify otherness as such, otherness must at the same time be sameness. Hegel however, does not want to accept this apparent contradiction beforehand, rather he wants to explicate the conditions necessary for resolving it. Throughout the Phenomenology, up and until the last chapter, the solution to this problem remains an open question. Perhaps, there is not even a thing-in-itself of which we speak; reality could well be mere chaos. Therefore, even the question of truth itself can only be legitimized retrospectively, when we prove that it even makes sense to speak of a reality in the first place. However, the idea of a thing-in-itself, is a necessary presupposition when considering the possibility of true knowledge; for something can only be known as such if it remains equal to itself, i.e. if it allows for identification. Pure manifoldness/pure un-relatedness, or chaos, cannot be known for it cannot be identified. This is the first condition for the possibility of Absolute knowledge. We may therefore rephrase the question of truth accordingly: are we as finite beings able to know substance?

The introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit is, for the most part, a discussion with Kant, who denied the possibility for finite beings to know a thing-in-itself, because we do not have an intellectual intuition (see note 3). Kant distinguishes our specific form of sensibility, which is

receptive, although mediated and conditioned by the a-priori forms of time and space, from that of a

Divine intellect. The receptivity of our senses implies a relationship towards otherness. Otherness appears as that which is distinct from me. That which is distinct from me must also be manifoldness, or difference. For if otherness would immediately allow for identification, it would not be otherness, but sameness. Again, this kind of knowing would presuppose an intellectual intuition. For us finite beings, otherness must necessarily take on the form of manifoldness. According to Kant, the identification of this manifoldness relies on the a-priori given concepts of our understanding, which

constitute the object. This constituted unity must be distinguished from the unity of the

thing-in-itself. But suppose this was true, suppose that our mind were to be structured in-and-for-itself, than our identification of otherness, and hence truth, would remain tied to a subjective perspective, which is distinct from knowledge of the thing-in-itself (e.g. from Divine knowledge). Hegel criticizes this conception of truth, because it is self-contradictory; truth cannot be relative and absolute at the

3 PdG, 57. ‘’Diese Besorgnis muß sich wohl sogar in die Überzeugung verwandeln, daß das ganze Beginnen, dasjenige, was An-sich ist, durch das Erkennen dem Bewußtsein zu erwerben, in seinem Begriffe widersinnig sei, und zwischen das Erkennen und das Absolute eine sie schlechthin scheidende Grenze falle.‘’

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same time4_{. Or put differently, truth cannot exist in manifold. It makes no sense to speak of ‘our’} knowledge, or ‘our’ truth, whilst at the same time separating this knowledge from Absolute

knowledge, or Absolute truth. True knowledge is Absolute knowledge5_. _This

critique of Kantianism however, does reveal two more positive conditions for the possibility of Absolute knowledge. First of all, if the notion of Absolute knowledge has any meaning, we cannot be

separated from the Absolute, or from that which Truly is (the thing-in-itself). The confusion inherent

in the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself is that we are both absolutely separated from it, and related to it, at the same time. We relate to it because of the receptivity of our senses, i.e. we are sensuously affected by otherness, or by some kind of objectivity. Yet, for-us, this otherness appears as

manifoldness. The unity required for the identification of this objectivity is therefore a subjective

unity (albeit with an objective, a-priori, and ontological signification) that must be distinguished from the unity of objectivity in-itself. Kant therefore posits that we are absolutely separated from this otherness as it is in-itself, and consequently that we cannot know it. However, this positing of the thing-in-itself is ambiguous, for it cannot be understood without the act of positing, and so it seems that even in this absolute separation, we are still related to it. This is contradictory: we are necessarily related to the thing-in-itself as sensually affected beings, yet this relation is, at the same time, posed as an absolute distinction (which is contradictory in itself). Hegel wants to resolve this contradiction right from the beginning. If true knowledge is to be possible, i.e. if it is possible for-us to know substance, than we must already partake in the Absolute throughout, for if we were to be distinguished from it, the Absolute would not be Absolute. Otherwise, the question of truth itself would lose all meaning6_{. This means that Hegel rejects the separation between the priori and the}

a-posteriori beforehand. His project therefore differs from the Kantian project from the get-go. He wants to explicate the conditions necessary for something to be identified and known as a thing-in-itself. We will refer to this as the second, and objective conditio sine qua non for the possibility of Absolute knowledge. The question, if it is possible for-us finite beings to know substance, can thus be 4 PdG, 57. ‘’Denn ist das Erkennen das Werkzeug, sich des absoluten Wesens zu bemächtigen, so fällt sogleich auf, daß die Anwendung eines Werkzeugs auf eine Sache sie vielmehr nicht läßt, wie sie für sich ist, sondern eine Formierung und Veränderung mit ihr vornimmt. Oder ist das Erkennen nicht Werkzeug unserer Tätigkeit, sondern gewissermaßen ein passives Medium, durch welches hindurch das Licht der Wahrheit an uns gelangt, so erhalten wir auch so sie nicht, wie sie an sich, sondern wie sie durch und in diesem Medium ist.‘’

5 PdG, 59. ‘’Diese Konsequenz ergibt sich daraus, daß das Absolute allein wahr, oder das Wahre allein absolut ist. Sie kann abgelehnt werden, durch den Unterschied, daß ein Erkennen, welches zwar nicht, wie die Wissenschaft will, das Absolute erkennt, doch auch wahr; und das Erkennen überhaupt, wenn es dasselbe zu fassen zwar unfähig sei, doch anderer Wahrheit fähig sein könne. Aber wir sehen nachgerade, daß solches Hinundherreden auf einen trüben Unterschied zwischen einem absoluten Wahren und einem sonstigen Wahren hinausläuft, und das Absolute, das Erkennen, und so fort, Worte sind, welche eine Bedeutung voraussetzen, um die zu erlangen es erst zu tun ist.‘’

6 The question of truth therefore presupposes a strange kind of circularity; the totality is in some sense the presupposition of this question, but it should also be the result. The Absolute is not something that we as philosophers have to construct, rather, if the Absolute has any meaning, philosophy must be regarded as a

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specified accordingly: under what conditions can we identify a thing-in-itself? The third important condition that is inseparable from the second, is that we need to be able to conceive of an open relationship towards otherness. If the mind were to be structured in-and-for-itself, we would be incapable of knowing otherness as it is in-itself, i.e. in its own nature as otherness. We will refer to this condition as the subjective conditio sine qua non for the possibility of Absolute knowledge. The question of identification presupposes the explication of the conditions necessary for conceiving of

an open relationship towards otherness7_. _{At first, Hegel seems}

to agree with Kant that it seems natural to suppose that, before philosophy enters upon its subject proper –namely, the actual knowledge of what Truly is, it is necessary to first come to an

understanding concerning knowledge. But after analyzing the question of truth, we see why he must reject this view8_{. This knowledge of knowledge, or of the a-priori conditions for attaining it, before all}

knowledge, is ambiguous, for it presupposes many things: it presupposes certain ideas about knowledge as an instrument (a-priori concepts) and as a medium (sensible intuition), or the

distinction between a subject and an object, and most importantly it takes for granted that the

Absolute stands one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true. Because Kantianism decides on these matters beforehand, it ‘forgets’ that these were the matters to be investigated in the first place9_{. It}

uses terms such as ‘the Absolute’, ‘subject’, ‘object’, and ‘knowledge’, without systematically developing the nature of these concepts. It is for this reason, that Hegel somewhat teasingly states, that Kant takes them for granted10_.

77 _{Here we already find an indication that Hegel does not propagate a totalitarian form of ‘system-thinking’,} contrary to ‘popular’ believe (e.g. Heidegger, Adorno, Levinas, etc.).He actually wants to think the exact opposite of what they blame him for. I will come back to this later.

8 PdG, 57/58. ‘’Es ist eine natürliche Vorstellung, daß, eh in der Philosophie an die Sache selbst, nämlich an das wirkliche Erkennen dessen, was in Wahrheit ist, gegangen wird, es notwendig sei, vorher über das Erkennen sich zu verständigen… Inzwischen wenn die Besorgnis, in Irrtum zu geraten, ein Mißtrauen in die Wissenschaft setzt, welche ohne dergleichen Bedenklichkeiten ans Werk selbst geht und wirklich erkennt, so ist nicht abzusehen, warum nicht umgekehrt ein Mißtrauen in dies Mißtrauen gesetzt und besorgt werden soll, daß diese Furcht zu irren schon der Irrtum selbst ist‘‘.

9 PdG, 58. ‘’In der Tat setzt (die Besorgnis) etwas, und zwar manches, als Wahrheit voraus, und stützt darauf ihre Bedenklichkeiten und Konsequenzen, was selbst vorher zu prüfen ist, ob es Wahrheit sei. Sie setzt nämlich Vorstellungen von dem Erkennen als einem Werkzeuge und Medium, auch einen Unterschied unserer

selbst von diesem Erkennen voraus; vorzüglich aber dies, daß das Absolute auf einer Seite stehe, und das Erkennen auf der andern Seite für sich und getrennt von dem Absoluten doch etwas Reelles, oder hiemit, daß

das Erkennen, welches, indem es außer dem Absoluten, wohl auch außer der Wahrheit ist, doch wahrhaft sei; eine Annahme, wodurch das, was sich Furcht vor dem Irrtume nennt, sich eher als Furcht vor der Wahrheit zu erkennen gibt.‘‘

10 PdG, 59. ‘’…und der damit verbundne Gebrauch von Worten als dem Absoluten, dem Erkennen, auch dem Objektiven und Subjektiven, und unzähligen andern, deren Bedeutung als allgemein bekannt vorausgesetzt wird, (könnten ) sogar als Betrug angesehen werden. Denn das Vorgeben, teils daß ihre Bedeutung allgemein bekannt ist, teils auch, daß man selbst ihren Begriff hat, scheint eher nur die Hauptsache ersparen zu sollen, nämlich diesen Begriff zu geben.‘’

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§2: On the necessity of a dialectical method

As finite beings, who are not in possession of an intellectual intuition, it is impossible for-us to position ourselves at the standpoint of Absolute knowing unreflectively. We cannot even be sure that the question itself is legitimate. Hegel therefore comes up with a different route. In a way, he turns the investigation upside-down. Instead of developing his own theory, which would already imply knowledge of some kind, and would therefore not be without presuppositions, he takes up on a particular position from our shared philosophical tradition that claims to represent a true position throughout. However, since many different conceptions of truth have been expressed throughout the history of philosophy, it follows that they cannot all be true. Hegel refers to these different

conceptions of truth as forms of phenomenal knowledge (das erscheinende Wissen, PdG, 60). The German word ‘Er-schein-ung’, contains the word ‘Schein’, which means something like mere

appearance: because truth cannot exist in manifold, these phenomenal conceptions of truth are

mutually exclusive and therefore merely appear to be true. One person might claim this position to be true, while another might claim that position to be true. Consequently, we are in need of a

method if we want to resolve this quarrel.

The Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing more than the presentation of this phenomenal knowing (die Darstellung des erscheinendes Wissens, PdG, 60). However, the goal of this enterprise must be the sublation of the phenomenality of knowledge, or to reach a position that is true

in-and-for-itself (I will explain this terminology further on). This presentation will therefore constitute a

philosophical science11_{. But how can we conceive of a methodology that will help us attain this aim?} Any methodology is likely to presuppose certain criteria, or principles of justification, for assessing the truth or falsehood of particular truth claims. And so it seems that we are stuck right from the beginning, for if we were able to assert the truthfulness of these criteria beforehand, than Absolute knowledge would already be obtained throughout12_.

Hegel has come up with an ingenious solution to this problem. In §1 we pointed to the inherent contradiction that underlies the question of truth: we want to identify otherness as it is

in-itself, but we are only able to know otherness in as far as we relate to otherness in a specific way, by

which we do not know a thing-in-itself. Thus, for-us to be able to know otherness in-itself, our relationship towards otherness must, at the same time, not be a relation, i.e. otherness must

simultaneously be sameness. Hegel, however, does not want to reject this contradiction beforehand, 11 PdG, 60. ‘’Die Wissenschaft muß sich aber von diesem Scheine befreien; und sie kann dies nur dadurch, daß sie sich gegen ihn wendet’’.

12 PdG, 64. ‘’Denn die Prüfung besteht in dem Anlegen eines angenommenen Maßstabes, und in der sich ergebenden Gleichheit oder Ungleichheit dessen, was geprüft wird, mit ihm die Entscheidung, ob es richtig oder unrichtig ist; und der Maßstab überhaupt, und ebenso die Wissenschaft, wenn sie der Maßstab wäre, ist dabei als das Wesen oder als das An-sich angenommen.‘’

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rather it turns out to be the crux of his methodology in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and it will constitute its driving force13_{. On the one hand, the question of truth presupposes that we relate to}

otherness, for else the question would not arise. In that case, we know otherness as it is for-us, or as it appears to us from a specific point of view. On the other hand, in as far as we pretend that this knowledge is true, this knowledge must at the same time be knowledge of otherness as it is in-itself,

independent of our specific relation towards it. But this distinction is not something external to

consciousness; rather it must make this distinction for-itself. In other words, every particular truth-claim has to investigate for-itself if it’s specific knowing of otherness, can simultaneously be understood as knowledge of a thing-in-itself, which would exist independently and outside of this relation. Consciousness must therefore subject itself to an immanent criterion for testing its ‘supposed’ Absolute knowledge14_.

The abovementioned consideration allows us to further specify a methodology that is not dependent on external criteria, or principles of justification. This methodology rests on a dialectic between a threefold perspective that pervades the entire Phenomenology: the dialectic between

natural consciousness, phenomenological consciousness, and philosophical consciousness15_{. In order}

to be able to test a particular truth-claim, Hegel, the author (philosophical consciousness), constructs a consciousness (natural consciousness) that represents a particular conception of truth borrowed from our shared philosophical tradition (a form of phenomenal knowing). This natural consciousness has a subjective certitude, or a particular criterion for identifying, what it ‘thinks’ is a thing-in-itself16_. It is a natural consciousness, because it is naïve and dogmatic; it will always keep true to this

particular criterion. Furthermore, philosophical consciousness, provides natural consciousness with an experimental setting, in which the latter tries to realize its subjective certitude, namely to identify a thing-in-itself objectively. Mediated by this experimental setting, natural consciousness will test

for-itself if its knowing of the object, can simultaneously be understood as knowledge of a thing-in-for-itself.

We, the readers of the Phenomenology of Spirit (phenomenological consciousness), are the mere 13 Ultimately, he will show that this contradiction is only apparent and that it can be resolved, albeit not in this immediate form. I will come back to this later.

14 PdG, 64/65. ‘’Das Bewußtsein gibt seinen Maßstab an ihm selbst, und die Untersuchung wird dadurch eine Vergleichung seiner mit sich selbst sein; denn die Unterscheidung, welche soeben gemacht worden ist, fällt in es. Es ist in ihm eines für ein anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die Bestimmtheit des Moments des Wissens an ihm; zugleich ist ihm dies andere nicht nur für es, sondern auch außer dieser Beziehung oder an sich: das Moment der Wahrheit. An dem also, was das Bewußtsein innerhalb seiner für das An-sich oder

das Wahre erklärt, haben wir den Maßstab, den es selbst aufstellt, sein Wissen daran zu messen’’. 15 J. Heinrichs (1983) p. 13.

16 As a constructed consciousness it is not really able to think. It should therefore not be confused with the consciousness of a concrete individual. Up and until the Spirit (Geist) chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, concrete individuals of flesh and blood play no role whatsoever. They are inconceivable up to that point, because the unity between mind and body has to be developed first. It is therefore not a common-sense consciousness neither, contrary to what Hyppolite thinks ‘’ Hegel, by contrast, returns to phenomenal

knowledge, that is, to the knowledge of common consciousness, and claims to show how it necessarily leads to absolute knowledge.’’ (Hyppolite, 1974, p. 6).

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spectators of this experiment (das reine Zusehen, PdG, 65)17_{. Eventually, we will see for this natural}

consciousness that it gets bogged down in a contradiction when it wants to realize its subjective certitude18_{. In that sense, phenomenological consciousness is always ahead of natural consciousness.}

We see for it, that what it ‘thought’ was a thing-in-itself, was really only a thing-in-itself for this consciousness, i.e. it was tied to his specific viewpoint. This is a contradiction, as true knowledge cannot be Absolute and relative at the same time. In that case, the hidden presupposition that characterized the first subjective certitude when it tried to identify a thing-in-itself, but failed, has to be explicated and taken up again (sublated) into the subjective certitude of a new form of natural consciousness. This productive negation, which explicates the necessary presupposition for the failure of one form of natural consciousness to identify a thing-in-itself, and integrates it into a higher and more complex form of natural consciousness, is what Hegel refers to as a determinate negation (bestimmte Negation, PdG, 62). It is therefore not only the subjective certitude that is put to the test, but also the criterion itself for identifying a thing-in-itself19_{. This is crucial for understanding the}

methodology of the Phenomenology of Spirit, because the immanent and logical necessity of the project is based on it. Hegel (or German Idealism in general) is adamant in his conviction that philosophy must take on the form of a philosophical science. But unlike other sciences (e.g. the natural sciences), the methodology of this science, and therefore the possibility of the science itself, cannot be dogmatically accepted beforehand, for the aim of this science is Absolute knowledge. Therefore, even the science itself will be constituted in the self-movement of consciousness, and can only retrospectively rightfully be deemed a science, namely when it proves that this movement leads to an Absolute position20_{. It is thus only after this self-justification of philosophy as philosophy, that}

we may speak of philosophy as a discipline in its own right. Up and until that point, the

Phenomenology of Spirit should be read as a way of doubt (der Weg der Ver-zweiflung, PdG, 61), or as

17 PdG, 65. ‘’Aber nicht nur nach dieser Seite, daß Begriff und Gegenstand, der Maßstab und das zu Prüfende, in dem Bewußtsein selbst vorhanden sind, wird eine Zutat von uns überflüssig, sondern wir werden auch der Mühe der Vergleichung beider und der eigentlichen Prüfung überhoben, so daß, indem das Bewußtsein sich selbst prüft, uns auch von dieser Seite nur das reine Zusehen bleibt. Denn das Bewußtsein ist einerseits Bewußtsein des Gegenstandes, anderseits Bewußtsein seiner selbst; Bewußtsein dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, und Bewußtsein seines Wissens davon. Indem beide für dasselbe sind, ist es selbst ihre Vergleichung; es wird für dasselbe, ob sein Wissen von dem Gegenstande diesem entspricht oder nicht. ‘’

18 Again, natural consciousness cannot become aware of this contradiction because it cannot reflect on its particular criterion for identifying a thing-in-itself. Only we as readers can, after the subjective certitude has been tested to its limit.

19 PdG, 66. ‘’Es wird hiemit dem Bewußtsein, daß dasjenige, was ihm vorher das An-sich war, nicht an sich ist, oder daß es nur für es an sich war… oder der Maßstab der Prüfung ändert sich, wenn dasjenige, dessen Maßstab er sein sollte, in der Prüfung nicht besteht; und die Prüfung ist nicht nur eine Prüfung des Wissens, sondern auch ihres Maßstabes.‘‘

20 PdG, 61. ‘’Die Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, welche das Bewußtsein auf diesem Wege durchläuft, ist vielmehr die ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewußtseins selbst zur Wissenschaft‘’. Contrary to Gadamer, who thinks that Hegel’s philosophy is committed to an absolute standpoint right from the beginning: ‘’Nun steht es für Hegel von vorherein fest, … daß das, worin sich das Wissen vollendet, … Geist sein muß.’’ (Gadamer, 1973. p. 219)

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a self-fulfilling scepticism (der sich vollbringende Skeptizismus, PdG, 61). The development of the determinate negation is precisely a form of skepticism that yields positive results. One cannot

immediately reject a position for being false, rather it should be rejected for a particular reason.

Explicating this reason will result in a new position, and thus in a positive content, in which the hidden presupposition of the previous position is explicated and integrated . Any form of skepticism that merely doubts, will never produce positive results21_{. Such a position would even be dogmatic for}

it would not question its own scepticism. What Hegel wants from us as readers, is merely to observe if this determinate negation can truly account for the immanent and logical necessity of the project. If not, than we should discard of the Phenomenology of Spirit altogether. It is therefore Hegel himself that provides us with a criterion for assessing the feasibility of the project in its own terms. Unlike any theory of knowledge which is never without presuppositions, he proposes that this basic principle is capable of systematically exposing all hidden presuppositions that we may have, thereby resulting in a position that is free from presuppositions, and hence true unconditionally. This threefold structure between natural consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and philosophical

consciousness is necessarily dialectical. We can identify this structure in the development of natural consciousness: this consciousness expresses a thesis (it claims to have absolute knowledge in the form of a certain philosophical position), an in-itself; but when examined more closely, this claim is shown to be a subjective certitude, and it turns out to be for-itself, instead of in-itself: this is the

anti-thesis; this means that a new position must be developed, mediated by a determinate negation, in

which the presupposition of the previous position is incorporated: this new position can be considered the synthesis of the previous position and its presupposition. Because every form of natural consciousness has a particular criterion for identifying a thing-in-itself, also the object itself must change with the appearance of a new form of natural consciousness22_{. The dialectic inherent in}

this threefold structure expresses the dialectical relationship between subject and object. The

necessity of this dialectical method directly follows from our characterization of the question of truth,

where subject and object are both distinguished from one another (for else the question would not arise) and internally related to one another (if true knowledge is to be possible). In general, a dialectical relationship consists of two opposing terms, which cannot be defined separately. In 21 PdG, 63. ‘’Das Nichts ist aber nur, genommen als das Nichts dessen, woraus es herkömmt, in der Tat das wahrhafte Resultat; es ist hiemit selbst ein bestimmtes und hat einen Inhalt. Der Skeptizismus, der mit der Abstraktion des Nichts oder der Leerheit endigt, kann von dieser nicht weiter fortgehen, sondern muß es erwarten, ob, und was ihm etwas Neues sich darbietet, um es in denselben leeren Abgrund zu werfen. Indem dagegen das Resultat, wie es in Wahrheit ist, aufgefaßt wird, als bestimmte Negation, so ist damit unmittelbar eine neue Form entsprungen, und in der Negation der Übergang gemacht, wodurch sich der Fortgang durch die vollständige Reihe der Gestalten von selbst ergibt.‘’

22 PdG, 66. ‘’Entspricht sich in dieser Vergleichung beides nicht, so scheint das Bewußtsein sein Wissen ändern zu müssen, um es dem Gegenstande gemäß zu machen, aber in der Veränderung des Wissens ändert sich ihm in der Tat auch der Gegenstand selbst; denn das vorhandene Wissen war wesentlich ein Wissen von dem Gegenstande; mit dem Wissen wird auch er ein anderer, denn er gehörte wesentlich diesem Wissen an. ‘’

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essence, it is a unity in contradistinction. For instance, both terms, subject and object, oppose each other, and yet they cannot be defined separately; an object is an object in contradistinction with a subject for whom that object is, and reversely, a subject is a subject in contradistinction with an object to which a subject is related. Both terms are what they are in relation to what they are not, i.e. they refer to one another, we might say as form (the knower) and content (what is known). If subject and object were absolutely separated right from the start (Kant), than Absolute truth would become an inaccessible term. In that sense, the end-result of Kantianism, that we cannot know a thing-in-itself, is merely the consequence of its point of departure.

Hegel refers to the whole of this dialectical self-movement of consciousness, or the

movement wherein natural consciousness tests for-itself if its subjective certitude can be realized, i.e. if it allows for objectively identifying a thing-in-itself, and the necessary transition from one form of natural consciousness to another, with the technical term ‘experience’ (PdG, 67). However, the transition, and therefore the necessary progress and interconnectedness between different forms of natural consciousness, is only for-us readers, and not for natural consciousness itself, which cannot reflect on its particular criterion for identifying a thing-in-itself (it has no memory)23_{. The goal of the}

entire dialectic is reached when our knowledge (our Notion) of the object as it appears for-us

(für-sich), corresponds to knowledge of the object as it is in-itself (the Object), i.e. as it exists

independently and outside of us (an-sich). It is where the Notion corresponds to the Object, and the Object corresponds to the Notion24_{. This position will be true in-and-for-itself (an-und-für-sich). It is at}

the endpoint of this dialectic that natural consciousness, phenomenological consciousness, and philosophical consciousness, will come to coincide. In some sense, philosophical consciousness (the author) represents the end-result of the science of the experience of consciousness throughout, namely the standpoint of the Absolute. It tries to guide phenomenological consciousness (the reader) to this endpoint by presenting to it different conceptions of truth borrowed from our shared

philosophical tradition (phenomenal knowledge) in the form of natural consciousness, where we merely have to observe this dialectical self-movement of consciousness. If philosophical

consciousness is capable of showing us readers, that natural consciousness succeeds in identifying a thing-in-itself, all forms of consciousness will be sublated in the position of Absolute knowing. But how can we conceive of this philosophical consciousness? It seems to presuppose what has to be proven, namely that such an Absolute standpoint exists. However, throughout the project, this 23 PdG, 67/68. ‘’Diese Betrachtung der Sache ist unsere Zutat, wodurch sich die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewußtseins zum wissenschaftlichen Gange erhebt, und welche nicht für das Bewußtsein ist, das wir betrachten ... für es ist dies Entstandene nur als Gegenstand, für uns zugleich als Bewegung und Werden.‘’

24 PdG, 62. ‘’Das Ziel aber ist dem Wissen ebenso notwendig als die Reihe des Fortganges gesteckt; es ist da, wo es nicht mehr über sich selbst hinauszugehen nötig hat, wo es sich selbst findet, und der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begriffe entspricht. Der Fortgang zu diesem Ziele ist daher auch unaufhaltsam, und auf keiner frühern Station Befriedigung zu finden.‘’

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consciousness merely represents a hypothetical Absolute knowing. Its Absolute status needs to be proven in the course of the development of the experience of consciousness25_.

It is Hegel’s bold contention, that the necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of natural consciousness, i.e. of the forms of phenomenal knowing (das erscheinende Wissen), will by itself bring to pass the completion and unity of the series, mediated by the principle of the

determinate negation: ‘’Die Vollständigkeit der Formen des nicht realen Bewußtseins wird sich durch die Notwendigkeit des Fortganges und Zusammenhanges selbst ergeben‘’ (PdG, 62). This path is therefore achieved by the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge: ‘’Sondern er (der Weg des Zweifels) ist die bewußte Einsicht in die Unwahrheit des erscheinenden Wissens‘’ (PdG, 62). It is precisely the phenomenality of knowledge that has to be redeemed: ‘’Indem es zu seiner wahren Existenz sich forttreibt, wird es einen Punkt erreichen, auf welchem es seinen Schein ablegt, mit Fremdartigem, das nur für es und als ein anderes ist, behaftet zu sein…‘‘ (PdG, 68). If it succeeds, than all forms of phenomenal knowledge, or all conceptions of truth that have been suggested throughout the history of Western philosophy, can retrospectively be understood as representing a

true and necessary moment on the pathway of the self-realization of Absolute knowledge (nur der nicht realisierte Begriff, PdG, 61), albeit not the whole truth, which is the only truth26_{. The principle of}

the determinate negation shows that a position is never plainly false, but is always false for some particular reason. Or expressed the other way around, it would have been true, were it not for this or that. This is what propels the investigation forward. Consequently, by developing the logical

progression and necessary interconnectedness of these positions, they are not simply negated, rather they are preserved and explicated as moments of an Absolute position, moments, we as finite beings, cannot do without: ‘’Die Erfahrung, welche das Bewußtsein über sich macht, kann ihrem Begriffe nach nichts weniger in sich begreifen als das ganze System desselben, oder das ganze Reich der Wahrheit des Geistes…‘‘ (PdG, 68). Furthermore, these moments are not abstract and formal

moments, prior to all experience (Kant, Fichte), but concrete moments that cannot be separated from experience: ‘’…so daß die Momente derselben in dieser eigentümlichen Bestimmtheit sich darstellen, nicht abstrakte, reine Momente zu sein, sondern so, wie sie für das Bewußtsein sind, oder wie dieses 25 Cobben (1996). p. 31 ‘’Door de voltooing van het ervaringsproces wordt het hypothetische karakter van het filosofische kennen als het ware ingehaald. De hele onderneming legitimeert zichzelf achteraf. De kloof tussen menselijk kennen en absoluut kennen wordt geslecht. Door de participatie van het menselijke kennen aan het absolute kennen, verliest het laatste niet alleen zijn hypothetische status, maar is het menselijk kennen tevens tot het ware inzicht in zichzelf gekomen. ‘’ – through the completion of the process of the experience of consciousness, the hypothetical character of philosophical knowledge is discarded. The whole enterprise justifies itself retrospectively. The gap between human knowledge and absolute knowledge is overcome. Because human knowledge partakes in Absolute knowledge, the latter will not only lose its hypothetical status, but reversely, human knowledge will have gained true insight into itself – (my translation).

26 This is not to say, that every philosophy (or every philosopher) in the grand history of western philosophy is given his due share. Particular philosophies often contain much more than Hegel reflects upon. What he is after, is their basic underlying schemes and presuppositions (e.g. empiricism, or rationalism, etc.).

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selbst in seiner Beziehung auf sie auftritt…‘‘ (PdG, 68). It is experience itself that is to be known for what it Truly is. And if we succeed in grasping it for what it Truly is, than this will signify the nature of Absolute knowledge itself: ‘’…und endlich, indem es selbst dies sein Wesen erfaßt, wird es die Natur

des absoluten Wissens selbst bezeichnen’’ (PdG 68). This

conception of philosophy has implications for understanding the history of philosophy in general. In Hegel’s view, the history of philosophy cannot be conceived of as the random accumulation of a manifold of distinct philosophical perspectives (although this may seem to be the case), rather, if one reflects on these positions, they allow for a systematical reconstruction, characterized by an

immanent and logical progression towards one common goal; the pursuit and ultimately even the attainment of Truth27_{. This is what constitutes philosophy as philosophy, i.e. as a discipline of its own} accord. The truth wills itself throughout the history of philosophy. And although Hegel is often blamed for an uncompromising arrogance for holding these views, and for seeing himself as the keystone of this tradition (which is true in some sense), I know of no other philosopher, that treats the history of philosophy with more respect and dignity than he does, for he shows that his philosophy must be understood as the result (and not simply as the negation) of all previous positions. In that sense, his philosophy represents the exact opposite of what could be deemed arrogant.

Remark

There is one condition that pertains to the possibility of a determinate negation in general that we should take into consideration now, although its justification is not achieved until the

self-consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. A determinate negation is characterized by a negative and a positive meaning. It negates a particular position (A, -A), but it also preserves what it negates, because it explicates a hidden presupposition. But it not only explicates this hidden

presupposition, it also integrates it into a new position (B). This is the full meaning of the word ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung). But this positive result also implies a transcendence with regard to the previous position. But how is this transcendence possible?

In order to explain the possibility of this transcendence, Hegel makes a comparison between the nature of life and the nature of self-consciousness. Living nature cannot transcend itself for-itself. A living organism is a finite being that is rather transcended by an alien negation, namely death. It passively undergoes this negation. A negation can have positive results only for a being that is also a

self-consciousness. For instance, a self-consciousness may have a particular conception of knowledge.

But this particular conception, as a particular conception is already distinct from other perspectives it 27 This is where most philosophers ridicule Hegel, for how could we be assured that this dialectic will not go on

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could possibly have had. Therefore, for a self-consciousness to commit itself to any-one position, he

must (although he may not be aware of it) contrapose this particular conception to his own self, but in contraposing himself to himself, he already transcends this particular conception. This allows for a

learning-process. Its conception of knowledge might not correspond to knowledge of a thing-in-itself,

in which case it would have to adjust its conception accordingly. But this adjustment is possible only if we understand it as a self-negation, or as a self-transcendence. In other words, self-consciousness is

for-itself the negation of its limited forms, or of its own death28_{. It is thus only a self-conscious being}

for whom a determinate negation can have positive results29_. _{This might seem trivial, but is}

has some important consequences. The methodology, as outlined above, hinges on the fact that consciousness must be able to realize its subjective certitude for-itself; it has to compare for-itself if its knowing of the object (the Notion) corresponds to knowledge of the object as it is in-itself (the Object). But how should it do this? For we have just seen, that this distinction can be justified only if we consider it the self-distinction of a self-consciousness; only a self-consciousness can explicitly

distinguish himself from the object he presumes to know, and distinguish that object from what that

object is in-itself. However, in the consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, there is no such thing as a self-consciousness. It has not been developed by a long-shot. Properly speaking, there is no subject that can be the bearer of experience30_{. Once again, it is important to keep in mind that}

the realization of the subjective certitude of natural consciousness, especially in the consciousness chapter, is nothing more than a construction designed for-us readers to reflect on the impossibility of the position that is presented. Initially, the process of testing this subjective certitude, therefore seems to rely solely on phenomenological consciousness. However, this does not mean that we have to give up on our merely ‘observing’ position. We are still not importing any standards of our own. The criteria for testing are derived from natural consciousness, in the form that philosophical

consciousness presents it to us (see §3). Once natural consciousness is developed to the extent that it has the subjective certitude to be an independent ‘self’, in the self-consciousness chapter of the

Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e. once we have accounted for the bearer of ‘experience’, it is better

equipped to realize its subjective certitude for-itself31_{. It is therefore only at this level that the} determinate negation, or the methodology, can support and justify itself.

28 PdG, 63. ‘’Das Bewußtsein aber ist für sich selbst sein Begriff, dadurch unmittelbar das Hinausgehen über das Beschränkte, und, da ihm dies Beschränkte angehört, über sich selbst… Das Bewußtsein leidet also diese Gewalt, sich die beschränkte Befriedigung zu verderben, von ihm selbst‘‘.

29 Hyppolite (1974) p. 16 ‘’But in consciousness death is a necessary moment by means of which consciousness survives itself and rises to a new form. That death is the beginning of a new life of consciousness. In this manner, consciousness, being for itself its own concept, incessantly transcends itself, and the death of what it held as its truth is the appearance of new truth’’.

30 In that sense, Hegel’s doubt experiment is much more radical than Descartes’. The identity of the self, or that there even is one, needs to be proven in the course of the development of the experience of consciousness. Natural consciousness cannot presuppose any identity beforehand, for the problem of identity is precisely the problem to be solved.

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§3 Transition to the Consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit

There is still one problem that we have not yet addressed, namely, how and where to begin? Let us start with the ‘where’ part. We have already analyzed the question of truth, where it became apparent that this question can only arise because we are related to otherness by means of the

receptivity of the senses. Knowledge of otherness presupposes a sensuous mediation. The

consciousness chapter can therefore be understood as a reflection on empiricism, for this constitutes its main premise. Consequently, the standpoint of the Phenomenology of Spirit is a modern one (e.g. we cannot rely on biblical scripture first). In general, the term ‘consciousness’ is a technical term. It signifies a relation to otherness (contrary to the technical term ‘self-consciousness’ which signifies a

self-relation). Consciousness relates to the sensually given world, and has the subjective certitude

that this world can be known as it is in-itself.

Now for the ‘how’ part on which we have already spent quite some time. We saw that philosophical consciousness confronts phenomenological consciousness with a particular conception of truth borrowed from our shared philosophical tradition (phenomenal knowledge) in the form of natural consciousness. It is important that we share this tradition in order for-us to be able to understand this concretization. Philosophical consciousness confronts us, so to say, with our own cultural baggage. But is not this concretization itself problematic? How is it possible for this doubt-experiment to appeal to historical forms of consciousness, the truth of which, has to be proven in the first place? However, we will see that every historical concretization is nothing more than a didactical tool. We need it in order to be able to determine the object, and hence the experimental setting. But the transition and progression from one object to another (from one type of natural consciousness to another) should be understood as a logical explication (as a determinate negation). In that case, the

historicity of the consciousness that mediated it, loses its significance32_.

Because Hegel determines the object of natural consciousness by means of a historical concretization, he provides natural consciousness with a particular experimental setting in which its subjective certitude can be put to the test (e.g. the tree, or the house at the level of sensuous certainty). And once again, it is important to keep in mind that we cannot assume the existence, and therefore the identity of these things beforehand. In that case, the question of the Phenomenology of

Spirit, if it makes sense to speak of a reality in the first place, or of a thing-in-itself, would already be

solved throughout. We will have to observe for natural consciousness, if its subjective certitude, or 31 And even then ‘self’ and ‘experience’ have to be put between brackets, because the first conception of the pure self is still without a body, and cannot even think.

32 Cobben (1996) p. 53 ‘’Daarom heeft de Phänomenologie des Geistes zichzelf in principe overbodig gemaakt als het vertwijfelingsexperiment met succes volvoerd kan worden. Er kan dan volstaan worden met de innerlijk noodzakelijke, logische ontwikkeling’’. – This is why the Phenomenology of Spirit has made itself redundant if the doubt-experiment can be completed successfully. The internal and necessary logical development, will then suffice – (my translation, J.E.).

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particular criterion for identifying a substance, can be realized, namely if it has objective truth. If it does not succeed in identifying a thing-in-itself, than the object is deconstructed, or its certitude is shown to be bound to a hidden presupposition33_{. We must therefore make the transition to a new}

form of natural consciousness, mediated by a logical explication, and thus to a new historical concretization of natural consciousness, in order to arrive at a new object that will provide us with a fresh experimental setting.

The consciousness chapter is divided in three sections; sensuous certainty, perception, and force, which could be considered the historical concretizations of respectively; Berkeley, Locke, and Newton. Hegel does not specifically name the philosophers, or philosophies he is referring to, so this will remain a reconstruction on our part. Because the consciousness chapter is a reflection on empiricism in its broadest sense, at this level, it is not yet possible to truly distinguish between a subject and an object, because this would presuppose the independence of both domains, and therefore an absolute distinction. Instead, the relation between subject and object concerns a

relative distinction, where both terms immediately refer to one another; an object is an object in

contradistinction with a subject for whom that object is, and a subject is a subject in contradistinction with an object to which a subject is related. In the first section however, even this relative distinction is merely for-us, readers.

CHAPTER TWO: CONSCIOUSNESS §4 Sense-certainty

In §1 we pointed to the inherent contradiction that underlies the question of truth. If we want to know otherness as it is in-itself, our relation towards otherness must at the same time, not be a relation, i.e. otherness must at the same time be sameness. The first section of the consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, or the position of sense-certainty, can be understood as the most minimal attempt, to satisfy this condition. It has the subjective certitude that otherness can

immediately be identified and known as a thing-in-itself. It is thus the most uncomplicated certitude,

which tries to exclude all possible subjective input (we can think of Ockham’s razor; we may not needlessly complicate matters unless it becomes absolutely necessary). This subjective certitude also fulfills another requirement that we touched upon in §1, namely that we need to be able to conceive 33 It is not until the spirit chapter of the phenomenology of spirit that the objects of this experimental setting itself are justified as objects of a truly existing world, i.e. that we may speak of the objective existence of time and space, or of a thing of many properties, or of a force of nature (these moments correspond to the different forms of empiricism that we will consider), and many more moments. It is thus only retrospectively that these moments can be understood as mere abstractions from a concrete totality (a concrete historical world), which Hegel signifies as Geist. PdG, 288. ‘’Der Geist ist hiemit das sich selbst tragende absolute reale Wesen. Alle bisherigen Gestalten des Bewußtseins sind Abstraktionen desselben; sie sind dies, daß er sich analysiert, seine Momente unterscheidet, und bei einzelnen verweilt. Dies Isolieren solcher Momente hat ihn selbst

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of an open relation towards otherness. If the mind were to be structured in-and-for-itself, we would be incapable of knowing otherness in its own nature, i.e. as otherness. We referred to this as the

subjective conditio sine qua non for the possibility of Absolute knowledge. As is common to the

empirical tradition in general, the mind, at the level of sense certainty, is therefore conceived of as a

blank slate, or as a tabula rasa, namely as an immediate openness towards otherness. This form of

natural consciousness, which represents a particular conception of truth borrowed from our shared philosophical tradition (phenomenal knowledge), and which is presented to us by philosophical consciousness, can be considered the historical concretization of Berkeley’s empiricism. We may recall his famous dictum ‘’to Be is to be perceived’’34_{. We, as readers, will have to observe for this}

consciousness if its subjective certitude can be realized without logical contradiction.

We would do well to reflect on the contradictory nature of this relation before we take a look at the experimental setting itself. In §2 we showed that the question of truth, or the question of knowledge, presupposes a dialectical relationship between form (the knower) and content (the object known), i.e. between a subject and an object. Subject and object are both distinguished from one another, for else the question would not arise, but have to be internally related to one another at the same time, if true knowledge is to be possible. Both terms are indispensable. However, sense certainty has the subjective certitude that the object can immediately be known as a thing-in-itself. But how is this even possible? It would have to exclude all mediation. We have just formulated this condition as the openness of the mind towards otherness. But what is this openness if we as readers reflect on it? The mind, conceived of as a blank slate, has no determination of its own, i.e. it has no particular being that would distinguish it from what it is not (the sensuously given world). It would rather coincide with its object. But then the question of truth itself loses its meaning, because the specific distinction that is characteristic of it, the distinction between a subject and an object, would cease to exist. If we would coincide with the object throughout, then the question of truth itself could

not have come up in the first place35_. _We

can also express the inadequacy of this relation if we focus on the object side. Intuitively, the certainty of the world of immediately given sensuous things seems the most rich, the most true, and the most determinate36_{. But if we reflect on this certainty, its knowledge is the poorest where it}

34 In his lectures on the history of philosophy (1971), Hegel characterizes the ‘’origineler hauptgedanke’’ of Berkeley as ‘’Das Sein von allem, was wir ein Ding nennen, ist sein Wahrgenommenwerden’’ (p.271).

35 In a way, this conclusion seems ambiguous. We want to conceive of an open relation towards otherness, and yet we criticize the notion of a blank slate for not having any determinations. I will come back to this problem in the self-consciousness chapter.

36 PdG, 69. ‘’Der konkrete Inhalt der sinnlichen Gewißheit läßt sie unmittelbar als die reichste Erkenntnis, ja als eine Erkenntnis von unendlichem Reichtum erscheinen, für welchen ebensowohl wenn wir im Raume und in der Zeit, als worin er sich ausbreitet, hinaus-, als wenn wir uns ein Stück aus dieser Fülle nehmen, und durch Teilung in dasselbe hineingehen, keine Grenze zu finden ist. Sie erscheint außerdem als die wahrhafteste; denn sie hat von dem Gegenstande noch nichts weggelassen, sondern ihn in seiner ganzen Vollständigkeit vor sich.‘’

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imagines itself the richest, the most false where it imagines itself the truest, and above all, the least determinate where it imagines itself the most determinate. We characterized the relation of sense certainty as an immediate openness towards Being in-itself. But what Being are we talking about? It cannot be a particular being, for every particular being is determined in contradistinction with all

other particular beings that it is not; every determination is negation. We must therefore abstract

from all qualitative determinations of Being: everything is. However, if everything is, without further qualifications, all we are left with is Being in its pure un-determinedness. But something which is purely undetermined, has no specific being, i.e. cannot be identified37,38_.

If we reflect on the relation of sense certainty, all we have is but a pure ‘I’ that ‘relates’ to a pure ‘This’39_{. We even have to put these terms between brackets, because from an inside perspective,}

there is no distinction between an I on the one hand, and a This on the other hand. Their relation is

pure and immediate40_{. If we take Berkeley’s dictum serious; ‘’to Be is to be perceived’’, it becomes} impossible to qualify Being in any way, i.e. to determine ‘what’ specific being we are referring to. In that case, it is even ambiguous to speak of ‘perception’ at all41_{. We must now analyze the experience}

of consciousness for-itself, and merely observe if it leads to a logical contradiction. There seems to be a methodological problem at stake here, if the subjective certitude of this sensuous

consciousness it to be put to the test. The pure ‘I’ ‘relates’ to a pure ‘This’ in a pure and immediate way42_{. Subjective certitude and truth immediately seem to coincide, because there is no distinction}

between a subject and an object. But then how should natural consciousness be able to test its subjective certitude for-itself? Consequently, it seems that the doubt-experiment is not able to progress past its starting-point. However, an actual sensuous consciousness still relates to a manifold of immediately given things. It must therefore try to realize its subjective, namely to be capable of 37 Hegel strikingly summarizes this paragraph in his Logic (1986), p. 83 ‘’Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist

also dasselbe‘‘. Pure positive Being is nothing but a pure abstraction, and as such, it is identical to pure

un-determinedness. It is, so to speak, a night in which ‘al cows are black’.

38 Heidegger (1980) therefore completely misunderstands Hegel when he remarks ‘’Die sinnliche Gewißheit sagt die Vorhandenheit des Vorhandenen Aus, in Hegels terminologie das Sein‘’ (p.78).

39 PdG, 69. ‘’Diese Gewißheit aber gibt in der Tat sich selbst für die abstrakteste und ärmste Wahrheit aus. Sie sagt von dem, was sie weiß, nur dies aus: es ist; und ihre Wahrheit enthält allein das Sein der Sache; das Bewußtsein seinerseits ist in dieser Gewißheit nur als reines Ich; oder Ich bin darin nur als reiner Dieser, und der Gegenstand ebenso nur als reines Dieses.‘’

40 PdG, 70. ‘’Ebenso ist die Gewißheit als Beziehung unmittelbare reine Beziehung ‘’. This citation already reveals the impossibility and inherent contradiction of sense certainty. There is no such thing as an ‘immediate relation’, for every relation presupposes mediation.

41 Hegel (1986), p. 83 ‘’Es ist nichts in ihm (das reine Sein) anzuschauen, wenn von Anschauen hier gesprochen werden kann; oder es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst‘‘.

42 It might seem annoying to use this lingo, but we need it in order to illustrate the impossibility of this relation. A pure ‘I’ that relates to A pure ‘This’ in a pure way, seems ridiculous because it is just a very complex way of saying that the I and the object immediately coincide. However, we must express it in this manner in order to articulate the difference between an inside perspective and an outside perspective. From an inside perspective the I and the object immediately coincide. But from an outside perspective, or for-us readers, there exists a

relative distinction between a subject and an object. This must be the case, for else the question of knowledge

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perceiving Being as it Truly is. For instance, it must test for-itself if this particular being can be

perceived as a true Being43_{. In that case, we have a distinction within natural consciousness itself,}

between its knowledge of the object, or the true Being it presumes to perceive (the subjective certitude) and its object (true Being in-itself)44_{. As a result, natural consciousness can test for-itself if}

its knowing of the object corresponds to the object as it is in-itself, i.e. it can experience in the technical sense45_{. We, as readers, will have to observe this experience of consciousness.}

At first, natural consciousness tries to perceive a particular being as a true Being. A particular being can either be a concrete ‘now’ in time or a concrete ‘here’ in space. Natural consciousness may perceive the night, or a tree. But when it waits long enough, or turns around, the night has turned into day, and the tree has become a house. As disappearing beings, the night and the tree are therefore not true Beings. They are what they are in relation to what they are not. Every particular being is determined in contradistinction with what it is not, i.e. with all other particular beings. The inadequacy of this attempt can also be expressed from the ‘subject’ side. When consciousness tries to perceive a particular being as a true Being, its openness mirrors that particular object. But it would then be a situated consciousness (it would in some sense be), and this situatedness conditions its openness towards otherness, thereby refuting its fundamental openness to otherness as such. In other words, natural consciousness ‘learns’ for-itself that it cannot realize its subjective certitude, to perceive Being, unless it abstracts from all qualitative determinations of Being. But this leaves only the formal determinations of time and space. In order to realize its subjective certitude, natural consciousness therefore tries to identify Being by pointing-out a specific moment in time and space: ‘’Wir müssen daher in denselben Punkt der Zeit oder des Raums eintreten, (und) sie (die Wahrheit) uns zeigen…’’ (PdG, 74). Pointing seems to be the only means for identifying when we lose all qualitative determinations of Being46_{. But also this attempt, which can be divided in three phases,}

necessarily fails. Natural consciousness points to a here or to a now, but in the movement of pointing-out, the here and the now that it meant to identify have already passed (1). It must therefore correct its view. The truth of the here and now, is that they have passed (2). But that which has disappeared,

is not. It therefore has to return to step 1, in order to identify a here or a now (3). Natural

consciousness cannot get out of this loophole and will have to go through this experience time and 43 PdG, 71. ‘’An dem reinen Sein aber, welches das Wesen dieser Gewißheit ausmacht, und welches sie als ihre Wahrheit aussagt, spielt, wenn wir zusehen, noch vieles andere beiher. Eine wirkliche sinnliche Gewißheit ist nicht nur diese reine Unmittelbarkeit, sondern ein Beispiel derselben.‘’

44 PdG, 70. ‘’Der Gegenstand ist also zu betrachten, ob er in der Tat, in der sinnlichen Gewißheit selbst, als solches Wesen ist, für welches er von ihr ausgegeben wird; ob dieser sein Begriff, Wesen zu sein, dem entspricht, wie er in ihr vorhanden ist.‘’

45 Although, as mentioned above (§3), natural consciousness cannot experience in the strict sense, because we have not yet developed a bearer of experience. We are dealing with a construction.

46 The activity of pointing (Zeigen) already seems to hint at the corporeality and therefore at the situatedness of natural consciousness. However, this corporeality, which is presupposed insofar as we are dealing with an

Hegel's Conception of Substance