Leadership? The role of leadership within political resistance in Germany during the rise of the NSDAP

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Leadership?

The role of leadership within political resistance

in Germany during the rise

of the NSDAP

Anika Auweiler

10113509

Master Thesis

Holocaust and Genocide Studies

Graduate School of Humanities

Supervisor and First Reader: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate

Second Reader: Dr. Karel Berkhoff

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Chapter 1. Introduction

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Resistance movements and, especially, individual acts of opposition can be found in all cases of war or civil conflict. There have even been occasions where these movements have been able to stop the atrocities which have been taking place in their country. A prominent example is the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group formed largely from Rwandan refugees who felt forced to leave their own country decades before. By invading Rwanda and overpowering the opposition they were able to bring to a halt the Genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In a post-war context, the people, groups or individuals who offered resistance against a former government, leaders or even rebels, are often depicted as heroes within their country and used as examples of bravery. An important point that needs to be considered in this context is that every country that has faced a conflict or war has experienced certain forms of resistance. The motivations and reasons for any form of resistance activity are always unique and in a certain way are dependent on the political structure that these acts are aimed against, the resources available, and the risks the resisting groups or individuals are willing to take. General questions that arise while researching the topic of resistance are which different kinds of actions or acts can be defined as resistance and if these acts should be measured depending on efficiency and outcome or judged on their motivation and commitment?

To be able to analyze the acts and motivations of resistance, or the failure to perform an effective resistance, it is of great importance to identify the actors involved; those in the field, those working more covertly, and the leaders behind resistance. Furthermore, to understand the context of these resistance acts it is important to identify the enemy, they are directed towards. The aim of this thesis is to show that acts of political resistance are not only dependent on individual decisions and actions but are interwoven with the actions and decisions made by many different actors, especially the leadership of the party. Furthermore, this thesis also aims to show to what extent decisions made in the past influenced the future.

Most of resistance literature differentiates between certain groups that are often involved in diverse forms of resistance. The military, religious institutions and political parties are organizational structures that are always included in such a discussion. However, a form of resistance that can be found in every conflict is political resistance. This does not necessarily need to take the form of open, active, or even armed resistance, but to a certain degree the political opposition will make sure, or at least attempt to ensure, that their voices of disapproval will be heard. The task of a political party in general is to

1_{Explanatory note by the author: As most of the literature used for this thesis is written in German, quotes used in the text are} translated into English to the best of the author’s ability and cited in the original language in the footnotes. The German quotes cited in the footnotes are adopted from the original text but the new spelling rules are used. German words that do not exist in the English language will be italicized and explained.

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2 represent their political agenda and voters’ wishes and to defend these against opposing parties and agendas. It can be argued that they resist their opposition in a legal context. In the case of political parties in Germany in the 1930s, the legal framework within which they could function in opposition to the government became increasingly restricted and was finally taken away completely just one month after Adolf Hitler became chancellor in 1933. The transformation from a ‘legal’ to an ‘unlawful’ form of political party will be one of the main topics within this thesis. As an example, the focus will be on two of the largest German opposition parties at that time, the SPD (Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschland) and the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland). Two topics will be central to this thesis: resistance and leadership, and in particular how these two factors influenced and affected each other.

As it is important to understand the historical context of this thesis, this introduction will give a short overview concerning the rise of the NSDAP and Hitler’s role as a leader. Furthermore, it will give a short summary of the two opposition parties, the SPD and the KPD, and give the reader a basic understanding of their political, legal and social situation. Later chapters will consider in more detail the opposition and resistance activities of these two parties. The next part will give a summary of the methodology of resistance and the diversity of resistance definitions. These parts of the introduction are necessary to explain the scope of this thesis and will lead to the formulation of the research question at the end of this chapter.

1.1 Historical Introduction

The focus of this subchapter will be the structural and political situation of Germany before and during the early years of Third Reich. An important question is how did most of the population decide to support, rather than to resist, the Nazi regime? We will examine the reasons that could explain their overall support and how Hitler succeeded in convincing a large part of a nation to support, or least condone, his rise to power. Furthermore, this chapter explains the risks taken by the few who were willing to openly voice their opinions against the leading regime. It also allows the reader to get a sense of the difficult transition faced by those people who decided to continue their work within the underground.

1.1.1 Hitler’s rise to power and the Weimar Republic

It can certainly be stated that Hitler was able to achieve a level of popularity and a large number of votes in a short period of time. One of the questions that is often asked is how he could achieve this? One answer forces us to consider the instability of the government and state structure he replaced, that of the Weimar Republic.

The Weimar Republic, established in 1918 after World War I, lasted for only fifteen years. Its starting situation was not a promising one. Even though the government had tried to get over what for many

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3 Germans was the humiliating loss of the Great War, reparations connected with the peace treaty and unprecedented hyperinflation kept raising concerns and doubts about the new government.2_{Due to}

these concerns, the government never got the chance to stabilize its relationship with the public and to rebuild a level of trust. Even though economic growth was picking up by around 1924, the economy and society were neither stable nor independent enough to survive the Great Depression that followed the Crash of 1929. Frustration concerning high unemployment rates, low income and little to no financial support for the poor, dominated public opinion of the Weimar Republic. “The Nazis initially built on the popular mood in the country in early 1933. Most solid citizens, and not just the Nazis, were fed up with the failed Weimar experiment.”3

Hitler as the candidate and spokesperson of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSADP) used these deficiencies to his advantage. The increase of support for Hitler was already apparent in the 1930 election where the NSDAP won 107 out of 577 Reichstag seats. Despite the fact that Hitler lost the presidential election to the incumbent president Paul von Hindenburg in March and April 1932, support and membership for his party increased as the crisis progressed.4_{This can also be seen in the}

increase of members that joined the party in the early 1930s; whereas in 1930 the Nazi movement had 129,583 registered members, the membership nearly quadrupled to reach 849,009 in 1933.5_{Some of}

these new members joined due to their frustration with the current government and their dislike of older more established parties, while others joined because they identified with the propaganda of the NSDAP and were sure that their troubles would be heard. “Hitler was able to make the transformation from rabble-rousing political speaker, into the deeply beloved Führer in a short time.”6

Even though the NSDAP, a political party that had been illegal only a couple of years previously, never reached a sitting majority, it became the largest party in the elections of 1932. The government realized that Hitler’s popularity and ability to charm a crowd could make him a useful tool to put at ease those frustrated minds who wanted an end to the Weimar Republic.7_{He was appointed as Chancellor in 1933.}

As only three members of the NSDAP, including Adolf Hitler, held positions in the government at that time, the government was sure of its ability to control the NSDAP members and move them in accord with the needs of the government. What would later be known as a political takeover was really a process of devolution of power, due to an underestimation of Hitler’s influence and support network.8

Even though Hitler was able to stabilize his power faster than anticipated, the leaders at the Reichstag gave him the opportunity to do so.

2_{Van Riel, A. & Schram, A. (1993). Weimar economic decline, Nazi economic recovery, and the stabilization of political} dictatorship. The journal of economic history, 53(01), p. 75

3_{Gellately, R. (2001). Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany. Oxford University Press. p.2}

4_{Van Riel, A., & Schram, A. (1993). Weimar economic decline, Nazi economic recovery, and the stabilization of political} dictatorship. The journal of economic history, 53(01), pp. 79-80

5_{Gellately, R. (2001). p.16} 6_{Gellately, R. (2001). p.9}

7_{Bergen, D. L. (2009). War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p.50} 8_{Hildebrand, K. (2009). pp.1-2}

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1.1.2 The characteristics of Adolf Hitler as a leader

One of the attributes that allowed Adolf Hitler to climb to the top of the political ladder in only a couple of years, was his ability to convince the public to support him. For example, by promising change for people where it was thought necessary.9_{Historical works in the first decades after the Third Reich}

assumed that the terror and violence typical of the later years of Third Reich were the norm in the early years of the regime and were a route to power. This appears not to have been the case and while violence was used as a tool, it was applied in a more controlled way, mainly against the opposition. Instead, Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann, Head of the Institute for Didactics of Democracy in Hannover, Germany, argued that by giving the public the feeling that they were heard and understood, Hitler was able to create a bond with the people who later voted for him while at the same time constructing a new social and political space which diminished the necessity to use violence as a political tool.10_Therefore,

violence and terror were only necessary as a tool against open opposition. The Canadian academic Robert Gellately, one of the leading scholars in the field of European history, and especially Nazi-Germany, quoted the historian Golo Mann to describe the state of mind of many Germans at that time of change. He argued, “It was the feeling that Hitler was historically right which made a large part of the nation ignore the horrors of the Nazi takeover……people were ready for it.”11_{Of course, to say that}

so many followed and supported Hitler during his dictatorial career because he was ‘historically right’ would simplify the situation. It can be argued however that he knew exactly how to use the characteristics of that time to his advantage. Klaus Hildebrand, a German historian and specialist on German military and political history, argued that one of the reasons the public could identify with Hitler’s plans for the future of Germany was a change in the general atmosphere. The widespread feeling of frustration towards democracy was part of this atmosphere.12_{Wolfgang Sauer, a German historian,}

stated

Evidence suggests that Hitler's prestige with the masses did not rest exclusively on economic and foreign policy successes; it also appears to have been supported by the fact that Hitler succeeded again and again in defeating and humiliating the members of the old oligarchy. Hitler's frequent invectives against this class in his speeches are usually explained as motivated merely by his own personal resentments.13

Nevertheless, the population only knew a fraction of his plans, at least in the early years of the Third Reich, and were rather ignorant about those attributes of Nazi policies that did not concern them. Hildebrand argued that in the years prior to Hitler’s election he only showed that part of his ideology

9_{Gellately, R. (2001). pp. 12-14}

10_{Schmiechen- Ackermann, D. (2012)'Volksgemeinschaft': Mythos, wirkungsmächtige soziale Verheißung oder soziale}

Realität im'Dritten Reich'?: Zwischenbilanz einer kontroversen Debatte. Schöningh, 2012. p. 29

11_{Golo Mann in Gellately, R. (2001). p.12} 12_{Hildebrand, K. (2009). p.14}

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5 that would satisfy the German citizens and convince them to vote for him. Most of the population did not realize what was happening behind the scene, because life did not change much in the first years after Hitler’s election. Hildebrand reasons, “The price for peace and quiet was certainly disproportionately high, since on the political level terror took the place of justice.”14_Political

opponents that did not adapt to Hitler’s political plans were forced to leave and in many cases were prosecuted for their convictions.

The British historian Ian Kershaw is well known for his work on National Socialism and his thorough research regarding Adolf Hitler. In his book Hitler, The Germans, and The Final Solution, he compared Stalin and Hitler and analysed their roles and positions as leaders of dictatorships. One of the main differences between them was, according to Kershaw, the security of their position and the loyalty given to them by their nations. On the one hand, he describes Hitler as a charismatic leader with no obvious replacement; the people supported him personally and not the party in general. On the other hand, Stalin was a feared rather than a trusted leader. Kershaw argued that in contrast to Hitler, Stalin was replaceable because the public did not have a bond of trust with him.15_{In his book Hildebrand used a}

quote by P. Stadler who points out that “Hitler, as opposed to Lenin, Mussolini and Franco, in fact earned his rise to his voters, who turned his party (the NSDAP) into the most forceful party at the Reichstag”.16

From the very beginning it was in Hitler’s best interests to forge a bond of loyalty with his voters, as he had previously done with his early followers. Loyalty is something that cannot be forced upon someone and can be identified as a crucial determinant of power. People are more willing to follow a leader whom they trust that he will have their best interests at heart, even if others must suffer for these goals to be met, rather than to follow a leader who could turn on them any moment.17_{Furthermore a}

leader who is elected to an office of power acts with a certain level of legitimacy. The British military historian Richard Overy makes a similar comparison in his book “The Dictators”. He argued that,

There is now no doubt that each dictatorship depended on winning the endorsement or co-operation of the majority of the people they ruled, and that they did not survive only from the fear they inspired. They each developed a powerful sense of their own legitimacy, which was shared by much of the population; this sense of moral certainty can only be comprehended by unravelling the threads of the moral garb in which the two systems were dressed.18

14_{Original Quote: ‘Freilich war der Preis für Ruhe und Ordnung, unverhältnismäßig hoch, da im politischen Bereich der Terror} an die Stelle des Rechtes getreten war. ‘ Hildebrand, K. (2009). p.6

15_{Kershaw, I. (2008). Hitler, The Germans, and The Final Solution. Yale University Press. pp. 33-37}

16_{Original Quote: „Dass Hitler im Gegensatz zu Lenin, Mussolini und Franco seinen Aufstieg wirklich den Wählern zu} verdanken hatte, welche seine Partei (die NSDAP) zur mächtigsten Partei des Reichstags machten“, P. Stadler in Hildebrand, K. (2009). p.4

17_{Kershaw, I. (2008). p. 35}

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1.1.3 Charismatic leadership

Kershaw explained the “systemlessness’ of Nazism and Hitler’s aversion to administration and long-term decision making. 19_{Nevertheless, the Nazi movement can be described as a charismatic leadership}

movement. To explain this assumption, Kershaw used Max Weber’s definition of ‘charismatic authority’ :

The perception of a heroic ‘mission’ and presumed greatness in the leader by his ‘following’; the tendency to arise in crisis conditions as an ‘emergency’ solution; the innate instability under the double constant threat of collapse of ‘charisma’ through failure to meet expectations of ‘routinisation’ into a ‘system’ capable of reproducing itself only through eliminating, subordinating or subsuming the ‘charismatic’ essence.20

As Kershaw explains, this definition has little analytical meaning because it is a descriptive model that gives no insight into the individual manifestation of the ‘charismatic authority’. Nevertheless, it shows how the Nazi movement could build its influence by relying heavily on Hitler as a charismatic leader. Kershaw used the phrase ‘working towards the Führer’ to describe the commitment and effectiveness of the institutions and individuals that belonged to and supported the Nazi party. This implies that before most actions Hitler was neither consulted nor needed to give an order. This can be explained by the believe of many people in the ideological goals Hitler and therefore they felt able to make decisions without consulting the Führer. Meeting ideological goals was not always the main motivation; often people hoped that by being able to satisfy the Führer through their work they would be rewarded either by an elevation of social status or material gain. This theory of ‘working towards the Führer’ does explain, however, the efficiency of many Nazi or German institutions and allowed Hitler to be less engaged in more actions than would have been expected. It could be argued that Germany was operating like a machine with as its main goal satisfying the Führer’s wishes and ideologies.21

Another line of argument that could explain the high level of support, and which was particularly used by historians during the first decades after the war, was that Germany was a totalitarian state during the time of the Third Reich.

1.1.4 “Political Religion” or a Totalitarian state

In the introduction of her article, Ulrike Ehret, a German historian focusing on nationalism and ethnicity, describes the experience of a young woman during the time of the Third Reich in Germany. Even though she had no affiliation to the Nazi Party and its policies, at the moment Hitler paraded past

19_{Kershaw, I. (2008). p.35}

20_{Max Weber in Kershaw, I. (2008). p. 37} 21_{Kershaw, I. (2008). p. 42-43}

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7 her, she, like everyone else, joined in the salute willingly if not enthusiastically.22_{The unexpected}

eagerness that overcame this woman not only happened to her, and could partly explain the cheering masses who greeted Hitler throughout his reign. That moments of this kind could lead to a sharing of enthusiasm and lead to a personal feeling of belonging, could be one of the explanations for this form of spontaneous group dynamic. A term that is often mentioned when, discussing the power and structure of the Third Reich is ‘political religion’. The Italian historian Emilio Gentile defined political religion as, “a type of religion which sacralises an ideology, a movement or a political regime through the deification of a secular entity transfigured into myth, considering it the primary and indisputable source of the meaning and the ultimate aim of human existence on earth.”23

Gentile and other authors use this term to explain the form of leadership and ideology Hitler presented to his nation. The ideology followed by the Nazi party included ideas that appealed to most of the population. These included the sacralisation of families and motherhood and the aim to decrease poverty and unemployment, amongst other things. It could be argued that these promises and values were especially appealing to that part of the population that suffered during the time of Weimar Republic due to economic or social deficits. According to Gentile’s definition, ‘political religion’ is not a traditional religion whose essence is the existence of a supernatural god. This would, after all, deny the existence of a secular religion from the outset. The British historian Roger Griffin first rejected this term due to the focus on religion rather than ideology but revised his opinion due to possibilities this definition creates for understanding totalitarianism. According to him, by trying to analyse and understand totalitarianism through the lens of political religion, aspects that could not be explained before find a place.24

Griffin found ‘political religion’ attractive for two reasons:

First, it can explain the destructiveness of totalitarianism not alone through the nihilism of these movements or their attempt to resist modernity, but as a product of an ideology that promises rebirth through destructiveness and creation. Second, ‘political religion’ can be seen as part of a ‘clustering’ approach to the key generic terms of totalitarian movements, where each of the defining features of these movements form part of a matrix, so that no single one can be explored adequately without involving the consideration of others.25

Friedrich presented the features that, according to him, needed to be fulfilled for a system to be defined as totalitarian:

22_{Ehret, U. (2007). Understanding the Popular Appeal of Fascism, National Socialism and Soviet Communism: The Revival} of Totalitarianism Theory and Political Religion. History Compass, 5(4), p. 1237

23_{Gentile, E. (2004) Fascism, totalitarianism and political religion: definitions and critical reflections on criticism of an} interpretation. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 5:3, p. 328

24_{Ehret, U. (2007). pp. 1243-1244} 25_{Griffin in Ehret, U. (2007). p.1243}

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8 (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led

by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police and three kinds of monopoly or more precisely monopolistic control; namely, that of (a) mass communication, (b) operational weapons, and (c) all organizations including economic ones, thus involving a centrally planned economy…. We might add that these six features could, if greater simplicity is desired, lie grouped into three, a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police and a monopoly of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in industrial mass society.26

Linz agreed with both definitions and argued that, “those definitions suggest a tendency toward the destruction of the line between state and society and the emergence of “total” politicization of society by political organizations, generally the party and its affiliates.”27

He argued that for a system to be totalitarian three dimensions must be present concurrently:” an ideology, a single mass party and other mobilization organizations, and concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized peaceful means.”28

In a later explanation of his definition, Linz developed an argument that explained the low rate of active resistance during the Nazi reign in Germany:

Citizen participation and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded and channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of “parochials” and “subjects,” characteristics of many authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers.29

Ehret used different theories relating to totalitarianism, which differ in the time they were made or the background of the scholars that made them. She also discussed Friedrich and Brzeskinski and compared them with the theories of more contemporary scholars, such as Griffin and Gentile.

Contrary to common belief, Friedrich and Brzeskinski did not interpret ideology as a mere functionalist means to manipulate the masses. Instead, their definition of totalitarian ideology already contained the essence of Roger Griffin’s ‘palingenetic worldview’ (the promise of and planning for national rebirth).30

It becomes clear that Ehret tried to explain how totalitarianism should not be viewed as a constructed unchangeable way of leading but rather as a process that evolves and adapts to certain changes in

26_{Friedrich C. quoted in Linz, J. J. (1975). Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Handbook of political science, 3, p.65} 27_{Linz, J. J. (1975). p.66}

28_{Linz, J. J. (1975). p.67}

29_{Linz, J. J. (1975). Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Handbook of political science, 3, p.70} 30_{Ehret, U. (2007). p.1239}

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9 society. This perspective agrees with Gentile who defined totalitarianism as a “continuous experiment in political domination”.31

Two authors who do not agree with defining Germany during the time of the Third Reich as a totalitarian state are the German historian Reinhard Mann and the American historian Eric Johnson. Mann argued, „The model of a ‘totalitarian’ society is a theoretical and practical absurdity which furthermore underestimates the flexibility and ingenuity of the people, who can cheat even an authoritarian regime.”32_{An example given by him, is listening to foreign radio broadcasts, even though listening to}

these broadcasts was absolutely forbidden and people who were caught listening were punished. Mann argued that a high percentage of the German population probably still listened to these in secret to gain information about the progress of the war.33_{This example showed that even though the Nazi regime}

had characteristics of a totalitarian state, to have total control of every action of a society is impossible. Nevertheless, a topic that needs to be mentioned here, and will also be discussed later, is the way of prosecuting forbidden activities and actions by the enforcing institutions of the NSDAP. It can be argued that even in a dictatorial state punishing all suspicious behaviour would be impossible because it would incur an enormous cost due to the necessary manpower. Johnson agrees with Mann and argued that the view of the Nazi secret police, the Gestapo, as an enforcer of Nazi policies on everyone in the German society without exceptions, is highly exaggerated. In his opinion, even though the Gestapo and other organs of the military were ruthless and strict in certain cases, they mainly focused on targeted groups, such as the Jewish population. He describes cases of German citizens who acted in ways inconsistent with Nazi policies being warned not to repeat their misbehaviour rather than being punished. He argued that if the same person would have been a Jew the consequences would have been much graver. The examples given by Johnson, of actions dealt with leniently were often connected to criticism of Hitler or his party.34_{Mann explains that even if the Gestapo wanted to arrest everyone who}

spoke ill of the Führer this would have been impossible due to the amount of manpower and resources that would have been necessary. Furthermore, he argued that it would not have been in the interests of the regime to sanction every opponent of the system, considering that they could always be later used as scapegoats for the failure of the regime. “The illegal formation of subversive political organisations is for a system naturally far more threatening than individual civil protests could ever be, even if they could be highly numerous in sum.”35

31_{Gentile quoted in Ehret, U. (2007). p.1239}

32_{Original Quote: „ Das Modell einer „totalitären“ Gesellschaft ist theoretisch und praktisch ein Unding und unterschätzt zudem} die Flexibilität und den Einfallsreichtum der Menschen, die auch einem autoritären Regime wenigstens ein Schnippchen schlagen können.“ Mann, R. (1980). Was wissen wir vom Widerstand? Datenqualität, Dunkelfeld und Forschungsartefakte. In Kleßmann, C., & Pingel, F. (Eds.). Gegner des Nationalsozialismus. Campus-Verlag. p. 44

33_{Mann, R. (1980). p.44}

34_{Johnson, E. A. (2011). Criminal Justice, Coercion and Consent in ‘Totalitarian’ Society: The Case of National Socialist} Germany. British journal of criminology, 51(3), pp.599- 615.

35_{Original Quote: “Die illegal Bildung staatsfeindlicher politischer Organisationen ist für ein System naturgemäß viel} bedrohlicher als je individuelle Proteste aus der Bevölkerung, auch wenn diese in der Summe sehr zahlreich sein können.“ In Mann, R. (1980). p.46

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10 Johnson said that due to the low level of strict prosecution by the Gestapo and the high level of consent by the general population, Nazi Germany cannot be defined as a totalitarian state. Nevertheless, Mann reiterated, “one should not forget and not be talked out of the fact that National Socialism was an enthusiastic, sparkling revolution, a German populist movement with an enormous emotional investment of believe and enthusiasm.”36

1.1.5 Conclusion Historical Introduction

To conclude this chapter the five factors proposed by Schmiechen-Ackermann as explanations for the voluntary compliance of the German population will be discussed. First of all, he identified ideological affinities as a reason for support. People believed in the ideas of the regime and could identify with the ideology and propaganda presented by the Nazis.37_{The group of people who supported the Nazi}

movement solely because of the ideology was rather small but created a strong backup system around Hitler and supported him until the end. Secondly, he argued people were convinced through persuasive manipulation by skilfully placed and promoted propaganda. The effects of this factor were already detectable during the in the elections of 1930, where the NSDAP received 18,3 % in comparison to 2,6 % in 1928. Hitler knew what he needed to promise the population to persuade them to turn their back against the Weimar Republic. In the case of propaganda focusing on the exclusion and ultimately the extermination of the Jewish population, it can be argued that believing in the propaganda made it easier to perceive these actions as legitimate. The third factor mentioned is affective monopolization. This can be explained as, overwhelming people with promises and actions that have a strong emotional appeal - a form of targeted ‘emotional politics’. As the fourth factor, he identified material enticements; the granting of social support and material benefits to the ‘Aryan’ population alone to seduce them and highlight their distinction from other ‘ethnic’ groups. By reducing the unemployment rate, partly via to military expenditure, Hitler gave the citizens a reason to believe in him. Furthermore, he demonstrated removing benefits from one group would benefit other groups. This could explain why many people stood aside while Jewish property was seized and the owners deported; some people hoped that they could benefit. The last factor identified by Schmiechen-Ackermann are social promises, for example the promise of an increased standard of living.38_{This factor is similar to material enticements, but}

explains better why people were willing to comply even though they did not share the Nazi ideology. Bergen gives an example concerning a university dean who terminated the contracts of his Jewish

36_{Original Quote: “Man soll nicht vergessen und sich nicht ausreden lassen, das der Nationalsozialismus eine enthusiastische,} funkensprühende Revolution, eine deutsche Volksbewegung mit einer ungeheuren seelischen Investierung von Glauben und Begeisterung war“. In Paul, G. & Mallmann, K.M. (1995). Milieus und Widerstand: Eine Verhaltensgeschichte der Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus. Dietz. p.13

37_{Schmiechen- Ackermann, D. (2012) 'Volksgemeinschaft': Mythos, wirkungsmächtige soziale Verheißung oder soziale}

Realität im'Dritten Reich'?: Zwischenbilanz einer kontroversen Debatte. Schöningh, 2012. p.28

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11 professors before he was ordered to do so. People hoped that by pleasing the Führer they would receive personal favours.39

Several theories that could explain the mass support towards Hitler and his party by the majority of the German population have been examined in this chapter. It can be concluded, that one of the reasons Hitler was viewed as an acceptable leader by the majority of the German population was due to his ability to use the flaws of Weimar Republic to relate to the public. He defined himself as one of ‘the people’, which appealed to the public and gave them the feeling that their concerns and needs were finally being heard. Another argument to explain the high level of support and, especially, the low level of resistance during the Third Reich was the use of violence and terror against any opposition to the Nazi-movement. As Mann and Johnson argued, the level of terror was much lower than often assumed. Nevertheless, Johnson’s argument needs to be revised when the discussion is focused on political opposition or even resistance. His argument that the SS and other Nazi institutions that enforced the rules only did so strictly, and only used violence, against individuals or groups that threatened the stability and power of the Third Reich. His conclusion was that terror was a tool used only in the minority of cases and then only if it concurred with Nazi ideology. In the case of political opposition, the people who belonged to opposition parties were individually no threat to the Nazi party but the collective strength of these parties made them undesirable and a target of the Nazi government. The argument that the Third Reich could be defined as a totalitarian state and was therefore nearly impossible to overthrow from within is often discussed and largely denied. It can be argued that even though some of the characteristics of a totalitarian state can be identified in the Third Reich, the individuals who fought against the regime and refused from the beginning to adapt to its rule prove that totalitarianism as a theory is not applicable. Mann made a similar remark in his work showing that by using the term ‘totalitarianism’ the individuals who dared to stand up against the regime, and risked their lives for doing so, are ignored and their actions are unacknowledged. Another reason why the definition of Germany as a totalitarian state should be revised is highlighted by Johnson in his analysis of the efficiency and strictness of the Gestapo. In a totalitarian system, every form of illegal open discontent or behaviour should be punished and prosecuted. As Johnson pointed out in his article, individuals who misbehaved were barely punished but rather only warned not to repeat such behaviour. Of course, the cases discussed by Johnson involved individuals who did not belong to groups defined as undesirable, such as the Jews, Gypsies or Homosexuals, but were ‘ordinary’ German citizens. This finding is also comparable with Kershaw’s comment concerning Hitler’s ability to forge a bond of trust with his supporters. It can be therefore argued that the priority of the regime was not to enforce their rules on every citizen without compromise but rather to assure a stability within the society.

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12 In conclusion, it can be argued that even though the Third Reich did not fulfil all the attributes of a totalitarian state, the strict enforcement of oppressive rules on ‘enemies of the state’ made it much more acceptable to be a bystander, or even a supporter, of the regime, rather than to actively resist it. Even though the quantity of political resistance was limited in numbers, opposition parties were partially able to survive underground due to those few people who were willing to risk their lives for their party and country. Ideologies, trust in their nation, and the belief that the preservation of the party was more important than individual lives.

1.2 Political Parties within the Third Reich

The KPD and SPD

This subchapter will give a short introduction of both the KPD and SPD, and therefore allow the reader to understand certain decisions made or chances missed in the early years of Hitler’s rise to power. It focuses on the history of the parties and the political standpoints they represented. It is necessary to point out that considering the political structure and form of discipline, even though the leadership had the last word and decided further actions, individual actions of resistance did not always conform to these rules. Individual acts of resistance and the reactions of the parties’ leaderships concerning the transformation of Germany’s political environment will be discussed later in separate chapters.

1.2.1 The KPD

The KPD was established in the very last days of 1918 after they split from the Social Democrats due to differences concerning the future of the party and ideologies. Even though they originated from the SPD, the KPD would later identify the SPD not only as their main opponent, but also as their enemy and would blame them for the creation and failure of the Weimar republic and the rise of the NSDAP. Conflicts of opinions concerning the future of the Social Democrats, and Germany in general, led to the separation of the left leaning Marxist-oriented Socialists under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Differences between the left and the centre-oriented party members were a daily struggle among the socialists, but the decision that was made on the 4th_{of august 1914 in the Reichstag}

left the party permanently fractured.40_{On this day the SPD voted for Germany’s participation in the war,}

which was not agreeable to the left-oriented members of the party. The Spartacus League was founded on that day.

Erich Weitz explained the emergence of the KPD by using the historical and political context. The KPD, in short, evolved historically within the vibrant and highly contested public spheres of the Weimar republic; it was never simply the creature of its own

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13 founders and leader or, later, of the Soviet Union. . . . For German communism, the

ultimate result of its emergence within this active lively – and very dangerous – matrix was the creation of a party and movement marked by a highly combative, intransigent, and masculinized political culture.41

Even though the KPD was a fully functional party, its ties with the Communists of the Soviet Union meant that the KPD could not be identified as independent and self-governing. It could rather be described as the German faction of a transnational party that was only able to govern the national party within the national sphere under the supervision of a larger entity, the Communist International. “As a section of the Communist International (Comintern), the KPD was not an independent actor, but a party whose policies and strategies were subordinated to the interests of the communist international movement.”42

Officially the KPD defined itself as anti-democratic and independent. Nevertheless, the ideologies, goals and the ideas concerning the future held by the Soviet Union were increasingly absorbed into the KPD’s body of thought. “The organizational integration into the Comintern, changed not only the function the Comintern held within the KPD but also let to a stronger assimilation by the KPD concerning the ideological position held by the Russian party, the bolshevization respectively the Stalinization. “43

Years before Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, the KPD announced that fascism was on the rise and that it would probably replace the democracy of the Weimar Republic. Even though they predicted the victory of fascism as early, it seemed that this party nevertheless as all the other political parties underestimated the rapid rise of power shown by the NSDAP and Hitler.44

The ideology of the KPD party led to it campaigning for the disintegration of the Weimar Republic and most of the votes they gained in the 1930 and 1932 elections came from former Social Democrats. The reason that the leading position of the SPD was decreasing can be attributed to their decision to stand behind the Republic and ensure its stability. Furthermore, the KPD saw itself as a labour party that understood the demands and wishes of the ‘common’ people and promoted themselves as such. To demonstrate the commitment of the more devoted members of the party, the correlation between unemployment and membership contribution is interesting. In 1932, 85 % of the members were

41_{Weitz, E. (1998). Communism and the Public Spheres of Weimar Germany. In Barclay, D. E., & Weitz, E. D. (Eds.). Between}

reform and revolution: German socialism and communism from 1840 to 1990. Berghahn Books. p. 276

42_{Herlemann, B. (1998), Communist Resistance between Comintern Directives and Nazi Terror. In Barclay, D. E., & Weitz,}

E. D. (Eds.). Between reform and revolution: German socialism and communism from 1840 to 1990. Berghahn Books. p. 357

43_{Original Quote: „Die organisatorische Einbindung in die Komintern brachte mit der Veränderung der Funktion der} Komintern auch eine immer stärkere Übernahme ideologischer Positionen der russischen Partei, also die Bolschiwiesierung bzw. die Stalinisierung der KPD.“ Weber, H. (1983). Kommunismus in Deutschland: 1918-1945 (Vol. 198). Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. p.56

44_{Weber, H. (2001) Kommunistischer Widerstand gegen die Hitler-Diktatur 1933-1939. Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand.} pp. 3-24

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14 unemployed and still they paid their membership contribution.45_{This clearly shows that even in an}

unstable period the party could motivate and encourage its members.

The leader of the KPD during the period discussed in this thesis was Ernst Thälmann, who had been a member of the KPD from the beginning of the party. After becoming a SPD member at the age of 17 in 1903, Thälmann left that party to join the splinter party USPD (Unabhängige SPD) in 1918 after three years in France as a soldier.46_{Part of the USPD, including Thälmann would one year later merge}

with the Spartacus Bund to form the KPD. During his term of office Thälmann fought diligently against the SPD.

1.2.2 The SPD

Just as the German revolution in 1918/1919 can be seen as a catalyst for the formation of the KPD, it can be argued that results of the French revolution in 1848 was the beginning for the Social Democratic Party of Germany. “The beginning of Social Democracy can be defined as part of the European emancipation process, that started with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The revolution of 1848/49 may be described as the prologue but the 60s and 70s as the formative phase of the German Social Democracy.”47_{Workers who felt that their society was changing because of the revolution, but}

saw no structural changes, decided that by unifying as a workers’ association, needs and goals could be fought for together. Due to the background of the founders, their priorities were focused mainly on workers’ rights and benefits, but furthermore they aimed to achieve a democracy within Germany that allowed the lower classes to have a voice.

Thus, the Social Democracy was a democratic people's party, which continued the traditions of the revolution of 1848, which were also cultivated symbolically, but also the party of the Fourth Class (proletariat), who wanted to solve the social question in particular. . . The party took the double-task of the vast restructuring of state and society. She was the party that demanded democratic and social reforms.48

After Bismarck banned the party in 1878, its members were forced to work underground until they regained political power and had the ability to demand re-legalisation in 1890.

45_{Herlemann, B. (1994). Kommunistischer Widerstand. In Benz, W., & Pehle, W. H. (1994). Lexikon des deutschen}

Widerstandes. S. Fischer. p. 28

46_{http://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/biografie-ernst-thaelmann.html}

47_{Original Quote: „Die Gründung der Sozialdemokratie ist einzuordnen in den mit Aufklärung und Französische Revolution} einsetzenden europäischen Emanzipationsprozess. Dabei mag man die Revolution von 1848/49 als Prolog, die 60er und 70er Jahre aber als formative Phase der deutschen Sozialdemokratie bezeichnen.“ Faulenbach, B. (2012). Geschichte der SPD: von

den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Vol. 2753). CH Beck. p.12

48_{Original Quote: „So war die Sozialdemokratie demokratische Volkspartei, die die Traditionen der Revolution von 1848} weiterführte, die auch symbolisch gepflegt wurden, doch auch Partei des Vierten Standes (Proletariat), der insbesondere die soziale Frage lösen wollte. . . Sie übernahm die Doppelaufgabe der weitgehenden Umgestaltung von Staat und Gesellschaft. Sie war die Partei des demokratischen und sozialen Reformverlangens.“ Faulenbach, B. (2012). pp.17-18

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15 Before the NSDAP gained power in 1932, the Social Democratic Party of Germany was the biggest party in the Reichstag with more than one million registered members.49_{They were different from other}

political parties in Germany because during the years of the Weimar Republic the SPD was able to create organizations and associations affiliated with the party in nearly every sector of daily life. While other political organizations at that time were still organizing and transforming themselves from informal organizations into political parties, the SPD was already established and grounded in the German political sphere.50_{Allan argued that rather than being only a political party, the SPD was able through}

the years to transform itself into a sort of sub-culture that was weaving social democratic norms and values into every aspect of daily life.51_{Even though this comprehensive form of political influence}

allowed the SPD to reach multiple sectors, this organizational approach was perhaps one of the causes of its downfall in the 1932 elections. SPD voters were spread throughout German society, and even though the majority belonged to the working class it was difficult for the party to develop an election campaign that met everyone’s demands. The NSDAP, on the other hand, was able to appeal to the general population.

Probably the main reason the SPD lost its parliamentary majority during the election in November 1932, was their support for the Weimar Republic. The increasing unemployment rate and the economic crisis that led to this left a large fraction of the German population frustrated and searching for someone or something to blame. The Weimar Republic was a newly constructed democratic form of government and the people held the government including the SPD responsible for the hardship Germany suffered. Their supporters became disaffected and switched their allegiance to political parties that they felt better served their interests. Many former SPD voters decided to vote for the NSDAP as this was a party that promised a decrease in unemployment and an increase in economic growth.52_{In the elections in March}

1933, the SPD got only 20 % of the votes, but this still made the SPD the second biggest party within the Reichstag.53_{Even though these numbers were devastating for the party, what needs to be}

remembered is that at this time SPD party members had already been already forbidden from taking part in the election. Even though the NSDAP won this election the SPD still had one fifth of the votes which could still be interpreted as a high level of loyalty by its voters.54

Nevertheless, even before these semi-legal elections in March, the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on January the 30th_{shocked and paralyzed the party, resulting in no thoughts of resistance. The general}

opinion of scholars is that the SPD was so habituated to a standardized procedure of opposing debates that it was not in a fit state to convince the electorate that they should to stand by the SPD. Furthermore,

49_{McDonough, F. (2001). Opposition and resistance in Nazi Germany. Cambridge University Press. p. 3} 50_{Berman, S. (1997). Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World politics, 49(03), p. 412}

51_{Allen, W.S. (1980) Die sozialdemokratische Untergrundbewegung: Zur Kontinuität der subkulturellen Werte. In Schmädeke,} J., & Steinbach, P. Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Piper. p. 850

52_{Van Riel, A. & Schram, A. (1993). Weimar economic decline, Nazi economic recovery, and the stabilization of political} dictatorship. The journal of economic history, 53(01). p. 77- 79

53_{McDonough, F. (2001). Opposition and resistance in Nazi Germany. Cambridge University Press. p. 3} 54_{Allen, W.S. (1980). p. 850}

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16 it did not have the ability to adapt fast enough to the changing climate of opinion. The party was convinced that the takeover by the NSDAP could only be interrupted or stopped by lawful debate. The chairman of the SPD during this period was Otto Wels, who became a SPD member when 18 years old and attended his first party congress in 1902. Wels became chairman of the party in 1919, a position he would hold till his death in 1939.

1.3 Resistance within a country of war

In a free democratic country that has established rules to allow the nation to speak their mind and share concerns, open opposition and opportunity for discussion are basic attributes of the public and political sphere. Nevertheless, in a context where these rights are withdrawn and any form of dissent is a punishable act, the risk and motive for any actions of resistance need to be considered. Over the years many scholars tried to develop theories of the act of resistance, considering the motives, risks and hoped outcomes, which lead to a considerable number of theories and opinions on this topic.

1.3.1 The diversity of resistance definitions

The topic of resistance during the time of the Third Reich, outside and inside Germany, has led to an immense collection of literature. Resistance can take many forms and has multiple characteristics, depending on the groups or individuals that resist. Furthermore, just as warfare adapts to the resources a certain country or army has available, so does resistance. A successful act of resistance can therefore be characterized amongst others by the ability to adapt to the situation at hand.55_{To be able to react}

against a dictator or other threats of violence, the group or individuals who want to openly oppose can only do so in an effective manner if they can identify the threat on time and do not underestimate it. Siegfried von Nostitz, a former German diplomat and author, stated “To many, the word ‘resistance’ or ‘rebellion’ still provokes the memory of the classical revolutions of the past centuries, of vague images of barricades, of fighters armed with breech-loaders and of waving flags, as it has been depicted in the famous painting by Delacroix.”56_{He used this statement to argue}_{that this romanticized form of}

resistance was a time of the past and difficult if not impossible to realise in a modern state, such as Germany was in 1930s. This was especially the case due to the increase of institutions that oversaw the arrest and prosecution of any individual or group that threatened to resist the regime. In the case of political resistance, it could be argued that the risk of being detected was even higher due to the high profile of the party members. This statement can also be used to explain certain reactions or lack thereof by the German population in general and the oppositional political parties in particular. The manner

55_{Ryszka, F. (1980). Formen des Widerstandes gegen den Nationalsozialismus. In Kleßmann, C., & Pingel, F. (Eds.). Gegner}

des Nationalsozialismus. Campus-Verlag.

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17 and vastness how Hitler managed to gain power was an unknown phenomenon in the political sphere. Both parties that will be analysed during this thesis, the SPD and KPD, where used to practise politics within a political structure that allowed opposition and open discussion. In that sense, their reaction can be compared to the argument made by van Nostitz. They were used to a form of politics that did not apply to the way Hitler build his regime and therefore they did not know which strategies to use. An important aspect of the analysis of resistance in general is to identify what motivated individuals or groups to resist and what was the result they hoped to achieve. Another issue that needs to be considered are the internal as well as external factors that influenced their decision making. Furthermore, it is important not to define resistance as a single act of non-conformity or dissent, but rather as a progression of activities resulting in an increase over time in the risk taken and the visibility of the actions. By reviewing only single isolated acts of resistance it could happen that the motivations and reasons that led to this act become lost.

Additionally, it is important to consider the context in which these activities occurred. In a dictatorship for example, behaviour such as disobedience let alone active resistance is forbidden under any circumstances and often prosecuted harshly. This restricts active resistance in most cases and limits any possibility of success. When analysing resistance and the context where these acts happened, it is necessary to analyse and understand of the risks taken and the very limited opportunities these individuals or groups had.

What needs to be considered in the German context, and what distinguished German resistance from other countries, was that rather than fighting an occupying power, resistance against the Third Reich, was committed by German people who decided to actively take part and resist. They therefore resisted against their own country and fellow countrymen.57_{This led to the issue of the partial blame directed}

towards the resistance by part of the German population in the post-war period and is an important factor that vastly affected the resistance-memory in Germany. In the Netherlands, for example, where resistance was supported by the Dutch government to the extent that it encouraged citizens to fight against the occupying forces, the memory of resistance is much more treasured than it will ever be in Germany.

1.3.2 The uniqueness of political resistance

The opinions and classification of acts of resistance and their efficiency differ highly amongst the various scholars reviewed in this thesis. Nevertheless, two groups that can be found in most resistance literature are defined as political and military, this thesis will focus on the former. Even though most scholars agree that only resistance that originated from within the military would have been able to stop

57_{Broszat, M. (1986). Zur Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Widerstands. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 34(3. H),pp.}

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18 the Third Reich, political resistance is often mentioned in the context of resourcefulness and the way of planning for a time thereafter.

Political resistance can be defined as actions that are instigated by political party members who resist with the aim of keeping their political movement and beliefs alive. An important difference is the transformation from ‘lawful’ to ‘unlawful’ actions. The ultimate aims of these actions are to rebuild the party and to offer a credible leadership in the case of victory.

What made German political resistance unique is the alteration of the legal status of political parties’, excluding the NSDAP, that followed the election in 1933. The task of a political party in general is to represent their political agenda and voters’ wishes and to defend these against opposing parties and with their own agendas. It can be argued that while they resist against their opposition they do so in a lawful way. In the case of German political parties this option was taken away after their parties were forbidden or restricted to express their opinion. The transformation from a ‘lawful’ to an ‘unlawful’ form of political party will be one of the main topics within this thesis.

Even though political resistance is often discussed in the literature, a comparison between different parties, their influence and motivations is often incomplete or not existent at all. Another issue that will be analysed here, and which is often missing in scholarly work regarding political resistance, is the question, to what level the history of the individual parties influenced their reaction to the rise of Hitler. While studying political resistance certain unique aspects need to be considered. One of these characteristics can be defined as established hierarchy. It is important to consider that different than many other resistance groups these parties were not created with the single purpose to end the Third Reich and overthrow Hitler as a leader, they existed years before in the legal political sphere and had an established agenda. In a time of war or crisis this established framework vanishes and the party needs to have the ability to readjust to the situation at hand. This also includes abandoning ideologies or strategies that were interwoven in the parties’ agenda since they were established. If the leadership of a party is not willing to change strategies or allow open resistance their resources are limited and their chances to survive as a viable party are marginal. A crucial factor that will be analysed is the difference between the strategies used by individual members or groups of a certain party and the reactions and strategies chosen by the leadership of the party: how did these actions and decisions effect each other, and to what extent did they work against each other?

1.4 Research questions and methodology

This thesis will make use of the large literature on political resistance during the beginning of the Third Reich to show the diverse reactions and decisions made during this time. Nevertheless, to understand certain actions it is important to not only analyse the lower ranked party members of the SPD and KPD but also the leadership of these parties. Both the SPD and KPD were not prepared for their political overthrow by the National Socialists. Even though the NSDAP became the most powerful party within

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19 only a couple of years, from 2,6 % in 1928 to 22.9 % in March 1933, it cannot be said that they emerged abruptly. The argument of this thesis is that due to several decisions made by their leaderships the SPD and KPD lost their ability to respond in a timely and effective manner.

Even though political resistance did occur within Germany, it can be argued that the hesitation of the parties’ leadership to respond prevented any form of early and party-wide strategies. By the time the leadership realized that their legitimacy as political parties, and the future of their country, were endangered any chance of preparing for a transition had been lost.

To get an insight into the decisions that were made and the motives underlying these decisions, this thesis will refer not only to the literature on this topic but also use a wide selection of primary sources. These sources allow a deeper insight in the motivations and reasoning behind certain decisions made by the SPD and KPD. Even though there was political resistance in Germany these actions were mainly carried out by low ranked party members and were limited in scope. The argument of this thesis is that these actions were so constrained because of choices made by the leaderships of the two parties. To be able to understand the reasons why certain strategies were followed and decisions were made, a variety of primary sources of members within the leadership of the SPD and KPD will be used.

The main research question this thesis will aim to answer is therefore,

Which actions and factors prevented the leaderships of the SPD and KPD to actively resist the

NSDAP or even prevent them from coming into power?

Three sub-questions that will allow the reader to get an better understanding of the context and the variables involved will be used to facilitate the main question.

The first question, “To what extend did political resistance exist in Germany and what was the role of the leadership?”, will be used to explain the divergence between actions performed by the members of the party and the leadership.

The second question, “In how far did the decisions of the party fractions abroad have an influence on the actual actions taken by the parties in Germany?”, will analyse the level of influence external actors had on the decisions made by the leadership located in Germany.

The third question, “To what extend did the different methods of leadership effect the popularity of the parties among voters?”, will examine the different strategies of leadership and compare these in correlation to the status of the parties among the public.

To be able to answer these questions the thesis is structured into three more chapters. The first chapter will use different definitions of resistance to develop an understanding of this term. This will help the reader to understand the intricacies and complexity of resistance in general and political resistance in particular. The third and fourth chapters will analyse the operations of the SPD and KPD during the period of 1928-1934. The first parts of these chapters will use examples of the resistance activities

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20 performed by party members. The second part will take a closer look at the leadership of these parties and by using primary sources will examine certain factors and strategies that were disadvantageous in the context of power preservation and resistance.

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21

Chapter 2. The variety of resistance definitions

This chapter will present several definitions and criteria concerning the term resistance, established and used by historians and scholars over the years and aims to give the reader a deeper level of insight into the diverse fields of resistance. One of the main difficulties that needs to be considered during the process of defining acts and movements as resistance is the complexity of actions and circumstances that must be born in mind. The variety of definitions that have been historically used, demonstrate how difficult it is to create an all-encompassing comprehensive definition. In relation to political resistance it can be argued that a difference should be made between two groups. First of all, the leadership of a political party whose acts could be classified as political oppositional behaviour. Second of all, individuals or groups who were actively trying to change their situation and that of their fellow party members. Even though the relationship between a party member and its party can have a significant influence on their livelihood and convictions, it could be argued that in a situation of immediate threat the convictions rather shift towards preserving your family and close network of friends. Even though, it cannot be argued that for individuals within the leadership this was not the case but the primary incentive for the leadership is to preserve the party.

2.1 The development of resistance research

The German historian Reinhard Mann, began his book by discussing the truthfulness of memoires and witness interviews concerning their involvement in resistance during the Third Reich. Mann cites Fritz Eberhard, a German journalist who was active in the resistance during this time. “Biographies, also oral histories of own experiences, possibly contain what someone wanted to have done rather than what someone really did”.58_{Mann, discussed the presence and absence of documents that can clarify the}

situation of resistance in Germany during the time of the Third Reich. One of the reasons for the paucity of records of resistance groups that could be found after the war can be explained that this lack was a method of precaution. The less records and documents a group produced the less evidence that could be found concerning their actions against the regime and if discovered these would have been used against them. Nevertheless, he argued that often this rule towards survival was not always followed. When these documents, leaflets, diaries and letters, came into the hands of the prosecutors of the regime, such as the SS, these were used as evidence and used to find accomplices.59_{Nevertheless Mann cautions}

to simply rely on these documents produced by the resistance to paint a full picture of the events. He argued that most of these reports are short and too factual and did not explain enough of the background

58_{Original Quote: „In Biographien, auch in mündlichen Erfahrungsberichten, ist vielleicht enthalten, was man getan haben} möchte und nicht, was man wirklich getan hat“. Fritz Eberhard quoted in Mann, R. (1980). p. 35