Public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization : the predicting role of police manners and trust

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Public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization

The predicting role of police manners and trust

Master thesis Political Science

International Relations

Micro-foundations of international conflict

Author: Pepijn Kip

Supervisor: Dr. Seiki Tanaka

Second reader: Dr. Floris Freek Vermeulen Date: June 23, 2017

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Abstract

This study examines the role of public cooperation with the police in the context of

countering radicalization. Existing literature mentioned the process-based policing model as mechanism to establish public cooperation in fighting general crime. This study applied the model on countering radicalization. A survey experiment among 180 participants in the Amsterdam district Geuzenveld was conducted. Results indicated that levels of public cooperation could be predicted by police manners via the mediator trust. This study linked police manners to hard and soft strategies, and found that hard strategies lead to less public cooperation than soft strategies. The findings implicate that the process-based policing model could be applied in the context of countering radicalization. This study improves the

understanding of countering radicalization as well as it broadens the knowledge on public cooperation.

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Since the London and Madrid bombings in 2004 and 2005, Western European authorities have been increasingly focusing on countering radicalization (Hellmuth 2015). I will refer to radicalization as the process in which individuals disengage from society and engage in the violent Jihad (Hegghammer 2013; Moghaddam 2005). Engaging in the violent Jihad refers to involvement in violent acts in either the domestic country or a country abroad (Hegghammer 2013). Although authorities’ increased focus on countering it, radicalization could be

considered aggravating in Western Europe: 2015 and 2016 each counted seven terrorist attacks, while in the period between 2005 and 2015 only three attacks occurred on Western European soil (Boutin & Chauzal 2016). Furthermore, approximately 4000 individuals left their homeland during last five years to engage in the violent Jihad abroad (ibid). This is a significant increase compared to the estimated 100 European individuals that engaged in the violent Jihad during the Iraq war in the early zeroes (Holman 2015).

This study examines the role of public cooperation in authorities’ attempt to counter radicalization. Public cooperation refers to civilians’ willingness to cooperate with the police (Tyler 2005). Studies on interaction between the police and civilians suggest public

cooperation to be a crucial aspect in combatting crime in general (Huq, Tyler & Schulhofer 2011). This indicates that environment could be of influence in the police’s success in combatting crime. Public cooperation, for instance the willingness to report crime, is considered to be predominantly a product of trust towards the police (Tyler 2005). Some research indicates that trust towards the police could influence public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization as well (Cherney & Murphy 2013). To further explore this possibility, current study examines the role of trust towards the police on public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization.

The specific aim of this study is to examine whether trust towards the police functions as a mediator between perceived police manners and a willingness to report radicalization. The central research question is: to what extent perceived police manners can explain a variation in public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. According to the process-based policing model perceived police manners are the main predictors of trust, which leads to public cooperation (Tyler 2005). Several studies support this assumed mechanism and found perceived police manners, via trust, to be the predictor of public cooperation in terms of willingness to report crime (Bradford et al. 2014; Pryce 2016; Reisig

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& Lloyd 2009). The role of public cooperation in countering radicalization is still under-examined. Some literature on interaction between the environment and radicalization emphasizes the importance of acquaintances (Doosje et al. 2016) and networks (King & Taylor 2011) but do mention public cooperation as an option for countering radicalization. Other literature does acknowledge the possible role of public cooperation in countering radicalization, but these studies are rare (Huq et al. 2011). In this thesis, environment refers to the circumstances and social networks that surround an individual. A social network will refer to a social group that relates to each other on one or more commonalities (Lindekilde,

Bertelsen & Stohl 2016). This could be a family, a sport club membership or having residence in the same neighborhood. Individuals that contain these social networks will be referred to as acquaintances.

Previous research acknowledges environment’s role in radicalization but leaves the possible role of the environment in countering under-examined. For this reason, the academic applicableness of the process-policing model could be considered limited to combatting crime in general. This study elaborates on previous research and examines the process-based

policing model could be applied in the context of countering radicalization. The expectation is that perceived police manners will predict willingness to report radicalization via the mediator trust.

The argument was examined by testing willingness to report radicalization among inhabitants of the Dutch capital Amsterdam. Like other West-European countries, the Netherlands has been facing problems with radicalization during past years: it counts, for instance, approximately 200 individuals who left the country recently to engage in the violent Jihad abroad (Boutin & Chauzal 2016). Counted per capita, the Netherlands outnumbers countries like the U.K. and Germany when it comes to these ‘foreign fighters’1

. According to evidence, an estimated 95% of radicalization occurs in urban areas in Western-Europe (ibid).

For this reason, Amsterdam, one of the largest Dutch urban areas, was chosen to conduct the study. Based on a personal interview with an Amsterdam police officer was decided to specifically aim the study at the district Geuzenveld in the borough Nieuw-West: this district would face the most severe problems with radicalization according to local police and would thus be the most relevant district in Amsterdam to focus on. Data were collected by the author through the conduct of structured surveys. The results indicated that perceived

1_{Foreign fighters are individuals who were born and raised in Western countries, but leave the domestic country}

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police manners were a predictor for willingness to report radicalization via the mediator trust. Due to this finding, this study would have implications on academic as well as on practical level.

Firstly, the process-based policing model possibly can be applied in the context of countering radicalization. This would mean that police manners could predict public cooperation with regards to countering radicalization. In the extension of this academic contribution, this finding contributes to policy as well. The second contribution is therefore of practical nature: police could think of policies that aim to maintain positive relationships with inhabitants of communities where radicalization occurs.

The next section maintains a literature review and will stress the existing gap in literature. The third section describes the theoretical argument and formulates hypotheses based on this argument. The fourth section contains a case overview with regards to radicalization in Amsterdam. Section five and six consist of this study’s methods and the analysis. The seventh section contains the discussion and limitations, whereas the eighth concludes.

2. Literature Review

This literature review contains an overview with previous relevant research. The first part elaborates on existing literature on radicalization and the environment, whereas the second focuses on previous research on public cooperation. Then, I will point out how this study could link both areas of research together and fill up a gap in the field of research.

2.1 Radicalization and the environment

2.1.1 The radicalization process

The environment is considered to be a strong predictor for the onset of radicalization. The perception of a relatively deprived environment would, according to multiple models, the onset factor for radicalization (Borum 2003; Moghaddam 2005). This perception of relative deprivation would lead to disengagement from society and a willingness to use violence. The disengagement from society would amongst other things mean the individual’s

disengagement from initial social networks. This disengagement, however, does not mean that a radicalizing individual disengages from all social networks; the disengagement from initial

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social networks would run parallel with engagement with more radical social networks (Moghaddam 2005). These more radical social networks would offer the radicalizing

individual the environment to continue radicalizing (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Research on the onset of radicalization, thus tend to indicate that the beginning of the process relies on

interaction with the environment.

Furthermore, more recent research indicates that this interaction with the environment does not stop when further stages of radicalization are reached; engagement in the violent Jihad implies for most individuals aligning with a Jihadist organization instead of operating alone (Hegghammer 2013; King & Taylor 2011). This alignment with organizations makes that individuals tend to fulfill different roles within a radical organization; like ‘normal’ organizations a hierarchy with different functions exist to optimize the efficiency of the organization (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Literature makes several distinctions in functions within Jihadist organizations, for instance between ‘domestic fighters’ and ‘foreign fighters’ (Hegghammer 2013), or between leaders, drifters and protégés (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Important notice, however, is that every function is part of a social network. This indicates that radicalized individuals that joined a Jihadist organization are not likely to become socially isolated in any stage on the radicalization process.

Based on discussed literature, the environment could be considered to play an important role in every stage of the radicalization process (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010;

Hegghamer 2013; Moghaddam 2005). Radicalizing individuals could therefore be assumed to be part of social networks in every stage of radicalization. This subsection has briefly

explained how the environment, for instance the presence of Jihadist organizations, could have a facilitating function in the radicalization process.

Since the environment possibly plays a facilitating role in the radicalization process, it could play an important role in the process of countering radicalization as well. As mentioned, radicalizing individuals would be part of social networks in every stage of the process. This would mean that a radicalizing individual would have an environment that is aware of this radicalization at every stage of the process. The next subsection elaborates on research on the continuous presence of social networks in context of countering radicalization. This

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2.1.2 Countering radicalization

A limited number of studies propose that the environment could be a predictor in countering radicalization (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011; Huq et al. 2011). Previous subsection mentioned that the environment possibly plays in an important role in the radicalization process. This subsection does not contradict previously mentioned studies but add to the findings and suggest that the environment could play a role in countering the process.

Research indicates that police increasingly acknowledges the importance of public cooperation when it comes to countering radicalization (Huq et. 2011). As mentioned, public cooperation is civilians’ willingness to cooperate with the police. Public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization is considered to have a passive and a pro-active form (ibid). Firstly, civilians could cooperate in police’s efforts to counter radicalization. This would for instance be a willingness to answer questions about an alleged radicalizing acquaintance. This type cooperation is considered to be the passive form of public cooperation. The pro-active form of public cooperation refers to willingness to make the police aware of risks within communities of radicalization. An example of this would be informing the police about a radicalizing acquaintance on own initiative. In this way, the environment could contribute to countering radicalization effectively. Especially public cooperation of Muslim communities is considered to be an important predictor for effectively countering radicalization.

Previous research namely suggests that presence of Muslim communities could be a predictor of the presence of radicalization (Huq et a. 2011; Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq 2010). Radicalization in Western Europe as well is in the U.S. would mainly occur in neighborhoods with high densities of Muslim inhabitants; the majority of radicalized individuals would have an Islamic background (Boutin & Chauzal 2016; Huq et al. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010).

Therefore, Jihadist radicalization would be more likely to occur in an environment with the presence of a Muslim community.

Since Muslim communities are linked to radicalization, Muslim communities would be more than other groups encouraged to engage in public cooperation with regards to countering radicalization (Huq et al. 2011). This public cooperation sometimes would lack because of ignorance (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). Further, this encouragement of public cooperation is considered to be interfered with other policies to counter radicalization. Due to the assumption that Muslim communities could be a breeding ground for radicalization, these

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communities would be more often targeted by coercive police policies (ibid). This coerciveness is considered to have negative effects on willingness to engage in public cooperation.

The next section elaborates more on public cooperation and discusses the broader field of research concerning the subject. By elaborating on the broader research field on public cooperation could be identified how this study could link public cooperation and

radicalization and the environment. Furthermore, the next section will explain why public cooperation could be influenced by, for instance, coercive police policies.

2.2 Public cooperation

2.2.1 Public cooperation and effective police work

Research indicates public cooperation to be a strong predictor of successful police work. Multiple studies suggest that police tend to be more effective in combatting crime in neighborhoods where public cooperation is high (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011; Reisig & Lloyd 2009). The important role of public cooperation in combatting crime, is mainly due to police’s inability to be present at every given moment. For this reason, police would be unable to monitor criminal activities at all times. A high level of public cooperation, for instance a willingness to report crime, could obviate the occasional absence of police. A neighborhood with a high level of public cooperation would so to say function as extra ears and eyes of the police.

Furthermore, the predicting power of public cooperation on successful police work is considered to be increasing when communities are less accessible to the police (Huq et al. 2011; Madon, Cherney & Murphy 2016). By this, I mean accessible in the context of

gathering information by monitoring. This accessibility could, for instance, decrease when a community speaks a different mother language than the police. In such case, police would have to rely on community members that speak the police’s language and are willing to engage in public cooperation. The role of public cooperation would especially be important in communities and neighborhoods where police is considered as outsider. This phenomenon was found in neighborhoods with a high density of immigrants in the U.K. (Huq et al. 2011) and Australia (Madon et al 2016). Effective monitoring in these neighborhoods would be challenging for the police due to differences in culture and language. For this reason, information would be predominantly gathered through public cooperation.

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2.2.2 Establishing public cooperation

The majority of recent research on establishing public cooperation could be linked to a previous study from the U.S. that examined the relation between trust towards the police and willingness to cooperate with the police amongst different ethnic groups (Tyler 2005). In the footsteps of this study, similar research has been done in the U.K. (Jackson et al. 2013), South-Africa (Bradford et al. 2014) and Australia (Murphy & Cherney 2011). The findings of these studies suggest trust towards the police to be the strongest predictor for public

cooperation.

Trust towards the police would be such a strong predictor for public cooperation because it is considered to be linked to police legitimacy; civilians that perceive a police force as legit would show higher levels of trust towards this police force, and vice versa (Murphy & Cherney 2011; Pryce 2016). Due to this legitimacy and trust, police would be considered as a logical solution in case of emergency. Absence of trust towards the police would lead to an increased tendency to take matters into own hand. A study on acceptance of violence, indicated that civilians show a more positive attitude towards the own use of violence when trust towards the police is absent (Jackson et al. 2013). The role of trust in public cooperation could be summarized as follows: “If citizens do not trust the system, they will not use it” (Moore 1997).

Although evidence suggests trust is of crucial importance in establishing public cooperation, research indicates that the presence of trust towards police is not always self-evident (Jacskon et al. 2013; Tyler 2005). To fully comprehend the mechanism of public cooperation, it is valuable to discuss possible predictors of trust.

2.2.3 Predictors of trust

Literature distinguishes three main predictors of trust with regards to public cooperation: police manners, police performance and identification with the police (Reisig & Lloyd 2009; Tyler 2005).

Police manners would, according to the process-based policing model, be the most prominent predictor of trust (Tyler 2005). The process-based policing model assumes the manners police operates with to be more important to gain trust than actual performance or effectiveness. Perceived transparency, respect and friendliness would lead to trust, whereas

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unreasonableness, disrespect and unfriendliness would establish the opposite (Cheurprakobkit & Bartsch 2001; Tyler 2005). According to the process-based policing model, positive police manners would lead to a perception of procedural justice: the experience that police treats civilians in a just way leads to trust towards the police (Reisig & Lloyd 2009). The process-based policing model is supported by multiple studies on procedural justice (Jackson et al. 2013; Pryce 2016; Murphy & Cherney 2011; Tyler 2005). Due to the multiplicity of support, the process-based policing model could be considered as a valuable predicting mechanism of trust towards the police. These studies were, however, conducted in relatively similar, low-crime Western environments in the U.S. (Tyler 2005), the U.K. (Jackson et al. 2013) and Australia (Murphy & Cherney 2011). Research conducted in environments with more

prevalence of crime, indicates that police performance could be another important predictor of trust (Bradford et al. 2014).

The police performance model assumes that police’s capacity and effectivity to fight crime is the most important predictor of trust (Tyler 2005). Further, visibility would be

essential; only when civilians observe the capacity and effectivity to fight crime, trust towards the police would be gained. As mentioned, the police performance model is predominantly supported by research that was conducted in relative high-crime environments. Research in South-Africa, for instance, indicated that besides police manners, police performance is an important predictor for trust (Bradford et al. 2014). Similar results were found in a

comparison study in Australia: for civilians living in neighborhoods with relatively more crime, police performance became a more prominent predictor of trust (Sargeant, Cherney & Murphy 2014).

In general, the police performance model has less empirical support than the process-based policing model. Moreover, studies that did find support for the police performance model did also find support for the process-based policing model (Bradford et al. 2014; Sargaent et al. 2014). Therefore, police manners could be considered as a more consistent predictor of trust towards the police than police performance. As mentioned, police manners and police performance are considered two predictors of trust towards the police. This does not mean these are the only two possible predictors of trust towards the police.

Another possible predictor of trust would be identification with the police. Identification in this context refers to the level that individuals perceive own identity as similar to the identity of the police officer (Madon et al. 2016). According to the social identity theory, similar perceived identities would lead the perception of belonging to the same social group and thus to identification (Tajfel & Turner 1986). High levels of

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identification would lead to more trust towards the police than low levels of identification. This phenomenon was found in neighborhoods in Australia with a high density of immigrants (Cherney & Murphy 2011).

Immigrants generally tended to show lower levels of identification with the police than natives (Madon et al. 2016). The partial absence of identification is linked to immigrants’ perception that the police belongs to another social group than themselves. Native civilians, on the other hand, would perceive the police more as their own social group. Studies

conducted in the U.S. indicated similar results, with Afro-Americans showing less

identification with the police, who consisted predominantly of white Americans (Tyler 2005). These studies on identification and trust tend to indicate that minorities show lower levels of trust towards the police due to the belonging to another social group. Although this could be the case, other research contradicts this assumption and explain low levels of minorities’ trust through another mechanism.

Minorities would show lower levels of trust towards the police as a result of personal negative interactions with the police (Cherney & Murphy 2014; Huq et al. 2011). Based on these findings, previous personal experiences with the police would predict trust towards the police. This aligns with the previous discussed process-based policing model that assumes police manners to be the main predictor for trust. This indicates that studies that found evidence for identification as predictor, also found the process based policing model to be a predictor. An interaction with a police officer that is disrespectful could be perceived as negative and thus lead to lower levels of trust. Besides the nature of interaction, the frequency of interaction would have influence on the levels of trust as well. Studies on ethnic profiling suggest that individuals who are repeatedly subject of stop and searches, start reporting lower levels of trust towards the police than individuals that were less stopped and searched

(Çankaya 2015).

2.3 The gap in literature

Previous research on radicalization and the environment indicates predominantly that the environment plays an important role in every stage of the process (Moghaddam 2005; King & Taylor 2011). Evidence suggest that this role exists at the onset of radicalization (Moghaddam 2005) as well as in later stages of radicalization (Hegghammer 2013). Furthermore, research indicates the environment could be a predictor of successful countering radicalization (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011; Doosje et al. 2016; Huq et al. 2011). This predicting power

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would possibly due to environmental awareness that goes along with radicalization

(Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). This environmental awareness indicates that countering could benefit from environments’ willingness to engage in public cooperation in the U.K. (Huq et al 2011) and the U.S. (Tyler et al. 2010)

The importance of public cooperation has stressed by multiple studies on police work; public cooperation is considered to be a strong predictor for effective police work (Reisig & Lloyd 2009; Tyler 2005). The presence of public cooperation would be mainly predicted by trust towards the police (Tyler 2005). According to the process-based policing model, perceived police manners would be the strongest predictor for trust towards the police (Jackson et al. 2013; Pryce 2016; Murphy & Cherney 2011; Tyler 2005). However, the examination of the process-based policing model has been predominantly focusing on fighting crime in general. How the process-based policing can be applied on countering radicalization is under-examined. Some literature on countering radicalization acknowledges the possibly important role of the environment (Huq et al. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010). However, these studies did not explicitly link perceived police manners to public cooperation in the context of radicalization through the process-based policing model.

Literature, thus, misses an explicit link between police manners and public cooperation in the context of radicalization.

This study examines the research question: to what extent perceived police manners can explain a variation in public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. To test the research question, the next section builds a theoretical argument and concludes with four hypotheses with regards to the research question.

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3. Theoretical Framework

The process-based policing model is the core of the theoretical argument that is made in this thesis. According to the process-based policing model police manners determine trust towards the police which can predict public cooperation (Tyler 2005). As mentioned, studies on police effectivity on fighting general crime have repeatedly indicated that the process-based policing model could be applied as a predictor for public cooperation (Jackson et al. 2013; Pryce 2016; Murphy & Cherney 2011).

I would state that this model could be applied in the context of countering radicalization well. This extension, however, would mean that public cooperation in the context of radicalization instead of fighting general crime could be predicted by the process-based policing model. For this reason, will be first explained why general crime possibly is interchangeable with radicalization as it comes to the process-based policing model. Then, this theoretical section explains the link of the conceptual model that elaborates on why public cooperation could be essential in effectively countering radicalization. The third part links executed police strategy to public cooperation in the context of radicalization. Police strategy functions as the ultimate link in the conceptual model. The fourth part discusses the possible role of frequency of the executed strategy in the conceptual model, whereas the fifth part describes environmental factors that could interfere with the effectiveness of the process-based policing model. The sixth and final part proposes the complete conceptual model as well as four hypothesizes that are based on this model.

3. 1 General crime and radicalization

General crime and radicalization is considered to have strong similarities on both conceptual (Freilich & LaFree 2015; Mullins 2009) and perceptual level (Bunker 2000; Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). Therefore, it is possible that radicalization could have the same function as general crime in the process-based model. In the initial model, public cooperation in fighting general is predicted by the model. However, this study suggests that public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization could be predicted the process-based policing model as well. The possible interchangeableness of general crime and radicalization is based on two findings in literature.

Firstly, radicalization is considered to have shared characteristics with general crime on the conceptual level (Freilich & LaFree 2015; Mullins 2009). Previous research indicates

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that both organized crime organizations and Jihadist organizations2

engage in illegal activities like weapon trade, people trafficking and laundering money (Mullins 2009). The similarity between radicalization and general crime is considered to exist on individual level as well: radicalized individuals and general criminals would have similar backgrounds and

overlapping personal characteristics (Freilich & LaFree 2015). Other research adds to this by suggesting that radicalized individuals are more likely to have a past that involved general criminal activities (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Due to the similarities between radicalization and general crime, some criminology models argue that radicalization should be approached as a form of crime by all means (Freilich & LaFree 2015; Mullins 2009). This assumption

suggests a certain equation of the concept of radicalization and the concept of general crime. However, this equation would not only exist on conceptual level, but on perceptual level as well.

Radicalization is considered to be perceived similar to general crime. Like general crime, the majority of civilians would perceive radicalization as societal unacceptable

(Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). Radicalization would pose negative effects on civilians in the shape of polarization and fear (Bunker 2000). Similar effects were found with regards to general crime: high-crime environments would have disruptive effects on societies (Bradford et al. 2014). Civilians’ similar negative perception of radicalization and general crime, possibly leads to similar levels of willingness to cooperate in stopping both. As mentioned, several studies indicated that willingness to engage in public cooperation exists in fighting general crime (Bradford et al. 2014; Tyler et al. 2005). This willingness possibly exists in the context of countering radicalization as well, since radicalization is perceived in a similar negative way as general crime (Bunker 2000). In this line of arguing, the negative perception of radicalization would lead to willingness to engage in public cooperation that is similar to public cooperation fighting crime in general. This could be an indication that the process-based policing model could not only be applied on general crime but on radicalization as well.

So far, it has been discussed that radicalization could replace general crime in the process-based policing model. To explore this claim, the conceptual model in this thesis tweaks the predicting value of the initial process-based policing model. Whereas the model initially predicts public cooperation in the context of general crime, this conceptual model’s aims to predict cooperation in the context of countering radicalization by the process-based

2_{Jihadist organizations refers here to the organizing of radicalized individuals with the purpose to bring the}

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policing model. The next step to explain the conceptual model of this study, is to elaborate on how countering radicalization can be linked to public cooperation in the process-bases

policing model.

3. 2 Public cooperation and countering radicalization

3.2.1. Invisibleness of radicalization

Public cooperation possibly is considered to be a strong predictor of effectively countering radicalization. Evidence suggests that the environment could function as predictor in countering radicalization (Huq et al. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010). As mentioned, the process-based policing model assumes public cooperation to be the result of an interaction between the environment and the police (Tyler 2005). The environment would therefore function as strong predictor in the initial process-based policing model.

Literature indicates that countering radicalization could rely on interaction with the

environment as well (Huq et al. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010). Evidence suggests that radicalization is a process that can occur with relative invisibleness to the police (Doosje et al. 2016;

Mogghadam 2005; Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). Several radicalization models suggest that radicalizing individuals only start engaging in violent acts in the last stages of radicalization (Doosje et al. 2016; Moghaddam 2005). In stages prior to this, the process of radicalization would mainly include shifts in mindset and an increased support for radical ideologies. However, such cognitive processes could be considered to lack visibility to the police. Police is likely to remain unaware of radicalizing individuals until is the individual engaged in a violent act. Police awareness of earlier stages radicalization would, because of invisibility, come from information that is shared by communities (Cherney & Murphy 2013; Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). Literature indicates that in contrary to the police, radicalization can be visible to communities (Cherney & Murphy 2013).

Studies on the radicalization process found that radicalizing individuals are surrounded by social networks at every stage of the process (Moghaddam 2005; Hegghammer 2013). This indicates that at every stage of radicalization, people are aware of this radicalization or in other words: radicalizing individuals would be surrounded with an aware environment. The next subsection elaborates on this assumption and explains which acquaintances could be

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expected to be aware of radicalization. These acquaintances would be of crucial importance for the link between public cooperation and countering radicalization.

3.2.2 Social networks and public cooperation

The environment of a radicalizing individual could be of value in countering radicalization cooperation (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). However, this value only becomes tangible in case the aware environment is willing to engage in public cooperation. The environment consists, as previously mentioned, of social networks that surround the radicalizing individuals (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Moghaddam 2005). Two types of acquaintances are distinguished here: radical acquaintances and non-radical acquaintances. This last group possibly plays the most important role in the link between public cooperation and countering radicalization.

Although being predominantly surrounded by an increasing number of radical acquaintances, radicalizing individuals would have non-radical acquaintances as well.

Evidence suggest that most individuals start radicalizing from environments that contain non-radical acquaintances (Doosje et 2016; Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). These non-radical acquaintances, thus, possibly could be aware of the onset of the radicalization process. As the process continues, the radicalizing individual is likely to make a shift to more radical acquaintances (King & Taylor 2011). However, some of the social networks that contain non-radical acquaintances, could stay intact. This perseverance could be due to family ties or spatial closeness, for instance being resident of the same street (Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). This group of acquaintances could possibly be of strong importance of public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. On the one hand, this group remains to some extent in contact with the radicalizing individual and is thus possibly aware of this radicalization. On the other hand, this group of acquaintances would not share the radical ideology and would therefore be more likely to engage in public cooperation to counter radicalization.

Evidence suggests that social networks of radicalizing individuals would increasingly consist of radical acquaintances (King & Taylor 2011). These acquaintances would be fully aware of an individual’s radicalization, since these acquaintances share the same ideology to some extent. The problem with this is, is that radical acquaintances are probably less willing to engage in public cooperation. Radical acquaintances of the radicalizing individual would thus be aware of the radicalization but possibly not willing to engage in public cooperation.

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This assumption is supported by previous research that indicates radicalized individuals would have a psychological shield of resilience around them (Doosje et al. 2016).

Three psychological stages are distinguished among radicalizing individuals: the sensitivity stage, the group member stage and the action stage. Only in the first stage,

individuals would be sensitive for messages that diverge from radical ideologies and could be de-radicalized (Doosje et al. 2016). De-radicalization refers to rejection of the Jihadist

ideology that was embraced before (ibid). For this reason, only radical acquaintances that are located in the sensitivity phase could possibly be convinced to engage in public cooperation. Public cooperation of acquaintances that are located in the ‘group member’ or ‘action’ stage could be considered to be unlikely.

Of the two discussed groups of acquaintances, especially non-radical acquaintances that remain in the social network of a radicalizing individual could be of importance in the link between public cooperation and countering radicalization. This subsection already slightly discussed that public cooperation only can be established if there is environmental willingness to engage in it. The next section elaborates on this and discusses how public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization could be established through different police strategies. The next subsection describes three links of the conceptual model: the link between trust and public cooperation, the link between perceived manners and trust and the link between police strategy and perceived police manners.

3.3 Police strategy and public cooperation

The process-based policing model assumes public cooperation to be established through trust towards the police (Tyler 2005). Trust towards the police would indicate that civilians have belief that the police is capable of making just decisions and has the integrity to make these just decisions. Evidence suggest that perceived police manners are the main predictor for trust towards the police (ibid). Perceived transparency, respect and friendliness would lead to trust, whereas unreasonableness, disrespect and unfriendliness would establish the opposite

(Cheurprakobkit & Bartsch 2001; Tyler 2005). Positively perceived manners would thus lead to trust to towards the police, whereas negatively perceived manners would lead to no trust.

The conceptual model of this study links perceived police manners to police strategy; perceived manners would be the result of the strategy that is chosen to execute. In this study, police strategy functions as the ultimate link in the conceptual model. The conceptual model distinguishes two types of police strategies in the context of radicalization: hard strategies and

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soft strategies. The next two subsections describe both strategies in the context of countering radicalization and link the strategies to perceived police manners.

3.3.1 Hard strategies

Hard police strategies aim to counter radicalization in two ways: the prevention of

radicalization and the prevention of violence perpetrated by radicalized individuals (Hellmuth 2015). Hard strategies aim to establish de-radicalization through repressive methods. These methods vary from ‘stop and searches’ to preventive arrests of suspected radicalized individuals (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011; Hellmuth 2015). After several bombings in the early zeroes, most Western European countries have implemented laws that allow police officers to ‘stop and search’ individuals that could form a threat in terms of radicalization. Furthermore, hard strategies would imply monitoring by security cameras, metal detectors and other sensors (Huq et al. 2011). In this way, hard police strategies would attempt to create a radical ‘unfriendly’ atmosphere (ibid).

However, the repressive character of hard strategies is linked to a negative perception of the police (Huq et al.2011). In the context of countering radicalization, hard strategies would often be perceived as exaggerative and unfunded (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011; Huq et al. 2011). This negative perception would not only be present at individuals that have been targeted by hard strategies: individuals that witnessed the police executing hard strategies would perceive the police in a similar negative way (ibid). For this reason, the execution of hard strategies could be considered to have effects on the way the environment perceives the police.

The conceptual model of this study therefore links hard police strategies to negatively perceived police manners by the environment. The process-based policing model suggests that negatively perceived police manners like unreasonableness, disrespect and unfriendliness lead to a decrease in trust towards the police (Tyler 2005). This study proposes that hard strategies would trigger this kind of perceived manners and would thus lead to a decrease in trust by the environment.

3.3.2. Soft strategies

Soft police strategies focus on two aspects of countering radicalization: prevention and rehabilitation (Hellmuth 2015; Horgan & Braddock 2010). The word ‘soft’ refers to the

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constructive approach of the strategy; soft strategies would aim to build a sustainable

srelationship with targeted individuals as well as with the environment (Hellmuth 2015; Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). This implicates that, unlike hard strategies, soft strategies would not benefit from repressive methods to be effective. Soft strategies aim to prevent radicalization by identifying individuals that have not been started radicalizing yet but form a high-risk group and individuals that are located in the first stages of the radicalization process or (Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). These individuals would, according to evidence, still be approachable and sensitive for

message that diverge from radical ideologies (Doosje et al. 2016). Study results indicate that an increase in self-esteem can be linked to radicalization prevention (Feddes, Mann & Doosje 2015). Based on this research, soft strategies could possibly be linked to a positive perception of the police by the individual the strategy is targeted on.

However, soft strategies have been in lesser extent linked to perceptual effects on the environment than hard strategies. The conceptual model of this study nevertheless proposes that the execution of soft strategies would lead to a positive perception of the police by the environment. This claim is based on the constructive approach of radicalization and the considered positive effects on targeted individuals (Feddes et al. 2015; Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). Furthermore, research indicates that hard police strategies would have effects on the perceptions of the environment. Therefore, this study’s conceptual model proposes opposite effects of soft strategies on the perceptions of the environment. In this line of arguing, soft strategies would trigger positive perceived police manners by the environment. The process policing model assumes positive police manners like respect, friendliness and transparency to increase trust towards the police (Tyler 2005).

So far, the process-based policing model has functioned as the core of this theoretical section. Firstly, the conceptual model proposed to apply the process-based policing model on public cooperation in the context of radicalization. The following sections explained stepwise, how each concept of the conceptual model is linked to each other. The next subsection,

deepens the conceptual model by proposing that the effect of police strategy could influenced by frequency.

3.4 The effect of frequency on police strategy

The conceptual model of this study assumes that frequency of executed police strategy is of strengthening influence on the proposed effect of police strategy on perceived police manners.

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A strategy that would be executed more often, would thus lead to a stronger perception of certain police manners. According to this claim, often executed hard strategies would lead to more negatively perceived police manners than rarely executed hard strategies. Likewise, often executed soft strategies would lead to more positively perceived manners than rarely executed ones.

Evidence suggest that reoccurring interaction with the police can lead to confirmation of experience-based perceptions of the police (Çankaya 2015; Cherney & Murphy 2013). Crucial for this confirmation, however, would be the similar nature of the interaction

(Çankaya 2015. In the previous subsection, the execution of a police strategy would possibly lead to the perception of certain manners by the environment. According to literature, this perception would be strengthened if executions of similar police strategies will be

experienced later (Cherney & Murphy 2013). The similarity of police strategy would lead to the confirmation of the previously perceived police manners. This confirmation would strengthen the already present perceived police manners. To explore this possibility, frequency was added to the conceptual model.

The addition of frequency to the conceptual model deepens the possible effect police strategy has on perceived police manners; the influence of frequency of executed strategies could be examined due to his addition. Frequency is not assumed to have a predicting value in the initial process-based policing model. The implementation of frequency into the conceptual model of this study, could be considered as an addition. As mentioned in the first subsection of the theoretical framework, the conceptual model of this study aims to predict public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. To further deepen the conceptual model, the next subsection discusses environmental concepts that could interfere with the public cooperation.

3.5 Interfering concepts of the environment

3.5.1 Fear

The first interfering concept could be fear for retaliation of the environment. As previously suggested, acquaintances that are aware of an individual’s radicalization are part of this individual’s social network (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). This social network could for instance be a family or being resident of the same neighborhood (ibid). However, in either scenario the radicalizing individual and the aware individual are somehow linked. This would mean that

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both individuals have shared acquaintances or are even relatives. Engaging in public cooperation to counter radicalization, would for an aware individual mean reporting an acquaintance to the police.

An eventual report of a radicalizing individual could have negative implications for the reporting individual. Studies on social groups suggest that negative behavior towards in-group members could lead to the exclusion of the in-group member that executes this behavior (Ruckman et al. 2015). The reporting individual could be perceived as a traitor and excluded from the social network. However, radicalizing individuals are known to become increasingly violent and have violent acquaintances (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). For this reason, engaging in public cooperation to counter radicalization could have more severe implications than just exclusion from the social network. These implications would in this case not only be based on a fear for exclusion but on a fear for violent retaliation as well. The first possible interfering concept with public cooperation is thus fear.

3.5.2 Motivation

Another factor that could interfere with public cooperation in countering radicalization, is a lack of motivation. As literature indicates, radicalizing individuals can be located in social networks that contain acquaintances with radical ideas (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; King & Taylor 2011; Wilner & Dubouloz 2010). The absence of motivation to report could be due to sympathizing of the acquaintances with radical ideologies themselves. For this reason, it is imaginable that an individual that is aware of an acquaintance’s radicalization, shares ideologies with this acquaintance. The both individuals could, per example, share the belief that Muslims in the Middle East are suppressed by Western dominancy. Whereas the radicalizing individual decides to travel abroad to become a foreign fighter, the other individual does not take up any action. However, due to the shared belief of Muslim

suppression, the latter individual lacks motivation to engage in public cooperation to counter radicalization. Furthermore, the previous section mentioned that aware individuals and radicalized individuals could be linked through a family tie. It is possible that an aware individual would generally be willing engage in public cooperation in the context of radicalization, but that this willingness is absent in case it concerns a relative. The second possible interfering in the conceptual model is thus a lack of motivation.

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3.5.3 Recognition of radicalization

A third concept that possibly interferes with engaging in public cooperation in the context of radicalization, is the lack of capacity to recognize radicalization. Evidence suggests that counter-radicalization strategies are prone to failure because of societal ignorance (Choudhury & Fenwick 2011). Acquaintances of radicalizing individuals would have valuable information about this radicalization, but did not know that this information could be relevant. The

perceived irrelevance of the information would be the result of incapacity to recognize signals of radicalization. Deviant behavior of radicalizing individuals, for instance, was not perceived as such by society and therefore not reported to the police (ibid). Examples of such deviant behavior could be a sudden increased interest in the Islam or seclusion from the environment (Doosje et al. 2013). Although such behavior is considered to be a possible signal of

radicalization, the environment does not always perceive this behavior as suspicious. Recognition of radicalization is tested in this study, but will not be included into the conceptual model. Unlike the concepts fear and motivation, recognition regards to

environmental awareness of the presence of radicalization. The conceptual model of this study, however, aims to predict willingness to public cooperation in the context of

radicalization. A baseline assumption for this, is that radicalization would be recognized as such. Since recognition is a baseline assumption for the onset of the conceptual model, it would not make sense to make it part of the conceptual model; incapacity to recognize will lead to no onset of the proposed conceptual model and could therefore not interfere with the dependent variable.

3.6 Complete conceptual model & Hypotheses

The proposed conceptual model links police strategies to public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization through the process-based policing model (Figure 1). Hard and soft strategies will, according to the expectations, lead to differently perceived police manners. Hard strategies, will be perceived as negative, whereas soft strategies will be perceived as positive. The effect of strategy on perceived police manners is expected to be strengthened by frequency. According to the process-based policing model, perception of the police manners will directly influence trust. This trust will lead to engagement in public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. Further, fear and the absence motivation are expected to have a negative effect on the willingness to engage in public cooperation.

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Figure 1. The complete conceptual model.

Based on the discussed theory and the proposed conceptual model, the following hypotheses will be tested.

The ‘strategy’ hypothesis: Hard strategies will lead to less public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization when compared to soft strategies.

The ‘frequency’ hypothesis: The proposed effect of strategies on perceived police manners is strengthened by frequency.

The ‘trust’ hypothesis: Trust functions as mediator for the effect strategy has on willingness to report radicalization.

The ‘interference’ hypothesis: Fear and motivation will have a negative effect on public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization.

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4. Case overview: radicalization in Amsterdam

This study has been conducted in Amsterdam. The conceptual model made a general claim about the possible relation between police strategy and public cooperation in the context of radicalization. Therefore, this section has an explaining function in why this claim could be specifically tested in Amsterdam. Firstly, the general situation with regards to radicalization in the Netherlands and Western Europe is discussed. The second subsection narrows down to Amsterdam and discusses why this study was conducted in the district of Geuzenveld. The third subsection describes characteristics of the district Geuzenveld.

4.1 Radicalization in the Netherlands

Similar to other countries in Western Europe, the Netherlands is facing issues with regards to radicalization (Boutin & Chauzal 2016). Unlike other Western European countries, the problems with radicalization could be considered to be less visible. Countries like Belgium, Germany, France and the U.K. all experienced Jihadist violence during last five years (Yourish, Lai & Aisch 2017). This type of problem is considered to be less present in the Netherlands; the last Jihadist violent incident, was the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 (Vermeulen 2014). However, radicalization is this thesis refers to engaging in the

violent Jihad in the domestic country or abroad.

Although, the Netherlands has not experienced domestic Jihadist violence recently, it is considered to have problems with individuals that engage in the violent Jihad abroad. The Netherlands is considered to have more than average problems with the departure of foreign fighters (Boutin & Chauzal 2016). According to evidence, the Netherlands is estimated to have the second most foreign fighters per capita in Western Europe. Only Belgium would count more foreign fighters per capita (ibid). The departure of foreign fighters is that it is considered to have disruptive effects on domestic societies (Hegghammer 2013).

Furthermore, the return of foreign fighters to domestic countries, would pose threats on

Western European countries. Due to experience in combat and in some cases, specific training camps, returned foreign fighters would have an increased capacity to attack the domestic country effectively (ibid).

For this reason, the departure and return of foreign fighters could be considered to contribute to Western Europe’s problems with radicalization. The Netherlands would

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especially be dealing with this aspect of radicalization, upon which was decided to focus in this study on foreign fighters. This would make a study on radicalization in the Netherlands most relevant. So far, radicalization in the Netherlands is put in the perspective of Western Europe to give an indication of the problems the Netherlands is facing with radicalization. The next subsection, explains the researcher’s choice to the conduct the study in Amsterdam.

4.2 The case of Amsterdam

Radicalization in the Netherlands is considered to have its center of gravity in the Randstad (Boutin & Chauzal 2016). The Randstad is the urban area in the western part of the

Netherlands and contains the major cities of the country. According to evidence, an estimated 95 percent of all radicalization in Western Europe takes place in the urban areas (ibid). With regards to the Netherlands major cities like Amsterdam, Den-Haag and Utrecht are considered to have most problems with radicalization (Van Unen 2017). In this study, was decided to focus on Amsterdam.

According to newsfeeds, the borough Nieuw-West would have the most problems with radicalization in Amsterdam (Roerdink 2015; Straathof 2015). Figure 1 shows the map of Amsterdam, with the borough Nieuw-West highlighted in green. To further explore the problems with radicalization in Nieuw-West, the researcher set up an interview with a local police officer that worked in the borough Nieuw-West. The borough Nieuw-West is divided in several districts (figure 2). According to the police officer, the district Geuzenveld would have the most severe problems with radicalization in Nieuw-West (Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April

2017). For this reason, was decided to conduct research in the district Geuzenveld: a study with the aim to examine public cooperation in the context of countering

radicalization, would be most relevant in a district where radicalization is relatively more prevalent.

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4.3 Characteristics of Geuzenveld

The district Geuzenveld counts approximately 18000 inhabitants and is located in the northern part of Nieuw-West (OIS 2016). Similar to the other districts of Nieuw-West, Geuzenveld’s population consists of a relative large part of non-Western immigrants: 62 percent of

Geuzenveld’s population consist of non-Western immigrants. The total population of

Amsterdam consists of 34 percent non-Western immigrants. This indicates that Geuzenveld’s population consists of a percentage non-Western immigrants that significantly differs from the average. Such high percentages of non-Western immigrants are besides in Nieuw-West, found in the Bijlmer district in Amsterdam (ibid). In the Bijlmer, however, immigrants predominantly have their roots in Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, whereas in Nieuw-West most immigrants have a Moroccan or Turkish roots. Geuzenveld is estimated to have a percentage of 46 with a Moroccan or Turkish roots. This could be considered to indicate that Geuzenveld has a relative large Muslim community; most Moroccan and Turkish immigrants Figure 2. The division of Nieuw-West into districts.

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have an Islamic background (OIS 2016). As mentioned in the literature review, the presence of Muslim communities is possibly a predictor for the presence of radicalization (Huq et a. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010).

Another possible predictor for the presence of radicalization would a deprived

environment (Borum 2003; Moghaddam 2005). Geuzenveld could possibly be perceived as a deprived environment by its inhabitants; the district is considered one of the districts in Amsterdam with the lowest scores on quality of life (OIS 2016). Inhabitants of Geuzenveld would grade the district with an average of 6.33

on quality of life, whereas the overall average in Amsterdam is 7.3. Furthermore, inhabitants of Geuzenveld would live in relative poverty, when compared to other parts of Amsterdam. Especially the Moroccan and Turkish

communities would be represented in the poverty numbers; 66 percent of households living under the poverty line would be of Moroccan or Turkish descent (ibid). Besides relative low scores on wealth, inhabitants of Geuzenveld score relatively low on socio-economic aspects, health and societal participation when compared to the rest of Amsterdam. Furthermore, Geuzenveld has a score of 128 on the safety index, which is the second highest of all 22 rated districts in Amsterdam. A high score on the safety index indicates relative high crime rates and domestic violence, as well as a stronger presence of perceived unsafety by inhabitants (ibid). Based on the descriptive characteristics, Geuzenveld could thus possibly be remarked as a deprived environment.

The deprived environment in combination with the presence of a relative large Muslim communities could make Geuzenveld a district with relatively more presence of

radicalization. Both a relative deprived environment (Borum 2003; Moghaddam 2005;) and the presence of Muslim communities (Huq et a. 2011; Tyler et al. 2010) would be predictors for the presence of radicalization. This claim is supported by the findings of the interview with the police officer that works in the borough Nieuw-West (Van der Merwe, A., personal communication, 14 April 2017). The descriptive characteristics of Geuzenveld, in

combination with findings of the personal influence, legitimize this study’s choice to target Geuzenveld.

3_{This grade refers to the Dutch grading system that contains scores from 1 to 10. The score 1 is the lowest}

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5. Analysis 5.1 Research design

This study aimed to examine the role of perceived police manners in willingness to engage in public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. This has been done by

conducting a survey experiment. Previous studies on public cooperation predominantly used surveys to conduct research (Madon et al. 2016; Murhpy & Cherney; Tyler 2005). This study’s aim is to contribute to this field of research on public cooperation. Therefore, was decided to measure public cooperation in the context of radicalization with surveys; in this way, this study would share a similar research design with previous studies on public cooperation.

The experimental aspect of the surveys was included to examine the effect of different perceived police manners on public cooperation. Previous research mainly conducted surveys between different social groups to explore variation in public cooperation (Murphy &

Chereny 2011; Tyler 2005). This study aimed to explore variation as a result of different perceived police manners. For this reason, was chosen to conduct a survey experiment.

5.2 Population and sample

This study had 180 participants with an average age of 46.9 (SD=20.3), ranging from 15 to 83. Among the participants were 54 males (30%), 121 females (67.2%) and 5 participants (2.8%) unknown. Men turned out to be less willing to participate to current study, which resulted in a skewed gender division.

Participants were a convenient sample from the population of the approximately 18000 inhabitants of Geuzenveld (OIS 2016). The sample is referred to as convenient, since participants were gathered in public areas. The public areas were shopping mall ‘Plein 40-45’, community centers and sport clubs. Due to limited resources and time was chosen to use a convenience sample.

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5.3 Methods

Materials

The used materials for this study were printed surveys. The items that were used in the surveys were designed by the researcher and derived from previous research on public cooperation (Tyler 2005). Participants also received an informed consent. This informed consent consisted a description of the study purpose and a guarantee for confidentiality and anonymity. Furthermore, the informed consent consisted the email address of the researcher in case participants would have later questions.

To analyze the data gathered through the surveys, the program SPSS was used. To conduct mediation analyses the program PROCESS was added to the initial program SPSS. Further, no computer programs were used to analyze the data.

Procedure

Inhabitants of Geuzenveld were asked to participate in a study on trust towards the police, without emphasizing the focus on the radicalization theme. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios. Afterwards, participants were told about the

radicalization focus of the study. Furthermore, confidentiality and anonymity was insured to each participant.

After collecting all 180 participants, the researcher manually converted the surveys to a dataset in SPSS. This dataset was used to analyze the data. Firstly, the internal consistency of the variables was measured, followed by multiple regression analyses. Then, with the program PROCESS mediation analyses were conducted.

5.4 Experimental design

As previously mentioned, this study conducted a survey experiment. The experimental design was a 2x2 design, with ‘strategy’ and ‘frequency’ as variables. Strategy was divided into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, whereas frequency was divided into ‘often’ and ‘rare’. The complete design thus included four conditions (table 1). Based on the proposed conceptual model, the

expectation was that each condition would lead to different levels of public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization. In each condition, participants were asked to read a short

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scenario that preceded the survey. In the ‘independent variable’ section will be elaborated on the content of the scenarios.

Table 1. Scenarios and expected outcomes

Strategy

Frequency Hard Soft

Often Least public cooperation Most public cooperation Rare Few public cooperation Some public cooperation

5.5 Independent variables

5.5.1 Scenario

As mentioned, each participant was assigned to one of the four (2x2) scenarios. ‘Hard’ scenarios maintained a short story about fictional neighbors that were arrested by the local police without a clear reason. This scenario aimed to trigger negatively perceived manners of the police. ‘Soft’ scenarios maintained a short story about the local police helping these neighbors with the reparation of a bike. This scenario aimed to trigger positively perceived manners of the police. In ‘often’ scenarios was added to the story that the local police frequently showed described behavior, whereas in ‘rare’ scenarios this behavior was

described as rare. Below are the four scenarios literally described. The actual scenarios were in Dutch, so in this thesis the scenarios were translated into English.

Scenario 1 (hard and rare): Imagine that the local police officer is rarely present in

your neighborhood to monitor inhabitants’ behavior. Yesterday, he arrested your neighbors without a clear reason and released them later.

Scenario 2 (hard and often): Imagine that the local police officer is often present in

your neighborhood to monitor inhabitants’ behavior. Yesterday, he arrested your neighbors without a clear reason and released them later.

Scenario 3 (soft and rare): Imagine that the local police officer is rarely present in

your neighborhood to monitor inhabitants’ behavior. Yesterday, he helped your neighbors with the reparation of their bike.

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Scenario 4 (soft and often): Imagine that the local police officer is often present in

your neighborhood to monitor inhabitants’ behavior. Yesterday, he helped your neighbors with the reparation of their bike.

5.5.2 Perceived police manners

As the conceptual model proposed, police strategy would be linkable to perceived police manners. The measurement of perceived police manners in this study could be considered to be the manipulation check; in each scenario, participants would be expected to perceive different police manners. To measure the perceived police manners, was referred to the scenario that preceded the survey. The sentence started with: ‘Based on the described

scenario, I find the local police officer…’. This sentence was followed by six items that could each be scored on a 1 to 7 scale. The six items were: ‘respectful’, ‘unfair’, ‘reasonable’, ‘unfriendly’, ‘polite’ and ‘transparent’. Item 2 ‘unfair’, and 4 ‘unfriendly’ were reversed before analyzing the data. The 1 to 7 scale was a scale to measure the level of agree with each item. The score 1 referred to ‘totally disagree’, whereas the score 7 referred to ‘totally agree’.

5.5.3 Trust

According to the conceptual model, trust would be directly affected by perceived police manners. The variable ‘trust’ was measured in a similar way as perceived police manners. Firstly, was referred back to the scenario that preceded the survey. The sentence started with: ‘Based on the described scenario, I find the local police officer…’. This sentence was

followed by six items that could each be scored on a 1 to 7 scale. The six items were: ‘to be trusted’, ‘treating inhabitants of the neighborhood unequal’, ‘does his work good’, ‘is an untrustworthy person’, ‘makes right decisions’ and ‘cares about all inhabitants of the neighborhood’. Item 2 ‘treating inhabitants of neighborhood unequal’ and 4 ‘is an

untrustworthy person’, were reversed before analyzing the data. The 1 to 7 scale was a scale to measure the level of agree with each item. The score 1 referred to ‘totally disagree’, whereas the score 7 referred to ‘totally agree’.

Public cooperation in the context of countering radicalization : the predicting role of police manners and trust