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The ‘Hollow’ Alliance:

The United States and Europe in crisis?

An Analysis of the ‘Diverging’ Transatlantic Alliance between Europe and the United States.

MA Thesis 2018-2019

Eva de Nijs

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The ‘Hollow’ Alliance:

The United States and Europe in crisis?

An Analysis of the ‘Diverging’ Transatlantic Alliance between Europe and the United

States.

Master of Arts in European Studies for European Policy

Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

By

Eva de Nijs

Amsterdam, The Netherlands 1 July 2019

Word Count: 20.192

Supervisor: Dr. László Marácz

Senior lecturer, European Studies University of Amsterdam

Second Examiner: Dr. Anne van Wageningen

Assistant Professor, European Studies University of Amsterdam

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’Transatlantic strategic cooperation is one reason why the second half of the twentieth century was so much better than the first. If the United states and Europe

can agree on a common strategy to meet the challenges of the new era, the world will be much the better for it’’1

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Foreword

Being a European citizen, I stand strongly behind the core values of our Union as described in Article 2 of the EU Treaty: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” However, my academic background in European studies and European Policy taught me to be an honest and objective student who is able to remain critical when necessary. Hereby I promise to deliver a Master thesis that highlights both the European and the American side, being it good or bad, equally.

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Executive Summary

There is much speculation about the Atlantic divergence between Europe and the United States and whether the transatlantic alliance is experiencing a crisis. The sometimes clumsy and harsh political performance of U.S. president Donald Trump contributes to this speculation. Is the idea of an emerging crisis real and are we witnessing a fundamental break between the Atlantic blocs or is the notion of an Atlantic crisis a more image-based fata morgana enhanced by the media and television?

On the one hand, the concept of intertwinement, that marks the relationship between the United States and Europe, is very deep and thorough. This idea is based on their shared history of social structures and trade, dating back to the seventeenth century, and their more recent collaboration through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), political entanglement and economic ties. It is therefore very unlikely that we are witnessing a structural removal or crisis. If we take the Brexit as an example, we see a restructuring of the Anglo-Saxon interests. Despite that, the Atlantic area remains intertwined. On the other hand, has the transatlantic alliance ever been totally free from crisis? The answer is no. Since NATO was established seventy years ago, there are various moments that show an Atlantic rift. The France withdrawal in 1966, the conflict in the Balkans and the war in Kosovo during the 1990s, the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, were all marked as internal Atlantic crises. Nonetheless, NATO showed its resilience on each occasion and proved to be a valuable alliance. There is currently no reason to believe that the transatlantic relationship, further consolidated through NATO, is experiencing a structural crisis. The Atlantic differences on burden-sharing, collective defense and external threats can only be viewed as a practical crisis of tomorrow’s challenges. Paradoxically, the new focal points of the future, as often emphasized by Trump, ensure a stronger Atlantic alliance.

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List of abbreviations

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP - Common Security and Defense Policy

EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EC - European Community

ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community

EEAS - European External Action Service

EEC - European Economic Community

EU - European Union

Euratom - European Atomic Energy Community

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GNP - Gross National Product

GWT - Global War on Terror

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MAP - Membership Action Plan

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

TEU - Treaty on European Union

SU - Soviet Union

UK - United Kingdom

UN - United Nations

US - United States

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Table of contents:

Foreword

Executive Summary

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction

10

1.1. The concept of Alliance

……… 13

1.2. The concept of intertwinement

………. 15

1.3. Thesis structure

……….. 16

1.4. Research design

………. 18

2. Contextualization of the History of the Transatlantic Alliance

20

2.1. The birth of the Transatlantic Alliance

………. 20

2.2. The development of European integration

……… 24

3. The Transatlantic Alliance: Shifting powers?

29

3.1. Developing a new position

... 29

3.1.1. From a unipolarity to a multipolarity………...………. 29

3.1.2. Decrease of America’s internationalism………. 30

3.2. Europe’s geopolitical ambition: a new purpose?

... 32

3.3. Conclusions

………... 33

4. Transatlantic Tensions: Then and Now

34

4.1. The end of the Cold War

……….. 35

4.1.1. A defining moment in history……… 36

4.1.2. The surprising persistence of NATO……….. 38

4.2. The terrorist attacks of 9/11

……… 40

4.2.1. A wave of European support………. 40

4.2.2. NATO’s first “out-of-area” operation………..……… 42

4.3. Iraq and the Bush administration

……….……… 43

4.3.1. A wave of anti-Americanism……….. 44

4.3.2. Transatlantic change and continuity………. 45

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5. Rebuilding the Transatlantic Alliance

49

5.1. Dealing with external challenges

……… 51

5.2. The greater Middle East

………. 52

5.2.1. Transatlantic responses to international terrorism……… 53

5.3. Cooperating with East Asia

………. 55

5.3.1. From Atlantic to ‘Pacific’?... 55

5.4. The “Eastern agenda’’

……….. 57

5.4.1. Ukraine: A Case Study……….... 57

5.4.1.1. Euro-Atlantic membership……….... 59

5.4.1.2. A resolute decision?... 59

5.4.1.3. NATO’s future approach………...… 61

5.5. Dealing with internal challenges

……….………. 62

5.6. Surviving the Trump era

………..………. 64

5.6.1. Thank you, Donald Trump……….………….. 64

6. Conclusions

67

Bibliography

Appendices

Appendix A:

The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

Appendix B:

Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2014-2018)

Appendix C:

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1 Introduction

Recent speculations about the divergent Euro-American relationship force us to ask some questions about the future of this transatlantic alliance. A variety of newspapers and magazines frequently publish articles that declare the beginning of what was or is called the ‘hollow’ alliance.2 The special relationship between Europe and the United States, that

was established after World War II through organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is of great importance for the world’s politics. For the past seventy years, both blocs of this transatlantic alliance have worked collectively to promote democracy, liberty, the rule of law, and market-based values in a global economy. There has been no greater alliance in history. Jens Stoltenberg, the organisation’s secretary-general claims that “NATO is the strongest, most successful alliance in history because we have been able to change”.3 And in fact, NATO has proven to be remarkably resilient.

However, the alliance is still changing and according to the public opinion, it is even in danger of a crisis. If the alliance actually is in crisis, it will have far-reaching consequences for our international security, stability and global trade. Europe is occupied with internal challenges such as Brexit and the populist surge, and the United States has to deal with its own political tensions as a result of the Trump presidency. More importantly, a decline of the Euro-American bond then results in a geopolitical rivalry among other continental powers. The world’s leading autocracies like China and Russia are already seizing their opportunity to take the stage.

Therefore, it is relevant to examine if the future existence of the transatlantic alliance is in danger. Can we speak of a transatlantic crisis and to which extent are the notions of a ‘hollow’ alliance justified? What are the (historical) causes and consequences of a transatlantic rift?

The American critical analyst Robert Kagan believes that the disparity in power between the United States and Europe is so disproportionate that “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy

2 Bloomberg (2019); The National Interest (2019); Time Magazine (2016); The New York Times (2004).

3 Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO: good for Europe and good for America”, Address to the United States Congress, April 3rd, 2019,

the US House of Representatives and the US Senate, Washington D.C., transcript and audio, 4:06,

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the same world’’.4 At NATO’s sixtieth birthday in 2009, Ted Carpenter, vice president of

defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute, referred to NATO as a “political fraternity rather than a credible security alliance”.5 Now, ten years later, at NATO’s

seventieth celebration, negative sentiments are still here. Journalist Gil Barndollar, author for The National Interest, wrote that NATO is past its retirement age and that the alliance “has become a social club”.6 However, others share the more popular vision that despite

the existing Euro-American differences, their transatlantic bond remains an important part of world politics.7 Regarding these perspectives, there is something to say for both

sides.Former Special Assistant to the President and current foreign policy expert Philip Gordon, has made an attempt to simplify the transatlantic issues with his statement that “It would be as wrong to exaggerate the gaps between Americans and Europeans as it would be to ignore them’’.8

Firstly, some people argue that the fundamental principles of the American grand strategy have remained unchallenged. The idea that the United States of America should lead the world and that it is the most dominant power in Europe, still finds great support. American primacy is still at the forefront of the liberal-democratic Western world and even beyond. The Euro-American relations and its shared economy are deeply integrated. The notion of intertwinement is therefore the key concept that will structure this thesis. On the other side, there are also people who strongly believe that the transatlantic peak is long behind us, and that the relationship between the United States and Europe has lost its centrality they had for decades. They believe that both sides of the Atlantic have become more independent than before.

Overall, there are three general standpoints concerning the Transatlantic Alliance: (1.) The transatlantic alliance still emerges as strong; (2.) The transatlantic alliance experienced fundamental change and was never the same after three historical events; the end of the Cold war, 9/11 and the war in Iraq; and (3.) The transatlantic alliance was never all that strong to begin with.

4 Lansford, T., and Tashev, B., Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post 9/11 Era,

London: Routledge 2005, p. 282

5 Carpenter, T., NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance, Policy Analysis, no. 635 (2009), p. 12.

6Barndollar, G., NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-70-and-past-retirement-age-51482, Last

accessed on June 2nd 2019.

7 Moustakis, F., and Chaudhuri, R., The transatlantic alliance revisited: Does America still need ‘’old Europe’’?, Defense &

Security Analysis, no. 4 (2005), p. 394.

8 Gordon, P.H., Bridging the Atlantic Divide. (European and US response to attacks on Sep 11, 2001), Foreign Affairs, no. 1

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After a careful evaluation of all three approaches in this thesis, I will illustrate that the transatlantic alliance is not a part of one particular standpoint but rather a mixture of these views. Nevertheless, on the notion of intertwinement, I will argue that the Euro-American relationship is so deeply integrated and consolidated that the future existence of NATO is not in jeopardy. However, pressures from within the alliance and even beyond its borders, in particular by Donald Trump as well as the lack of European public support for the strengthening of European defense spending or a European army, makes it difficult to safeguard this perspective.

I will present a number of arguments and identify historical key periods to make the case that the transatlantic alliance is experiencing fundamental change and whether the current Atlantic divergence marks a point of crisis. I will seek to find an answer to the following research question: To what extent is the Transatlantic Alliance between the United States and Europe ‘in crisis’? Related questions to support this research question are:

• Can we speak of a divergent alliance which no longer holds any value, now and in the future?

• To what extent has Europe in the Post-World War II era shown that it actually has its own position?

• What can we learn from a study of intertwining?

The transatlantic relationship can be seen as an observational process which will always shift and have different outcomes. Before looking at processes of change and shifts in the EU-US relationship, we have to take into account the complex overlap that characterizes both EU and NATO membership. NATO consists of both EU and non-EU members. On the other hand, the European Union consists of NATO and non-NATO members. From the 29 NATO members, 22 states are also members of the European Union. In order to untangle this difficult mixture, this thesis will either use the term ‘NATO member(ship)’ or ‘EU member(ship)’.

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1.1 The concept of Alliance

Although alliances are a ‘central and constant phenomenon in international politics throughout history’,9 the term has been given different definitions by various scholars.10

Multiple studies, articles, analysis and literature in international relations have produced 35 different definitions, of which Edwin Fedder was the only one who made a conceptual analysis effort in 1968 with his article ‘The Concept of Alliance’.11 Despite the efforts in

the field of alliance theory, the concept needed further theorizing. According to Stefan Bergsmann, who wrote the chapter ‘The Concept of Military Alliance’ in the book Small

States and Alliances (2001) by Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, the term ‘alliance’ still

lacked a precise and theoretically useful definition of the concept of a (military) alliance. Bergsmann put forward the idea of a ‘triangle concept’ (see figure 1.) in which he proposed that the term and the referent are often referred to with different conceptions. Some authors use the term ‘alliance’ interchangeably with terms as coalition, bloc, pact or security arrangement. On the other hand, authors tend to use different exemplary alliances as their referent. In this case, NATO is widely chosen as the prototype of an alliance.12 Bergsmann argues that the practical usage of the concept of alliance to date has

been too divergent.

Figure 1: The Triangle Concept-Term Referent.

9 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 20. Stefan Bergsmann even refers to

ancient periods, the Middles Ages and the centuries of Bismarck and Napoleon that show states forming alliances.

10 Fedder, E.H., The Concept of Alliance, International Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (1968), p. 68. 11 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 20. 12 Ibid., p. 21.

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Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary for example, defines an alliance as “an association (as by treaty) of two or more nations to further their common interests”. Although this meaning of ‘a connection between actors’ is too common according to Bergsmann, it does correspond with the historical development of the term in which all scholars so far, have considered an alliance in the essence as “a specific kind of relation between states to achieve certain goals”.13 However, other scholars who proposed a more thorough

definition of the term ‘alliance’ still lack precision, as stated by Stefan Bergsmann.

One of the earliest works on the definition of an alliance is that of the political science scholar George Liska in his study Nations in Alliance (1962)14, who argued that an

alliance is a “formal association between two or more states against the thread of a third”.15 Although Liska’s definition contains an element of what an actual alliance is, his

formulation already puts forward a reason for establishing an alliance, which is threat. According to Stefan Bergsmann, George Liska’s definition contains one of the hypotheses to be tested (threat) and is therefore not theoretically appropriate.16

Another definition in the alliance theory literature is that of the authors Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann and John Sullivan, who wrote the book Unity and Disintegration in

International Alliances (1973).17 They suggest that an alliance is a “formal agreement

between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues”.18 Bergsmann

brings in that 1.) their definition is too broad; 2.) that a formal agreement to establish an alliance is not necessary as long as the alliance’s members are aware of their own commitment, and 3.) that members of an alliance do not have to be nation-states as previous alliances in the time of Napoleon have shown.19

The last author is the international relations scholar, Stephen M. Walt, who published The Origins of Alliances (1990)20 and views the alliance as “a cooperative

security relationship between two or more states, usually taking the form of a written military commitment”.21 In this case, Stefan Bergsmann argues that “the definition is so

broad that almost every security arrangement will qualify as an alliance thereby making

13 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, pp. 23-24.

14 See: Liska, G., Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 1962. 15 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 25.

16 Ibid., p. 25.

17 See: Holsti, O., Hopmann, T., and Sullivan, J., Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, Maryland: University Press

of America 1985.

18 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 26. 19 Ibid., p. 26.

20 See: Walt, S.M., The Origins of Alliances, New York: Cornell University Press 1990. 21 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 27.

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theorizing impossible”. He adds that Walt’s definition also leaves out what the content of this ‘military commitment’ is and when it should be used.22

Overall, Stefan Bergsmann’s analysis should serve as a more modern contribution to all previous literature and is by no means a critique on the abovementioned scholars. Considering all the former definitions of an ‘alliance’, Stefan Bergsmann identified eight elements23 to develop a concise definition of the concept of alliance:

“an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain”. With the comprehensive theoretical definition of Alliance, as specified by Stefan Bergsmann, the question to ‘What is the transatlantic alliance’?, can be answered with his concept of the alliance as stated above, yet applied to the two power blocs on both sides of the Atlantic; the United States of America and Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the embodiment of the norms and values that underlie the transatlantic security relationship; it forms the heart of the transatlantic alliance. In that respect, NATO serves as the cornerstone of the transatlantic relationship, and therefore both terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

1.2 The concept of intertwinement

The transatlantic alliance is founded on the base of intertwinement. The mutual overlap and extensive relationship between the United States and Europe is not a post-World War II phenomenon but dates back to the seventeenth century. As this term functions as an important theme in this thesis, the notion of intertwinement deserves a brief historical explanation in an academic context.

One of the oldest influential thinkers who described early notions of intertwinement in a visible Anglo-American ideology, is the British philosopher and physician John Locke (1632-1704). In his work Second Treatise of Government, Locke identified certain government functions like the Anglo-American involvement in foreign

22 Reiter, E., and Gärtner, H., Small States and Alliances, Berlin: Springer 2001, p. 27.

23The eight elements of an alliance, according to Stefan Bergsmann (pp. 28-29), are: (1.) Alliances are arrangements

between states; (2.) Alliances are explicit agreements; (3.) Alliances deal with a certain behaviour for a certain contingency

in the future; (4.) The event for which the specified behaviour is promised is uncertain; (5.) An alliance is a promise; (6.) The

promise comprises an assistance. This assistance is the use of one’s own resources for the defense of the other; (7.) The promise is a mutual one; (8.) The agreement falls into the realm of national security.

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affairs in a legal and political context in de eighteenth century.24 He explained that the

Anglo-Saxon domain was spreading towards nation states who were initially not a part of this sphere, like the United States. The Anglo-Saxon domain intertwined with the U.S., resulting in an American ideology. Locke therefore identified the base of an Anglo-American intertwinement from which the later NATO, as a military alliance, was founded. Moreover, the U.S.’ diplomatic history shows us that early intertwinement was visible during the eighteenth century. In the interest of commerce, American commissioners were sent to Vienna, Spain, Prussia and Tuscany in 1776.25

The American historian Carroll Quigley mentions in his study The Anglo-American

Establishment (1981), that early Anglo-American alliances contained more than merely

economic and political structures. Quigley shows that there were also intertwined groups of people on both sides of the Atlantic through friendship, marriage and family ties.26

These social structures consolidated the Anglo-American intertwinement, as much as economic and political structures. According to Quigley, the influence of the Anglo-American group started to be significant from the sixteenth century onward and resulted in a leading supremacy which they achieved through alliances.27 In the current era of

Western modernity, the Atlantic intertwinement is also marked by an overlap of pop-culture, music, fashion, television and social media. Moreover, the economic ties between the Atlantic blocs show that Europe and the United States are each other’s main trading partners and the two largest blocs in the economic and political system overall.28

The current transatlantic relationship under NATO is therefore not an unexpected alliance, as this brief study of intertwinement shows. Rather, it explains the reason why a military alliance between both blocs could be established.

1.3 Thesis structure

The first chapter ‘Contextualization of the history of the transatlantic alliance’, will look into the history and the shaping of the Transatlantic Alliance with the birth of NATO and the development of the European integration at its core. This chapter serves as a

24 Yoo, J., The Power of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

2005, p. 36.

25 Burnett, E., Note on American Negotiations for Commercial Treaties, The American Historical Review, no. 3 (1911), p. 579. 26 Quigley, C., The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden, New York: Books in Focus 1981.

27 Denson, J.V., Reassessing the Presidency: The Rise of the Executive State and the Decline of Freedom, Alabama: Ludwig von

Mises Institute 2001, p. 464.

28 McKinney, J., United States-EU Economic Relations in a Changing Global Economy, Miami-Florida European Union Center

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foundation to gain a deeper understanding of both organisations.

The second chapter ‘The transatlantic alliance: shifting powers?’, provides an overview of the shifting powers in the Transatlantic Alliance. It detects the directions in which both NATO and the EU are heading. The way in which the United States and Europe give substance to their relationship determines the outcome of the Alliance. This chapter will therefore look into the steps, shifts and future plans both blocs undertake to provide NATO’s security and cooperation. The main question to answer in this chapter is whether the transatlantic alliance still shares a common ground or that it resembles divergence that can potentially lead to a so-called ‘hollow’ Alliance.

Chapter three ‘Transatlantic tensions: then and now’, will discuss the development and impact of the three crises that shaped the Alliance. Firstly, I will demonstrate that the collapse of communism and therefore the end of the Cold War is the most defining moment in NATO’s history. This crisis resulted in an ‘identity and purpose’-rift in the Atlantic arena. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 underline the second crisis. In this case we can speak of a global crisis in which NATO’s population witnessed an emotional loss and collective grievance. The most recent crisis that impeded with the functioning and future of NATO was the war in Iraq during the Bush administration.

The final chapter ‘Rebuilding the transatlantic alliance’, will deal with internal and external challenges that threaten the Alliance’s cooperation. Externally, this chapter will focus on the Middle East, East Asia and Eastern Europe, and specifically the crisis in Ukraine. Internally, this chapter will look into issues surrounding collective defense in Article 5 and the 2% pledge, and the impact of Donald Trump in the Atlantic field.

This will lead to an overall conclusion about the extent to which the Transatlantic Alliance between the United States and Europe is in crisis, and whether we can speak of a diverging Alliance that no longer holds value. A thorough examination of NATO’s foundation, current ‘climate’, former crises, and the existing challenges, should allow me to draw conclusions. By then, it should have become clear that the relationship between the EU and U.S. is validated by the notion of intertwinement, and that the challenges of the future are the present crisis of NATO. Finally, a number of recommendations for the future cooperation of NATO members will be given.

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1.4 Research design

Defining text and document analysis

This thesis will offer an international political analysis in a historical context of the transatlantic alliance to find an answer to the research question. The research method that is most suitable for this design is through text and document analysis, as explained by Glenn Bowen: “As a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative studies – intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organisation, or program”,29 which applies perfectly to the study of

NATO as an organisation, and to the single phenomenon of the transatlantic relationship.

Rationale for document analysis

Document analysis is originally a social research method. In his article Document Analysis

as a Qualitative Research Method, Bowen also explains that document analysis in the past

was generally used as a complementary research method, as for today, it serves as a method in its own right.30 The sociologist David Altheide, refers to document analysis as

an ‘emerging methodology’ and states that it entails a process of interpretation and description,31 which is the base of this thesis. Bowen adds that “Organisational and

institutional documents have been a staple in qualitative research for many years. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of research reports and journal articles that mention document analysis as part of the methodology”.32 Moreover,

documents are the most viable source for historical and cultural research, such as in this thesis, as they provide background information and historical insight that can be used to answer the research question.33

Zina O’Leary, an internationally-recognized leader in research methodologies, emphasizes that there is a huge plethora of text for research, yet written documents are by far most likely to be used.34 According to document analysis methodology, books,

articles, journals, letters, newspapers, press releases, minutes of meetings, background papers and organisational or institutional reports may be used for analysis and can be

29 Bowen, G., Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, Qualitative Research Journal, no. 2 (2009), p.29. 30 Ibid., p. 29.

31 Nagy Hesse-Biber, S., and Leavy, P., Handbook of Emergent Methods, New York: The Guilford Press 2008, pp. 133-137. 32 Bowen, G., Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, Qualitative Research Journal, no. 2 (2009), p. 27. 33 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

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found in “libraries, newspaper archives, and organisational or institutional files”.35 This

thesis includes most of the above listing. On the one hand, the historical context of this thesis was based on the use of articles, books, journals, newspapers and press releases. On the other hand, first-hand EU and NATO documents (diplomatic communications and institutional reports) such as NATO’s ‘North Atlantic Treaty 1949’ and the ‘Helsinki Final Act 1975’ of the European Union, were used to support the international political analysis in this research. These data gave inside in the functioning of NATO and the EU, as well as defining the historical events that marked transatlantic tensions and crises.

Moreover, the number of documents a researcher should gather is not limited. Bowen notes that because documents include a wide array of types, the researcher should focus on the quality of each document, rather than the quantity. Therefore, the text and documents used in this thesis were comprehensively reviewed.

The process of document analysis

According to Zina O’Leary, there is a detailed planning process that takes place before a researcher can conduct document analysis.36 Therefore, this thesis followed the given

outline prior to the writing process. This consisted of 1.) Planning – creating a list of text and documents to explore and determine its value and accessibility; 2.) Gather – analysing and storing relevant text and documents, as well as developing an appropriate scheme to organise this all; and 3.) Review – assessing the authenticity and credibility of text and documents, as well as the consideration of biases. O’Leary mentions the issue of bias, both in the author of the document, and the researcher. Bowen agrees to this notion as he emphasizes the importance as a researcher to demonstrate objectivity and evaluate the original purpose of the document thoroughly.37 Therefore, this thesis carefully took into

consideration the potential subjectivity of the authors and tried to safeguard the own objectivity in the writing of a credible research text.

Advantages and limitations of document analysis

Document analysis is a useful methodology for a variety of different fields of research. Although it is a primary method, it can also compliment other methods. The advantages of using documents is that they contain data that can no longer be observed or witnessed

35 Bowen, G., Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, Qualitative Research Journal, no. 2 (2009), p. 27. 36 O’Leary, Z., The Essential Guide to Doing Research, London: SAGE Publications 2004, p. 179.

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and can also track historical and political change and development throughout.38 They

provide a broad coverage. Moreover, most documents are available in the public domain, especially in online databases.39

Both Bowen and O’Leary refer to the disadvantages of document analysis as ‘concerns’, because they rather see it as potential ‘flaws’ that can be avoided easily through a clear and organised planning by the researcher, as outlined in the above process.40 The single unchangeable limitation is that selecting and assessing text and

documents may be time consuming, as it was for this thesis. The overall writing process was shorter than that of gathering and analysing all relevant data. Other limitations however, as stated, are manageable. This include for example that not every document provides the necessary information to answer the research question. Most documents are ‘incomplete’, in a way that not all data is useful to the researcher. Therefore, it is important to carefully asses which documents provide small or large amounts of useful information. According to O’Leary, these are mainly ‘concerns’ as the researcher has prior knowledge to the limitations and can resolve it.41

2 Contextualization of the History of the Transatlantic Alliance

2.1 The birth of the Transatlantic Alliance

In May 1945 World War II come to an end in Europe with the defeat of Nazi Germany. German dominance and warfare shattered Europe’s identity, unity and peace. The general feeling across the continent was the urge of forging a mutual assistance treaty that would provide a common defense system. In the turmoil of the post war period, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was designed as a military security alliance and originally signed in Washington D.C. between France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Canada and the United States. This union became known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It formally committed the treaty members to protect each other and to promote peace, and political and military stability in the West:

38 Research Methodology in Education, An Introduction to Document Analysis, https://lled500.trubox.ca/2016/244, Last

accessed on June 4th 2019.

39 Bowen, G., Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method, Qualitative Research Journal, no. 2 (2009), p. 31. 40 Research Methodology in Education, An Introduction to Document Analysis, https://lled500.trubox.ca/2016/244, Last

accessed on June 4th 2019.

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“The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty’’.4243

After almost 150 years, the usual isolationist United States broke a long tradition of non-entanglement by signing the treaty. The first alliance between both continents was a Franco-American alliance at the time of the War of Independence in 1778, directed at the United Kingdom and negotiated by one of the Founding Fathers, Benjamin Franklin.44

NATO was the second military alliance the United States concluded in their entire history. On the other hand, the study of intertwinement laid a solid base for the signing of a (military) treaty. Through the EU-US intertwined relationship a military alliance was the next logical step.

NATO was constructed as a political order and designed to protect Western Europe from further Soviet expansion. President Harry S. Truman urged U.S.’ participation in the construction of NATO as an integral part of his foreign policy to counterbalance the Soviet Union and its communist expansion. The United States was threatened by the possible communist influence in Central- and Western Europe and therefore felt the urge to unite the North Atlantic area. Moreover, the United States believed that “they could help create a peaceful and prosperous world’’.45 Logically, the Soviet Union strongly opposed NATO,

and its official establishment further restrained the East-West relation.46

42 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 24.; Author unknown, The North Atlantic Treaty (Official Document), Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949,

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf, Last accessed on October 11th 2018.

43 See appendix A: The North Atlantic Treaty.

44 Kaplan, L.S., NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2007, p. ix. 45 Ibid., 2007, p. x.

46 NATO, NATO-Russia relations: the facts, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm, Last accessed on June

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According to Jamie Shea, former spokesman for NATO and Deputy Assistant Secretary General, there was nothing inevitable about the birth of NATO. As a matter of fact, NATO negotiations took so long as both sides of the Atlantic had their own hesitations and doubts about the content of the treaty. The United States feared a loss of their national sovereignty and the European nations, especially France, felt that the Americans forced them to play an inferior role.47 North-America and Europe ultimately decided that their

only viable security option in a post-World War II sphere was to collaborate. Very often images convey that the only reason for the formation of NATO was simply mutual fear and hostility towards the Soviet Union.48 That it was created, as NATO’s first Secretary General

Lord Ismay described, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’’.49 Jamie Shea suggests that this is a deceptive representation of the facts and that

one of the United States’ major driving forces to participate in NATO was even more so ‘the sense of hopelessness and despair’ that affected post-War Europe.50 At the time there

was a total collapse of the stable underpinnings of society with unbearable living standards; altogether Europe had suffered enormous damages.

In line with Lord Ismay and Jamie Shea, many other Brits have fulfilled high positions within NATO, stemming from the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. The traditional cultural special relationship is defined by its shared history and language, as well as their geographical location - both countries are protected by sea. Above all, the United Kingdom is geographically the closest Western ally to the United States, making it a valuable partner. In the field of politics, trade, diplomacy and military – nowadays especially nuclear and intelligence information51 – the

Anglo-American relationship experiences a high degree of cooperation. In the midst of the transatlantic alliance between North-America and Europe, the ‘special relationship’ will have, up until now and without regard of Brexit, an exclusive connection and status.

47 Kaplan, L.S., NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2007, p. x. 48Jamie Shea, “NATO, 1949: NATO’s Anxious Birth”, Video lecture by Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for

Emerging Security Challenges, NATO, Brussels, March 5th, 2009, transcript and audio,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139301.htm.

49 Wallander, C.A., Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War, International Organization, no. 4 (2000),

p. 711.

50 Jamie Shea, “NATO, 1949: NATO’s Anxious Birth”, Video lecture by Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for

Emerging Security Challenges, NATO, Brussels, March 5th, 2009, transcript and audio,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139301.htm.

51 Dumbrell, J., A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq, Basingstoke: Palgrave

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All member states understood that real peace was not only characterized by ‘the absence of war’ but that a solid pact was also required. To guarantee this, the treaty members avowed to stand together against aggression. At the heart of NATO’s founding treaty stands the collective defense clause. The principle of collective defense as legally set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also referred to as the Washington Treaty, is specified as follows: “An (armed) attack against one of NATO’s allies is considered an attack

against all allies’’.52 The first time in history NATO invoked Article 5 was immediately after

the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Not realizing how long-standing the commitment to Europe would be at the time (the U.S. initially thought the treaty would be an agreement for approximately ten years), the United States renounced their isolationism and became involved in European security affairs.53 The second World War made them realize that peace in Europe was also

important for the security of the United States. Some historians and politicians at the time and even today asked themselves the question ‘Was NATO really necessary?’. George Kennan, a former American diplomat and best known as an advocate for his policy of containment, once called the North Atlantic Treaty “a dreadful militarization of the entire East-West relationship’’.54 Others however, describe NATO as the ‘most successful

alliance in history’.55 There is no easy answer to this question, only that without NATO the

Western unification and integration wouldn’t nearly have achieved as much as it does today. It has brought stability and democratic norms and values across Europe. Moreover, throughout time, the transatlantic alliance deepened and formed an essential factor of the international system.56

Last April NATO marked its seventieth birthday, which is considered a great accomplishment and even a milestone as NATO is the longest standing alliance in history. NATO started with twelve treaty members and that number more than doubled

52NATO, Collective Defense – Article 5., https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_110496.htm, Last accessed on October 11th 2018 .

53 Jamie Shea, “NATO, 1949: NATO’s Anxious Birth”, Video lecture by Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for

Emerging Security Challenges, NATO, Brussels, March 5th, 2009, transcript and audio,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139301.htm.

54 Sherwin, M. J., The Militarization of Foreign Affairs,

https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/07/books/the-militarization-of-foreign-affairs.html, Last accessed on October 29th 2019.

55 Webber, M., Sperling, J., and Smith, A.M., NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration?, Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p. 1.

56 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

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throughout the years to twenty-nine member states today. The transatlantic relationship has been one of a kind, complemented by the simultaneous integration of the later European Union. It is even fair to say that NATO plays an important factor in the emergence of European integration in all its different structures.57 By way of illustration,

NATO membership can be viewed as a prelude to possible future membership of the European Union. Members of NATO passed the ‘democratic tests’ NATO appoints and can therefore guarantee a level of democratic and political quality the European Union also expects of future candidate countries. NATO membership makes it easier to become a member of the EU. To truly understand NATO and therefore the core of the transatlantic alliance, we first have to understand the circumstances in which Europe founded itself.

2.2 The development of European integration

The first steps of European integration already started in the late 1940s when the idea of a European Community (EC) was discussed to ensure future peace and cooperation. The democratic countries of Western Europe desired a cooperation based on security and defense to protect themselves against the Soviet Union or a potential attack from Germany. They took the risk of committing themselves to a process of European integration, of working together on a powerful and united Europe. With this intention the nations’ leaders believed that a pacification of Europe and peace were only attainable through a reconciliation of European states.58 This led to the signing of the Treaty of

Brussels in 1948 between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. As the Treaty of Brussels was signed before the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, its members also had the implicit meaning to demonstrate to the United States their willingness to jointly work on security.59 The United States after all, strongly promoted

further European integration and believed this would strengthen and secure the transatlantic relationship.

In 1951 the first union, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was formed between six countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, France and West-Germany. This cornerstone of European integration was realized by Robert Schuman –

57 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 2.

58 Robert Schuman Foundation, Fathers of Europe., https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/divers/fathers-of-europe.pdf,

Last accessed on 20th October 2018.

59 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

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together with Jean Monnet, the first president of the ECSC’s High Authority – also known as ‘the Father(s) of Europe’. According to others in their time “the founding fathers were the true craftsmen of European unity in the public arena […]’’.60 The member states

agreed to work together on the production of coal and steel, materials that were essential for rebuilding military forces. By working together on this, the ECSC-countries (including West-Germany) felt that it would take away tensions and any new war-frictions between them. The remarkable success story of the ECSC was beautifully addressed in 1954 in an annual speech by European integration activist Jean Monnet:

“Everyone can now see that our experiment has produced results. The way to make Europe, I want to repeat here, is to pool resources, create common institutions by transferring sovereignty to them and granting them the power of decision and to set up common rules which apply equally to all […]’’. “At a moment when the peoples of Europe are looking to their future with a feeling of uncertainty and concern, the High Authority asks your Assembly to give them the message that the unity of Europe, with all hopes that it brings with it, is possible and that it is being achieved’’.61

By 1957, the ESCS had blossomed to an extent that its members decided to take a next step with the Treaty of Rome, by creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Its aim was to create a common market in which it would be easier to buy and sell products, not only coal and steel. Throughout the six treaty members, the EEC also tried to make it easier to travel, live and work in and out each country. As a result, other states wanted to join the EEC and memberships started to grow. On the other hand, there were also countries that were keen on keeping their independence and protested to join. Any country that wanted to be part of the EEC first had to apply; the existing members decided who would be accepted. These rules were later formally set out in the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. They include accession criteria (geographic, political and economic criteria, and legislative alignment) that define whether an aspirant country is eligible for membership.

60 Robert Schuman Foundation, Fathers of Europe., https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/divers/fathers-of-europe.pdf,

Last accessed on 20th October 2018.

61 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

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American initial enthusiasm for further integration of the Community made room for a growing distance between the United States and Western Europe. The issue whether a more intensive integration should be pursued, meaning becoming a ‘deeper’ or ‘wider’ Community, would remain a central focus point ever since.62 On 23 April 1973, Henry

Kissinger gave a speech that distanced the transatlantic relationship. He undermined and insulted Europe by saying that “The problems in Atlantic relationships are real… The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical. […] We need a shared view of the world we seek to build’’.63 He

meant to strengthen the Euro-American relationship but by proclaiming that the EU had ‘regional’ and the U.S. ‘global’ interests, Kissinger offended and alienated the other European NATO members.

On the other hand, the American irritations towards the Community were, to some extent, understandable. While the European Community was only in its transitional phase, the member states had promised America to achieve a European Union no later than 1980.64 Unfortunately, in 1973, the European countries were less concerned with

their political obligations due to the economic prosperities they had attained. The Americans interpreted this behaviour as follows: ‘’Europeans have acted as though the alliance does not exist’’, and the New York Times even stated that ‘their relationship (i.e. EU-US) had struck an all-time low’.65 Even though the European Community became

financially independent, they still needed the United States behind them.

In 1986, the Single European Act was signed which further reduced barriers between the different member states. After that, in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on European Union (TEU), officially renamed the EEC as the European Union (EU) we know it today. Across the Atlantic, president Bush’s reaction to this historic moment was that ‘’European unity is good for Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, and good for the world […] a strong united Europe is very much in America’s interest’’, which, considered

62 Urwin, D.W., The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, London: Pearson Education Unlimited

1994, p. 23.

63 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 87.

64 Council on Foreign Relations, The Year of Europe?, Foreign Affairs, no. 52 (1974), p. 241. 65 Ibid., p. 237.

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by many Europeans, sounded rather self-centred.66 The TEU introduced more

cooperation between governments in areas such as defense and justice, as well as the introduction of plans to bring the economies of the member countries closer together. Consequently in 2002, the Euro was introduced as the EU’s new currency.

Countries continued to join the European Union leading to the biggest enlargement of new member states in 2004, when ten countries entered; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The so called ‘big bang’ was the largest EU expansion in terms of territory and numbers of states and population, many of whom were Eastern bloc-countries and belonged to the former Soviet Union, satellite states or the Baltic countries. Many of these countries joined the European Union to be part of the Western bloc and its economy, looking for shelter for the Russian threat. On the European side, the new members brought an increased level of security along EU borders67 and were an achievement of democratic consolidation. The Eastern

enlargement is also defined as EU’s security policy, to prevent political instability and protect new members from authoritarian regimes possibly replacing former communist regimes. According to research professor in EU’s external policies, Helene Sjursen, “enlargement was regarded as the best strategy to reduce risks of instability spreading to Western Europe’’.68 Simultaneously, apart from Cyprus and Malta, the new EU member

states joined (or already had joined) NATO. The new NATO members were more focused on the United States than on European NATO members with regard to leadership in security matters. Although the new states were enthusiastic about their European Union membership, they rather tended to look at the United States for all matters outside European economics.69

The economic side of the transatlantic alliance was primarily being dictated by the integration process of the EU. After the TEU officially went into force in 1993, its economic sphere loomed large and American dominance in transatlantic economic relations decreased. The European Union had a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (if not per capita) and a larger population in total than the United States. The creation of the EU was

66 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 131.

67Corum, J.S., The Security Concerns of the Baltic States and NATO Allies, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1171.pdf,

Last accessed on November 15th 2018.

68 Sjursen, H., Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, New York: Routledge 2006, p. 132.

69 Corum, J.S., The Security Concerns of the Baltic States and NATO Allies, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1171.pdf, Last

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considered an ‘economically stable entity’.70 Although the future would (and will) prove

otherwise, with the collapse of the financial markets and the Euro zone and the increasing importance of Asian economies, at that point in time the United States was somehow surpassed by its own goodwill in promoting and encouraging further European integration. Especially the Americans, and Europeans as well, never expected the European integration to be such a remarkable success story.71 Before, it was expected that

Europe would follow the United States in leading the way as a unilateral security power. This expectation was referred to as the ‘Atlantic fantasy’, which was ultimately mirrored by the ‘Atlantic nightmare’; namely, that Europe transformed itself to an economically independent entity freed from American dominance.72 Some scholars even spoke of

‘historical irony’73 when the U.S. seemed economically dominated by the Europeans, while

Europe benefitted from America’s willingness to act as Europe’s ‘strategic guarantor’74,

and offering their assistance, knowledge and financial services in the post-War era. Meanwhile, as the EU further developed, the question ‘What kind of entity is the European Union?’ arose. It is neither a state nor an international organization; its status is questionable. Some suggest that the EU is mainly a free market. Others, however, refer to it as a common space of European values and identity. To some the EU is a problem-solving entity, promoting and protecting its members’ interests.75

Although it may seem that the development and ultimately, the creation of the European Union was a steady upward integration process towards an ‘ever closer union’, reality shows that it was mainly a rollercoaster with various complex interactions, influenced by national leaders and its governments who were highly concerned with their countries’ self-interest.76 In addition, several Euro-American frictions occurred during the European

integration process, which meant that the transatlantic alliance, officially established through NATO, would possibly experience more tensions in the future.

First, it is important to find out in which direction both the United States and

70 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 2 & p. 131.

71 Ibid., p. 4.

72 Webber, M., Sperling, J., and Smith, A.M., NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration?, Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p. 153.

73 Hanhimäki, J., Schoenborn, B., and Zanchetta, B., Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction, London: Routledge

2012, p. 2.

74 Kupchan, C., The Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations: Discord and Repair, Politique Etrangère, no. 1 (2009), p. 2. 75 Sjursen, H., Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, New York: Routledge 2006, pp. 1-2.

76 Urwin, D.W., The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, London: Pearson Education Unlimited

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Europe are moving. What steps do they individually take to ensure NATO’s security and cooperation in the future? And do these steps and future plans share a common ground, or do they resemble ‘divergence’? Are potential shifts surmountable, allowing the EU-US to focus on international issues that threaten our liberal-democratic western world? The way in which the United States and Europe give substance to their relationship determines the outcome of the Alliance. Are they heading in opposite directions or will they converge? If transatlantic thoughts, values and priorities on both sides of the Atlantic become alienated, then there may be a real ‘hollow’ alliance in which other power blocs take over.

3 The Transatlantic Alliance: Shifting powers?

3.1 Developing a new position

3.1.1 From a unipolarity to a multipolarity

Up until the Iraq crisis in 2003, the world was characterized by the unipolarity of the world’s most powerful country, the United States. In that period the differences between the Atlantic blocs were highlighted. Afterwards, the war in Iraq marked the decline of U.S.’ hegemony and the end of America’s unipolar world order. However, it is not the decline of the United States per se, but rather the rise of others that contribute to this transition. The changing economic relations between power blocs like the United States, the European Union and China, evidently show that we are entering a multipolar world. The global balance of power is shifting from a unipolarity to a new world order, with states like China on the rise. In this case unipolarity can be seen as a system in which one state exercises power over other states at an economic, cultural and military level. On the other hand, multipolarity means that two or more states have ‘commensurate power-projection capabilities’.77

Since America is taking a more unilaterist stance and a step back from multilateral institutions – partly as a result of Donald Trump’s increasingly populist and economic nationalist attitude – other world powers such as East Asia have entered the arena. According to foreign relations expert Charles Kupchan, American stability and dominance in the global arena is already decreasing and will eventually come to an end. The impact

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of a multipolar system is then that the United States has to share its leading position with other powerful blocs such as East Asia or possibly Russia. Ultimately, the U.S. will remain powerful, but its relative strength will decline.

However, studies show that the United States in terms of power, is still ahead of other emerging continents. According to Michael Beckley, a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the set of resources that are vital for international politics, namely wealth, innovation and conventional military capabilities, are still ranked the highest by the United States. Although China significantly improved these indicators over the past decade, they do not share an equal amount of this power yet.78

Despite the fact that there is a decrease of America’s unipolarity, there is no actual threat that Europe will become the new unipolarity in the world in the foreseeable future. Critics argue that it is unlikely for Europe to become more powerful than the United States. The main criteria here is that the EU member states are too strong, and Brussels is too decentralized, and the cultural and linguistic differences are too broad to compete in ‘world dominance’.79 Moreover, the EU traditionally relies more on the U.S. than vice

versa, making it unlikely that it will suddenly become a unipolarity in the global arena. While global power relations are shifting, the European states are being forced to stand up for their own interests and security.

The end of American supremacy and a return to a multipolar system is expected to be difficult to accept in Washington. President Donald Trump is a supporter of America’s Grand Strategy and emphasizes the importance of American primacy.80 On the other hand,

Trump understands that the rise of China is inevitable, yet he perceives them as a threat rather than a partner.

3.1.2 Decrease of America’s internationalism

An important factor in the waning unipolarity of America is the decrease of liberal internationalism in the United States. The idea of liberal internationalism was developed as a foreign policy doctrine by former U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), but

78 Beckley, M., China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure, International Security, no. 3 (2012), p. 56.

79 Kupchan, C., The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy, Political Science

Quarterly, no. 2 (2003), p. 210.

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was mainly used after the Second World War. It advocates the spread of liberal principles in an international sphere to achieve a more liberal world order. The United States used this liberal internationalism to impose its leading power and to interfere in the affairs of other (sovereign) nations with the intention of providing support. A larger part of the twenty-first century is defined by the United States’ liberal internationalism, mostly overseas. Critics argue that the American interference was a way to secure its authority as the hegemonic leader in the global arena. On the other hand, the Americans have established a liberal order in the western world. Nowadays, liberal internationalism is decreasing as a result of political developments such as isolationism and the replacement of multilateralism with unilateralism.81 This development can change the international

landscape drastically.82 Due to the increasing number of threats on American territory,

their commitments abroad, to serve as an international guardian, become less important. The most sensible example is the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in which American attention shifted from resolving problems abroad to address internal affairs and security threats. It can be stated that “the more time U.S. forces spend defending American territory, the less time they will spend defending the territory of others’’.83

The decrease of American internationalism gives room to new powerful blocs like China and Russia who are already united and collaborating in a political and economic organisation of their own. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), or Shanghai Pact, formally established in 2003, centres around security-related topics and serves as an alternative to NATO. SCO is widely regarded as the “alliance of the East” and its geographical coverage in the Asia-Pacific region extends to nearly half of the global population. In the event that China and Russia become the two most powerful non-liberal states and determine the economic, security and potentially the political world order, the implications for the West, and therefore NATO, are extensive.84 Although this prospect is

very speculative, it is a scenario all nation states should take into consideration. When push comes to shove, China and Russia will dominate and Europe comes last. Therefore, China and Russia are a serious challenge for the future development of NATO, and subsequently the United States and Europe.

81 Jahn, B., Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects, International Affairs, no. 1 (2018), p. 43. 82 Kupchan, C., The Rise of Europe, America’s Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy, Political Science

Quarterly, no. 2 (2003), pp. 216-223.

83 Ibid., pp. 223-224.

84 Fumagalli, M., Order in Asia Beyond Power Transition: Understanding China’s Rise, Changing International Roles and Grand

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