Acold war consensus on compellence; A comparative study between democratic and republican administrations

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A Cold War Consensus on Compellence?

A Comparative Study Between Democratic and Republican

Administrations

Maarten van Giessen 2052466

Leiden University

Bachelor Project: Political Science

Thesis Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. H. Pellikaan Date: 20 December, 2019

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Table of Contents

Introduction ... 1

The Cold War Consensus ... 1

A Qualitative Research on Compellence ... 3

Methodology ... 5

A Small-N Comparative Study ... 5

Terminology ... 5

Case Selection ... 6

Variables ... 9

Structure ... 11

Democratic Administrations: Case Studies ... 12

Cuban Missiles (1962) ... 12

Crisis description ... 12

An ultimatum ... 13

A threat of grave damage to both sides ... 14

Pleiku (1965) ... 14

An active implicit threat ... 15

A threat to U.S. influence ... 15

A threat of grave damage to North Vietnam ... 16

A threat by coalition ... 16

U.S. Hostages in Iran (1979-1981) ... 17

A passive implicit threat ... 18

A political threat to Iran... 19

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Conclusion: A Democratic Pattern? ... 19

Republican Administrations: Case Studies ... 21

The Korean War III (1953) ... 21

A vague threat ... 21

A threat of grave damage to North Korea and the PCR ... 22

Black September (1970) ... 22

A threat to Syrian influence ... 24

Mayaguez (1975) ... 24

A threat of grave damage to Cambodia ... 25

Conclusion: A Republican Pattern ... 26

Conclusion ... 27

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1 Introduction

The Cold War Consensus

During the Cold War, scholars generally argued that a bipartisan consensus about the means and ends of foreign policy was part of the U.S. political environment in the post-war period (Meernik, 1993; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1990). According to some scholars, the Cold War consensus was primarily a narrative put forward by and beneficial for the elite (Krebs, 2015b). At the same time, the consensus is mentioned as a factor for the unnecessary continuation of the Cold War struggle, while others utilize the theory as a backing for their realist thought (Craig & Logevall, 2009; Fordham, 2010). Consistent with the many functions that are attributed to this theory, disagreement remains on the theory itself, while the question remains: did the Cold War consensus exist?

Wittkopf and McCormick (1990b) showed evidence of the existence of a consensus on foreign policy issues in a study focusing on popular opinion data. Evidence of bipartisanship, namely in the first two decades after the World War II, was found in their research on a potential consensus in U.S. Congress as well (Meernik, 1993; McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990b). The conventional wisdom states this bipartisan agreement came to an end after the Vietnam War, which many believe to have brought an end to the consensus (Witkopff & McCormick, 1990b). Witkopff and McComrick (1990b), however, did not find sufficient evidence to argue that the Vietnam War in itself produced a major watershed in the post-war record. Krebs (2015a) believes the Cold War consensus to have started eroding even before the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965, and to not have been coalesced until the mid-1950s, contrary to the conventional view. On the other hand, a small minority suggests that the consensus remained fixed during the entire Cold War (Bacevich, 2007; Craig & Logevall, 2009; Krebs, 2015c). This uncommon perspective can be linked to realist or statist approaches to historical accounts of the Cold War, which argue that the consensus resulted from U.S. decision makers acting to defend certain core values (Fordham, 2010).

Krebs (2015b) provides an alternative constructivist approach on the emergence of the consensus, rooted in the dynamics of domestic politics and public narrative. According to Krebs (2015b, p. 219), the Cold War consensus was “a narrow shared

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narrative of national security regarding the Communist adversary and the interconnected nature of global politics”, put forward by the elite. He argues that such narratives “were not the faithful and straightforward reflections of global realities” and that they were neither “the usual expected responses to policy failure and success” (Krebs, 2015b, p. 219). After measuring newspaper editorials on foreign affairs, Krebs (2015a) argues the consensus to be narrower than generally thought.

Krebs (2015c) believes these contrasting views on the Cold War consensus persist due to a lack of systematic evidence of what the consensus consisted out of, when it consolidated and when it collapsed. In addition, the use of various research methods is responsible for this absence of consensus in the literature as well. Wittkopf & McCormick (1990a; 1990b), for instance, utilized public opinion data to measure the consensus, while they analyse congressional votes in a different research. On the other hand, Krebs (2015b; 2015c) discusses the Cold War consensus in the context of an elite narrative and analyses newspaper editorials. Others employ a broad analysis of U.S. national security and foreign policy (Bacevich, 2007; Craig, Campball & Logevall, 2009; Fordham, 2010).

This paper will provide a new perspective on the Cold War consensus theory. In contrast with earlier research, an analysis will be made of concrete actions relating to U.S. foreign policy on the highest level of policy-making. Democratic and Republican administrations during the Cold War will be compared regarding a certain aspect of foreign policy, demarcating the research. This will be done by means of the following research question: How does compellence policy compare between Democratic and Republican administrations during the Cold War era?

A Qualitative Research on Compellence

Coercive diplomacy1_{has been an extensively researched topic in the study of} international relations. Mainly in the United States, it was one of the most influential

1_{I here use the term ‘coercive diplomacy’ as used in The Strategy of Conflict (Schelling, 1960) and in}

“Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001” (Sechser, 2011), enhancing both deterrence and compellence, as opposed to George (1991; 1994), who defines coercive diplomacy as a narrower concept

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schools of thought within international relations during the Cold War (Jervis, 1979). The first studies emerged, unsurprisingly, during the first years of the nuclear era and focused mainly on the concept of deterrence. 2 Although these early studies had little impact on policy, they laid the groundwork for a new wave of influential research on the subject during the late 1950s, a period which was characterised by the intensification of the Cold War (Lupovici, 2010).

Simultaneously with the rise of the second wave of research on deterrence theory, Schelling identified two types of coercive diplomacy, whereas previously only deterrence was recognized as one. His ground-braking work, The Strategy of Conflict (1960), differentiated between deterrent threats and compellent threats based on the nature of their objective. Schelling argued that deterrent threats serve to dissuade an opponent to undertake a certain hypothetical action, whereas compellent threats are designed to intimidate an opponent into forgoing a valuable possession or altering its behaviour. I.e., deterrence is concerned with preserving the status quo, while compellence is interested in changing the status quo (Sechser, 2011).

Despite the identification of this distinction within the literature of coercive threats, most Western scholars remained focused on the concept of deterrence (Sechser, 2011).3 Given the relatively scarce literature on compellence, it is necessary to evaluate compellence within the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy. The abundance of literature on United States foreign policy is an excellent starting point for doing so. Many scholars have done quantitative research on the effectiveness of U.S. deterrent and compellent threats and have written extensive analyses on years of coercive diplomacy policy. Recently, Sescher (2011) and Pfundstein (2012) have made significant contributions to the quantitative compellence literature. However, almost no small-N research on U.S. compellence cases exists.

than compellence, excluding blackmail and deterrence. The terminology surrounding the concept of compellence will be discussed in the following chapter.

2_{Jervis (1979) further explains the relation between the study of coercive diplomacy and the new problems}

the Cold War and nuclear age brought about.

3_{The lack of research on compellence strategy is rather surprising, because deterrent threats do not seem}

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While quantitative research is certainly helpful for the enrichment of compellence literature, there should be room for qualitative research as well. Large-N research tends to overlook the specifics and curiosities of cases, as LeBow and Stein (1990) demonstrated for deterrence cases.4 Qualitative research on compellence might be useful in order to generate a necessary deeper understanding of the dynamics of certain compellence cases. This room for in-depth analyses allows us to answer questions we otherwise could not, one of which this research seeks to answer.

4_{Indeed, LeBow and Stein’s (1990) criticism focuses exclusively on the issues of deterrence theory.}

However, LeBow and Stein (1990) demonstrate that sometimes the conceptual line between deterrence and compellence is blurry and arbitrary. Moreover, their critique illustrates the inherent problems with quantitative research.

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5 Methodology A Small-N Comparative Study

In order to answer the research question, this project will obtain the structure of a comparative case study. Small-N comparative studies generate an in-depth analysis of certain cases, while allowing room for the greater scope of contextualization as well. Comparative case studies consist of two or more cases and are widely used in the political research field (Halperin & Health, 2017). This study will consist of six cases: three cases will be analysed for Democratic administrations and three for Republican administrations.

Terminology

In order to determine whether cases can genuinely by classified as an instance of compellence, the term first must be defined. A compellent threat is an explicit demand by one state, the challenger, that the other state, the target, alter its behaviour. A promise of military sanctions is made by the challenging state in case the target state chooses not to comply (Sechser, 2011). In other words, the purpose of a compellent threat is to persuade the target state to change its behaviour. No brute force should be used in order to make the other state comply, which could be an example of failed compellence (Pfundstein, 2012).

Sechser (2011) defines three key features of compellence. First, a compellent threat should demand a change in the status quo. Threats to persuade states to renounce actions not already made, do not qualify as compellent threats, since this does not call for a change in the status quo. Second, compellence involves an assurance of future military action if the demand is not met. This assurance may occur through explicit verbal communication or through public military manoeuvres or demonstrations that correspond with the threat. Third, the compellent threat must be made from one state to another. A compellent threat can be made by multiple challengers, although it always targets one state (Sechser, 2011)

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6 Case selection

The next task is to choose certain compellence cases to compare. For this, both Pfundstein’s and Sechser’s database can be used, while the former is more convenient. Pfundstein (2012) is solely interested in cases where the U.S. is the challenging actor, similar with this research. In addition, she provides a more comprehensive dataset, including case summaries. Multiple other large datasets exist on U.S. military intervention, although these do not limit their universe of cases to compellence. This has the major disadvantage of excluding cases where a compellent threat was successfully issued (Pfundstein, 2012).

Pfundstein (2012) utilizes data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) to compose her dataset. The ICB Project was set up as a response to the lack of systematic research on international crises. For each case, the ICB data records information on the actors, the international system, the crisis trigger, the actor’s behaviour and the crisis resolution. Moreover, the ICB dataset conveniently contains a summary for each crisis (Pfundstein, 2012)

Pfundstein (2012) points out the possibility that threats could be issued outside the scope of an international crisis. However, she estimated “that it is possible but unlikely that a state would issue a compellent threat that demands a change in behaviour from a target state outside the scope of a crisis” (Pfundstein, 2012, p.10). Data from the Militarized Compellent Threats database would suggest this estimation to be correct. Not focusing exclusively on international crises, Sechser (2011) does not find more cases of compellent threats made by the United States during the Cold War than Pfundstein (2012).5

As presented in the table below, ten compellent threats were issued by the U.S. during the Cold War, which are equally distributed under Democratic and Republican administrations. In this paper six cases of compellence will be examined, three per administrations represented by a U.S. major party. In order to prevent selection bias, the simple throw of a dice determined the case selection. The following three cases in which a compellent threat has been made under Democratic administrations will be analysed:

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Table 1: Compellent threats issued by the U.S. in international crises, during the Cold War (Pfundstein, 2012, p.17-22) Case

#

Crisis Name Date Opponent Other Actors Administration

140 Korean War III 16 Apr - 27 Jul 1953 China, North Korea South Korea Eisenhower (Republican) 180 Pathet Lao Offensive 9 Mar - 16 May 1961 Pathet Lao, USSR Thailand Kennedy

(Democratic)

196 Cuban Missiles 16 Oct - 20 Nov 1962 USSR Cuba Kennedy

(Democratic)

213 Pleiku 7 Feb - Late Mar 1965 North Vietnam South Vietnam Johnson

(Democratic)

224 Pueblo 21 Jan - 23 Dec 1968 North Korea none Johnson

(Democratic) 238 Black September 15 Sept - 29 Sept 1970 Syria, USSR Jordan, Israel Nixon

(Republican) 249 Christmas Bombing 23 Oct 1972 - 27 Jan 1973 North Vietnam South Vietnam Nixon

(Republican)

259 Mayaguez 12 May – 15 May 1975 Cambodia China Ford

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309 US Hostages in Iran 4 Nov 1979 - 20 Jan 1981 Iran none Carter

(Democratic)

391 Invasion of Panama 15 Dec 1989 - 3 Jan 1990 Panama none Bush

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“Cuban Missiles”, “Pleiku” and “US Hostages in Iran”. The cases “Korean War III”, “Black September” and “Mayaguez” will be discussed for Republican administrations.

Variables

Pfundstein (2012) classified five types of compellent threats, which will prove useful in the comparison of the cases. During Pfundstein’s (2012) analysis of the cases, this classification is employed as an ordinal variable. In descending order, the first type of threat that Pfundstein (2012) identifies is an ultimatum: a compellent threat that is being issued through a public statement or private communication, with specific demands for the target state, a promise for punishment in the case of noncompliance, and a specific deadline for compliance.6_{The second classified threat is an open-ended threat. This type} of threat, where demands and punishment for noncompliance are communicated through a public statement or private communication as well, has no explicit deadline. The third compellent threat type is a vague threat. A vague threat too is communicated through a public statement or private communication, but lacks specific demands and/or punishment for noncompliance. Such a threat lacks a deadline for compliance as well. The fourth type is classified as an active implicit threat, which is issued through the application of limited force. No specific demands are made and no deadline is imposed. Active implicit threats serve to obtain compliance by the prospect of future pain for the target state. The last type of threat that Pfundstein (2012) identifies, is a passive implicit threat: a threat communicated through the movement of military assets. The challenger, in this case, does not specify its demands, nor does it impose a deadline (Pfundstein, 2012).

These types can be divided into two broad categories: the first three types of compellent threats are explicitly issued by a representative of the U.S. government, either through private channels of communications or through a public statement. The last two

6_{Schelling (1966) argues that a deadline is mandatory for a threat to be compellent. This research,}

however, argues that a deadline is not a necessary component of a compellent threat, consistent with Sechser (2011) and Pfundstein (2012).

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types are implied through the movement of military assets or through the application of limited force (Pfundstein, 2012)

Another variable that will be used in this comparison concerns the gravity of the crisis in which a compellent threat is issued. It identifies the object of gravest threat, as perceived by the challenging and target state at any time during the crisis. Within compellence cases, it is likely that the challenging state determines the object of gravest threat for the target state by issuing the threat. Assuming the challenging state is aware of this, (which is far not a radical assumption,) the threat perception of the opposing actor relates, at least in part, to the nature of a compellent threat. Therefore, the gravity of a crisis as perceived by the target state is relevant to in this analysis. However, since perceptions can only be shaped to a certain degree, one should be careful with the interpretation of this variable. The object of gravest threat for the challenging state is relevant to discuss as well, since it could provide useful insights regarding the circumstances in which a compellent threat was issued.

The following values can be attributed to the gravity of a crisis, in ascending order: economic threat, limited military threat, political threat, territorial threat, threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem, threat of grave damage and threat to existence. When more than one value is threatened, the most severe will be discussed. Being used as an ordinal variable in Sechser’s (2011) dataset, the variable is not of perfect ascending scale (Brecher, Wilkenfield, Beardsley, James & Quinn, 2017; Pfundstein, 2012). Pfundstein (2012) further explains this:

“For example, the severity of a territorial threat can vary greatly, and a political threat can approximate a threat to existence for a leader that is facing overthrow. It is a useful scale, however, for considering how the actors perceived crisis stakes and how the stakes of a particular crisis may differ for the actors involved.” The final variable this paper considers, concerns itself with whether a threat was issued with or on behalf of at least one other state (Pfundstein, 2012). Pfundstein (2012) names this variable ‘threat by coalition’. Variables regarding the “success” of a compellent threat are not included, considering the research goal concerns itself with the nature of compellent threats, not the outcome.

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11 Structure

In the next sections the six cases will be analysed in-depth. In the first section three compellent threats issued by Democratic administrations will be examined. The same will be done for threats issued by Republican administrations in the second section. First, a brief crisis description of each case will be given, whereafter the variables mentioned above will be discussed per case. In the conclusion of both sections, a potential internal pattern will be discussed, whereas the general conclusion will answer the research question.

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Democratic Administrations: Case Studies Cuban Missiles (1962)

Crisis description. The Cuban missile crisis was triggered on 16 October 1962, when President John F. Kennedy was informed by the C.I.A. that the Soviet Union was installing ballistic missiles on Cuba (Gibson, 2011; Smoke, 1974; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=196). After six days of deliberations with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), Kennedy announced a naval blockade of Cuba, limited to offensive military equipment. Khrushchev’s major response to the blockade was a letter, containing a proposal offering the removal of the missiles and the disruption of further shipments in return for an end to the blockade and a U.S. assurance to not invade Cuba in the future (Gibons, 2011; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=196).

On 27 October the crisis further escalated, when an unauthorized shooting of a U.S. U-2 flight over Cuba occurred. That same day Kennedy received another letter from Moscow, offering the dismantling of the missiles in Cuba in exchange for the removal of the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Kennedy sent his brother to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to agree on the Soviet proposal regarding a public promise to not invade Cuba and removing the Jupiters in Turkey. The latter, however, would have to remain a back-channel promise. Furthermore, Robbert Kennedy issued a tough warning that an immediate reply was needed, at the latest by the next day. In a formal letter, Kennedy sent his acceptance of the proposals made in Moscow’s first letter, without mentioning the second one.7 The following day, the U.S. government was notified that Soviet work on the Cuban missile sites had stopped. The missiles were subsequently shipped back to the USSR and Soviet government allowed UN observers to verify the dismantling of the sites. Khrushchev warned Washington that U-2 flights over Cuba must be stopped as well (Gibson, 2011; Scott & Hughes, 2015; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=196)

7_{Scott & Hughes (2015, p.20) argued that this agreement should not be seen as an equal trade:}

“If there was a trade, it was not an equal one since what Khrushchev gave up was important to both him and Kennedy and what Kennedy surrendered was not.”

Earlier the Kennedy administration had sought an excuse to remove the missiles and they were moreover expected to be removed somewhere in the near future (Scott & Hughes, 2015).

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The crisis continued hereafter for several more weeks, although at a lower level of intensity, because Castro demanded a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The US resumed the blockade after Cuba rejected inspection by the United Nations (UN). To reassure the prevention of a new crisis, a U.S.-USSR agreement was reached on 7 November. Cuba joined the agreement on 20 November, terminating the crisis for all three actors (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=196).

An ultimatum. During the Cuban missile crisis, two compellent threats were issued by the U.S. However, only one threat per crisis can be examined, since this paper concerns a comparative case study of compellent threats, not international crises. To avoid over-counting threats, Pfundstein (2012) did not split crises in which more than one compellent threat against the target was issued into discrete cases. Similarly with her study, the last threat issued or implied by the U.S. during the crisis will be employed here, in this case an ultimatum.

On 27 October, the day of the shooting of the U.S. U-2 spy aircraft, Kennedy wanted to resolve the crisis with haste and sent his brother to communicate a message to Dobrynin, accepting the removal of the missiles in Turkey. Scott & Hughes (2015, p.27) state that “Kennedy gave a deadline for compliance and made clear that if it were not forthcoming the US would attack.” Although this clearly describes an ultimatum according to the classification by Pfundstein (2012) (the threat specifies a demand, punishment for noncompliance and a deadline), some controversy remains about the usage of the term in this case. Multiple accounts mention that Robert Kennedy stated to the Soviet Union that this was not an ultimatum (Chandler, 2017). Chandler (2017) then argues that therefore it was none, although he mentions that Khrushchev does label it as such in his memoirs. Such a simple argumentation overlooks the more complex dynamics regarding interaction and communication in international relations. Scott & Hughes (2015) point out that ultimata are not acceptable in modern diplomacy, at least not among two states of somewhat equal power, because acceding to one would be a clear indication of weakness. They argue that, by emphasizing that the message should not be interpreted as an ultimatum, the Kennedy administration made acceptance easier (Scott & Hughes, 2015).

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A threat of grave damage to both sides. Brecher et. al (2017) classify ‘a threat of grave damage’ as the threat of large casualties in war and/or the threat of mass bombings. This situation seems to be the case for the challenger as well as the target state during the missile crisis. Both the United States and the Soviet Union understood that this crisis could get out of hand quite easily possibly resulting in large casualties.

It seems unlikely that a threat of grave damage was imminent and instantly perceived as such by the U.S. upon the discovery of the missiles on 16 October. Kennedy’s decision to impose a naval blockade changed this perception, however. Putting ships, planes and men into motion, no one could be sure what would happen, since the decision to fire a weapon during the crisis would probably have been made by a military subordinate.8_{Both sides stressed that the situation could not be allowed to get} out of control, yet this premised on the realization that it could. The tense situation further increased after the shooting down of the U.S. spy plane. Accounts suggest that after the incident both leaders experienced an urgent need to quickly resolve the crisis, fearing escalation (Scott & Hughes, 2015). This illustrates both state’s perception of a threat of grave damage.

Pleiku (1965)

Crisis description. On 7 February 1965 a crisis was triggered for the United States and South Vietnam after Vietcong forces performed a mortar attack on a U.S. helicopter base and barrack near Pleiku airfield, killing eight, wounding 126, and destroying twenty U.S. aircrafts (Kennedy, 2010; Logevall, 2013; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=213). Within hours of receiving the call, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson gathered the National Security Council (NSC). It was a near-unanimous decision to attack four pre-selected targets in North Vietnam as a first response, without informing South Vietnam (Logevall, 2013).

On 10 February another major retaliatory strike was launched by the U.S. following a Vietcong attack on U.S. barracks 75 miles east of Pleiku. On 13 February, after deliberation with the NSC, the administration formulated a formal response to the

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Pleiku incident. ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ was initiated to start measured and limited air action in cooperation with South Vietnam against selected military targets in North Vietnam (Logevall, 2013; Wells, 1994).9

The crisis ended on 2 March, the day the first U.S. air strikes began. Operation Rolling Thunder marked a sharp escalation in American involvement in the Vietnam War. The Pleiku crisis had no clear outcome, dragging the U.S. further into a complicated war, which would persist in many years to come (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=213).

An active implicit threat. Operation Rolling Thunder is often characterized as an example of consensus without agreement, mentioning disagreement among the U.S. administration regarding the goals of the operation, while consensus existed on the means (Pape, 1990; Pfundstein, 2012). Pape (1990), however, argues this diagnosis not to be accurate. He states that there was broad consensus among the administration that Rolling Thunder was intended to coerce North Vietnam into ceasing the infiltration of troops and supplies into the South and into negotiating a peace settlement. Some officials believe it could also serve to bolster South Vietnamese morale and to reaffirm U.S. commitment to resist communist influence in the area (Pape, 1990).

Thus, Rolling Thunder was at least partly executed in order to coerce North Vietnam. This coercion classifies as an active implicit form of compellence, according to Pfundstein’s (2012) classification. No specific demands were made, nor did the U.S. impose a deadline. With the air strikes following the Vietcong attacks, while applying limited force with interventions, the U.S. sought to coerce North Vietnam through the prospect of future pain (Logevall, 2013; Pfundstein, 2012; Pope, 1990; Simons, 1971).

A threat to U.S. influence. The gravity of the Pleiku crisis for the United States is interpreted as a ‘threat to influence in the international or regional sub-system’ (Brecher

9_{The Pleiku incident rather was a pre-text than a cause for the operation. In the weeks prior to the incident,}

U.S. officials had decided to dramatically increase U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war (Logevall, 2013). Logevall (2013) mentions that the Johnson administration was seeking an incentive to initiate the new policy.

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et al., 2017; Pfundstein, 2012). For the U.S., of course, the entire Vietnam War partly revolved around regional influence, attempting to contain communism in the area. The U.S. perceived the struggle in Vietnam as a battle in the larger Cold War against the Soviet Union (Chapman, 2012). Thus, the stakes in such a relatively small incident were at least in part perceived by the U.S. as a threat to their influence in the region, which needed to be overcome. It is not surprising, then, that certain officials within the Johnson administration wanted to escalate the war in order to demonstrate U.S. commitment to combating communist forces in the region (Pape, 1990).

A threat of grave damage to North Vietnam. More than perhaps any other type of compellent threat, an active implicit threat stresses the willingness to inflict future pain in case of noncompliance, by means of the application of limited force. With Operation Rolling Thunder, the United States sought to do exactly this. Since Ang (2002) argues that the possibility of large casualties and mass bombings was understood by the North Vietnamese leadership, the threat perception for the target state is identified as a threat of grave damage.10

A threat by coalition. Although the role of South Vietnam in the decision-making concerning the U.S. response to the Pleiku crisis was negligible, the threat issued is identified as made by a coalition. This is not to argue that South Vietnam played a significant role during the crisis. For instance, North Vietnam was not even notified of the bombings on 19 February. However, the South Vietnamese military did help in the actual execution of the threat: in multiple instances they participated in U.S. military operations intended as a response to the crisis (Logevall, 2013).

10_{In The Vietnam War from the Other Side Ang (2002) further discusses the motives for the continuation}

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17 U.S. Hostages in Iran (1979 – 1981)

Crisis description. On 20 October 1979 U.S. President Jimmy Carter agreed to admit the former Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, into the United States for medical treatment. This sparked outrage among revolutionary forces in Iran, which earlier had initiated the Iranian Revolution, leading to the end of the Pahlavi dynasty. On 4 November a crisis was triggered for the United States, when several hundred Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy after a peaceful sit-in, taking over 50 U.S. diplomats and aides hostage (Glad, 1989; Thiétart & Forgues, 1997). A decision was made by the Iranian government headed by Bazargan, and later by Khomeini, to put the U.S. hostages on trial if Washington did not return the Shah to Iran. The U.S., however, refused these terms (Glad, 1989; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309).

The U.S. first responded on 10 November by ordering Iranian students without legal documents to leave the United States. Two days later, the U.S. started the boycott of Iranian oil. On 14 November U.S. and British naval vessels began manoeuvres in the Arabian sea. That same day, all Iranian assets in the United States were frozen. Iran decided to release all black and female U.S. hostages less than a week later (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309).

Khomeini postponed the hostage issue, announcing the new Iranian Parliament was to decide on the issue. On 22 March, however, the parliamentary elections were postponed. On the same day, Carter authorized a plan to rescue the hostages at a meeting of the NSC. On 7 April diplomatic relations with Iran were broken. Subsequently, on 11 April an airborne rescue mission was sent to Iran. Yet, the collision of two helicopters, which caused the death of eight U.S. soldiers, led Carter to abort the mission. The failed rescue mission caused Iran to disperse the hostages among sixteen locations (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309).

In September, suddenly, news reached Washington that Khomeini was prepared to discuss terms for the release of the hostages. On the day U.S. proposals were to be issued, however, war broke out between Iran and Iraq. The hostage issue was set aside until November, when the Iranian Parliament adopted the conditions outlined by Khomeini for the release of the hostages, demanding a financial compensation. On 20

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January the final documents were signed for the release of the hostages. (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309).

A passive implicit threat. On 12 November the Carter administration issued a compellent threat, by ordering U.S. and British ships to start maneuvers in the Arabian sea (Pfundstein, 2012; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309). In late November, Carter enforced his threat by ordering the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk to join the four ships already present (Glad, 1989). Gary Sick, an advisor on the U.S. NSC, reported:

“With the arrival of Kitty Hawk, the United States had at its disposal the largest naval force to be assembled in the Indian Ocean since at least World War II and the most impressive array of firepower ever deployed to those waters” (Brams, 2000, p. 229).

The threat itself, as well as a deadline or punishment for noncompliance were never made explicit. However, Glad (1989) and Pfundstein (2012) note that the U.S. actions served in part to suggest the United States might resort to the use of force if the remaining hostages were not freed, which was publicly suggested by the White House as well (Glad, 1989). Brams (1993) and Pfundstein (2012) note that the naval movements partly served as a deterrent threat too, deterring Iran from hurting the hostages.

A threat to U.S. influence. The object of gravest threat to the United States during the hostage crisis was a threat to its influence in the region. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. and most western countries generally were supportive of the regime (Thiétart & Forgues, 1997). With Carter ruling out another coup11_{restoring power to the Shah, the} United States felt normal relations with the revolutionary government must be developed in order to maintain its influence in the region (Emery, 2010).12_{The hostage crisis for the}

11_{Earlier, in 1953, the U.S. had staged a regime change in Iran, overthrowing the democratically elected}

government and restoring power to the Shah (Emery, 2010).

12_{Voices within the Carter administration argued the new regime in Iran could be a useful bulwark against}

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U.S., however, endangered the development of normal working relations with the new regime and therefore threatened its regional influence.

A political threat to Iran. A political threat is defined by Brecher et al. (2017) as a threat of the overthrowal of a regime, the change of institutions, the replacement of elites, the intervention in domestic politics and/or subversion. Although Carter had ruled out a forceful regime change initiated by the U.S., the fear of an American coup to restore the power of the Shah was widely felt among Iranians (Houghton, 2006). Furthermore, Slim (1992) notes this fear about a U.S. plot was felt under the new Iranian leadership as well. Therefore, the object of gravest threat for Iran during the crisis is identified as a political threat. Although the United States threatened the use of force, there is no evidence to suggest that Iran experienced the threat of grave damage during the hostage crisis.

A threat by coalition. The role of other nations in the U.S. hostage crisis, aside from mediation efforts, is almost non-existent. However, similarly with the Pleiku incident, the U.S. compellent threat is identified as being issued by a coalition. This is due to the threat itself being executed through the maneuvers of U.S. and British naval vessels, which implies British support for the U.S. position (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=309).13

Conclusion: A Democratic Pattern?

After the analysis of three cases in which a compellent threat was issued by Democratic administrations, no clear pattern has been discovered. During the Cuban missile crisis an ultimatum was explicitly communicated to the USSR, while the threats issued during the Pleiku and U.S. hostage crisis were both implicit: the Johnson

13_{Pfundstein (2012) does not mention the involvement of the British military in the naval exercises. Neither}

does she code the implicit passive threat by the U.S. as issued by a coalition. A reason for this could be that the United Kingdom was not named as a crisis actor throughout the hostage crisis. However, as Pfundstein (2012) does not further discusses her cases in-depth, her motivations for this remain unclear.

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administration issued an active implicit threat and Carter issued a passive implicit threat. Using Pfundstein’s (2012) ordinal classification of the threat types, it can be observed that such implicit threats, in relation to an ultimatum, are placed on the other end of the spectrum.

Moreover, during the Pleiku crisis and the hostage crisis, the compellent threat was executed by more than one state. The Johnson administration involved the South Vietnamese military in his response to the Pleiku crisis, while the threat issued by the Carter administration was executed in cooperation with the British military. The missile crisis, contrarily, involved no threat by a coalition.

Furthermore, a pattern between Democratic administrations relating to the object of gravest threat to the target state is absent. U.S. threats during the Cuban missile crisis and the Pleiku crisis caused the opposing state to perceive a threat of grave damage, while Iran merely perceived a political threat during the hostage crisis. Assuming the values that Brecher et al. (2017) utilized concerning the gravity of the crisis, a political threat is substantially different from a threat of grave damage.14 However, as previously discussed, this variable is not of perfect ascending scale. When analysing U.S. intention, (which perhaps is more relevant given this paper’s concern with the nature of a compellent threat and not the outcome,) the same pattern was found: the Kennedy and Johnson administration sought to seriously threaten the opposing state in both crises, whereas the Carter administration sought to be more careful in its approach.

Possible explanations for this variance between Democratic administrations can be identified. For instance, in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the object of gravest threat for the United States was different from the other examined cases. A comprehensive explanation for these variances, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

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Republican Administrations: Case Studies The Korean War III (1953)

Crisis description. On 16 April 1953 military forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea began a new offensive against UN troops after a general easing of the fighting. In the context of a military stalemate and political discussions regarding the return of prisoners of war (POW) to the North15_{, a crisis was triggered for} the administration of U.S. President Dweight D. Eisenhower (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=140). Washington, seeking an armistice, responded in the end of May by hinting at the possible use of nuclear weapons to break the deadlock in Korea. The PRC and North Korea agreed on 8 June to the possibility of a voluntary return of the POWs, which broke the political deadlock. South Korea perceived any agreement on the POW issue as a compromise of its reunification plans for a unified Korea and was alarmed by the softening Chinese stance, fearing a U.S. withdrawal. Subsequently, on 18 June, South Korea executed an unauthorized release of 25,000 POWs, angering the U.S. However, the peace negotiations continued and an armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, ending the crisis for the U.S. and the remaining actors (Foot, 1988-1989; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=140)

A vague threat. By threatening with the use of nuclear weapons, the United States issued a vague compellent threat against the PRC and North Korea (Pfundstein, 2012). The threat was communicated through private channels: the U.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Dulles, informed the Prime Minister of India that nuclear weapons were being considered if the deadlock was not broken, assuming that it would be relayed to Bejing (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=140). Although the U.S. did specify its demand for an armistice, it did not explicitly impose a deadline (Pfundstein, 2012). Foot (1988-1989) notes that a one-week recess was called by the U.S. in order for the Chinese and North Korean governments to consider its decision. However, it was not implied that

15_{North Korean POWs in South Korea stated they did not want to return to the North, while their return}

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the U.S. would resort to the use of nuclear weapons if an armistice was not reached by then. Furthermore, punishment for noncompliance was implied but not clearly specified (Pfundstein, 2012).

A threat to U.S. influence The United States perceived a threat to is regional influence during the Korean War (III) crisis. Gaddis (2005) and Mozingo (1967) argue that the U.S. was concerned with containing communism in the region, as was the case for multiple other crises that have been examined. Relatedly, the object of gravest threat during the third Korean War crisis is identified as a decline in regional influence. With an on-going war, U.S. influence in the region remained under threat. Demanding an armistice implied interest in securing this influence.

A threat of grave damage to the PCR and North Korea. The PCR and North Korea experienced a threat of grave danger after the U.S. implied the possible use of nuclear weapons. Foot (1988-1989) argues that China and North Korea understood “that rejection of the final UN Command position would mean an expanded war, probably involving the use of nuclear weapons” (p.112). Therefore, these states were well aware of the possibilities of mass bombings and/or large casualties as a consequence for noncompliance and were, thus, experiencing a threat of grave danger (Brecher et al., 2017).

Black September (1970)

Crisis description. On 15 September 1970 a crisis was triggered for the administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon, when the Jordanian head of state, King Hussein, announced a drastic change in his cabinet by including military personnel. The U.S. perceived this as an intention by the Jordanian government to confront the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which played into U.S. fears of the loss of an ally in the case of an overthrowal of Hussein’s regime. Meanwhile, Syria feared a decline in its regional influence if the PLO were defeated and acted by invading Jordan on 19 September. The Jordan military immediately engaged in battle with Syrian forces and

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appealed to the U.S. for aid. The U.S. outsourced this request of direct military involvement to Israel. The Israeli parliament in turn decided in favour of military action in order to prevent a Palestinian victory, if necessary. On 21 September the U.S. made a decision to provide umbrella support to Israel if the Soviet Union and Egypt intervened in the war. National Security Advisor Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Rabin, furthermore, worked out a plan for the possibility of a joint military operation. The crisis escalated for Syria and the United States with the deployment of the Jordan air force against Palestinians on the 22nd _{of September. That same day, all Syrian tanks withdrew} from Jordan, after which Palestinian guerrillas were forced to leave Jordan. A Jordan/Syrian cease-fire agreement was signed on 27 September, whereas a general cease-fire was implemented on the 29th_{, ending the crisis for all actors. (Siniver, 2005;} www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=238).

A passive implicit threat. During the Black September crisis, the U.S. issued an implicit threat through the movement of forces (Pfundstein, 2012; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=238). By placing airborne divisions in Germany and the U.S. on semi-alert status and by manoeuvres of naval vessels, the U.S., in part, sought to compel Syria to withdraw (Pfundstein, 2012; Pierson, 2013). Until Syrian forces had been pulled back, the Nixon administration stressed that pressure was to be applied to Damascus (Siniver, 2009). The movement of forces was a statement of intention to the Iraqi and Soviet governments as well, although this was intended to deter these governments, especially the latter, from intervening in the war (Litwak, 1986; Pierson, 2013; Siniver, 2009). No specification was given to Syria regarding the nature of the punishment for noncompliance, neither was a deadline imposed (Pfundstein, 2012; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=238).

A threat to U.S. influence. Siniver (2006) describes King Hussein as “by far the most pro-American leader in the Arab world” (p. 122). Maintaining Hussein’s regime was of primary concern to the U.S., for it was thought by the Nixon administration that a toppling of Hussein could lead to a radical Syrian-dominated regime in Jordan. This, in turn, could endanger Israel, another area in which the U.S. enjoyed regional influence.

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The survival of the king’s regime was therefore perceived as a key to stability in the region by the Nixon administration (Rubinovitz, 2010; Siniver, 2006; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=238). It is logical, then, that the object of gravest threat for the United States during the Black September crisis was a decline in regional influence (Pfundstein, 2012).

A threat to Syrian influence. Syrian involvement in the crisis in general was due

to its concern of a decline in regional influence

(www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=238). Therefore, the object of gravest threat to Syria is identified as a threat to influence (Pfundstein, 2012). The U.S. threat, not implying a threat of grave damage to the state Syria itself, but merely implicitly demanding its withdrawal, is unlikely to have altered Syria’s threat perception.

Mayaguez (1975)

Crisis description. Amidst a context of declining U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, the Mayaguez, a U.S. cargo ship, was seized near the Cambodian coast by the Khmer Rouge, the communist Cambodian regime that followed the pro-American Khmer Republic. The seizure on 12 May 1975 triggered a crisis for the administration of U.S. President Gerald Ford. The ship, together with its crew, was taken into custody. On the same day of the capture of the Mayaguez, the U.S. demanded the return of the ship and crew. On the 13May, the U.S. threatened the use of force, if necessary (Head, Short & MacFarlane, 1978; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=259).

The day after the U.S. threat, the Ford administration decided to use military force, after deliberations with the NSC on the issue. A few minutes after fighting began, the Khmer Rouge released the ship and crew, marking an end to the crisis for the United States. However, fighting continued between Cambodian forces and the U.S. marines in the vicinity, causing large numbers of casualties on both sides. On 15 May the U.S. ceased its military operations (Friedman, 2010; www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=259)

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A vague threat. The U.S. threat issued on 13 May 1975 is being identified as a vague compellent threat (Pfundstein, 2012). The Ford administration forwarded a note to the Khmer Rouge regime implying the employment of force in case the ship and crew were not released (Hamm, 1977). The note was delivered to both the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Cambodian Embassy. Although the notes were returned without answer, there is little doubt the message reached Cambodian authorities (Head, Short & MacFarlane, 1978) The threat, however, was not explicitly specified and merely mentioned “serious consequences” (Pfundstein, 2012). Moreover, the note lacked a specific deadline for compliance. Therefore, the message is interpreted as a vague threat. Through the movement of forces and, later, the use of limited force, the U.S. threat was further emphasized (Hamm, 1977; Head, Short & MacFarlane, 1978).

A threat to U.S. influence. After the devastating war in Vietnam, the Ford administration looked upon the Mayaguez crisis within a context of declining influence in Southeast Asia (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=259). Bohn (2015) and Head, Short and MacFarlane (1978) argue the administration’s response to the incident was shaped to a certain degree by this perception of a decline in regional power. Therefore, the object of gravest threat during the Mayaguez crisis is identified as a threat to U.S. influence.

A threat of grave damage to Cambodia. For the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the object of gravest threat it faced during the crisis was a threat of grave damage. This threat perception was primarily shaped by the U.S. threat, since it was due to its compellent threat that a crisis was triggered (www.icb.umd.edu/dataviewer/?crisno=259). The U.S. threat mentioned “serious consequences” in the case of noncompliance (Pfundstein, 2012), suggesting more than merely an operation to free the ship and crew. It is thus assumed that the Khmer Rouge perceived a threat of grave damage, although no records exist on the Cambodian perception of the crisis.

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26 Conclusion: A Republican Pattern?

Among Republican administrations, a pattern regarding compellence policy is more ostensible. In two instances, during the Korean War (III) crisis and the Mayaguez crisis, a vague threat was issued. During the Black September crisis, the U.S. issued a passive implicit threat, which is similar to a vague threat on all levels except regarding the articulation of the threat (Pfundstein, 2012). The gravity of the crisis as perceived by the target state is fairly similar per case as well. Both North Korea and the PCR, during the Korean War (III) crisis, as Cambodia, during the Mayaguez crisis, perceived a threat of grave damage. For Syria, the object of gravest threat was a decline in its regional influence, which, assuming the scale of Brecher et al. (2017), is near the same level as a threat to grave damage. In addition, U.S. intentions seem to be aligned with these threat perceptions as well. However, earlier reservations concerning the interpretation of this variable should be kept in mind. Lastly, none of the compellent threats issued by Republican administration were either issued or executed in cooperation.

A possible explanation for the relative similarity regarding compellence policy among Republican administrations could be the uniformity in U.S. threat perception during all crises. In each case, the crisis gravity for the United States was perceived as a threat to influence. This, however, would not entirely explain the different values shown during the Black September crisis. Both the threat type and threat perception of the target state were different from the other Republican cases, although slightly.

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27 Conclusion

In this research six cases of compellence have been examined: three compellent threats issued by Democratic administrations and three issued by Republican administrations. Among Democratic administrations no clear pattern was found on any of the employed variables. In the comparison of Republican administrations, a pattern was more visible: two cases showed identical values on all variables, whereas one case demonstrated similar values.

In nearly all cases, the gravity of the crisis for the United States was a threat to its regional influence. This is not entirely surprising for two reasons. First, enjoying superpower status meant that the U.S. did not have to fear a serious threat to its existence, a threat of grave damage or a serious political or territorial threat, unless if the threat is issued by another superpower. Only once, during the Cuban missile crisis, did the U.S. threat perception differ from a decline in regional power, when it perceived a threat of grave damage by, indeed, the Soviet Union. Second, the Cold War was more than anything a battle for influence. The prominent U.S. domino theory and the related containment policy pursued by the United States, demonstrated the commitment to expand its influence, attempting to counter communism. In all cases in which the gravity of the crisis for the U.S. was identified as a threat to its influence, it was fearing a loss in power to communist regimes.

Furthermore, in almost all examined compellence cases, the threat perception of the target state was a threat of grave damage, meaning it was facing the threat of large casualties and/or mass bombings. The frequent perception of this threat type by U.S. opponents is neither surprising. As a nuclear superpower, the U.S. experienced the military capacity to destroy every opponent in the examined cases, whereas only the Soviet Union was able to invoke the same damage during the missile crisis. The U.S. hostage crisis is the only case in which an opponent perceived no such threat. During this crisis, the U.S. chose for a less aggressive strategy, pursuing diplomatic approaches on multiple occasions, for Iran held leverage over the United States in the form of hostages.16 Again, one should be aware of earlier reservations regarding the interpretation of this

16_{One could argue along similar lines and point to the threat perception of Cambodia during the Mayaguez}

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variable, while it is only possible to shape the threat perception of an opponent to a certain degree.

At first sight, a pattern between Democratic and Republican administrations regarding Pfundstein’s (2012) threat types seems absent: the U.S. issued two vague threats, two passive implicit threats, one active implicit threat, and one ultimatum. Most of these threats, however, are more similar than this classification suggests. Except for the missile crisis, all cases lacked a deadline and a specific demand. In addition, all but one lacked an explicit promise for punishment. One cannot argue, however, that this represents a clear pattern. Finally, when comparing on the use of coalitions when issuing a compellent threat, no pattern can be observed. Two Democratic administrations executed a threat in cooperation with another state, during the Pleiku crisis and during the hostage crisis. Besides these two cases, no administration issued a compellent threat in cooperation.

In conclusion, it appears that there was some kind of bipartisan consensus on compellence policy in the United States, although it concerns a narrow one. The frequent threat perception by target states of a grave threat suggests a consensus on the implied gravity of compellent threats. In addition, all threats but one lacked a deadline and a specific demand. On the use of coalitions in the execution of a compellent threat, a bipartisan consensus seems rather absent.

Moreover, further research is necessary in order to demonstrate the existence or absence of a bipartisan consensus on compellence on the governmental level. Although some patterns between both parties were discovered, it is hard to draw general conclusions from a small-N study. In a broader context, more research focusing on certain aspects of foreign policy could provide useful insights on the Cold War consensus theory by breaking down the consensus.

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