How does a networked policy actor effectively operate in influencing the European Commission’s Migration and Asylum policies?

Graduate School of Social Science

Master Thesis Political Science & International Relations

How does a networked policy actor effectively operate in influencing the

European Commission’s Migration and Asylum policies?

A case study of the European Platform of Asylum and Migration (EPAM)

By: Myou Lieve Roscam Abbing Student ID: 11207787 Supervisor: Dr. Conny Roggeband Second Reader: Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado

14th _{June 2018} Word Count: 22700

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my profound gratitude for my thesis supervisor Dr. Conny Roggeband for making this thesis possible. I am grateful for your guidance, insight and support which you have graciously continued to offer me over the course of this research project. I could not have wished for a better supervisor. Moreover, I would like to thank my second reader Dr. Rosa Sanchez, for taking the time to read my thesis and for initiating my interest in the field of lobbying and advocacy.

I would like to thank my respondents for their cooperation and providing me with their resourceful and critical insights. Thank you for allowing me to gain a comprehensive understanding of the internal structures of policy networks and illustrating the fundamental importance of collectively cooperating with one another.

I would like to thank Alexandra Martin for her endless support, understanding, elegance and continuous motivation in allowing me to be the best version of myself.

I would like to thank my family and particularly my sister, my greatest supporter and a continuous inspiration to me. Thank you for your unceasing patience and for your eternal support. Lastly, my loving parents who have contributed to my personal fulfilment in every single way, and who are the underlying reason behind each of my achievements. Thank you for your unconditional love, support, guidance and never ending inspiration.

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Abstract

There remains a lack of agreement and research focusing on the specific factors that contribute to the effectiveness of interest groups. Specifically, whether they truly obtain the ability to exert influence in the European political playing field. There has been limited academic research conducted into analysing how a policy platform, whose internal structure comprises of diverse interest groups, has the ability to collectively influence legislation. This thesis explores the internal structures and collective cooperation that takes place within a policy platform. Respectively, how a policy platform, as a collective actor, approaches EU institutions and EU agencies. It will primarily aim to provide insight how interest organisations are embedding themselves into a structured network policy platform, with the goal of influencing European legislation multilaterally. This insight will be presented from three diverse perspective namely that of; institutional access, collective action and consensus building.

Some scholarly debates can be used as a stepping stone in gaining a further understanding how the collective action of interest groups can lead to success factors in influencing European legislation. Beyers, De Bruycker & Baller (2015) focus on research regarding interest group activity within the European political landscape. More detailed, their research elaborates on the necessity of involving interest groups in the European decision-making process for maintaining European democratic values and legitimacy. Further literature emphasises how collective action is involving individual interest groups to join platforms with the expectancy to influence legislation more effectively (Scholz, Berardo & Kile, 2008; Schlager, 1995; Thiel & Ucarer, 2014). I involve the study of Eising (2007) and Beyers (2004) which deliberates on the role of institutional access between interest groups and international organisations. The study of institutional access remains important as it is often considered a prominent factor in allowing interest groups or policy platforms to exert their influence. Specifically, how interest groups are individually and collectively advocating shared issues to reach the appropriate actor or institute, and influence the relevant policy. Therefore, the present study will show how members of a structured networking platform, acting as a policy actor, are aiming to be effective in influencing EU policy.

Keywords: interest organisations; transnational advocacy; consensus building; European Union; influence; collective action; networking policy actor; policy platform; institutional access

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Table of Content

2.1. Interest Groups and Policy Making………..… 9

2.2. Interest Groups and Policy Network Actors in the European Union……….. 13

2.3. Collective versus Individual Action……….... 16

2.4. The Role of Collective Actors in Consensus Building………... 18

3. Methodology……….. 22

3.1. Case Selection………. 23

3.2. Methods of Data Collection ………..………. 26

3.3. Data Collection………... 29

3.4. Data Processing……….. 31

4. Analysis……….. 33

4.1. Emergence of EPAM as a policy network………. 33

4.2. Assessing the view from the opposing side………... 39

4.2.1. The European Union Agencies: a liaison………..43

4.3. Institutional Access……….47

4.4. Collective versus individual actions……….. 51

Individual actions……….. 54

4.5. Consensus building in a policy platform……… 57

5. Conclusion………. 62

Bibliography………...66

Annexes………..74

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List of Abbreviations

CCME - Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe DG - Directorate General

DG HOME – Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs DG JUST – Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers EC – European Commission

ECRE – European Council on Refugees and Exiles EP – European Parliament

EPIM - European Platform for Integration and Migration EPAM – European Platform of Asylum and Migration EU – European Union

FRA - Fundamental Rights Agency

Frontex - European Border and Coast Guard Agency

IGO – International Governmental Organisation MPG - Migration Policy Group

NGO – Non-governmental organisation UN - United Nations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner Refugees

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1. Introduction

The study of interest organisations has drawn considerable academic attention. “It is now a

commonplace of observation that interest groups are important and even necessary components of democratic politics” (Moe, 1988, p.2). Scholars have thoroughly examined interest groups internal structures (Kohler-Koch, 2009), their approach in aiming to influence legislation and policies (Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015), and the manners in which they employ framing techniques (Dür, 2008). Interest groups can be established “on the basis of their observable policy-related activities, in particular, activities related to influencing policy outcomes” (Baroni, Caroll, Chalmers, Marquez & Rasmussen, 2014, p. 141). Besides their aim to increasingly influence the legislative process, interest groups can additionally be seen “acting as agents of influence, channels of representation, sources of information and expertise and communicators to specialised sectors of society” (Moe, 1988, p.2). Research continues to highlight that interest groups, specifically, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are increasingly integrating themselves into the core of European politics (Kastrati, 2017). It is therefore necessary for research to continue generating new developments, in order to close the gaps in research which are analysing the influence, information and access that interest groups withhold (Tallberg, Dellmuth, Agne & Duit, 2015 & Thiel & Ucarer, 2014). There remains a necessity to invest in further research which examines the areas of access and policy input from NGOs. This is primarily due to the “success that NGOs have in influencing policy making with international organisations (IOs)” (Tallberg et al., 2015, p.213). Particularly, in the European Union (EU) “interest groups and NGOs increasingly seek to influence supranational policy making” (Thiel, Ucarer, 2014, p.99). Thiel and Ucarer (2014) argue that “interest groups and NGOs are achieving remarkable level of success in appealing to EU institutions” (Thiel & Ucarer, 2014, p. 100). However, more research is necessary in identifying the factors that account for success in influencing policy. Due to the multiple levels of governance which subsists within the European Union, there is a strong need to lay further emphasis on the consultation process and access between interest groups and European institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2009). Institutional access remains to be an imperative notion in understanding how interest groups are able to exploit their access. Particularly, whether this might go hand in hand with the exerting of influence (Klüver, 2013).

6 This research should be able to systematically answer the following research question: How does EPAM as a networked policy actor effectively operate in influencing the European Commission’s Migration and Asylum policies? As this question involves various intertwined concepts it requires some elaboration. The research has the aim to analyse the effectiveness of interest groups in a networked policy platform, and the tactics they employ to influence policy in the EU. Moreover, I analyse the ways in which this platform, which acts as a policy platform, is used by interest groups as a way to multilaterally influence policy. The empirical research will rely on a single case study of the European Platform for Asylum and Migration (EPAM). A networked policy actor which operates at the EU level on asylum and migration policies and affairs.

This study will analyse interest groups within a policy platform whose presence in the European political landscape is examined from three theoretical perspectives; institutional access, collective action and consensus building. The research will furthermore present four sub-research questions determined by these three perspectives. Collective action is primarily acknowledged by scholars as a reference to ‘influence’. Specifically, how multiple interest groups are coordinating their lobbying tactics within a singular policy platform. The coordinated action amongst interest groups similarly refers to the concept of ‘commonality of interests’. This concept “considers the influence patterns among interest groups and the extent to which sectors or other interest groups have similar perspectives or similar interests” (Hamm, 1983, p. 382). This research should be able to demonstrate how and why interest groups seek to be incorporated into a policy platform, as an effective approach towards influencing legislation. This assumption is based on the nature that research into interest groups is often explained by referring to political group activity. This refers to theory that interest groups have “common interests which are maintained through member support of group policies, and where group policies are an expression of underlying common interests” (Moe, 1988, p.2). These concepts are primarily based on the scholarly work of Mancur Olson (1965) who developed the ‘logic of collective action’ theory. He established that when individuals share a mutual interest in achieving a comparable political goal they will attain to this in the form of a collective good (Olson, 1965). Meanwhile, scholars remain to draw focus on the particular ways in which coordinated or collective action is employed as a strategy to influence the legislative process. However, there remains a lack of representation how this is achieved through the means and structures of a policy network. Therefore, this is an aspect which the theoretical framework will particularly lay its focus on.

7 Consensus building or collaboration within a political context is often referred to as a positive approach in multilaterally solving societal or global issues (Smith, 1999). Consensus refers “to a decision being made without objective from any voting member of the particular body in question” (Smith, 1999, p.174). This research will be analysing whether a policy platform, without a secretariat, consisting of various NGOs and co-chaired by an IGO, are enabling the concept of consensus building as a strategy to effectively influence EU legislation. Furthermore, whether the process of consensus building is likewise reflecting the decision-making process of the chosen policy platform. This aspect of the research can be seen as particularly contributory. Mainly, as it analyses the aforementioned procedures and concepts and applies it to a policy platform whose internal operational structures significantly differ compared to that of; individual interest groups, organisations or political committees. The process of effectively reaching consensus is likewise relatively ambiguous in the case of EPAM. This is specifically with regards to their extensive membership presence, and the platform’s inclusive environment with various niche organisations. Furthermore, scholars have recognised that interest groups often cooperate with a variety of other political and intergovernmental (IG) organisations. However, obtaining an analysis of the collected advocating strategies of interest groups shared interests, remains infrequent. My thesis aims to address this gap of the literature, as it remains valuable to examine the internal operational structures amongst interest groups within a shared policy platform. In addition to addressing the coordinated lobbying strategies that are exerted through such a platform. Lastly, the literature lacks in emphasising the complexity of efficiently reaching consensus within a large structured policy network. Therefore, this thesis will provide an accurate and realistic representation of the contributing factors that have the ability to interfere with the consensus process of a policy network.

This empirical study will furthermore aim to highlight the importance of access, specifically the institutional access between interest groups and international organisations. This is particularly due to access being considered a prominent factor in allowing interest groups or policy platforms to exert their influence. The theoretical contribution equally lays on this aspect of the research. There is abundant academic literature focusing on the reliant institutional relationship between individual interest groups and the European Commission (Joachim & Locher, 2009, Cram 2011). However, there remains to be limited knowledge regarding the understanding of policy platforms subsisting of multiple interest groups, and their cohesive access to European institutions. It is of

8 importance to assess whether receiving institutional access can be seen as a reflection of the effectiveness organisations acting individually or collectively. Meaning, is the access of interest organisations a reflection of their collective of individual power? It is critical to provide research in this area as the European political sphere increasingly sees political movements formed. These political movements are mainly consisting of pan-European platforms, aiming to influence legislation either domestically or in an European context (Joachim & Locher, 2009). “The expanding involvement of pan-European interest groups in policy areas reflects the need for a counterweight to the technocratic legitimacy deficits inherent in the EU’s transnational structure” (Thiel & Ucarer, 2014, p.101). The selected areas of focus are primarily based on the idea that there is a lack of theoretical understanding of the persistency factors that drive interest group influence within a structured policy platform.

This research will therefore be of contributory value in explaining the operational internal structures of a policy platform, and the collective and coordinated actions that subsist within such a platform. Moreover, this thesis should provide an insight into various factors that can contribute to a policy network’s success and effectiveness in influencing European decision-making. This will be based on the presence of; institutional access, collective action and consensus building within a loose structured policy network. Indeed, to a certain extent there has been scholarly recognition of interest groups success in the European Union and the benefits in lobbying collectively. However, examining the interactions and influence amongst interest groups within a network policy platform, and the manners in which this influence is effectively exerted externally, remains to be under-theorised. This research will make a contribution to the literature on the influence of loose structured policy networks in EU politics. Besides this research making a contribution to scholarly research, it should similarly create awareness to the improvements of EU policy procedures and technocracy.

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2. Theoretical Framework

This first section will represent the theoretical components of the research. I commence the theoretical framework by providing a clear overview of the definitions and structures of interest groups. Consequently, I aim to demonstrate how interest groups are a current representation of policy making and governance. Particularly, in the current European landscape. Furthermore, I aim to provide a theoretical understanding concerning the structures of collective action, as a strategic approach amongst interest organisations. Subsequently, I aim to clarify the process of consensus building, and how this can effectively take place in a structured policy platforms. Notably, their remains to be a gap in the literature regarding this. The literature presented in this theoretical framework will serve as a base for my empirical data.

2.1 Interest Groups and Policy Making

In order to attain an adequate understanding of the central role that interest groups play in EU legislative politics, one must firstly provide an accurate definition of the term. In the European context interest groups are nowadays often referred to as groups “aiming to influence the EU decision-making process and contribute to democratic decision-making by aggregating and facilitating participation of interested citizens” (Michalowitz, 2007, p.132). We see the importance of studying interest group influence in the EU. Particularly, the extent to which interest groups are effectively contributing to the political decision-making, reflected back in a variety of academic studies (Beyers 2004; Dür 2005; Bouwen 2002). The literature regarding the notion of influence is often based on two distinctive arguments, one being normative, and the other one being empirical. The normative argument (Michalowitz, 2007) highlights that it is of importance to have interest groups included in EU policy processes, for purposes of democratic deficit and citizen participation. Michalowitz (2007) argues that it can be perceived as either a contributory force of European democratic governance or with “fears of overly influential European interest groups in endangering democratic decision-making” (Michalowitz, 2007, p. 133). One can similarly aim to look at it from an empirical perspective, however, there remains uncertainty in establishing the extent in which influence is embedded in policy making. Dür (2008) argues that the representation of interest groups and their perceived influence can be observed at either side of the political

10 decision-making spectrum. One side of the spectrum being the lobbying and agenda-setting, the other being access to EU institutions and thus the policy processes. Regardless of its perception, Dür (2008) highlights the significance of studying interest group influence. Particularly, as it remains “highly relevant for both debates on the democratic legitimacy of the EU and our understanding of policy-making processes in this entity (Dür, 2008, p.559).

Despite the influence of interest groups being actively defined and acknowledged, there seems to be a deficiency in identifying the precise factors that make this influence occur. Influence is difficult to grasp and there is much disagreement between scholars about definitions and measurements. However, influence can generally be seen as “an actor’s ability to shape a decision in line with their preferences” (Dür, 2008, p.561; Nagel, 1975, p.29). Scholars in the field of political science also often use Max Webers definition of power, which can be considered a more operational way of defining influence. Namely, “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Parsons & Henderson, 1965, in Wallimann, Tatsis & Zito, 1977, p.231). Michalowitz (2007) affirms that if we regard interest groups to be as influential as they are considered to be, then it is that of “lobbying efforts of interest groups that should be reflected in policy outcomes” (Michalowitz, 2007, p.133). This statement claims that if an interest group pursues a strong form of lobbying, their interest will be incorporated into policy outcomes. If this statement would be accepted then it would revolve around the belief that policy outcomes should be a direct reflection of lobbying efforts from interest groups (Chalmers, 2011). This highlights that influence is often measured in examining whether the values and interest from interest groups can be seen reflected back in policy (Michalowitz, 2007; Dür, 2008; Beyers et al, 2008, Chalmers, 2011). There remains extensive research which argues that influence does not necessarily have to reflect lobbying efforts from interest groups. Therefore, one should not merely observe policy outcomes, but actively include and examine other aspects which could play a decisive role in establishing influence. Namely, that of political development, institutional access and pressure (Bauwen; 2002, Mahoney; 2007; Coen, 2007). Therefore, in terms of ‘influence’, this research will similarly involve all of the above mentioned components.

11 Policy Networks

When analysing the role of interest organisations and their aligned influence, it can be argued that it is likewise of importance to analyse the role of policy actors. Particularly, the contextual factors that present themselves in policy agenda setting. Policy networks can be defined as “political structures that define the role which actors play within networks, have distinct sets of rules; and contain organisational imperative and pressure to maintain the network” (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.4). When examining the outcomes of European policies, it is necessary to focus on the central role that policy networks play. Particularly, as Pollack (2015) argues that the EU has seen significant changes in policy making, due to the increased recognition of external actors such as policy networks. He argues that there is a decrease in the traditional sense of EU policy making, as it is “occurring less through hierarchical authority structures and more through negotiation and persuasion within more decentralised policy networks” (Pollack, 2015, p.49). A policy network actor “brings strategic knowledge to a structured context, and both that strategic knowledge and the structure context help shape the agent’s action” (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.4). Scholars such as Yanacopulos (2005), Keck & Sikkink (1998), and Khagram, Riker & Sikkink (2002) have associated policy networks with that of transnational advocacy networks, due to its encompassing term, applicable to either networks. A transnational advocacy network “is a broad term used to describe an activist network that transcends national boundaries and that consists of members motivated by shared values, rather than professional or material concerns” (Yanacopulos, 2005, p.94).

In the study of policy networks and policy collaboration in understanding governance, it remains unclear as to how they operate as an effective collective actor. Particularly, in face of their different outlooks, goals, mandates, resources and more. Brockhaus, Di Gregorio & Carmenta (2014) provide an understanding how a policy network as such can contribute to the “investigation of key determinants of policy making in a particular domain” (Brockhaus et al., 2014, p.2). However, they lack to draw focus on providing an understanding in what ways policy actors are mainly exercising their influence and power through collective collaborations in policy networks. What strategies make the basis for their political negotiations? Additionally, to what extent are exchange of information and resources a contributory factor in a policy process? Therefore, it remains of value to gain a critical insight how stakeholders and interest groups are efficiently

12 embedding themselves in policy networks as a means to influence governance. It is however known that policy processes have developed themselves significantly over the years, and that interest groups are of compelling and contributing value to this. Interest groups role in policy processes have provided “stability and continuity to both networks and policies” (Richardson, 2000, p.1006). As political structures are often a reflection of their political time frame, we have witnessed interest groups “learning to exploit the opportunities presented by a policy process which is increasingly characterized by multiple opportunity structures” (Richardson, 2000, p.1006). In our current political arena we find interest groups taking a front position in policy networks (Pollack, 2015). This is possibly a result of continuously adapting and “contributing to the development of a more complex and rapidly changing policy environment” (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, & Salisbury, 1993, p. 371).

Richardson (2006) similarly argues that the increasing presence of interest groups in policy networks is due to the ‘uncertainty’ they might acquire as individual actors. This uncertainty is then consequently decreased as interest groups become collective actors subsisting within the same network (Richardson, 2006). Meaning, this is a result of interest groups exchanging their knowledge and expertise. When a policy network is established it is of interest to observe the manners in which the interest groups choose to operate through. Baumgartner and Jones (1991) have established a dual-theory for interest groups to effectively employ their policy networks as a way to influence policies and debate; this theory is named ‘punctuated-equilibrium’. This theory “emphasizes two related elements of the policy process: issue definition and agenda setting” (True, Jones & Baumgarner, 1999, p.156). It remains ambiguous for one to provide a definite definition of what an ‘issue’ in its entirety represents. However, in a scholarly fashion it is often defined individually. True et al. (1999) have argued that due to the ever changing public agenda, one must continuously question existing policies. Specifically, as “the questioning of policies at the most fundamental levels creates opportunities for major reversals in policy outcomes” (True et al., 1999, p.156). To apply this theory under the current political microscope, it is necessary to evaluate how ‘issues’ are collectively defined within a policy network. More importantly, how agenda setting is ultimately achieved through the means of a policy network. This scholarly research therefore contributes to this research’s first sub-question: How do interest groups use a policy network as part of their advocacy and lobbying strategies?

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2.2 Interest Groups and Policy Network Actors in the European Union

European institutions, and particularly the EC, will often seek the knowledge, expertise and legitimacy from interest groups (Mahoney & Beckstrand, 2011). Hooghe (2001) even claimed that “European Commission officials discuss EU policies as frequently with interest organisations as with members of the European Parliament (EP) or the Council of the EU” (Hooghe, 2001, p.64). This reaffirms the need to thoroughly examine the relationship and institutional access that occurs between European institutions, interest groups and policy networks. Specifically, as it is easier to measure levels of access, compared to measuring influence in policy outcomes. Firstly, one must provide a comprehensive or encompassing definition of what the term ‘access’ means. Eising (2007) defines access as “the frequency of contacts between interest organisations and EU institutions” (Eising, 2007, p.331). By all means it remains challenging to precisely measure or define ‘access’, since interest organisations can also exert influence in indirect ways. Therefore, one must understand that access is not necessarily a reflection of influence (Eising 2007). Klüver et al. (2015) argue that “lobbying in the EU is affected by institutional factors that vary within the EU political system, such as the institutional fragmentation within the EC, interest intermediation and the distribution of powers” (Klüver et al., 2015, p.448). Therefore, when a relationship between an institution and an interest group is successfully established it will allow for a more thorough analysis of measuring interest group influence. For example, when the EC “launches a new legislative initiative, this propels political activity of affected stakeholders as they mobilise to shape the outcome of the policy debate in their favour” (Klüver et al., 2015, p.448). Richardson (2000) likewise argued that the EU “constitutes a promising opportunity structure offering a multitude of access points to interest groups, as they can directly lobby the European institutions to achieve their policy goals” (Richardson, 2000, in Klüver et al., 2015, p.448).

We see that influence similarly goes hand in hand with political power, development, access and institutional setting. Therefore, influence cannot be effectively analysed without including the aforementioned aspects in the process. Chalmers (2011) has argued that influence is mainly associated with “interest group resources, group organisation, a related capacity for collective action, the institutional setting of the policy process and the policy issue itself” (Chalmers, 2011, p.474). Therefore, another critical argument as to why it is of essence to establish the initial relationship between the interest group and the decision-maker, is due to the vast amount of

14 “evidence indicating that interest groups tend to lobby friends rather than foes” (Chalmers, 2011, p.474). This asserts that when the relationship is established, policy actors mainly carry the role of informative ‘friend’. Mainly, in which the lobbying consists “of the exchange of information between well-informed interest groups and understaffed decision-makers (Crombez, 2002, in Chalmers, 2011, p.474). This should be kept into consideration when aiming to analyse influence from interest groups. It does not merely revolve around examining the lobbying tactics that are employed towards the EU decision-makers, as sufficient research indicates that influence is not solely found in policy outcomes. However, “in terms of the informational service interest groups provide decision-makers in the EU” (Coen 2007; Chalmers, 2011, p.475). One must understand that the continuing expanding European field is dependent on its external actors and discourse (Lawn & Lingard, 2002).

Eising (2007) has concluded that there are three pillars of the EU institutional setting which are responsible for determining the access of interest groups. The three pillars refer to the EU institutions, with the EC being the most important pillar, as it is the guardian of the treaties. The two remaining pillars are a reference to the EP and the Council, as political legislation passes through these (Eising, 2007). Furthermore, it is known that the EU provides interest groups with various opportunities to represent their interests. Constantelos (1996) established that ‘interest groups at any territorial level are free to lobby government at any number of levels’ (Constantelos, 1996, p.30).

When looking at modern European governance, specifically over the past decade, one can see a noticeable increase of policy networks acting as new structures of governance (Beyers, 2004; Coen, 2007; Eising, 2007; Eising, 2004). Therefore, it is noticeable that one associates the study of European governance with that of policy networks. One might argue that with the rise of globalisation and Europeanisation there is an additional sense of advocating for shared purpose, shared decision-making and for the harmonisation of equality in political exchange. Particularly, reflecting levels of new political opportunities on a supranational level. The EU, to a certain extent, experienced particular hardship with the rise of collective actors intruding in the European political arena (Imig & Tarrow, 2001). Specifically, as European legislation has never been so interfered with by “various separate but interdependent organisations which coordinate their actions through interdependencies of resources and interests” (Börzel, 1997, p.5).

15 Policy networks are considered an analytical model where mainly the interaction amongst different groups are analysed (Börzel, 1997). Therefore, it is of equal importance for one to evaluate the independent relationships amongst the actor and decision maker, and not merely account a policy network to serve as a theoretical answer. The study of interest group presence in policy networks in the EU can be accounted for in a variety of manners. It could serve as a tool in establishing supranational and transnational policy making, as seeing the EU as a new form of governance in a legitimate political order (Jachtenfuchs, Dietz & Jung, 1998). Moreover, that “European governance proceeds through negotiations in policy networks linking public and private actors of different levels and dimensions of government” (Börzel, 1997, p.12). This should similarly allow for the study of policy networks in the European Union to repeatedly be analysed from all its perspective, particularly as its political playing field is likewise continuously changing its course.

Lastly, it is important to note that the reasons as to why interest groups and policy networks decide to lobby the EU institutions is embedded in organisational theory. Eising (2007) argues that the institutional access from interest organisations can be influenced from four diverse dimensions. These four dimensions are considered to be: “institutional context, resource dependencies, interest group organization, and strategic choices” (Eising, 2007, p.329). One can see that the interactions that occur between interest groups and the EU, beyond the above mentioned influences, still have the ability to alter greatly. However, the institutional context should be a representation of the opportunities interest groups receive in attaining access with the relevant policy-makers (Lowery, 2007).

The scholarly research makes clear how interest groups are involved in the EU institutions. Moreover, it shows how policy networks and interest groups are embedding themselves in the European political landscape, and how this can help shape their access. There is sufficient scholarly research in displaying why interest groups seek out the EU institutions, and how they have become an integrated part of the EU political sphere. However, there remains a lack in research demonstrating whether this attained sense of ‘access’ is primarily a reflection of an interest groups individual action or collective action. This leads to the research’s second sub-question: Do interest groups choose for individual or collective action as a way to attain institutional access?

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2.3 Collective versus Individual Action

The previous sections have aimed to elaborate on the external structures that contribute to interest organisations efficiency and their allocated presence in the political arena. Specifically, the presence of policy networks in the EU. This section seeks to elaborate on the collective action amongst interest organisations in a structured policy platform. Explicitly, how interest organisations intent to organise and undertake action collectively. Furthermore, it will aim to elaborate on the strategies responsible for driving interest groups to act collectively. These strategies are primarily constructed in order to influence and achieve legislative multilaterally, and successfully. Furthermore, this section will provide a clear definition and explanation in what the term ‘coalition’ precisely entails, and by what means it is applicable to a structured platform. Additionally, the latter part of the chapter will analyse when interest groups choose to act accordingly in a collective manner and when they choose to exert their influence, or actions, individually. The theoretical support provided in this section should lead to an understanding of member organisations collective and individual actions taking place within a coalition. There is relatively limited literature in exemplifying the precise choices that member organisations undertake, and how these choices are reflected within a platforms coalition. This leads to the third research sub-question: When do interest groups opt for individual or collective action as part of their advocacy?

In order to establish how member organisations in policy platforms can achieve success, one should observe this from an arrayed perspective. Firstly, I shall provide some clarification with reference to the terminology that will take place in this chapter. The term ‘success’ I primarily correlate with amending or implementing legislation as a result of having influenced relevant policy actors. The term ‘coalition’ refers to a “particular type of NGO network, which unlike a network involves more value and commitment” (Yanacopulos, 2005, p.93). In order to evaluate the success of organisation’s collective actions, one must consider the following external factors; “funding, legitimacy and information on an NGOs organisational strategy” (Yanacopulos, 2005, p.93). The main force driving collective action, is the shared sense of knowledge, information and expertise, which is often fixated on an explicit single-issue area. Interest groups generally aim to undertake collective action as a means to express members interests and to gain credibility. A predominant benefit that interest groups receive as being part of a coalition is; “greater strength

17 when voicing shared positions, together with enhanced informal access to information through trusted relations” (Yanacopulos, 2005, p.95). Interest groups are aware that in order to achieve and exert greater influence they must ensemble all of their expertise, resources and strategies collectively. It is claimed that member organisations often base their advocacy strategies on the external context and environment of the chosen policy area. If interest organisations are aiming to influence policy which are considered ‘high’ in impact, or that represent a large constituency, they will be more likely to choose to advocate collectively. Subsequently, Snijders (2001) argues that one can view policy networks “as dynamic structures that evolve from the sequence of strategic decisions made by independent policy actors to improve their individual payoffs in the collective dilemma (Snijders 2001, in Scholz et al., 2009, p.394). This shows that strong coalitions in policy networks, and the managing of new relationships are often necessary and required for interest organisations. They are required to; “increase the likelihood of favourable outcomes and expand the possibilities for potential joint efforts” (Scholz et al., 2009, p.394). However, a downfall of this strategy is that interest organisations are occasionally constrained by “already existing relationships and by the costs and uncertainties of seeking and maintaining relationships continuously” (Scholz et al., 2009, p.395). However, the aligned credibility and legitimacy perceived by member organisations is similarly an aspect as to why they would choose for collective action, or immerse themselves in a structured coalition (Mahoney, 2007). Furthermore, it is known that the EU institutions feel more ‘pressurised’ and are more likely to accept invitations and consultations when they get approached in a collective manner (Kröger, 2017). Organisations are additionally more likely to undertake collective action, as this is the most established way for interest organisations to receive and share relevant information.

Binderkantz (2005) declared that reasons for interest organisations to undertake individual action is because they “find themselves in a competitive situation with regards to attracting members” (Binderkantz, 2005, p.711). Interest organisations that are part of a policy platform, in which a coalition is experiencing intensive membership competition, they might decide to exclusively undertake advocacy action. Explicitly, as a strategy for individual exposure or to establish a particular hegemony within the coalition. Member organisations who are demonstrating high levels of activity, will perhaps choose for individual action to gain political influence (Binderkantz, 2005). One of the main forces that drive interest organisations to opt for individual action, can be measured by the following manners: measures of competitiveness, member

18 situations, measures of membership influence and measures of privileged positions (Binderkantz, 2005). Furthermore, one can similarly acknowledge that there may also be an incentive from the EU to ask interest organisations to act on an individual basis. Lastly, another aspect to consider is that of resource dependency, referring mainly to funding. This serves as an influential reason for member organisations to act individually or collectively. If a policy platform obtains the resources to support collective action on a grand scale, member organisations will decidedly choose this as their strategy. However, policy networks and interest organisations mainly struggle with attaining resources and funding, therefore they can solely be effective in an individual manner (Siegel, 2009).

This section has aimed to present both arguments and scholarly theories defining the strategies of member organisations deciding to either advocate or undertake any form of action, individually or collectively. We see that this answer is dependent on external and situational contexts, credibility, influence and resources available. The literature demonstrated that collective action amongst interest groups can primarily act as an effective strategy in influencing legislation multilaterally. There remains to be a lack of current research which can illustrate how cooperative activity amongst EU interest groups is adequately reached, and exerted in terms of influence. Another component which is underrepresented in the literature is demonstrating precise reasons that lead to an organisation’s decision to act individually. The majority of the literature primarily focuses on the ‘collective’ aspect of policy networks and interest groups actions. Hence, often disregarding the reasons and actions for interest groups to act on an individual basis. This research will therefore contribute to the literature by showing both which collective strategies have been successfully undertaken and how this has resulted in legislative success. In addition to revealing the particular reasons, strategies and situations that interest groups are in when choosing to act individually.

2.4 The Role of Collective Actors in Consensus Building

The previous section has aimed to provide an insight into the structures of collective action amongst interest organisations. Specifically, how interest organisations are collectively undertaking action within a structured policy platform. This section aims to highlight the internal factors that contribute to the process of building consensus.

19 As highlighted in the previous literature chapters, one of the primary aims of a policy platform is establishing and advocating for joint political goals. To attain this they need to achieve consensus. Within a political framework Parry (1976) has defined the term ‘consensus’ as a “high degree of ‘trust’ amongst member of a political system” (Parry, 1976, p.129). It is argued that this sense of ‘trust’ can often serve as an important pillar in successfully achieving consensus. Koppenjan (2007) argued that the process of reaching consensus can likewise be seen as ‘problem solving’. He argues that if a policy platform or a network governance aims to be successful, they should rely on the model of consensus building. Meaning, “mobilising resources and creating support to solve societal problems” (Koppenjan, 2007, p.133). However, he likewise highlights that even though every network should strive for consensus, the process of reaching consensus remains to receive criticism. This criticism stems from perceptions that policy networks can enable ‘unrealistic’ instruments to reach their goals (Koppenjan, 2007). Such as, consultations and long-term deliberation processes, which only consumes “excessive energy and money but ultimately produces weak compromises or deadlocked decision making” (Koppenjan, 2007, p. 134). This fuels the debate whether it is actually more effective for policy platforms to rely on the process of reaching consensus, or not. One can say that a primary motivation for policy platforms to rely on the process of reaching consensus, is at it leads to a clear sense of collective action and interest representations. Although, on the contrary one can say that interest groups should establish a clear sense of leadership and transparency in the division of their interests and responsibilities (Koppenjan, 2007). One must understand that in order to comprehend the manners in which policy platforms can effectively reach consensus, one must consider the political setting, along with the strategies that interest groups are accounted for. When looking at the perspective from interest organisations their fundamental approach in reaching consensus is not entirely derived from merely; “agreeing on a common policy position on specific issues, but on establishing a shared interest” (Imig & Tarrow, 2001, p.149). Beyers (2009) contends that “when designing their strategies interest groups have to decide about the arenas where they will present their policy views” (Beyers, 2009, p.1189). In order to examine how interest groups reach a consensus, it is necessary for one to identify the aligned political context and surrounding affairs. To elaborate on Beyer’s statement, “the political context that surrounds crucial issues determines whether and to what extent organisations are capable of deploying their resources effectively” (Burstain & Linton, 2002, p.396-397 in Beyers, 2009, p.1190).

20 Reaching consensus can be particularly challenging for interest organisations as one must understand that diverse interest organisations will require diverse resources, issues, outlooks and constituencies. It is often the case that interest organisations will “share common goals and values, but disagree on how to realise these into a broader political environment” (Beyers, 2009, p.1190). Therefore, we see that the political issues are mainly serving as the unifying factor in achieving consensus amongst interest organisations. This is perhaps as conflicts regarding political issues are particularly rare, and “usually they concern deeply shared social norms, spanning an overall political system and referring to profoundly held values” (Beyers, 2009, p.1190). Fraussen and Halpin (2018) had built on this theory and demonstrated what commonalities were necessary in order for interest organisations to reach consensus, and vis-a-vis serve as effective political organisations. These included obtaining a “common position, a belief to seek to advocate politically for a constituency, tasks of mobilising support/members, seeking political influence and securing organisational survival” (Fraussen & Halpin, 2018, p.26).

Scholarly research has been successful in demonstrating the precise roles of interest organisations and the motives that lead collective cooperation amongst diverse interest groups. Research literature has similarly highlighted that aspects such as ‘trust’ and sharing a ‘common goal’ is crucial in reaching consensus between interest organisations. However, there remains to be uncertainty in being able to analyse and clarify the internal structures and means of these political platforms. Particularly, more research is required into the exact manners in which consensus is reached; along with understanding the influence that is specifically aligned with the internal settings amongst European interest groups. Additional research should be able to demonstrate what specific factors are either contributing or constraining interest groups ability to reach consensus in an effective manner. Consequently, this leads to the research’s final sub-research question: How do interest organisations effectively build consensus within a policy platform?

In conclusion, the sub-research questions that have been presented throughout the theoretical framework have been constructed as a way to gain critical insight into the various interactions and roles that interest groups obtain. Namely, that of interest groups influence, collective action, consensus building, and the access and interaction with the EU.

The next section of the thesis will present and justify the methodological choices and components of the research. These choices were critically made in order to answer my research

21 question, and the four sub-research questions. I commence the section by justifying my choice of selecting and applying qualitative data. Then, I defend my case selection and explain in what way my data was collected. Lastly, I provide insight into the method of data processing.

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3. Methodology

This section explains my research design and the methods which were selected in order to conduct the empirical exploration of the thesis. It will aim to validate the selected methodological choices and provide insight in how the empirical process has developed itself. This section should be able to demonstrate how my choices were critically selected in order to efficiently answer the research question. I will firstly justify the selection of my case and then address the methodological approach for obtaining the data. Next, I will demonstrate in what ways my case selection can and is supported by theoretical understanding. This will be done by looking at various literature on case selection and theoretical replication (Herron & Quinn, 2016; Gerring 2008; Rowley, 2002). Furthermore, an elaboration on the selected methods will follow, particularly to justify the selected interviews. This lays particular focus on the fieldwork undertaken in Brussels, Belgium. Lastly, I will describe how I processed the gathered empirical data.

Qualitative Data

This research is predominantly relying its intentions on scholarly theories. Therefore, it is necessary to be contingent on the means of qualitative methods. In order to effectively address the research question, I was required to gather qualitative data. I chose to depend on a qualitative study over that of a quantitative one, as it came down to the desire of wanting to “expose the human part of a story” (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012, p.1). The research takes the form of a case study design. A qualitative case study design was primarily chosen as it has the ability to “reproduce the relevant causal features of a larger universe (representativeness) and provide variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest” (Gerring, 2008, p.2). Furthermore, it has been recognised that case studies can be seen as useful tools, as they provide additional insights which would otherwise be hard to obtain through quantitative methods (Rowley, 2002). The primary aim of my study is to attain an accurate understanding of the role of interest organisations in a networking policy platform. Therefore, opting for a qualitative methodological approach seemed most thorough. A qualitative case study design allowed me to efficiently test the cooperation and relationship between interest organisations, policy platforms and institutional access.

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3.1 Case Selection

This section will address the case study design and highlight both the advantages and disadvantages of selection a qualitative case study. Yin (1995) defined a case study as an empirical analysis that “investigates a contemporary phenomena within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, in Rowley, 2002, p. 18). Scholarly literature has argued that one should select a case which sought to: “elucidate the features of a broader population, represent something larger than the case itself” (Seawright, Gerring, 2008, p.294). For this research it was of necessity to select a case which was of contemporary essence to study. More specifically, which would be of relevance to the current convoluted political landscape. It was of importance to choose a case which would to a certain extent be aligned with an already established framework or theory. Particularly, as this would contribute to the research’s theoretical replication. Yin (1998) described theoretical replication as cases that are constructed in a way to cover the variety of theoretical settings.

I chose a single case study as it reflected the most prominent approach in obtaining elaborate details into an already established network. It is argued that “case studies are an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed” (Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg, 1991, p.8). It has moreover been recognised that it offers researchers with an “empirical and theoretical gains in understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions, and motives (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991, p.8). It is precisely the aim of this research to receive a greater understanding of the aforementioned features. Finally, a case study also provides one with flexibility regarding their compatibility with other methods and it proves to be particularly useful in informing policy (Gerring, 2008).

I commenced the case selection by choosing a political issue which interested me. Then, by selecting a case which focused on the chosen political issue. Consequently, I found theories and academic literature which I could apply to the selected case. I chose to select the case of EPAM as it was the largest and most established (lose) networking policy platform, which focused on the debate and policies of migration and asylum at EU-level. Furthermore, EPAM consists of a diverse range of interest group coalitions, all advocating and working within the field of migration and asylum in Europe. The platform is composed of over forty-one member organisations active in a variety of European countries. The EPAM members mainly consist of NGOs. Furthermore, there

24 were alternative motivations for me to select EPAM as my theoretical case, those were as followed: personal attribution (1) to the field of work; the alignment with scholarly theories (2); European existence (3); presence of esteemed organisations (4).

To elaborate on the notion of ‘personal attribution’, this is based on having gained a first-hand

experience on the severity and urgency of the ongoing refugee crisis. In the summer of 2015 I worked as a volunteer for Caritas Austria, assisting incoming refugees at the Viennese train stations. Witnessing this ongoing crisis in the prime of its time, gave me a profound urgency in wanting to understand the field of migration and asylum better. Explicitly, wanting to understand the relevant policies guiding this at European level. Particularly, what action both European NGOs and the European institutions were undertaking to solve this urgent crisis. Although the debate on migration and asylum has not been “unique in either its causes or its drivers, it has become a highly sensitive political issue, generating intense political and public debate” (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015, p.2). Hence, it can be considered a necessity to fundamentally understand the ways in which migration and asylum, has and currently is, contributing to our ever changing political landscape. Therefore, my personal inclination led to the first empirical decision to select the case of EPAM. Particularly, concerning its reputation as one of the most influential European NGO platforms regarding the topic of migration and asylum.

The second decision to select EPAM as my case was due to their close alignment with scholarly theories. As my thesis has a deductive approach it was of importance to select a case where theory could efficiently be aligned with. EPAM allowed for a solid case as theoretical and scholarly research regarding consensus building, collective action and institutional access could all apply to the EPAM case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Michalowitz, 2007; Princen, 2011; Scholz, Berardo & Kile, 2008; Tallberg, Dellmuth, Agne & Duit, 2015). Lastly, in terms of theoretical replication and exploration this research should be relevant for practitioners and scholars. Respectively, those intending to gather a greater understanding of the internal features of a policy platform operating at EU level.

The third and fourth decision, (which were presence of esteemed organisations and European existence), are relatively intertwined with one another. The reason for selecting EPAM as my case, was due to their platform being a prominent presence in the European political sphere. The majority of the EPAM member organisations have an already relatively established presence in the ‘Bruxellois’ landscape. Particularly, the variety of resources and expertise that these

25 organisations share makes EPAM an attractive platform to study. Furthermore, with an UN agency co-chairing EPAM, it adds an additional layer of political significance and interest.

With regards to the sampling of the case study I had to find an appropriate balance between selecting NGOs that were central to the platform and those that were of less prominence. Those that are seen as central actors could be distinguished as the chair, co-chairs and the coordinator of the platform. The rest of the NGO were selected based on their level of activity, influence, and visible presence within the platform. Their ‘level of activity’ refers to how long they have been a member of the platform and how many campaigns or activities they have coordinated. Their ‘influence’ is a reference to their relationships with institutional actors or policy makers. Lastly, their ‘visibility’ refers to their exposure and recognition within the civil society sphere. However, in relation to validity and reliability I likewise needed to select the less recognised and established NGOs. Those were the interest groups who have not been a member organisation for a significant amount of time (+3 years), or who have a niche mandate and are therefore often not widely recognised in the political field.

The selection criteria was as followed; the participants had to be part of an EPAM member organisation (1); interest organisations had to be active at EU level (2); interviewees were required to have sufficient knowledge regarding the dynamics and internal structures of EPAM (3) and the interviewees had to be able to converse in either Dutch or English (4). Based on the mentioned criteria, I selected all of the relevant actors and approached them by email. In this process I made sure to present myself as well as the layout of the research. Explicitly, the precise focus of the research and how they would be of relevance to the study. I chose to merely focus on the EC out of the European institutions, as EPAM’s main lobbying strategies are primarily targeted towards them. Therefore, I sent an email to members of the Avramopoulus cabinet, the DG on Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. Lastly, I also sent out an email to one EU agency, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). This agency was added later to the research as a consequence of often being mentioned in the interviews.

Limitations

One must likewise draw on the criticism and limitations that comes with selecting a case study as a research design. Yin (1991) criticised case studies for their lack of generalisability, as they tend to merely focus on one specific unit. Yin (1991) also argued that case studies regularly lack

26 in their precision. Specifically, that often the negligence of the researchers allow “equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions” (Yin, 1991, p.21). Furthermore, it is often argued that the interviewee or researcher focusing on a single case study will not be capable to remain fully objective in their observations. Particularly, in their ability to separate their personal views.

The limitations also refer to the validity and reliability of a research (Burnard, 1991, p.464). However, with regards to the lack of external validity, all of the selected interest organisations are all specialised within the same field of expertise, namely migration and asylum. Therefore, generalisation regarding the internal structures of the selected interest organisations are relatively similar. Lastly, I had various confidential and internal documents made available to me. These documents were applicable to all of the member organisations of EPAM. This all contributed to keeping the lack of generalisation on a relatively low spectrum.

3.2. Methods of Data Collection

This section will address the variety of methods used in order to collect the data. This section will lay emphasis on the ways in which the data was gathered. Moreover, it will also provide an understanding of how the data was gathered. It should demonstrate how I gathered the data from the case study. Furthermore, it should acknowledge what the necessary data is in being able to answer my research question. Lastly, it will look at triangulation as a means to increase the validity and reliability of the research.

In order to efficiently answer my research question, I will partly rely on the scholarly theories presented in the theoretical framework. Namely, the literature regarding interest group influence, consensus building, institutional access and collective action. Focusing on the literature assisted me in selecting the appropriate research question. Moreover, to sufficiently rely on these scholarly debates and theories, I will test and justify them based on engaging with qualitative methods. The following qualitative methods were chosen as these seemed most effective in obtaining my data: semi-structured interviews (1), process tracing (2), and document analysis (3). Focusing on one particular case study similarly presented the opportunity to use the above mentioned qualitative methods throughout the entire study. The latter sections will provide justifications on each of these methods and emphasise why these methods seemed most adequate and reliable. Furthermore, as

27 my research question focuses on an international organisation (EC), selecting qualitative methods seemed most appropriate in being able to answer the research question. Specifically, as it would serve as the most efficient method in transcending issues such as transparency. Additionally, selecting a qualitative approach presented the opportunity to contribute to the literature through offering additional and innovative insights into otherwise relatively ambiguous and abstruse processes.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Peabody, Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson and Kolodny (1990) demonstrated that in the field of political science one can always apply interviews as an appropriate research strategy. They even argue that “one of the most potent, high-yield ways of studying political elites is to interview them (Peabody et. al., 1990, p.454). A primary reason to select semi-structured interviews was based on the assumption that it allowed for open-ended questions and answers. Particularly, allowing room for interpretation and opportunities for follow up questions (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006).

This research design offered the ability for further in-depth knowledge on the research question and the objectives that were aimed to be investigated. Interviewing multiple interest groups active within the same environment, should lead to additional and innovative insights into the wider population of the case. Interviews are subsequently needed in this research as the interviewees will be discussing the internal structures of EPAM. Specifically, elaborating on perhaps sensitive and ambiguous relations. This could reflect the process of consensus building and the cooperation amongst interest organisations. One can consider this nature of rhetoric to be only viable through an interview, as one will not find it displayed in any documents. The interviews were primarily divided into the three themes of: institutional access; collective action; consensus building. By conducting interviews I received a more thorough overview and in-depth understanding of the themes that I was investigating. Furthermore, it allowed for an easier approach in drawing comparison between the chosen themes and selected actors. Lastly, as the majority of interviews were held with actors subsisting of the same platform, the common themes in the interviews were easier to compare and contrast.

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Document Analysis

I chose to select document analysis as one of the units of my analysis. Bowen (2009) defines document analysis as a “systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents” (Bowen, 2009, p.27). Bowen (2009) explained that researchers analyse documents and code them into themes regarding their chosen topic. The documents analysed for this research mainly consisted out of public EPAM documents, along with two confidential documents. These documents included overviews of EPAM’s activities, joint statements, mission statements, examples of achievements and a transparent overview of the emails and consultations between EPAM and EU officials. The choice to incorporate document analysis in this research was presumably based on accessibility, along with being able to gather data which could support my case study. As my resources were limited regarding both time and funding, a document analysis was an appropriate choice as a way to gather data. Subsequently, as my research is focusing on the structures of a large platform it was easier to analyse the organisations documents, than to address the organisation in its entirety (Bowen, 2009).

Bowen (2009) similarly argues that document analysis can be seen as an important social research tool, particularly in terms of methodological triangulation. This is particularly as document analysis is “often used in combination with other qualitative research methods as a means of triangulation – the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Bowen, 2009, p.28). Thus, by involving interviews as a convergence with the document analysis I am triangulating the data. Meaning, I am attempting to “provide a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility” (Eisner, 1991, p.110 in Bowen, 2009, p.28). By involving information through both the document analysis and the interviews, I am similarly reducing the probability of bias. Lastly, Yin (1994) argued that for a single case study such as mine, it is purposely applicable to use document analysis as a research method.

Process Tracing

Process tracing can be seen as an essential method of a qualitative analysis, specifically in the field of political science. It is defined as the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011, p.823). In this research it primarily served as a tool to analyse the political settings and evaluate