A Memory of the Mediterranean: the European Union between security, migration and humanitarian action

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A MEMORY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE

EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN SECURITY,

MIGRATION AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

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MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Célia Océane Floriane Blondin

12402176

Main Supervisor: Dr. H.L. Muehlenhoff

Second Supervisor: Prof. Dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz

July 2019

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ABSTRACT

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During the summer of 2015, the European Union faced great migratory movements that highlighted the inadequacy of the European instruments in case of larger numbers. The magnitude of the arrivals and the dramatic conditions suffered by migrants in their voyage to the European territory quickly transformed the situation into one of international visibility. This work studies how the European Union decided to approach the situation, and how it dealt with the humanitarian aspect of man-made disasters migration process. Precisely, it will look at the existence of a securitisation of the migration policy during what came to be called a “Migration Crisis”, and research the effects on humanitarian action by the European Union.

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INTRODUCTION

“Tutti fratelli” (“all brothers”) is a morale inspired by Henri Dunant to gather help for the wounded soldiers of the Battle of Solferino in 1859 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010). Since then, the Red Cross, Dunant’s heritage, is an established emblem of humanitarian help in times of crisis, and governments developed their own humanitarian duties. The European Union, symbol of ever deeper integration has become one of the world’s leader in deploying such operations across the globe. But, with unique integration, the EU has to face policy challenges that were before a national competence. A migration policy is one of those challenges, and it became one of international visibility when in 2015 over one million of migrants (European Parliament, 2017), arrived on the Mediterranean shores of the EU. It was soon after categorized as a “Migration Crisis”, by definition a problematic appellation. In fact, it is important to distance this work from the term. By not using the word “crisis” to describe the migration movements of 2015 I aim at gaining in neutrality, in my approach and in the way I will conduct this study. Not assuming it is a crisis is a prerequisite to study it, instead migration will be quantified in terms of movements, inflows or numbers.

Migration is a typical domain for the state to regulate as a demonstration of its power, and so is the conservation of its border and the distinction made between the citizens and foreigners. In this respect, the EU acted like a state when the borders were being stressed to new levels. In matters of borders, the EU is a unique example of integration for a union, and achieved a level of free movement that requires precautions when it comes to the outside. That is why with this free movement of goods and people within the union the Union developed

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agencies of border protection. Indeed for example, the most famous one is the EU External Border Agency, most known under its acronym FRONTEX. In the context of the summer 2015, those agencies had their budget enhanced, and tripled for the case of FRONTEX (European Commission, 2015). This reaction is one of the component of a bigger phenomenon that will be the focus of this work. For migration is a wide subject for the EU, that includes various polices and speeds depending on the Member States talked about. Notably, one of the issues was that according to the immigration policy of the EU, as stated on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) on the articles 79 and 80, the country of arrival is where the migrant has to stay and apply for asylum. It is visible how this poses a fairness issue for the Mediterranean countries, receiving massive numbers of applications, and being the one to have to bear the costs of it. This is the “first entry rule” of the Dublin IV Regulation.

Moreover, another issue is that often, the Mediterranean countries are not the desired final destination for the migrants. many of them wish to try their chances up in the EU, and place their application there. This means that they have to go through the arrival countries, using irregulars means of migration and stay undetected and follow the rest of their “route”. Indeed, the EU identified two routes taken by the migrants. The first one and the most-used one, is the Central Mediterranean route, mainly used by sub-Saharan and North African migrants transiting across Libya (European Council, 2019a). The second one is the Eastern Mediterranean route, privileged path for Syria’s war refugees, it shows a crossing through the sea from Turkey to Greece (European Council, 2018a).

Because of those irregular entries, the overflowing of the migration and asylum system of some states and the human tragedies happening, the EU was facing pressures from the Member States to find ways to handle the situation. Eventually, the situation was deemed by

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the Union as a top priority, and is treated as such until today even though the claims are in favour of a slowing down of the numbers of arrivals.

This is the whole problematic that interest me in this work, of how the Union got surprised by the numbers of arrivals, the means by which migrants are coming into the territory and the chosen ways to deal with it and the impacts for all the related domains or policies. The clear strains (European Parliament, 2017) on the existing mechanisms had policy impacts, notably on the attention given to the handling of the humanitarian action. Because of the gap created by the needs and what the Union had at this moment was non neglectable, new mandates were required for several domains, whether the asylum system, the border security, or as I want to study, the humanitarian capacities of the Union. More than an adaptation, the human inflows required urgent humanitarian action, and to match those needs, the EU did not have any agencies with the proper mandate, because this type of action never was directed for inside the Union, but only as part of the external policy. In 2015 the EU only had the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO), used to conduct humanitarian mission over the world and provide help and protection to human victims of natural disaster or man-made conflicts. The catastrophic outcomes of migration through the Mediterranean and the needs of the migrants once arrived on land were comparable to what DG ECHO is armed for and used to face, hence its role in the situation for the years to come.

With the established institutional situation and problems faced by the Union in 2015, it remains to introduce the point of view that is going to be centric to this work. Nearly four years later, the EU and the media are still referring to the migrants arrivals as part of the “crisis”, and this is a question of definition, but mostly framing. Why choose to call the migration inflows of 2015 a “migration crisis”, when as the EU noted itself, the mechanisms in place were the

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ones at fault in the processing? Many even choose to call it a ‘Management Crisis’ in acknowledgement of what were the primary problems in the administrative and logistic handling of the migrants. This question calls on the definition of what is a crisis and the feeling of urgency related to it, and the contextuality of the events. It is then a question of how the EU lived the migratory inflows of 2015: in terms of perception of mass migration and the capacities of the authorities and policies. The game-changing fact is that this sort of situation happened in the EU. This has a direct influence on Member States territories and economic capacities refers to a Home Affaires mandate, and because I focus on the European level, it falls under the EU internal security strategy (DG ECHO, 2019). This is what I want to study, the securitisation of the migration and in which ways referring to it as a “crisis” influenced the institutional, international handling of the situation.

I am then facing a special type of framing of a situation that could have been categorized in many different ways. As said before, the choice to emphasize on the numbers of migrants coming in, as an external issue posing problems to the EU is one type of framing possible. This will ultimately guide the institutional and political developments of the period. Hence the choice to research the effects of such a framing and to understand the consequences of it. This research question will be focused on one domain of this crisis, the humanitarian side, notably because it is intrinsically related to migration: linking border control and political power with human rights and humanitarianism. Hence, I will ask how did the securitisation framing of

the European Migration Crisis of 2015 influenced the humanitarian action of the EU? In

this question I have the introduction of key terms: securitisation, framing and humanitarian action. Those are concepts that I will elaborate extensively later on, but it is possible to start to define them. Securitisation, as part of the Security field of study, is the invocation of the safety of the state and the characterization of a threat to its political, physical and moral integrity, requiring exceptional measures (Vultee, 2010).

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Typically, it is tied to the idea of framing, because of the need of political actors to convince the citizens that an event is effectively a threat to security (Wæver, 1993). Framing is a conceptual part of the communication domain, with sociological and psychological aspects, and is before all a process. It is a process of perceiving reality and shaping facts while excluding some elements, “which lead individuals to interpret issues differently” (Borah, 2011, p.248). Consequently, it is understandable how the construction of a securitisation framing can have possible institutional repercussions to face the said threat. The relation between that process and humanitarian action is what I will study. Humanitarianism is a doctrine that evolved since the 19th_{century’s battlefields, and has now in core principles: impartiality, neutrality,}

independence and humanity (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). This doctrine is supposed to guide international, behaviour in case of natural or man-made disasters.

With the 2015 migration movements, these concepts are coming together in the management of borders and humans, causing the problematic for the EU and the urgency. How does these concepts relate to the others in practice of the crisis, and which one prevails? What does the prevailing of one means for the others? Can the EU answer to its border control duty and at the same time abide international law and face the international pressures to care for migrants crossing the Mediterranean? Is the categorisation of a crisis the way to get the necessary measures in action? All these questions are at the basis of the research question, and I am going to study this as following.

The first chapter will be a review of the existing literature on the subject. I will introduce the migration and the security policies of the EU as well as its humanitarian mandate. This will open the way to present the existing theories to study migration in the EU and the crisis. It will consist in the presentation of the major tendencies in the study of securitisation, and academic

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opinions on the matter, and the same will be done for humanitarian action. The role of the EU will also be treated.

The second chapter will be my theoretical framework. Using the theories I will have presented, I am going to construct my framework, and use a revised version of securitisation through the lens of framing: the securitisation-exceptionalism dynamic, and link it to humanitarian action. The third chapter will consist in explaining the methodology of this work. I want to do a qualitative study using the securitisation-exceptionalism dynamic and look for proofs of a security crisis and threat construction by the EU through a discourse analysis. In this part I will also present my argument.

The empirical part will be divided in two parts. The fourth chapter will be focused on the study of the securitisation process, to study the threat construction discourse of the EU as well as the possible policy implications. The fifth chapter will build on the previous one, to study the consequences on humanitarian action in terms of policy changes, adding a chronological aspect to characterise the securitisation process in regard of the humanitarian action.

I will conclude by answering the researching question and balancing the results vis-à-vis my argument.

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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

In the following chapter, I will discuss the existing literature on securitisation and humanitarian action, to show the tendencies that can be found amongst the scholarly work. This will allows this work to sustain an argument on the effect of the first on the second, in the context of the EU. Thus, I will first start by reviewing the literature on the securitisation of migration, where I need to develop the important developments in the line of thoughts by presenting the major figures amongst the scholars responsible for it. I will put an emphasis on the European context to go over the specifics of this precise level and the discourses attached to securitisation. Second, I will talk about the humanitarian action literature, a related yet distinct literature on the EU. It will expose how it is traditionally studied and to make the link between the two academic spheres, as this work will.

1.1. Securitisation of migration

There is quite an extensive on the securitisation of migration, as a phenomena traditionally looked upon as a problem for the states. It is however possible to identify some tendencies, in the study of the securitisation of migration. As I will develop, this subject is analysed in the literature through the “speech act” process (Wæver, 1993) , as the basis of the Copenhagen School. This discourse centric approach is based on how migration might threaten not only the state but the nation itself. To that are tied the ideas of identity preservation and economical

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danger. A specific focus on the European Union is also very often made in this literature, because of how representative the EU is. However I will also expose that this is not without any critique. Another way academics study securitisation of migration is with the acknowledgement of the “speech act” process but taking it on a reverse chain of action: the policies are the one influencing the speeches and the securitisation of the issue in the nation. Here also, the EU is a very much used example, through the development of the European integration in terms of borders and frontiers abolishment and the internal market.

Migration has been one of the first topic to be studied under the lens of securitisation, because of the different types of policy and society changes it can induce for the state politically and economically (IISS, 1991, pp.37-38). However, Securitisation theory did not arose before the 1990’s, after a major shift in the field of security studies. Indeed, the question of the “meaning of security” (Huysmans, 2006, p.15) was at the centre of the debate, because of a redefinition of the term, stranding from the traditional vision of it. Leaving the idea that security only meant the military survival of the state, various new areas were to be added to the security studies realm (Vultee, 2010). This means that we do not solely have the “phenomena of war” (Waltz, 1991, p.212), but the inclusion of other societal phenomenon such as migration, diseases, or even climate change. That is because those new areas touch to different extents the existing nation and organisation of the state. This is a socially constructed expansion of the term and a modern vision of what the “survival of the collective units and principles” means (Vultee, 2010, p.34). Because security was not solely the idea of war anymore, the lines of what entered the field of security were blurred to start a debate on what could now be included in security studies and International Relations. Before the redefinition of what is security, the purpose and status of the field was unquestioned, however, with the widening of the definition a contestation to it developed. Indeed, for some the consequences were great on the necessary

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knowledge it implied on each field that was to be securitised (Huysmans, 2006); others also saw a danger in the extension of the security agenda for the states (Waltz, 1991). This is however what the Critical Security Studies (CSS) is interested in, as they go against the “traditional Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, ‘top-down’, methodologically positivist and philosophically realist thinking” (Glover, 2011). The CSS has embraced a more identity and culturally based vison of the concept of security. From this new approach different scholars took the lead in developing the idea, as it notably gave rise to the Copenhagen School with Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver as the two most prominent writers of that school. Essentially, and as the rest of the chapter will develop, the CSS is a departure from the classic Realist way of thoughts, to a more contemporary way of understanding security politics.

1.1.1. New models from International Relations theories to study the

securitisation of migration

From that point, there is the emergence of five models used to study the securitisation of migration, with their roots in International Relations theories (Bourbeau, 2011). The first two are the more closely related to the Realist theory, with the core idea the survival of the state as the reference point for every move in international politics. Security is then a zero sum game for its students and can only be seen through the action of war and military defence (Walt, 1991, 2002). However, even though the realist theory do not accept the extension of the concept of security, scholars went through and proposed new models with some of its core assumptions.

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The first one uses the basis idea that fighting against structural anarchy and preserving material interest were a preoccupation of the state, and large movements of population represent a threat to those goals (Kaplan, 1994). Because in this model migration is said to bring disorder to the society, states should fear it. That disorder would come from the very large numbers or from the integration issue with a possible fight over the resources: the rich against the poor (Connelly and Kennedy, 1994), and this is why the states should fear mass migration. This fear for the integrity of the state rationalises the securitisation of security by the government and the measures taken against it.

The second model with Realist roots talks about the risk of international conflict with migration, and thus should be considered a security concern by the state (Weiner, 1993). However, both these models are criticised by some scholars, because the “central explanatory variables of both models are inconclusive” (Bourbeau, 2011, p.37). Because studies struggled to prove that fear of international conflict or “alarmist points of view” (Bourbeau, 2011, p.37) were driving countries to act upon migration in a securitised way.

The third model proposed by scholars to study securitisation of migration comes from the Neorealist theory and aims at revisiting the state dynamic to generalise to more than one state (Rudolph, 2006). In this model the key explicative factor is the “structural threat environment”, this means that there’s an external geopolitical threat: migration, that will be answered by the state and will lead to the formulation of policies. There is a constructivist side to Rudolph’s approach with an emphasis on pre-existing ideas that is however too far from the actual constructivist ideas to categorise it as such, and it stays within the Neorealist spectrum.

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The fourth model to study securitisation of migration descents from Governmentalism, a theory with Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu as head figures. However, it is Didier Bigo who will develop this approach to study securitisation and migration (Bigo, 1996, 2002, 2008), and will come up with the model of Governmentality of unease. For him, securitised migration is not the result of the urgency and exceptional practices, but is caused by the bureaucratic routine of security professionals. In other words, securitisation of migration is explained by a top-down governmentality made by security agents and diffusing in the political realm of migration. Here also a point is made on the importance of ideas of one type of agent, but it is done without the essential assumption that constructivists have: securitisation appears because of the “multiplicity of agents in the social world, and on the mutual constitutions of agents and structures” (Bourbeau, 2011, p.38). Another critique is made by Judith Butler (2013), where she criticises the assumption made by Bourdieu about the discourse impact of the security agents or professionals (“speech act” according to the theory of the fifth model that will follow). She points out that the position of the security agents is not necessarily one of social power and if so, it is not a fixed one nor does it automatically come with a legitimation of speech, because that can be acquired by other means than social positioning. This means that security professionals or agents are not the only one capable of presenting something as an issue.

This idea of the act of speaking about security depending on your social position is very much linked to the fifth and last model of studying, the ST model and its focus on Speech Act.

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1.1.2. The Securitisation Theory model of securitisation of migration

This Securitisation Theory (ST) model is the most common approach found in the securitisation of migration literature, and compared to the other four more used, this is why I will develop it more extensively. The ST model was principally theorised by the Copenhagen School, they theorised securitisation as a discursive act, made by the political actors, and conceptualised that as the “speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998, Wæver 1995).

Within this school, securitisation is the process of transforming an issue, like migration, into a security issue by political actors. It is the attempt “to re-conceptualise security as an illocutionary speech act” (Glover, 2011, p.78). This branch of the literature aims at showing how political actors will use a security based language to categorise an issue as a security threat, requiring exceptional actions from the state. In this vision, it is “the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words something is done” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 26). This is called a securitising move: the goal is to influence policy making (Vultee, 2010, Glover, 2011). Indeed, security relies in the power of the political actors to cast an issue, such as migration that does not evidently have a security character but can be manipulated as such. It is a question of capability “to socially and politically construct a threat” (Taureck, 2006, p.55). The example of immigration is very used (Vultee, 2010; Glover 2011; Huysmans, 2006, 2000; Iov and Bogdan 2017; Bourbeau 2011; Weiner, 1992/93,1995; Wæever et al.1993) to show how it is going to be more than people arriving at border points, but that immigration touches to key elements for the organisation and stability of the nation and the survival of state units. For that, the literature looks for the points emphasised in the discourses , and the ways migration is presented to be a threat to something essential.

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There are three tendencies in the arguments used to create the threat of migration. The first is to talk about the very large numbers arriving at once, to show how it can destabilise the market, and create legitimacy problems. Often it is accompanied by a special vocabulary exacerbating the threat connotations, typically we have the use of metaphors like “flooding” or “waves of migrants” or even “invasion” (Huysmans, 2006).

A second position, and a very famous one, found in the literature is to put forward the cultural aspect of migration, and how immigrants can disrupts the way of life of nationals and thus the functioning of the state (Huysmans, 2006). Often, the emphasis put by academics is how migration and immigration are related to the concept of identity and the fear of losing the uniqueness of the nation for the receiving countries. Migration is then studied as an attack on the way of life of the nationals, which needs to be fought off using exceptional policy measures. For example instead of improving immigration procedures, English-only laws will be established (Vultee, 2010). Hence, an attack on the identity would be made because of the possible language difference, or cultural us and customs differences, or even religion (Huysmans, 2006). Migration is then creating a simple dichotomy: the “us versus them” nexus, this is a question of societal security and what is the state capable of doing for it (Glover, 2011). This phenomena is analysed as bringing political trust to the state because of the act of securitizing the “other”: the citizens are trusting the state to do something to preserve them (Huysmans, 2000). Unrest and political legitimacy are at stakes with the protection of the identity and culture of the country.

The third fashion to explain why political actors and discourses will tend to securitize migration is found in the economic profile of migrants (Huysmans, 2000). That is to say, to accentuate the threat posed by immigration political actors will look at the characteristics of the migrants and expose in the speech act how they are different from the nationals. For example in terms

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of working skills (low or high skilled workers) and how that could negatively impact the market or create wages competition.

The ST model also has its research methods. In the Copenhagen School’s interpretation of securitisation there is the act of convincing through the “speech act” at the core of the process, as a type of framing and organisation of ideas, hence, discourse analysis is the most used method. Indeed, this literature investigates the framing used for each issues by the political actors to know what does it take to convince the public. The question asked by Barry Buzan is “when does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violation of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” (Buzan and al.1998, p.25). The assumption is then that a successful framing leads to an institutional bending. To study this process, the Copenhagen School follows mostly a discourse analysis method. It is used to see how transmissible securitisation is, so precisely academics will use presidential speeches, debates, and every kind of publicly available document (Glover, 2011). This security framing, as said before leads to policy bending, but some authors are situating this period of institutional bending is analysed as a state of exception, allowing the state to act in emergency, bypassing democratic rules (Hanrieder, Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).

It is worth noting however, that although used by many, this strand of the literature is not without its critiques. As part of the theory of securitisation, the concept of Desecuritisation was added and notably supported by Wæver, to palliate the issue of adding to the security agenda. Desecuritisation advocates for the return to “normal politics”, instead of going down the path of securitising moves and exceptional measures that can trespass what is considered democratic (Glover, 2011). This is seen by the criticising literature as a too reductive vision of what is “normal politics” and what is not, only adding to the dichotomy of “bad” and “good”

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politics (Glover, 2011; Aradau, 2004; Eriksson, 1999; Floyd, 2007; Wyn Jones, 1999). Also, it is argued that this inclusion of Desecuritisation might be a façade used by the Copenhagen School to deny their role in the securitisation of more areas than before, inducing the need to desecuritise. For these authors, it is part of why the Copenhagen School has been too focused on looking at how securitisation is transmitted, and not enough on the policy responses taken by the authorities (Glover, 2011). A solution proposed would be to merge the theories of securitisation and Desecuritisation to bring a more complete framework of analysis, and depart from the more simple path of looking how we went from “normal politics” to “exceptional terrain of security” (Glover, 2011, p.83).

Another critique is made on how the characterisation of the “speech act” is missing out on an essential part of a bigger democratic narrative. This is tied to the research methods of the Copenhagen School and the ST model in general. Because the focus is on political actors’ discourses, the data is collected by analysing the language used in the discourses, to see how transmissible securitisation is. This means the use of presidential speech, political parties publications or declarations, parliamentary debates, in the case of the EU they will look at publicly available European Commission documents, and European Parliament public debates (Glover, 2011). This method is then criticised because it lacks in including the study of securitising agents that are not political actors, but who’s democratic participations are embedded in the securitising moves. Especially in the case of migration, which can be securitised in a bottom-up fashion, rather than the top-down one studied by the ST model. This is described as an inadequate attention to how such speech acts are “received by population at large” (Glover, 2011, p. 84). This is also to say that any counternarratives are failed to be taken into account, whereas they are part of the information the nationals are being given, and thus it impacts how we study the propagation and the success of a securitising move. The following

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figure found in the analysis of Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014), illustrates the cycle of securitisation and the recommended Desecuritisation because of the implication on democratic pathways.

Figure 1: the securitisation process

source: Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014

To summarise, the ST model of the Copenhagen School is centred around the speech and how it can convey the idea of a threat and the need to take security measures to face it as a country. The political actors are considered as the sources of the speech and the public the recipient of it, because the speech is used as a justification of the policy bending or of the new measures being taken or being planned. The range of the speech and its component are indicators of its possible success, creating and sustaining at the same time the climate of danger of an external phenomenon like migration to the security of the nation. At the same time this theory is critical of securitisation because of the problematic it posed on a bigger societal picture to have state categorise domains as migration as security issues. Consequently, the

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scholars of this school advocate for if not a return, a change of perspective to shift from securitisation to another frame to take care of the same domain.

This brings the next part of this review, dedicated to the literature of the phenomena of securitising migration but in the EU. There I will emphasize that the ST model is also an applicable theory, but that other tendencies exist and are very tailored to the EU.

1.1.3. The European construction and the securitisation of migration

As stated before, the previous model is possible to use when looking at the European migration policy, but it is also possible to find in the literature different approaches, tying the European construction to the securitisation of migration. Overall, I observe that the literature studies the securitisation of migration phenomena as a response given to a societal threat to the EU, whether we talk about identity or economic survival, or just preservation.

Indeed, it is studied as to show the involvement of the security actors in what is at first sight either an economical or cultural issue, and how those areas are impacted by the European integration. European integration took societal security apart from the state, which is left with the fight for sovereignty, but the European society now fights threats to its identity (Glover, 2011). That is justified by Ole Wæver (1995), who argues that the state is no longer able to call on societal identity properly anymore. In addition, he argues that the EU is fearing a return to the 19th century European international system, and that migration is not a one source process, but multi-faced.

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In response to that societal threat, authors argue that the EU has a discursive construction, and analyses how migration went from being first a military threat with the national border security at stakes, to a political issue and then a threat of a societal status (Iov and Bogdan, 2017). In the case of the EU, the multi-faces of that securitisation process are observed as coming from: extreme right parties in some EU countries governments.

This leads the EU to adopt policy responses: that is how border control is analysed, as a way to keep the EU society safe. This is made by asking the question of what are the European discursive ways of transmit securisation, who are the political actors and the time period crucial for the policy responses at the European level (Iov and Bogdan, 2017). Then, it is mostly head of states that are under the radar, especially the ones with strong right views on immigration and with conservatory ideas. The solution proposed by these political actors is to close the borders and put in place migration quotas. A blame game is put in place by some of the political actors, blaming the EU for having not foreseen the migratory inflows of 2015 for example. Iov and Bogdan take the famous example of Viktor Orban, current Hungarian Prime Minister, and his advocacy against the threat of immigration (Iov and Bogdan, 2017).

However, the need to protect the economic status of the EU and its identity is also present in the point of view that securitised migration happened because of the European construction and very developed integration (Huysmans, 2000; 2006), that created a new “us versus them” dichotomy: the EU and the rest. This idea goes back to the elaboration of the European treaties, and how it led to the EU being a very used study case by scholars looking at the securitisation of migration, and that is because of its strong border control policy and strict asylum system (Iov and Bogdan, 2017). In particular, it is the Third Pillar of the EU, originated with the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht and later dissolved in 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon, that influenced the migration policy. This pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, added to

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the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention, “most visibly indicate that the European integration process is implicated in the development of a restrictive migration policy, and the social construction of migration” (Huysmans, 2000, p. 751). It is explained by the progressive abolishment of the borders and frontiers between the Member States, to facilitate the movement of persons, goods and capitals, thus creating the need to protect the external borders. the assumption is that the easy circulation of the internal market would also ease illegal trafficking networks, that mostly comes from outside of the EU. To prevent this illegal flows, the solution is to prevent them from entering. This in result, “locates the regulation of migration in an institutional framework that deals with the protection of internal security” (ibid, p.757). migration becomes a problem that needs a solution, and it will define the practices, mobilizing special institutions and expectations. In this analysis, it is the security problem that triggers the security policy, and as we will see it is not the same for all the visions about European securitisation of migration.

Indeed, another focus made is to look at how the EU wants to acquire those security capacities and develop its specialised agency leading to the securitisation of migration (Waever, 1995; Huysmans, 1995; Bigo 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). That is because of the development of security agencies and their widened roles over the protection of what is the acquis communautaire of the EU. Agencies can contribute to the securitisation of asylum and migration while their mandates is to manage operational cooperation at the external border, and thus through securitising practices (Léonard, 2011).

As seen, the EU can be analysed differently to explain its migration policy and tendency to securitise it, whether because it is a will to protect its identity similar to what countries can experience, or because of the unique development of its internal market, free movement, and institutions. It is argued that institutional changes and the framing of migration are in a cycle

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of mutual influence, and shape each other. An approach to the issue is to look within the agencies of security of the EU, the one in charge on the border control, that is to say, FRONTEX, or the Schengen Information system, and that is what we can find in the Fourth Model presented above, theorised by Bigo.

However, in relation to what I will argue below, the EU is also bound by Human Rights and International Law, that could have also be an influence on the elaboration of the migration policy, as a different approach to the same problem (Huysmans, 2000).

1.2. Humanitarian action literature: a discourse analysis and a

western façade

At the basis of humanitarian action, there is the principle of humanitarianism, a doctrine of lawful and moral behaviour to be abide by the states and nowadays by international organisations, especially the EU. As seen previously, the European Member States and the EU have their own policies and security issues tied to the phenomena of migration, but it is also a choice of framing amongst other possible.

Humanitarianism has been defined since the 19th century, in response to horrors on the battlefields, notably by Henri Dunant, the Geneva born social activist in his “A Memory of Solferino” (red. 2013). This led to the beginning of Humanitarian action and principles, to follow the promotion of life doctrine of humanitarianism. It is based on three core principles: neutrality of the aid (the agents must not take any sides in the crisis, nor get involved);

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impartiality (no discrimination must be made between the recipients); independence (humanitarian agents must detach the help form governments and create their own policies to preserve autonomy). Humanitarian action, as stated above, also includes the principle of humanity, stressing the duty to preserve human life (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). Now, it is described as a dominant paradigm of political behaviour asking for compassionate interventions, in order to prevent physical suffering of human in times of crisis (Fassin, 2012). It is supposedly more useful to call on moral and feelings than rights and when asking to government to take action. Humanitarianism is then a geopolitical discourse, that includes institutionalised policies with at their centre the preservation of human life and the reductions of suffering (Williams, 2014). As a guiding morale, it has a strong influence on humanitarian rights (Reiff, 2002) and humanitarian action is the outcome on practical matters (Orford, 2003).

That is why when analysed, a “rationalising logic” (Williams, 2014, p.4) can be associated with humanitarianism, as moral concerns that provide the logical frame upon which military intervention and exceptional international and local policy are developed and justified. This idea of frame, occupies some part in the literature, with the idea that humanitarian action has been used as a discursive political tool (Williams, 2014; Ticktin, 2006, 2011; Carrera, Blockmans, Gros, Guild, 2015; Perkowski, 2016). Indeed, humanitarian discourse and justifications for action, practices and politics are for the feminist theories and a post-colonial approach embedded in ideologies of vulnerability, victimisation and heroic rescue (Williams, 2014).

Some are arguing that in the context of crisis with humanitarian affects are being used by humanitarian actors and governments, like the EU in the case of the refugee crisis of 2015, in their political discourse to justify the framing of security and give the international scene the reassurance that measures are being taken in order to “save the victims”. This would mean that

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the core principles of humanitarian help are being broken, as they are supposed to be apolitical. Indeed, the humanitarian action of the EU is mostly studied in its relation to the migration policy and how the EU securitised it as we saw previously.

The critical point for the EU and its Member States is in the visibility of the migrants and of the tragedies of the Mediterranean, making the Migration Crisis a top priority on the European agenda (Carrera, Blockmans, Gros, Guild, 2015). This literature, on the humanitarian action of the EU in the crisis, essentially describes the humanitarian efforts as being part of discourse that is linked with the security framing also present. Indeed, the humanitarian crisis of 2015 and onwards can “link discourses and practices of humanitarianism, security and human rights in the governance of the Mediterranean (Perkowski, 2016, p.331). Because as stated before, the idea of the “victim” is tied to the purpose of humanitarian action, a victim in need of a saviour to protect them from the security threats. In the discursive context there are similarities presented between the human rights discourse and the humanitarianism one: they both have at their heart the idea of victims, and a hierarchical juxtaposition with the saviour, in our case the EU. This leaves the security threat to be determined: the illegal trafficking and illegal entries posing an issue for the border control and migration policies of the EU.

Another point of this literature is how humanitarian action is utilised by the securitising agents to soften the action of the Union. That is to say the discourse is oriented through humanitarian needs, and describes the urgency to act upon the humanitarian duty, while it is in fact security measures being executed by security agencies (Perkowski, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Carrera, Blockmans, Gros, Guild 2015). Through the use of the discourse and a framing, humanitarianism, and humanitarian action are used by security agencies as they are “portraying their work in humanitarian terms” (Perkowski, 2016, p.332). In this analysis, there is an

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appropriation of humanitarian action and human rights, supporting the migration regime installed by the EU in dealing with the crisis and creating a new coalition.

This review exposes how the study of securitisation and humanitarian action is essentially made through the study of discourses and framing. These framings have policy implications and can be seen at the national level as well as at the European level. In regard to my subject of research, humanitarian action and securitisation of migration for the EU are closely related but also distinct in their components, which creates the gap that interests me. That is to say, the securitisation of the migration policy, through which ever existing ways studied by the literature, can have repercussions on the humanitarian aspect. Securitisation is a large and complex political shadow on the measures being taken in a precise context, for this study since 2015 and onwards, and how it impacts, uses, distorts humanitarian action is what I aim to study.

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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is designed to explain and justify the choice of theory that will be followed in this study. Drawing on the past chapter, I will detail where I am positioning myself in the literature, and develop on the combination of theories that will help me answer my research question. The first part of this chapter is going to be my chosen framework, which will guide the rest of the study and orientate how the empirical part is going to be conducted. The second part of the chapter is for the argument that I will sustain and try to demonstrate. It will re-centre the point and bring a focus on the crucial importance of humanitarian action within emergency responses in a Securitisation climate, to emphasise that to study humanitarian action is an aware choice vis-à-vis the role of the Union even in the case of a security threat.

2.1. The Securitisation-Exceptionalism framework

With this overview of the state of the art on securitisation and humanitarian action, this study can now be situated theoretically. My goal is to understand the approach taken by the EU in 2015 and the after effects since then, especially for Humanitarian action. By that, I mean to look into the changes that the typical humanitarian action by the EU had to go through, because of the 2015 situation. The Securitisation Theory model and the Copenhagen School have a focus on the discourse and the political actors that are relevant in the case of the decision process in the EU. Because of how public and mediatic the migration movements were in 2015,

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it required the action of the highest spheres of the Union (the European Council and the European Commission notably). This model also analyses the policy effects and the democratic bending, in time of crisis, and passing over how legally and politically this is accepted. As explained also in the previous chapter, the reformulation of the concept of security is the reason for some issues to be newly characterised as a security concern, and as migration is the topic of that subject and is in the 2015 context very tied to the humanitarian duty of the EU, this theory model is fitted to this study. However, this model does not have a chronological component, as in it does not study if the crisis lasts, or if the securitisation evolves. In this regard, and because the goal of this work is to study the gap between the migration policy and the humanitarian action, the theoretical frame needs to include the passage between the two. To do that, I have chosen to work with the legal theory of the State of Exception, in combination of the Securitisation Theory, to analyse the emergency response of the EU in 2015 up until today. This combination is proposed by Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) in their study of supranational responses in health crises by the World Health Organisation. I will also emphasise on one of their key concepts that makes the connection possible: the “Emergency Trap”.

It is possible to use this two-faced approach in my study because of the similarities: the EU qualifies as a supranational entity, and I also want to study emergency responses within the securitisation of the migration in 2015, and the consequences on humanitarian action. This is why the theory of State of Exception completes the analysis of the Securitisation Theory model with the inclusion of the reconstruction of the security components, the power of political authority and includes the possibility of it lasting in time. To go further in the linking of the securitised migration and the humanitarian action, I am also going to use what these two authors called the “Emergency Trap” for the political authorities. This trap is conceptualised

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as a phase of the securitisation that happens because of the State of Exception, the assumption is that the “Emergency Trap functions as an institutional driver of Securitisation” (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014, p.331).

The theory of State of Exception is used as a three steps framework analysis . The first step of the framework is to reconstruct the logic of emergency governance. It needs to be redefined to include a wider spectrum of what is governance. That way, exceptionalism does not apply to the state only but can be seen at the international organisation level as well, and at different levels of political authority in the state. This why this framework can be used in this work to look at the political authority of the Union in dealing with the migration in the Member States.

The second step is to conceptualise the “Emergency Trap” of global security. The dynamic of securitisation-exceptionalism is theorised as inherent to securitisation processes and has a tendency of self-reinforcing. That is why the institutional effects of a successful securitisation would be lasting, as opposed to what a ‘normal state of politics’ would allow, making the securitisation the normalcy.

Hence, trapping the politics into the ever securitised circle and state of exceptionalism justifying those same politics. The possibility of political actors to adopt exceptional measures to face the framed security issue is also a circle of its own: contributing to empowering them and making their claims and their discourses even more relevant. The Trap is thus in the institutionalisation of the emergency politics and the growing power of those who are the sources of the policies. The fact that this can happen in the International Organisation level, at the EU level, is also relevant to the ‘trap’ situation because of the different mechanisms present at the European level than at the national level. Indeed, the democratic checks are more distant

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and the adoption process, although very clear with the possibility of accessing the debates, they do tend to be less perceived by the European citizens, even more so in the case of emergency adoption.

However, it is worth noting that compared to other international organisation types with a less developed centralisation of decision, or democratic component, the EU is doing better in terms of existing mechanisms and is thus here again in a unique position. To recapitulate this step : to the case of the migration phenomena, it would mean a securitisation that would have triggered exceptionalism, and a following ‘Emergency Trap’. I would have to see long lasting institutional effects coming from the EU, here principally the Commission, because of a portrayed threat that is reinforcing itself.

The third step of the framework is based on the concept of Desecuritisation. The Copenhagen School sees Desecuritisation as a critical reconstruction of emergency global governance to show that going from securitisation is a political choice but not essential. However, in this dynamic Desecuritisation is also a goal but it is re-interpreted to make it irrelevant through an institutional alternative. In other words, because securitisation is considered as the end of normal politics and a political choice by the Copenhagen School, if there is no securitisation there’s no need of Desecuritisation. Thus, with the establishment of checks on the executive authorities, it would break the ‘trap’. This step is pre-emptive and prospective and aims at containing securitisation rather than undermining the threats, as the Copenhagen School advises.

This last step is however not entirely fitting to the question I am raising, as I aim at determining the effects of a securitisation of migration policy on other policies but not how the EU can be provided with supplementary democratic checks (Glover, 2011; Huysmans, 2000). This is why

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I have chosen not to address it as part of my framework but to recognise its existence to discuss it further in the conclusion, in light of the results of the following study.

The emphasis on exceptionalism is suited for this study because of how unpredicted the 2015 events were of the fact that EU mechanisms were not able to deal with the numbers of migrants and the realisation of the lack of suited instruments to respond to humanitarian law within the EU. This is why the dynamic of securitisation-exceptionalism is convenient and has at its core the “Emergency Trap”: the fact that securitisation becomes embedded in the political frames throughout time, even passed the paroxysm point of the crisis.

Securitisation theory then traditionally uses a discourse analysis method to study the securitisation attempts by the political actors. This work will do the same: an analysis of the EU discourse as a whole in regard to the migration movements of the summer 2015 and onwards, by looking at the discourses of the related policies on migration.

From that this work will also look at the consequences of that discourse and policy adaptations on the humanitarian action planned by the EU. Following, I am introducing the method that I will use, which is based on the traditional ways the literature studies securitisation discourses (Williams, 2016; Balzacq, Léonard, Ruzicka, 2016; Ibrahim, 2005; Huysmans, 2006; Vultee, 2010; Perkowski, 2016; Huysmans, 2000). Particularly I will draw on the work of Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014), as I will borrow some of their conceptual propositions for securitisation and the development they propose in terms of governmentality and supranational power.

Hence, I am choosing a framework that allows me to build upon the securitisation theory that is closest to the goal of this work, that is to say the Securitisation Theory model of the Copenhagen School. It emphasises the framing and discourses, and with the capacity to

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link the framing of one policy, migration policy, to another non-securitised one, humanitarian action. That, in the special temporality of the 2015 events, allows to look at the peak of stress on the institutions and a continuity since then. This will thus be a qualitative research, done through the collection of data in written materials already existing. I will collect these data in accordance with my operationalisation scheme composed of dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators. In order to do apply this framework of analysis, I need to first demonstrate that there’s a security crisis for the EU because of the migration levels. This includes two steps: having a security crisis and it being a threat to the EU requiring an action.

To study those phenomenon, I am going to use a methodology derived and adapted to my research from F. Vultee (2010), and Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014). My framework is composed of two dimensions, three sub-dimensions and three sets of indicators. The dimensions are the main phases of the Securitisation-Exceptionalism framework (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). The first dimension is “Security Crisis”, as it is the basic assumption of this work in regard to the migration policy and it needs to be demonstrated. The second is the “Policy Trap”, as the consequence of the securitisation on humanitarian action. Below, the figure 2 is designed to bring clarity to the chosen method, as it will precede the explanation of the dimensions, sub-dimensions, and indicators that will guide the research conduction.

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Figure 2: the operationalisation

The “Security Crisis” dimension relates to the first and second steps of the framework, and goes around the fact that we are analysing what is called the “Migration Crisis”. Through this dimension the goal is to analyse how one policy, the migration one, becomes securitised by the EU as a political actors itself composed of other political actors. Its components are derived from the work of Henrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014), but to create the “Security Crisis” dimension is a personal choice, made to match the topic of this study.

The first sub-dimension attached to that dimension is “European Security Threat”, as a characterisation of a phenomena that is pressuring existing mechanisms and institution capacity Dimension Sub-dimension Indicators

Security Crisis (D1)

European Security Threat (SD1)

(I1)Unexpected and Exceptional (I2) Urgency and Time Pressure

Securitisation & State of Exception

(SD2)

(I1) Governance Responses and Timely Reactions (I2) Facilitated Decisions

(I3) Agenda Setting

Policy Trap (D2)

Humanitarian Action Effects

(SD3)

(I1) New Policies for Humanitarian Action (I2) Humanitarian Action Comparison (I3) Types of Agents

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of the Union and of the Member States either the Mediterranean ones or the others. It is a appellation of my choosing, because of my focus on the EU, and my wish of creating a tailored method. Thus, in this sub-dimension, the position is before the security framing, or to say the securitisation process. What I want to search in this sub-dimension is touching on the security of the Union, the criteria to be categorised as a threat as the expanded definition of security now allows it. To identify where does the stress come from is a requisite to demonstrate how the security framing of such an event can happen and lead to a possible ‘Emergency Trap’ (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).

This sub-dimension will be analysed through indicators, that will help me collect the necessary data to identify the presence of a threat in the making by the Union. Indeed, because this phase describes the contents of the disruptive nature of what are the ‘normal setting’ of migration, that asks for the ‘normal politics’ (Glover, 2011) and not the emergency policy responses, the second sub-dimension becomes possible. Hence, as indicators of such situation, I will have two points to look at.

As an indicator number (1) of a threat in the making, there’s a need of ‘Unexpected and Exceptional’, that is to say, what happens to the Union has to be something that the current institutions, mechanisms, decision makers, and even European citizens are not used nor were prepared to see or deal with, no matter the type of impact it has, the surprise is a possible trigger of fear, and as shown above, it is the basis of a securitisation framing. This indicator comes from a reflexion on the components of a crisis.

In relation to that, I need to look at a related point, with the indicator number (2) the “Urgency and Time Pressure”, because migration is not supposed to bring the necessity of accelerated treatment, if the Union has to act in urgency it can be considered as a premises of a crisis.

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This leads to the second and complementary sub-dimension of “Securitisation and State of Emergency” as based on the proposed link by Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014), that will finish the completion of the Security Crisis because of Migration. This second sub-dimension is there to demonstrate where the threat and the security concerns are securitised by the Union and its multiple types of political actors. This is when the need to take actions at the European level is put forward, and the emphasis to act fast (because of the time pressure), even if it means bypassing the normal politics and democratic pathways is needed. The realisation of this sub-dimension exposes the State of Emergency and the exceptionalism of the given situation. This at term will set the Emergency Trap. This time, the set of indicators is composed of three points. As a number (1), and related to the last indicator of the first sub-dimension, I need to look for ‘Governance Responses and Timely Reactions’ because it is supposed to be consequence of a threat to the established political and legal order of the Union, as argued by the Copenhagen School.

In order to see this expressed need, and again because of what would have been demonstrated with the first set of indicators, in (2) I have to check for ‘Facilitated Decisions’. That is to say and following what C. Schmitt (2005) argues, because there is a special need arising to either adapt a policy or create one, the sovereign power will have to decide when the situation has crossed the boundaries of the normal politics and needs to be acted upon. This is one of the component of the State of Emergency and why exceptionalism is part of the framework: the policies enacted during the time of securitisation are unbound by the usually more slow process of democracy, especially in the context of the EU and the coordination with Member States. As a subsequent requirement, the indicator number (2) requires for these policies to also be long lasting, as an already explained part of the Emergency Trap and of a successful securitisation process. The policy bending will have to be still true in the long run, passed a

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2015-2016 time frame, to be considered part of the Securitisation-Exceptionalism framework. The last three indicators are part of the typical way used in securitisation framing studies to demonstrate that a frame is indeed formulated.

Indicator number (3) is very closely related to the latter, and will concern the ‘Agenda Setting’ in the continuity for the EU. By that, I mean to observe how the Union plans on dealing with what it calls a “crisis”, if it is taken only as an episodic momentum as the term crisis would suggest, or is it more of a log run policy change that is envisioned by the EU.

My final dimension is the second step of the Securitisation-Exceptionalism framework, and aims at looking at the ‘Policy Trap’ created by the securitisation of the migration policy (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014) . Indeed, this dimension wants to look at how it can have effects on a second policy that even if related to the migrants, do not traditionally interfere with a national or in this case European migration policy. This dimension is the link between the two policies and shows that the Securitisation-Exceptionalism framework can go very far in the context of the EU, even in the case of a second policy that has strong anchorage in International Law and is a doctrine approved by the EU on its own. To that is added the fact that despite being an International Organisation, the EU is a unique model of legal and political integration between Member States. For a policy trap to be possible because of a successful securitisation of the migration policy in such a setting is prescriptive of the possible effects to be seen on the Humanitarian handling of the situation.

Thus, as the only sub-dimension of this dimension, I will look at the ‘Humanitarian Action Effects’. Because as said, there are two existing but separated legal realms, and because of the particularity of this migration phenomena and the European context of integration between countries, the two legal orders are impacted by the State of Emergency (Hanrieder

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and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). To place this sub-dimension here, as a subordinate to the policy trap is acknowledging a chain of events, and putting the Humanitarian Action as a collateral damage of the securitisation of the migration policy. This sub-dimension will have a set of three indicators, designed to demonstrate the policy trap and determine what are the effects on humanitarian action if there is any, in order to answer our research question. More than that, I would like to characterise the possible effects in light of the impact they had on the handling of the migrants. That is to say, I want to emphasise that effects are not by definition a negative outcome in this work, and can also be different in intensity depending on the time period. That is what I tried to cover with the choice of my indicators.

Hence, as my indicator number (1), and using what will be find in the second sub-dimension of ‘Securitisation and State of Exception’, I will look at ‘New Policies for Humanitarian Action’. That is to say I will be here interested in which policies are relevant for humanitarian action and what are the consequences of the new policies given as responses to the crisis. This means that in this part I will try to characterise the policies that I would have already mentioned, to appreciate the effects of securitisation on the approach taken by the EU to deal with the necessary humanitarian measures.

To make the effects more relevant and the appreciation more founded, as my indicator number (2) I chose ‘Humanitarian Action Comparison’. I have chosen to look for major differences with the existing humanitarian principles and established ways of humanitarian action in the context of migration. This will allow me to be more objective in the characterisation of the effects of securitisation. Indeed, a comparison like this one is necessary to see if some things are effectively being changed or created in the occasion of this precise case of migration and European level governance. In other words, are those new policies

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different from what is traditionally seen in humanitarian action for displaced persons, or are the basic humanitarian principles respected ?

As another way to help me describe the effects of securitisation on humanitarian action, in indicator number (3) I will look at the execution of the previous policies, with the indicator ‘Types of Agents’. This indicator is here because of the need to differentiate between humanitarian action and security, as for example M. Ticktin did in her study of human functions (2006, 2011). This indicator is about the attribution of mandates: the type of agents in charge of dealing with the organisation of humanitarian action or even the managing of migrants and their lives is an indication of the degree of grip securitisation has. This means that I will consider a greater securitisation of humanitarian action to exist if what can be considered security agents are in charge of implementing the policies. On the opposite, I will consider the involvement of peace agents as minimising the effects and being closer to independence of humanitarian action at the benefit of migrants. With this explanation of how I am going to conduct my research, to summarise, figure 2 is a table of my operationalisation to help make my explanation clearer.

In conclusion of this part, I want to produce a personalised study of how humanitarian action can be affected by a securitised migration policy. And that is through both because of the clear similarities of human management of these policies and because of the spill-over and short-cuts that the State of Emergency has on other policies, even with different legal groundings. This proposed framework and operationalisation are as said based on a discourse analysis of the EU, and will basically be done through the study of the language used, to look at the orientation of the formulation of policy documents on migration and humanitarian action. Thus, the vocabulary of security and danger connotations, will prove the will of political actors

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to consider migration as a security problem. However, I will not establish an exhaustive list of words to look at, as it may vary greatly depending on the articles studied. Moreover, the frame of securitisation is vast and as explained before can touch the economic, political and social stability of the countries, it would not make sense to list all the possible words related to these domains.

2.2. An argument on the importance of time pressure and its

absence

Using this approach will guide my research and give it a more precise direction and comprehension of the exceptionalism of the so called “Migration Crisis” and how it could have consequences on how migrants are understood and given help and care when arriving and as long as the vulnerability of the migration process is present. Hence, I need to come back to the research question: how did the securitisation framing of the European Migration Crisis of

2015 influenced the humanitarian action of the EU? This can be helpful to re-centre the

work in light of the previous chapter and part above to give clarity to the rest. Because through that question I want to look at the effect of a societal phenomenon on a European policy on another policy. However, securitisation being a response to migration inflows on the Mediterranean shores also implies that it is critically linked to human lives. Hence we have two policies that aim at managing humans, but in different capacities and mandates. The migration policy is first of all an organisational and regulating policy to process and control the new entries on the European territory. Whereas the Humanitarian mandate of the Union is

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to provide emergency help, and basic rights to human in need because of a disruptive situation such as a strong increase of migrants of people in 2015 and the conditions of the migration itself. In sum, this is a case of overlapping and time pressure because of the unique pair studied here: migration policy and its influence on humanitarian action. This relation allows me to propose the argument that I will sustain in this study.

Considering the chosen approach, I argue that securitisation of the migration policy will have policy effects on humanitarian action, but without conjecturing that these effects will be negative. That is to say, securitisation and its inherent emergency situation will mean a swift reaction and decisions facilitating the provision of humanitarian action. However, because of the Emergency Trap I also argue that the continuity in time of the migration inflows, will outlast the urgency of humanitarian action. This will leave only the security concerns, even if the distress component is still present.

A Memory of the Mediterranean: the European Union between security, migration and humanitarian action

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