Civil Wars, State-building and Displacement June 2017 Master Thesis Political Science - International Relations
Elliot Parry
11257431The Contribution of Education to Peacebuilding Efforts in Southeast Myanmar:
Case study of the Karen Education Services
Word count: 16,497
‘Education is the medium to connect with the world. It should not only be a reflection of Myanmar’s tradition. If we measure education only by your customs, we will all be left behind’ - Arkar Moe Thu, NNER
23/06/2017 Supervisor: Prof. Steele
Acknowledgements
:I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisor Prof. Steele, for her patience and guidance in this project.
I would also, like to thank my friends and family for the support given to me during the long library hours. Honourable mentions go to Luis, Marcou, Toby and the flatmates of 22 Bijltjespad (Alice, Miranda E., Ivan, Miranda R., Scarlett/Skrrrt, Guillem, Guy, Fabi and Jenny) for putting up with countless mood swings and perpetual questioning of the point of life. In addition, I would like to thank N.C. for providing a stress-free zone to relax and escape the realities of writing a thesis.
On a more serious note, I would like to thank all the individuals I met during my fieldwork in Mae Sot, Thailand and Yangon, Myanmar that actively participated in the research, your help and time was appreciated beyond words. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude towards the innumerable friendly people I met during the month long fieldwork and who were eager to help.
Content:
• Acknowledgement……….……….iii
• Map………..v
• Introduction……….1
• Chapter 1: Literature Review - the Role of Education in Peacebuilding………5
I. Conceptualisation of Peacebuilding ………5
II. The Security First and Liberal Peace Model .………7
III. The Role of Education Peacebuilding .………8
• Chapter 2: Context - Education in the context of Peacebuilding between the State and the KNU……….…13
I. Case selection.…..………13
II. Peace Process………14
A. Ceasefire - Achieving negative Peace……….…14
B. Peace Process: Moving Past Negative Peace - Resolving Core Differences…..15
III. Main Actors….………15
A. The State of Myanmar………..15
B. Karen………16
C. Karen National Union….……….…………15
IV. Concluding Summary………..18
• Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework………21
I. ‘4Rs’ Perspective on Peacebuilding………21
II. Assumptions………23
• Chapter 4: Methodology………25
I. Methods………25
A. Data Collection: Semi-structured Interviews……….25
B. Data Analysis.………27
II. Ethical Considerations………27
• Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis………..………..29
I. KED and the State working towards sustainable peace?………29
A. National Ceasefire Agreement - Coordination problems exposing a fragile peace ………..29
B. National reform a missed opportunity for inclusion………31
C. State expansion in the local context………32
D. Reflection on results……….………..…….………34
II. Inequalities Exacerbating Tensions……….…..35
A. Inequality between teachers………35
1. Inequality of teacher training Karen Identity and Education………….…..35
2. Inequality of pay..…….……….37
C. Reflection on Results….……….…….41
III. Ethnic Identity and Education………..….…43
A. Ethnocentric programs at the service of protecting Karen identity………44
B. Promoting Peace and Reconciliation in the Curriculum….…….…….……….45
C. Reflection on Results……….……..46
• Conclusion……….…………49
I. Main Findings………..49
II. Reflection on ‘4R’s’ Theoretical Framework and Methodology.….…….……..51
A. Reflection on Theoretical framework………..…51
B. Reflection of Methodology………..52
III. Future Research………..52
• Bibliography………..………54
Introduction
:After over 60 years of civil war, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the state finally agreed to a ceasefire in 2012. The KNU has fought the state since independence, over issues of equal rights and self-determination for ethnic Karen in central and southeast Myanmar along the Thai border. The ceasefire marked the beginning of a long and arduous peace process between the central Myanmar government, the military and numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to deal with the root causes of the conflict as well as deal with its legacy through peacebuilding efforts. Although, the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) recognises the importance of education as a crucial component of the peace process and a central grievance amongst ethnic minorities, it fails however, to address directly issues pertaining to the sector in peacebuilding. The efforts have been directed towards integrating socially and economically into the Union, neglected territories in the border regions. Simultaneously, since the arrival of democracy in Myanmar in 2011, the government has started to reform the education sector in order to provide greater access to schools and more inclusive of minority groups. Education might not be an explicit element of the peace process however, the narrative of inclusion and equality does inscribe itself in the wider peacebuilding project. In this thesis I will address the following research question: how has education contributed to achieving sustainable peace between the KNU and the State?
UNESCO (2011: 14) argues that, ‘education can play a pivotal role in peacebuilding. Perhaps more than in any other sector, education can provide the highly visible early peace dividends on which the survival of peace agreements may depend’. Nevertheless, The current academic literature surrounding education and conflict focuses mostly on the impact of conflict on education. However, the literature is less clear on the impact of education on conflict and by extension peace. The literature tends to highlight the crucial role of education as a mechanism for reconciliation in post conflict scenarios. Often nevertheless, the literature fails to explain how education can reproduce ‘the attitudes, values and social relations’ that underlie the conflict (Buckland, 2004: 2). Education is vital to the transformation necessary in conflict to achieve a sustainable peace, as it is an opportunity to influence the daily lives of individuals most vulnerable to conflict, children. The research argues that a constructive approach to education in peacebuilding can only be achieved under the right conditions. The thesis explores the connection between the difficulties in achieving a
sustainable peace and education services provided by the state and KNU. In this regard, the research contributes to the literature on education in conflict and more generally on peacebuilding.
The thesis is divided in five chapters. I start by discussing the existing literature to conceptualise peacebuilding a necessary process to achieve sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. In particular, I discuss how theories pertaining to explaining peacebuilding as a security first approach fails to incorporate the transformative change needed to ensure that conflict does not recur. As the research focuses specifically on the role of eduction I review the different ways in which education contributes to exacerbating tensions between communities and how it can help sustain peaceful relations in post ethnic conflict situations.
In the following chapter, I provide a background to the peace process in Myanmar, which aims to build peace in conflict affected areas. I start by justifying my case selection. Following on, I explain some general aspects of the ceasefire and the difficulties in resolving core differences regarding issues of equal rights. Furthermore, I will provide an overview of the main actors involved in the context of peacebuilding: the State, the ethnic Karen and the KNU.
Chapter three explains the theoretical framework used to analyse how education has contributed or hindered sustainable peace. The framework applied comes from a project supported by the Research Consortium on Education in Peace, which seeks to explore multiple dimensions between education and peacebuilding. The framework is based on Nancy Fraser’s conceptualisation of social justice and focuses on four dimensions of peacebuilding: redistribution, representation, recognition and reconciliation within education. The thesis’s argument aims to contribute to the framework and hence, it will adopt a similar perspective. The chapter will explain in further detail each aspect and its contribution to sustainable peace.
Following on, chapter four offers an overview of the methods used to collect the data and analyse the data. In addition, the methodology chapter offers a discussion around the ethical considerations of conducting fieldwork in Myanmar.
The final chapter of the thesis, engages with the main findings of the fieldwork and analyses them through the theoretical lens. I start first by analysing how the state and the KNU work together towards sustainable peace. I identify two major themes derived from the previous section: inequalities in the education systems and the role of identity in ethnic education. The section on inequalities will be explained in regard to the structural transformation needed to achieve sustainable peace. Meanwhile, the section on identity will be analysed and discuss in respect to the
behavioural change also required for durable peace. I conclude every section with a brief discussion linking the results to their contribution to peace through the theoretical framework.
Finally, I conclude the thesis with a summary of the main findings to answer the research question. In addition, I critically reflect on the theoretical framework applied and methodology used to gather data. I also, offer possible area of future research based on the fieldwork and results of the research.
Chapter 1: Literature Review - the Role of Education in
Peacebuilding
I. Conceptualisation of Peace Building
The academic literature offers a wide range of definitions concerning the concept of peacebuilding. Ho - Won Jeong (2005: 1) offers an inclusive and broad definition of peacebuilding:
“involves a process comprising various functions and roles. It often entails a wide range of sequential activities, proceeding from ceasefire and refugee resettlement to the establishment of a new government and economic reconstruction. The end of violent conflict has to be accompanied by rebuilding the physical infrastructure and the restoration of essential government functions that provide basic social services. In the long run, stability cannot be achieved without the participation of former adversaries in a democratic political process and socioeconomic reform’.
Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 26) elaborate by adding that peacebuilding is ‘an effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict’. During the first generation of peacebuilding missions the approach involved short interventions centred on the role of the international community. This approach to peacebuilding was characterised by centralised and political measures by external actors (Haugerudbraaten, 1998). However, the imposition of external intervention models without regards for existing structures was confronted to the harsh reality that ‘societies at war’s end are not fresh clay that can easily be molded’ (Hartzell, 2014: 380). In effect, war has a profoundly transformative effect on societies (Faust, 2008). The shift places a stronger emphasis on the importance of indigenous actors and the local context (Haugerudbraaten, 1998; Leonardson & Rudd, 2015). This approached coined ‘peacebuilding from below’ suggest that long term ‘solutions are derived and built from below’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005). The approach reflects the importance of local empowerment. The long term and short term perspectives for conflict transformation is achieved by ‘validating and building on people and resources within the local context’ (Lederach, 1995: 212). Consequently, intervening actors must include local actors during the whole process of peacebuilding.
According to Galtung (1976) peacebuilding involves 3 dimensions that are sequenced as follows: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. During the first phase, peacemaking attempts to resolve the conflict by bringing hostile parties to a negotiated agreement (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). In a second phase, peacekeeping refers to the use of the military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations of sustainable peace (Bellamy and Williams, 2010). Nonetheless, the literature is more debated concerning the third phase of peacebuilding: peacebuilding itself. The concept was first introduced in An Agenda for Peace by Boutros Ghali (1992), where he stated that peacebuilding should be understood as ‘sustained co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems…’. This involves a multidimensional approach that requires acting upon the security, politics, economics, legal and social dimensions of a country (Hartzell, 2014). Haugerudbraaten (1998) explains that the broadness of the concept blurred the understanding of peacebuilding. Consequently, the lack of clarity has led to divisions among scholars, policymakers and practitioners especially in regard to the objective of peacebuilding (Hartzell, 2014).
The literature presents contrasting opinions on the goal of peacebuilding (Haugerudbraaten, 1998; Hartzell, 2014). A section of the literature supposes that negative peace should be the end goal (Kaufmann, 1996). Negative peace is achieved through an end to violence and ensuring that it will not start again (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 18; Gatlung, 1964). This perspective supposes a short time frame as reestablishment of security is seen as the core component of peacebuilding, Nonetheless, a considerable section of the literature argues that ensuring an end to the violence is not sufficient to achieve sustainable peace (Jeong, 2009). Unresolved issues at the root of the conflict can still regenerate violence between groups. The proponents of a more long term involvement claim that positive peace needs to be ensured in order for peace to be sustainable. Positive Peace, also called participatory peace, adds an extra component to the peace process (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006: 19, 1964). The aim is to ensure that society does not return to the pre-war status quo by pursuing social development as well as an end to confrontation. Peacebuilding must tackles the root causes of conflict in order to stop the dynamics underlying confrontation to not undermine the peace (Jeong, 2005). The core objective is to produce the conditions that will ensure that both societies do not return to conflict in the long term. Hence, peacebuilding goes beyond simply halting violence but must transform a conflictual relationship to a peaceful and constructive (Kaufman, 2006).
The mere restoration of the order does not allow for such a shift to happen because ‘it ignores the imbalances between groups in existing and economic structures (Jeong, 2005: 3). Peacebuilding efforts must be aimed at changing the underlying social structures and processes in order to stop a return to the pre-war status-quo (Ibid.) It is therefore necessary for peacebuilding campaigns to involve structural and behavioural change. Structural change is associated with state-building in a post conflict environment, which entails an institutional approach to peacebuilding to engage with the root causes of conflict to prevent renewed confrontations.(Lemay-Hébert, 2013; Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2010). State-building in the context of peaceState-building refers to a more long sighted approach focused on strengthening state institutions (Bendana, 2005). As defined by Fukuyama (2004: 17) state building implies ‘the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones’. In addition, to institutional reconstruction efforts, peacebuilding requires reconciliation between the warring parties. Peacebuilding requires a change in the nature of the human interaction between the two groups (Kaufman, 2006). The behavioural change is necessary to alter the perceptions through education programs, media campaigns…in order to establish trust between the groups (Jeong, 2005). The emotional and psychological impact of conflict must be addressed to have sustainable peace to be achieved (Kaufman, 2006). This is especially relevant in the case of ethnic conflicts (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Peacebuilding must prevent the return of the institutional inequalities underpinning the root causes of conflict as well as bridge the emotional divide between the two groups. In sum, peacebuilding is a long term process to achieve a positive peace in post conflict societies through structural and behavioural change.
II. The security first and Liberal Peace Model
International intervention in peacebuilding efforts however, has often been focused on simply ensuring a cessation of violence. The security-first approach focuses on a short to medium timeframe to ensure basic security is established so as to lay the foundations of development (Novelli, Lopez Cardozo, Smith, 2015: 5). The practice involves security as a precondition of development in order to create stability that will decrease the likelihood of a return to violence. (Denney, 2011: 279). This approach assumes that there is a relationship between poverty and security (Denney: 2011). Nevertheless, while security is clearly essential
to any peacebuilding efforts, it is not sufficient to transform a negative peace into a positive peace (Novelli and Smith, 2011).
The security-first approach is linked to the notion of ‘liberal peace’ (Paris, 2010). It reflects the view of Western democracies that peace amongst and within nations is more likely if countries prioritise security sector reform and adopt a liberal democracy with a market driven economy, the rule of law as well as strong institutions (Paris, 2004; Doyle, 2005). However this model of peace has been duly critiqued by scholars, practitioners and recipients of these interventions (Paris, 2010). In effect, liberal peace has been accused of fostering instability through the organisation of early elections and fails to address the immediate needs of the marginalised themselves (Hartzell, 2014; Newman et al., 2009; Paris, 2004).
According to McCandless (2012: 1), the international community is slowly ‘recognising the untapped potential of administrative and social services to restore peace and stability’. In contrast, the security first approach disregards the urgency of re-establishing vital social services that meet the immediate needs of the local people (health, education…). Social services can contribute to peacebuilding through two processes. First, the provision social services can directly address grievances that underlie the conflict (Ibid.:2). Secondly, it offers a direct line of contact between the state and society, helping it to restore state legitimacy (Van de Walle and Scott, 2009). Nonetheless, funds for the restoration of basic social services are often significantly inferior to those for the security sector (McCandless, 2012: 2). In turn, this suggest that the international community still prioritises a security first approach.
III.The Role of Education in Peacebuilding
As mentioned in the introduction, in this thesis I aim to show how education contributes to sustainable peace. In this last section of the chapter, I will review the literature concerning education in conflict and peace. This will help set the backdrop to my own contribution to the academic literature.
It is difficult to express a direct causal relationship between education and conflict (Smith & Vaux, 2003, UNICEF, 2014b). The literature supposes ‘two faces of education’. The first is
the destructive impact of education (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Buckland (2005: 2) explains that education systems and ‘schooling frequently play (a role) in reproducing the attitudes, values and social relations underlying civil conflict’. Based on a similar assumption, Bush and Saltarelli claim ‘that education can have a socially constructive impact on intergroup relations’ as well as a socially destructive impact (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). The role of education in an individual’s formative years has a resounding effect on the individual’s relation with society and in multi-cultural societies on the interaction between groups (Ibid.).
Several factors are recurrent in the literature highlighting the processes through which education amplifies ethnic tensions (UNICEF, 2014b, Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). First, is the unequal access to education either through denying access or the implementation of quotas. When groups are denied access to education they subsequently become excluded from socio-economic participation in the long-run (Simon & Vaux, 2003). In effect, they do not possess the skills required for employment in modern society, marginalising them and often maintaining them in poverty. Second, education can be used at a tool of cultural repression, whereby individual cultural identities are eroded by assimilationist education policies that ban the use of minority language and other cultural markers (Stavenhagen, 1996; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Imposing the majority group’s language can be seen as an act of oppression, if the minority group’s mother tongue is not acknowledged. This reflects a clear violation of a minorities cultural and linguistic rights and can lead to conflict. Thirdly, the content of the curricula and textbooks can be manipulated to reflect the dominant groups own perception of history. Graham Brown (1994) explains how the construction of history according to the dominants group understanding by omitting events and cultural ideas dear for a minority can exacerbate ethnic tensions. Furthermore, the curricula can homogenise diversity or present it as a danger, thereby heighten ethnic tensions through the distortion of history through omission or commission (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Tawil, 2003). Simultaneously, this may impact the perception of self-worth of an individual as well as breed intolerance factors underlying ethnic civil wars. Accordingly, a teacher centric education system, where the focus is on giving the correct answer rather than teaching skills necessary for learning opens up room for the child to be manipulated (Straub, 1989; Save the Children, 2008). Finally, another contributing factor is the impact of segregated systems. In the context of Myanmar, the segregation of the system is linked to
different education providers rather than being imposed by the state on ethnic grounds. In this case segregation can highlights differences and produced mutual ignorance of opposing groups.
These factors may not be all present simultaneously but they are rarely employed individually. As a result, ethnic minority children leave the formal education system without the skills necessary to integrate fully socio-economy of the country. In turn, exiling them to the fringes of society and further marginalisation. As a result, the education they receive perpetuates the inequalities of society. When extracted to a societal level these factors can deepen the ethnic divide. Nevertheless, just as education can exacerbate tensions between two groups it can also, build social cohesion (Buckland, 2004; UNICEF, 2014). Education is multidimensional impact on society - politics, culture, economy…- can reduce polarisation along ethnic lines by encouraging a more equal society and put in place a ‘culture of dialogue’ (Buckland, 2014: 12). According to Unicef (2014: 2) , education ‘Education is arguably the single most transformative institution […] It forms the bedrock of a country’s economy, good governance, gender equality, identity and culture.’
Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 27) offer four guiding principles for education in peacebuilding. First, it must be understood as a process and not as an end product. Second, it requires a long term commitment as education plays is a relevant tool during the whole peacebuilding process (UNICEF, 2014b). Third, the role of education in peacebuilding must be driven by local actors, and give a greater voice to parents and teachers alike. The process of decentralisation entails ‘improving the quality of education by increasing participation, ownership and accountability’ at the local level (Smith & Vaux, 2003: 23). Finally, education must rather create opportunity for reconciliation rather than impose solutions. In effect, the individual’s psychological process of moving past the psychological impact of the conflict is linked to the groups social cohesion and healing (Jeong, 2005). The process cannot be imposed however, education can create space for it to flourish. The four principles should guide any actors’ actions in regard to peacebuilding education and help create a system conducive to sustainable peace.
Sustainable peace is the overarching goal of peacebuilding, how can education contribute? What are the goals of peacebuilding education? Education contributes in two folds to
peacebuilding: reconstruction and reconciliation (Smith & Vaux, 2003). The concept refers to ‘repairing damage to the social fabric' not only through infrastructure and institution building but also in ‘social and emotional terms’ (Ibid.: 46). Reconstruction refers to the act of repairing the physical infrastructure and institutions demolished during the conflict. Understandably this can lead to tensions over what needs reconstruction and how (Ibid.). For example, making sure that quality education is not only found in areas demographically dominated by the majority. In terms of peacebuilding reconstructing the institutions and infrastructure must not replicate the structural inequalities underlying the conflict and promote nonviolent means of conflict resolution (Jeong, 2005; Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Reconstruction refers back to the idea for the need for structural change mentioned above. On the other hand, reconciliation is a central feature of rebuilding relations between people at a psychological and social level (Jeong, 2005). The process requires overcoming the political polarisation along ethnic lines that remain from the legacy of the violence in order to create a common bond (Ibid.: 155-158). Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 30) suggest that peacebuilding education can change ‘the rules of the game’ not by altering identities (which could be perceived as cultural repression - a cause of conflict) but by changing the interaction between groups from mistrust to mutual trust. In sum, education’s role in peacebuilding is non-negotiable. It must be understood as a long term transformative process that works towards equality and building bridges between communities. However, it is important to understand that education by its own is not sufficient to bring a short term solution to the conflict. In the long run, nevertheless, education is key to the success of peacebuilding missions.
Chapter 2: Context - Education in the Context of Peacebuilding between
the State and the KNU
In this chapter, I introduce present the context of the research. I start by explaining my case selection. Following, I outline the peace process with reference to the ceasefire and the different positions of the KNU and the state. Finally, I will give a brief description of the main actors and their education services.
I. Case selection
The aim of this thesis is to explore the contribution of education to peacebuilding in Myanmar. The studies linking education and peacebuilding in Myanmar tend to focus on the case of the Mon National Education Committee (MNEC) in the Mon state. The relationship between the MNEC and the state has been heralded as a model to strive for within a federalist state structure (Lall and South, 2016). Meanwhile, other ethnic education systems have rarely been the focus of an individual study. As mentioned previously, I focus on the case of the Karen National Union because of their developed education services and the contention around the future of these services in Myanmar. Furthermore, since the signature of a ceasefire between the state and the KNU, the Karen areas near the border with Thailand have seen continuous efforts by the government to develop the region in order to bring sustainable peace. The conflict has largely stalled since the mid 2000s between the KNU and state achieving negative peace however, sustainable peace has been elusive. Unlike the Mon, the Karen have refused to disarm and demobilised making a return to violence more probable.
In the past the KNU and the state have held several rounds of negotiations over a time span of two decades. However, the repeated failures to move past the simple halt of violence and the return to conflict, highlights the difficulties of achieving sustainable peace. In 2012, the KNU and the state reached a historical ceasefire agreement putting an end to the longest running civil war in the world since the end of World War Two. Since then, the KNU and state have worked together successfully in the health sector and have put in place a plan to converge their health systems. They have recognised the benefits of cooperation, making use of each other’s relative advantages. The state’s greater resources and the KNU’s access to hard to reach areas
have benefited the Karen population as a whole. The National Ceasefire Agreement recognises the role of education in peacebuilding and yet, it has contributed little to the peace process. The role of education in peacebuilding is significant as explained by the literature and yet, education has not been at the forefront of the peace process. It is hence interesting to understand how education has contributed or damaged the prospect for peace in the region.
II. Peace Process
A. Ceasefire - Achieving negative Peace
In 2015, Thein Sein’s government negotiated the NCA which included both previous ceasefire EAOs as well as non-ceasefire EAOs. The state’s most notorious success was ending the conflict with the KNU in 2012 and reiterating the agreement with the signature of the NCA in 2015. The agreement includes provision that recognises the role of ethnic actors within education and removes signatories from the Unlawful Association Act. Consequently, the ceasefire acknowledges the role of EAOs in providing administrative structures and services to locals. In addition, the removal of the Unlawful Association Act offers the signatories the opportunity to engage with the wider international development community and protects individual associated with the signatory group from prosecution (South and Lall, 2016). As a result, there has been a growing space for the KNU’s civilian activities due to the decline in violence and improved relation with the government (Jolliffe, 2016). Nonetheless, the KNU’s military wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has not disarmed or demobilise but have been constricted to a few guerrilla areas. Peace is not achieved in a linear fashion yet, the KNU retaining its weapons undermines the peace process - shows a lack of trust with negotiating partner - and increases the risk of a return of violence (Jeong, 2005).
B. Peace Process: Moving Past Negative Peace - Resolving Core Differences
The peace process in Myanmar is complex due to the wide range of issues that have generated the conflict as well as the ones that have appeared during the civil war. The peace
process does not solely focus on addressing the root causes of the conflict it also aims to deal with its legacy to set the foundations for a united country.
The government’s objective is to sign one peace agreement that includes all stakeholders in the conflict. The agreements would require from the EAOs the integration into the Union of Myanmar, the acceptance of the 2008 Constitution and the cessation of the pursuit for national sovereignty. These demands made by the central government requires compromises on core issues for ethnic minorities concerning self-determination. The EAOs have based their demands on the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which guarantees the right to self-determination, autonomy within a federal state and equal rights for all citizens of the Union. Unfortunately the1947 agreement was never implemented, it is seen as the trigger event of ethnic insurgencies around the country and a sign that the Bamar centralised state cannot be trusted. The EAOs’ position in the peace process seems to be concerned with protecting their cultural identity and obtaining equal rights.
In sum, the ceasefire has successfully secured a decline of the violence and an increase in the development of the region. Nevertheless, the KNU and the government have yet to find a solution to core differences between them.
III.Main actors
A. The State
In 2011, the ruling junta passed over its power to a quasi-democratic civilian government elected in a sham election, which many ethnic political parties, as well as Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, boycotted. Nevertheless, the former general and President Thein Sein initiated much-needed reforms in all sectors of government in a move to decentralise the state. Reform was slow and little was done during his time in power to alleviate ethnic political grievances. However, education was placed at the forefront of sectorial reform as can be seen by the vast increases in the MoE’s budget and moves to make education free and compulsory (Jolliffe & Speers Mears, 2016: 28). Moerover, a number of information gathering initiatives and the beginning of a
decentralisation process can be observed. For example, the state has created space for MTB education in government schools if it is necessary. Other plans such as the Comprehensive Education Sector Reform (CESR) which informed the 2014 National Education Law included guarantees for the preservation of ethnic culture through education. In effect, it underlines the importance of education in the wider process of structural reform the state is undertaken in the context democratisation.
In the following elections in 2015, the NLD’s landslide victory was met with national and international applause at the prospect of further reform, however with it also came high expectations. Little can yet be gathered from the NLD’s impact on education apart from the recently published National Education Strategic Program (NESP), which plans out education reform targets between 2016 - 2021. However, the report already faces a number of challenges. Most notably the plan was published in 2017, a year after the plan was due to be implemented. Secondly, it gives little information has to how the NLD will deal with education reform as it was commissioned by the previous government and only modified slightly by Suu Kyi’s government. In addition, the central government will have to coordinate internally between all the departments that work within the education: Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Border Affairs and Security, the Tatmadaw and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture.
Altogether, these ministries provide some form of support (funds, materials and uniforms) to formal state and non-state education establishments. However, the MoE does not officially recognise support given to schools by ethnic education providers. Consequently, they are unlikely to coordinate with existing infrastructure when expanding to a new area. The MoE either recognises them as a community school or as a MoE schools, even though the ethnic education provider is present within the school.
In conclusion, since 2011 the democratic governments have worked on bringing EAOs to the negotiation table to reach a peace agreement. Simultaneously, the governments have engaged in education sector reform but progress has been slow. Nevertheless, both these moves shows intent in developing the country and acting upon the difficulties present.
B. Karen
The Karen people are the third largest ethnic group in Myanmar, making up 7% of the population, approximately five to six million people (South, 2011). The ethnic group is widespread geographically, they cover the corridor from the Ayeyarwady Region to the southeast border area along the coast. Due to the conflict hundreds of thousands have fled to Thailand as refugees or as migrant workers in border cities such as Mae Sot. The majority of the ethnic group are Buddhist as in most of Myanmar, however, Christians represent 20% of the group (Jolliffe, 2016).
Contrary to popular belief, the term ‘Karen’ encompasses multiple culturally diverse sub-groups. Since the start of the civil war the two dominant sub-groups, Sgaw and Pwo Karen, have been at the forefront of the ethnic group’s political representation. The culturally diverse sub groups have mutually unintelligible languages, yet the feeling of a common identity emerged as a result of a shared history and has been consolidated by the experience of the civil war (Minority Rights Group, 2017). The shared experiences and cultural proximity of the groups has resulted in a united political ethnic identity, which was initially represented by the KNU. Unfortunately, throughout the course of the conflict the united political front based on a shared identity collapsed in the 1990s. In 1995 the group suffered a major setback as a large Buddhist faction defected to form the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DBKA), as tension appeared between KNU Christian elite and the mostly Buddhist ranking soldiers. The split between the Christian and the Buddhist in the KNU is considered the reasons for the group’s rapid decline (Jolliffe, 2016). Nonetheless, the KNU remains the main insurgent opposition to the state in the Kayin State.
C. Karen National Union
The KNU political agenda walks a fine line between unification and secession, the group advocates for a total autonomous state within a Union of equals composed of the different ethnic groups within Myanmar. For many years the KNU has fought for regime change and was a strong supporter of the democratic movement in Myanmar. However, since 2012 the KNU has shifted its focus to obtaining a federal state with complete internal
autonomy (Jolliffe, 2016). These demands reflect a central political grievance that motivates the KNU: the domination of the state apparatus by the ethnic Bamar (Mang, 2012).The KNU’s parallel governance structure supports these demands for autonomy by providing an example of how a federal system could work (South & Lall, 2016). Simultaneously, the parallel governance can be seen as a symbol of resistance against the Bamar centric state Because defies the centralised system and Burmanisation (Ibid.).
Since entering talks with the state in 2011 the KNU’s relation with the state has considerably changed. Seen for a long time has one of the state’s fiercest enemies due to the repeated failure of peace talks in 1949, 1960, 1963 and again in the 1990s, compared with armed groups in the north of the country such as the Kachin who until recently had maintained a ceasefire with government for two decades (David Taw, 2005). The situation has in recent years been flipped on its head has the Kachin have returned to fighting, while the KNU has been a central partner to the government in bringing ethnic groups to the table. The new relation with the government has been duly critique by external actors (EAOs, Karen civil societies…) and ethnic Karen alike. The internal dissent has caused a major split within the KNU that has cast a shadow of doubt over the group’s ability to internally agree to any peace agreement (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017).
The KNU has three responsibilities: the physical protection of the Karen people, the political representation and governance. The first two are explored above in relation to conflict and representation in the peace process. Finally, the KNU acts as a parallel governance system in many Karen areas. For example, there exist numerous ethnic 1
community schools in government held areas where state schools are also present but where members of the community would rather send their child to an ethnic education school (Jolliffe & Speers Mears, 2016). The KNU’s Karen Education Department (KED), along with its network of local NGOs support over 1,504 community schools covering over 160,000 students and providing stipends to over 4000 teachers during the 2015-2016 academic year (KSEAG, 2015). Ethnic education providers such as the KED are ‘any organisation that defines itself in relation to ethnicity and that provides basic education services - kindergarten, primary school, middle school, and high schools’ (Jolliffe & Speers
Interview 2 19/04/2017
Mears, October 2016). Historically, Karen education has been provided by local authorities, religious or community organisations. The ethnic education system has changed little since the start of the civil war and relies on teaching the main Karen language (Sgaw) as well as Karen literature and culture. The protection of Karen identity is based on the continuation of these teachings. The KED support local community based schools through teacher training programs by the Karen Working Teachers Group (KWTG), furniture and classroom textbooks (their own or the governments) as well as helping to build schools. In addition, the KED plays an important role in helping students access further education pathways be it in government schools or in migrant schools across the border in Thailand (Jolliffe, 2016).
In sum, the KNU is the most significant political representation of ethnic Karen in opposition to the government, even though the situation has shifted in recent year towards a more collaborative partnership in some sectors. The ethnic education services remain symbols of resistance against the Bamar dominated state. They come in support of self determination claims and protect the Karen identity.
IV.Concluding Summary:
Since 2011, the ethnic Karen have seen a decline in violence and an expansion in their freedoms. Nevertheless, the state and the KNU have failed to move past the significant achievement of negative peace as core differences are not resolved. The democratisation of the state has opened up space for much needed structural reform of the education sector. In addition, peacebuilding has increased the opportunity for both parties to extend their civil administration, however this may cause more problems rather than bring solutions. Service delivery in particular education in ceasefire areas remains a contentious issue as both parties have attached a strategic and symbolic importance to the issue.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
I. The ‘4Rs’ perspective on Peacebuilding
In this thesis, I argue that not addressing education as a concrete way to achieve sustainable peace has led to the failure of peacebuilding in Myanmar. Education in the KNU and State peacebuilding efforts has not contributed to transforming the status quo between the state and the KNU as well as its education service affiliates. In effect, the state education system fails on several aspects. First, it fails to provide equal access to the Karen children. Second, it fails to recognise the ethnic diversity of students. Third, the centralised decision making process has failed to include important stakeholders within education reform. Finally, the KNU education system fails to move past the ethnocentric mindset that deepens ethnic mistrust between the Karen and the state.
The lens used to analyse the findings is based on the theoretical framework developed by Novelli, Lopez Cardozo, Smith (2015) for the Research Consortium on Education in Peace. It builds upon the framework offered by Fraser to understand the connection between social justice and positive peace. Fraser defines her ideal of social justice as participatory parity (Fraser, 1998). The norms suggest that justice requires social arrangements that permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers (Fraser, 1998: 5). The 3R’s framework offers a diagnostic tool that underlines: injustices, disparities, limitations … and does not simply focus on the need for redistribution of resources but also includes issues of representation and recognition of minority groups. The 4R’s framework builds upon Fraser’s work by adding an extra dimension: reconciliation. The latter is fundamental as it emphasises the transformative aspect necessary to move from negative to positive peace. The analytical lens focuses on the link between education and peacebuilding, and argues that to achieve positive peace, a socially just education is crucial. The analytical lens recognises the multiple dimensions of inequality and injustice that underline the structural and symbolic violence at the root of ethnic confrontation. The framework links social justice in the education sector with sustainable peace through four interlinked causal mechanisms: redistribution, representation, recognition and reconciliation. In effect, the interconnected dimensions helps highlight ‘the role of education
within cultural, political and economic processes of conflict and peacebuilding’ (Higgins, Maber, Lopez Cardozo & Shah, 2016: 2).
Before moving onto the results of my research it is important to define each term and its contribution to sustainable peace through peacebuilding efforts within the education sector. First, redistribution refers to addressing inequalities in terms of economic redistribution of resources; not only financially but also in terms of equality of access and outcomes in education. Indeed, the unequal redistribution of resources can undermine peacebuilding by perpetuating the structural inequalities between groups and returning to the pre conflict status quo. A biased distribution of resources exacerbates tensions that lead to conflict.
Second, representation refers to the political dimension of inclusive involvement of stakeholders in decision-making at all levels of the education sector (state, regional and local). The freedom of expressing ones opinion and having an impact on the decision making process reduces feeling of marginalisation. In post-conflict countries it is paramount that the decision making process be as inclusive as possible in order for individuals to feel part of a common destiny. In turn, fostering a feeling of belonging through political representation contributes to a peaceful society.
The third dimension refers to the cultural and identity role played by education in peacebuilding. It involves, respecting individual cultures and identities through the recognition of minority languages, history… In multi-ethnic countries it is important to recognise the positive contribution of diversity to the nation. Recognising that individuals can have several identities (for example: an individual can identify with being Myanmarese, Karen and Christian simultaneously) and accepting it as being a positive contribution to the nation, will promote a culture of dialogue rather than violence.
Finally reconciliation refers to bridging ethnic animosity by transforming a destructive relationship into a constructive and peaceful one. The transformative dimension supposes overcoming the past to foster tolerance and trust through education. Reconciliation is not only a process but an end goal of peacebuilding. Eliminating animosity between former enemies is crucial to positive peace. The behavioural change necessary is a long term process.
Reconciliation unlike the other three dimensions requires both side to overcome the past and does not solely rely on state action.
It is important to note the overlap between each of the ‘4Rs’ (Novelli, Lopez Cardozo, Smith, 2015: 17). Redistribution through for example the provision of equal access for students to schools, also requires the recognition of individual identities of marginalised groups in order for inclusion and equal opportunity of all students. In this regard the recognition of diversity is strongly connected to the reconciliation of differences between students. In turn, reconciliation and recognition are connected to representation through the place given to marginalised group in the education content and decision making process. Finally, representation in decision making is related to redistribution through the process of allocation of resources.
The 4R’s framework will be used to analyse the education systems within the peacebuilding process. The role of education in conflict as explained previously is fundamental because of the double impact it has; first, on reproducing structural inequality and second, on deepening the ethnic divide, by consolidating ethnic identities. In consequence, education plays an important part in peacebuilding through the structural change (for example providing equal access) and behavioural change (for example promoting tolerance) it supports.
II. Assumptions
I make therefore, a certain number of assumptions regarding education and peacebuilding. First, I assume that the goal of peacebuilding is to achieve a positive peace as defined by Gatlung (1964). This requires moving past the security-first approach and towards a socially just idea of peace that requires more than the simple redistribution of resources. A social justice approach to peacebuilding requires addressing inequalities of marginalised minorities politically, culturally and socially because these factors are the basis for the unequal distribution of resources (Novelli, Lopez Cardozo, Smith, 2015: 17). A sustainable approach to peacebuilding contributes to the social development of society by addressing the root causes of conflict that are political, economic and social in nature.
Secondly, I do not posit that education alone can produce a positive peace however, I assume that social services such education and health play an important role in the peacebuilding process. As education is multi-dimensional and impacts security, politics, economics, culture and social. First, education plays a vital role in creating a safe society in post conflict affected countries by laying the foundations for reforms within the security sector. Secondly, educating parties in the need to produce solid political structures to be involved in the decision making process, through mechanisms promoting dialogue rather than violence. Thirdly, education contributes to etc equal economic integration of the individual that allows him to provide for his livelihood. Finally, education can transform social relations in a way that leads to greater tolerance of diversity, trust between groups and a commitment to dialogue (UNICEF, 2011: 33). It is therefore, necessary to understand education as a multidimensional instrument of social transformation with the aim of achieving social justice.
Chapter 4: Methodology
The chapter discusses the methods used to collect and analyse the data as well as the ethical considerations.
I. Methods
A. Data Collection: Semi-structured Interviews
The qualitative date was collected through semi-structured interviews as it gives the opportunity for the participant to express his experiences and views on the subject of study in his own words. However, the data collected might lack in objectivity. The interviewer carries out the interview with a specific direction in mind - the particularities of different systems, peace process, funding… - however, the interviewee is given the opportunity to approach the issues through his own perceptions. Accordingly, the participant can discuss topics that he feels especially relevant from his own experiences that might not have appeared to the researcher. In contrast, structured interviews and surveys do not permit such flexibility. To facilitate the interviews and make sure that all aspects were covered, I designed interview guides. I interviewed people of different backgrounds and expertise consequently the questions were adapted in accordance to the person's own position within the group and responses.
Altogether, nine one-hour one-on-one interviews and another with two participants were carried out with individuals with diverse roles in the education sector. To understand the opportunities and challenges faced by Karen in terms of education on a local level three NGO teachers and teacher trainer were interviewed in Mae Sot, Thailand as well as an expert on ethnic Karen. The other interviews were carried out with a more specific outlook on policy and the peace process. The interviews include a senior member of the KED as well as six executives from organisations that help provide and coordinate education in conflict-affected areas in Southeast Myanmar. The time constraint did not allow me to re-interview respondents in order to check the consistency of responses. In spite of this, certain issues were ever-present and dominated much of the interviews which indicated their
importance to the research. Initially, it was also planned to interview staff in Karen community schools in both government-controlled and KNU controlled areas in order to get interview people that have been impacted by the peace process in the education sector. However, due to time, resource and security constraints, it was not possible. As a result, individuals selected for interviews have significant knowledge of the Karen and state education systems. Moreover, I was given the opportunity to participate in a workshop on Current Challenges and Future Direction for English teachers organised by the Thabyay Education Institute in Yangon. The workshop might not have been specifically on ethnic education but it gave me a better understanding of the obstacles faced by education services in the country as teachers were invited to give their own views and ask questions on discrimination in the classroom, infrastructure deficit, child centered learning… In addition, Karen, Burmese and other ethnics nationalities that I met in Mae Sot, Mawlanmyne and Yangon were very eager to share their thoughts on Myanmar’s political situation. Informal discussions with several locals informed my understanding of ethnic minority grievances as well as their perceptions of state and ethnic education systems.
As I do not speak Burmese or any of the Karen dialects, all the interviews were conducted in English during which notes were taken and reviewed immediately after. Furthermore, when conducting semi-structured interviews it is recommended to record the interaction as it enables the researcher to focus on the participant's responses and not be distracted by note taking (Bryman, 2012). Unfortunately, due to the sensitive nature of education in conflict dynamics, recording was not always accepted even under the promise of total anonymity. I will keep secret the identities of the participants for their own safety. I will, therefore, minimise all biographical elements in order to make it impossible to identify individual respondents.
I was present on the field from April 12th to May 8th; the already short time frame was made shorter by holidays linked to the Song Kran festival in Thailand and the Thingyan festival in Myanmar during the first week in Thailand and for up to two weeks in Myanmar. Unfortunately, due to the festivities the schools were closed and travelling was made difficult. I believe it had an impact on the amount of data gathered because potential respondents were on holiday. In sum, the constraints expressed above have been taken into
account in the research process as they hamper the accuracy of the data collection and therefore, its analysis.
B. Data Analysis
The raw data was analysed systematically after each interview in order to be able to adapt and correct questions, methods and other tools used during the meeting. As not all interviews were recorded, the analysis was done based on the notes taken during and after the interviews. From the interviews, I highlighted the recurring themes in relation to the research question guiding the thesis. The themes were then compared with those identified in the literature in order to give a comprehensive answer to the research question posed.
In order to avoid bias during my interviews I crafted opened ended questions and adopted a neutral stance in regard to the perception of the interviewee on a given topic. In addition, I would ask several times the same question to different respondents to get confirmation or denial of information previously gathered. However, as in all qualitative research a certain level of bias is inevitable (Bryman, 2012).
II. Ethical issues
While undertaking the research project I considered the ethical implications during data collection on the field (Bryman, 2012). I was briefed before my departure on the ethical behaviour to adopt during my interaction with respondents. Conducting research on issues pertaining to ethnic communities, the government and the peace process is particularly sensitive in Myanmar. I, therefore, paid attention to make participant feel at ease in taking part in the project. I obtained verbal consent beforehand as to not leave a paper trail disclaiming names, and all academic material in relation to the project was secured for the duration of the research project. Before each interview, I made sure to introduce the objectives of the study and respondents confirmed partaking on a voluntary basis. In case, the interview was recorded the informants were explained that at any time they could request for the recordings to stop. In the end of every interview, I reassured them of the anonymity of their responses. The measures employed helped alleviate any feeling of discomfort and assure the security of the participants.
Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis
In this chapter, I present my findings in three sections and tie them to my theoretical framework. I start by studying the Karen Education Department and the state’s education systems contribution to peace. I then analyse the negative impact of inequalities in the education systems on sustainable peace. Lastly, I explain the link between education and Karen identity and its impact on achieving positive peace.
I. KED and the State working towards sustainable peace?
“We still don’t know how or if we can integrate [with the MoE] in the future. That depends on the negotiations between the MoE and central KED. Our aim [at the local level] is to give children an education.” (East Daw Na, Kayin State, KED administrator cited by: Jolliffe, 2016)
The KED acknowledges that the ceasefire has opened up room for interaction with the government. Nonetheless, the ethnic education provider remains wary of the state’s increasing presence in previously inaccessible areas. In this section, I argue that the ceasefire has created space for cooperation between the government and the KNU however, that the cooperation seems to be imposed rather than willing.
A. National Ceasefire Agreement - Coordination problems exposing a fragile peace
The KED was formally established in the 1970s but the KNU has been supporting community schools since the 1950s. Today, the KED helps schools in areas under government control, mixed control and in its strongholds along the Thai border. The KED recognises that if it is to continue to be relevant in a peaceful federal system within Myanmar it will need to transform. However, the 2
KED is questioning whether to engage in development and reform with the government in parallel to the peace process or to wait for the peace process to be completed. The KNU as a whole has 3
shown reticence in engaging with the government “as it does not want to be caught in the same
Interview 2 19/04/2017
2
Ibid
situation as the Kachin”. The ethnic Kachin insurgent group in the north of the country had a 4
ceasefire in place with the government for over 20 years during which the region opened up to State led development. Ethnic Kachin schools cooperated extensively with the state education system during that period. However, in 2011 the agreement collapsed leaving Kachin social services vulnerable due to their exposure and reliance to the state. Consequently, many respondents referred to previous actions taken by the government during ceasefires with other ethnic groups to explain the KNU’s reserve in working with the government. The failures of peacebuilding enterprises by the government in other ceasefire areas has depicted it as an untrustworthy partner in development.
During the research, I was led to understand that the KED was still unsure of how to deal with the government and lacked a clear visualisation of the strategy in the long-run. In the meantime, 5
the interim arrangement as previously stated recognises the role of ethnic education providers in Chapter 6 and imposes coordination between the two groups in terms of balancing social services and opening space for cooperation. Unfortunately, recognition has caused some tensions between 6
Karen taking a hardline against the government and those with a softer approach. The removal from the Unlawful Association Act has brought the KED into the legal fold obliging it to abide to existing laws. As a result, “from that perspective, we are no more than their (government) agency”, as one respondent expressed. Obviously, we can understand that the perception can critically undermine 7
the KNU’s own position within the peace process as the agreement establishes a hierarchy by placing the KNU under the authority of the 2008 Constitution which the state is the guarantor. The hierarchy imposes an inequality of status within the peace process, therefore the state does not treat the KNU as its equal within the peace process. Consequently, the KNU is wary of the state’s peacebuilding efforts.
Nevertheless, respondents have claimed “we want to work in accordance to NCA […] but no
coordination” as the NCA fails to clarify the mechanisms for coordination between the two parties. 8
Interview 4 20/04/2017
4
Interview 2 19/04/2017
5
‘Chapter 6: Future Tasks’, National Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic
6
of the Union of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organisation, October 15th, 2015
(www.peaceagreements.org/wggsite/downloadAgreementMasterDocument/id/1436)(accessed 12/06/2017) Interview 2 19/04/2017 7 Ibid. 8
The KED and the state representatives have struggled to communicate effectively on balancing services between education regimes. The growing number of meetings between the two sides has not established local sectoral procedures for interaction outside of the central level (Union level). One respondent underlined the difficulties of dealing with the government:
“We’ve not met at Union level but at State level. It is frustrating because at the state and regional level there is no education minister, there is only one at Union level. State and Regions only have directors. So a lot of things raised with them are beyond their authority” 9
The lack of high-level executive representatives of the state education system deeply undermines the negotiations for sectoral reform alongside the peace process. In effect, this reveals an imbalance within the relationship because the decision-making process for state education is done at the central level. The no-show of decision makers at talks with the KED from the government side suggest a continued marginalisation of the Karen representatives from decision making.
B. National reform a missed opportunity for inclusion
Respondents also, claimed that the shortage of minority representation extended to important decision making processes concerning the government education reform plans including Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR), National Education Law 2014 and the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP). One respondent described the CESR as “comprehensive but not
inclusive” when pushed to explain further the interviewee stated that the government invited only
ethnic people from within the state structure, therefore excluding the parallel education systems. 10
In his case, the government has sought validation for its program from ethnic minorities already within its own structure, therefore not including the minority stakeholders outside the state education system. In addition, during the two review sessions for the NESP, only senior members were invited to speak, denying teachers, headmasters and students the opportunity to give their own comments. The peace process, therefore, seems to be conducted at the Union level and imposed upon the local population without cooperation. Another respondent, however, questioned the comprehensiveness of the review as he explained the flawed data collection:
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
“For example, textbooks are being distributed in refugee camps but refugee schools do not use government system. The system is comprehensive as government does distribute books but not comprehensive as not used by ethnic groups” 11
The school system in refugee camps along the Thai side of the border is run by the Karen Refugee Committee Education Entity (KRCEE), a branch of the KED. Students inside the camps are taught in Karen (Sgaw) and learn the Karen curriculum hence the translation of state education textbooks is not appropriate as it does not reflect the local context. Similar comments were made concerning the NESP: “little attention given in the NESP to ethnic complimentary education
systems”. Terms such as ‘ethnic’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationality’ appear scarcely in the education plan for 12
the next five years (Ministry of Education, 2017). Ethnic education providers hoped that this plan 13
was going to give them a firm idea of what the new democratic government had envisioned for ethnic education providers, however the plan fell well short of expectations. The failure to include ethnic education providers within the reform program marks a missed opportunity by the government to make concrete moves towards making the system more than just complimentary by name. The two examples seem to highlight a recurring tendency in the peace process that coordination is done on the government's terms.
C. State expansion in the local context
Nonetheless, the KED and the government have managed to agree to an informal arrangement allowing the transfer of ethnic education students to state schools. In this regard, we see that the government and the KED are working together to give the opportunity to students to receive a recognised education. Ethnic education is not recognised by the government, therefore KED graduates often find themselves without an accredited diploma. Unfortunately, as one respondent put it, “it is not because your door is unlocked that they (ethnic minorities) can come in”. The 14
interviewee was expressing her doubts over the actual accessibility of MoE schools that often require placement tests in order for pupils to be transferred from the KED to the state system. The
Interview 4 19/04/2017
11
Interview 9 06/05/2017
12
The term ‘Ethnic’ appears 22 times, ‘Ethnicity’ appears once and ‘ethnic education schools/
13
systems’ appears 4 times in a 268 page document. Interview 3 20/04/2017
