African solutions to African problems : the success of regional peacekeeping in Africa

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AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN

PROBLEMS

The Success of Regional Peacekeeping in Africa

Name: Emma Drost

Student ID: 11038373

Bachelor Thesis Political Science: International Relations

Teacher: Dr. Sebastian Krapohl

Second Reader: Dr. Philip Schleifer

Place and Date: Amsterdam, 28 January 2019

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1. Introduction

The first United Nations peace operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was deployed in 1948 to observe and maintain the ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli war (Usden and Juergenliemk: 1). Around forty years later, since the end of the Cold War, debate concerning regional peacekeeping operations has emerged. These are peace operations carried out by regional organizations, like the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Bures 2006). One can think of many potential advantages of regional peacekeeping, but the potential disadvantages are just as numerous. Upholders of regional peace operations base their argumentation on benefits like enhanced legitimacy, sensitivity and geographical proximity. Critics, however, point at potential dangers like forum shopping, biased interests and lack of experience, resources and standards (Williams 2016a: 7-9).

Especially noteworthy in the regional peacekeeping-discussion is the African Union, since the African continent has hosted by far the largest number of United Nations peacekeeping missions. The establishment of the African Union was finalized in 2002, and its vision is that of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena” (The African Union Commission). The organization has its own Peace and Security Council (PSC) and adopted an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in light of its motto: African solutions to African problems. The African Union is well represented in the literature concerning regional peace operations, with scholars writing about ‘Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces’ (Feldman 2008) and ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations’ (Murithi 2008), amongst others.

One of the key questions is: “can the African Union deliver peace and security?” (Omorogbe 2011). Omorogbe concludes that “the AU is currently unable to provide for Africa’s peace and security, especially in contexts where the UN is unwilling to deploy” (idem: 35). The African Union struggles with resource challenges, which undermine the effectiveness of its actions, which leads to a need for help from the United Nations (ibid). In its current stage, the African Union Peace and Security Council needs the United Nations when it comes to conducting peace operations. In this light, the United Nations and the African Union are at the moment carrying out a so-called hybrid operation in Darfur.

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However, it has become clear that there are a few challenges to this partnership. For example, the United Nations does not want to establish a peacekeeping mission before a ceasefire agreement or peace accord is signed. Next to that, the non-use of force is one of the core principles of UN peacekeeping (Boutellis and Williams 2013: 7). “Instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it”, which means the use of force might even be necessary (African Union in Boutellis and Williams 2013: 9).

The African Union’s regional peacekeeping endeavors could be positive or negative, a valuable addition or a liability. Since the APSA entered into force as recent as December 2003, it might be difficult to already test its success. However, one case does come to mind when thinking about the potential success of African peacekeeping: Somalia. Between 1992 and 1995, the United Nations deployed two peacekeeping missions in Somalia. UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, respectively, are often quoted as the United Nations’ biggest peacekeeping failure. In January 2007, the African Union’s PSC created AMISOM, a peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with approval of the United Nations. AMISOM is seen as a relatively successful mission. Because UNOSOM and AMISOM were deployed in the same country, it makes for a perfect opportunity for comparing United Nations peacekeeping and African Union peacekeeping in Africa and look for the differences leading to success or failure.

While AMISOM is an ongoing operation, it is interesting to see the difference between this mission and both the United Nations missions. How come they failed and withdrew fast, while this African mission has been operating for eleven years and booking several successes? The case of Somalia can expose fundamental differences between United Nations peacekeeping and African Union peace operations, which influence the level of success on that continent. Since these differences are inherent to the organizations, they can be expected to be true for other cases of African regional peacekeeping as well. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: What makes regional peacekeeping more successful in Africa than global peacekeeping?

This research question will be answered by analyzing the case of Somalia by means of a comparison between UNOSOM and AMISOM. Chapter two will discuss theories regarding the success and failure of global peacekeeping missions, and why UNOSOM failed, in order to set up the theoretical framework that will be used to evaluate the differences in success between the United Nations missions and the African Union operation. Chapter three will provide an overview of the case of Somalia, with specific attention for the civil war and the

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different peace operations the country has hosted. Chapter four will then study AMISOM in-depth to see how it differs from the UNOSOM missions.

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2. Success and Failure in Peacekeeping

To determine what makes regional peacekeeping more successful in Africa than global peacekeeping, the first step is to research success and failure in global peacekeeping. What makes for a failed mission? Is there some kind of blueprint for success? What makes a peace operation successful? Next, it is of importance where the United Nations went wrong in Somalia. This way, it will be easier to see where the African Union could have learned from the United Nations’ mistakes. The general factors for peacekeeping success will be combined with the factors specific to the case of Somalia to explain the success of AMISOM, which can shed light on the success of regional peacekeeping in Africa.

2.1. Factors for Success in Global Peacekeeping

The success and failure of peacekeeping missions has extensively been researched. When comparing several articles, scholars seem to agree on a number of factors that are crucial to a missions’ success, or its failure. These factors of course also include external ones, which the operation cannot influence. For example, if one or more of the warring parties receives external support from outside actors, peacekeeping is less successful (Pushkina 2006: 139). Since this research focuses on the difference between organizations, these factors are not of importance here and will not be included. The goal here is to compare the United Nations and the African Union regarding their peacekeeping efforts, and it would not be fair to include factors they are not able to influence.

Darya Pushkina tests several hypotheses in her 2006 article ‘A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission’. She finds that commitment of the United Nations is strongly associated with the success of a mission. This commitment is measured in terms of “the degree to which peacekeeping forces are (a) given the resources necessary to fulfil their mandates (these include both military and logistical support as well as the supply of personnel) and (b) provided the resources in a timely manner” (Pushkina 2006: 139). Next to that, operations have a higher chance of success when accompanied by effective diplomacy, which means the negotiation of a meaningful settlement agreement that addresses the issues underlying the conflict (idem: 141). The warring parties’ consent and cooperation with the mission is also an important factor (idem: 142). This is taken to be an internal factor, since it depends at least partly on the character of the operation.

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Duane Bratt largely argues in line with Pushkina. In ‘Explaining peacekeeping performance: The UN in internal conflicts’, he states that full consent by all parties to the conflict is of the utmost importance when establishing a peacekeeping operation (Bratt 1997: 47). A comprehensive settlement agreement is the best indicator of success, according to Bratt. In this agreement, the following must be included: “the mandate of the peacekeeping operation; a mechanism for governing the country during the transitional stage prior to conflict resolution; and a provision for resolving the conflict” (idem: 67). Finally, the intervening troops must be impartial (idem: 63).

Jaïr van der Lijn, finally, tests multiple factors for success and failure of peace operations gathered from literature and confirms several. He also highlights consent and cooperation from the parties to the conflict, but adds that parties need to have a sense of security. Conflicts often create a security dilemma for the warring parties, and in order to stop this spiral the operation should provide alternative sources for a sense of security (van der Lijn 2009: 7). “For this reason, parties must perceive the intervention as sustained, committed and credible” (ibid). Next to that, timely deployment is of importance. Late deployment can lead to instability and loss of trust (idem: 9). Furthermore, competent leadership and personnel, and clear command structures form the basis for the implementation of a mandate and thus are essential for a peace operation’s success (idem: 10). Lastly, the underlying causes of the conflict have to be properly addressed in order to realize reconstruction (idem: 12).

In short, scholars seem to agree on a number of internal factors that are important for the success of a peace operation. Timely deployment, effective diplomacy, consent and cooperation of the warring parties and the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement agreement are of importance. The underlying causes of the conflict must be addressed, and the intervening organization must be committed to realizing peace while remaining impartial and making sure the command structures are clear and the personnel and leadership is competent. Now, the question is which of these factors were not realized in Somalia. What did the United Nations do wrong? Multiple articles answering this question will be combined to form an inclusive answer, which then in turn can be combined with the above established ingredients for a successful peace operation to form a theoretical framework fit for evaluating the African Union Mission in Somalia.

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2.2. What Went Wrong in Somalia?

In his 1994 article ‘From Peacekeeping to Peace enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia’, Ramesh Thakur comes to five points of improvement for the United Nations. He argues that the United Nations “needs to sharpen its skills at identifying potential conflicts before they break into war so that parties to disputes can be brought together during the period of infancy” (Thakur 1994: 409). Next to that, he points to problems like imperial overreach and an unclear mandate. Also, because of the authorization of the use of force in this mission which led to heavy military presence, UNOSOM was by many Somalis perceived as an occupation force (idem: 399). Lastly, lack of understanding of the implications of Somalia’s clan system tremendously hindered the mission’s effectiveness (idem: 403).

Snjezana Sucin largely agrees with Thakur. She distinguishes a number of lessons to be learned from Somalia in regard to future peacekeeping missions, also starting with the importance of a timely intervention to make preventive diplomacy possible (Sucin 1995: 180). In addition to that, she discusses multiple mandate problems. The means and mandate must be commensurate, greater delegation of authority is necessary, and there needs to be a consistent ‘big picture’ focus (idem: 180-181). The execution of these factors was not sufficient in the UNOSOM missions. She calls UNOSOM I “minimalist and ineffective” and UNOSOM II “overstretched and coercive” (idem: 180).

Crocker, too, stresses the need for diplomacy, whether preventive, coercive or mediatory (Crocker 1995: 6). In line with Sucin, he also argues for a better understanding of the linkage between mandate and resources made available by member states. “The United Nations overreached in Somalia when they expanded the initial mandate without providing the means to carry it out” (ibid). Next to that, better unity of command and institutional reform to end “bureaucratic fiefdoms in the field” are necessary (ibid).

The importance of understanding the situation you are intervening in is reintroduced by Michael Maren. While this sounds obvious, it is clear the United Nations did not have an optimal understanding of the situation in Somalia when it send in its troops. “There were no issues. No ideological differences. Nothing to negotiate. As the UN stayed in Somalia it continued to supply the raw material of the conflict: loot” (Maren 1996: 202). There was a lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict and the clan system, which led to a severe misreading of the situation on the ground (Maren 1996).

Commander Charles Fowler once again mentions UNOSOMs mandate problems. He quotes the “obvious disconnect between the ends desired and the means approved” (Fowler

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1999: 7). For example, “Resolution 733 called for an arms embargo but included no enforcement mechanism” (idem: 6). Also, the deployed mission structure was inadequate to effect change in the security situation (idem: 8). Next to that, similar to Thakur’s fourth argument, the eventual authorization and use of force led to the peacekeepers no longer being neutral (idem: 14). “UNOSOM II Commander, LTGEN Cevik Bir, issued Fragmentary Order 39 which stated: "Organized, armed militias, technicals, and other crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and may be engaged without provocation (emphasis added)”” (Allard in Fowler 1999: 14). As a result, distrust grew and the relationship with the Somalis deteriorated.

Murphy discusses practically all problems and lessons mentioned above. He again starts with the lost opportunity for preventive diplomacy or mediation due to the slow response of the United Nations (Murphy 2002). Furthermore, he identifies numerous problems regarding UNOSOMs mandates. He argues the mandate was ill-defined, underlying political problems were not given enough attention, and issues of command and control hindered the mission’s effectiveness. Next to that, the constant policy shifts did not benefit the confidence among traditional Somali leaders, leading to considerable mistrust between civil and military components (ibid). Overall, there was a poor understanding of the situation.

In her 2013 article, Kapteijns sums up UNOSOMs main problems in just one sentence: “Although UNOSOM II inherited from UNITAF a hazardous security situation, in its own right too it proved to be flawed in practically all aspects. These defects included, apart from the UN’s own handling of the transition, its ambiguous approach to Somali sovereignty; its convoluted and non-unified command structure; its weak and underdeveloped civilian support structure; the contradictory rules of engagement observed by the thirty-something different national troop contingents that made up the UNOSOM II coalition; its inconsistent observance of humanitarian law and disregard for human rights violations; and its unprincipled, cowardly and wasteful relations with Somalis” (Kapteijns 2013: 431). So, she identifies mainly mandate problems, as well as some issues regarding neutrality as also mentioned by other scholars.

2.3. Theoretical Framework

When reading and comparing the articles about success in peacekeeping and the United Nations’ failure in Somalia set out above, it becomes clear that there is a lot of overlap. A lot of ingredients for success were not taken care of in the mission and hindered the United

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Nations effectiveness in Somalia. The factors for success in peacekeeping and the faults of the United Nations in Somalia can be combined into four different problem areas: impartiality, response time, mandate, and cultural understanding.

The problem in the first category, impartiality, is that the peacekeepers were not perceived as impartial, partly because of the authorization of the use of force. The peace operation was seen as an ‘occupation force’ and there was civilian mistrust. There is reasonable doubt regarding the neutrality of the UN intervention in Somalia (Fowler 1999, Thakur 1994, Murphy 2002, Kapteijns 2013). There was obviously no consent or cooperation from the warring parties, while this is often named to be a very important factor for success in peacekeeping missions (Pushkina 2006, Bratt 1997, van der Lijn 2009). UNOSOM also did not manage to become the alternative source of security the Somalis needed in order to counter the security dilemma.

The second category problematizes the United Nations’ late reaction to the situation in Somalia. It should have acted before the conflict broke out into war, so that there would be the opportunity for preventive, coercive or mediatory diplomacy. This is often more successful and less complex and costly (Sucin 1995, Crocker 1995, Thakur 1994, Murphy 2002). UNOSOM was not deployed timely, which could have prevented further instability and loss of trust (van der Lijn 2009).

The third category, mandate, is an elaborate one. According to various authors, there were a lot of problems with the mandate of especially UNOSOM II. The mission was ill-defined, and the mandate unclear. There was a disconnection between the desired ends and the approved means, no unity of command, ineffective structure, and a lack of constant ‘big picture’ focus. Overall, the missions were cases of imperial overstretch (Fowler 1999, Sucin 1995, Crocker 1995, Thakur 1994, Kapteijns 2013, Murphy 2002). So, the commitment of the United Nations, as defined by Pushkina, was not nearly high enough. The resources necessary to fulfil UNSOMS mandates were not provided or came too late. There was also no competent leadership and personnel or a clear command structure, which are identified as important factors for success (Pushkina 2006, van der Lijn 2009).

The fourth category, finally, might be of special importance in this case. It is argued that the United Nations lacked sufficient cultural understanding of the Somali society and values. They did not fully grasp the clan system in Somalia, with its multiple warlords, which led to severe misreading of the situation on the ground (Maren 1996, Thakur 1994, Murphy 2002). Obviously, it is hard to solve a conflict you do not fully understand. Many scholars have pointed out the importance of addressing the underlying causes of a conflict in order to

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be able to bring peace (van der Lijn 2009). This was not sufficiently the case with the United Nations in Somalia.

These four problem areas, then, can be divided into two categories: where response time and mandate can be seen as technical matters, the issues of impartiality and cultural understanding have a more structural nature. The technical matters are problems from which the African Union can learn, so it does not make the same mistake as the United Nations. The structural problems, however, are not issues where the African Union can simply learn from the United Nations or vice versa. They are much more fundamental. One can for example expect that the African Union might have a better cultural understanding in the case of Somalia, since it is a regional organization. The next chapter will provide a synoptic overview of the case of Somalia, with specific attention for the civil war and the different peace operations the country has hosted, after which AMISOM can be evaluated using the four categories of impartiality, response time, mandate and cultural understanding.

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3. Case: Somalia

In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland became independent and formed the number-seven-shaped United Republic of Somalia in East Africa (BBC 2018). Somalia’s climate is mainly hot and dry, and most of the country is flat. This increases the mobility of nomads, who make up three-fifths of the fifteen million large Somali population (Janzen and Lewis 2019: 1; The World Bank 2018). Only two-fifths of the Somalis is urban (Janzen and Lewis 2019: 3). 99% of the Somali belong to the Sunni sect of Islam (ibid). The Somali society is based on a clan system. In short, this means groups “trace their common ancestry back to a single father. These clans, which in turn are subdivided into numerous subclans, combine at a higher level to form clan families” (ibid). There are six major clans: the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir, the Hawiye, the Rahanwein, and the Digil (Ssereo 2003: 25). “The clan families have common ancestral origins and they are interrelated through complex networks of social relationships, which extend over clan territories marked with fluid borders, within the national territory. The knowledge of one's genealogy several generations back is an important identity reference for the individual and the clan community” (ibid).

3.1. The Somali Civil War

After the creation of the Republic of Somalia, some Somalis agitated for a ‘Greater Somalia’, that would have included parts of what are today Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia (Hesse 2010: 247). For this reason, Somali dictator General Mohamad Siyaad Barre invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden in 1977. After the war was lost less than a year later, with around 25.000 casualties, opposition against the Barre regime rose and the country experienced a surge of clan pressures (ibid; Janzen and Lewis 2019: 9). “Fierce government repression, heightened clan cleavages and animosities, gross levels of corruption, and low salaries all combined to accelerate the state’s decline” (Menkhaus 2007: 80). Large numbers of unemployed youth, competition over resources and power, and the availability of weapons did not benefit the situation (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33). Eventually, after many bloody years, the Barre regime fell in January 1991 (Hesse 2010: 247).

1991 is often seen as the start of the decades-long civil war in Somalia that is still going on today. In May of that year, northwestern region Somaliland is established by a unilateral declaration of secession, while southern Somalia suffers from an economy of

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plunder with violent banditry by armed gunmen (Menkhaus 2007: 80). The starting period of the civil war has a profound impact on the country. “It includes unaddressed war crimes and deep interclan grievances over atrocities committed; massive levels of stolen property, unresolved property disputes, and occupied territory; the rise of warlords and others with vested interests in continued lawlessness and impunity; the near-universal spread of armaments; the destruction of much of Mogadishu; the looting of nearly all public goods and state properties; the flight of as many as a million Somalis abroad; massive internal displacement; and an unresolved secession in the north” (idem: 81).

“By October 1992, the country was in ruins. About 300,000 people had died during the preceding year, 1.5 million were at risk because of famine, almost 4.5 of the total population of 6 million were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases, and 700,000 had sought refuge in neighbouring states. More than 60 per cent of Somalia's basic infrastructure had been destroyed, 80 percent of all social services had ceased functioning, and the major cities in northern areas were reduced to rubble” (Thakur 1994: 402). In 1998, the Northern Puntland region declares autonomy (BBC 2018). The middle and south of Somalia are a violent patchwork of clan-based fiefdoms, the main clans with access to military equipment set up their own spheres of influence (Hesse 2010: 247; Janzen and Lewis 2019: 9). More than ten peace conferences were held during the 1990s, largely unsuccessful (Janzen and Lewis 2019: 9).

3.2. UNOSOM

Between 1992 and 1995, the United Nations deployed two peacekeeping missions in Somalia. UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, respectively, are often quoted as the United Nations’ biggest peacekeeping failure. “UNOSOM I suffered from several problems. Troops often refused to accept orders from UN commanders before checking with their own governments, and difficulties with communicating and coordinating activities impeded the mission. The $43 million intervention had few casualties, but its effectiveness was poor” (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2018). After that, “UNOSOM II did not—and could not—fulfill its mandate, and the population continued to suffer from all it had endured from 1992 onward” (ibid).

The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in April 1992 by the adoption of resolution 751, mainly to monitor a ceasefire and facilitate humanitarian aid to people suffering from famine and the civil war (United Nations 1992a). “The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and

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extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area” (United Nations a).

The situation in Somalia, however, continued to deteriorate. As also discussed in the previous chapter, a lot went wrong. There was no government to negotiate with and Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. The de facto authorities did not approve of the United Nations’ presence and UNOSOM troops were fired upon (ibid). Humanitarian aid was there, but could not reach the intended receivers, which led to an estimated 3000 people a day dying of starvation. Therefore, the Security Council authorized the use of force in December 1992. In resolution 794, it stated that troops may “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (United Nations 1992b: 3). Around the same time, a United States-initiated Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was deployed, aimed at protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid (Menkhaus 2007: 81; United Nations a).

In March 1993, UNITAF and UNOSOM I were merged and upgraded to UNOSOM II, which was also endowed with enforcement power to ensure its mandate, again focused on humanitarian assistance. Next to that, assisting in reconciliation and the reconstruction of political, economic and social life was also part of UNOSOM II’s mandate (United Nations 1993a: 4). “The Secretary-General told the Security Council in September that UNOSOM II’s ability to provide security had been reduced by troop withdrawals, budget restrictions and military actions by the Somali factions. Wider problems included the lack of commitment to peace by the factions and insufficient political will by Member States” (United Nations b). They officially withdrew in March 1995. During UNOSOM I and II, 157 United Nations peacekeeping personnel had lost their lives (ibid).

3.3. AMISOM

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active peacekeeping mission since 2007 created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, approved by the United Nations Security Council, and operated by the African Union. Via United Nations Security Council resolution 1744, the African Union member states were authorized to “take all necessary measures as appropriate” to support reconciliation (United Nations 2007: 2-3).

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In the years between UNOSOM and AMISOM, a new party had introduced itself to the conflict. A jihadist separation from the Islamic Courts, al-Shabaab, made its way to southern and central Somalia (BBC 2018). Al-Shabaab had taken advantage of the weakness of Somalia’s government institutions and controlled large patches of ungoverned territory (Global Conflict Tracker 2019). In 2011, it controlled the vital port of Kismayo, as well as parts of the capital Mogadishu (ibid). “By 2013 African Union, Somali, and regional forces had pushed al-Shabaab out of major cities, but the militants still controlled towns and villages mostly in the south” (GlobalSecurity.org 2018).

AMISOM’s mandate got extended and renewed several times since 2007. Late 2008, the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia (United Nations 2008). AMISOM’s troop strength was increased in 2010 and 2013. Contrary to UNOSOM, AMISOM is often seen as relatively successful. “The mission has been credited with various successes, especially since AMISOM pushed the majority of Al-Shabaab forces out of Mogadishu” (Williams 2016b: 40). It slowly restores peace and security, undertakes counter-radicalization programs, and helps restore Somalia’s state sovereignty (Rwengabo 2016: 92). “AMISOM managed to gain a stronger foothold in the region, sufficiently decreasing the relative power of the enemy” (Kouloumas 2017).

The latest resolution on AMISOM discusses the “gradual and phased reduction and reorganisation of AMISOM’s uniformed personnel in line with the implementation of the transition plan in order to provide a greater support role to the Somali security forces in line with the National Security Architecture as they progressively take the lead for security in Somalia” (United Nations 2018: 3). AMISOM is extended until the end of May 2019, in which period the troops will steadily be reduced. The Somali security institutions are supposed to take the lead by December 2021 (idem: 3-4). Some AMISOM troops will stay present to assist, mentor and protect.

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4. The Success of AMISOM

Why is regional peacekeeping more successful in Africa than global peacekeeping? After identifying where the United Nations went wrong in Somalia, this question can be answered by studying AMISOM’s approach to UNOSOM’s technical problems, response time and mandate, and the African Union’s dealing with the structural peacekeeping issues, impartiality and cultural understanding. United Nations Security Council Resolutions will be used, as well as official African Union documents, NGO reports and academic articles on the subject.

4.1. Technical Factors

The first two issues the United Nations encountered in Somalia, according to different scholars, were technical of nature. The organization did not step in fast enough, which took away the opportunity for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. This can be seen as general critique on the United Nations, since it only wants to intervene when there is already a ceasefire or peace agreement in place. The African Union views peace operations as an opportunity to bring peace, so mediation or preventive diplomacy should be high on their list. Next to that, the mandates of the UNOSOM missions were deeply flawed. The African Union could have learned from the United Nations’ mistakes here. So, when and how did AMISOM intervene in the conflict in Somalia?

4.1.1. Response Time

At first glance, looking at the response time for AMISOM might not seem relevant. After all, they intervened after the United Nations, with an interim period of almost twelve years. Not really a timely response to the conflict. However, AMISOM also responded to a new threat: al-Shabaab.

In 1994, Islamic Courts started to appear in Mogadishu. After several years of anarchy, “the establishment of the Islamic Courts was not so much an Islamist imperative as a response to the need for some means of upholding law and order” (Barnes and Hassan 2007: 152). And the sharia courts were a success: they dealt with criminality and “pacified one of the most dangerous cities in the world” (Gettleman 2006). The Courts were not linked to a

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specific school of Islam law and they were not presided over by expert Islamic judges (Barnes and Hassan 2007: 152).

In 2005, an unexplained wave of disappearances and assassinations hit Somalia’s capital. Activists within the Islamic Courts claimed the United States’ government was responsible, targeting the courts’ members via covert missions (idem: 153). “It was in this context that a military force known as Al-Shabaab (‘the Youth’) emerged, related to but seemingly autonomous of the broad- based Courts movement” (idem: 154). In 2007, al-Shabaab claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda, so the United States added the group to its list of foreign terrorist organizations short after (Hanson 2009). “While initially a minor actor in 2005, eight years later they were responsible for carrying out nearly 400 attacks in Somalia and neighboring countries” (Mueller 2018: 119). The rise of al-Shabaab was a remarkable phenomenon, in the sense that the group was able to develop cross-clan alliances in war-torn and clan-based Somalia (Solomon 2014: 351).

How did the international community react after the rise of al-Shabaab? In 2006, Ethiopian National Defense Forces entered Somalia, to support a transitional federal government in opposition to the powerful Islamic Courts Union (Civins 2010: 121). By January 2007, after the dissolution of the Islamic Courts Union, various militias including al-Shabaab started a campaign against the transitional government as well as the Ethiopian troops. The transitional government lacked legitimacy in most parts of Somalia and the jihadists radicalized to conducting a jihad against all non-Muslim and non-Somali forces (Mwangi 2012: 518). “The ensuing violence would last for over two years, inflict significant losses on all parties to the conflict and result in a catastrophic deterioration of humanitarian conditions for the Somali populace” (Civins 2010: 122).

Where UNOSOM was initially deployed to monitor the ceasefire in Somalia, AMISOM was deployed to support and facilitate dialogue and reconciliation. The situation was deteriorating again, and so AMISOM stepped in. Five months after the deployment of AMISOM, a National Reconciliation Conference was held in Mogadishu. However, offshoots of the Islamic Courts (like al-Shabaab) and opposition leaders boycotted the conference and held their own in Eritrea, where they joined forces to fight the transitional federal government (AMISOM 2018). While the National Reconciliation Conference was not that successful, it was an attempt. The African Union stepped in when there was still an opportunity for mediation or diplomacy to deal with the new threat of terrorist organizations. Of course, the conflict in Somalia had been going on for more than a decade, but when new actors entered

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the scene and threatened the weak progress Somalia made, the African Union stepped in as soon as they could.

It might not seem fair to compare the United Nations and the African Union on response time in the case of their interventions in Somalia. However, as mentioned before, the United Nations in general does not intervene until there is a ceasefire or peace agreement in place. The African Union, on the other hand, views peace operations as an opportunity to bring peace. This can explain the difference in response time. In short, it is clear the African Union and United Nations have a different approach regarding when to intervene, which can explain why African Union peacekeeping in Africa is more successful than global peacekeeping.

4.1.2. Mandate

There were a lot of problems with both UNOSOM mandates. In short, they were ill-defined and unclear, there was a disconnection between desired ends and approved means, the command structure was ineffective and there was a lack of ‘big picture’ focus. Did the African Union learn from the United Nations’ mistakes?

Interesting to note in this regard, is that AMISOM technically also derives its mandate from United Nations Security Council resolutions. The African Union is at the moment unable to finance and sustain its own peace operations and thus depends on support from the United Nations for its more elaborate peace operations (Boutellis and Williams 2013: 13). Since the African Union wants to go in to ‘make’ peace rather than to ‘keep’ it, this leads to some friction between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council. AMISOM has become the biggest and most complex African Union peace operation ever and so the support of the United Nations was crucial (idem: 15). However, the African Union Peace and Security Council does also release its own documents regarding AMISOM: communiques of the council’s meetings regarding Somalia and their mission there. These documents will also be used to assess the differences between UNOSOM and AMISOM mandates.

Are there differences to be found between the UNOSOM mandates and AMISOMs mandate? The first difference that catches the eye is one also discussed in the paragraph above, namely the reason for the missions’ deployment, which inevitably influences the mandate of the mission. UNOSOM was initially deployed to monitor the ceasefire in Somalia, AMISOM was deployed to support and facilitate dialogue and reconciliation.

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UNOSOM I appointed a special representative of Somalia to provide overall direction for the mission, and a committee of the Security Council to gather information on the implementation by states of the imposed arms embargo and to increase the effectiveness of said embargo (United Nations 1992a: 58). The other part of the mandate discussed humanitarian assistance, for the realization of which the troops were authorized to use force if necessary (United Nations 1992b: 3). UNOSOM II was focused more on rehabilitation and reconciliation, and the protection of major ports, airports and infrastructure, as well as United Nations’ personnel, installations and equipment (United Nations 1993a, United Nations 1994). During this mission, the troops were repeatedly under attack, and were authorized to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” (United Nations 1993b: 1).

So, while UNOSOM’s desired ends became more ambitious, there was no real increase in approved means. The mandate of UNOSOM II included dangerous tasks of protection, but the use of force was only legitimate when used against attackers who already made victims within the United Nations’ troops. This disconnection, amongst others, made for a case of overstretch. Next to that, the command structure is nowhere specified. “Troops often refused to accept orders from UN commanders before checking with their own governments, and difficulties with communicating and coordinating activities impeded the mission” (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2018).

What does the mandate of AMISOM look like? AMISOM was deployed to support dialogue and reconciliation, provide protection to the transitional government institutions, and create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance (United Nations 2007: 2-3). Right from the start, AMISOM was authorized to “take all necessary measures as appropriate” to carry out its mandate (idem: 2). Next to that, in contrast to UNOSOM, AMISOMs mandate is updated and changed relatively quickly and often when something changes. For example, when its efforts were hindered, it was authorized to impose specified sanctions like travel bans and freezing assets (African Union 2008: 2). So, less disconnection between the desired ends and the approved means.

The African Union, in its communique regarding the establishment of AMISOM, also expresses its wish to “create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia” (African Union 2007: 2). It wants to realize this by supporting the government, helping it to take back control over Mogadishu, and drive al-Shabaab out. This shows some sense of the ‘big picture’ focus that was missing in UNOSOM. Next to that, the African Union communiques are noticeably more detailed than the United Nations

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resolutions. Troop types and size are specified, as well as logistical support (idem: 2-3). Forces provided by member states are divided over different sectors, with one member state per sector, and this is overseen by the AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant Gen. Jim Beesigye Owoyesigire (AMISOM 2018b).

In short, it is clear that AMISOM learned from UNOSOMs mistakes when it comes to mandate problems. Troops are better equipped to fulfill the mandate, there is a sense of ‘big picture’ focus, the command structure is clearer and the mandate in general is much more specific, detailed and defined. This, too, can explain the success of regional peacekeeping in Somalia.

4.2. Structural Factors

Mandate and response time are both problems from which the African Union had the possibility to learn from the United Nations mistakes. But impartiality and cultural understanding are issues of a different category. These are not things that can easily be learned, while at the same time they are the factors that can make a real difference in peace operations like the one in Somalia. UNOSOM troops were perceived as an occupation force and could not provide for an alternative source of security, and the United Nations lacked sufficient cultural understanding of the Somali society and values, with its clan system with multiple warlords, which led to misreading of the situation on the ground. These are the factors that could really make the case for regional peacekeeping, opposite to global peacekeeping.

4.2.1. Impartiality

Impartiality is a tricky factor to research. An organization like the African Union can be preferred by the Somali people because of regional legitimacy, which may lead to an increase in consent and cooperation. At the same time, regional powers might have biased interests, which would undermine impartiality (Williams 2016a: 7-9). In short, it can be argued that both of these sides are true for the case of AMISOM.

UNOSOM was perceived as an occupation force by the Somalis, and there was severe civilian mistrust regarding the United Nations troops. “Any attempt to restore order in the chaotic circumstances of Somalia would have the effect, even if it lacked the intention, of the UN force taking sides in the vicious war between Somali communities” (Thakur 1994: 398).

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The mission claimed neutrality and impartiality, but in reality some warlords were favored over others (Kaptijens 2013: 427). There was also very little to no consent or cooperation: “the deployment was based on traditional peacekeeping premises, i.e. the consent of the parties. However, this was a failed state and the application of conventional thinking and methods was not appropriate. Not surprisingly, there was poor cooperation from the factions and outright opposition from others” (Murphy 2002).

AMISOM did make an effort to secure civilian support. It organized regular meetings with community leaders, donations of clean drinking water, and out-patient clinics for treating Somali civilians (Freear and de Coning 2013: 8). Whilst the Somali people acknowledge that AMISOM has significantly reduced the threat of Al-Shabaab, many still hold critical views of the peace operation. Some troop-contributing countries are perceived very friendly, interacting with the community and providing additional support. But the Ethiopian force is frowned upon, and Somalis feel like they are taking revenge for things that happened in the past (International Refugees Rights Initiative 2017). This does obviously not increase perceptions of impartiality.

But, in general, AMISOM is not even pretending to be impartial. Security Council Resolution 2036 grants AMISOM the authority to “take all necessary measures as appropriate in those sectors in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia” (United Nations 2012). AMISOM was deployed to fight Al-Shabaab, and to support the transitional federal government. The mission clearly picked a side in this conflict, which one can argue is inevitable when using force in a peace operation.

So, on first glance, the factor ‘impartiality’ seems like it cannot help explain why regional peacekeeping is more successful in Africa than global peacekeeping. The African Union is known for its preference for using force in peace operations, which requires taking sides in the conflict. However, the African Union’s transparent partiality, and clear approach to the use of force and distinction in who is the enemy and who are allies, might give its mission more legitimacy than the United Nations missions.

“A peacekeeping force’s legitimacy comes from a social contract, where a society will consider the peacekeepers’ use of force and authority legitimate because the peacekeepers are there for a purpose that is beneficial: to provide security so that order and peace may be restored” (Mersiades 2005: 207). This is complicated by the fact that multiple actors are involved in conflicts, which leads to multiple social contracts. “The multiplicity of social

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contracts results in multiple perceptions of what is legitimate peacekeeper performance, which complicates any legitimation process” (idem: 208).

And here the United Nations and the African Union deployed different strategies. UNOSOM claimed neutrality and tried to keep everyone happy, which instead led to no one really being happy, mistrust from all parties and aversion against the mission and its troops. AMISOM on the other hand openly picked a side, that of the transitional federal government, and thus alienated some fractions, but gained consent and cooperation from others. AMISOM is seen as illegitimate by some, UNOSOM by all. Concluding, the important factor here might not be impartiality, but legitimacy. While both missions were not impartial, AMISOM managed to secure more legitimacy than UNOSOM, which can explain why the African Union is more successful in Somalia than the United Nations were.

4.2.2. Cultural Understanding

The final factor researched here might be the most important one in the case of Somalia, and possibly a defining difference between the United Nations and regional peace operations in general. Besides the fact that it is hard to solve a conflict you do not fully understand, it is important to fully address the underlying causes of a conflict in order to even be able to bring peace. Cultural understanding is essential, and it is argued that the United Nations lacked that in Somalia. They did not fully grasp the implications of the clan system in Somali society on the conflict. It can be expected that this factor can really explain the success of regional peacekeeping in Africa. “Neighbouring states usually possess a deeper knowledge of the culture, history and language of a regional conflict” (Bratt 1997: 60). This should make for a mission better adapted to the situation, and better able to address all underlying causes of the conflict.

According to Tamara Duffey, UNOSOMs “most significant problems were those resulting from the failure to understand Somali culture. Lack of cultural understanding started from the highest level of decision-making at the very beginning” (Duffey 2000: 156). They acted against the wishes of the different warlords, which intensified the fighting. A fundamental feature of Somali culture is the notion of collective responsibility, which is embedded in Somali customary law and diya (blood money) payments. It requires the clan to “protect and support its members” (idem: 158). The United Nations ignored this and held one individual warlord responsible for his failure to cooperate in solving the conflict. Next to that, the United Nations falsely demanded that one clan should hold the power in Somalia, instead

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of helping to restore the traditional clan equilibrium and power sharing in the country (ibid). “It was assumed that Somalia needed outside direction and help to build new institutions rather than rebuild on the basis of Somali tradition” (Bentley and Oakley 1995: 4). In short, “the UN's misunderstanding of the clan system and the decentralized nature of traditional Somali political institutions led the UN to pursue basic political errors” (Duffey 2000: 158).

Is there an observable difference in AMISOMs approach? For one, it can be derived from AMISOM tactics that they understand the Somali system much better. For example, troops worked with or through proxies to avoid diya responses from clans aimed at the troops (Hesse 2014: 584). Next to that, the proxies also “denied al-Shabaab’s leaders the claim that Somalis were suffering a ‘massive Christian invasion’” (Agence France-Presse in Hesse 2014: 584). This demonstrates significant knowledge about the situation in Somalia. Furthermore, Sebastiano Rwengabo links cultural understanding also to organizational commitment. It has become clear that the United Nations’ commitment to the mission in Somalia was not enough. Rwengabo argues that shared Pan-African values create incentives for African states to “bear costs and sustain AMISOM’s momentum” (Rwengabo 2016:127).

Daniel Olsher argues that in the African Union’s mission in Somalia, “soldiers came mostly from African countries and brought with them an intuitive understanding of the importance of and knowledge about local factors. In particular, AMISOM forces were able to make deep connections with Somali civilians, allowing the mission to gain information on local al-Qaeda offshoot al-Shabaab as well as circumvent local ‘spoiler’ factions unsupportive of the overall mission” (Olsher 2013: 122). While AMISOM is also often criticized for not being enough ‘Somali-like’, it can be argued that the, according to some people small, difference between the African Union mission and the United Nations missions in cultural understanding makes a difference. Cultural insights helped improve strategies used by troops and increased commitment by African Union member states to contribute to AMISOM.

The African Union’s cultural understanding regarding the situation in Somalia painfully exposes the danger of ignorance. With a little more knowledge, mistakes could have been prevented in UNOSOM. “It was the neo-colonial attempts to shape and mould future Somali political arrangements that led to disaster” (Murphy 2002). Understanding the society and conflict you are stepping into, is key for a mission’s effectiveness. It determines the whole character of a mission. The United Nations significant lack thereof and the problems that created, show why in the end cultural understanding might be the most important argument in the regional peacekeeping discussion.

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5. Conclusion

What makes regional peacekeeping in Africa more successful than global peacekeeping? To answer this question, peacekeeping missions of both the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia have been compared. Four problem areas, factors for success in peacekeeping the United Nations did not meet in Somalia, were identified. AMISOM was then evaluated on response time, mandate, impartiality and cultural understanding.

Concluding, it has become clear the African Union performs better on all four factors. When a new threat emerged, the mission was set up as soon as possible. The mandate is more detailed, command structures are defined, and when a disconnection between the desired ends and the approved means begins to emerge, the mandate is upgraded. Even though AMISOM is not impartial, they managed to secure consent and cooperation from some fractions, granting them more legitimacy than the United Nations ever had. And, maybe most importantly, AMISOM shows significant cultural understanding, which expresses through its troop strategies.

Of course, only one case has been analyzed. Generalization, therefore, might seem problematic. However, it can be argued that the results found here might apply to the African continent in general when it comes to regional peacekeeping. Response time and mandate are technical factors, where the African Union could have learned from UNOSOMs failures. But both are influenced by more fundamental differences between the African Union and the United Nations. The United Nations only intervenes when there is a cease fire or peace agreement in place, while the African Union wants to actively make peace. The difference in response time thus will always be. And the mandate is also influenced by this, as well as by the level of cultural understanding and partiality. Careful generalization thus is possible.

The United Nations and the African Union have different approaches to peace operations. These differences seem to make the difference in Africa. Regional peacekeeping is more successful in Africa than global peacekeeping, because the African solution to African problems seems to work.

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