The Impact of Good Governance on Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Marc Pullens
University of Amsterdam
Name/studentnumber: Marc Pullens/5735025 Faculty: Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences Study: Future Planet Studies, Major: Political Science Attendant: Dr. Robin J. Pistorius
Word count: Date: 29-01-2015
Abstract
The framework of Good Governance is evaluated in this study, with regards to the context of the fight against Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Considering this reciprocity, the study concludes that the contemporary decision-making framework lacks components. Therefore, new additive components are researched and evaluated. This is done by elaborations of the concepts Supply-Chain Accountability and Maximum Sustainable Yield, whilst considering the dimensions of International Relations and Case-Study Governance. These new components are: science-based policy, fish health policy, productivity/efficiency, fish health risk assessments, human rights risk assessments, due diligence, verification/traceability and training/capacity building. In the end, a new improved good governance framework is presented, which entails enhanced decision-making processes to fight IUU fishing.
Keywords: Illegal Unreported Unregulated, Good Governance, Framework, Supply-Chain Accountability, Maximum Sustainable Yield.
Abstract 2 Table of Contents
Introduction 6
1. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing as a global issue 8 1.1. The definition of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 8 1.2. The impact of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 9
1.3. Contemporary combat actions 11
1.3.1 The Sustainable Supply-Chain 12
1.3.1.1. Raising Awareness. 13
1.3.1.2. Increasing Transparency 15
1.3.1.3. Raising Economic Incentives 16
2. Extending the Good Governance framework 19
2.1 The foundations of Good Governance as a policy framework 19 2.2 Supply-Chain Accountability, Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Good 24 Governance framework
2.2.1. Supply-Chain Accountability 25
2.2.1.1. International Relations dimension and Supply-Chain 28 Accountability
2.2.1.1.1. The Basic International Relations dimension 28 2.2.1.1.2. Combining the International Relations-core 30 and Supply-Chain Accountability
2.2.2. Maximum Sustainable Yield 34
2.2.2.1. Maximum Sustainable Yield and the International 37 Relations dimension
Sustainable Yield
2.2.2.1.2. International Relations dimension stakeholders 39 and Maximum Sustainble Yield
2.3 Case Study Governance Dimension combined with Supply-Chain 43 Accountability and Maximum Sustainable Yield
2.4 Strengthening the Good Governance Framework 51
3. Chances and Spoilers of the new components 57
3.1. The opportunities of the new components to the good 58 governance framework
3.1.1. Science-based policy-making 58
3.1.2. Risk assessments and traceability approaches 59
3.1.3. Productivity and Efficiency 61
3.2. The spoilers of the new components 62
4. Conclusion 65
The battle on IUU fishing with Good Governance
Development is threatened by bad governance. Today, we affirm what we know to be true from decades of experience -- development and economic growth that is truly sustainable and inclusive depends on governments and institutions that care about their people, that are accountable, that respect human rights and deliver justice for everybody and not just some. (Barack Obama during his speech on the Sustainable Development Goals, September 27, 2015)
This statement entails some of the most important conditions necessary for sustainable development to succeed. It claims that ‘bad governance’ would impair sustainable development, equal human rights and accountable economic growth. Opposite of bad governance is good governance. A concept, which has seen a stellar increase in popularity since the end of the twentieth century. According to Montfort, (2001, p. 17) good governance is an ethical decision-making framework with a focus on: interactions between relevant stakeholders and organizations. Furthermore, Bossert (2006, p. 12) states that essential conditions for good governance are to aim for enhancements in participation, transparency, cooperation and equality for all relevant actors effected by these decisions.
One of the other objectives, of the mentioned Sustainable Development Goals is elucidated by Target 14. This target states: in order to achieve sustainable development, it is required to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources (UN General Assembly, 2015, p. 14). The process of sustainable use of marine resources entails finding ways to allow the catch of fish and other sealife, without irreversible damage on their populations and ecosystems. Actions that do irreversibly harm these populations and ecosystems consist of overfishing and using hazardous fishing methods. These actions are most commonly found amidst illegal fishery practices. The main issue, associated with this kind of fish production is: it concerns unreported and unregulated fish. Therefore, Illegal
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fish production leads to a global, unsustainable development of seafood products. A way to tackle this global issue would be through the implementation of an improved decision-making framework, which should incentivize global cooperative initiatives to fight IUU fishing. Therefore, this bachelor-thesis addresses the question about what the impact of good governance is on IUU fishing.
To answer this question, in Chapter 1 this study will start with an elaboration on the issues surrounding IUU fishing, to portray a clear picture of the plurality of society- and ecology levels it affects. To enable the process of integration of the IUU fishing issues and the good governance framework, Chapter 2 will proceed with an explanation and evaluation of the concept of governance and good governance. The results, gathered from this evaluation, indicate that, with regards to tackling the IUU fishing issues, the contemporary good governance framework lacks required accountability and ecological sustainable components. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, two concepts are introduced: Supply-Chain Accountability and Maximum Sustainable Yield. To ensure that these concepts relate to the issues surrounding IUU fishing, two dimensions are subsequently introduced and integrated. Together, these new concepts and dimensions produce new components addable to the framework of good governance. Therewith, they enhance its efficiency and effectiveness as a decision-making framework, improved to deal with the IUU fishing related issues.
1. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing as a global issue
To gain understanding about the impact of good governance on managing Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, background knowledge on the subject of IUU fishing and the issues surrounding it will be required. Therefore, an explanation will be given on what IUU fishing entails and on which defensive measures are being, or will in the future be, taken against IUU piracy. After gaining this necessary knowledge, an elaboration will follow on the link between costumers and IUU fishing. This is done by establishing the necessity for an increase in sustainability in the fish production chain. Explaining this link is needed to obtain comprehension about the current situation consumers find themselves in. Consumers lack the knowledge and/or capacity to have a choice in not buying or eating IUU fish. The sustainability of the production chain will be subdivided into the concepts of awareness, transparancy, traceability and economic insentives. These concepts were chosen for the fact that when they are combined, they give a complete picture of what, according to Kim and Jung (2008, p. 552-559), is necessary for Sustainable Supply-Chains (SSC). We conclude with a number of argumentative statements on why the concept of good governance should be related to the sustainable production chains and therewith to solving the issues surrounding IUU fishing. But first we commence with a clarification of IUU fishing.
1.1. The definition of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
Illegal unreported and unregulated fishing is a worldwide transnational phenomenon, of which could be said that it is a form of piracy in the fish-industry. IUU fishing can be found all over the globe, where it is harmful for local ecosystems, coastal communities and fish-industries. Especially in certain areas of the oceans around Asia en Africa IUU fishing is common. There is an estimated amount of IUU fishing globally between 13% and 31% of the total amount of fish production (WWF, 2015, p. 2).
As stated above, IUU fishing entails fisheries who opperate in an illegal, unreported and unregulated manner. This illegality concerns the negligence of fishing-regulations by IUU fisheries in continental fishing-zones, as well as in the high seas. Unreported fishing relates to a shortage of required reporting. Required reporting concerns reporting catch-quotas and locations of fishing by fishermen to the appropriate governing institutions. This leads to uncertainty about the total amount of fish caught and on used docking locations. Unregulated refers to the lack of registration of IUU fisheries and their vessels. This will lead to governing institutions having trouble with traceability and transparency of these vessels and therefore enabling the IUU fisheries to execute their piracy activities. According to the World Ocean Review series compiled by the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Maribus (2013),
IUU fishing often targets high-value demersal species (i.e. those which live and feed on or near the bottom of the sea) such as cod, as well as salmon, trout, lobster and prawns. It is mainly interested in species which are already overexploited by legal fishing or which are subject to restrictions for fisheries management purposes. As these species can only be traded in small quantities, demand and prices are high – making this a lucrative business for IUU fishermen. (p. 70)
To follow up on what we now know of IUU fishing and what the acronym stands for, we shall now look at the impact of IUU.
1.2. The impact of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
IUU fishing is a global issue which affects ecosystems and the sustainable production of fish. Therefore a lot of different parties of interest are harmed by IUU piracy. First, there are the fish-stocks, of which 30% is already under considerable strain (Food Agriculture Organization, 2010, p. 8) and are pressured even further because of unknown quantities of extra fishing done by non-authorized fisheries. To make matters worse, the easiest, cheapest
catch-methods used by IUU fisheries compromises the sustainability of the fish-stocks and ecosystems in these areas. Secondly, the fishing-industry and local fishermen are hindered in their efforts to fish in sustainable and responsible ways by the uncertainty that is created through the distorting activities done by IUU fisheries. These activities lead to losses in income and forced redundancies. Thirdly, governments suffer from the IUU fishing as well, not only because of the extra costs they make when battling IUU fisheries, but the lack of tax-income hurts them financially. Global losses due to Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing are estimated at between US$ 10-23 billion per year (Boto, La Peccerella, Scalco, 2012, p. 4).
Besides the troubles and losses caused by IUU fishing, it has become increasingly clear that there are extraculicular crimes associated with IUU fishing. Crimes such as money laundring, drugtravelling, human trafficking and slavery are more common ammongst IUU fisheries than originally thought. These types of crimes are listed under the umbrella of Marine Living Resource crime (MLR-crime). MLR-crimes have the capacity to destabilize marine living resource management agreements and is therefore a form of environmental crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines MLR-crime as: “criminal conduct that may cause harm to the marine living environment, typically offences established on the basis of contravention of marine living resource management and conservation” (2011, p. 8). To summarize the link between IUU fishing and MLR-crime, the term IUU fishing focuses mainly on fishing operations and the activities of fishing vessels. The MLR-definition, includes criminal activities up- and downstream of the illegal fishing activities. Therefore, IUU fishing and MLR-crime combined risk the sustainability of a multi-billion-dollar seafood industry.
To summarize the above, “IUU fishing is a global challenge which threatens marine ecosystems by depleting important fish stocks, undermines markets which in turn lead to
law-abiding fishermen and companies that pay the price” (Holmefjord, 2008, p. 4). Because more than 1.5 billion people depend on fish for food and nutrition (FAO, 2010, p. 3), IUU fishing threatens food security and sustainability and undermines efforts to reduce global hunger, especially in developing countries. IUU fishing also threatens economic security, impacting livelihoods and potentially contributing to international conflict and conflicts between industrial and small-scale fishers. Because of this diversity of issues and involved parties, the impact of IUU fishing on our global society is extremely complicated. This means that the IUU fishing issues will not solved with a single solution. That is why, only through a framework of joined solutions, an ending to IUU fishing can be achieved.
1.3. Contemporary combat actions
Several initiatives arose and regulations have been made on a global scale to fight IUU fisheries. In Europe the EU uses a Yellow and Red Card system to pressure governments of third world countries to start taking care of their IUU fishing problems (European Commission, 2013). But on the level of non-governmental environmental agencies and institutions like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) and the Good Fish Foundation (GFF), try to increase the awareness on IUU fishing to such levels that we can support combating initiatives. It is important to increase the awareness on the subject of IUU fishing to such levels that also non-governmental level environmental agencies and institutions like the WWF, EJF and the GFF can support combating initiatives. These initiatives, arisen through cooperation of NGO's, environmental agencies and common folk, would aim at pressuring governments and appropriate governing institutions to act against IUU fishing and IUU fish import. The impact of awareness will be further explained in the subdivised paragraphs of the Sustainable Supply-Chain paragraph (1.3.1).
Besides the explanation of awareness-raising acts, this paragraph will also elaborate on initiatives that focus more on technical support and solutions to improve control and governing applications. Examples are lists comprising (non) sustainable fishing vessels that could be supported by satellite-control. Other examples are the improvements to catch certificates. By supplying fisheries with electronic catch certificates, which are more easily manageable and traceable, improvements to the transparency and traceability of fisheries and production chains can be achieved.
1.3.1 The Sustainable Supply-Chain. As we learned in paragraph 1.2, IUU fishing is a very complex issue with many different parties involved. The governments are trying to deal with international and national agreements and laws, the fish industry is trying to produce and sell fish, whilst dealing with IUU fishing practices and there are the NGO’s and consumers looking for sustainable fishproducts. It is up to all these parties to find ways in which they can guide the flow of fish towards a sustainable consumption through a Sustainable Supply-Chain (SSC). According to Kim and Jung (2008), “SSC is a new paradigm that can generate new supply-chain value by managerial innovation to not only maximize the supply-chain profitability but also minimize their environmental and social impact” (p. 553). This means that increasing sustainability in governing fish will lead to improvements in the entire supply-chain.
Because of the complexity of the IUU fishing issue, regular people do not have the time, capacity or access to knowledge on this subject. The main reason why it is so difficult for customers to be assured of sustainable fish is the complexity of the supply-chain of fish and their issues with IUU fish production. When the fish-industry itself cannot, or does not want to, be hundred percent certain about where their fish is coming from, it becomes an impossible task for the customer. The complexity of the problem faced by the fish-industry in
producing and transporting non-IUU fish is subdivisable in three parts: awareness, transparency and economic incentives as is shown in Figure 2. There is a positive loop between the three concepts. Each has a positive (+) influence on the other if done correctly.
Figure 2. Loop of the Sustainable Supply Chain based on information provided by Kim & Jung (2008, p. 552-559)
In the next part of this chapter, we will elaborate on these three concepts and how they relate to each other and to IUU, after which the relation between a sustainable supply-chain and good governance will be explained.
1.3.1.1. Raising Awareness. In order to raise awareness on complex matters unknown to the public, organizations and foundations are necessary to make this information publicly available. These organizations and foundations increase awareness through campagning with leaflets, labels, apps, meetings and advertisements. They even increase the knowledge on how to sustainably fish at the fisheries themselves. Three influential organizations in the world of combating IUU fishing are, the De Vereniging van Importeurs van Visproducten (VIV), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and Monterey Bay Aquarium (MBA). All three organizations have guidelines and rules on IUU fishing, in what is called a Code of Conduct. Exploring these codes lead to remarkably similar stances on awareness, transparency and
traceability. An example of a number of principles found in these codes can be found at the VIV Code of Conduct (2007),
General Principles for members of VIV and their business partners,
● Comply to all laws of the country of origin and destination of the fish products;
● Organize their supply-chain with business partners who commit themselves to the VIV code of conduct, or similar codes (e.g. MSC, EurepGAP, FAO, etc.);
● Will work on traceability throughout the chain. Product are sourced and produced according to practices which are in line with the VIV CoC;
● Will contribute to transparency through open communication;
● Will actively promote the use of certified sustainable species. (p. 3-5)
Besides these principles, the MSC and MBA take an active role in influencing the process of negotiating international guidelines and standards through the United Nations General Assembly and the FAO. These include the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate IUU fishing, international guidelines on flag State responsibility, and standards to support the establishment of a Global Record of fishing vessels.
By involving the industry, wholesales and public, awareness throughout the chain from fish to customer can be increased, thereby increasing knowledge and participation. When people or fisheries feel that they are “in the loop” and supported in their efforts to do better, they will have the incentives necessary to act alike (MSC, 2014). It also stimulates public incentives to demand of their governments to improve policy and control towards fair, social and environmental standards in the fisheries production chain. These are, according to Kim & Jung (2008, p. 552-559) prerequisites to a Sustainable Supply-Chain. The FAO States in their IPOA (International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 2001) that,
An important element in successful implementation will be close and effective coordination and consultation, and the sharing of information to reduce the incidence of IUU fishing, among States and relevant regional and global organizations. The full participation of stakeholders in combating IUU fishing, including industry, fishing communities, and non-governmental organizations, should be encouraged. (para. 3.9.1)
1.3.1.2. Increasing Transparency. In Figure 2, it is introduced that increasing awareness has a beneficial influence on transparency in the supply-chain. This is because of their impact on policy-making. During the making of policy, on improving social and environmental standards, the governing institutions will have a need to research the current situation. This need will stimulate actions by which transparency throughout the chain should increase. The governing institutions do struggle with mapping their fishery supply-chains because of the circumventing of IUU fishing vessels of conservation and management measures. To avoid detection, IUU fishers often violate certain basic safety requirements, such as keeping navigation lights lit at night, which puts other mariners at risk. As was mentioned earlier in the previous paragraph, satellite systems are capable of tracking fishing vessels. Most vessels have a transponder system, called an Automatic Identification System (AIS), that sends out and receives information to help ships avoid collisions. Automatic identification systems are designed to be capable of providing information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically. The information that is sent out can be intercepted by satellites, leaving a trail as a single ship pings their way across the sea. One problem is that fishing boats can easily send fake identifying information through their transponders, or shut them off altogether. A solution to that problem could be found in globally listing all fishing vessels. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recently
amended their ship identification numbering scheme to allow most fishing vessels to obtain an IMO number, which facilitates the identification and monitoring of vessels over time, despite changes in name, ownership, or flag. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2014, p. 8)
Before we start looking at the economic incentives, the concepts of awareness and transparency can be combined in a single definition of traceability. This is defined as the systematic ability to access any, or all information relating to a food under consideration, throughout their entire life cycle, by means of recorded identifications. Implementing robust traceability systems in supply-chains make it possible to obtain reliable, relevant information about the catch and fisheries origins, about the handling of fish products for health and safety reasons, and about their movements through supply-chains. In short, about many of the fundamental characteristics and qualities of seafood products (WWF, 2015, p. 2).
1.3.1.3. Raising Economic Incentives. Economic incentives have many forms. In case of the SSC and costumer link, we can split these forms in two separate stories. The first one showing how economic incentives can be harmful to fish and their ecosystems. The second one being economic incentives to inspire customers to buy sustainable fish products through subsidization or, for normal fisheries, to practice more sustainable ways of fishproduction, by helping them with funding for the required capital.
Figure 3. portrays that one of the three pressures on human uses of ecosystems is economic pressure on the market. Earlier we explained how MLR-crime influenced economic situations of other fisheries, communities and governments. Besides the dodging of costs done by IUU fisheries, normal or sustainable fisheries have to deal with increasing costs when trying to fish responsibly. IUU fisheries also use the markets to sell their cheap, illegal fish.
Figure 3. Human made pressures on ecosystems.
Next to the increased costs of fishing responsibly, many development countries have the issue of subsidies that contribute to overfishing and IUU fishing. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been trying to fight this problem, and it has been included in other international sustainable development agreements. Even today, countries spend $30 billion dollars a year on fisheries subsidies, 60% of which directly encourages unsustainable, destructive, or even illegal practices (World Bank Group, 2015, p. 1-3). The resulting market distortion is a major factor behind the mismanagement of the world’s fisheries, which the World Bank Group had calculated to have cost the global economy $83 billion dollars in 2012. The United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (2011) calls for full transparency and disclosure of subsidies. That way unfair distribution of funds can be halted. On the other hand, there is much to be said for economic stimulation of sustainable fish production. By having governments aiding smaller fisheries to transition to become sustainable fisheries, they do not have to worry about the losses made through investments in better gear. The fundings will also keep the prizes of sustainable fish on a decent level compared to the cheap illegal fish. This way customers will not be detered by high fish prizes.
As to the relation between transparency, awareness and economic incentives: by increasing traceability along the supply-chains it will become easier to track who the
sustainable fisheries are and which vessels are marked as IUU vessels. With this knowledge, importharbors can stop IUU fish from entering their country, thereby removing their illegal economic income. This will also have a beneficial effect on the market and its transparency for the customers, who with their increased participation and awareness are likely to be stimulated to buy the sustainable fish. This will further increase economic incentives for other non-sustainable fisheries to transition to sustainable fisheries.
This chapter has provided an understanding of what IUU fishing entails, what its impacts are and what is being done about it. To be able however, to answer the questions on what the impacts of good governance on IUU fishing might be, the concept of good governance will be elucidated in the next chapter. Accordingly, it will be shown that the current framework of good governance is lacking in components, which will be extended in the finalizing paragraphs of the chapter.
2. Extending the Good Governance framework
As stated earlier, this Chapter will proceed with explaining why the concept of good governance is applicable to the issue of IUU fishing. Before we get to good governance however, we shall first have a look at governance itself to reach an understanding of the basis of good governance. After which we will discuss the concepts of Supply-Chain Accountability (SCA) and Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), whilst considering their link to IUU. Furthermore, the concepts of SCA and MSY will be looked at with two different dimensions. The International Relation (IR) dimension, and the Case-Study Governance (CSG) dimension. By doing so, a clearer picture will arise, of scope and impact, of these concepts with regards to governance and production and thus to possible IUU fishing solutions. To conclude Chapter 2, the combination of the concepts of SCA and MSY with the dimensions will be presented as additive concepts to the framework of good governance to improve its quality, scope and effectiveness as a policy framework in the fight against IUU fishing.
2.1 The foundations of Good Governance as a policy framework
As mentioned, before we can explain what good governance is and how it relates to IUU, an explanation on governance is needed. According to Rogers and Hall (2003), governance is,
The exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels...it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. (p. 9)
Considering this definition, governance has a wide array of content, which makes it a multi-interpretable definition. Therefore, it is important to state what the basic premise of governance is about. According to Monfort (2001, p.17), governance relates to the manner in which the interaction and interdependence between relevant stakeholders and organizations take shape in the process of decision-making. Whilst these organizations try to achieve their goals, they have to account for their actions to the relevant stakeholders, whom in turn have the task of supervising these actions. This reciprocity between organizations and stakeholders makes it clear that governance includes the activities of organization, control, supervision and accountability. As Bossert (2006, p. 12) states, it is an essential part of governance to ensure the coexistence of efficient and effective policy-goals, whilst keeping organizations transparent and accountable to the stakeholders. Even though we now have a basic idea on what the concept of governance entails, differing approaches to governance may still be followed and there is not one specific definition of governance.
There is a clear distinction between good and bad governance and several frameworks have been made to measure good governance. As was mentioned earlier, the basic premise of governance relies on the reciprocity of the organizations and stakeholders, with the focus on organization, control, supervision and accountability. To achieve good governance according to Montfort (2001, p.17-18), social responsibility conditions are required. This refers to including moral values into the decision-making process. Hence on top of the basic governance conditions, necessary conditions for the framework called good Governance are inclusiveness, accountability, participation, transparency, predictability, cooperation and responsiveness. Poor governance exists when these conditions are not met by the governing system. This leads to increased political and social risk, institutional failure and degradation of the capacity to cope with shared problems (UNESCAP, 2009). Social analysts have shown that there is a strong causal relationship between better governance and better development
outcomes such as: higher incomes through increased effectiveness of production and decision-making processes, increases in feelings of political/corporate legitimacy and associated stability and regulatory quality against corruption and free riders. (Kaufmann et al., 1999, p.9-10). Following from these outcomes, good governance is essential to poverty reduction, stability of state and industry, and effectiveness and sustainability of production chains. The conditions necessary for good governance, which have been operationalized by Rogers and Hall (2003, p. 19), the FAO (2001, p. 1-24) and Montfort (2001, p.17-18), are portrayed in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Components of the basic good governance framework
There is a form of good governance when the governance is: ● Open and transparent
Once institutions are open and transparent to the general public, it will increase confidence about the governing system and create understanding about policy formulation. (Rogers and Hall, 2003, p. 19)
● Inclusive and communicative
This includes, wide participation throughout the policy chain, from conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence in the outcome and in the institutions that deliver policies. Direct communication will lead civil society to be
socialized into governance (Rogers and Hall, 2003, p. 19). This coincides with the previously mentioned statement of the FAO (2001): “The full participation of stakeholders in combating IUU fishing, including industry, fishing communities, and non-governmental organizations, should be encouraged” (para. 3.9.1). By actively promoting effective participative systems in all levels of policy-making, peoples creative energy and diversity are activated to improve governance.
● Coherent and integrative
Policy-making and action has to be coherent and governance should enhance the effectiveness of combating issues (Rogers and Hall, 2003, p. 19). In this case, it would entail battling IUU fisheries.
● Equitable and ethical
All men and women should have equal opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. Therefore governance has to be strongly based upon the ethical principles of the society in which it functions and should be based on the rule of law (Rogers and Hall, 2003, p. 19). This comes into practice with ownership, justice and property rights for which fair regulatory frameworks are necessary to address these issues. This leads to all fisheries requiring equal chances to improve their production. Meeting the diverse needs of all people in existing and future fishing communities, good governance promotes personal well-being and social cohesion.
● Accountable
Each institution, organization or fishery must be able to explain about and take responsibility for their actions. The consequences for violation of the rules should be clear and maintained (Montfort, 2001, p. 19).
It will be necessary to create conditions under which collaboration amongst organizations, stakeholders and the public is made possible (Montfort, 2001, p. 19).
● Responsive and sustainable
Policies should be implemented in a proper manner and decision making must take place at the most appropriate level. In order to be both responsive and sustainable the policies should be incentive based to ensure there is a clear social and/or environmental and economic gain (Rogers and Hall, 2003, p. 19).
Figure 5. The picture shows the complete story on Good Governance gathered from the info given in paragraph 2.1
The listed operationalizations can be compared to what we now know about raising awareness, transparency and economic incentives in a sustainable way. Figure 5 portrays the complete picture of the current good governance framework, through showing the operationalizations, contemporary good Governance components and the reciprocity of awareness, transparency and economic incentives. Combining good Governance with the
SSC-triangle of paragraph 1.3.1 (Figure 2) explains the mentioned reciprocity; through increased participation of all relevant stakeholders, policy improvements (e.g. good governance) will be fair and broadly accepted. Furthermore by increasing transparency, control of IUU fishing piracy is enhanced and information sharing is made more easy. This will lead to fisheries having several incentives to transition towards sustainable fisheries, therewith improving the environments for the fish and increasing the food security for future generations. Improvements to this framework are still possible, hence in the next part, a start will be made with the additions to the framework of good governance.
2.2 Supply-Chain Accountability, Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Good Governance framework
As we learned in Chapter 2.1, good governance is summarized: a framework focussed on transparency and participation between all relevant stakeholders. Now that an understanding on the framework of good governance is reached, this paragraph will proceed with an explanation of two different policy concepts on battling aspects of IUU fishing. These concepts are Supply-Chain Accountability (SCA) and Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). These concepts will be evaluated to indicate, whether they can be an addition to the existing good Governance framework. After which it will be explained in what manner these policy recommendations can be integrated into the framework. Meanwhile, two different dimensions will be used as basic presumptions with which we will look at both concepts, SCA and MSY. These dimensions are the International Relations (IR) dimension and Case-Study Governance (CSG) dimension. The IR dimension focusses on varying international and transnational norms and principles, taking into consideration that there are three relevant differing actors: States, companies and the public. The CSG dimension concerns the decision-making processes in the Netherlands and the EU with regard to battling IUU fishing. To conclude this
chapter once the combining of the concepts of SCA and MSY and the IR and CSG dimensions into the good governance framework is finalized, the new good governance framework is presented as an improved tool for battling IUU fishing.
2.2.1. Supply-Chain Accountability. Before the above mentioned concepts and dimensions are combined, this chapter begins with elaborating on the concept of Supply-Chain Accountability. This will enable us to later combine the gained knowledge on SCA with IR and CSG dimensions. Therewith, making it possible for us to observe any differences in this reciprocity in contrast to the interaction of the MSY concept and these dimensions. These will be looked at in a subsequent chapter.
In this paper, SCA will be presented as a combination of corporate social responsibility and corporate accountability. The MVO platform (2012) claims that corporate social responsibility is “a result-driven process whereby a company assumes responsibility across all its business operations for the social, ecological and economic consequences of its activities, and is accountable and transparent towards its stakeholders regarding these issues” (p. 4). In addition, they state that corporate accountability emphasizes the possibility for stakeholders and governments to hold companies into account. The MVO platform therewith, defines SCA into a process of responsibility, transparency and accountability. To reach a further understanding of how SCA can be an addition to the good governance framework, it will first be shown in what manner the concept of SCA relates to the IUU fishing issue.
Relevant IUU fishing stakeholders, like the global monitoring organization Verité (2016), state that SCA is about increasing the awareness of the risks of labor abuse in key commodities and about the protection of the workers. It follows that one of the major issues equivalent stakeholders face when dealing with IUU, is the related MRL-crime. As stated in paragraph 1.2, MLR-crime is a form of environmental crime and it has the capacity to
destabilize marine living resource management agreements. Additionally, it includes crimes such as money laundring, drugtravelling, human trafficking and slavery. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR, 2011, p. 2), human trafficking includes forced labor and bonded labor. Both of these ways of labor are covered by the SCA and are found in IUU fishing companies. Forced labor, as stated in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Forced Labour No. 29, consists of all involuntary work done under the pressure by any penalty. Bearing this in mind, ILO Convention No. 105 formulates, that forced labor should never be used for political coercion, economic gains, discrimination or to punish strikes. Therefore, companies should eliminate instances of forced and bonded labor in supply-chains. They can achieve this through development of holistic and long term human rights due diligence process based on an analysis of company activities and how these affect their workers. According to Professor John Ruggie, the former Special Representative to the UN Secretary General for Business and Human Rights, human rights due diligence includes: commitment of companies to respect human rights, periodic assessments whether these rights are still employed, integration of commitments and assessments into a code of conduct and reporting performance. Hence, human rights due diligence evaluates companies on the risk of human rights violations, giving companies the tools to exercise control over their human-rights related risks and enforcing them to act responsibly. (ICCR, 2011 p.5-6).
Next to the previously mentioned SCA components of human rights policy, risk assessments and due diligence, the ICCR advices companies to take into account the following components into their holistic human rights framework to achieve effective SCA; Verification and traceability, collaboration, disclosure/transparency and training and capacity building (ICCR, 2011, p. 4). For the capacity building component it is essential to notice that whilst training employees, business partners and suppliers on how to identify a victims of
trafficking, they learn how to proceed with reporting to the correct agencies. This will avoid inaction and jeopardizing of the victims safety and secures the security and sustainability of the supply-chain. Except for the training/capacity building, the due diligence, the human rights policy and the human rights risk assessment components, the others match the already existing components of the Chapter 2.1 good governance framework. This outcome is presented in Table 1.
Table 1.
SCA Framework Components SCA Framework
Components
Additive to current GG framework
Human rights policy *
Due diligence *
Human rights risk assessments * Verification/traceability * Training/capacity building * Collaboration n/a Disclosure/transparency n/a
Note. This table represents the findings of paragraph 2.2.1 and combines it with information gathered from paragraph 2.1. It shows whether a SCA component is additive to the existing good governance framework, by having an asterisk show when it does, and n/a represents that the component is not already part of the contemporary good governance framework,
Hitherto the gained knowledge on SCA is summed up as a framework that, in regards to IUU, is focussed on the supply-chain. Thereby mainly aiming at the social human standards and organizationally components. How these components relate to the IR dimension will be
discussed in the next paragraph, therewith clarifying the link between these components and international principles and norms. This will show if and how international organizations implement the SCA components into their foundations.
2.2.1.1. International Relations dimension and Supply-Chain Accountability. At the start of this chapter, the two dimensions, IR and CSG were mentioned to be included into the concepts of SCA and MSY. Considering SCA and the dimension of IR, we have already been presented with a number of relevant principles and norms during the introduction of the ILO conventions and the statement by former UN secretary general John Ruggie. Keeping these statements in mind, further elaboration on IR dimensions will be introduced in the following paragraph.
As stated before, the IR dimensions consist of international and transnational principles regarding the responsibilities of governments, companies and the public. Considering there are many different parties in regards to these international principles, four of the more major stakeholders have been chosen as premises to take note of which principles and norms there are. These four stakeholders are: the previously mentioned ILO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Global Compact and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Before we commence on elaborating on these stakeholders, the basic principles of the IR at its core shall be elucidated. Thereby clarifying the foundations on which these stakeholders base their principles on.
2.2.1.1.1. The Basic International Relations dimension. The core issue International Relations face arises when two or more nations serve its collective interest, but by doing so being confronted to forgo their individual interests. In the case of fish, this happens to fisheries that could benefit from sticking to agreements on sustainably fishing. This would
result in an ecological and economical stable fish production globally. Even still, these fisheries have their individual interests in catching as much fish as possible to gain their own maximum profit. This problem is also defined as a collective goods problem (Olson, 1965, p. 1-2), a problem of free riders or the tragedy of the commons. Two mitigating factors to the collective goods problem generally are found when dealing with smaller groups, thereby simplifying the distribution of the goods, and making it harder to conceal free riding since it is easier to find the one responsible. Unfortunately, both these factors are oppositely found with regards to the IUU fishing issue. IUU fishing is a global problem with many parties involved and fish do not hold themselves to manmade boundaries. That is why tracking and catching of these perpetrators remains difficult. Therefore, it is acute in International affairs to enforce individual States the needed measures to provide for the common good. Another reason is the lack of a central authority, because each state is sovereign. Goldstein and Pevehouse presented (2008, p. 4-9) three solutions to the problem of collective goods. Table 2 shows a summary of these solution.
Table 2:
Solutions to common goods problem. Probable
solution
Strengths Weaknesses
Dominance Order, stability, predictability
Oppression, resentment
Reciprocity Incentives for mutual cooperation
Downward spirals; complex accounting
Identity Sacrifice for Group, redefine interests
Demonizing an Out-Group
Note. This table is based on (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, p. 4-9). It presents the strengths and weaknesses of the three possible solutions to the common goods problem.
The dominance solution relies on the strengths of leadership of a hegemon, the reciprocity solution on the other hand, seeks salvation in cooperation. In contrast to the previous two, the identity approach does not rely on the interests of the individual State, but looks towards the solution that members of a community care enough about the identity and beneficial interest of others, to sacrifice their own desires. Based on the foundations, of mainly the reciprocity and identity solutions, in the next part the IR stakeholders and their principles and norms will be introduced. Therewith connecting these principles, and later on enabling the connection of the IR dimension to the SCA.
2.2.1.1.2. Combining the International Relations-core and Supply-Chain Accountability. Starting with the ILO, it is an organization part of the United Nations which works internationally through developing conventions. The development of these conventions is handled with a tripartite reciprocity system. This means that, during the decision-making process, beneficial behaviour to the group is preferred over behaviour that serves self-interest (Goldstein, 2007, p. 5). Furthermore, tripartite means that there is one representative of each of the 181 member States governments, one representative of each national employers’ organizations and one representing each of the States unions. Therefore, the ILO aims, with these tripartite social dialogue and the resulting conventions, to increase participation, transparency and public support. As presented by the MVO platform (2012, p. 7), the ILO considers eight of their conventions as keyconventions to the international norms and principles. These eight conventions are subdivided into 4 main goals:
● The ban on all forms of forced labor (ILO Conventions 29 and 105);
● Freedom of assembly and recognition of the right to collective bargaining (ILO conventions 87, 98 and 135);
● The prohibition of discrimination based on ethnicity, gender or social origin (ILO Conventions 100 and 111).
The ILO conventions are signed by at least 150 countries and the eight keyconventions are part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR are part of the Global Compact guidelines (2016, para. 3-6), are often opted into company codes of conduct and are part of the OECD codes. With the UDHR in mind, in 2015 the OECD drafted new guidelines for multinational companies. These include norms regarding the environment, employment, corruption, protection of costumers and SCA (p. 5-6). Considering the SCA, the OECD’s focus relates more to corporate social responsibility, or as mentioned at the start of this chapter, to the responsibilities of companies towards the public and governments. OECD countries are urged to incentivize their industries to follow these guidelines, therefore leaning to a more identity approach, but States are not bound by any law to follow the rules to the letter. Another more advice and identity approach oriented stakeholder with regards to international norms and principles is the Global Compact. Again it is an initiative by the UN, but in contrast to the ILO, not the countries, but individual companies can draft themselves to these principles. The Global Compact has ten main principles they advise companies to follow (2016, para. 1-10). As the ILO principles these are subdivided in the same way, and for the most part overlap with the ILO conventions and the UDHR. But considering the environmental principles, they have drafted more in-depth guidelines. Which are divided into three principles:
● Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges. According to principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (UNEP, 1992) the precautionary approach entails that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (para. 15). Therefore, it
is quite similar to the due diligence component of SCA. Furthermore, principle seven of the UN Global compact (2016, para. 7) states that this approach involves a combination of risk assessment, management and communication. Therewith not solely increasing scientific value of the approach, but of the transparency and participation in the decision-making processes as well. Due to the fact that part of the risk assessment comes from scientific-technological evaluation and economic cost benefit analysis, but also from considering the acceptance of the public.
● Principle 8: Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. This principle is based on Chapter 30 of Agenda 21 (1992), which arguments that because of the fact that Businesses gain their legitimacy through meeting the needs of the society, they are incentivized to ensure that their production does not harm the environment (p. 292).
● Principle 9: Encourage the development and spreading of environmentally friendly technologies. Which leads to industries having more sustainable resources and less environmental impact. Furthermore, this principle entails pollution, prevention and monitoring technologies, therewith potentially incentivizing development of IUU fishing combating programs.
To conclude this part on principles of the IR dimension, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) will be discussed. The reasoning behind choosing the ISO as a relevant stakeholder regarding the IR dimension is, that in contrast to the UN based organizations or the OECD, this is an independent non-governmental international organization. According to Goldstein (2007), “Nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations or terrorist networks, also rely on identity politics to a great extent” (p. 8). Using the identity approach as a foundation, the ISO focusses on producing internationally carried standards for technology,
ecology and economic developments. With these standards their goals are to create growth, open up global markets and make trade fairer mostly for developing countries. Next to these goals, they try to help global issues such as climate change, energy and social responsibility (ISO, 2016, p. 1). The two standards that are of interest to the IUU fishing issue are ISO 26000: Guidance on social responsibility and ISO 22005: Traceability in the feed and food chain -- General principles and basic requirements for system design and implementation. Thereby, ISO standards combine the principles laid out by the above mentioned stakeholders. Combining all the principles with the SCA framework leads to the following Table 3.
Table 3
Supply-Chain Accountability components join IR stakeholder principles stakeholder
Principles
SCA components
ILO OECD Global
Compact
ISO 26000
Human rights policy * n/a * *
Due diligence n/a * *+ *
Human rights risk assessments * * * n/a Verification/ Traceability n/a * * * Training/capacity building n/a * n/a * Collaboration * * * * Disclosure/ Transparency n/a * n/a *
Note. This table is based on the information provided in paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.1.1.2 It combines the IR principles and norms of the different stakeholders provided in paragraph 2.2.1.1.2 with the components of Supply-Chain Accountability (2.2.1). The asterisks
represent, that the component is part of the principles by the stakeholder, if not n/a is provided.
By combining the components of the SCA framework with the IR dimension per stakeholder, Table 3 clarifies and shows which components, major international stakeholders, tend to focus on more. Thus, we have finalized the SCA story, a continuation will be made exploring the introduction of addable concepts to the good governance framework with elaborating on the concept of MSY.
2.2.2. Maximum Sustainable Yield. As we now know SCA tends to focus on the human social and organizing aspects of the IUU fishing issues. It achieves this, through upgrading the supply-chain management, developing international standards and increasing awareness on human trafficking. Furthermore, it was presented in paragraphs 2.2.1.1 and following, that the IR dimension shows that reciprocity and identity politics are often followed to gain multistakeholder conventions. Another goal, was to improve the effectiveness and participation in supply-chain management and production.
Besides the impact on the human and organizing side of the fish production chain, IUU fishing is a great threat to the fish as well. In this chapter the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) will be presented to illustrate what it entails, how it interconnects with IUU fishing and how different parties benefit from using MSY. This way the necessary context will have been introduced once we, in the next Chapter, start elaborating on the reciprocity between MSY, ASC, IUU fishing and the good Governance framework. As was mentioned earlier in paragraph 1.2, IUU fishing considerably strains the fishstocks through overfishing. A definition of overfishing is found in the newly approved Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Enforcement Act of the United States (2015), where it is stated as a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes a fishery’s capacity to produce the maximum
sustainable yield on a continuing basis (p. 1-4). Maximum Sustainable Yield therefore, in contrast to Supply-Chain Accountability, tends to focus more on the health and sustainability of the fishstocks. According to Birdlife, Oceana, Greenpeace and WWF EPO (2012) MSY is a necessary policy step in order to fight the loss of these fishstocks. They claim that, “Of the assessed stocks, 63% in the Atlantic are overfished, 82% in the Mediterranean and 4 out of the 6 stocks for which scientific advice is available in the Baltic” (p. 1). Furthermore, they state that in the past decision-making processes by the European Commission have been focussed on short term social and economic considerations. Meanwhile disregarding the limits of the ecosystems and scientific advice considering the maintenance of fish stocks. According to Birdlife et al. (2012), MSY concerns the largest catch obtainable from a stock over an indefinite period, whilst sustaining the population size at the level of maximum growth (p. 2). Figure 6 clarifies this process. It is portrayed, that the status of the harvested stock (S) depends on the size of the fish population (P) and the rate of exploitation (E). This presents MSY as a concept which is used to determine catch levels below the exploitation threshold, thereby ensuring a sustainable fish population over time. Whereas sustainable refers to, sustainable development, which is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World Commission, 2014, p. 13).
Figure 6. S = P - E, the stock is measured by subtracting the exploitation of fish out of the stock from the population of the stock and its yearly growth through nature.
Now that it has been presented what MSY is and how it interconnects with IUU fishing, three main benefiting parties from the MSY program will be introduced: the fish, the fisheries and the trade. As was stated in the factsheet presented by the European Commission (2006, p. 1-2), the restoration of the fish stocks through MSY planning can prevent vulnerable stocks from collapsing. In addition, the general health increase of the fish allows the fish to grow larger, thereby leading to less discarding of juveniles. Next to these developments, the lower levels of fishing will lead to reductions in by-catches and to fewer interruptions and impacts on the ecosystems. For the fisheries there is a lot to gain in effectiveness. Increasing the stability of the stocks will lead to stable catches, thereby reducing operating costs by reducing the fuel expenses, whilst equal amounts of fishing brings higher yields. This increase in productivity has positive effects on the competitiveness and secures a future in fishing for the industry and local fishery communities alike. Considering the trade increases in regional fisheries will help the industry to compete with imports or yield higher exports, therefore improving the regions balance of trade.
To summarize the above, the concept of MSY and the plans made considering its principles are mainly beneficial to fish and its ecosystems, fisheries and their future and to regional competitiveness of their fishindustry. This makes it a tool with which IUU fishing can be fought. Through stabilization of fishstocks in a region, it is made easier to observe anomalies caused by illegal overfishing. And as it was stated earlier, this overfishing is one of the major issues dealing with IUU fishing. To conclude on this chapter of MSY and to summarize the MSY components, Table 4 will be presented. Thereby, considering whether the component already exists in the current good governance Framework.
Table 4
MSY components and the good governance framework
Governance framework
Fish Health Policy *
Fish Health Risk Assessment *
Science-Based Policy *
Productivity/ Efficiency *
Cooperation n/a
Social and Economic Viability n/a
Note. This table is based on the combined information presented by paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2.2. It contains the MSY components and evaluates whether they are already part of the current good governance framework. Asterisks show if they are new to the contemporary framework. On the other hand n/a is provided when they are already included by the framework.
2.2.2.1. Maximum Sustainable Yield and the International Relations dimension. Thusfar, it has been clarified what the concept of MSY entails. This has made it possible to relate this concept to the norms and principles of the IR dimensions presented earlier. Before we get to connecting the concept and dimensions, this paragraph shall first briefly summarize what has been stated about the components of MSY in the previous paragraph, to therewith recapture the essence of the concept that was elucidated. As we have learned in the previous paragraph the policy agencies, with regards to developing sustainable fish, are focussed on using scientific advice through consultation with NGO’s. Accordingly they consider the social, economic and environmental results for the fish industries and fish communities, as is portrayed in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Map of MSY in practice, to show how MSY plans are developed.
2.2.2.1.1. Basic International Relations and Maximum Sustainable Yield. To commence the elaboration on the the IR dimension in regards to MSY, the basic premise of the IR dimension is once again required to enable the bonding of the dimension and the concept. In paragraph 2.2.1.1.1, the collective goods problem (Olson, 1965) was defined as: the situation in which every fishery would benefit from sticking to agreements on sustainably fishing, thereby making it possible to reach an ecological and economical stable fish production. Even though they should be aware of these cooperation benefits, they maintain their individual interest in catching as much fish as possible to gain the short term maximum profit. This problem made it acute in International affairs to enforce individual States the needed measures to provide for the common good, whereby States could possibly reside to either the dominance, reciprocity or identity approach (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, p. 4-9). Following the structure of the SCA Chapter, this paragraph will proceed with presenting a number of relevant stakeholders in the IR dimension related to the MSY concept. Therefore, the paragraph will start with statements on MSY by the European Commission and the goals
they proposed to achieve with its implementation. After which the presentation continues with an elaboration on relations between the international standards of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the MSY principles. Finalizing the paragraph with introducing the ways in which the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) acts as an organizations, which facilitates and monitors State and non-State actor’s implementation of fisheries laws.
2.2.2.1.2. International Relations dimension stakeholders and Maximum Sustainable Yield.
Considering the concept of MSY and what it entails, the European Commission looks to commend actions focussed on dealing with mixed fisheries (EU Commission, 2015, p. 2). Mixed fisheries consist of fisheries that catch more than one species. Whilst catching fish these fisheries should let the most vulnerable stock determine the exploitation limits of all other fish. The reasoning behind this principle lies with the European Commission, according to whom it is the most relevant way in which MSY is achieved for all stocks concerned. Furthermore fishermen can decrease their impact on the most vulnerable species by upgrading their effectiveness through the use of selective gear. Subsequently, the EU Commission (2015) have set up funding possibilities to enforce changes in fisheries towards more sustainable fishing. They have proposed a strong European Maritime and Fisheries Funds (EMFF), with which they intend to include funding:
● “for the fishing industry to develop more selective fishing methods, which again refers to increasing the efficiency and therewith associated productivity
● for vessel owners and fishermen to participate in selectivity trials
● for social dialogue meetings of the fishing industry in and across MS to exchange ideas and best practises
● for training and professional qualifications to become familiar with innovative gears ● for diversification of small scale fishermen
● for the fishing industry to collect specific data, be it biological or socio-economic data ● for marketing initiatives to develop products brands, such as "MSY fish"
● for fishermen to participate actively in regionalization by coming forward with concrete proposals on how to achieve MSY 2015.” (p. 2-3)
As was stated by Alberstadt (2014, p. 266-267), the principles of the MSY are to be found in international treaties of old such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to Schrijver (2010) the treaty obliges States to command principles and norms of conservation and resource management of living resources, furthermore it acts as a warning to the common heritage of freedom of access to the seas. Therewith, the treaty is the foundation of the rules for managing the high seas and the living resources found therein. Additionally, Article 117 of the UNCLOS (1982) implies that, every State, alone or cooperatively, has a responsibility to take measures to the conservation of living resources of the high seas (p. 65). Furthermore, article 61(3) address the requirement of MSY in regards to fishing practices in internal waters such as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) (Aust, 2005, p. 333). Therewith, the UNCLOS creates a commanding framework for the access and behaviour of State’s fisheries amongst the high seas, the EEZ and the national waters. Subsequently the UNCLOS provides compelling principles for national fisheries and it promotes international cooperation of States to abide by their standards, which are accepted as customary rules (Aust, 2005, p. 321). Recalling the ideas of freedom of the seas and fisheries conservation, according to Schrijver (2010), the UNCLOS principles main goal is to promote responsible usage of this freedom, whilst considering conservation and sustainable resource management. To illustrate this, it is stated in article 116 that, even though every coastal State has ownership over their fish stocks, they have the international responsibility to
sustain these as well, for example through regarding MSY (Aust, 2005, p. 319-322). Harrison (2011, p. 308) claims that given the generic character of the UNCLOS standards, and the seemingly acceptance of States fisheries to the principles of MSY, it demonstrates acknowledgement by States of MSY as a legal norm on the high seas, in EEZ and national waters.
A different kind of norm on the seas is found with the standard-setting NGO called the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Unlike the standard-setting done by the UN, which focusses on monitoring fishery laws, the MSC facilitates and monitors State and non-State actor’s implementation of these fishery laws (MSC, 2014, p. 6). Furthermore, the MSC certifies fisheries with an environmental standard developed through cooperation with scientific experts. This standard is based on three criteria: sustainable fish stocks, minimizing environmental impacts of fishing and effective management. The third criteria entails that fisheries must pursue local, national and international laws (MSC, 2014, p. 147-150). With regards to these international agreements, according to the MSC: they are important cooperation driven programs, which could offer greater reassurances to the fisheries and supply-chain organisations that participate. To conclude this paragraph Table 5 will be provided displaying the link between the components of MSY and the relevant stakeholders, thereby showing which principles and components can be connected.
Table 5
Stakeholder principles and MSY summary stakeholder Principles MSY components EU Commission UN (UNCLOS) MSC
Fish Health Policy * * *
Fish Health Risk Assessment * n/a * Science-Based Policy n/a n/a * Productivity/ Efficiency * n/a * Cooperation * * *
Social and Economic Viability
* * n/a
Note. This table is based on the information provided in paragraph 2.2.2.1.2. It summarizes and combines international relations principles and norms of the different stakeholders with the concept of maximum sustainable yield. The asterisks show which principles are part of the stakeholder’s principles.
2.3 Case Study Governance Dimension combined with Supply-Chain Accountability and Maximum Sustainable Yield
Having completed the elaboration on the IR dimension and its link to the concepts of SCA and MSY, this chapter shall discuss the dimension of Case Study Governance (CSG). By looking at the CSG dimension, a clear picture will be unveiled on the situation of governance and policy-making surrounding IUU fish combatting in the Netherlands and their interaction with European Union and other relevant stakeholders. To achieve this picture, heatmaps of the Dutch supply-chain will be presented to show how these stakeholders are relevant to the Dutch fish industry and how they relate to policy-making processes considering the IUU fishing issue. Prior to presenting the overall map and an associated table, a list of relevant stakeholders, in regards to the Dutch fish supply-chain, is necessary. To clarify these stakeholders and their relations to each other, they have been divided into roughly five categories: fish industry, political and control agencies, national & international organizations, the public and the market, as will be made visible by the upcoming figures. Each subfigure will show a part of the overall fish-policy-chain of the Netherland and it will be discussed how the presented stakeholders interact with one another in these chains. After this division, the complete heatmap with Table 6 will be introduced. Table 6 will connect the SCA and MSY components to the five categories of the CSG dimension stakeholders.
● Fishing industry (blue)
All fish, that eventually end up on the market, must be caught first, whether it is on the high seas, or near the coast. In the Netherlands, almost all of the major fish producing and processing companies are part of the VIV (Vereniging voor Importeurs van Visproducten), otherwise known as the FishFederation. They therefore represent the interests of the Dutch fishtrade, retail and processing industry on national and international level.
Figure 8. The fish industry stakeholders-chain is based on knowledge provided by Pramod & Nakamura (2014, p. 107). It shows the interactions between stakeholders relevant to the fishing industry. The fisheries deliver fish to the Port of Rotterdam, where it goes through customs before it can be delivered to the markets, via a middleman or the processors. Furthermore, fisheries are incentivized to improve their sustainability and effectiveness, by certification labels of the MSC and the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC). Besides that, all Dutch fisheries are part of the VIV, which provides them with a code of conduct.
