The power of social movements : the Hiraak in Yemen and the debate on authoritarian resilience

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M A S T E R T H E S I S P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E :

I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S

The power of social

movements: the

Hiraak in Yemen and

the debate on

authoritarian

resilience

U N I V E R S I T Y O F A M S T E R D A M

Student Mariska van der Plas

Student number 11004983

Supervisor Dr. V. Matthies-Boon

Second reader Dr. F. Boussaid

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Front-page image: members of the Hiraak raise the separatist flag of South Yemen (Yahya 2012).

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Abstract

The Hiraak is a movement that originated in 2007 in response to the repressive regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. Since then, this movement challenges the status quo in order to obtain equal rights, political participation, and job opportunities. This dissertation examines in what way the Hiraak contributed in ending the authoritarian resilience of Saleh in Yemen. In order to answer this research question, a qualitative single case study analysis has been employed in which new social movement theory and protracted social conflict theory have been used. A focus has been placed on examining the political grievances of the Hiraak in order to answer the question why they started to mobilise against the regime. While examining the strength of a social movement in destabilising an authoritarian regime, concepts of authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism were criticised for the fact that they are eradicative towards differences within the region. The research concludes that the Hiraak contributed in destabilising the Yemeni regime, by continuously making use of non-violent means available to a new social movement, such as sit-ins, marches, and rallies, and as a consequence to their diverse support from the south.

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List of Abbreviations

GPC General People’s Congress

NGOs Non-governmental organisations NSMs New social movements

NSMT New Social Movement Theory

PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen – South Yemen PSO Political Security Office

SMT Social Movement Theory

YAR Yemen Arab Republic – North Yemen YSP Yemeni Socialist Party

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Introduction

Long before former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted from office in Yemen in 2012, the foundations for his retirement were already in the making. Whilst the actual uprising in 2011 was initiated and guided by the mainly youth-led movement, other factors ensured that the right circumstances were created in order to oust Saleh (International Crisis Group 2011). From 1990 onwards, Saleh experienced difficulties by the influence of the Huthis from the north, the Hiraak from the south, the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, and foreign involvement by Saudi Arabia. Hence, the 2011 uprising was not the first time Yemen experienced forms of protest since its unification in 1990. When looking for reasons why Saleh was not able to stay in power, research has mainly focused on the role of the Huthis from the north, which would be a source of Saudi-Iranian rivalry, on the destabilising effect Al-Qaeda exercised on Yemeni territory, and on the internal struggle within the regime (Rabi 2015; Phillips 2011; Day 2009; USAID 2017). Nevertheless, the situation is far more complex and variables have been overlooked when studying one of the poorest countries of the Middle East. Before Yemen became united in 1990, it consisted of North and South Yemen that were characterised by entirely different cultures, political systems, and social interactions. The governments of both countries decided to become united to gain from the oil reserves they shared, but also for the purpose to stay economically healthy and not to be subject to the downfall of the former Soviet Union (Rabi 2015). Whilst aiming for a democratic country in which the people from the north and south would be equally represented, the north gained the upper hand and paved the way for years of authoritarian rule. The president of the country, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was a ruler who upheld harsh measures in order to stay in power and to supress resentment and opposition towards his regime. A consequence of this policy was that certain groups, and one in particular, became the target of suppression and inequality.

The south in general, and more particular the southern movement, the Hiraak, became vulnerable to the policies of Saleh. From the beginning of the unification, they experienced political disadvantages by not being fully represented in the government. Due to this subordination, the YSP, the biggest political party from south Yemen, was not able to defend the interests of the southerners (Rabi 2015: 124-125; Durac 2014). From 1990 on, they have build up grievances, based on political and social inequality compared to the northerners. They have been excluded from important government positions, are subject to job discrimination, and face unthinkable violent responses to their peaceful demonstrations. Eventually, this has led the thousands of deprived southerners to become united in their

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struggle against the “northern occupation” (Longley Alley & al-Iryani 2009). A movement, the Hiraak, had been called into life in 2005 and has contributed in protesting against the regime of Saleh. By stepping away from the often adopted approach on looking at the role terrorism and the Huthis have played in challenging Saleh, this dissertation steps away from this stance and takes on a different angle. Instead, this dissertation will focus on answering the main research question as in what way the unresolved political grievances of the Hiraak movement of southern Yemen have contributed to end the “authoritarian resilience” of Saleh’s regime in Yemen. This dissertation solely focuses on one of many elements in challenging Saleh’s regime, that of the Hiraak. Nevertheless, the researcher recognises the importance of the Huthis, the influence of Saudi Arabia, and also that of al-Qaeda. In fact, it is not the intention to weigh the differences between the different factors, but only to point out what actions the Hiraak has taken in order to demand change that possibly have led to the destabilisation of Saleh’s regime.

The relevance of this research is shaped around the following elements. Yemen can be called the black sheep of the Middle East: it is the poorest, most underdeveloped country that is also suffering from a lack of recognition of its internal problems and is often overshadowed by countries that experience intense conflict, such as Syria or Iraq (The World Bank 2017; UNOCHA n.d.). In addition, due to the lack of attention, Yemen, as well as the broader region, is often portrayed as a country that is locked into authoritarianism and is coined being exceptional, compared to other countries that have democratised (Bellin 2004). Today, this country is on the brink of famine, partly due to water shortages, mainly due to incompetent government policies and long enduring internal conflicts (USAID 2017; Rabi 2015). Conducting this research is not only relevant for the social debate on how far a government can go to suppress its people, but also for the academic debate that is concerned with authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. The destabilisation of the Saleh regime has until now mostly been researched from a perspective that focuses on the internal elitist structure of the regime and on the role of the Huthis and al-Qaeda (Day 2009; Longley Alley 2013; USAID 2017). However, the role of social movements is also important. In addition, this research is also relevant for academic purposes since it attempts to show, with the help of this case study, that notions of Middle East exceptionalism and the parallel notion of authoritarian resilience should be contested and cannot be applied to the Middle East as a whole, presuming that it is one homogenous entity.

As will be argued throughout this dissertation, the Hiraak has played a significant role in challenging the stability of the Saleh regime, perceptions of authoritarian resilience, and the

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generalisations often made when studying the Middle East, being called Middle East exceptionalism. The theories used in order to study the role of the Hiraak in influencing the durability of Saleh’s regime are New Social Movement Theory and protracted social conflict theory (Tilly 2006; Bayat 2010; della Porta & Diani 2011; Azar 1990). They will contribute in analysing how the Hiraak has come into existence and what the importance is of social movements in challenging the status quo in a Middle Eastern country. Hence, while using these theories, the theories concerning authoritarian resilience will be closely scrutinised (Bellin 2004 & 2012; Huntington 1991; Heydemann 2007; Josua & Edel 2015). New Social Movement Theory will be used to challenge the idea that Middle Eastern states are subject to authoritarianism from which they cannot escape (della Porta & Diani 2011; Durac 2015). By using these theories on answering the research question, this dissertation argues that the Hiraak has been challenging the Saleh regime by making use of the repressive and modern modular repertoire of social movements. It has been able to weaken the regime due to its continuous peaceful pressure on the government and its determination to secede from the north. In addition, the argument follows that this case study is able to challenge the perceptions coined by theory on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. The case of the Hiraak shows that the ordinary people of Yemen are strong enough to challenge the regime, contrary to what is often presumed that Middle Eastern people are subject to the regime and are not able to speak up (Bellin 2004).

In order to reach these conclusions, the second chapter of this dissertation will outline the various theories and concepts that are used. New social movement theory, protracted social conflict theory, and the concepts of authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism are discussed by which the positive and negative aspects of each theory and concept are highlighted. The third chapter provides the framework on methodology. For this research, single case study research is being conducted in which secondary literature analysis has been applied. Multiple sources are used in order to validate the reached conclusions and to ensure triangulation. The fourth chapter addresses the findings of the research. This chapter is divided into three sections, all of which answer one sub-question. The questions being answered are provided in a chronological manner by first answering how Saleh had established his authoritarian rule and what the main tenets of his autocratic rule were. Thereafter, a focus will be placed on the Hiraak, by explaining how their political grievances had come into existence and what they exactly are. Finally, this chapter focuses on the interaction between the first two questions, explaining how the Hiraak contributed in eroding the stability of the Saleh regime and its final downfall in the timeframe of 2007-2011. The

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fifth chapter is the analytical chapter in which the theories are applied to the case study concerning the Hiraak. The findings are combined to a theoretical perspective in order to reach conclusions that contribute to the academic field concerning social movement theory and Middle Eastern studies within political sciences. Finally, the last chapter will conclude this dissertation by outlining the main arguments. The main argument will be made that the Hiraak as a social movement is a considerable opposition force to the Yemeni regime that is able to challenge and change the status quo due to its continuous peaceful actions that fall within the new social movement paradigm. Furthermore, arguments will be made that the case study of the Hiraak is an example of how social movements are and can be of significant importance in influencing the strength of a regime in the Middle East. It challenges the perception that citizens in Middle Eastern countries are voiceless and weak and in fact states that authoritarian resilience in a country like Yemen is a concept on loose grounds. Studying the role of social movements shows that this is an important and overlooked factor in the oppositional forces to regimes in the Middle East and henceforth pose a threat to the notion of authoritarian resilience.

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Theoretical Framework

This research will posit itself against the background of theories in social and political sciences. In order to place the emergence and existence of the Hiraak into a broader academic perspective, social movement theory will be used. This theoretical debate finds its origins with Charles Tilly (2006) and will expand itself to include works from Asef Bayat (2010), Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (2011), and Vincent Durac (2015). The Hiraak’s grievances, that have become larger over the past couple of decades, will be assessed when looking at factors of protracted social conflict by Edward Azar (1990) and as a consequence to authoritarian rule. Henceforth, Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule from 1990 until 2012 will be placed into the wider academic debate that revolves around authoritarianism and authoritarian resilience. In the end, the debate on authoritarian resilience will be put into perspective when linking this to the notion of Middle East exceptionalism (Anderson 2006; Bellin 2004; Bellin 2012; Hariri 2015). As will be highlighted, research on the Middle East in political science departments has significantly focused on particular angles. Thus, it is important for the reader to be aware of this background and become indulged into a critical debate on how research is formulated and biased in certain ways that used to be a common approach to political sciences. It is important to include this debate to ensure that the researcher and reader are both aware of the sensitivity of these topics.

Theory on Social Movements

Historical trajectory of defining social movements

Social movements are a rather new phenomenon for study that have only been studied since the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Tilly 2006). As they have been studied since only recently, and due to its importance in the political sciences, several theories on social movements will be discussed throughout this section. The purpose of outlining all these different types of theories is not to eventually find a theory that is suitable to the case study of the Hiraak. Instead, positioning the Hiraak as a social movement within theories on social movements is relevant in order to show that theory on social movements can be applied to the Middle East, and that it accordingly does not have to be treated as an exceptional region. Instead, by using case studies that lie outside the Western hemisphere allows the researcher to challenge these theories and to apply them critically to the Hiraak.

Charles Tilly is often perceived as the founding father of Social Movement Theory (SMT) and aims to formulate a thoroughly understanding of what social movements are. Tilly

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(2006) has defined social movements as being part of contentious politics that are characterised by sustained campaigns of claim making, whereby they target specific objects and make claims on identity, standing, and on specific programmes. Contentious politics involves all types of acts and activities that are performed to challenge the status quo. Social movements are part of contentious politics, as are civil wars, revolutions, and ethnic conflicts (Tarrow 2015). In addition to campaigns of claim making, standing and specific programmes, in order to make their claims, social movements are involved in public performances including rallies, sit ins, demonstrations, public meetings, occupations, and lobbying. In order to legitimise a social movement, they make claims on four elements: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly 2006: 182). When these four aspects are present, effective demonstrations can be hold and claims can be made (Tilly 2006). Furthermore, social movements are not characterised by solo acts and performances but rather by interactive campaigns that underline a broader aim. Henceforth, according to Tilly (2006), social movements are coherent actors that make claims on issues that are central to all types of public performances.

Charles Tilly’s work has been important to shape the contours of SMT. Nevertheless, SMT has been subject to criticism and debate. Therefore, it is important to outline additional definitions that are offered by Neil Stammers (in Durac 2015) and Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (2011). Stammers’s question as to what distinguishes social movements from “other forms of human association” is a valid question and must be answered in order for this theory to be of relevance to social and political sciences (Durac 2015: 241). To elaborate, social movements are used in various contexts and are often confused with broader cultural trends or the opposite, with more formally constructed organisations (Stammers 2009: 34). These are all types of human association, but a difference can be made between them. Hence, Stammers defines social movements as collective actors that share a minimal sense of collective identity and interest and that are comprised of individuals. According to him, the main aim of social movements is to change or defend certain aspects of society that are crucial to them and their movement (Durac 2015: 242).

Della Porta and Diani hold on to the definition provided by Mario Diani (1992), defining social movements according to three pillars: the informal interaction between individuals, groups and organisations; collective identity; and the notion that there are no strict boundaries as to what social movements entail. To elaborate, della Porta and Diani (2011) claim that social movements are informal networks created by a multiplicity of actors: individuals, groups, and organisations. Furthermore, these social movements are engaged in

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political or cultural conflicts on the basis of a shared collective identity. Social movements pose a challenge to law and order in their struggle to reach social change (della Porta & Diani 2011). An important aspect that della Porta and Diani use in their research on social movements is that they do not perceive these movements to be homogenous entities. On the contrary, even though social movements are build upon a shared collective identity does not imply that all ideas and viewpoints of all actors involved within the movement are similar (Durac 2015). In addition, social movements often have a decentralised structure. Della Porta and Diani (1999) claim that coordination of a social movement is often assured by different organisations. Many groups and organisations are present in a social movement and they all take part in many different kinds of local collective action (della Porta & Diani 1999: 141).

As Vincent Durac (2015) correctly points out, there is a wide range of social movement definitions that all have slightly different perceptions of what they exactly entail. Nevertheless, some similarities can be discovered from the abovementioned definitions. Tilly (2006), della Porta and Diani (2011), and Stammers (in Durac 2015), all stress notions of unity and collective identity that are central to a social movement. For Tilly (2006), unity refers to the notion of unification between all members of a movement. When a movement is divided, their cause will not be recognised as worthy to be considered (Tilly 1998: 213). The same holds for the importance of collective identity. Collective identity keeps a movement together and strengthens the aim of the movement to be recognised and heard (Tilly 2006: 184). Della Porta and Diani (2011) argue the same stating that social movements act on the basis of a shared identity. Stammers shares both ideas on unity and collective identity, arguing that social movements can be understood as unified collective actors and whose members identify with one another “at least to some extent” (in Durac 2015: 242). In addition to shared notions on the importance of unity and identity in a social movement, what also can be concluded is the willingness of social movements to create change and to make a cause for a particular issue that used to be undervalued.

Still, what should be taken into consideration is that these concepts and theories are Western-based notions of social movements, often applied to social movements in Western countries (Bayat 2010: 3). The entire study of social movements was limited to case studies from Europe and the United States (Beining & Vairel 2013: 1). These movements mobilised in democratic countries, where opportunities for mobilisation were far more available than for movements in authoritarian states where the focus for mobilisation lies more in the perceived collective threat (Beining & Vairel 2013; Tarrow 1998). Until recently, not much attention was given at all to contentious politics that was taking place in the global South. Acts of

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contention often take place below the radar screen of the phenomenon that political science usually studies (Beining & Vairel 2013: 11). This, however, is particularly prevalent in authoritarian countries, where movements have fewer opportunities to mobilise. When SMT has been applied to Middle Eastern countries, there was often a focus on Islamic movements. However, for scholars like Bayat (2010) and Singerman (in Durac 2015), this has been found troublesome. They state that social movements in the Middle East cannot be reduced to simple classifications within SMT and need to be regarded for their differences and complexities (Durac 2015: 243).

Hence, what followed was the development of new theories. From the 1970s, a new turn in SMT emerged that has come to notice new forms of social movements. Contrary to the argument that social movements are often engaged in a political conflict with the state, new social movements (NSMs) focus more on the individual and the increasing importance of autonomy in relation to political and institutional spheres (della Porta & Diani 2011). Adding to that, new social movement theory (NSMT) has slightly come to distance itself from SMT in that it does not focus on nationalist movements but more on the importance of individual struggles. Whilst traditional social movements have a strong working class character and struggle for state power, new social movements contain elements that are explicitly non-political, focusing for example on environmental issues, human rights, and peace and solidarity (idem). Visible in these NSMs is the “politics from below”, politics in the streets that is initiated within the individual and not from an overarching organisation (idem.). Instead, NSMs are characterised by loose networks that have informal organisation structures (Beinin & Vairel 2013).

Furthermore, while social movements were characterised by a top-down approach with a hierarchical structure, NSMs are characterised by informal networks and anti-hierarchical structures. In addition, they do not necessarily value the pursuance for political power but rather bring about cultural change. In order to reach this change, NSMs often adopt non-violent approaches to reach their goals (Durac 2015: 234-244).

To take SMT one final step further, Asef Bayat (2010) has come to define social nonmovements as the new form of social movements. Social nonmovements are defined as a movement against an issue, in which people are not collectively organised but participate in forms of protest in their daily activities, as an individual (Bayat 2010: 20). This approach draws on the notion of “politics from below.” Social nonmovements consist of non-collective actors: the “subaltern,” people that were not given a voice in the past, but through daily practices resist the status quo (Bayat 2010: 14). When looking at the Middle East, social

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nonmovements consist of millions of subaltern, mainly the urban poor, Muslim women and the youth who are not given a voice in the public sphere. They are struggling to survive and through daily forms of resistance try to affect and wake up the powerful elite and the society in general (Bayat 2010: 15).

Having outlined the various theories on social movements, it is important to clarify which theories will be used in order to analytically assess the Hiraak as a movement. While SMT is a theory that provides a clear framework on what social movements exactly entail, it remains troublesome that this theory is based on studies conducted in Western countries. The conditions of these countries in which social movements operate are highly different from the conditions in authoritarian countries. Hence, the emergence of NSMT will be highly taken into consideration as a theory in response to the weaknesses of SMT. The researcher is convinced that NSMT is more applicable to the case study of the Hiraak because of its emphasis on “politics from below,” and the limits of mobilising in an authoritarian state. In addition, the emphasis SMT puts on the working class mobilising against the state in search for more materialistic gains is too narrow-minded, whilst NSMT highlights other desired goals by movements such as equal rights and peace.

Why do people organise?

In order to examine in what way the Hiraak have contributed in destabilising Saleh’s regime, it is important to know why they have organised in the first place. Conducting research on this question will focus on both internal and external factors of a social movement. When looking at external factors, according to Sidney Tarrow (1998), social movements mobilise because of political opportunities and constraints. Political opportunities are the perceived probability that social protest will lead to success in reaching the desired goal (Goldstone & Tilly 2001 in Tarrow 1998). Tarrow (1998) adopts a rather rationalist perspective when saying that members of social movements are rational actors, who make choices on the basis of perceived costs and benefits. Henceforth, he mainly focuses on external incentives for social movements to mobilise. Tarrow (1998: 77-79) provides several incentives that will trigger mobilisation. Firstly, newly opened access to political participation – for example elections – can trigger contention. Secondly, the shifting of political alignments, due to inter alia new election outcomes, can pose an incentive to exercise power. Thirdly, conflicts within elitists segments of a society may contribute to creating opportunities for social movements to take advantage of this weaker situation. Tarrow’s final offered incentive is that of having influential allies.

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When social movements have allies that will help them in their cause, they are more likely to arise.

These four aspects provide opportunity for contention. However, there are also constraints to be found for social movements to exercise their programme. Whether social movements can arise or not depends on the state structure. For the purpose of this dissertation, a focus will be put on authoritarian states. Under authoritarian rule, the authorities often crush social movements. Nevertheless, the characteristic of an authoritarian regime in which power is centralised in an elitist structure also provides some opportunities. As Tarrow (1998) argues, once the system is weakened, it becomes easier to target one specific field. Furthermore, “though suppression is more brutal and frightening, there is evidence that increasing the costs of organization and mobilization is a more effective strategy in the long run” (Tarrow 1998: 83). States can adopt more repressive measures when social movements are holding sit-ins or protests. Still, these restrictive and sometimes brutal measures could cause a reverse effect. It may feed the will of the social movement to mobilise even more but also to escape the public spaces and continue their protest in the private spheres (idem). Consequently, when that happens, the authorities will have a harder time at controlling social movements.

When looking at internal reasons for social movements to come into existence, a focus is often placed on grievances that shape action. Bert Klandermans (1997) defines grievances as the “outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem” (in Klandermans 2015: 2). Furthermore, grievances can be divided into illegitimate inequality and violated principles. Illegitimate inequalities are suddenly imposed grievances that stir social movement. Violated principles are the continuous disregard of certain principles that eventually stir social movement mobilisation (Klandermans 2015). Relative deprivation theory is linked to illegitimate inequality and holds that feelings of deprivation stem from the comparison with one’s own situation to a standard that a person wants to uphold. Feelings are shaped by peoples’ perceptions on what they deserve and hence look at what they are still lacking. Relative deprivation theory is able to explain why and when people start to participate in social movement protests and mobilisation. As it seems, social movements that consist of more advantaged members compared to disadvantaged members are more likely to engage in collective action (Tyler & Smith 1995: 3). In addition, social movements will more likely become active when one can observe a large group-based deprivation instead of individual-based deprivation. The difference between individual-individual-based deprivation and group-individual-based

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deprivation is that the former is based on interpersonal comparisons, looking at what one is personally lacking compared to another individual. On the contrary, group-based deprivation focuses one what a group is deprived from as a whole. This deprivation is often based on a racial or ethnic background, but can also be based on its gender (Tyler & Smith 1995: 5). In general, group relative deprivation instigates political protests and demands for change (idem.).

Still, having those grievances does not necessarily imply that they will also be made explicit in public. Henceforth, one can make a distinction between two types of action one can take in order to express the grievances. Firstly, instrumental action can be taken that refers to the aim of people to mobilise in a social movement to influence and possibly change the social and/or political environment. For this to happen, it must be attractive for people to join a movement, thus decreasing the costs but increasing the benefits of such an alignment. Simply put, people must be given incentives to join a social movement (Klandermans 2015: 6-7). Nevertheless, these incentives might be constrained by the external environment, especially when mobilising in an authoritarian state, costs of participation can increase substantially (Tilly 1978 in Klandermans 2015; Tarrow 1998). Secondly, people can start to join social movements and mobilise their grievances in public when they feel the need to express their sentiments. This so-called expressive action holds that people want to regain agency, therefore trying to “gain dignity back into their lives through struggle and moral expression” (Klandermans 2015: 6). As Bert Klandermans (2015) rightly puts it, one of the most important motives to join a movement is to act on one’s view, and this is charged with emotion.

The study of emotions within social movements started to gain attention from the 1990s onwards. It has been argued that emotions play an important role in every aspect and moment of a protest (Jasper 2011). Emotions can stimulate and hinder the mobilisation of protests, the strategies of those movements and the success of such a movement (idem). According to James Jasper (2011: 289-292), there are a couple of emotions that are of importance to social movements. Feelings of honour and pride may stimulate people to join a movement in order to uphold their reputation. Secondly, feelings of belonging cause people to stay a member of the movement for a longer time. Such feelings revolve around emotions of love, pride, and excitement. Thirdly, the desire to have an impact fuels people to become involved in social movements. This desire comes from feelings of anger, fear and a sense of threat. Besides the fact that emotions can play a role in providing a meaning to participate in a social movement, it also plays a significant role in ensuring that the movement can function.

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Emotions can create feelings of solidarity which strengthens the sense of loyalty within a movement. In fact, this can even stimulate members of a movement to act and protest (Eyerman 2005 in Jasper 2011: 294).

To sum up, emotions can play a significant role in the creation and duration of a social movement. This combined with collective grievances can be a major factor in the organisation of a movement. Hence, the notion of expressive action will be scrutinised on the case study of Hiraak.

Social movements in authoritarian settings

Against the backdrop of operating in an authoritarian environment, it is important to provide a framework on how social movements organise. How do social movements organise and what actions do they take in a restricted and often repressive environment? First of all, it is important to clarify what is meant by repression. Often, repression is assessed in terms of state repression. Nevertheless, individuals, groups and organisations can also be repressed by other non-state actors. For this reason, Tilly (1978: 100) has come to define repression as “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (in Earl 2003: 46). When looking at repression, one should not only look for coercive measures that use violent means to restrict actions of social movements. On the contrary, one should also focus on the less-evident types of repression. Such types can be counter-demonstrations by other movements. The state can also be involved in conducting such types of repression, for instance by imposing restrictions on social movement organisations that restrict them in organising (Earl 2003).

Social movements adapt to the environment they are in; henceforth, social movements in authoritarian states adjust their policies and actions according to what is possible in a restrictive environment (Johnston 2015). Johnston argues that social movements encompass the same elements as the aforementioned definitions summed up, but adds that public manifestations are often limited and less overt, and that they make more use of a so-called repressive repertoire (Johnston 2015: 2). This repertoire consists of actions that are taken before actual public mobilisation takes place. These actions are often conducted within the private sphere, and contribute to the occurrence of a social movement (Johnston 2015). One such an action can be called contentious speech. Contentious talk consists of oppositional speech acts, which also take place in informal and private settings. This type of speech is the first marker of being engaged in contentious politics and often lays the ground for further mobilisation against the authoritarian state in the future (Johnston 2006). Other types of action

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that fall under the heading of the repressive repertoire are, inter alia, oppositional speech acts covered in symbolic actions, such as collectively putting flowers on an emotionally sensitive place to commemorate a particular anniversary or the gathering of people. A second example is taking part in activities that push the limits of what is defined as acceptable by the status-quo (Johsnton 2015: 10). Once social movements decide and are able to publicly express their grievances, they hold on to the modern modular repertoire, which includes marches, strikes, demonstrations, meetings and petitions (Johnston 2015).

Protracted Social Conflict Theory

The Hiraak is a social movement that finds its origins in 2005. However, the foundations for this movement were already being laid long before that year. From 1990 onwards, former South Yemen experienced a couple of major setbacks compared to former North Yemen and the current regime. Grievances were shaped especially in the years between 1990 and 2000. Hence, the conflict between the Hiraak and the government is already going on for two decades. Due to this longevity, it is of relevance for this dissertation to include the work from Edward Azar (1990) on protracted social conflict. His theory is part of the discipline conflict studies and has been developed in light of criticism towards the established conflict studies theories that focused on a division between internal and external dimensions of a conflict. According to Azar, multiple conflicts existed that did not fit in this type of framework. Henceforth, he developed his theory that shows how conflicts are more often characterised by a blurred dividing line between internal and external sources; the multiplicity of causal factors; and, the fact that these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points. For this study, the conflict that is being inquired is that between the former government under Saleh and the Hiraak.

Protracted social conflict can be studied along three processes: genesis, dynamics and outcomes. There are four preconditions for a protracted social conflict to occur. Firstly, the communal content must be present in multiple numbers. Multicommunal societies can exist in countries that have a colonial legacy and/or know a historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors. Secondly, human needs must be met. If these human needs cannot be met by the authorities, grievances will occur and can be a factor in cultivating a protracted social conflict. Azar (1990) defines human needs as material needs, but also as having access to social institutions and effective participation in society. It revolves around the question whether communities are accepted or not in society. The occurrence of grievances as explained by Azar can be directly linked to the importance of emotions as being a factor in

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the organisation and endurance of a social movement, as explained by Klandermans (2015). Hence, these two aspects of social movements and protracted social conflict will be combined in analysing the reasons for the Hiraak to mobilise. Thirdly, protracted social conflicts can be triggered by the role of the state and its governance. When states prove to be incompetent and cannot satisfy the needs of the population, protracted social conflict is more likely to occur. Finally, international linkages play a central role. Azar gives two types of international dependency. Firstly, countries can be economically dependent. This limits the autonomy of the state and can distort the economic development, which curbs the satisfaction of security needs (Azar 1990: 11). Secondly, countries can be involved in military or political relationships. Often, client loyalty leads to a contradiction between the pursued domestic and foreign policy of a state and the needs of its own population. Thus, when countries prove to be more economically dependent or have strong political or military relationships with stronger states, the country of concern is more susceptible to adopt policies that are not in line with its people’s demands and wishes (Azar 1990: 11-12).

Process dynamics focus on factors that are deemed to be responsible for the activation of conflicts. What contributes to the activation of conflicts is, firstly, the role of communal actions and strategies (Azar 1990). Often, collective recognition of individual grievances will lead to collective protest. Once a trivial event has led to the escalation of conflict, the victimised group will extend this event to broader issues that they want to see changed. Then, questions emerge on how to organise their mobilisation, the goals they want to pursue, and the tactics they will employ to reach those aims (Ramsbotham 2005). Secondly, state actions and strategies are of importance. When states address grievances, a protracted social conflict can be kept latent. Often, due to the winner-takes-it-all mentality, states that face collective protest employ coercive repression instead of accommodation (idem). In both cases, for communal actions and state actions, external assistance can be sought in order to reach their aim. Finally, existing, build-in elements of conflicts can cause a conflict to be activated. Perceptions and motivations behind a state or communal actors are shaped by experiences, fears and belief systems. At a certain moment, these build-in sentiments become so entrenched in society that one can observe a conflict spiral.

In the end, Azar (1990) looks at outcome analysis. For protracted social conflicts, there are no winners. All actors tend to be victimised in the process. In addition, such conflicts do not have a clear termination point. Furthermore, physical security becomes deteriorated; political institutions prove to become degenerated; psychological ossification

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occurs; and, increased dependency and cliency occur since communal actors have to rely more and more on support from external actors (Azar 1990: 16-17).

For the study of the Hiraak in the environment of a repressive state, the elements of genesis and process dynamics will be used. It will contribute in defining the grievances of the Hiraak, and provides a framework on where to place these grievances and what role they have played in shaping and activating the conflict. It looks at the deeper reasons underlining the Yemeni conflict, and will help answer the question how the grievances of the south have evolved over the past. It will be used to highlight the grievances of the Hiraak, and will offer a slightly different perspective on these grievances within the conflict as compared to what NSMT has to say about this.

Authoritarianism in the Middle East

The Hiraak operates in a state that is characterised by authoritarian tenets. As has been outlined above, the grievances of a social movement are shaped by both internal and external factors. To fully understand the external factors that contribute to the grievances of a social movement, this theoretical framework will also include the debate on authoritarianism, authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. Before laying out the contours of the academic debate on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism, it is important to first come to a definition concerning authoritarianism. Over the years, scholars have put forward many definitions on authoritarian states. Most of them have stepped away from a rigid black-and-white perspective of either democratic states or dictatorships. Instead, many types of democracies and dictatorships exist, ranging from electoral democracy to single-party dictatorship, and electoral authoritarianism to personalist autocracies (Geddes et al. 2014; Bogaards 2012; Lidén 2014; Wahman et al. 2013).

In this framework, the researcher will step away from the often-adopted approach of defining authoritarian states by what they are not: democratic. Instead, three types of dictatorships that fall within electoral dictatorships will be highlighted: no-party, one-party, and multi-party authoritarian regimes. This subdivision has been constructed as an answer to Barbara Geddes’s typology of authoritarian regimes as being military, personalist, single party or a mixture. Wahman et al. (2013) have specified the single party regime that Geddes (1999: 121) defines as a system in which “access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and compete in elections.” In general, electoral authoritarian regimes are systems in which elections are allowed and

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multiple parties can officially participate in elections. Nevertheless, their existence does not mean elections are fair and competitive. Often, it is used as a method to legitimise the rule of one current regime (Lidén 2014). Wahman et al. (2013) have specified the typology of electoral dictatorships by making three types of sub-divisions. No-party regimes are defined as regimes in which no parties are allowed to take part in elections. One-party systems are regimes wherein only one party can participate in elections. Finally, there are multi-party regimes that are characterised by the existence of multiple (opposition) parties who can participate in elections (Wahman et al. 2013).

Authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism

From the 1990s onwards, scholars (Huntington 1991; Bellin 2004) in the political sciences started to believe that the Middle East was a region on its own. It did not democratise as many other regions did during the third wave of democratisation and on the contrary has stayed within its boundaries of authoritarianism (Huntington 1991). Defecting from the main path of democratisation, academics became concerned with this region and they questioned as to why these authoritarian regimes were so resilient. Several explanations have been given for the reason for this persistence. Eva Bellin (2004 & 2012) has searched for societal explanations for the continuous persistence of authoritarianism. A weak civil society; poor populations; the role of Islam; the notion of rentier state; and, the unequal relationship between men and women are said to partially explain authoritarian resilience in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there are other factors involved that account as well for the resistance towards democracy. Arguments are made that the strength, coherence and effectiveness of a state’s coercive apparatus is of crucial importance in either maintaining authoritarianism or in laying the groundwork for democracy (Bellin 2004). Hence, it has been argued that the persistence of coercive state apparatuses account for the authoritarian resilience in the Middle East (Bellin 2004).

In addition to these culturally and institutionally bound factors that have been argued to account for authoritarian resilience, authoritarian states adopt strategies for regime survival. Those strategies emerge from the need to consolidate the authoritarian regime as well as possible. In general, authoritarian consolidation is captured as “a deliberate state project driven by political elites seeking to secure their ruling position” (Göbel 2011: 183). Regime consolidation is centred around three aspects: the power to coerce one’s will on the people; the power to regulate society through institutions; and, the power to make people want what

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the government wants them to do (Göbel 2011: 177). The following strategies are adopted in order to ensure regime survival and authoritarian consolidation.

One of the strategies that states adopt to secure regime survival is the use of repression and coercion. In the Middle East, many states are authoritarian and it has been argued that the characteristics of the state and opposition account for the degree of repression (Josua & Edel 2015). Firstly, the closer the military is located to the power centre, the more likely states use repressive measures to accomplish regime survival. In addition, the larger the scope of this military and/or security apparatus is, the more likely it is the use of repression will occur. Thirdly, when states experience violent dissent, they will use repression more often. Finally, the larger the number of protestors and the higher the perceived threat level is, the more likely it is the regime will use repressive measures to combat this dissent (Josua & Edel 2015: 293-295).

Another strategy states can adopt for regime survival is called authoritarian upgrading (Josua & Edel 2015; Heydemann 2007; Heydemann & Leenders 2011). According to Steven Heydemann (2007: 1), “Authoritarian upgrading involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic and social conditions.” How this upgrading exactly happens varies and depends on the context. When looking at the Middle East, this region has undergone change on several levels. Throughout the 1980s, civil society has grown significantly, calls for liberalisation and electoral reform became widespread, economic markets have diversified and access to media and internet has become very easy (Heydemann 2007: 5-19). These changes were a threat to the stability of many regimes in the Middle East, and therefore authoritarian leaders adopt a ‘learning strategy’ which allows them to stay in power. Leaders adapt themselves to situations, learn from their fellow authoritarian leaders, and learn how to make an even more consolidated regime (Heydemann 2007; Heydemann & Leenders 2011). Heydemann (2007) provides a framework on authoritarian upgrading and argues that five elements are central to this practice. Firstly, civil societies are appropriated and contained by the regime. In doing so, the regime’s aim is to exploit civil societies and get control over civil society organisations (Heydemann 2007: 5-10). Secondly, regimes try to manage political contestation. The regime allows a certain degree of political opposition, but once these political opponents become threatening to the status quo, these individuals or organisations will become targets of regime coercion and repression (Heydemann 2007: 10-12). In addition, authoritarian states have adopted more economic reforms to strengthen their support system around them. These so-called economic liberal reforms are selective and only benefit the elite around governments. It provides

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opportunities for regime supporters, and creates many challenges for opponents. These practices are part of government patronage, which gives the ruler the control to appoint certain people to important positions or grant them privileges (Heydemann 2007: 13). The reforms have caused more inequality and, combined with a growing labour force but a declining labour market, leads to anger among the population (Heydemann 2007: 13-16). Fourthly, regimes control new types of communication technologies. Internet and media have become more accessible in the Middle East, but this poses a threat to the regime. Henceforth, the state allows it to exist, but adopts policies in which it places restrictions on the use of Internet and closely monitors the Internet by its users (Heydemann 2007: 18-21). Finally, authoritarian states upgrade their regime by diversifying international linkages. States in the Middle East are intensifying diplomatic and economic ties with non-Western countries in order to avoid pressures for human rights change and simply focus and benefit from investments to be made with, for example, Asian countries (Heydemann 2007: 23-24).

This authoritarian upgrading is a means to maintain stability and works counterproductive towards democracy. Academics started to perceive this authoritarian resilience as something peculiar to the Middle East; it was seen as exceptional compared to other world regions (Bellin 2004; Hariri 2015; Salamay 2009). This so-called notion of Middle East exceptionalism is something that emerged during the 1990s. As mentioned previously, this notion was mainly shaped by the fact that the Middle East did not participate in the third wave of democratisation that Huntington coined after many authoritarian states democratised during the previous two decades (Huntington 1991). In fact, it has been argued that Middle Eastern states have not democratised because they failed to economically liberalise; failed to modernise; experienced a lack of institutionalism; and, have been subject to colonialism (Salamay 2009).

The increasing focus of scholarly work on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism has occurred in a particular academic environment in which research on democratisation skyrocketed during the 1990s and 2000s. In hindsight, it has been problematic, and still is, to solely focus on the Middle East in terms of its democratic future perspective and authoritarian institutions. Conducting research in these terms has been sparked from the political science departments that were largely guided by influential research institutions in the United States (Dalacoura 2012). Nevertheless, when placing so much emphasis on those two phenomena, the researcher dismisses the Middle East as, firstly, one homogenous entity. Secondly, it regards the Western standard of democracy as the prior development the Middle East also has to undergo. And thirdly, these two lenses withhold

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scholars from looking at the Middle East from other perspectives but from authoritarianism and exceptionalism (Anderson 2006).

The uprisings of 2011 have shaken the debate on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. While for some this does not undo their previous lines of reasoning, it has created the possibility for other scholars (Medani 2013; Gausse III 2011) to more explicitely express their alternative views on perceiving and studying the region. For the former group of scholars, like Eva Bellin (2012), the uprisings of 2011 do not mean that these concepts can be called outdated or regarded as unimportant. Bellin’s (2012) research still emphasises the reasons for why Middle Eastern states are and have been so resilient to democracy. The reason for this type of research finds its origin in the argument that research on authoritarian resilience has not become less valid because two or three regimes were toppled during the uprisings, nor because the protests did not sweep through every country in the Middle East (Bellin 2012).

For the latter group of scholars, arguments exist that Middle East Studies’ scholars should take on a different lens: diminish the focus on authoritarian resilience, but look at the importance of social movements and of civil society (Medani 2013). Using authoritarian resilience as the main starting point of one’s investigation leads to assumptions that Middle Eastern states are subject to weak civil societies, are subject to state patronage and have weak oppositions (Medani 2013). In addition, there are also scholars who believe that authoritarian stability is a myth (Gause III 2011). Since the uprisings of 2011, Gregory Gause III (2011) argues that one cannot speak anymore of authoritarian resilience. Instead, over the years scholars have studied this region with a particular lens, which led them to “underestimate the forces for change that were bubbling below, and at times above, the surface of Arab politics” (Gause III 2011: 90). As will become visible throughout this dissertation, this perspective of focusing on forces from below will be adopted as thoroughly as possible.

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Methodology

This dissertation has been concerned with gaining in-depth knowledge on one particular topic, namely the role of a social movement, the Hiraak, in ending the authoritarian resilience of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. Henceforth, two types of qualitative methods have been used in order to gain such a qualitative understanding of the case. The first method that will be discussed in this methods section is single case study analysis, which is the most important method since it defines the scope of the problem and sets the boundaries in which the research will be operationalised. Secondly, within the single case study analysis, secondary literature analysis has been conducted in order to gain the relevant data on the position of the Hiraak during Saleh’s authoritarian rule.

Single case study analysis

Single case study analysis is a qualitative research method that provides a framework in which the data analysis was conducted. A case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004: 242). When looking at the research question, the case studies that have been chosen are Yemen, and within Yemen a specific case study of a social movement, the Hiraak. The Hiraak in this case was the unit of analysis. For this dissertation, Yemen was chosen as a deviant case study to the existing theories on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. It was a deviant case study since it did not comply with existing studies and their outcomes. Many studies on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism predicted that countries in the Middle East are bound to dictatorship and are not able to overcome this condition (Bellin 2004; Heydemann 2007; Salamay 2009). However, as has been witnessed in 2012, Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down after being in office for 21 years. Henceforth, conducting this study challenges conclusions made by studies on Middle East exceptionalism.

From the start of the dissertation, the researcher assumed that Yemen would prove to be a deviant case within the theories of authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism in the sense that it did not meet the expectations of these theories. The reason for choosing a deviant case is to explore new, or still unspecified, explanations on existing theories (Seawright & Gerring 2008). For the purpose of this investigation, the author aimed to find new explanations and provide a critical assessment towards authoritarian resilience arguments. A focus has been put on the importance of social movements and the power of the ordinary people in destabilising the former Yemeni government. By doing this, the author

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stepped away from the notions that Middle Eastern states are subject to weak civil societies and the success of so-called authoritarian upgrading (Bellin 2004; Heydemann 2007).

Conducting single case study analysis can both pose advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, a disadvantage of single case study analysis is the potential bias in the selection of this case. The selection can be prone to subjectivity of the researcher and it might be difficult to extract this research to a wider population. A researcher may already possess information on the case that might be beneficial in order to reach satisfactory conclusions, or it can help to comply with existing theories that the researcher wants to uphold. When looking at the case study of the Hiraak, the researcher has been aware that this movement has been important in shaping and influencing the policies of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. Hence, it has been important to not only focus on the decisive role of the Hiraak in destabilising Saleh’s regime but to also look for arguments that state the opposite and possibly contradict the important role the Hiraak took on in shaping the contours of the regime’s policy decisions. In addition, when making use of single case study analysis, it might be difficult to apply the findings to other cases because they can be case-bound and subject to variables that other cases do not own. Hence, it might be difficult to generalise the findings and to uphold external validity. Because the findings provide firstly an explanation and analysis of one particular case, it might be difficult to replicate this to other cases that are bound within a different context and which are subject to different variables. Still, this disadvantage directly poses an advantage as well. Using single case studies allows the researcher to obtain a rich understanding of the situation and it is a suitable method for research of explanatory nature (Gerring 2004). Even though the probability of replicating this case study to the larger population is slightly smaller, it does provide the researcher and reader excellent knowledge on the topic. When making use of single case study analysis to investigate the role of the Hiraak movement in destabilising the former Yemeni regime, a lot of in-depth knowledge has been gained. Questions as to why and how this movement organised have been answered by using this research method that focuses on the explanatory nature of a research.

Secondly, another advantage of using single case study analysis is that it can shed a different light on a theory or a situation that will help future research to be more critical and explore new ways of assessing a topic. This can be particularly relevant when looking at the pitfalls of the theories on authoritarian resilience and Middle East exceptionalism. A critical assessment will be conducted when the role of social movements will be assessed in destabilising the regime under Saleh. Since he stepped down from office in 2012, the notion

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of authoritarian resilience is under attack and deserves to be scrutinised as to what the relevance of this theory still is in today’s political sciences and to Yemen in general.

Secondary literature analysis

Within the single case study analysis, secondary literature analysis was conducted. Secondary literature analysis is part of the broader method of secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis draws on pre-existing data to investigate new research questions (Coltart et al. 2013). Employing this type of method was particularly relevant to help answering the more descriptive sub-questions as to how Ali Abdullah Saleh had consolidated his regime and the historical accounts of how the Hiraak’s grievances have evolved over time. In addition, secondary literature analysis has been highly relevant to provide a clear overview of the debate and different stances on as to what authoritarianism exactly entails. The sources that have been used when conducting research on these topics were primarily extrapolated from academic journals such as the Annual Review of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Affairs, and the journal Studies in Comparative International Development. Moreover, reports were consulted from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, and also from other types of research institutes such as the Middle East Institute and the World Bank. Conducting research on the more current events concerning the Hiraak in Yemen focused on up-to-date news articles from sources such as Al-Jazeera and Foreign Affairs. These sources provide high quality journalism. Nevertheless, when using such sources, their possible bias must be taken into consideration. This, however, must be considered at all times, also when using data from academic journals and NGOs.

Secondary literature analysis has been used in this research as a method concerned with analysing literature and documents that have already conducted research and analysis on the Hiraak and on Yemen in general. Employing secondary literature analysis can both be beneficial and at the same time pose disadvantages to a research. The advantages of secondary literature analysis have already been broadly outlined above. It is highly useful in providing answers to the more descriptive sub-questions and conducting secondary literature analysis will provide a clear overview of theoretical debates. The questions as to how Saleh had established his government and what the main tenets of his regime entailed were scrutinised when employing secondary literature analysis. Moreover, the grievances of the Hiraak were outlined and described when making use of the analysis of a wide-range of secondary literature on this topic.

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In addition, advantages concerning secondary literature analysis also involved practical issues. Firstly, conducting secondary literature analysis allowed the researcher to be concerned with theoretical and substantive issues instead of practical problems of collecting new data (Hakim 1982: 16). It saved time and money and instead more effort could be put into analysing and interpreting results. In addition, and highly relevant for this research on the Hiraak in Yemen, secondary literature analysis was a useful method to employ when it is too risky to conduct a primary investigation in a country that is war-torn and too dangerous to conduct a politically-sensitive research. When trying to get an in-depth grasp in what way the Hiraak has contributed in ending the Saleh regime, it is very important to be working in an environment that is not struck by politically motivated assassinations and arrests (Blumi 2011: 129).

The disadvantages that are attached to secondary literature analysis are as following. When using secondary literature analysis in the social sciences, the researcher is dealing with non-naturalistic data. Non-naturalistic data is data collected for the purpose of social research; this data has already been interpreted and interfered by the researcher (Coltart et al. 2013). Furthermore, it has been argued that conducting secondary analysis is subject to problems of data not fitting the research questions and that the researcher lacks contextual knowledge (Hammersley 2009). While conducting research on the Hiraak, these possible disadvantages made the researcher alert on disentangling conclusions made by former analyses. Attention has been paid as to how conclusions were reached, if triangulation was being applied whereby the sources were checked for validity, and what the possible agenda behind the research has been. The conclusions reached for this research were based on multiple sources that contributed in establishing validity to the arguments. Moreover, the potential lack of contextual knowledge by not conducting primary analysis itself has tried to be overcome by reading and making sense of already conducted research on the Hiraak. The research conducted for this dissertation has based its analysis on a wide range of academic sources that evaluated the historical patterns leading to the emergence of the Hiraak and the consequential influence they have had on the stability of the government.

While being aware of the disadvantages of employing secondary literature analysis, it has been used for its substantive and analytical emphasis. It helped to give answers to, on the one hand, the more descriptive sub-questions, and, on the other hand, to gain a clear overview and debate of the used theories. In general, conducting secondary literature analysis combined with a single case study analysis has proved to be beneficial to answer the research questions for this dissertation. The in-depth knowledge gained by employing secondary literature

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analysis provided answers on the Hiraak, its grievances, and the political environment created by Saleh in which it operated.

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Findings: Saleh’s rule and the Hiraak’s grievances

The Hiraak finds its origins long before its establishment in 2007. With the unification of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, North Yemen) in 1990, the foundations were being laid on which the south would build its grievances. Ali Abdullah Saleh, former president of the YAR, would become the first president of united Yemen in 1993. This electoral victory for Saleh marked the beginning of a long-lived authoritarian rule, in which the south would experience a life of second-ranked citizens (Rabi 2015). In order to answer the research question in what way the grievances of the Hiraak contributed in ending Saleh’s authoritarian regime, it is, firstly, of significance to understand how Ali Abdullah Saleh had established its rule and on which grounds the following grievances would grow. Henceforth, the first section of this chapter will inquire Saleh’s authoritarian rule, its patronage networks and elitist behaviour. Thereafter, the second section will contribute in explaining what the Hiraak’s grievances exactly entail. Emphasis will be placed on the political aspects of these grievances. Finally, the last section will adopt a more interactive approach between the first two sections, exploring what the effects of the Hiraak’s grievances and actions were on the stability of Saleh’s rule.

Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime consolidation

Voices of protest should be understood in a broad perspective, thereby focusing not only on the dynamics within a protest movement, but also on the environment that has shaped the possibility and reasons for why such movements mobilise. To answer the research question as to what the role of the Hiraak was, and arguably still is, in destabilising Saleh’s regime it is necessary to explore the environment that has allowed this social movement to emerge. Henceforth, this section will focus on answering the first sub-question of this dissertation, concerned with how Ali Abdullah Saleh had established his authoritarian regime and what the main tenets of this regime were. As will become clear throughout this chapter, Saleh had established an authoritarian state of which the structure and consequences can still be seen today, even though he has been ousted from office. He has left an environment behind in which policies of divide-and-rule are present on the surface, and in which patronage and corruption are daily practices (Phillips 2008). In order to scrutinise how Saleh established his authoritarian regime, this section will firstly focus on the process of unification and the

The power of social movements : the Hiraak in Yemen and the debate on authoritarian resilience

M A S T E R T H E S I S P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E :

I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S