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Public Administration - Crisis and Security Management | Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Exploring Dutch asylum reception policy in the second decade of the twentieth century

The Relationship Between the Government,

Municipalities and Local Citizens

Master thesis of:

B. F. M. Naafs S1141651 Supervisor: Drs. C. Nagtegaal Second Reader: Dr. E. Devroe 30 January 2017

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Abstract

This thesis includes an exploratory research on Dutch reception policy, a policy area which was under real pressure from mid-2015 until mid-2016. Considering reception policy at the stage of a policy crisis, crisis literature is used to look into the issue. Based on the gap hypothesis and principal-agent theory, an attempt is made to understand the reasons why reception policy is and will result in a policy crisis under the current circumstances. These circumstances mean the current relationships between the relevant actors regarding reception policy. From a policy perspective, both research methods of interviewing and surveying are used to research the reciprocal relationships between the government, municipalities and local citizens.

Drawing conclusions on the reasons why reception policy will result in a policy crisis under its current circumstances, an attempt is made to recommend a solution. This recommendation is based on crisis literature and takes the readers along the subjects of experiencing a policy crisis, politicization, de-politicization, securitization and solidarity.

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Preface

In the context of the master Crisis and Security Management, I started writing this master thesis in February 2016. Taking part in the capstone ‘Immigration and Refugees’, Leiden University provided me the knowledge to take the first step in the direction of my final choice of subject: reception policy of asylum seekers in the Netherlands.

As will become apparent in this thesis, the Netherlands has been experiencing tumultuous times from mid-2015 until mid-2016 due to the exceptional increase of asylum requests. This causing a national and international crisis in many ways, making it an interesting topic of research for a crisis management student. As I already kept an eye on the developments while starting this research, from February 2016 I subsequently got the chance to intensify my interest on the subject because of my internship at the Utrecht Taskforce Accommodation of Refugees (In Dutch: Taskforce Opvang Vluchtelingen). This organizational body - set up by the Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, Province of Utrecht, security region of Utrecht and municipalities of Utrecht - was assigned the task to support the province and security region of Utrecht to reach the target of 3000 accommodation places requested by the government. During my internship, I experienced the administrative and political problems that play along regarding my research topic. So parallel with doing research, which lasted from February 2015 until July 2016, I was also professionally engaged to the research topic. A great experience, which has certainly contributed to the vision I developed in this master thesis.

This thesis is written for Dutch society, given the fact the issue puts the relations between the government, municipalities and local citizens on the edge. This thesis is written to clarify the causes of the crisis, and open the eyes of the people who are in the position to address the issue.

I want to thank my thesis supervisor, Kees Nagtegaal, for his guidance during the process of writing my master thesis from the period of February 2016 to December 2016. I want to thank the mayors who have taken the time to be a part of my research. I want to thank the team of my internship, with Jasper Nagtegaal, Jean Paul Andela and Peter Bos in particular, who supported me in my research. And finally I want to thank my parents, who have always been a listening ear.

I hope you will enjoy reading this thesis.

Bern Naafs,

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Table of Content

Preface ... 2

1. Introduction and Research Question ... 6

1.1 Introduction ... 6

1.2 Problem Definition ... 8

1.2.1 The Current State of Affairs ... 8

1.2.2 The Issue of Accommodating Asylum Seekers ... 10

1.2.3 Research Question ... 11 1.3 Relevance ... 11 1.3.1 Academic ... 11 1.3.2 Societal ... 12 1.4 Reading Guide ... 13 2. Theory ... 14 2.1 About States ... 14

2.2 Dutch Asylum Policy: Three Approaches but No Solution ... 16

2.2.1 Responding Positively: Civil Resistance and the Extreme Right ... 16

2.2.2 Responding Negatively: a Liberal Society and EU Chairman ... 17

2.2.3 An Absence of Acting: From Low to High Politics ... 17

2.3 Considering Reception Policy at the Stage of Policy Crisis ... 19

2.3.1 Crisis ... 19

2.3.2 From a Solidarity to a Conflict Crisis ... 19

2.3.3 The Dutch Reception Policy Community ... 20

2.3.4 Policy Crises ... 23

2.4 The Emergence and Ending of Policy Crises ... 23

2.4.1 Legitimacy ... 23

2.4.2 Policy Crises: Losing Legitimacy ... 24

2.4.3 The Emergence of Crises ... 24

2.4.4 Crisis Decision Making ... 25

2.4.5 Crisis Management Strategies ... 25

2.5 Why Reception Policy Fails ... 26

2.5.1 The Gap Hypothesis ... 26

2.5.2 The Disjuncture Between Public and Policy-makers at the Decision-making and Implementation Stage of Reception Policy ... 27

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2.6 Using Principal-agent Theory to Interpret the Failure of Reception Policy ... 29

2.6.1 Principal-agent Theory ... 29

2.6.2 Using Principal-agent Theory to Interpret the Disjuncture Between Public and Policy- makers at the Decision-making and Implementation Stage of Reception Policy ... 31

2.6.3 Using Principal-agent Theory to Interpret the Discrepancy Between the Policy Goals of the Government and the Output ... 32

2.7 Conceptualization ... 33

2.7.1 Conclusions on the Disjuncture Between Public and Policy-makers at the Decision- making and Implementation Stage of Reception Policy ... 33

2.7.2 Conclusions on The Discrepancy Between the Policy Goals of the Government and the Output ... 33

3. Research Design ... 35

3.1 Type of Research ... 35

3.2 Case Selection ... 35

3.3 Method of Data Collection ... 36

3.4 Operationalization ... 38

3.4.1 Concerning the Research Question ... 38

3.4.2 Concerning the Perception Questions ... 41

3.4.2 Concerning the Perception Questions ... 42

3.5 Limitations ... 43

4. Analysis... 43

4.1 Data on the Research Question ... 44

4.1.1 Data on Sub-question 1: To What Extent Do Local City Councilors Take Into Account Electoral Repercussions Regarding Reception Policy? ... 44

4.1.2 Data on Sub-question 2: To What Extent Do Local Policy Communities Recognize a Lack of Public Support, Thus a Lack of Legitimacy, on Reception Policy? ... 44

4.1.3 Data on Sub-question 3: To What Extent Is the Government Shirking its Possibilities and Responsibilities, Thus Inadequately Enforcing Reception Policy? ... 44

4.1.4 Data on Sub-question 4: To What Extent Do the Government and Mayors Have Goal Conflict, Making Mayors Inadequately Implementing Reception Policy? ... 49

4.2 Perception Questions ... 53

4.2.1 Topic 1: Experiencing a Policy Crisis ... 53

4.2.2 Topic 2: Politicization ... 55

4.2.3 Topic 3: De-politicization ... 57

4.2.4 Topic 4: Securitization ... 58

4.2.5 Topic 5: Solidarity ... 59

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5.1 The Research Question ... 64

5.1.1 Political Deadlock ... 64

5.1.2 Discrepancy ... 67

5.1.3 Conclusion ... 71

5.2 Recommendation ... 72

5.2.1 Experiencing a Policy crisis ... 72

5.2.2 Politicization ... 72

5.2.3 De-politicization ... 73

5.2.4 Securitization ... 73

5.2.5 Solidarity ... 74

6. Sources ... 77

Appendix 1 – Results Online Survey ... 90

Appendix 2 – News Letter VNG ... 195

Appendix 3 – Semi Structured Interview 1 with Lucas Bolsius ... 198

Appendix 4 – Semi Structured Interview 2 with Jos Wienen ... 203

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1. Introduction and Research Question

1.1 Introduction

In 2015, around 1,3 million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe and asked for asylum (BBC 2016). Especially the Southern and Southeastern European states have seen an increasing influx of civilians from the African continent and the Middle-East since the mid-2010’s, confronting these states with numbers they cannot handle any more in 2015. With a lack of cooperation between the European member states and their failure to harmonize the resettling op people, national governments reacted with comparable restrictive measures to deal with the rising number of asylum requests (Alink 2016, 19; Joly 1992; Cornelius et al., 2004). These measures proved to be temporarily, as the number of asylum requests stayed the same in Europe and only moved to other spots on the European waterbed. Today we still find ourselves in a European migrant or refugee crisis. A crisis that puts national authorities in an administrative crisis on both the European and national level. A crisis that partly arises due to the national and international strategies (with the additional policy choices) of European states.

Because there is a close relationship between political conflict and economic and social problems, it can be difficult to make the distinction between migrants and refugees. “It is difficult when people flee from countries where poverty and violence are direct consequences of the political system” (Loescher 1993,6). Confusion on the classification has led some people to view refugees, migrants, drug dealers and terrorists as more or less the same (1993, 97). Therefore, it is of great importance to separate refugees from migrants. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is someone with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (United Nations 1951). With its 1967 Protocol (United Nations 1967) it constitutes the starting point for states’ responsibility to contribute to the protection of refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) works together with governments and “both advises and supports them as needed to implement their responsibilities” (UNHCR 2015). Migrants do not move because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but to “improve their lives by finding work, education, family reunion or other reasons” (UNHCR 2015).

While the definition of 1951 remains important to protect refugees from “persecution”, increasingly large number of politically coerced and displaced people do not fall within the Convention’s strict definition. “Migrants who flee threatening circumstances that do not involve individual persecution have not been widely accepted as refugees, although until recently many have been given

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humanitarian assistance and treated on an ad hoc basis as de facto or non-Convention refugees” (Loescher 1993, 6). The problem is that today the world “is witnessing a huge growth in forcibly displaced people who are not adequately protected by current international norms” (Loescher 1993, 6). Although not all people who arrive at the European borders flee direct persecution or death, depicting those who come from conflict zones like Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan as migrants is too narrow.

The arrival of migrants and refugees make European policymakers realize immigrants and refugees are no temporary problems but persistent issues they have to deal with. The European Council tries to agree on joint migration policies since Tampere in 1999, but European politicians are still unsuccessful in their attempts to reach consensus on effective policies (European Council 1999; Freeman et al. 2013, 21). Meanwhile, since 2010 European governments are under great pressure to deal with the proper evaluation of the great majority of asylum requests. Although in March 2016 Turkey and the European Union (EU) made an agreement to jointly coordinate the influxes (European Commission 2016), each individual country still has to deal with asylum requests.

In the Netherlands the number of asylum requests rose to 59.100 in 2015 (Rijksoverheid 2016a), creating administrative, political and social unrest (Cats 2015). The Dutch government found itself balancing between influencing international and national concerns. It claimed the asylum policy would be tightened, but the number of asylum requests was not much lower in the beginning of 2016 (Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst 2016a). During the period of doing research, which lasted until July 2016, it was not yet clear or the number of asylum requests would decrease or increase during the summer months. But in both the past and present, the Dutch know they have to process each application seriously. And during this processing of applications, reception of asylum seekers is needed. This thesis focusses on the period of accommodating asylum seekers during this process, examining the Dutch administrative struggles that currently constitute an obstacle to ensure these accommodations.

In this thesis asylum seekers are considered the people who arrive at the Netherlands, and need accommodation while their request is being processed. Immigrants follow a different application procedure and hence do not need accommodation regulated bythe Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers (COA). The COA is an independent administrative body that falls under the political responsibility of the Minister of Security and Justice, with the objective of accommodating and assisting asylum seekers. Therefore, immigrants are not addressed in this thesis. However, the truth is there are people who endeavor to be considered a de facto refugee to obtain a residence permit by the procedure of the COA, but should be only eligible to obtain a residence permit by other application procedures looking at their motivations. The Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst (IND) and secret services are expected to pick this immigrants out of the application procedure of the COA (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2016).

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The term asylum seeker originally refers to someone who wants to be permitted residence as a refugee in the legal context, but today approval is also given to asylum seekers who are not covered by the strict understanding of a refugee in the UN Treaty. The public administration literature is confronted with this watering down of the legal concept of a refugee, as it is currently used in a more general sense. Even governments use the term refugees for the public, probably to let the public form a positive image about and emphasize with asylum seekers. Summarized, an asylum seeker is not a refugee (yet), but may even get a residence permit by the application procedure of the COA as a non-Convention refugee.

Until recently academic literature focused on migration, because refugee policy was considered a UN concern which recipient states could not influence in the past (Freeman 1995; Freeman 2006; Gibney 1999). But because asylum policy not solely encompasses refugee policy anymore, this thesis applies the migration literature to analyze asylum policy. This thesis considers asylum policy as the actions the Dutch authorities have to take from the moment asylum is requested until the moment he/she is housed in the country or leaves the country (un)voluntarily. When this thesis cites statements including the concept “immigration”, it should be understood in the sense of the watered down legal concept of asylum. Immigration literature originally includes immigrants, but in this thesis its theories, concepts and perspectives are applied to the watered down legal concept of refugees and asylum seekers in the general sense.

1.2 Problem Definition

1.2.1 The Current State of Affairs

In September 2015 it becomes clear the Netherlands is confronted with numbers of asylum requests it cannot process and accommodate with its then existing capabilities. On the Seventeenth of September 2015, the Director-General of Immigration sends a letter to all the Dutch chairmen of the security regions concerning short-term crisis emergency reception for refugees (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2015a). On 30 September 2015 the Director-General of Immigration applies all mayors, councils of Mayors and Alderman (College van Burgemeester en Wethouders (B&W)), and municipal councils (Gemeenteraad) concerning crisis emergency reception (Directeur-Generaal Vreemdelingenzaken 2015). This crisis emergency reception was needed in order to prevent asylum seekers sleeping outside. Sport halls were converted for 72 hours accommodation. On 12 October 2015, the unit-manager of the COA requests the directors of the security regions to actualize 500 emergency reception places by each security region (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2015b).

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In this respect, on 13 October 2015, the Minister of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations asks the twelve Dutch Commissioners of the King to act as “representative of the government” (rijksheer) in the realization of the emergency reception places in their specific province (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2015).1 Every Dutch province has a specified target of 2500 reception places, as well as 500 places per security region situated in the particular province (Regering en VNG 2015).2

These places are needed because the Netherlands received 59.110 asylum requests (consisting of first applications, repeated applications and family reunion) in 2015, of which approximately 75% comes from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea (Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst 2015). Because people in these countries are confronted with issues as war and violations of human rights, the IND honors nearly all these requests. But even for the period of processing the requests, as well as the possible housing or (forced) departure of asylum seekers, reception places are needed. Reception places that the COA has to arrange. Although the Dutch Prime-Minister sees the Turkey-deal as the light at the end of the tunnel that is “designed to bring the influx to zero” (De Volkskrant 2016), the COA expects to table the same amount of asylum requests in 2016 (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2015c).Their crisis scenario is even calculated on 90.000 for 2016. Since the COA’s regular reception centers do not offer enough capacity, new locations are required in cooperation with (and situated in) municipalities. Therefore, progress is needed regarding the realization of accommodation in the Dutch municipalities. Progress that can be achieved by harmonizing the execution of policies by the different governmental levels. This thesis considers the political and administrative process of creating accommodation for asylum seekers as the execution of accommodation or reception policy.

As part of the national asylum policy (and reception policy in particular) two policy agreements are signed between the government and the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG), the association which represents all 390 Dutch municipalities. In November 2015 the ‘Policy Agreement Increased Influx of Asylum Seekers’ was signed, followed by the ‘Development Agreement Increased Influx of Asylum Seekers’ in April 2016 (Regering en VNG 2015; Regering en VNG 2016). Both in order to foster cooperation between the various administrative levels.

1 In the Netherlands the Commissioner of the King is the chairman of the “College van Gedeputeerde Staten”

and of “Provinciale Staten van de provincies”. Therefore, it is the ‘face’ of the government of each province. There are twelve provinces in the Netherlands, and therefore twelve Commisioners of the King.

2 The Netherlands has 25 security regions in which cooperation takes place by various authorities and services in

the execution of tasks in the field of firefighting, disaster- and crisis management, medical assistance, public order and safety. Six provinces have a security region that has the same geographical borders as the provincial borders, and the other half of the provinces have more than one security region inside their provincial borders.

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1.2.2 The Issue of Accommodating Asylum Seekers

An article in the Dutch Daily Algemeen Dagblad (AD) (den Hartog 2016) shows the provinces and security regions do not comply to the given task of the government to effectuate emergency reception places. These tasks are based on the target of 58.000 places, and it has to be noted that at the same time existing reception centers will be closed. While the anticipated crisis scenario becomes reality in the beginning of 2016, the number of available reception places decreases. This resulting in a greater shortage.

An essential part of proper execution of asylum policy is a well-organized reception policy. Asylum can be seen as a ‘wicked problem’ regarding the discontinuity, uncontrollability of and uncertainty on the timing and size of the requests (t’ Hart and Wijkhuijs 1999, 158-159). Another problem is that from the moment a foreigner enters the Netherlands until the moment he/she gets a residence permit (or is expelled out of the country), asylum policy involves a complex policy domain as it is linked to the policy fields of different ministries (e.g. home affairs, foreign affairs, labour, justice and economics). Once a person has received a residence permit, multiple issues require government attention. Think of the services that are associated with integration as education and employment; cultural integration; housing; social service; and security concerns (Joly 1996, 133-136; Chepel d’Appollonia 2008, 1-2). Finally, the realization of accommodation is associated with the half-yearly target for municipalities to house and integrate a certain number of people who received a residence permit (Rijksoverheid 2016b). These fields and issues need to be linked, causing competition between the different actors on the construction of the asylum issue (Lahav 2006, 208).

In addition, the transnationality of the issue makes it even more difficult to cope with the problem. National incentives determine the international and national strategies of states, but governments are not able to fully protect their state’s sovereignty and national interests from external influences. Asylum policy-making has become “more complex and multi-tiered, making a popular discourse among migration scholars that states have ‘lost control’ over immigration” (Sassen 1996, 3). The policy process of immigration was probably never confined to a narrow governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction. “Today more than two decades of public opinion and public political debate have become part of the arena wherein immigration policy is shaped” (Sassen 1996, 68).

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1.2.3 Research Question

At the moment this research was written, which lasted from January 2016 until July 2016, the Dutch were still in great uncertainty about the number of asylum requests in the months to follow. On the threshold of the traditional summer-spike of asylum requests, this research felt the importance of addressing the question why the Dutch target of realizing reception places were not met during the period under research. It focused on the administrative problems that arose regarding Dutch reception policy.

But from July 2016, as the summer-spike did not appear, the issues concerning reception policy would turn out to be less problematic (Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst 2016b). Nevertheless, this research provides key findings on the issue of accommodating asylum seekers in the Netherlands. It shows the difficulties the authorities had in the period under research to achieve the targets, and will have in the future when the influx rises again.

The complex and multi-tiered asylum issue posed challenges to the national, provincial and municipal authorities that had to execute asylum policy in the existing political and societal circumstances. Circumstances that possibly ensured relational problems. Therefore, principal-agent theory is used to interpret the reciprocal relationships between the authorities and society in the Netherlands. This thesis addresses if the reciprocal relationships hindered the achievement of the objectives, and asks why the goals of the national government do not match the goals of the lower municipal authorities. This leads to the explorative research question of:

“Why does Dutch reception policy, with the current reciprocal relationships between the government,

municipalities and local citizens result in a policy crisis?”

This theses will describe the reciprocal relationships and its problems regarding the execution of reception policy, explaining why reception policy results in a policy crisis. This explanation will clarify why the Dutch target of realizing reception places was not met, subsequently followed by recommendation of a crisis approach.

1.3 Relevance

1.3.1 Academic

The research question sets out a problematic issue that has both academic and societal relevance. While there has been a lot of discussion on the reasons why execution of immigration policies poses a challenge to liberal democracies, the actual execution remains largely neglected. As Lahav states “little attention has been given to the variety of actors and venues where immigration policy is shaped, elaborated and implemented” (2006, 207). States find themselves in a two-level game where all relevant actors try to implement their strategies and pursue their interests on both the international and

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national level. Statesmen “are typically trying to do two things at once” (Evans et al. 2003, 15). While a government has its reasons to choose one of the three approaches (will be discussed in chapter 2.2) to affect the amount and duration of the processing of asylum requests, the practicalities of the reception period starting at the asylum request up to the approval or disapproval of the request is overlooked in scientific studies. This thesis examines this period.

As Rudolph (2003, 31) states “migration had long been considered peripheral to international relations scholarship, especially security studies’ and to a great extent international political economy”. In the post-9/11 world, “security studies are becoming more interested in issue areas as immigration that have become linked to security concerns” (2003, 31). Due to this security aspect the issue ranks high on both the societal and political agenda, making it hard for the authorities to govern this issue (see chapter 2.2.3). For the academic discipline of ‘Crisis and Security Management’ this thesis aims to examine the causes of a policy crisis, observe the different actors that are involved and find potential responses to the problem in order to govern the crisis. For this purpose crisis literature, principal-agent theory and the gap hypothesis are used.

1.3.2 Societal

All public administration and management “is conducted within a political setting where the goals and means of activities are politically relevant” (Lane 2005, 5). As chapter 2.2.3 notes reception policy also finds itself in this political setting in which policy-makers and executives of policy have to find an answer to govern the issue. Public administration “is concerned with the management of public programs” (Denhardt 1995, 1). The goal of public administration is the “creation of public value to solve problems concerned with the public” (Stoker 2006, 44). Bovaird distinguishes public management and public governance, with public management as “an approach that uses managerial techniques to increase the value for money achieved by public services” (Bovaird 2003, 5). Public governance means “how an organization works with its partners, stakeholders and networks to influence the outcomes of public policies” (Bovaird 2003, 5).

In the light of public administration and public governance, the government has the task to lead the country in the case of the societal, political and administrative challenge reception policy poses.First of all to execute its imposed task of reception policy. Secondly, to prevent a further escalation of the issue that endangers the Dutch democratic norms and values. Think of the societal relations, taking into account the current hardening of the debate and the difficult relations between policy-makers, executers of policy and the public (Telegraaf 2015). This thesis shows the authorities what underlies the obstacles of reception policy, and provides the authorities with a possible strategy in the recommendation section.

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1.4 Reading Guide

The theoretical part of this thesis starts with a clarification of states’ behavior on asylum policy in chapter 2.1. In this context chapter 2.2 explains which options liberal states have to deal with this issue, bringing up the issues of civil resistance, the growth of extreme-right anti-immigrant parties, and the process of politicization and securitization. Building on theory, chapter 2.3 considers reception policy at the stage of a policy crisis examining crisis literature. Chapter 2.4 continues on this crisis literature, focusing on the question how policy crises emerge and end. It elaborates on crisis literature with regard to issues of reception policy, and may provide strategies that are applicable to reception policy. As policy crises are characterized by disappointing results or even failure of the policy, chapter 2.5 uses the gap hypothesis to explain why reception policy fails. Principal-agent theory is used to elaborate on this failure of reception policy in chapter 2.6. In chapter 2.7 a conceptual scheme is formulated, drawing conclusions on the concepts that underlie the failure of reception policy and the policy crisis.

Chapter 3 encompasses the research design of this thesis. Chapter 3.1 gives an explanation on the type, chapter 3.2 on the case selection, and chapter 3.3 on the methodology of the research. The concepts of the theoretical part are operationalized in chapter 3.4, after which chapter 3.5 ends the research design addressing the limitations of the research.

The analysis chapter 4 sets out the data that has been found on the research. Chapter 4.1 specifically presents the data on the four sub-questions that are used to answer the central research question, and chapter 4.2 provides the data related to the perception questions and its five topics.

The final chapter 5 gives the conclusion and recommendation of this research. The data of chapter 4.1 is used to answer the research question in chapter 5.1, and the data of chapter 4.2 supports the recommendation in chapter 5.2.

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2. Theory

2.1 About States

The difficulty for liberal democracies is to maintain protection for refugees without attracting unwanted large numbers of immigrants. States prefer restrictive criteria in the attempt to limit the granting of a refugee status to the people who have a well-founded fear of persecution, deterring the economic immigrants who do not risk their lives (Jacobsen 1996; Gordenker 1987; Weiner 1992). Western governments are in a split between “a humanitarian sentiment towards refugees and the recognition that the more generous the law of asylum, the greater the number of applicants” (will be) (Weiner 1992, 116). With citizens being afraid for the economic, political and cultural costs the admission of immigrants entails - anxiety strengthened by the dubious legitimacy of many asylum claims – many Western states “have done little more than fulfill their international law duty not to return to a dangerous state or territory (refouler) the seekers of asylum who make it to their borders” (Gibney 1999, 169). “States face no similar obligations for forced migrants and refugees outside their territory”, giving states´ incentives to prevent or discourage asylum seekers to request asylum in their country (Thielemann and El-Enany 2010, 209). The collective action literature to refugee protection suggests that “states have an incentive to enhance the restrictiveness of their refugee policies in order to shift responsibilities away from themselves onto others” (Thielemann and El-Enany 2010, 220).

Although Western states avoid to take more responsibility: how should they respond to the asylum requests of people who do not experience the direct threat of death or persecution but certainly have good reasons to flee their homes? Gibney (1999, 171-175) shows the difference between an impartial perspective, “stressing the universal moral claims of human beings to equal consideration by states”, and a partial view stressing the moral claims of communities. These views underpin the clash of competing moral and ethical claims in state responsibilities to refugees, where Gibney believes states have to accept as many refugees they can without undermining the provision of collective goods among its members. He shows “the tension between the demands of morality (as expressed in most ideal theories) and the majority views of the citizens of democratic states (as expressed through politics)” as a result of the responsibility of states to act in accordance with the results of democratic processes (1999, 175).

Key factors that should shape the political limits of state action to assist asylum seekers are the needs of the claimants, the state’s economy, ethnic affinity, integration history, the actions of other states, and the population and number of entrants (1999, 176-177). Brochmann introduces the dimensions of national security, national economy, demography, social and cultural cohesion as the factors that should constitute the basis for a state’s legitimization of its national control policy towards immigrants

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(Brochmann and Hammar 1999, 6). Jacobsen also introduces four factors that influence the policy responses of governments to mass refugee influxes: bureaucratic choices made by the government; international relations; absorption capacity of the local host community (willingness and ability – economic capacity and social receptiveness); and national security considerations (1996, 660-670). According to Joly naked ‘national interest’ governs states their decisions and policies on asylum, considering the state of the economy, social costs and their culture/ideology (Joly 1996, 21-25).

Gibney (1999) presents humanitarianism, considering the moral kindness of states and individuals to all human beings (outsiders), as a principle states can use to explain their responsibilities regarding the assistance to asylum seekers. However, this means that when a country is believed to have a large capacity on one of the aforementioned factors, it would be better able to deal with high numbers of asylum seekers. For states, receiving more requests means receiving more problems, a situation states generally want to avoid. Therefore states will deliberately score low on the different factors, making it look like increasing efforts are tough to realize in their country.

Besides, the partial view noted by Gibney also has its reasons. Writers like Keely strengthen this partial view with the political argument that a nation has a right to claim a state “to govern their territory as the political expression of their nationality” (1996, 1051). On a final note, just opening up the borders will have adverse effects for state, citizen and asylum seeker.

Considering the aforementioned factors, a host government has three options when it is facing influxes of asylum seekers (Gordenker, 1987). First of all, it can respond positively when the influx is seen as an opportunity or obligation. Second option is to respond negatively when the refugees threatens local capacities or security. Third, it can do nothing, suggesting that “it lacks the capacity for action, is unwilling to act, or does not consider the appearance of refugees as a significant matter for its agenda” (Gordenker, 1987). But at the end, governments themselves must decide “when and how strongly to encourage the return of refugees and what to do about those who cannot return to their homes or be resettled elsewhere” (Jacobsen 1996, 658).

It is clear states have both internal and external concerns that pushes them to take a certain stance in their approach to asylum seekers. Of course Western countries would prefer a solution (be it military, economically, humanitarian assistance or otherwise) for the current influxes that is organized on African or Middle Eastern ground, instead of just absorbing the people who arrive at the European borders. And yes, the influxes are part of the two-level games played by states in the national and international arena. This two-level game approach “recognizes that domestic policies can be used to affect the outcomes of international bargaining, and that international moves may be solely aimed at achieving domestic goals” (Evans et al. 2003, 17). Seeing the accommodating of asylum seekers as a part of asylum policy, states try to influence this policy with internal and external considerations. Besides, the reception policy is used to affect the asylum policy and other policy areas on the national

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and international level. But despite states’ considerations and policies, each day states end up with new requests. Until they make a decision regarding a request, states have to accommodate this person.

2.2 Dutch Asylum Policy: Three Approaches but No Solution

2.2.1 Responding Positively: Civil Resistance and the Extreme Right

As described in chapter 2.1, states have three options to respond to the influx of asylum seekers (Gordenker 1987). First of all, a government can have a positive approach to asylum policy trying to play its part where possible from a humanitarian perspective. However, knowing a positive approach can attract greater numbers of requests that put pressure on the economic, social, cultural, and political capacities of a country, positive responses on the influx should not be expected.

Governments consist of politicians, who are vote-maximizers and guided by self-interest (Lewin 1991, 61). From this point of view there is an important link between vote-maximization and the realization of policy goals. In fact, “political scientists take for granted that policies are not rational solutions based on social science models of migration dynamics but stem from compromises between various interest groups, mediated by media pressure and party politics” (Lahav 2006, 204).

The increasing influx and presence of asylum seekers and ethnic migrants “have become major public issues, affecting the level of antiforeigner sentiment” (Semyonov et al. 2006). In Europe, this resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers also increases the likelihood of voting for extreme-right wing parties (Lubbers et al. 2002). With the influx of asylum seekers and migrants as an increasingly important part in electoral politics (Freeman et al. 2013, 21), “the growth of extreme right anti-immigrant parties places center-right politicians under tremendous electoral pressures (Tranhardt and Schulte 2000; Perlmutter 1996; Arzheimer and Carter 2006).

In the Netherlands the center-right Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)) experiences this pressures together with its coalition Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)). The Party For the Freedom (Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)), headed by Geert Wilders, has become an important political force due to its negative approach to the asylum issue. It is more successful than VVD and PvdA in the polls, making it the largest party (den Hartog 2015; Nu.nl 2015). In the current situation the electorate does not seem to appreciate a positive stance on asylum policy, making it unlikely that the government will choose a positive approach with the chance of losing votes in the run up for the Dutch parliamentary elections that will take place in March 2017.

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2.2.2 Responding Negatively: a Liberal Society and EU Chairman

Although anti-asylum feelings rage through the country, Joppke notes ‘accepting unwanted immigration is inherent in the liberalness of liberal states’ (1998b, 290). Similarly, Hollifield refers to the ‘liberal state thesis’, noted as the understanding "that ‘rights’ (beyond push-pull and social network factors) are one of the key explanatory factors for the persistence of international migration to liberal states” (2000, 148). In relation to the acceptance of asylum requests, Hollifield et al. (2014, 9) note liberals face a paradox, questioning “how a liberal society can tolerate the presence of individuals in it who are members but not citizens”. They continue asking whether “not all individuals who are members (i.e., permanent residents) of a liberal society should be accorded the full panoply of rights (social, political and civil) enjoyed by those who are citizens”.

Furthermore, the Netherlands itself is a country of immigration (Hollifield et al. 2014 ,17). The country does not have a comprehensive policy, but always “employed a series of ad hoc policies in response to changing economic and social conditions” (2014, 17). Nevertheless migration has always been a central feature of political development “going back to the founding of the Dutch state itself, and Dutch society has been defined by core liberal values of pragmatism, tolerance, and humanism” (2014, 17-18). These national values could possibly be the reason that prevents the government to direct towards a more restricting immigration policy.

As chapter 2.1 clarified states face the dilemma of balancing between protecting state sovereignty against the protection of human rights (Sassen 1996, 60). States “have been a participant in the emergence of human rights regimes, and various components of the state have been key agents for the incorporation of human rights in domestic law” (1996, 60). As well as many other countries, the Netherlands has ratified the Geneva Refugee Convention (United Nations 1951) and the New York Protocol (United Nations 1967), commitments that prioritize the needs of the individual refugee and not the interests of Dutch society (Brochmann and Hammar 1999, 150). Under these circumstances it is improbable the Dutch government takes a negative stance.

In the period of January 1 2016 until June 30 2016 the Netherlands also chaired the EU, where the country pinned on European cooperation (EU2016, 2016). It would be a strange situation if the Netherlands would run counter to its own proposed European policy.

2.2.3 An Absence of Acting: From Low to High Politics

No doubt it is the two-level game that explains the current approach of the coalition partners VVD and PvdA, but the way things are now heading is perceived as an absence of acting (Het Parool 2015). This approach of the government can be seen as Gordenker’s third option of not acting on an issue. The migration issue “was markedly transformed from its capricious presence on the foreign policy landscape over a decade or so earlier” (Weiner 1993). After the Second World War immigration “had

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been considered from an economic or cultural threat perspective”, whereupon the Cold War caused a threat perspective in relation to physical safety or national security (Rudolph 2006). With the beginning of the twenty-first century, “migration had shifted from the predominantly technical domain of ‘low politics” (e.g., economic and social concerns) to what international relations scholars refer to as security or “high politics” (e.g., issues pertaining to political and national integrity and security)” (Freeman et al. 2013, 236). This increased political attention, known as the concept of politicization, will be further addressed in chapter 2.4.3.

Besides identifying immigration as a serious problem, electorates also started to consider immigration as a threat (Claude-Valentin 2004). They talked of “invasion, insecurity, loss of identity, sovereignty, control and terrorism” (Freeman et al 2013, 236). People feel unsafe or threatened by the new influxes of predominantly Arab populations. Chepel d’Appollonia identifies at least four important threats: “The threat to national security posed by enlarged borders; the threat to political and civil rights posed by an unprecedented number of noncitizen residents; the threat to racial, ethnic, and religious tolerance in civil societies posed by a potential ‘enemy inside’; and the threat to the capacities of these countries’ economies to generate wealth and redistribute it through effective social policies for second- and third-generation immigrants”, before these third-generations remain economically excluded and become potential recruits for criminal- or terrorist groups through this destitution (2008, 1-23).

Politicians who seek “to mobilize more restrictive migration regulation may capitalize on security or ‘terror’ frames; inversely, those who want to mobilize ideological divisions may draw on fears of cultural diversity” (Freeman et al. 2013, 244). Immigration attitudes are largely dependent on the framing of its threats, so state actors can ‘securitize’ an issue for their own interests. In international relations securitization is the presenting of an issue as “an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure in the name of security” (Buzan et al. 1997, 32-33). It is an extreme version of politicization and includes elements of “strategic social construction of threats by governmental and nongovernmental actors for political or other gain and the creation of moral panics that exaggerate the extent of the threat to social order” (Chepel d’Appollonia 2008, 131).

Securitization studies try to understand “who securitizes (the securitizing actor), on what issues (the threats), for whom (the referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions” (Buzan et al. 1997, 32). Securitization theorists assert that successfully securitized subjects receive disproportionate amounts of attention and resources compared to unsuccessfully securitized subjects causing more human damage (Buzan et al. 1997, 25). A common example used by securitization theorists is the priority on counter-terrorism measures, even though people are more likely to be killed by automobiles than a terrorist attacks (Zwitter and de Wilde 2010).

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It is obvious the current asylum issue gets a lot of attention and is excessively associated with security issues like the terrorist attacks in Paris and the sexual assaults in Cologne last year (Rosman 2015; KRO NCRV 2016). As Abulof (2014) notes a securitizing act is successful when it is accepted by the audience. In the Netherlands the polls show Wilders’ success of securitizing the issue (den Hartog 2015), clarifying that people link the asylum issue to security concerns. The extreme-right PVV uses this strategy to support its argument to close the Dutch borders (Wilders 2015). The appropriateness of the attention given to the issue is questionable due to this securitization.Nevertheless, the attention calls for actions by the government.

2.3 Considering Reception Policy at the Stage of Policy Crisis

2.3.1 Crisis

The government is heavily criticized for its passive approach, which was reflected in the polls that precede the parliamentary elections of 2017 (Het Parool 2015). It seems the current approach is no long-term solution, but as section 2.2 discussed both the positive or negative stance has its shortcomings. Perhaps a crisis approach offers opportunities, but this requires a better understanding of the crisis literature. This section will specify the concepts of a (policy) crisis and the involved policy community that are needed to continue research on reception policy.

Rosenthal et al. (1998, 12) define crises as “serious threats to the basic structures or fundamental values and norms of a social system, which requires to take critical decisions in a short time and a high degree of uncertainty”. Crises are critical phases for a community or society (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 11). Stability and order are replaced by chaos, threats and uncertainty. It affects the vital structures and functions that enable the daily course of affairs in our society. The government is expected to conduct anticipating policies and effective crisis management for the short and long term. Rosenthal et al. consider crisis management as “the responses of managers and officials to the genesis, conduct and consequences of crises” (1998, 14).

Crises are moments for action, asking for acts of administrative elites under the pressure of the media. It are phases where emotions, changing perceptions and collective meanings play an important role (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 11). It is a dynamical process of escalation and de-escalation.

2.3.2 From a Solidarity to a Conflict Crisis

Rosenthal et al. make the distinction between solidarity and conflict crises. The first feels the need, content and scope of government action in general, whereby especially in the initial phase agreement exists on the need of intervention. However, this consensus may change in time due to contradictory interests and opinions (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 13). “Conflict crises mainly occur when groups act

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against the existing social system or certain facets and collide with the government as the representative of the established order” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 13).

2.3.3 The Dutch Reception Policy Community

The different actors involved in the field of a particular policy sector are regarded a policy community. A policy community consists of authorities, stakeholders, policy makers and executives of policy (Allink 2006, 38-46). Rosenthal et al. (1998) place policy communities between the social and political level. Gauraudon and Lahav (2000) provide an insight in all the different actors and logistics that are present in the different levels of policy-making on immigration policies (see figure 2.1 below). It clarifies the policy community, with different policy fields, that work in the immigration sector. Because this thesis considers reception policy a part of asylum policy, it will be seen as a part of immigration policy. Therefore, the figure of immigration policy shows the same actors and logics that we can use to understand asylum policy in general and reception policy in particular.

As figure 2.1 shows many actors and policy fields play a role regarding the immigration sector. This paragraph regards reception policy as a policy subsector of the immigration sector, seeing it as the process of the realization of accommodation for asylum seekers. With the clarification of the reception policy sub-sector, this research is able to explicate the policy community working in this sub-sector. As already described in chapter 1.2.1 the request of the Minister of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations on October 13 refers to the targets of realizing accommodation, leading to consultations between the government and the VNG (Regering en VNG 2015). With the ‘Policy Agreement Increased Influx of Asylum Seekers’ of 27 November 2015 the Dutch government and VNG started

Figure 2.1 : The different levels of policy-making on immigration policies

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their structural cooperation on the issue. In order to give content to this cooperation they established the ‘National Staging table Increased Influx of asylum seekers’ (Landelijke Regietafel verhoogde asielinstroom). This national table discusses the progress regarding the agreements between the government and VNG on reception policy and the housing of people with a residence permit. The national table searches for potential problems, explores possible solutions and support lower authorities when necessary.

In this respect the Commissioners of the King were requested by the Minister to act as “representative of the government” to execute the national policies on the regional level (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2015). The twelve Dutch Commissioners of the King have been requested to arrange or participate in the current administering ‘Regional Staging tables’ (Regionale Regietafels). These regional tables can pose questions and give signals to the national table about obstacles on the execution of the national policies. These Regional Staging tables are the coordinating body where the national policies are discussed between representatives of: the particular province; the municipalities of this province; the security regions situated in this province; the police; and the COA.

Each province was free to support this Regional Staging table with an administrative body. But because the majority of the Dutch provinces solely installed a Regional Staging table without a supportive body, this thesis will not elaborate on these supporting structures. Another reason why this thesis does not address these supporting bodies is because these structures have ultimately shown to have no say in the decision process itself.

The Regional Staging tables have been talking with all its municipalities to address possible plans on realizing accommodation, where municipalities can also submit proposals themselves. The mayor, together with its Alderman (B&W) constitute the executive board of a municipality. Their plans have to be accepted by the gemeenteraad (city council), consisting of raadsleden (councilors). The aim is that agreements are made on a location between the particular municipality, the COA and the owner of the location. In this thesis all these different actors comprise the Dutch policy community on reception policy. The Mayor, college and gemeenteraad are seen as the local government or the local policy community working on the reception policy sub-sector. Figure 2.2 shows the division of the Dutch authorities which are present in the reception policy sector.

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Figure 2.2 (Source: COA 2016)

Dutch Government

Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) National Staging table Increased Influx of asylum seekers

From the Government

The Minister of Home Affairs, Ronald Plasterk

The Secretary of State of Security and Justice, Klaas Dijkhoff The Director-General of Administration and Housing, Gert-Jan Buitendijk The Director-General of Immigration, Jan-Kees Goet

From the municipalities and provinces

The Vice-President of VNG, Hubert Bruls

The chairman of the committee security of VNG, Theo Weterings The Director of VNG, Jantine Kriens

The president of the Association of Provincial Authorities (Interprovinciaal overleg), Ank Bijleveld The Commissioner of the King of Drenthe, Jacques Tichelaar

From the COA

The chairman of the Board, Gerard Bakker Taskforce manager board COA, Els Tieman

When the subject requires delegates of the VNG or ministers and public officials from other ministries they can join the table.

Provincie Limburg Veilig heid regio(‘s) Limburg-Noord (23); Zuid-Limburg (24); Provincie Flevoland Veilig heid regio(‘s) Flevoland (25); Provincie Noord-Brabant Veilig heid regio(‘s) Midden en West-Brabant (20); Brabant-Noord (21); Brabant-Zuidoost (22); Provincie Zeeland Veilig heid regio(‘s) Zeeland (19); Provincie Zuid-Holland Veilig heid regio(‘s) Kennemer land (12); Haagland en (15); Hollands Midden (16); Rotterdam Rijnmond (17); Zuid- Holland-Zuid (18); Provincie Noord-Holland Veilig heids regio(‘s) Noord- Holland-Noord (10); Zaanstreek-Waterland (11); Amsterdam -Amstelland (13); Gooi en Vechtstreek (14); Provincie Utrecht Veilig heid regio(‘s) Utrecht (9); Provincie Gelderland Veilig heid regio(‘s) Noord- en Oost-Gelderland (6); Gelderland Midden (7); Gelderland -Zuid (8); Provincie Overijssel Veilig heid regio(‘s) IJsselland (4); Twente (5); Provincie Drenthe Veilig heid regio(‘s) Drenthe (3); Provincie Friesland Veilig heid regio(‘s) Fryslan (2); Provincie Groningen Veilig heid regio(‘s) Groningen (1); 23 24 12 26 13 6 25 33 54 66 48 60

The 390 Municipalities subdivided by each Province

The 12 Provinces and its 25 Security Regions

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2.3.4 Policy Crises

Of course there are different types of crises, but to describe the administrative issues that play a role in addressing the influxes of asylum seekers, the term ‘policy crisis’ used by Boin et al. is the most applicable one (1998, 119). Public administration is confronted with policy crises, concerning the profound disruption of the course of events inside a policy sector. It refers to the functioning of an organization or the implementation of policy, whereby the administrative authority in question is under pressure (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).

Policy crises are “periods in which different actors inside a particular policy sector face disappointing outcomes, costs escalations, mutual tensions or problems of integrity” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 120). Policy sectors face policy crises, like crises in general, in terms of threat, time pressure and uncertainty. But instead of just acute events that are characteristic for international crisis research, the time constraints of policy crises can be months or even years. Policy crises are characterized by “the occurrence of an event or development that is conceived as a threat by the different administrative actors within a particular policy sector” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 121).

With all the in chapter 2.3.3 mentioned actors of the Dutch reception policy community seeing themselves in a policy crisis, we can consider the reception policy sub-sector at the stage of a policy crisis (Regering en VNG 2015).

2.4 The Emergence and Ending of Policy Crises

2.4.1 Legitimacy

After section 2.3 linked the crisis literature to reception policy, this section continues on the crisis literature concerning policy crisis. ‘t Hart (1993) designates the disturbances that characterize policy crises in terms of legitimacy, seeing this concept as the most important characteristic of policy crisis. The concept of legitimacy is defined as “the acceptance of governance by those who are governed” (Rosenthal et al. 1996, 29-31). Legitimacy on the one hand involves obtaining and maintaining social support (acceptance of the representatives by the public), and on the other hand political support (acceptance of the government by the Parliament). A policy sector has a high degree of legitimacy when the governance and policy of the specific sector is perceived “desirable, appropriate or proper by those who have to deal with the sector in one way or another” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 122). This high degree indicates a wide acceptance of the organizational goals; policy contents; procedures; political-administrative power relations in the policy process; and the final results that are achieved by the policy sector. “Obtaining and maintaining legitimacy is crucial for a policy community” (Wilson 1989). After all, legitimacy means social and political acceptance of the functioning of a policy sector. Support that is necessary for the stability, continuity and predictability inside the sector and ensures the constant supply of financial, power- or human resources (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 123). A legitimate

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policy community enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, enabling the community to develop policies and implement proposals and policies more quietly (Selznick 1957; Wilson 1989). When a policy community has legitimacy, both citizens and political officials will have a tendency to give the benefit of the doubt in times of difficulty. It can be hard for citizens that are part of a policy community to maintain legitimacy, because their role in public office sometimes asks to apply morality to public policies instead of personal morality on certain issues (van Gunsteren 1998; Weiner 1996, 192-193). This morality to public policies is often not supported by the majority of those citizens who are not in public office.

2.4.2 Policy Crises: Losing Legitimacy

The loss of legitimacy can have adverse consequences for a policy community. Policy communities will be monitored by “media attention, hearings in parliamentary committees, strengthened accountability procedures, parliamentary control on expenditures and the overt calls for policy changes” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 124). Basically, the policy community is monitored by its social and political environment. With the functioning of the policy community subject to harsh criticism, policy makers need to react. Rosenthal et al. (1998, 125) recognize a policy crises when “the administrative actors within a policy sector perceive the decline of political and/or social legitimacy as threatening to the institutional status quo inside a particular policy sector”.

2.4.3 The Emergence of Crises

Rosenthal et al. (1998, 125) give three possible reasons for the occurrence of policy crises, corresponding to the causes of the problematic asylum issue as described in chapter 1.2.2 and 2.2.3. The first cause is disengagement, when the social embedding of a policy community is subject to erosion. In this case the agenda and method do not reflect the clients’ and other stakeholders’ norms and expectation anymore (1998, 125).

Second is disregard, or the administrative inability to timely observe the loss of legitimacy and tackle the causes for social and political concern (Turner, 1978). Again, three factors are distinguished that influence this administrative (in)ability. First is the ‘ambiguity of feedback’, indicating complex problems touch many different policy fields making it difficult to recognize the problem and understand the roots of the problem. Second are the “shortcomings in the recognition of the organization its own place inside the sector”. Every organizational structure has its pattern of processing information, where an hierarchical organization structure can cause information filtering and a flat structure compartmentalization and therefore rivalry (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 132). Signals of legitimacy problems can also go unnoticed through blind spots in the organizational structure. Third is the ‘administrative inability to implement the necessary policy changes and adapt institutional structures’ (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 134). This may be due to the lack of willingness and commitment to correct identified problems and implement policy changes (March and Olsen 1983). It could be

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possible certain groups are not eager to implement policy changes because they have an interest in maintaining the current situation (Wildavsky, 1979; Hogwood and Peters 1982).

Third cause is politicization, making the functioning of the policy sector subject to political battle. With the politicization of an issue the functioning of the policy sector working on the issue is put on the political agenda as highly important (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 125). Another characteristic of politicization is the increase of the number of actors engaged in the sector. The political and public attention increases too. Inter alia media attention and scoring opportunities for other politicians make the responsible authorities nervous. Politicization “makes it practically impossible for policy makers to nuance or play down the severity of the problem and take action” (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 125).

2.4.4 Crisis Decision Making

As noted in chapter 2.2.3 and 2.4.3 politicization currently brings the Dutch authorities into trouble regarding the asylum issue. Rosenthal et al. (1998, 125) clarify politicization ensures the level of decision-making to scale up, “decreasing the policy freedom of the implementation organization and sector administrators as a result of political centralization”.

Crises are moments for leadership. In order to enable authorities to take responsibility in a crisis, decision making shifts to higher levels of the organizational hierarchy (Rosenthal and Boin 1998, 48). Premise of this centralization thesis is that “under critical conditions the democratic principles of broad involvement and “checks and balances” must yield for the adage that authorities should take responsibilities” (Rosenthal and Boin 1998, 49; ‘t Hart et al. 1993).

Crises are interesting for a democracy. Authorities take the lead in decision making, but it soon creates a tendency to sideline supervisory bodies like a parliament or municipal council (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 65). Given the time constraints the decision making process seems to benefit from a certain degree of closeness, with an afterwards discussion on the accountabilities. But this prompt decision making is at odds with the consultation of representatives, supporters and organized interest groups. Occasionally, under critical circumstances, authorities consciously leave difficult decision making to other actors (Rijpma and Otten 1998, 53). Central authorities do not always take responsibility, although they are formally entitled to do so. Of course central intervention should be only used when the local, regional or provincial authorities are not capable to deal with the circumstances. But sometimes, even when this is the case, central authorities shirk their duties.

2.4.5 Crisis Management Strategies

When a situation has been defined a policy crisis, the administrative actors will seek to eliminate the causes of the crisis and try to minimize the impact of the crisis. Managing a policy crisis means repairing the legitimacy of the policy and the policy community itself (Suchman 1995). Boin and

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Otten give two types of action, which are ‘policy change’ and ‘influencing the social and political acceptance of the sector’ (1996). However, “the hindrance of policy- and institutional reforms by a combination of psychological, political and organizational barriers, make the first action more of a last resort than a logical reaction” (Jervis 1976; Sabatier 1987). It seems unlikely the government will use this first type of action, since reform has never been a point of discussion in the last two years. Although the COA is an evolving ‘growth- and reduce organization’ depending on the influx, the existence of the organization itself is not in question.

The second option attempts to mute the crisis. Boin and Otten distinguish two possible strategies, which are ‘reform-oriented actions’ and ‘rhetorical-symbolical reactions’. As already noted there are no signs of attempts to reform the COA. Therefore, reform-oriented actions are highly unlikely with regard to reception policy. According to Boin and Otten the most important rhetorical-symbolical strategy is the instrument of political authorities to ‘depoliticize’ an issue (Rosenthal et al. 1998, 135-139). With this reaction controversial issues can be redefined as a technical issue enabling all actors to agree on a solution that has been based on expertise and thus depoliticized. Important, since policy-makers experience great difficulty to counterbalance the politicizing of an issue.

This chapter, following crisis literature, showed the causes that underlie a policy crisis. Politicization of an issue, in particular, constitutes problems for the authorities to deal with the issue. Under the guise of crisis management strategies depoliticizing the issue seems the best practice. The previous paragraphs concerning crisis literature seem suitable to the reception policy sub-sector. When the research in this thesis clarifies why reception policy – with the current reciprocal relationships between the government, municipalities and local citizens – results in a policy crisis, this literature can form the basis to make an argument for a crisis approach to depoliticize reception policy. This argument is reflected in the recommendation chapter 5.2.

2.5 Why Reception Policy Fails

2.5.1 The Gap Hypothesis

Policy crises involve disappointing results, meaning the failure of policy. In migration literature the failure of migration policies is often explained by the gap hypothesis. Policy gaps encompass differences between policy goals and outputs, thereby explaining the failure of policies. Immigration literature discusses three dimensions of the ‘policy gap’: “the disjuncture between public and policy-makers at the decision-making and implementation stage; the relationship between restrictive policy goals and ‘liberal’ or ‘expansive’ outputs; and the dynamic between the international and domestic arenas” (Lahav 2006, 218). This thesis will examine the first two mentioned dimensions. There is no doubt that the third dimension plays an essential role in the policy strategy of the Dutch government, because as already described in chapter 2.1 the Dutch government has to take national and

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