United nation, dispersed over states
The Kurds: dealing with different out-groups
Bachelor-thesis Political Science
Sara Rubingh
10024905
Bachelor Project: Crossing Boundaries? Nationalism and National Identity
Tim Reeskens
January, 2014
Je est un autre
− Arthur Rimbaud (in Verhaege, 2013: 28)
I respect the flag in that Arab Iraqis see it as their flag and I don't want
to offend them. But I would not carry that flag, because I don't think it
represents me.
−
Kurdish commentator (on Website al Iraqi, 2005)
Index
1. Introduction 4 2. Theories 6 2.1 Identity 6 2.2 Context 9 2.2.1 Turkey 10 2.2.2 Iraq 11 2.3 Conflict 12 2.4 Hypotheses 13 3. Methods 15 3.1 Content Analysis 15 3.2 Sources 15 3.3 Events 17 3.4 Operationalization 17 4. Content Analysis 18 4.1 Event 1 18 4.2 Event 2 21 5. Conclusions 24 6. Reflection 26 7. Bibliography 27 31. Introduction
“They are taking our jobs”. This has been said quite often, when one fears the increase of immigrants. The already present individuals feel threatened by the newcomers. This threat can be material, like the example here. Yet, this threat can be cultural as well, for example in the form of contesting traditions. When an identity group is threatened by another group (the out-group), the individuals in this group will identify stronger with each other. Yet, identity does not only become more salient, they will also define membership in more exclusive terms. In other words, it becomes harder to become a member of the group (Hjerm & Schnabel, 2010: 530-531; Wright, 2011: 837). This perception of threat might lead to conflict, which polarizes identities even more. Because of memories of the conflict the worst motivations are ascribed to the other and unifying them becomes increasingly difficult (Posen, 1993; Ramsbotham, 2005: 117).
However, what if the identity group is dispersed over several countries and they are dealing with different out-groups? The Kurds are such an identity group. They have their own culture, language and religion, but they are without a state. Furthermore, they are spread over multiple states. In all of these other states they form a minority, even though there is a difference in the measure to which they are integrated into these countries (Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 356). In Iraq, the Kurds enjoy a great amount of autonomy (ibid. 360). However, in Turkey, there is often violent conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. For example, after the military coup in 1980, protests by Kurds were beaten down heavily (Mousseau, 2012: 53-54). This raises the question if Kurds are still united even though they are dispersed over these different countries with different contexts.
In July 2013 the Kurds have agreed to organize a congress and to reach a shared strategy and voice. They have long desired more independence and a homeland, but successive governments in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria have suppressed them and have taken advantage of their disunity. By organizing this congress they seem to want to make a change (Reuters, 2013). However, the congress was delayed for the third time in November, 2013. This time, there is no future date planned due to “technical and political problems” (Website Kurdnet, 2013). This again puts into question the unity of the Kurds.
As mentioned before, the Kurds are dealing with different out-groups: respectively the Turks, Iraqis, Iranians and Syrians. There is not one common enemy anymore. This puts into question if
identities still intensify because of conflicts with out-groups. For example, if the Turkish Kurds are attacked, does it generate a reaction with the Iraqi Kurds? Especially these two groups of Kurds live in different contexts, as seen in the preceding examples. Therefore, I will focus on these groups in this analysis, which will be explained in more detail the theories section.
This leads to the central research question of this thesis: To what extent are the Kurds united despite
them being dispersed over different states with different out-groups? There are theories on the
attachment to an identity group as presented above. This thesis, however could give a better insight into these theories. The unique context could provide new insights on the internal mechanisms of identity formation. Furthermore, this could shed a light on the importance of context for these mechanisms. Moreover, the future of the Kurds will be impacted by the extent to which they feel united. Will they pursue common goals or will they adapt more to their separate contexts? Furthermore, this helps to create policies that can generate certain (desirable) outcomes for society concerning in- and out-grouping. It could also be interesting for other somewhat similar cases, like the Roma, even though they do not have the same goal of self-determination.
Several sub questions are interesting to look at in connection to existing theories. First, what is identity and what are the different dimensions of identity? Second, how does context affect this identity? This is particularly interesting in regard to the Kurds, who live in different contexts. Third, an important context is conflict. How does conflict affect identity and in- and out-grouping? Naturally, the case of the Kurds will be looked at in greater depth. These questions will be discussed in the following section. Hereafter, I will discuss the research method, followed by the analysis. I will end this thesis with some concluding remarks, an answer to the research question and a reflection on this thesis. I will not focus on possible solutions for the conflicts involved, since its scope is more focused on identity formation, instead of solving the conflict.
2. Theories
In the following section the important theories concerning the research question will be explained and at the same time the main concepts will be applied to the Kurdish case. I will end this section with my expectations after researching the existing literature and formulate a hypothesis.
2.1 Identity
Identity is a social category. Social categories are characterized by certain rules of membership, which determine who are included in these categories. Furthermore, the members of the category are thought to have certain characteristics. For example, if one is a professor, a level of education is required and there are certain norms of proper behavior (Fearon & Laitin, 2000: 848). Other examples of content of these categories are age, gender, shared heritage, language, territory, religion, culture, legal rights and duties, a shared economic system, myths, historical memories, attitudes, perception and sentiments for political institutions. These categories together make up an identity. An individual can thus be part of several social categories. Members of the same categories often form identity groups. With the creation of a category of the self, a category of the other is also created. The other is not a member of the category or the identity group (Kunovich, 2009: 574-575; Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007: 747-748).
Identity groups and nations share several similarities. A nation is a collective of people “united by shared cultural features (myths, values, etc.) and the belief in the right to territorial self-determination” (Barrington, 1997: 713). The nation thus also shares the same identity. Furthermore, the idea of self-determination is central to a nation. Self-determination is often seen as having control over a state, but controlling a state is not the same as self-determination. The idea of having a territory is more crucial to self-determination (ibid. 711-712).
Identity has multiple dimensions. There are affective and normative dimensions. The affective dimension refers to the emotional attachment to a certain identity. In other words, how strongly one relates oneself to a certain identity group. The normative dimension refers to the boundaries of the identity or in other words, who is considered a member of a certain identity group and who is not (Wright & Reeskens, 2014: 46). Membership of a nation can be based on ethnic or civic characteristics. The ethnic definition of membership is based on heritage, a common language and a
distinctive culture. You are a member by birth. The civic definition of membership is based on citizenship, participation and respect for liberal values and respect for the accompanying institutions with these liberal values. The civic definition is more voluntary than the ethnic definition, which makes it possible for immigrants to become a member of an identity group. However, both definitions of membership usually occur at the same time as we will see with the Kurds (Kunovich, 2009: 574-575; Wright & Reeskens, 2014: 47; Pehrson, Vignoles & Brown, 2009: 26).
Nationalism, then, is the actual pursuit of a set of rights proclaimed by the members of the nations. These rights include at a minimum territorial autonomy or sovereignty. Nations can pursue this through arguments as well as other activities, for example of a more violent nature. It is important to distinguish nationalism from patriotism, where the autonomy is already there. It also differs from ethnic politics: an ethnic group can be the starting point for nationalism, but there are other starting points as well (Barrington, 1997: 713-715).
The Kurds are often seen as an ethnic group, but there is no agreement on the definition of this ethnic identity or who can be a member of the group. For example, some individuals who were born from Kurdish families now feel Turkish and have totally integrated into Turkish culture, while others feel Kurdish without a Kurdish origin (van Bruinessen, 2000: 1). In other words, the Kurdish identity group is not simply defined in ethnic terms. Membership is more voluntary, since one can become Kurdish or integrate into other identities. There are however, some shared characteristics of the Kurdish identity group.
These shared characteristics do not clearly demarcate them from other groups. However, it does give an idea of the content of the Kurdish identity. Even though there are several dialects, one can say that there is a shared Kurdish language, for they do understand each other (van Bruinessen, 2000: 1-2). Despite different dialects and the attempts to assimilate them, it is very unlikely that the Kurdish language will stop existing (Eagleton, 1993: 125). Furthermore, the Kurds have a distinct religion. They follow a certain school of Sunni Islam, which distinguishes them from Turks and Iraqis. “A stranger is frequently asked what his mezhep (the Kurdish school) is, as a cautious way of finding out whether he is Turk or a Kurd” (van Bruinessen, 2000: 2). However, in the other regions, Kurds have other religions as well. For example, in Iran there are Kurdish Shi’i and Christian Kurds (ibid.). Moreover, Kurdish symbols vary greatly over the different regions and have many similarities with the other ethnic groups of the region. These symbols entail Kurdish cooking, dress,
music and folklore. This variety is also explained by the way local governments have suppressed the expression of their cultural repertoire. There are certain features that can be seen as Kurdish, but they do not define a boundary between Kurds and non-Kurds (van Bruinessen, 2000: 3-4). However, this way one can touch on the content of the Kurdish identity, even though it is not clearly demarcated.
The territory where the Kurds live is also not clearly demarcated. There are certain areas where mostly Kurds live, like eastern Anatolia, western Iran and portions of northern Iraq, Syria and Armenia, (as portrayed in Figure 1). Some of these areas are referred to as Kurdistan by the Kurds, but this is not officially recognized by all of its neighbors (Culcasi, 2006: 682-683). Sources estimating the amount of Kurds in the world differ widely, because of differing criteria of ethnicity, religion and language. Furthermore, statistics may also have been manipulated for political purposes. Nevertheless, most estimates vary between 20 and 25 million Kurds including communities outside of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria (ibid.; Website Encyclopedia Britannica).
Figure 1: maps of Kurdistan (Culcasi, 2006: 682)
Additionally Kurds used to live a nomadic life, which makes it difficult to track them. Their lives revolved mainly around herding sheep and goats and marginal agriculture in Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Their society was organized in tribes, led by a firm leader. With the creation of national boundaries 8
after World War I, the Kurds were no longer able to live in their traditional ways. They were forced to live a village life, taking up farming or become unemployed. The leaders of the tribe still enjoy authority, but much weaker than before, especially in the large urban areas (Website Encyclopedia Britannica; Mousseau, 2012: 56-57).
The Kurds can be seen as a nation; they share certain cultural features and after the creation of national boundaries and the simultaneous introduction of private property the Kurdish nationalism flowered among a minority of urban Kurds. For example, in 1908 a Kurdish newspaper was revived and at the same time the first Kurdish political club was founded in Turkey. In 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was signed. This treaty contained an autonomous region for the Kurds, however it was never ratified. It was replaced by the Lausanne treaty in 1923, where the Kurds or Kurdistan were not mentioned (Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 357). Therefore, the first attempt for self-determination and a state failed and the Kurds became more fragmented than before. Various Kurdish separatist movements rose at this time, because of this changing context (Website Encyclopedia Britannica). Since the treaty of Sevres in 1920, the Kurds had not been mentioned in any international document until 1991 (Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 357).
2.2 Context
One's identity is composed out of individual roots. These individual characteristics, such as age and gender, help make up identities for individuals. But of course we have to realize that individuals live in a certain context and this context has an effect on the individual and identity groups (Kunovich, 2009: 575-576). For example, the country of origin usually decides which language an individual speaks. Likewise, the Kurds only became nationalistic after the creation of national boundaries, supporting the importance of context.
Context is thus also important for identity groups. Identities are usually seen as attributed and unchangeable (Calhoun, 1993: 215). However, even though identities are rooted in history, for example one’s country and heritage, they do change because of a changing context. There are multiple identities, which overlap and interact. Therefore, there are internal flows of information, like ideas, language and cultural productions (ibid). I have already described how the identity of the Kurds is not clearly demarcated and that this identity adapts to the different regions. Identity groups do not exist in a vacuum, and change because of interactions with others. Therefore, I will now
discuss the different countries where the Kurds live. Because of the complexity of the Kurdish case, I will only focus on the Kurds living in Turkey and Iraq. These countries are namely the most different for the Kurds but nonetheless geographical adjacent. In Turkey there is violent conflict and the rights of Kurds are very much declined, while in Iraq after a period of conflict the Kurds have their own autonomous region (Mousseau, 2012: 60; Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 359-360).
2.2.1. Turkey
After the creation of national boundaries, the Turkish constitution stated an official national ideology. The nation was based on the Turkish language, Sunni Islam and a cultural heritage of Turkish decent. At the same time, it was based on Kemalism, after the founder of the republic. One of the aspects of Kemalism is secularism. Subsequently, the only minority groups recognized were the Greeks, Armenians and Jews, because they were non-Muslim. Likewise, the Kurds and Shiites are seen as Turkish, because they are Muslim (Mousseau, 2012: 50-51). Turkish nationalism wanted to incorporate all ethnic identities into the Turkish identity. All citizens, despite their ethnic identity, are equal for the law. The Turks feared that public recognition and political expression of other ethnic identities would cause polarization and undermine the national unity. Therefore, people could express their ethnic identity in private, but political, cultural and linguistic rights have been limited. For example, the Kurds are often called “Mountain Turks”, because they mainly live in the mountains in South East Anatolia. After the military coup in 1980 the Turkish autocratic character was strengthened for security reasons. Kurds were not allowed to be educated in Kurdish or wear their ceremonial clothing in public. Likewise, Kurdish newspapers and journals were now banned. Furthermore, Kurdish political organizations in the eastern provinces of Turkey were suppressed and they were encouraged to move to more urban areas (Tezcür, 2009: 5; Mousseau, 2012: 46, 53-54; Website Encyclopedia Britannica).
To many Kurds, this Turkish civic identity is just a way to secure domination of the Turkish ethnic identity over other ethnic identities. Others feel these identities can exist side by side, although there is a certain stigma attached to being Kurdish. For example, an engineer who works in Izmir who is greatly respected, always takes his Kurdish telephone calls outside, because he does not want his other colleges hear him speak Kurdish (Tezcür, 2009: 6-7). There were periodic uprisings and in 1978 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was formed by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK’s main goal was to create an independent Kurdistan and they operated mainly in eastern Anatolia. The PKK 10
fighters engaged in (violent) guerilla attacks against the government. This led to a state of war in Eastern Turkey in the 1980’s and 90’s. In 1999 founder Öcalan was captured and the party’s actions heavily decreased (Website Encyclopedia Britannica). However, not all the Kurds in Turkey agreed with PKK’s approach. There are several other parties as well. Besides the PKK with a more socialist character, there is a liberal Kurdish party (TKDP), and also Islamic Kurds are widely represented in different parties. The competition between Islamic Kurds and secular Kurds have occasionally been violent (Tezcür, 2009: 9-11).
In 2002, through pressure of the European Union, the Turkish government legalized broadcasts and education in the Kurdish language. This meant progress for the Kurds, but still in practice there has been suppression, especially around political parties. Turkey and the PKK continue to have (violent) clashes (Mousseau, 2012: 60; Website Encyclopedia Britannica).
2.2.2. Iraq
In Iraq, the pressure on the Kurds to become Iraqi was much less than in Turkey. They were allowed to speak Kurdish and engage in their own culture (Website Encyclopedia Britannica). The cultural pressure thus was much less, however the repression was very intense. Iraqis carried out a policy of ‘Arabisation’ of the Kurds, by destroying villages and deporting Kurds from all over the country. As a reaction, there were sporadic armed rebellions by the Kurds, sometimes led by the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (IKDP), who were supported by Iran (Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 357-359). In 1975 a peace treaty failed and with an agreement between Iraq and Iran the Kurdish resistance collapsed and thousands had to flee to Iran and Turkey. The violence kept on going, be it at a lower level. Until in a few years later large numbers of Kurds were forced to move from oil rich areas and areas close to supporting Iran (ibid.: 358; Website Encyclopedia Britannica). Then, in the Iran-Iraq war again violence arose, when the Iraqis used chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians. Despite these attacks the Kurds kept resisting and were again heavily suppressed (ibid.).
A lot improved for the Kurds after the occupation of Kuwait and the following Persian Gulf war. This time the United States supported a safe haven in Northern Iraq for the Kurds, where they had self-determination. They were free from interference by the Iraqi government (Website Encyclopedia Britannica; Azam & Saadi-Sedik, 2004: 359-360). However, there were internal clashes within the area. The two Kurdish parties in the region could not agree on the distribution of
taxes and power. Despite these clashes, which were solved in a peace treaty in the United States, the Kurdish economy did very well. Subsequently, a lot improved for the Iraqi Kurds (ibid.: 360-361; Website Encyclopedia Britannica).
An interesting aspect is, that within the regions the Kurds are also divided up to a certain point. In both Turkey and Iraq there are several Kurdish parties, who also get into conflict with each other. A second interesting observation is that the Kurdish leaders now seek solutions in existing states, again supporting the importance of context (Eagleton, 1993: 124).
2.3 Conflict
Even though identities are always changing and adapting to context, they do have actual consequences. They can create networks of social relations, which can lead to cultural institutions. Identities have even led to conflict (Tilly, 2006: 209; Calhoun, 1993: 215). Furthermore, conflict has an interesting effect on group identity as well and can thus be seen as an important context. In the preceding section I described several conflict situations between the Kurds and the regions they lived in. Conflict arises when there is a struggle between at least two interdependent parties. These parties pursue incompatible goals, scarce resources and interference from others in achieving their goals (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007: 8-9). This struggle can come from ethnic contradictions, but this is of course not the same as a conflict (Tishkov, 1999: 574).
There are plenty of theories on the relations between conflict and identity. However, it has also been said that this relation has been exaggerated (Kalyvas, 2003). There are no “big causes” of conflict like ethnic clashes, but they change from individual to individual. Individuals have certain personal objectives, resulting from greed or personal vendettas for example. These objectives can get covered up by the main oppositions of conflict or they can become politicized because of these main oppositions. The thing is that they now have the context to attain one's personal objectives (ibid.). In other words, (group) identity can be used as a disguise for the pursuit of personal goals. Even though this is an interesting thesis and good to keep in mind, it is not so much concerned with the main question posed here. However, it does mean that conflicts do not necessarily have an effect on identity formation.
Identity can be the basis for excluding minority groups. The basic needs of a communal group are 12
not met by the group in charge, because they do not belong to the same group. The communal group is the out-group. In Turkey, for example, Kurds are not allowed to be educated in their own language. Conflict then arises when there is no progression of the situation over the long run. The communal group may try to get recognized via conflict (Ramsbotham, 2005). Closely related, elites can also play a role in identities, especially in conflict. Elites can transmit certain ideas to the masses, which tend to agree with these ideas. For example, elites can manipulate people into feeling more united, by creating a common enemy in order to legitimate certain policies. A conflict with this common enemy is then more likely (Hutchinson, Domke, Billeaudeaux & Garland, 2004).
Individuals of different identity groups can also feel threatened by individuals of other identity groups. They might fear that their culture will change or that they will lose their economic position. This threat will make them identify stronger with their own group and define its membership in more exclusive terms (Hjerm & Schnabel, 2010: 530-531)(Wright, 2011: 837). The in-group thus becomes more important and allows fewer members. When the threat gets to a very high level, it might ultimately lead to a pre-emptive strike of one group on the other to stop the threat and conflict can arise (Posen, 1993; Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007).
Furthermore, conflict also has an effect on identity. There are certain build-in-mechanisms of conflict that polarize identities even more. When conflict has lasted a long time, the opposition between the groups can become internalized in individuals, it becomes a cultural repertoire. This has to do with the experience of fear and violence, and the fear of it happening again. This generates negative images of members of the other group and a greater distinction between the own group and the others (Ramsbotham, 2005: 117). Because individuals live in a particular society, this polarization of identities can also grow into collective emotional repertoires. Individuals in the same society share central beliefs that consist of collective memories. Furthermore, they experience this violence and fear together, which make up for collective memories. This may lead to the repetition of behavior during the conflict, because it is mostly done unconsciously and does not require any imagination of the future. It tends to limit expectations to the future with past experiences of fear. It also makes it more difficult to reach compromises and possible solutions for the conflict. This can thus prolong the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001: 605-609; Ramsbotham, 2005: 117).
2.4 Hypotheses
Even though the Kurds do not have a clearly demarcated group identity, they consider themselves as one group with the goal of self-determination. Furthermore, they are a minority in all the countries they live in. They feel threatened, because of their identity and according to the theory, the experiencing of a threat leads to a more united identity. Furthermore, prolonged conflict leads to an even stronger polarization of identities, and thus to a more united identity in contrast to other identities. Therefore, I expect that the Kurds feel united. However, the context of these different countries also matters. Therefore, I do expect the different contexts of the countries to have an impact on their unity. The Kurds might feel a stronger bond with their own region and this might decrease the overall feeling of unity. I also have to keep in mind that there are conflicts between the Kurds in the several regions.
• Hypothesis: The Kurds are united, even though they are dispersed over different countries.
There are several out-groups, who are seen by them as common enemies.
3. Methods
In the preceding section, I explained my expectations on the basis of existing theories. In the following section, I will explain how I will research the hypothesis. Firstly, I will explain the method used in this thesis: content analysis. Secondly, I will describe the sampling of the documents. Thirdly, I will explain the particular points in time chosen to look at these documents. I will end this section with the particular markers to look for in the documents.
3.1 Content Analysis
In this thesis I want to look at sources where Kurdish individuals come together and discuss. For example, as mentioned before the Kurds are planning on having a congress. Due to limited time and resources I have decided to look for sources of information mainly on the internet, for example, an online Kurdish newspaper, but mostly blogs and fora. This is where Kurds actually interact. In other words, I will look at existing documents and I will do a content analysis (Bryman, 2008: 274). Documents are of course not direct reflections of reality, but they can tell us something about the underlying reality. I also have to take into account that these documents are created in certain contexts by certain authors (ibid.: 526-527).
Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages on choosing this type of research. Content analysis allows great transparency, since anyone can look at the documents presented. However, the research can only reach as far as the documents let you. But then again, it gives greater insight into a social group, that is usually difficult to gain access to (Bryman, 2008: 278, 288-291).
3.2 Sources
When one has to sample the sources for researches, one has to try to be as objective as possible. In order to be as objective as possible, it is recommended to be transparent. Personal biases then interfere in the process as little as possible. Furthermore, I will try to be as systematic as possible, because consistency can also suppress biases (Bryman, 2008: 274). I picked purely Iraqi and Turkish sources, but also an exclusively Kurdish one. I tried to get a representative sample by for example excluding the PKK forum. Also, I wanted there to be a large amount of members posting. A possible weakness is that I only sampled English documents, which might influence the
representativeness.
Newspaper Hurriyet Daily News
The Hurriyet Daily news is the best-known Turkish newspaper in English. It focuses not only on Turkey, but on the rest of the world as well. It was established in 1961 and the staff is mostly Turkish. The newspaper tries to be independent. Therefore, the journalists have the right to give their own opinion, even if it's not the newspapers opinion (Website Hurriyet Daily News).
Forum Turkish Living
This forum has almost 30,000 registered members. It was founded in December 2003 and the members can make donations. The forum is meant to talk about Turkish life in general, but it also has a specific Kurdish section. The vehicular language is English, but some comments are in other languages (Website Turkish Living).
Forum al Iraqi
This website was made in 1996 and at first consisted pages on the history of Iraq, the Iraqi flags, photos and some audio clips. In 1997, a guest book was created and also a monthly Arabic newspaper. After 1999 the monthly newspaper ceased and the focus was more on fora. The forum also made alliances with websites like Iraqsport.com and Iraq.net. This led to a large increase of members, also for many Iraqi’s living outside of Iraq. There are about 5000 members posting on the forum, which is a non-profit organization which provides free communal services (Website al Iraqi).
Website Northern Iraq
The website was founded in 2005. It has a news section, a blog section and a forum section with almost 7000 members. The members are mostly Kurdish and the website has a more activist character. For example, the slogan is: there is no north Iraq (Website Northern Iraq).
Electronic journal Kurdnet
Kurdnet is an online electronic journal that was established in 1998. It states that it is an independent, non-political and non-profit organization that has no affiliation to any other group or establishment. Kurdnet states they are committed to honesty, accuracy, integrity and independence. Their goal is to promote democracy, freedom and human rights in Kurdistan (which they define as Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia, Georgia). The website had over 5 million unique visitors last 16
year. It redistributes articles by AP and Reuters, but it also has columns and articles written by its own journalists (Website Kurdnet).
3.3 Events
I want to select certain dates to look at these sources, to make it more feasible The best way to go about this is to look at certain events (Bryman, 2008: 278-280). I picked the events that contain conflict in one region of the Kurds that do not directly have an effect on the other regions. In other words, I picked events that severely threaten the Kurds in the region, but do not directly threaten the other Kurds. If they feel united they should be mentioning this in the sources. The sampled events are comparable, since they are both of a material nature. This way, the effect on identity formation should be similar for the two events. Of course other events could have an impact as well, but due to the limited time and resources of this thesis I will only focus on these two.
The first event took place in Turkey in October 2007. The Turkish parliament then gave the go-ahead to military operations in Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels of the PKK (Website BBC Kurdistan Timeline). The second event happened in Iraq in December 2005. There was news that a foreign firm had begun drilling for oil in the Kurdish north. This sparked new fears of secession among Iraqi Sunni leaders, with possible actions against the Kurds. The Kurdish authorities later reported that they had indeed discovered a large amount of oil (Website BBC Kurdistan Timeline).
3.4 Operationalization
With media-output and documents, it is a custom to look for certain themes. The outputs can be deemed to be genuine, although the authorship of the articles is often unclear (Bryman, 2008: 523). The themes can be either concerned with manifest or latent content: manifest being what it is clearly about. Latent is more concerned with the meaning that lies beneath the superficial indicators (ibid. 527). In this case, the meaning is more latent. The events are of course important, but I will look at signs of a common identity and a feeling of unity.
Deriving from the theoretical frame work, the first sign of unity is contact between the Kurds. They should at least be in contact with each other, since they have to share this feeling of being threatened and in fear. Together they will have to make a social repertoire, which is difficult when
they do not have any contact with each other. Therefore, the first marker I will look for is whether the event happening to the Turkish Kurds is being talked about by the Iraqi Kurds and of course vice versa. Secondly, it is important to see whether the Kurds talk about these events in terms of “them”, “they”, “we” and “us”. Do they as a group feel like a common enemy is threatening them? Using these terms could be interpreted as feeling united countering the out-group. Furthermore, I will analyze different citations. These citations will be portrayed exactly as they have been written on these different sources, in order for the meaning to come off as clear as possible.
4. Content Analysis
I will now analyze the earlier described events as portrayed in the sources. I will discuss the two events separately in this section and elaborate on more general findings in the following concluding section.
4.1 Event 1
In October 2007 the Turkish parliament had decided to begin a military operation in Iraq. It wanted to track down the PKK and other Kurdish rebels. Therefore, Turkey came under international pressure to avoid an invasion (Website BBC Kurdistan Timeline). This event is actually mentioned in the sources. For example, there were over 150 articles posted on Kurdnet (website Kurdnet). On the several fora they often post news articles and discuss the content. The event is also mentioned on these fora.
Moreover, there was obvious mentioning of “them” and “they”, when the Kurds talked about the Turks. One article on the event cited a Kurdish member of parliament, stating "Turks have
Kurdophobia. They are afraid of anything Kurdish” (Website Kurdnet, 2007e). The authors posting
on the forums are mainly Iraqi Kurds and describe Turks in negative ways. Turks are seen as killing machines that hate Kurds. One member stated: ““all the turks want to do is kill kill and kill...theyre
[sic.] the worst human being ...just look at the ottoman empire's history enough said its really said ppl [sic.] have to deal with turks” (Website al Iraqi, 2007a). In one column on Kurdnet the Turks
were even compared to Saddam Hussein, Milosevic and Hitler, claiming that they should be prosecuted.
“The entire Turkish government should be brought to justice before International Court, like the Iraqi executed dictator Saddam Hussein, and the former Yugoslavian dictator Milosevic, for the crimes they committed against humanity. [..] I believe the Turkish government is the same as the former Nazi Government in the past and its leaders are like Hitler” (Website
Kurdnet, 2007a).
There were also a lot of comments stating the Turks should go back to Mongolia, because they do not naturally live in Turkey. “TURKS GO BACK TO MONGOLIA! WE ALL HATE YOU [sic.]” 19
(Website Northern Iraq, 2007b). The Iraqi Kurds do not see the Turkish Kurds as part of Turkey. They see Turks as the invaders of Turkey, who naturally belong to the territory of Mongolia. They clearly define the Turks in ethnic terms here.
Furthermore, there is a lot of use of terms like “we” and “us”; “we” being the Kurds in general. In one article on Kurdnet a political activist is cited: “We are ready to defend our beloved Kurdistan
that is targeted by the Turkish regime" (Website Kurdnet, 2007c). On the fora there was also a lot of
talk on defending “us” and fighting the Turks: “We shall fight them on the mountains, we shall fight
them on the fields, we shall fight them in the valleys. We shall fight them in villages and towns. We shall fight them until North Kurdistan Liberated” (Website al Iraqi, 2007b). They did not really
want to fight, but they had to because they felt that they were being attacked.
“it is hard to reason with a country such as Turkey, that is based on racism. We try working
with them but they are not giving us a chance. I just dont [sic.] get these people, we turned our backs on our northern brothers a few times for them but there is no wining [sic.] with them” (Website al Iraqi, 2007c).
It is “us “ Kurds against the Turks and “we” had no choice, but to fight back.
However, often a distinction is made between the different regions of the Kurds. The Kurds seem to feel like one group against the enemies, but the group does have different sections. One of the members on the forums said: “I am also for a war between South Kurdistan and Turkey, that the
Northern and Southern Kurds be unite against the barbaric turkish, persian and arabic Invasors [sic.]” (Website Northern Iraq, 2007a). They talked about “Southern Kurdistan” and “Northern
Kurdistan”, but also attached to the different states, like “Syrian Kurds”. One the same forum another member stated:
“20% of the PKK members are Kurds from southern Kurdistan, and also Kurds from Syrian
Kurdistan and Iranian Kurdistan there is no way they are going out of southern Kurdistan they have lots of support, Kurds from southern Kurdistan set themselves on fire when Ocalan was arrested” (Website al Iraqi, 2007b).
In one news article on Kurdnet, it was clear that there are also Kurds who identify more with their 20
region and they do want to distance themselves from the violent practices. One young laborer said: “We don't want the PKK and we don't want the military. We don't want their bullets or their bombs" (Website Kurdnet, 2007d). Another asked: “Why are they threatening us, we are not a part of the
PKK issue?” (Website Kurdnet, 2007b). However, they often do blame the “others”:
“War, What is it good for, I never thought anyside really wins in war, our people realy [sic.] deserves to live those few years in peace, we got tired, since 1916 and we always have war, let's enjoy the break. Turks also should know their problem need a political solution, they never can do anything useful in S. Kurdistan while having millions of Kurds live in substandards in N. Kurdistan” (Website al Iraqi, 2007b).
The Kurds thus did not all feel like fighting and defending each other. They just wanted to be left alone by “the others”.
4.2 Event 2
In December 2005, a foreign firm had begun drilling for oil in the Kurdish north of Iraq. The Kurdish authorities later reported that there was indeed a major discovery of oil. This sparked new fears of secession among Iraqi Sunni leaders and could lead to possible consequences for Kurdistan (Website BBC Timeline Kurdistan). This event was less mentioned than the former event. There were about 15 mentions in articles on the discovery of oil in Kurdistan on Kurdnet (website Kurdnet). Furthermore, Kurdish Turkish forums do not really exist and on the Turkish forums they did not really discuss this event. Additionally, some of the forums were created after 2005.
The newspapers, however, did mention the events. Kurdnet stated that the leaders of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq made a deal with a foreign company to drill for oil. It is obvious that this newspaper sees the two groups as opposites, with negative images of each other. In several articles they stated that the drilling for oil could help the Kurds gain more control over the region, because of being more economically independent. They cited the leader of the Kurdish region: "This project will contribute to the growth of the Kurdish economy and its reconstruction.
The time when the Kurdish people will no longer be oppressed and will profit from its own riches has finally arrived" (Website Kurdnet, 2005a). Kurdnet also focused on the perspective of the Iraqis
by stating that most Iraqis fear Kurdish independence. The Iraqis did not want the oil into the hands 21
of the Kurds. The oil deputy minister stated: “people don't like Kurdish people. They say they drill
oil and want oil for themselves” (Website Kurdnet, 2005b). Then again, Kurdish politicians received
permission and urged for a change of the constitution to gain total control of oil in their region. In the same article, they also showed that the Kurds do not want to give up this opportunity to the “other”. A Kurdish government advisor stated: “If everything is in the hands of Baghdad, the
opportunity for abuse can happen” (ibid.). In another article on Kurdnet, they also focused on the
fear of Iraqis. The feared Kurds, but also Shi’ites would take control over the oil revenues in their regions in Iraq. The Shi'ites and Kurds had been holding bilateral talks in northern Iraq that week while violence continued further south. (Website Kurdnet, 2005c). In other words, the threat seems bigger to the Iraqis. They see themselves as different from the Kurds and do not want the Kurds to gain control over the oil. For the Kurds it feels like an opportunity to gain more independence.
Even though the blogs in Turkey do not really talk about this event, the newspaper did mention the event. It is stated that since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Turks have feared that the Kurds would gain control over the north of Iraq. They would be free from Baghdad’s power and this could have an effect on the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. A Turkish former-ambassador mentioned the PKK: “The PKK greatly benefits from the current power vacuum in Iraq. The security problem will
be resolved only when Iraq is able to control all of its territory.” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005a).
Thus it seems that the Turks were also the ones who fear that the Kurds in Iraq would gain more control. They did not make a distinction between the PKK and other Kurds. In another article on the subject, it stated that a delegation of the KDP of Kurdish leader Barzani was in Ankara shortly after the oil deal. It was the first time Turkish officials and Iraqi Kurds talked. There are no real details about the talks available though. Nevertheless, there was an interesting mention of the PKK in the article again:
“Talks between the KDP delegation and Turkish officials were expected to center on the
protection of Iraq's integrity, a possible visit by Barzani to Ankara and the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, NTV television said” (Hurriyet
Daily News, 2005b).
This article did make a distinction between the KDP and the PKK and thus the different sections of the Kurds. It seems that after the talks, the Turks saw an opportunity as well.
On the Iraqi blogs, there was talk about this event. One Iraqi Kurd stated: “It is our oil. Iraq hasn't
anything to do with it. Over my dead body that Baghdad will get control over Kurdish oil! Long live Kurdistan” (Website al Iraqi, 2005). Obviously, this confirms the Kurds see the Iraqis as the “other”
with a negative connotation. The Kurds feel they have the right to gain control over their oil revenues.
5. Conclusions
It seems there is still contact between the different regions of the Kurds. A first example is the congress they wanted to organize. Furthermore, the sampled threatening events are discussed in the other regions. Moreover, Kurds of one region felt concerned about events going on in other regions. They talked in terms of “the other”, the non-Kurdish people. There was a clear distinction made between the different groups: the Turks, the Iraqis and the Kurds. A big part of these others were seen as anti-Kurdish and they described them in negative terms. A particular interesting discovery is the talk in terms of “we” and “us”. The others wanted to harm “us, the Kurds”. Especially the other seemed to see the Kurds as one group. Nevertheless, the Kurds themselves did make distinctions between the different regions. They saw each other as one, but there are different provinces so it seems. The second threat I described was much more seen as an opportunity. The other region therefore did not feel threatened either. As an interesting side note, it seemed the Iraqis and the Turks were threatened more than the Kurds.
The preceding theories section also has a light to shed on these findings. First, there is a threat experienced by one group of Kurds, which also affects Kurds in other regions. They all seem to feel a common threat. Furthermore, they tend to feel more united because of the experience of the threat. “We, the Kurds are being threatened”. Moreover, there is definitely a form of out-grouping visible. Because of the conflicts’ long time span, they ascribe the worst motivations to the other. An example of a motivation is seeing the Turks as killing machines. This concerns mainly direct violent threats. Nevertheless, different contexts do have an effect on identity formation of the Kurds. As mentioned before, Kurds do feel more attached to their own regions; their identity is also formed by the different contexts. Therefore, I can affirm the hypothesis; the threat and conflict does bring the Kurds together and intensifies excluding features of their identity. However, the different contexts also have an effect, which makes them identifying even more with their own regional Kurds. The second event also confirms the goal of self-determination. They aim for more autonomy and economical control.
The research question was: To what extent are the Kurds united despite them being dispersed over
different states with different out-groups? Concluding from the preceding, one can say that the
Kurds are still united. This is the case even though I described how the Kurds are not a clearly demarcated identity group. They define themselves in different terms and the content of the identity 24
is different per region. However, they experience the same threat and conflict. Furthermore, it seems that they are united against their enemies. Nonetheless, the dispersion over different states does have an effect as well. They can be seen as one in-group, but with several little in-groups as well. It seems that because of the context of conflict they feel more alike.
This could have implications for the future of the Kurds. Changing contexts could have an impact on the pursuance of goals and solving the conflict. It also has implications for existing theories. It seems that common enemies do indeed intensify the in-group feelings, even if it is not a direct threat do the whole group. However, the different contexts have an impact as well. As I described earlier, the Kurds do make distinctions between the Kurds living in different regions.
In the beginning of this thesis two citations were presented. I feel that they really explain something about the Kurdish case. The other is very important in this case, because this is what they have to fight against together. The other therefore is a part of the Kurdish identity: “je est un autre”. Furthermore, the second citation really explained this as well. “I respect the flag in that Arab Iraqis
see it as their flag and I don't want to offend them. But I would not carry that flag, because I don't think it represents me”. They just do not feel represented by the others’ symbols, clearly making a
boundary between the self and the other.
In the following section I will discuss the limitations of this thesis and also some recommendations for further research.
6. Reflection
I do realize I have a more constructivist perception of identity. I think that identities can change over time and that they are not “natural”. Therefore, someone with a more modernistic or ethnic perception would have a very different idea of how to design a research on this topic and would probably look for ways the Kurds revive the Kurdish identity.
Moreover, in this thesis I only talked about the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. For a better insight into the mechanisms, the Syrian and Iranian Kurds should be taken into account as well. There are concerns with the generalization of case studies (Bryman, 2008: 53-54). However, this case is seen as more unique and offers an opportunity to look into the mechanisms of identity, also in relation to conflict.
I also realize that blogs are not the most reliable sources. There could be other blogs and the individuals posting on these blogs might not be the most representative. I tried to be systematic in the sampling of the blogs. Naturally, there was a limitation because I could only sample English blogs. Therefore, for further research I would recommend to sample Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish written blogs as well. Furthermore, due to limited time and resources I had a rather small sample, therefore I would recommend a larger sample. Moreover, different types of researches could also help with illuminating the Kurdish identity formation. I think it would be particularly interesting to interview Kurds on their experience. How they incorporate their identity into their contexts, especially there being several Kurdish parties in the regions. Also more quantitative research, for example questionnaires could help with the bigger picture and make it more generalizable.
I realize that other events than the two that I sampled here, could also have an impact on the Kurdish identity. Further research could take into account more events. In this thesis, I focused mainly on violent and more material threats. However, I think it would also be interesting to look at more cultural treats for the Kurds and the effect that has on the other regions. For example, in September 2006 the leader of Kurdistan, ordered the replacement of the Iraqi national flag with the Kurdish one in government buildings. However, Iraq’s Prime Minister al-Maliki states that the Iraqi flag is the only flag that should be raised over any square inch or Iraq (Website BBC Kurdistan Timeline). This can be seen as a cultural threat for the Kurds, since many Kurds do not feel represented by the Iraqi flag. It would be interesting to see if this is perceived with fear by the Kurds, intensifying their identities once more.
7. Bibliography
Azam, J.P. & Saadi‐Sedik, T. (2004) Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds. Defense and Peace Economics, Vol.15 (4): pp. 343-364.
Bar-Tal, D. (2001) Why does fear overrides hope in.... intractable conflicts. Political Psychology, Vol. 22(3), pp. 601-627.
Barrington, L.W. (1997) Nation and Nationalism: The misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science.
Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30 (4): pp. 712-716.
Bruinessen, van M. (2000) Kurdish ethno-nationalism versus nation-building states. Collected
articles. Istanbul: The Isis Press: pp. 1-11.
Bryman, A.B. (2008) Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Culcasi, K. (2006) Cartographically constructing Kurdistan within geopolitical and orientalist discourses. Political Geography, Vol. 25: pp. 680-706.
Eagleton, W. (1993) Review: The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview by Philip K. Kreyenbroek; Stefan Sperl. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20 (1): pp. 124-126.
Fearon, J.D. & Laitin, D.D. (2000) Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic identities. International Organization, Vol. 54(4): pp. 845-877.
Hjerm, M. & Schnabel, A. (2010) Mobilizing Nationalist Sentiments: Which Factors Affect Nationalist Sentiments in Europe? Social Science Research, Vol. 39(4): pp. 527-539.
Hutcheson, J., Domke, D., Billeaudeaux, A. & Garland, P. (2004). U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic Press Following September 11. Political Communication, Vol. 21(1): pp. 27-50.
Kalyvas, S. (2003) Ontology of political violence. Perspectives on Politics, Vol.1(3), pp.475-494. 27
Kunovich, R. M. (2009) The Sources and Consequences of National Identification. American
Sociological Review, Vol. 74(4): pp. 573-593.
Mousseau, D.Y. (2012) An inquiry into the linkage among nationalizing policies, democratization, and ethno-nationalist conflict: the Kurdish case in Turkey. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of
Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 40 (1): pp. 45-62.
Pehrson, S. Vignoles, V. L. & Brown, R. (2009) National Identification and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice: Individual and Contextual Effects on National Definitions. Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 72(1): pp. 24-38.
Posen, B. (1993) The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, Vol. 35 (1), pp.27-47.
Ramsbotham, O. (2005) The analysis of Protracted Social Conflict: a tribute to Edward Azar.
Review of International Studies. Vol. 31, pp. 109–126.
Reeskens, T. & Wright, M. (2014) Shifting Loyalties? Globalization and National identity in the Twenty-First Century. In W. Aarts & L. Halman (Eds.), Value Contrasts and Consensus in
Present-Day Europe. Painting Europe’s Moral Landscape. Leiden: Brill: pp. 45-67.
Reuters (2013) Pan-Kurdish congress planned to unify ranks amid regional turmoil. 23 July. Online:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/23/us-kurds-congress-idUSBRE96M0NA20130723
Rousseau, D.L. & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2007) Identity, Power and Threat Perception: a cross-national Experimental Study. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51(5), pp.744-771.
Tezcür, G.M. (2009) Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation.
European Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 10: pp. 1-18.
Tilly, C. (2006) Political Identities in Changing Polities. Social Research, Vol. 70 (2): pp. 205-214.
Tishkov, V. (1999) Ethnic conflicts in the former USSR: use and misuse of typologies and data. 28
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36 (5): pp. 571-591.
Verhaege, P. (2013) Identiteit. Amsterdam: de Bezige Bij.
Website al Iraqi http://www.aliraqi.org/#aboutus
Website al Iraqi (2005) 12 May. http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=45649&page=4
Website BBC Kurdistan Timeline http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15467672
Website Encyclopedia Britannica http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/325191/Kurd
Website Hurriyet Daily News
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/about-the-newsroom.aspx?pageID=454
Website Kurdnet http://www.ekurd.net/aboutkurd.htm
Website Kurdnet (2013) Long-awaited pan-Kurdish National conference postponed indefinitely. 11 November. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/11/state7483.htm
Website Northern Iraq http://northerniraq.info/forums/memberlist.php?mode=leaders
Wilmot, W. W. & Hocker, J. L. (2007) Interpersonal Conflict. Boston: McGraw Hill: pp.8-9.
Wright, M. (2011) Diversity and the Imagined Community: Immigrant Diversity and Conceptions of National Identity. Political Psychology, Vol. 32(5): pp. 837-862.
Sources for Analysis
Hurriyet Daily News (2005a) Turkey sees high stakes for own security in Iraq vote. 14 December.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-sees-high-stakes-for-own-security-in-iraq-vote.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkey-sees-high-stakes-for-own-security-in-iraq-vote-2005-12-14
Hurriyet Daily News (2005b) Iraqi Kurdish delegation in Ankara for talks. 28 December.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-kurdish-delegation-in-ankara-for-talks.aspx?pageID=438&n=iraqi-kurdish-delegation-in-ankara-for-talks-2005-12-28
Website al Iraqi (2005a) 3 December. http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=53124
Website al Iraqi (2007a) 12 October. http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=79798
Website al Iraqi (2007b) 13-14 October. http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=79720
Website al Iraqi (2007c) 15 October. http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=78968
Website Kurdnet (2005a) Oil bust for Iraq Kurds. 1 December.
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2005/12/investkurdistan48.htm
Website Kurdnet (2005b) Foreign oil deal renews debate on Kurd autonomy. 9 December. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2005/12/investkurdistan52.htm
Website Kurdnet (2005c) Iraqi Sunnis grasp olive branch. 31 December. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2005/12/government517.htm
Website Kurdnet (2007a) The Conspiracy Agreement Made Between The Iraqi And Turkish Internal Ministers. 1 October.
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/independentstate1648.htm
Website Kurdnet (2007b) Massive demonstration in Iraqi Kurdistan against Turkish parliament's decision. 18 October.
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/independentstate1696.htm
Website Kurdnet (2007c) Kirkuk: Hundreds of Kurds protest against Turkey's incursion plan. 22 October. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/kirkukkurdistan300.htm
Website Kurdnet (2007d) Kurds mix fear and defiance on Turkey-Iraqi Kurdistan border. 23 30
October. http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/turkeykurdistan1453.htm
Website Kurdnet (2007e) Turkey accuses Iraqi Kurdistan of harbouring 'terrorists', discuss possible economic sanctions. 31 October.
http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2007/10/turkeykurdistan1475.htm
Website Northern Iraq (2007b) 9 October.
http://northerniraq.info/forums/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=2664&start=15
Website Northern Iraq (2007a) 8 October.
http://northerniraq.info/forums/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=2664
Website Turkish Living http://www.turkishliving.com/forums/announcements-about-forum/4850-kurdish-discussion-threads.html
