How American intelligence and the US Government let the Shah fall
Photo: National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (L) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
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Table of contents
Introduction Page 2
Chapter one: Setting the stage for Revolution Page 5
- The Cold War context Page 6
- The situation in Iran leading up to 1976 Page 9
- US-Iran relations before 1976 Page 13
Chapter two: Gathering intelligence in Iran Page 17
- How did the United States gather intelligence in Iran between 1976
and 1979? Page 17
- Role of the US embassy in Tehran Page 22
- Role of the Central Intelligence Agency Page 27
- What went wrong? Page 30
Chapter three: The US government and Iran Page 34
- Jimmy Carter and Shah Pahlavi Page 34
- Carter’s staff and advisors Page 39
- The fall of the Shah Page 43
- The seizure of the embassy and the end to the special relationship
between the US and Iran Page 47
Conclusion Page 50
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“There is no doubt that we will be ultimately judged on two fronts: what happens to the Americans and what we do after their release/murder to retaliate against Iran”1
These words were used when Jimmy Carter’s Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, tried to inform the president on what he thought might be the consequences to the Carter Presidency. In November 1979 a crowd of mostly students seized the US embassy in Tehran and took its staff hostage. This was the latest escalation in the series of events now known as the Iranian Revolution. The sudden fall of Iran’s autocratic ruler (the Shah), the ascension to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his conservative religious following plus the seizure of the US embassy and ensuing hostage crisis would tarnish Carter’s chances of a second term in the White House as well as his legacy.
Ever since the relationship between the United States and Iran was destroyed in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s the two nations have been enemies. The now theocratic state of Iran is a center of power in a volatile region, and more often than not their interests and those of the US have been antithetical. This has greatly encumbered the peace-process in Israel and Palestine and the destabilizing effects have made the Middle East a breeding ground for terrorist organizations. In addition to these side-effects, the US has feared Iran’s attempts to acquire the technology to create nuclear weapons. Recent attempts to reconcile some of the differences or at least maintain some form of dialogue have been slow-going and very difficult to navigate.
Iran is and has always been a dominant presence in the region, and before 1979 the US and Iran were close allies. The relationship between Shah Pahlavi and successive US presidents can be described as exemplary. So the collapse of the Shah’s power and the following crises in Iran surprised and angered many Americans. How could a close ally let the United States down in such an unforgiving way? In retrospect, observers like Abrahamian2, Donovan3, Bill4, Jervis5 and Sick6, have concluded that widespread dissatisfaction and unanswered grievances in Iranian
1 Office of the Chief of Staff files, Folder Iran 11/79, November 8 1979,
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/34/cos_142099_34b_09-Iran_11-79.pdf. 2
E. Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 coup in Iran’, Science & Society 65/2 (2001) 182-215.
3 M. Donovan, ‘National intelligence and the Iranian revolution’, Intelligence and National Security 12/1 (1997) 143-163.
4
J.A. Bill, “Iran and the crisis of '78”, Foreign Affairs 57 (1978) 323-342.
5 R. Jervis, Why intelligence fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell University Press 2010).
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society had been brewing for a long time, and the base of the American friendship with Iran was hardly any deeper than the Shah and his government. But in the years leading up to the Revolution, there were plenty of signals that something was changing. Ayatollah Khomeini had been a radical voice of opposition starting in the early 1960s, (violent) uproar broke out on several occasions, often targeting the Shah and his American ally, and the Shah’s repressing reaction to any dissent only fueled the core opposition. All of these signals were missed. How could this have happened?
In order to find an answer to these questions this research will use a combination of primary sources, both official and classified documents, public speeches, newspaper articles and secondary literature. Many scholars have addressed the underlying causes of the Iranian Revolution, but the question why so many signs were missed at the time remains largely unanswered. A pivotal factor in researching the origins and results of the Iranian Revolution is the availability of source material. Earlier authors had to look for primary sources in archives and by requesting releases by the government and private entities like newspapers. Over recent years, both the government and private parties have digitalized many old documents and through this development entire databases have become more accessible and easily explored. Aside from easy access, many documents (especially formerly classified ones) have been released by the US government. Sources like the Digital National Security Archive and the CIA reading room have published documents that had earlier been off limits due to the ‘classified’ status. Especially the 1953 overthrow of prime minister Mossadeq has recently received much attention due to the release of documentation that confirmed the role the CIA played in the plot as previously suspected. However, not all material has been released or digitalized, so in this research only currently available sources are included. If shockingly revealing documents are released in the near future that might affect the extent of this research.
Primary material will play a central role in this research, but in order to thoroughly analyze this period, and create the proper context, the earlier research of academics will be used. The earlier mentioned scholars, as well as many others have focused on the sudden coming of Revolution in Iran, and the ensuing hostage crisis has been thoroughly analyzed. This research will focus more on the preceding period and the signs and information that have been missed in order to complement these other academic writings. By combining academic analyses and source
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material this research paper will provide an answer to the question of how the signs of coming change in Iran could have been missed.
In order to give this research a clear aim, it will focus on a main research question: How could the American government have been so misinformed on the real situation in Iran? This main question will be answered by splitting it into sub questions: What was the dominant view Washington had of Iranian society? How did the US embassy in Tehran gather information on Iran, and how did the CIA? How was the available information handled by the Carter administration? By answering these questions a clear picture can be created about the way the relationship between the US and Iran was handled and interpreted. This way the main research question can be answered.
For a structural approach to finding answers to these questions the successive chapters of this research each examine a different aspect of the situation. In the first chapter the strategic importance of Iran will be discussed, with a focus on the context of the Cold War. When this important framework has been reviewed it will continue by providing a short historic overview of Iranian politics and society and the situation in Iran leading up to 1976. The first chapter will then provide an overview of US-Iran relations before 1976.
The second chapter will focus on the way information was gathered by the US in Iran. An in depth analysis of how information was gathered in general is followed by analysis of the role of the embassy and the CIA in this process. This chapter will conclude with an overview of what they missed and what went wrong in the information gathering process. The third and final chapter will then review the way the US government, and in particular the Carter administration, handled the brewing situation in Iran. After a review of the relationship between Shah Pahlavi and Jimmy Carter, this chapter will take a closer look at Carter’s closest advisors and how they viewed the situation in Iran. The chapter will finish on the fall of the Shah and the seizure of the embassy. Finally this research will feature a conclusion which will provide answers for the research questions stated above.
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Chapter one: Setting the stage for Revolution
In order to fully comprehend the relationship between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is imperative that one understands the historic developments that preceded the clash between the two countries which occurred during and following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The events that stemmed from this Revolution have damaged the relations and mutual understanding of these two nations for decades to follow. This first chapter aims to provide an overview of US-Iran relations leading up to 1976, and offer the necessary context for further exploration of the events that eventually spoiled a mutually beneficial friendship.
When analyzing the Iranian Revolution it is imperative to keep in mind the overarching structure in the world that dominated international relations at that time. This was the Cold War era, and the words and actions of both parties cannot be fully understood or valued without appreciating the gravity of this global dynamic. This chapter will not only discuss the events leading up to 1976, but will also provide an overview of the consequences that came from Cold War rhetoric and the influence this had on both nations, as well as the region in which they operated.
Cold War dynamics played a pivotal role on the world stage during the time of the crisis and Revolution in Iran, but Iran’s interior political system and the powers at play are another crucial cog in the workings of brewing uproar. The schism between the US and Iran is visible to this day, the mutual hatred (or at the very least disapproval) is palpable whenever the two nations go head to head. But the internal political shift, and the political, religious and societal pressures that led to the uncertain days now referred to as the Iranian Revolution have not been central to most analyses of the conflict. For example, David Houghton, in his article on the hostage crisis in Tehran focusses solely on international Cold War context in describing the events that preceded the taking of the Embassy.7 The internal Iranian situation is hereby dismissed as less important than the circumstances of the Cold War. In this first chapter the root causes of the conflict will be highlighted and analyzed. Which processes leading up to the days of revolution can be identified as cause?
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When the background and internal Iranian situation have been clarified, an overview of US-Iran relations leading up to 1976 will be provided. The dealings between the US government and the Shah will take center stage. But for a clear background to support deep analysis in the following chapters, the history of the relationship between the Pahlavi rulers and the US will be analyzed. In order to understand the breakdown between Iran and the United States the analysis of this history will gravitate towards the period of the Nixon- and Ford administrations. In the following chapters the presidency of Jimmy Carter will be discussed in depth, but the link between the Carter administration and the Iranian Revolution is too intertwined to be incorporated in the first chapter.
The Cold War context
For a large part of the twentieth century the Cold War has played a central role. The global power struggle between the two first nuclear powers captured people’s imagination and filled millions with fear over a stretch of more than forty years. For this reason the Cold War is discussed here, because its influences motivated, scared and hardened both sides in the clash between the United States and Iran. Any political move on the international playing field was first and foremost influenced and fueled by the overarching structure of the Cold war.
For the United States, it could be argued, the Cold War was warming up even before the end of World War II. For the cooperation between the United States and its western allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, was perceived even by President Roosevelt as a ‘deal with the devil’.8
With a perspective that so radically discards the idea of a communist system as ‘evil’ it is virtually impossible to imagine the United States and the Soviet Union would have been able to peacefully coexist after the end of the war. So the stage was already set when Hitler’s Europe was liberated and Japan signed their surrender, for the two remaining superpowers to lock horns in the aftermath.9 According to John Lewis Gaddis this nearly unavoidable clash was eventually executed by the changed face that represented America. On April 12th 1945 President Roosevelt died, and with him the subtle and statesmanlike approach to US-Soviet relations was also laid to rest. His successor, Harry S. Truman, was less burdened by
8 J.L. Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold
War (Oxford University Press, 2005) 3-4.
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finesse and tried to carry out Roosevelt’s policy in his own way, and by doing so reversed it irreparably.10
In February of 1946 the United States policy for dealing with the Soviet Union changed swiftly and permanently. The then relatively junior Foreign Service officer in Moscow, George F. Kennan wrote a long telegram voicing his views concerning Russian intent.11 Kennan shed a light on how the Soviet leadership operated, and his findings proved a shocking departure from what was until then widely believed. He asserted that the top leadership in the Soviet Union created and maintained the fabricated truth that all other countries were out to destroy Russia. Through this threat they were able to legitimize their actions, both internal and in the international arena, and retain their power. For many Russians, both officials and ordinary citizens, this must have been easy to believe, for the German betrayal of 1941 had left scars that remained fresh.12 Kennan subsequently suggested that the idea of developing a certain rapport with the Russian government, which had been the aim up until then, was a faulty premise to begin with, and he suggested a radically different approach. Kennan set forth what has become known as containment strategy in his ‘long telegram’, and his ideas resonated in Washington.
“The new strategy contained several departures from past practice: (1) No further efforts would be made to conceal disagreements with the Russians; rather, these would be aired openly, frankly, but in a non-provocative manner. (2) There would be no more concessions to the Soviet Union: the United States would, in effect, "draw the line," defending all future targets of Soviet expansion, but without any attempt to "liberate" areas already under Moscow's control. (3) To facilitate this goal, United States military strength would be reconstituted and requests from allies for economic and military aid would be favorably considered…”13
This new strategy did more than just change the tone to the dealings between the USSR and the United States, the playing field was also dramatically expanded. Where the lines had until that moment been drawn through the sectors of occupied Germany, this new approach made the entire world a potential frontier for the conflict between the ideals of parliamentary
10
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 14-16. 11 Ibidem, 18-21.
12 Gaddis, We now know, 11.
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democracy and the rule of the proletariat. Aside from a change in rhetoric, the possibility of armed conflict became more likely with a virtually unlimited number of potential battlefields.
This might have been acceptable for the United States in 1946. It would seem a risk worth taking for the years to follow. But that suddenly changed in the summer of 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb, far earlier than Americans had expected.14 This event shook the outlook of American policy. Until that moment the US had been complacent in the knowledge that they were the sole proprietor of the most devastating weapon known to man. Now that the USSR had bridged the gap so swiftly the balance in the world shifted again. The idea of direct confrontation seemed even more self-destructive now and this dynamic would shape the remainder of the Cold War period.15 With the possibility of a successful clash with the Soviet Union out of the way, the focus shifted more and more to the rest of the world. Countries that seemed on the brink of regime change were coaxed in either direction by the two superpowers.
And so the battles of the early Cold War were fought in countries like Greece, Cuba, Iran and the city of Berlin.16 Each region eventually became subject to the strategy of containment as far as America was concerned. Changes in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iran were met with deliberate interventions and sometimes flat-out warfare. Though sometimes the prefixes for intervention were ill-defined. For example the Eisenhower Doctrine stated it would deter communism in the Middle-East.17 What form that communism might take and which countries were still considered to be part of the Middle-East would seem to be crucial parameters, but this vagueness would in turn provide a certain flexibility that enabled the US government to modify its response to each individual threat. With each new president the doctrine would be modified, but the basic structure of containment strategy would prevail in the long run. The Kennedy administration focused less on the military strength and more on coaching change. By accepting that regime change throughout the world was inevitable, a strategy could be implemented to guide this change in a non-communist direction.18 This strategy was eventually sidetracked by the dragging engagement in Vietnam, mainly under presidents Johnson and Nixon. However,
14 Gaddis, Stategies of Containment, 77. 15
V. Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, 1998) 76-78. 16 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 108.
17 Ibidem, 179. 18 Ibidem, 222.
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supporting allies in instable regions (like Iran in the Middle-East) remained common practice in an effort to effectively contain communism.
The Iranian case is a textbook example of the implementation of containment-strategy. When prime minister Mossadeq tried to steer Iran on a course to self-control and exploitation of its own oil, a combined British-American effort tried to halt this process. Mossadeq was eventually overthrown, but not just because of the immediate oil supply. The Iranian Tudeh party was thought to have strong links with the Soviet Union and if they were to seize control of Iran they might align themselves with the USSR, thwarting American strategic interests in the region. The fear of communist governments caused the US to intervene in many Third-World countries over the course of the Cold War.
The situation in Iran leading up to 1976
In its long history, Iran has played a lead role on the world stage at different moments in time. The infamous Persian attacks on Greece in the fifth century BC and Alexander the Great’s conquest of Persia speak to a pattern in which Persia (and later Iran) was constantly subject to regional conflict. This is not a surprise when Iran’s geographic position is considered. The country was situated between ancient empires like Greece and China. It lay squarely in the trade route that connected Europe to Asia for centuries. With its proximity to Russia, China and the Middle East, combined with the natural resources confined within its boundaries, it’s no wonder Iran is perpetually being harassed.
Case in point: the Great War. Initially Iran was not involved in the Great War, and had no immediate intention to join the fighting. Two neighboring countries however, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, had joined the war on opposing sides.19 To make matters more complicated the British Empire had significant economic interests in Iran, most importantly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.20 During the war, Russian and British troops had been stationed in Iran in order to mount an offensive against the Ottoman Empire. Iran’s province of Azerbaijan became a battleground so Iran, and its Shah from the Qajar dynasty, were drawn into the war. Iran’s inability to fend for itself became painfully clear, and after the armistice effectively ended
19 E.L. Daniel, The history of Iran (ABC-CLIO, 2012) 130. 20 Daniel, The history of Iran, 130.
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the war, the region was divided between the great powers. Russia withdrew from the region after its internal Revolutions in 1917, and the struggle to influence Iran was then between England and the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Eventually the British influence remained.
Due to the state of the country, and the constant foreign intervention and meddling, the Shah was left with a small base of power. As a result, in 1921, the government was overthrown during a coup led by a young military man: Reza Khan.21 Eventually he adopted the title Reza Shah Pahlavi, effectively vesting the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah had to build Iran up from the ground, and did so relying heavily on his military.22 The Shah aimed at a modernized Iranian state and worked ceaselessly to achieve it. Under his directive women were forced to remove their veils, and were legally emancipated. The Shah realized that Iran’s geographic position could also be viewed as a strength, and cleverly leveraged British and Russian interests against each other.23 This strategy failed when Russia and England formally joined sides in World War II and the powers jointly occupied Iran in 1941. Reza Pahlavi abdicated the throne and left his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in charge.
The new Shah was educated in Switzerland and ascended to power during the joint British and Russian occupation of Iran. After the war ended so did the occupation. The British left according to plan, while the Soviet forces remained in place. Stalin saw plenty of reasons to stay involved in Iranian affairs: the country was close to the USSR’s southern border and rich in oil sources.24 So strategically and economically this was a very interesting opportunity. The Iranian government filed a complaint with the UN Security Council in early 1946. The discussion became heated rather quickly and the American and Soviet delegates bumped heads in the UN. Eventually Iran agreed to give the USSR a 51 percent share of Iranian oil in return for Russian retreat.25 The Soviet troops left but Iran immediately revoked the deal and reclaimed sovereignty. The first Cold War clash between the US and USSR over Iran had subsided, for now.
Iran was once again a sovereign state, be it with a young Shah as its ruler. And the new Shah immediately faced severe challenges. In 1948 the Persian parliament (the Majlis) refused
21 Reza Shah Pahlavi, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Reza-Shah-Pahlavi. 22
Reza Shah Pahlavi, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Reza-Shah-Pahlavi. 23 Reza Shah Pahlavi, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Reza-Shah-Pahlavi. 24 B.M. Blechman & D.M. Hart, ‘Afghanistan and the 1946 Iran analogy’, Survival 22/6 (1980) 248-253. 25 Blechman & Hart, ‘Afghanistan and the 1946 Iran analogy’, 249.
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an oil concession to the Soviet Union.26 This unnerved the British, who were extracting oil from the south of the country through their Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. If Iran were to develop its own oil extraction they would surely cut the British out of the profits. One politician was most vocal with his opposition to any concessions to the British: Mohammad Mossadeq.27 The British tried to force Iran into signing a renewed deal, raising Iran’s share of the profits, but this proved insufficient. Parliament rejected the deal and effectively nationalized the oil industry. Mossadeq was appointed prime minister and was charged with implementing the nationalization.28 Great Britain saw a direct threat to its interests and decided Mossadeq had to leave.29
What started as a personal ambition to make Iran more self-sufficient, developed into a threat to the “security of the free world” if this attitude would spill over to other oil producing countries, effectively taking control of oil away from Britain and the US.30 The US joined the UK in her effort to prevent nationalization by Iran, and several trade missions were sent to negotiate a more favorable outcome. The British stated that Mossadeq was the sole reason the talks 1951 bore no fruit.31 During a last-ditch effort by the British and the Americans, they appealed to the Shah himself and his supporters in parliament to curb Mossadeq and appoint a new prime-minister. When Mossadeq caught wind of this scheme he appealed to the public, arguing that the Shah had no place meddling in these affairs.32 This posed a direct challenge to the Shah’s authority. However the public responded by taking to the streets. After three days of violent clashes in July 1952 between protesters and the army, the Shah reinstated Mossadeq and even gave him a peace offering: the war ministry portfolio.33 After this final failure the British and Americans started to contemplate an overthrow of Mossadeq.
In regaining control of Iranian oil, every thinkable action was a viable option to England, who felt its control slipping away. The United States allied with the British primarily in order to prevent the Iranian case from setting a precedent that would be followed by other oil exporting countries and potentially taking English and American control of oil away. A wide array of
26 Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 coup in Iran’, 184-185. 27 Ibidem, 185.
28
Ibidem, 186.
29 M.J. Gasiorowski & M. Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran (Syracuse University Press, 2004) 4-6.
30
Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 coup in Iran’, 188. 31 Ibidem, 191.
32 Ibidem, 195. 33 Ibidem, 195.
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destabilizing propaganda, arming rebellious tribes and even the killing of Teheran’s chief of police shook Iran.34 Mossadeq grew increasingly cautious and kept his public appearances to a minimum. All of these circumstances created an acute sense of instability.35 Through rumors and propaganda, the blame was increasingly accredited to the communist factions in Iran. For the United States especially this seemed a ‘two birds with one stone’ solution. The scrutinizing gaze was averted from their British allies, and the threat of the Cold War coming to Iran made the country a crucial chess piece on the geopolitical stage. All of these measures were setting the stage for an attempted coup, which happened on August 15th 1953. The plan was to quickly arrest Mossadeq and a few key officers, but a guard loyal to Mossadeq tipped of the guards and the conspirators were now themselves captured.36 The Shah was informed and he decided to flee to Baghdad. The coup was over and Mossadeq seemed more solidly in power than before.
These events were not lost on the people of Tehran. Crowds had flooded the streets supporting Mossadeq and chanting “Yankee go home”.37
The US embassy urged Mossadeq to curb the anti-American protests, stating it would endanger their companies’ security. Mossadeq tried to ease the situation and banned protests. In order to enforce this measure he called on the army to take control of the streets of Tehran.38 This proved a crucial mistake however, as many of the army regiments were royalists plotting to overthrow his regime. And the tanks that rolled into Tehran to help Mossadeq, proved his downfall. In the aftermath of the coup the Shah returned and increased royal power. Mossadeq was arrested, his supporters repressed and the power of parliament seriously limited.39 The CIA had played a large part in planning and managing the overthrow of Mossadeq and in its original plan admitted that if the attempt were to fail, or American involvement had been discovered, it would have made for a devastating loss to American interests. But the coup was a success. However the relatively moderate voice of opposition posted by Mossadeq was in the long run supplanted by the more radical Ayatollah Khomeini. The monarchy, and with it British and American interests were protected, but a new problem already dawned on the horizon.
34 Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 coup in Iran’, 203-204.
35 Gasiorowski & Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran, 15-17. 36
Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 coup in Iran’, 206-207. 37 Ibidem, 208.
38 Ibidem, 208-210. 39 Ibidem, 212-213.
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US-Iran relations before 1976
“The humiliation and frustration felt by Iranians laid the foundation of the anti-Americanism that ultimately produced the 1979 Islamic Revolution”40
After the 1953 coup, the United States and Iran had strengthened their partnership. The Shah had taken complete control over parliament and effectively installed autocratic rule. In return for the American assistance in the ouster of Mossadeq, the Shah awarded the US a forty percent share of the new oil consortium.41 While formally the Iranian state had kept control of the oil production and export process, in reality control was completely in foreign hands. As a result of a now guaranteed stream of oil from Iran, the US increasingly became dependent on Iranian oil. So the two states were closely allied, both strategically and economically. The autocratic role of the Shah also virtually guaranteed Iran’s cooperation and solidarity when it came to Cold War dynamics. Iran, located directly south of the Soviet Union, was now an ally to the United States. This made for a pivotal victory in the region. The Middle East was a volatile region, and a strong and stable Iran could do much to ensure relative peace and a stable export of oil.
Helping the Shah regain power wasn’t enough to ensure a stable future. So after the coup the CIA helped the Shah in founding an Iranian secret service. The Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK) became a largely CIA trained powerhouse and one of the Shah’s most feared assets.42 While useful for the Shah, the Iranian population feared the power and methods of SAVAK, and viewed it as inherently American-backed. This image contributed to the growing anti-American sentiment among the population. The SAVAK targeted any potential threats to the power of the Shah, and many leaders and key figures of the Iranian Revolution were captured and tortured by this organization.43 The United States followed through by strengthening the Iranian army with military aid, advisors and trainers. The American meddling in Iranian affairs as perceived by large parts of the population wasn’t just imagined, it was very real.
40 S.H. Mousavian, Iran and the United States: An insider’s view on the failed past and the road to peace (Bloomsbury, 2014) 24.
41 Mousavian, Iran and the United States, 25. 42 Ibidem, 25.
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However effective the programs to solidify the Shah’s rule, there was a downside to it. The benefits of the new system and oil exploitations went largely to the Shah, his supporters, large foreign businesses and urban centers.44 Leaving large parts of the population behind. This led to high food prices and heavy inflation, which in turn caused unrest. With no political freedom or means of expression the unruly situation seemed ready to boil over. This was not lost on the freshly inaugurated Kennedy administration. The US steered the Shah away from his focus on ‘westernizing’ the country and towards programs that promoted socio-economic reform.45 The Shah modestly dubbed the change of policy ‘the white revolution’.46 While these programs relieved the initial (economic) stress, they were inspired and constructed by American advisors, and implemented by a western-oriented Shah. Many felt the dominance of western culture replacing traditional Iranian customs.
The main criticism came from hardline religious leaders. First and foremost Ayatollah Khomeini. When in 1963 the Ayatollah openly criticized the Shah and his white revolution, in particular the increased rights of women and foreign influences, the Shah reacted violently. Khomeini was arrested and ensuing protests were shut down by use of force and with a parade of arrests made by the SAVAK.47 Popular resentment forced the Shah’s hand in an early release of Khomeini, but the unrest had been suppressed, for now. In the following years, Ayatollah Khomeini would remain a voice of opposition, and a decisive figure in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
The relationship between the US and Iran grew more intimate after 1963. The Shah realized that he could play to America’s fears by using Cold War paranoia in order to secure more financial and material support. After President Kennedy’s assassination the Shah would be dealing with Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson was more straightforward than his predecessor in his focus on outsmarting the USSR. Under Johnson Iran received enormous amounts of military aid and funding, and the Johnson administration removed international barriers in order to be able to ship sophisticated military equipment to Iran.48 And this unwavering relationship between the two states would last through the subsequent administrations of Nixon and Ford, because as
44 Mousavian, Iran and the United States, 26.
45 A.M. Ansari, The myth of the white revolution: Mohammad reza shah, 'modernization' and the consolidation of power, Middle Eastern Studies, 37/3 (2001) 2-3.
46 Mousavian, Iran and the United States, 26. 47 Ibidem, 27.
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Richard Cottam states: “For these administrations and the ambassadors they sent to Iran, the Shah was viewed almost uncritically.”49
Cottam also says that the ambassadors were so afraid of falling from grace with the Shah that they refused to even meet with members of opposition parties.50 This would probably have fed into the idea that the Shah was in deep with the American government and simultaneously robbed the ambassadors of any insight into the motivations and organization of the opposition.
Under President Nixon the American support for Iran was gradually increased even further. With the war in Vietnam drawing to an ugly conclusion, the curtailing of Soviet expansion became an even more imperative notion to the United States government. With Iran as a solid ally in the region, it would seem the Soviet Union had no chance of getting a foothold in the Middle East without risking a confrontation with an increasingly powerful and militarily capable Iran. Starting with Nixon’s ascent to the position of president in 1969 a steady influx of aid poured into the Iranian military. In 1972 the efforts were stepped up when Nixon personally went to Tehran to negotiate a new arms agreement.51 This new agreement ramped up the military power of Iran even further. In the 1972 agreement the sale of high performance jet fighters was included. These top shelf technological fighters came complete with teams of military advisors and technicians and would greatly improve Iran’s military potential.52
As a consequence of this deal the Shah found a renewed energy to further expand the military capacities of Iran’s forces. New bases were opened along the northern border (in order to monitor Soviet movements and ICBM testing activities) and the southern border for the security of oil transportation. The US was fanatically providing the Shah’s Iran with military equipment, personnel and resources and in return imported vast quantities of oil. The relationship between the two countries was as warm as possibly imaginable. At least, on the surface. Underneath the Iranian population’s resentment against both their leader and the United States was brewing and the much heralded friendship was on the eve of sudden change. Because throughout the period 1953-1976 waves of dissent and protest had come and gone. The Iranian opposition was quieted with the ouster of Mossadeq, but not destroyed. Radical voices like Ayatollah Khomeini capitalized on the resistance to the partnership between the Shah and the
49
R.W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: a cold war case study (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989) 148. 50 Cottam, Iran and the United States, 148.
51 Mousavian, Iran and the United States, 28. 52 Ibidem, 28.
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US, for which he was eventually exiled. The severe repression against dissenting voices only fueled the idea that the Shah was an autocratic ruler with little compassion for his country’s needs, and the foundation was laid for the widespread protests of 1978/79.
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Chapter two: Gathering intelligence in Iran
In the first chapter the situation in Iran before 1976 has been reviewed, as well as US-Iran relations. This relationship has been embedded in the Cold War framework that can explain a lot of both parties’ behavior. The focus of this research however is the relatively sudden breach in the relationship between these two countries, and the question how it could have gone south so quickly. In order to find an answer to this question, the second chapter will explore the American government’s understanding of Iran’s interior situation. The daily political reality of Iran was closely monitored by the American diplomatic presence in Iran. The epicenter of all American activity of this kind was the American embassy compound in Tehran. The diplomats stationed here and their local presence would suggest they were the most completely informed people on the internal Iranian situation.
Aside from official diplomatic presence, the secret service played a large role in maintaining the Shah’s position by finding information on possible threats to said position. So with embassy personnel and intelligence officers trying to map the political landscape in the capital, how could this brewing revolutionary situation have been missed? After dissecting the way information was gathered and processed, this chapter will look at the role of the embassy and the intelligence service. The final part of the chapter will focus on the information and processes these parties missed, and analyze how crucial this missed information or insight was.
How did the United States gather intelligence in Iran between 1976 and 1979?
“On the last day of 1977, President Jimmy Carter declared Iran to be ‘an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world’.”53
Between that moment and the end of 1978 United States policy regarding Iran didn’t change. Michael Donovan, however, argues in his article that the first signs of the Iranian Revolution started mere weeks after Carter uttered these words.54 So what happened in the period between late 1977 and late 1978 in Iran, and why did American sources and intelligence miss the signs?
53 Donovan, ‘National intelligence and the Iranian revolution’, 143. 54 Ibidem, 143.
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Did the increasingly massive and violent protests not spark inquiry into the stability of the Shah’s regime? Were analysis of existing opposition and elites not adequate to predict the impending rise of opposing forces? The following paragraphs will delve into the methods the American government employed in order to gather intelligence on Iran’s internal stability.
The American government had created a powerful ally by supporting the Shah through the 1953 Mossadeq-crisis, and the formerly mainly British influence in the region was supplanted by American influence. The ties between the US government and the Shah were founded on mutually beneficial weapons-deals and financial aid. The strength of the Shah’s position largely guaranteed a strong opposing force to communist influences in the decades after 1953 in an extremely volatile region. Obviously the American government needed information on the internal Iranian situation in order to prevent any possible threats against the Shah’s power. One of the most important sources in Iran was the American Central Intelligence Agency: the CIA. With a vast network of sources and operatives the Agency was able to create elaborate reports on opposition and threats.
A perfect example of such a report is an account on the “elites and distribution of power in Iran”, written in February 1976.55
This eighty-three-page research paper delves into the varying bases of power, power structures and potential threats in Iran’s (near) future. Every well written research paper should justify itself relatively early on, and this paper is no different. The opening words are: “Iran’s importance need not be stressed. A major oil-producer and one of the most influential states in OPEC, it aspires to a position of power and influence. This paper is not focused on its political and international prospects, but rather attempts to portray and to analyze the people who run Iran, dominate its politics, control its businesses, set its cultural and moral standards and even try to change its ways.”56
The most direct concerns for the United States are put forth here in a straight forward manner.
Without veiling the truth the author accepts that Iran’s oil supply, and its influence on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at large, is a crucial factor for the American economy. In 1973 the OPEC had enacted an oil embargo upon the United States after
55
CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, February 1976, National Security Archive, DNSA collection: Iran Revolution,
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679111799/18434C2D748D45FDPQ/2?accountid=14615. 56 CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, 9.
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the US had backed Israel during the Yom Kippur War.57 The ensuing shock to the American economy had shown the American government that provoking or destabilizing OPEC countries would come at a price it was not willing to pay. So in half a sentence the pressing need for a stable and friendly Iran is unmistakably presented. The second part of the abovementioned sentence focusses on the Iranian elites, their position in society and politics and perhaps their intention to change the current political reality. This immediately threatens the stability so wholeheartedly sought after by the US. So this first sentence sets out why Iran is important, what should be done in order to maintain friendly relations, and the potential threat to the stability of Iran. A statement with such clarity and candor would never be issued by press release, but in this instance it is meant to clarify the topic of this research which is marked ‘secret’ on every page so only certain people in the administration could gain access to it.
Now with a so carefully worded introduction, and a very clear goal to identify potential threats in Iranian society, one would expect just that. But the report misses a very important element in Iranian society. While the most prominent families, the new bureaucratic elite, the new-style parliament and the Pahlavi family itself are analyzed thoroughly, the most dangerously looming threat is largely ignored. Because the propelling force during the Iranian Revolution has proven to have been the radical Islamic views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The report dedicates almost five pages to the religious community.58 Several leaders and organizations are mentioned, and their opposition to secular Pahlavi rule is stated. However their opposition is framed largely as ideological and something that has been going on for centuries. Khomeini is mentioned by name, as a spiritual leader to the Mujahadin-e-Khalq, which translates as ‘the people’s warriors’.59
Khomeini had been a voice of opposition from his position of exile in Iraq. Also, the Mujahadin had been identified with remnants of Mossadeq support. So a potential mixture of nationalist and religious opposition is in fact positively identified by the author. And to top it all off, the Soviet embassy in Tehran is said to be cultivating this opposition in an attempt to destabilize the American presence.60 However the significance of these forces doesn’t make it into the conclusion.
57
A.S. Blinder, Economic policy and the great stagflation (Elsevier, 2013) 25. 58 CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, 51-55. 59 CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, 54. 60 CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, 55.
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What is so telling about this report is that the author is feverishly looking for opposing forces. And he does identify a possible threat to the Shah’s rule. Over the decades since the Mossadeq insurrection, the Shah had bended parliament to his will and created an increasingly influential bureaucratic elite. And it is this elite that could become a threat to the Shah’s position in the long run, according to the report. The report also looks toward the next Shah, the then 15-year old son of Shah Pahlavi.61 The horrendous oversight regarding the threat posed by Khomeini and his followers would prove more dire than the author could have contemplated at that moment.
The role of Ayatollah Khomeini was underestimated by the CIA in 1976, and it was once again underestimated by the Iranian government. The state controlled press issued an article ridiculing Khomeini in early 1978.62 The article was very effective, but certainly not in the way the Iranian government had hoped. The intention of the article was to discredit and undermine Khomeini’s position and legitimacy as a contender for secular power in Iran. However, the mocking tone of the article sparked violent demonstrations in the holy city of Qom. This demonstration was followed by continued violent protest throughout the country from that moment until the Shah’s downfall in early 1979.63
The Qom protest did not go unnoticed in the US embassy compound in Tehran. On February 1st 1978 the embassy sent a document marked ‘secret’ to the State Department in Washington D.C.64 The language with which this cable opens doesn’t reveal a very pressing situation. As mentioned in chapter one, the American ambassadors’ sounding board on what was going on in Iran mainly consisted of the Shah and his government. A fear to offend the Shah inhibited their contacts with opposition forces. This might in part explain the lack of insight into the opposition displayed in this document.
The document’s summary states that the most pressing opposition comes from “the ‘liberal moderate’ opposition which has advocated return to ‘constitutional’ rule.”65
Directly following that statement the document asserts that the Iranian government itself is most suspicious of the religious opposition. The government had restricted public meetings of
61 CIA research paper: “Elites and the distribution of power in Iran”, 15. 62 Donovan, ‘National intelligence and the Iranian revolution’, 143. 63
Ibidem, 143.
64 Diplomatic cable from US embassy in Tehran, “The Iranian opposition”, 1 February 1978, National Security
Archive, http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview/1679096880/18434C2D748D45FDPQ/17?accountid=14615.
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religious opposition, however the circulation of written opinions had not been forbidden.66 The government itself had organized pro-government protest in order to balance out the noise. The document also states that the opposition believes the United States are in a position to strongly influence the Shah and his government. The document’s author believes that the opposition would be open to allowing an American role in the process of political transition, but warns not to squander this opportunity for it could lead to further heightening of anti-US sentiment in the country.67
While this document testifies that a certain sense of urgency exists and the gravitas of the situation is partially grasped, it lacks the conviction to explicitly point out the opposition’s most dangerous elements and leaders. This is made painstakingly clear in the way this cable handles the Mujahadin and the power of the Ayatollahs: “Some muslem Ayatollahs have contact with some Mujahadin-e-Khalq (People’s strugglers) guerrillas. They do not, as far as we know, form a specific group for this purpose.”68
This insight, as well as the cautious language used, makes the role of the Ayatollah’s and the Mujahadin seem more insignificant than they would turn out to be. This cable was created by diplomats in Tehran, the ones that had a relatively large amount of insight for Americans. The recipients at the State Department, however, had to rely largely on information as presented in these cables. So if the diplomats in Tehran relayed that the core of the opposition on the streets of Iran’s cities consisted of ‘liberal moderates’, then that’s what State Department officials in D.C. would likely conclude.
The report does ascribe a larger and more dominant role to the religious community than the CIA report from 1976 did however. The religious opposition is said to rally around Ayatollah Shariatmadari, but with the in 1963 exiled Khomeini being viewed as the “true leader of the Shiite faithful”.69
In addition to Khomeini’s role, the report states that many Ayatollah’s and Mullah’s (religious leaders) had been either exiled or imprisoned in 1977 after making anti-government statements in the fall. This seems a legitimate reason for the Muslim community to feel aggrieved and politically repressed. However this is not explicitly voiced in the document.
What these reports illustrate is that the American observers on the ground were not able to grasp the ideological propelling potential of Khomeini and his followers. His claim to power
66
Diplomatic cable, “The Iranian opposition”, 31. 67 Diplomatic cable, “The Iranian opposition”, 31-32. 68 Diplomatic cable, “The Iranian opposition”, 33. 69 Diplomatic cable, “The Iranian opposition”, 35.
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and the depth of his support is constantly overlooked. While Shah Pahlavi did try to curtail Khomeini’s reach, and even sent him into exile, the American observers seemed unaware that the Ayatollah could pose a serious threat. How come the most dangerous element inside Iran was so consistently dismissed as just a minor concern? And especially after 1977, the Iranian government itself saw very clearly the potential threat the Ayatollah and the religious groups formed. Maybe the Shah’s government mishandled the situation by arresting and exiling the movement’s leaders, but this still wasn’t enough to convince the US government and government officials that the threat was indeed severe.
Maybe a partial explanation can be found in Jimmy Carter’s own words on dealing with the Ayatollah: “Khomeini was acting insanely.”70
When one concludes someone is acting ‘insanely’, it strongly suggests a lack of insight into that other person’s motives and beliefs. And not only does this lack of insight hold true towards Khomeini, the broad support he had mustered in the Iranian society is hereby also dismissed and misunderstood. Carter also stated “we always behaved as if we were dealing with a rational person”.71
Both these statements echo an insurmountable distance between both parties. In this instance Carter was referring to the period after the Shah had fled Iran in early 1979 and the US was dealing with Khomeini as head of state. But the same lack of understanding can be found in the documents above from 1976 and 1978. The US observers analyze Iranian society in the only way they know how, by focusing on the head of states and ruling and contending elites. In western states this approach usually works, because the structures and cultural influences are familiar and easily understood. But the inherent influence of the Ayatollahs and the Mullahs was structurally underestimated when Iranian society was concerned. So these documents provide us with a somewhat sobering lesson: that when a society is studied from the sidelines and by ‘neutral observers’, crucial elements can be easily overlooked.
Role of the US embassy in Tehran
The United States embassy compound in Iran has become infamous because of the Iranian hostage crisis. In November of 1979 Iranian followers (mostly students) of Ayatollah Ruhollah
70 D.P. Houghton, US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 52. 71 Houghton, US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis, 52.
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Khomeini stormed the embassy and kept its personnel hostage for 444 days. This painful display of American incompetence to do anything about it has captured the imagination of contemporary public. But before the embassy in Iran became an embattled fortification, it was just another embassy. One with a serious task however. Because after the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 the United States provided Shah Pahlavi with intelligence and support to maintain order in Iran.
This role was a very precarious one however. While the American government was adamant in standing by the Shah, and by extension creating a stable and non-Soviet haven in the Middle East, this approach had a very distinct downside. As the US backed the faltering Pahlavi regime more feverously between 1976 and 1979, the Iranian population developed a growing resentment towards America. This process was virtually instigated in 1971. In that year “leading spokesmen of the burgeoning middle classes and Shi’ite religious organizations were harassed, jailed and physically attacked.”72
In order to coordinate the more tense situation the US sent ambassadors to Tehran of “obvious military and intelligence background.”73
In the meantime the US stepped up its effort to cement the Shah’s position. Successive presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford increasingly praised the Shah for his programs and contributions to human rights.74 As a result the Iranian middle classes began to shift their anger from the Shah toward the United States itself. Consequentially American embassy personnel became the target of Iranian attacks, and the embassy was transformed into a fortified compound.75
This new situation forced American diplomats and embassy personnel to spend even more time clustered together on the embassy grounds. And the culture on the embassy grounds was not focused on understanding the Iranian social reality. On the contrary, as James Bill (a leading scholar on Iran) concluded in 1978: “The ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission have, until very recently, been more concerned with confirming Washington’s stereotype of Iran than encouraging their diplomats to develop a true understanding of Iranian culture.”76 One ambassador is even credited with warning his diplomats to be sure not to contract the disease “localitis”.77
With such a rift between Iranian society and the ‘neutral observer’ that is the
72 Bill, “Iran and the crisis of '78”, 338. 73 Ibidem, 338. 74 Ibidem, 338. 75 Ibidem, 338. 76 Ibidem, 339. 77 Ibidem, 339.
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ambassador, it leaves little doubt this attitude has significantly contributed to the ignorance of real threats to Pahlavi power in Iranian society.
This ignorance of the looming threat to the Shah is the only logical explanation for the ambassador’s attitude towards the future of US-Iran relations. For example as late as May 1977 the ambassador speaks very positively of the Shah’s new ambitions of upgrading Iranian power supply with nuclear capacity. In a cable to the State Department the ambassador hails the Iranian nuclear program and emphasizes that there is no threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons with the newly acquired technology: “It (Iran) has, in addition, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle-East.”78 The ambassador continued with an assurance by the Shah’s regime: “Against whom should we arm ourselves with nuclear weapons? Conventional arms serve our purposes adequately.”79
It is clear that the ambassador in Tehran was completely oblivious to the increasing popular contempt towards the Shah’s rule. Otherwise he would never have supported Iran developing nuclear technology. It was a logical next step both for Iran and the US to make sure Iran would develop nuclear technology. This would in part break the power of the OPEC countries and diminish Iran’s reliability on steady oil supply.80
The fear of the oil cartel was a direct consequence of the oil crisis, and making Iran independent would further solidify America’s ally as truly independent. Therefore both the Shah and the US saw a ‘staggering nuclear future’ for Iran.81
A minor problem was the idea of nonproliferation. Western countries were weary of further spreading nuclear technology, which could in time be weaponized. But in the eyes of the American government, Iran was a solid ally in the global fight against communism and it would pose no threat to international security.
James Bill, in his 1978 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, paints a gloomy picture of the role the ambassador and his staff play in Iran. He argues that the diplomats in Iran are not in the least inclined to really get to know the Iranian culture and political landscape.82 And with the politicians in Washington adhering largely to their own interpretation of what Iran is, Bill sees little hope for a change in approach. However, he does acknowledge that the current crisis (of
78 Diplomatic cable from US embassy in Tehran, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran”, 1 May 1977, National
Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb268/doc14b.pdf.
79
Diplomatic cable, “The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran”, 8.
80 J.D. Hamblin, “The Nuclearization of Iran in the Seventies”, Diplomatic History, 38/5 (2014) 1114-1135. 81 Hamblin, “The Nuclearization of Iran in the Seventies”, 1121.
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1978), and the “incessant violence and sabotage” could spark changes in the foreseeable future.83 Therefore he states the US should be open to the possibility of change and not blindly maintain support for the Shah. In his analysis the Shah could decide to abdicate the throne in favor of his, then 18 year old, son. He states this scenario is unlikely, but if it were to happen the young Shah would need substantial backing from the military.
A more likely course of action in Bill’s opinion is that in the case of the Shah’s defeat he would be succeeded by a group of left-wing military officers, a right-wing military junta, a liberal democratic system or a communist government.84 Bill then continues to discuss these options and concludes all of these are unlikely and Iran will in the future remain closely allied to the US and under US approved rule. The irony of this idea is not just how wrong he would be proven over the following couple of years, but that in his mind the option of Ayatollahs rising to power simply did not exist. So even someone who criticizes the current US policy towards Iran could not uncover the real threat to Pahlavi rule and continued American alliance.
It seems that the new ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, quickly realized he had a potentially explosive situation on his hands. Sullivan had arrived in Tehran just before Jimmy Carter visited the Shah in December 1977 and was almost immediately confronted with the riots at Qom and the violent protests that followed. On the 10th of January 1978 Sullivan cabled Washington and explained his idea that some changes would have to be made.85 The new ambassador saw how single-minded the embassy had functioned over the preceding years and realized that by merely monitoring and befriending the Shah no new insights would come to light. He thought a possible solution would be to “assess the range of embassy contacts in the important segments of Iranian society and initiate steps to initiate relationships to the extent possible with those forces and groups which are evolving into important centers of influence as Iran modernizes.”86
This initiative of the ambassador seemed like a good step in the right direction, however it had apparently come years too late.
Some points that were put forth by the new ambassador were new and seemed like a fresh approach to US-Iran relations. But a large part of this diplomatic cable is dedicated to ensuring
83 Bill, “Iran and the crisis of ‘78”, 340. 84 Ibidem, 340.
85
Diplomatic cable from US embassy in Tehran, “Goals and objectives in Iran”, 10 January 1978, National Security
Archive,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/doc32.pdf. 86 Diplomatic cable, “Goals and objectives in Iran”, 2.
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the military program stays in place, oil keeps coming out of Iran at a favorable rate, Iranian airspace and ports remain accessible to the US military, and Iran’s position as a staunch US ally in the region is to be maintained and solidified.87 One remarkable new item is found at the very bottom of the list. An item that reflects the wishes of the current American president: the guarantee that Iran would be forced to work on its human rights violations. With human rights being one of Carter’s signature issues when he ran for office, the embassy could hardly allow the relationship with the Shah to deteriorate by calling him on human rights violations. With all American chips bet with the Shah’s power, there was to be no risk of alienating him from the US.
In retrospect it seems clear what went wrong in the way the United States embassy handled Iranian politics for most of the time between 1971 and 1979. After initial backlash against embassy personnel the compound was increasingly shut off from the outside world and ambassadors and personnel handled the ruling elite and Pahlavi rulers almost exclusively. They were bound to miss changes or even long running processes in Iranian society just because they were out of touch. In 1978 it became clear that approach had to change and the problems with the current strategy were diagnosed. But the outcome seems, in retrospect, set at that point. Both researchers like James Bill and the ambassador in Tehran himself realized changes had to be made, and quickly. However optimistic the proposed measures were, their implementation was carried out without conviction, if at all. What James Bill suggested in 1978 was quite a departure from common practice: opening up the system and allowing other parties to share in power, a decrease in US interference (both actual and perceived), a review of the massive military sales and aid to Iran, and finally: more involvement of embassy officials in all parts of Iranian society.88 If these ideas had been immediately and fully implemented, the Shah’s fate might have been altered. But the proposed actions were barely implemented before the full scale of the revolution crushed any hopes of preventing the eventual overthrow of Pahlavi rule.
87 Diplomatic cable, “Goals and objectives in Iran”, 2-6. 88 Bill, “Iran and the crisis of ‘78”, 341-342.
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Role of the Central Intelligence Agency
As the US embassy mission was to maintain good contact with the Shah and provide information on developments in Iran. The CIA’s main mission, as the Agency’s name implies, is to provide intelligence that could help the United States in pursuing its interests. But the CIA’s main concern in Iran was not the internal political situation, but monitoring and combatting Soviet influences. As is pointed out before in this research, Iran’s role as a solid ally in the Middle-East was crucial to the United States. Obviously economic factors, mainly oil, weighed in on Iran’s importance, but preventing the spread of communism had been a number one priority for the US since the late 1940’s. With the recent quagmire that was the Vietnam War it seemed more important to prevent communist forces from gaining power in third world countries, instead of fighting them once they had gained said power.
In order to create an understanding of the threats the Shah’s regime faced it was important the CIA had access to a vast array of sources so a clear picture of possible treats and movements could be distilled. Before and during the ouster of Mossadeq in 1953 the CIA had used a multitude of sources in order to create as broad an opposition to Mossadeq as possible. But throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s the CIA shifted its main focus to monitoring Soviet activity in the region.89 And after the Shah had solidified his power base by ousting Mossadeq, the United States assumed the opposition had been effectively eliminated which ended the need for contacts with opposition forces.90 These reasons nullified the effect of the CIA’s elaborate network of spies in Iran, because these spies were mainly looking for information on Soviet activity.
The CIA also worked very closely with the Shah’s secret service: SAVAK. Because of this relationship the Shah was very well informed of the CIA’s activities. In addition to that, the Shah met with Agency officials on a regular basis for briefings on the current situation. This system opened the same trap for the CIA as had affected the embassy, they were relatively blind to internal opposition in Iranian society.91 The Shah and SAVAK provided one-sided information for the CIA, completely ignoring the religious opposition and underestimating their base of support constantly. The Shah and SAVAK did not see the revolutionary potential of Shi’i
89 E. Naraghi, From palace to prison: inside the Iranian revolution (IB Tauris 1999) 126. 90 Naraghi, From palace to prison, 126.
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Islam and as a direct consequence the CIA also missed the link.92 And so the preoccupation with communist forces in and near Iran was consolidated in Tehran, Langley and Washington D.C.
Another reason the CIA has been unable to create a clear picture on the threats towards the position of Shah Pahlavi was a simple case of resources. In the years before the Revolution the CIA had employed two political analysts in Iran and two economic analysts.93 The CIA field office in Tehran was small and did not produce a large amount of political analysis. This explains to a large extent why so many signs of trouble were missed by the CIA. It makes sense the Agency relied heavily on SAVAK in lieu of the necessary manpower to thoroughly analyze Iranian society. The reports that emerged out of the Tehran field office were very rich in description, but lacked a thorough analysis. And to top off the incomplete nature of these reports, they did not receive much attention in Washington (or Langley) until the crisis became apparent in the fall of 1978.94
The lack of realization that a real challenge to the Shah’s power was imminent paired with the relatively narrow extent of CIA research posed a problem already. For example as late as August 1978 the CIA figured the Shah’s commitment to “free, parliamentary elections next year” had not been “forced on the Shah by events but rather seems to be part of his deliberate timetable for developing the kind of Iran that he envisages.“95
This kind of misinterpretation by the CIA may have sealed the fate of the faltering Shah. While both the CIA and the American government in general believed the Shah was a confident autocrat, willing to utilize every instrument available to retain power, in reality the Shah relied heavily on the notion that the US would support him no matter what.96 And with the position of the Shah greatly overestimated, the CIA focused on Khomeini and religious opposition solely in terms of terrorist threats.97 So the political force of Khomeini’s movement and the potential to mobilization it possessed were never even considered a factor. So the CIA overestimated the Shah’s position, fell short in analytical power and focused on the wrong targets for the wrong reasons.
The events of early 1978 sparked a certain urgency for diplomats and the intelligence community to understand where the sudden protests in Qom and other cities were coming from.
92
Naraghi, From palace to prison, 126. 93 Jervis, Why intelligence fails, 21. 94 Ibidem, 21-22.
95
Secret report on Iran, “Iran: A political assessment”, August 9 1978,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010058-9.pdf. 96 Jervis, Why intelligence fails, 24-25.