Djibouti avant tout: Sustainable peace development through a civic nationalist framework enforcing Afar-Issa rapprochement

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Djibouti avant tout: Sustainable peace development through a civic

nationalist framework enforcing Afar-Issa rapprochement

Deek Hussain Jama

MSc Political Science: International Relations Student number: 12272337

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze Second reader: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon Date: June 2020

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude to my mother and sisters for being a huge emotional support during the difficult times throughout this course. Your encouragement is something that I treasure and I hope you know how much I would do the same for you all. I’d also like to thank my friends both in the UK and the Netherlands for being motivating throughout my studies. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my study advisors, Michael and Vivienne, for guiding me to challenge myself throughout this thesis.

I dedicate this to my grandmother, Mako Jama, who unfortunately passed away in the final weeks of my Master’s course. Her stories of Djibouti’s revolutionary moments have motivated me to research the cultural and political history of our people.

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ABSTRACT

The Afars and Issas; two ethnic groups indigenous to the Horn of Africa involved in an ongoing protraction of violence in Ethiopia. Although the population of Djibouti is majorly comprised of the two, the nation has not seen a similar level of contention since the Civil War. This thesis explores how Djiboutian civic nationalism works to reconcile the mental distances between the Afar and Issa identities caused by a historic and transnational conflict. An explanation will be presented through a case study of bureaucratic and guerrilla relations from the nation’s time as La Côte Français des Somalis to the present-day Republic. By establishing the successes and setbacks of peace development within the nation, this research will deploy a comprehensive understanding that advances knowledge of peace studies in the Djiboutian context.

Keywords: Afar, Africa, Civic nationalism, Djibouti, Ethnic conflict, Ethnic politics, Horn of

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ABBREVIATIONS

APP – Afar People’s Party

AROD - Action pour la Révision de l'Ordre à Djibouti

FDLD - Front Démocratique pour la Libération de Djibouti

FLCS - Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis

FRUD - Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie

IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development

MNDID – Mouvement National Djiboutien pour l'Instauration de la Démocratie

MPL - Mouvement Populaire de Libération

RADD - Rassemblement pour l'Action de Développement et la Démocratie

RDA - Regroupement Démocratique Afar

RPP - Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès

RTD - Radiodiffusion Télévision de Djibouti

SNPC - Somalia National Peace Conference

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La défense de la Nation et de l'intégrité du territoire de la République est un devoir sacré pour tout citoyen Djiboutien.

(The defence of the Nation and the integrity of the Republic’s territory is the sacred duty of every Djiboutian citizen) - La Constitution de la République de Djibouti, Titre II, Art. 6, 1992.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The Afar-Issa conflict has been protracted and heightened since the 16th Century (Prunier & Ficquet 2015: 34). A phenomenon so bloody and deep-rooted, it is has been baptised as the longest-running inter-ethnic dispute in the Horn of Africa (Kebbede 2016: 54). Its presence has been felt from the Awash River Valley in Ethiopia to the Obock coast in Djibouti but its magnitude is asymmetrical amongst the region. On one hand, violence remains potent in the Afar and Somali autonomous regional states of Ethiopia. As of 2019, around 124,000 Afars and Issas have been displaced, endured injuries, death, and have had scarce access to food or water (OCHCA 2020). On the other, Djibouti is currently the most peaceful in the Red Sea region (IEP 2019). Indeed, the last occurrence of profound bloodshed was the nation’s Civil War of 1991-1994. It is also one of the five fastest developing nations in the continent and this can be attributed to the relatively amicable socio-political relationship between the Afars and the Issas (IEP 2019). Through the 1994 Peace Accord between the Afar party, Front pour

la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie, and the Issa party, Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès, the nation was declared as comprising of one people working for the stability

of their sovereign lands, for the first time1 (Djibouti. Council of Ministers 1994).

Having said that, the two ethnic groups have never seen such unity before 1991. Embroiled in conflicts during the Middle Ages, French Colonialism and Djibouti’s independence; researchers and reporters alike would take turns speculating the potential dissolution of Djibouti’s existence as a country established on ethnic divisions (Abdi 1977; Schraeder 1993; Shilling 1973). With no constitution before 1992 and a political system that was designed to be exploited, hatred undeniably blistered and festered. In this depiction of Djibouti, we see an unexpected reconciliation of an Afar-Issa antagonism that predates the country itself. It becomes even more intriguing when we acknowledge that the Afar-Issa conflict continues across its borders in Ethiopia.

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This research paper aims to figure out what has caused this sudden consolidation by exploring the paramount question: To what extent has civic nationalism facilitated Djibouti’s

peace development? To construct a fully comprehensive answer, I shall provide an

explanation to three sub-questions that seek to understand Djibouti’s development by examining its historical conflict and its present-day peace level:

1: How did the Afar-Issa relationship lead to the outbreak of the Djiboutian Civil War? 2: What has Djibouti done to reconcile Afar-Issa grievances after the Djiboutian Civil War? 3: What are the potential threats to Afar-Issa reconciliation in Djibouti?

This endeavour also aims to fill a knowledge gap in the understandings of the Afar-Issa conflict and the Djiboutian realm. Many theories on the Afar-Issa conflict are orientated to providing an explanation on either a regional or Ethiopian scale. They provide extensive materialist and ideological understandings of the conflict. In comparison, the literature on Djibouti remains largely historiographical. However, in select literature that do, in fact, present explanatory theories of Djiboutian domestic affairs have been focused on explaining what caused the conflict than what pacified it. These previous works have been incredibly insightful in creating a theoretical framework that understands the nature of the conflict and the national setting that I wish to evaluate yet they are entrenched in conflict studies. Although this research will explore the conflict extensively, it is categorically posited in peace studies.

The significance of this research in the Political Sciences is distinct by the lack of knowledge production in the Horn of Africa in comparison to other regions of the continent. Although literature is present, as mentioned above, they are dissimilar in their accounts which leads me to believe that it remains misunderstood. Moreover, it is evident that Djibouti is one of the least studied African nations (DeLancey 1992: 209). As such, this research is not only valued because it attempts to provide an explanatory account of conflict to peace, but also the fact that it exists.

Concepts that will be applied to this research will be interdisciplinary by virtue of a postcolonial ontological and epistemological position. Violence will be considered multidimensional and exemplified through Galtung’s triad of direct, structural and cultural expressions. A divergence of identities will be interpreted through concepts of victimisation, tribalism and ethnic nationalism. In addition, peace will also be established as equally complex and a convergence of identities will be examined and compared to the understandings of civic nationalism as a contemporary African reconciliatory approach.

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These questions will be answered through a longitudinal case study encompassing six critical periods in the second independence referendum of 1967, Djibouti’s independence in 1977, the governmental transition to a one-party system in 1981, the Civil War of 1991-1994, the peace process of between 1992-2001, and the current state 2001-2020. I will employ thematic and discursive analytic approaches to evaluate Djibouti’s Journal Officiel, French newspaper of record, Le Monde, and reports from the US Department of State to compare and comprehend how the government and guerrilla groups have contributed and experienced conflict. Based on the assertions made by these analyses, I will then evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the nation’s current peace level.

My research will be anchored through an inferential evaluation of my own ethics. As a British-Dutch national of Djiboutian-Somali descent, my positionality must be addressed from various standpoints. I will deconstruct any potentially biased or Eurocentric assumptions on the Afar-Issa relations and peace development by entrenching myself in relevant theories and concepts. Subsequently, my findings will be transparent, abductive and thick in description in order to provide a constructive answer.

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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will provide a brief historical timeline of the Afar-Issa conflict in Djibouti. In addition, it will delve into studies that have posited possible explanations and solutions for the protracted nature of the conflict. Through a critical examination of their central arguments, I will demonstrate the relevance of my research and how it is situated within current literature.

Case introduction: Djibouti’s socio-political sphere

Two people, one nation

Djibouti is a small but essential state located in the Horn of Africa that emerged after gaining independence as the former Territoire français des Afars et des Issas (French Territory of the Afars and Issas) in 1977. Like many other nations in the continent, it is fairly young but its history is long-established and constitutive to the society we see today. Djibouti stands at a crossroads between the Suez Canal in the north, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the west and the heart of Africa to the south and east. According to the Global Peace Index, the nation is the most peaceful in Northeast Africa for the reason that it is surrounded by Ethiopian-Eritrean clashes, the Somali Civil War and the Yemeni Civil War (IEP 2019). Under these qualities, it is best known for being a geopolitical location of high value (IBP USA 2006a: 26). Correspondingly, Djibouti hosts military bases of incredibly powerful nations; the US, China, France, Italy and Japan. In these bases, anti-piracy ventures, counter-terrorism initiatives and intelligence surveillance have been pursued (ibid). With perpetual conflict occurring in neighbouring countries, Djibouti is in the eye of the storm and as such, has been used by foreign actors to regulate the region. However, as a consequence, the importance of its domestic stability is comparatively overlooked.

Djibouti is in a unique position that needs to be explored. The current total population is around 960,000 (World Bank 2020). Approximately 95% of that number consists of the Afars and Issas (Wiafe-Amoako 2019: 208). It is important to know that these two ethnic

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groups have been engaged in protracted violence for centuries (Michaelson 2000: 4). As a result of their size and history of contention, their relationship with each other determines how stable Djibouti is. To complicate the matter, there continues to be hostility between their kinfolk along the Afar and Somali regional states of Ethiopia because of long-term grievances and scarcity in resources (OCHA 2020). With bloodshed perpetually appearing at its doorstep and instances of occasional spillover, Djibouti’s peace is always in a state of jeopardy.

Elaborating on the two ethnic groups, The Afars are a Cushitic people who are native to the Horn of Africa. As illustrated in Figure 1, their indigenous domain covers the Danakil Depression which reaches from the Awash River valley in the heart of Ethiopia across to the Obock district of

Djibouti and the city of Massawa in central Eritrea. Although they contribute to 35% of Djibouti’s ethnic makeup, which amounts to around 334,000, they are more than 2.6 million strong in their greater territory (CSA 2017). They have their own Afro-Asiatic

language, Afar, but huge parts of the community in their respective countries can

speak Arabic, French and Somali. Traditionally, the Afars are nomadic pastoralists and for the most part, have largely remained a rural group of people (Hubbard 2011: 22). Nonetheless, their presence in the capital, Djibouti city, has been constant and their political presence is ever-growing.

Similarly, the Issas are also a Cushitic people who are traditionally nomadic pastoralists. They reside in an adjacent yet contiguous region that consists of Northern

Figure 1. Transnational map highlighting Afar-Issa ethnic borders and historical areas of conflict.

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Ethiopia, Northern Somaliland/Somalia2 and Southern Djibouti. In Djibouti, they make up 65% of the population, which would amount to 640,000 (Wiafe-Amoako 2019: 208). Although present in the rural south, the majority of them are concentrated in Djibouti City (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211). The Issas are a clan of the larger Somali ethnicity that currently comprises of around 22 million people that are native to most of the Horn of Africa (UNPD 2019). In Djibouti, the Issas widely speak the Somali, which is also Afro-Asiatic, as their mother tongue but the majority of them can also speak Arabic and French; Afar is not as common. Since the Issas have been urbanised earlier and at a greater capacity, they have been more involved in the bureaucracy of the nation since the colonial era (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211).

Pre-independence conflict

The Afar-Issa conflict has been the longest rivalry amongst all ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa (Kebbede 2016: 54). The exact date of when conflict erupted is hard to pinpoint due to their oral tradition of recording history but the conflict can be seen in the turn of the 16th Century (Prunier & Ficquet 2015: 34). However, conflict along the Djiboutian region can be dated back to the 18th Century after the Issa expansion from northern Somalia towards the Awash River Basin in the west and Djibouti City in the north (Lewis 1961:71). Although violence was extensive in the Ethiopian hinterlands, Djibouti was sparsely populated, so instances of violence were not constant but occasional.

Tensions were heightened after the arrival of the French and an influx of populations. In 1862, the French Empire bought the rights to use the port of Obock from Afar Sultan, Dini Ahmed Aboubaker to integrate it into their international trade routes (Degefu 2003: 31). The following decades saw a French expansion to the ports of Tadjoura and Djibouti City. Then, Djibouti City quickly replaced Obock as the economic centre of the region and saw a huge rise of Arab, European and Issa merchants (ibid). Finally, the three ports were integrated into one territory in 1896 as La Côte Français des Somalis (French Somaliland). Alongside this new territory came a French and Arab ruling class with an urbanised Issa majority (Shehim & Searing 1980: 211).

The changing face of Djibouti resulted in newfound Afar-Issa animosities that were manifested through political mediums. In the early 20th Century, both the Afars and Issas

2Somaliland is a disputed territory with limited international recognition. A distinction will be made in this paper

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endured a political awakening but due to the latter being more urbanised, the Issas became more entrenched in the colony’s bureaucracy and thus, jurisdiction began to sway in their favour (idem: 212). Political contention between the two ethnic groups began when Somalia got its independence in 1960 from British rule and there was a rising sense of Pan-Somalism; a movement to unite all Somali-majority areas into one greater nation (idem: 210). With the indigenous Issa ruling class sympathetic to the cause, there grew an exasperation amongst the Afars who dreaded the idea of being governed by a sizable Somali state (Thibaut 1999: 316). The French had the same reservations and suppressed this prospect during the first referendum in 1958 by bolstering the value of the Afar vote but more importantly, transplanting Afar figureheads in politics as a means to skew the results (ibid). The same thing occurred for the second referendum in 1967. Subsequently, the colony remained and Issa governors were increasingly replaced by Afar counterparts in the Chamber of Deputies under the entity, Regroupement Démocratique Afar (RDA) (ibid). Consequently, the unanticipated turn in the designation of power led to many protests and conflicts.

The years following the second referendum saw an emergence of stronger political polarisation as parties forged on ethnic divisions were mobilising en masse. What was thought as a colonial attempt to subdue the tensions and maintain control, actually turned out to be counterproductive as the Issas began a hostile offence against the French. The first politically charged attack on military and civil Europeans happened in 1970 as Omar Elmi Khaireh, a member of the marginalised, Front de Libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS), launched a grenade in Djibouti City’s Zinc Palm Tree Bar and Restaurant (United States, Joint Publications Research Service 1976: 24). Afterwards, attacks on the French became continuous in the 1970s, such as the kidnap of the French ambassador to Mogadishu, Jean Geury. This kidnap was notable for the fact that the FLCS unsuccessfully demanded unconditional Djiboutian independence in exchange for Geury’s return (King 1986: 174). Alongside these series of events, there was outside push from the UN and the West for France to leave its last African colony, and grant Djibouti its sovereignty (Shehim & Searing 1980: 216). Internal hostility and external pressure inevitably expelled French presence to a certain degree after independence in 1977 but this did not resolve Afar-Issa tensions. Instead, this meant that the two were now completely fixated on each other's animosity.

Post-independence conflict

With the formation of the Djiboutian state, came an Issa stronghold government ready to reverse colonial bureaucracy. In 1979, two years after independence, a single-party system

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was introduced under the first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, as a way to unify political differences (Thibaut 1999: 317). Under his party, Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP), there would be a supposed representation of all ethnic groups, thus removing the need for a variety of voices (Schraeder 1993: 207). The party’s cabinet positions were allocated based on ethnicity; one Arab, one Somali from the Gadabuursi clan, one Somali from the Isaaq clan, seven Afars and six Issas (idem: 208). These actions could have initially been perceived as sincere since Aptidon declared a desire for peace and liberation from French rule but this quickly changed as autonomous Afar legislators were rapidly dismissed and replaced (ibid). Consequently, the Afar population began to see the diversity as nothing but “window-dressing” since all members were anointed, not elected, by the Issa-founded RPP (idem: 209).

Inter-ethnic animosity was also heavily exacerbated by relations with Ethiopia and Somalia. During the Ogaden War in the late 1970s. Djiboutian individuals would leave to fight with their respective kinfolk since the conflict laid on Afar-Issa ethnic borders in north-eastern Ethiopia. Proceeding the end of this war, the Ethio-Somali conflict translated directly into domestic affairs (Shehim & Searing 1980: 222). Since the Somalis lost, there came an influx of Issa refugees from other countries, which drastically aggravated an already defined ethnic cleavage (Crisp 1984: 74). Simultaneously, the Ethiopian Afars came out victorious from the conflict and began to move towards the northern Djibouti districts of Obock and Tadjoura in the pursuit of unifying an Afar nation. This led to an establishment of transnational Afar political entities such as the Ethiopian-based Mouvement Populaire de

libération (MPL) (Schraeder 1993: 210). Alongside this regional pursuit, there was also Afar

mobilisation in domestic affairs, such as the formation of the Front Démocratique pour la

Libération de Djibouti (FDLD) (ibid). The Afars were now clear and insistent; whether

Djibouti continues or an Afar nation is formed, they wanted the immediate removal of RPP and Aptidon.

Aptidon’s governmental response to growing unrest amongst the Djiboutian population was to administer mass displacements of “foreign” and “domestic” actors. In the early 1980s, Issa refugees with no valid permits or residency cards were sent to camps in Dikhil and Ali Sabieh in southwest Djibouti (Crisp 1984: 76). This was a means to ease cleavages within the capital city but lead to instances of spillover conflict in the rural areas, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the early 1990s, the mobilisation of Afars in the north became so palpable that the Djiboutian government wished for France to aid them in the removal of “foreign militants” upsetting the peace of the country (Schraeder 1993: 215). However, the

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French rejected such a notion as the insurgent entities that were being targeted were under domestic leadership and consisted of little external military personnel, as such, they announced that this was a domestic problem but would maintain their presence in the country as a precautionary measure (ibid). In lieu of this, Aptidon decided to balance this growing Afar presence by capturing notable leaders and recruiting Issa guerrilla fighters from the Ethio-Somali region (idem: 214). Over these decades, the oscillating politicisation of who was welcome and who was not induced a volatile atmosphere of uncertainty that resulted in the Civil War 1991-1994.

After numerous arbitrary arrests of Afars, the marginalised political community in the north transformed into a full-scale guerrilla movement of 3,000, Front pour la Restauration

de l'Unité et de la Démocratie (FRUD). Inspired by similar groups who overthrew Mengistu

and Barre, dictators of Ethiopia and Somalia respectively, FRUD wished to cease long-standing maltreatment by force (Schraeder 1993: 211). Most of the conflict happened in and around Obock and Tadjoura since these were the only two state-controlled towns in the Afar-majority north. The government immediately reacted by boosting reinforcement to crackdown on dissidents. The war caused around 1,000 deaths with many more left unaccounted for (Marshall 2019). Although a number of scholars have described the conflict as “low-intensity”, this was a substantial number compared to larger countries since the country only had a total population under 630,000 at the time (World Bank n.d.). In its 14 years of existence, Djibouti descended into chaos and with conflict happening in all of its immediate neighbouring countries, there was a question as to whether this would be another endless battle.

Present-day peace level

In comparison to its immediate neighbours, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen who were categorized as countries with a low or very low state of peace, Djibouti is at a medium level Peace Index and has shown significant improvement (IEP 2019). As demonstrated, Djibouti has moved on from the Civil War that ended in 1994. The beginning of this move can be seen when Aptidon expressed a compromise with the opposition group, FRUD, in the constitution of the state (IBP 2006a: 83-84). The discussion involved the integration of Afar leaders in governmental delegations and more political freedoms (ibid). Although the rest of the 1990s was a back and forth of violence and cooperation, there was minimal hostility that threatened the stability of the state as it did before. After the inauguration of the current president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, in 1999, the Djiboutian government reached a finalisation of peace agreements

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with FRUD in 2001. Both parties described the agreement as a pursuit to a “real devolution” in tensions (ibid). In addition, the fact that Djibouti hosts numerous military bases of powerful nations reduces the chances of domestic chaos. As mentioned before, there is a strong presence of foreign powers. Military partnerships with countries such as the US are usually compounded with humanitarian aid and assistance in security (IBP 2006a: 27). With all this in mind, peace in Djibouti is still fragile. Not only is there a spillover effect with the Afar-Issa conflict within Ethiopia but the nation has experienced piracy, terrorist attacks and constant influx of refugees from Eritrea, Somalia and Yemen (ECHO 2017). Due to being situated in a heated region, the nation is a simmering cauldron that evidently needs to continue strengthening its domestic peace status.

Literary synopses: Crux of the conflict

When exploring previous literature of the Afar-Issa relationship, most belong to the field of conflict studies. For example, there is a large discussion that their prolonged pastoralist conflict in the Horn of Africa is due to competition in resources and territory (Degefu 2003; Kebbede 2016; Lewis 2003). Kaplan asserts that this exactly the case in Djibouti’s barren landscape where there were resources are scarce (1978:53). Medhane suggests that this is potentially caused by cultural differences on fundamental beliefs in cohabitation. Most notably, he explains the differences in territorialism where the Issas believe that only God owns the land and as such, everyone has a right to graze and territorial rights are dependent on who is occupying the land at a given time (Medhane 2006: 14-15). This fluidity in territory directly conflicts with the Afar belief in a static Afar homeland. This can be seen in the Issa expansion from Northern Somalia to Djibouti city in the 1700s where they overtook resources and ports for their mercantile and agriculture-based economy (Stanley 2007: 133). In Yasin’s case study about Afar-Issa transboundary alliances in Ethiopia and Djibouti, he discovers that over generations, these dynamics instate stereotypes that accumulate into collective memories of ‘ancient hatred’ and ‘security dilemmas’ (2010: 21-22). Furthermore, it seeps into contemporary governance in these nations and can be seen in both groups’ competitiveness for power and ‘winner-takes-it-all’ rationale (ibid). This could be applied to the Issa-majority government in Djibouti and how they have competed with the Afar opposition around the Civil War.

What is apparent in theories that have evaluated the social dimension of the inter-ethnic conflicts, is the lack of solutions that are also socially orientated. For example,

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Oberschall suggests the everlasting peace can only be found in the separation of the two ethnic groups into exclusive territories, be it regional or national (2007:11). This does not address their animosities, rather it suggests that it is too deep-rooted to be solved. Furthermore, on a relationship suggested as a conflict of territories there is no way that you can allocate land between the Afars and Issas who have contended where their territorial borders lie. Yasin also does not provide a sufficient solution. First of all, he denies that we have truly reached peace in Djibouti (2010: 268-292). Djibouti’s current pace status may not be the most ideal but to denounce the progress it has made since the 1990s would render you unable to find out what has worked in the reconciliatory process during this period. Second of all, he finalises his findings, by demanding that the Issa government be accommodating to the Afar population and reform their corrupted political system (ibid). However, he does not explain how this can be done, especially since he declares that both the Issas and Afar inherently mistrust each other. To enact these actions that he wishes the government to do, we need to figure out a way to break the cultural institutions that have generated the inequality in the first place.

Another researched facet of the Afar-Issa conflict of Djibouti is the role of French colonialism and its political legacy of tribalism. Tribalism is a colonial tool that imbalances power amongst a multicultural society (Mamdani 2001: 21-22). It politicises ethnic groups against each other within the colony’s domestic affairs as a means to maintain a Western elite class at the top of the social order (ibid). Lewis theorises that the constant switching of alliances between the French and the two indigenous groups created a new urbanised socio-political dimension to the existing animosity (Lewis 1955: 155). He states that the French incessantly retitled the colony with ethnically-charged misnomers and political officials that empowered the most compliant over the most defiant (ibid). For example, the Issas had more power during the nation’s time as La Côte Français des Somalis when the Afars rejected France’s territorial claims, and the Afars had more power on the Le territoire Français des

Afars et Issas after the Issas mobilised for independence (Kadamy 1996: 512). In addition,

many theorists illustrate how the Djiboutian government after independence inherited this tribalised political dynamic (Abdi 1977; Sorenson 1992). Kadamy explains that the seal of tribalisation was affixed when the repressive Issa-majority government was haphazardly created with French and Arab political and economic participation (1996: 513). In comparison, Schraeder asserts that the seal was, in fact, the enactment of the National Mobilisation Law in 1981 that banned Afar voices (1993: 207). Over the time leading up to the Civil War, a cycle was present where the heightening of repression was met with a heightening of insurgency.

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These accounts are vital but are mainly a historiographical rendition of the Djiboutian political sphere. We can see a link between Djibouti’s political legacy and the Afar-Issa conflict but we are missing an understanding to what degree the political institutions have allowed ethnic exploitation. Moreover, there is not a comparable amount of focus on how this has affected Djibouti’s peace development. Stating that the conflict is caused by the political system implies that the political system needs to be changed to cause peace. We need to comprehend how Djibouti has done this and how effective it has been.

One of the most discussed topics in the Horn of Africa is the rise of ethnic nationalism and civil conflict in the 20th century, especially amongst the Afars and Issas (Kefale 2013; Leta et al 2015; Mengisteab 2013). Firstly, it is imperative to call attention to the difference between the previously discussed topic, tribalism, and ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is an exclusive ideology that does not entertain a diverse ethnic makeup in the first place and favours a nation that is defined by the homogeneity of its people (Leoussi 2001: 62). Its contemporary form was born in Europe as a response to the Napoleonic occupation of Central and Western Europe in the early 19th Century, this ideology is treated as the foundation of the nation-state concept (Dusche 2010: 42). Under German anti-feudalist enlightenment, it centralised the worth of a state within its people and consequently defines the worth of the people within the state. In the past, this has induced a fierce loyalty that has caused atrocities such as ethnic cleansings and genocides (ibid). This paradigm was introduced to the world by European colonisers who invaded lands to extend their own nation-states (idem: 38). As a consequence, these new colonies were stripped of their own unique concepts of territory and were sorted into the social periphery of a Western world.

Shehim and Searing state the ethnic nationalist awakening of the Afars and Issas was after the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the Algerian War in 1954 (1980: 212). These were monumental events as the Eurocentric notion of the ethnic nationalism ironically emboldened the native Egyptians and Algerians to overthrow their colonisers and transform their colonies into contemporary nation-states. The leader of the Egyptian movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser, called for a rise in nationalism and anti-imperialism amongst his neighbours (ibid). The Algerian war, a mobilisation towards self-determination and independence, sent shockwaves throughout the French empire (ibid). Amidst their concurrent tension, rather than uniting the ethnic groups against imperialism, it is evident that the awakening actually incited the desire for segregated nation-states; Greater Somalia and Afar Country. Going back to Yasin’s “winner-takes-it-all” illustration, the annexation of Djibouti was equally fundamental in both Afar and Issa nationalism. Shehim and Searing round-up the circumstances by stating that

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neither group were truly dedicated to the preservation of the state and the colony essentially existed by French demand (idem: 209). This lack of concern for state stability and a desire to seize the territory makes it ideal for a brewing conflict to explode.

With these motivations to destabilise post-colonial nations in order to create ethnic nation-states, Hundie suggests bolstering an interdependence between the domestic ethnic groups and also between the post-colonial states (2010: 146). He suggests doing so by creating transboundary institutions that facilitate inter-ethnic resource sharing and a strong national and international alliances to enforce border security (ibid). This is enlightening but it is regional and economic-based. We also need to address how state stability can be strengthened through domestic and cultural institutions.

It is evident that the Afar-Issa conflict has been pursued in conflict studies, however, the problem is that peace studies on this topic are comparatively so few and far in between. Alemu adopts all the discussions of ancient hatred, resource conflict and ethnic nationalism and explains that violence is multidimensional and can encompass all explanations (2018: 235-254). As such, he takes a multidimensional approach to produce peace. He rejects the reductionist approach of amounting the conflict to a disagreement of material that can be resolved through simple territorial allocation. Rather, he emphasises that the conflict has also been a psychological, emotional, historical, economic and political conflict, so he suggests a socio-political consolidation through transforming the memory of violence between the two, strengthening it through a synthesis of conflict resolution customary traditions from both cultures and Ethiopian legislation (ibid).

Much of what Alemu discusses is insightful in understanding that there is not simply one explanation in the Afar-Issa conflict yet that is why his own research is not enough to apply to the Djiboutian context. His study is within the Ethiopian realm and so there are dimensions unique to Djibouti that he has not explained. For example, the role of tribalism as a result of European colonialism. The French have reordered the Afar-Issa relationship and have politicised them differently in comparison to Ethiopia who has never been colonised. Furthermore, Ethiopia is an ethnic federalist state that provides local authority to its regions, which means that both the Afars and Issas have had a much more comparable level of political power to weaponise against one another. The Djiboutian government has been a centralised authority since its colonial past where the two would take turns to wield the power and experience the political repression. Consequently, there are levels to the Djiboutian experience of the Afar-Issa conflict that needs to be evaluated in the nation’s peace development.

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Overall, not much attention has been made to explain the core differences of the Afar-Issa conflict and peace development in the Djiboutian context. Many theorists have provided stimulating explanations, from material to ideological motivations. Yet within these understandings, even with Djibouti in mind, they have been so focused on understanding the conflict that their comprehension of peace and how it can be reached is lacking. When peace studies are mentioned, however, they remain regional or orientated to the Ethiopian state. I argue that this knowledge gap requires exhaustive attention.

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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

After conducting a historical overview and evaluation of relevant discussions and their applicability, I will now select, clarify and synthesise mentioned concepts to create a theoretical framework that is able to support my study. More specifically, I will further evaluate the multidimensionality of violence and peace, how identities can experience these social dynamics differently and how a civic nationalism could enforce a reconciliation through converging identities and reconciling experiences.

Multidimensional conflict

Anatomy of violence

The typologies of violence and peace are broad and contrasting, however, I did find some insight from Alemu’s critical analysis of the Afar-Issa conflict in Ethiopia. More specifically, his utilisation of Galtung’s theories of multidimensional violence and peace. Although Galtung may have not theorised about violence in the African context, his concepts are indeed fascinating. Utilising Western-sourced theories in my postcolonial position is not contradictory, in fact it is vital. I must prevent my research from being “reverse-Eurocentric” where the aim amounts to rebuking the European school of thought rather than truly answering the research question (Donzé-Magnier 2017: 5-6). To commit to the latter, I must adopt concepts from various disciplines and creatively interweave them to provide a framework adept to understanding the particularised task at hand (Spivak 1988: 71-72). Accordingly, I find evaluating Galtung’s theory relevant because he presents a structure that maps out a way to understand violence and peace on a sociological level void of cultural ties. This then allows me to contextualise it to the Afar-Issa conflict and peace development in the Djiboutian context.

Galtung illustrates violence with a triad scheme; cultural, structural and direct. The first concept, cultural violence, is the legitimisation of violent acts and intentions. It is the catalyst that empowers direct and structural violence, in fact, it can frame it as the right thing to do (Galtung 1990: 292). This is done so through cultural institutions that construct the

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foundation of reality and how we interpret them; religion, language, art etc. (idem: 291). Galtung also depicts a synonymy between violence and power in their requirement for legitimation, as such the ethos of a community to validate violence is essential for the cycle of the triad to continue.

The next form is structural violence; the exercise of avoidable inequality in a social structure that benefits the elite. It is the act and the execution of institutionalising the deprivation of basic human needs on the grounds of traits such as race, class and gender (Galtung 1990: 292). On a national scale, this degradation can be characterised by a lack of an ecological balance comprised of survival, well-being, freedom and basic human maintenance (ibid). Synthesising this point with, Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)’s indicators of good African governance (2019), my understanding of this can be concluded by the assertion that structural violence is the active pursuit of stripping the vital institutions; safety and security, rule of law, transparency of corruption, human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development.

The final component of Galtung’s triad is direct violence. It is violence in its most primitive form and entails harm inflicted unto another; murder, genocide, rape, pillaging etc. (Galtung 1990: 292). This is the action that causes physical long-lasting pain to the target. In the context of protracted conflict, direct violence is not arbitrary and is, in fact, dependent on the previous two unseen forms of violence. It is motivated by them and in turn, strengthens them back.

Applying Galtung’s prism to the Afar-Issa relations, we begin to see a pattern in the anarchy. As mentioned before, Afar-Issa relations comes from a period predating the Djiboutian state and French colonialism. Conflict was incited because of territorial expansion due to a scarcity of resource, which impeded on the geographical security of the other. This would incite defence and offence; direct violence. Fast forward to the existence of Djibouti in the 20th Century and you see domestic direct violence between the government and guerrilla militia. Moreover, there is regional direct violence in the form of spillover conflict. Instances of structural violence can be examined in the governance of Djibouti and the power imbalance amongst the Afars and Issas. Finally, the cultural violence will derive from contrasting societal motivations to perpetuate the Afar-Issa antagonism.

Anatomy of peace

Peace in the discussion of conflict is often defined as less complex but the concept is more than simply an absence of violence. Galtung presupposes that we should not fall into the trap

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of a violence-peace binary that defines the latter as simply war-avoidant (1991: 293). Much rather, he illustrates peace as complex in its own right. Firstly, there are two overarching dimensions; negative and positive (Galtung 1969: 170). Negative peace is the absence of violence and positive peace is the presence of peaceful cooperation (ibid). Within this explanation, he highlights how the dimensions are insufficient without the other. For example, negative without positive is indifference and positive without negative lacks justice (idem: 294). Furthermore, the concept is transitional and one must observe the negative and positive characteristics on a past-present-future linear register (idem: 183). Peace is not static but is defined through it’s the realisation from violence to a vertical development of egalitarianism (ibid). Consequently, not only is the concept interconnected with conflict studies but also developmental studies (ibid). From this, it would be assumed that there is indeed a degree of peace in Djibouti since there has been a transition from profound violence and there has been a national effort to prevent a relapse. Yet this merely identifies that there is a presence of peace and does not provide the full scale of its nature.

To do so, Galtung refers back to his triad schema to create a ‘culture of peace’ concept that identifies multidimensional mechanisms. Cultural peace is the absence of violent discourse and the presence of a peaceful dialogue of justice and poly-centrism that normalises harmonious cohabitation (Galtung 1990: 302). Interestingly, he calls cultural peace the “social glue” in this triad (ibid). Structural peace is the absence of structural exploitation and the presence of an institutionalised equitable social order (Galtung 1969: 177). If we advance this notion by referring to Mansfield’s assertions on peace and democracy, we see that Galtung’s structural peace is synonymous with a political justice that must occur to induce true harmony (2011: 231-133).

Lastly, Direct peace is exemplified by the absence of direct violence (e.g. ceasefires) and a partnership in sustaining it (e.g. collaborative military intervention of threats to harmony) (Galtung 1976: 282-285). By discussing the scale of which violence and peace have been expressed within Djibouti, one can judge actions as being benefits or hindrances within the Afar-Issa reconciliatory process.

From this theory of peace, we are able to find socio-political behaviour patterns that could have aided in Djibouti’s peace development. Nevertheless, Galtung’s theories are still void of context, thus we must further develop these renditions of violence and peace in order to particularise our theoretical framework to understanding the Afar-Issa conflict.

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Collective identities within an antagonistic and heterogeneous society

In my literature review, I noticed the major argument of how the contrasting identities and experiences of the Afars and Issas has caused and justified conflict. Most notably, the themes of an “ancient hatred”, tribalised political identity and ethnic nationalism are recurrent. Taking these into account, it seems as though the core of the cultural dimension of violence is that their identity and perspective of the outside world is rooted in the antagonism of the other.

With Eisenstadt and Giesen’s notion of collective identity and how it constitutes an exclusive subjective reality, the conflict becomes more intelligible. Collective identities are a series of socially patterned interactions between members who are similar (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995: 74). This similarity can derive from labels of ethnicity, culture, language and initiation. These validators are a requirement to construct an internal equality on which trust and cooperation can be based on (ibid). As the group develops, the collective identity is strengthened through a commonality of experiences that characterise a concerted set of norms and ethics (ibid). I would go further and emphasise on the notion that collective identity also exists by virtue of the “other”. Collective identity has a conceptual border that limits the networks of trust and interdependence; Eisenstadt and Giesen say that it is because identities are divisive in nature; who is included and who is excluded (1995: 76). An identity is not an identity if it does not distinguish you and your group. For example, we are all human but this is not a social identity but a fact. Therefore, there can be no “us” without “them”.

Following this, the exclusivity of “us” and the vilification of “them” seems to be culturally institutionalised through victimisation. Bar-Tal et al theorise that in conflict, both opponents will perceive themselves as the one who wrong has been done unto (2009: 245). This perpetuated narrative not only condemns the opponent but it also is a medium for solidarity amongst your kin (ibid). Cikara et al explain that this also works in reverse where intergroup competition of resources and power can exhibit palpable ‘schadenfreude’3 in all forms of contact (2011: 310-311).

Going back to the Afars and Issas and Medhane’s explanation for their pastoralist conflict. The disagreement arrived from their opposing perspectives on territorialism and rights to resources. The conflict was experienced differently and subsequently led to the two groups to vilify each other. Furthermore, it becomes a part of their identity because it tightens

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the internal bonds amongst members. After a continuation of conflict, a cycle begins to revolve where violence is thought of as a predisposed circumstance in their co-existence. Consequently, this internal allegiance on a regional scale permitted ideologies such as an ancient hatred and ethnic nationalism to grow.

This sort of human interaction in Africa was then bastardised by tribalism. Eze asserts that tribalism was a colonial strategy that reforms indigenous groups into imagined politicised communities as a means to fragment masses and integrate them into a Eurocentric world (2010: 67-69). As a result, the “tribe” is already a sociological state of war. Although the French did not entirely imagine the Afar-Issa animosity, it is apparent that they did weaponise it to their advantage as the colonial rulers of Djibouti. It is within this context of a prolonged contrast of collective identities being translated on to a socio-political level that mental distances and lack of empathy become so profound and affects the nation beyond their day of Independence.

From ethnic to civic nationalism: a peace-building framework

Trying to discover an answer to ethnic cleavages in the African context, Political Science theories of civic nationalism comes to mind. According to Forrest, civic nationalism is the unity of a diverse body under a culture of inclusivity and egalitarianism on the basis of territorial separatism (2004:6). In the context of African nations, it is the adoption of state lines imposed by colonial demarcations and the emancipation of all their social caveats, such as the tribalisation of ethnic identities.

Fawn asserts that there are three forces that stabilise the nation-to-state balance; civic nationalism, strong states and ethnic homogeneity (Fawn 2004: 96). Ethnic homogeneity and a strong state are inherently able to conform the masses but when the weak or moderate state is competing for legitimacy with more than one ethnic nationalism, power is negatively decentralised and there becomes a rise in national dissatisfaction (ibid). For Djibouti and many newly independent countries, dissatisfaction was unavoidable. Ekeh describes that an element to the colonial divide et impera technique was the legitimation that they received from it. After turning the people against each other, they would portray their authority as the mediating “benefactor” (Ekeh 1975: 98). As a consequence of their departure proceeding a nation’s independence, a structural void becomes apparent. Ethnic nationalism fed off this void and dissatisfaction as it promised security, equality amongst members and superiority over outsiders (Wesemüller 2014: 35). Although the new African state wishes to fill this void

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it cannot do so without the emancipation of its inherited colonial bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is optimised by pitting ethnicities against each other, so when one ethnicity gains power, others suffer. This can be seen when the Djiboutian Issa-majority government was sympathetic to the Pan-Somalist expansion in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the government lost legitimacy amongst the Afars who now were motivated to create their own Afar country. A competition of interests without regards to the stability of the state inevitably galvanises conflict and therefore, this competition must be neutralised.

To consolidate the African nation’s lack in ethnic homogeneity, they must compensate by deepening the two factors that levels the nation-to-state balance. In the face of an ethnic ideological conflict, one must heighten the premier factor, civic nationalism, amongst its people before focusing on the other factor, state strengthening. This is because you must first legitimise and centralise the state’s power.

Civic nationalism does so by addressing the people as the civic. In Adam’s research about non-racialism in South Africa after the apartheid, he describes civic nationalism as the antithesis to racialized nationalism where people are connected by ‘consent and not descent’ (1994: 17). As such, it devalues the loyalty felt by blood and values the loyalty felt by proximity and shared experiences. This goes hand in hand with Gaertner et al’s theory of reconciling two opposing identities by socially re-categorising the two camps and develop a ‘common ingroup identity’ (1993: 20-21). This is done through inclusive discourse and highlighting similarities in experiences and cultural markers (ibid). In the case of civic nationalism, it would be identifying the people under a civic label such as “Djiboutian”, connecting the people through a shared history under French colonialism as Cushitic people. Moreover, the identity must be ideationally bordered by designating all foreigners, regardless if they are members of the larger regional Afar and Issa identity, as the ‘outgroup’. What is interesting in this discussion is the comparability to Galtung’s notion of cultural peace where you work for unity. By doing so through the cultural markers, as mentioned above, you can begin to open a dialogue of cooperation.

However, identitarian commonalities are not enough for civic nationalism to reconcile grievances. Greenfield explains that dignity is the essence of nationalism and this nature must be established within a polity or a society for it to function (1993:49). This is further elaborated by Adam who explains that any form of nationalism proves to be insufficient in the face of profound emotional, material and political injustices (1994: 22). To repair this, an equity amongst members must be established. In other words, a political justice felt on all social, political and economic levels. Moreover, it must continue to develop with the nation

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and is adaptive to future obstacles that threaten the unity of the people (idem: 29). From this understanding of civic nationalism, it parallels the concepts of structural and direct peace built on cooperation. Furthermore, in the context of Djibouti, the notion of dignity explains why ethnic nationalism filled the void of French expulsion after Independence as the tribalised political system was created for injustice. Thus, to create a successful civic nationalism, it must be proactive in structural and direct peace as well as cultural. For the Afars and Issas, this would mean acknowledging grievances and candidly mending them.

Proposing a theoretical model

Figure 2. Conceptual map of how conflict is formed and how civic nationalism can mediate this relation

Advancing from my review on Djiboutian literature and theories of violence, identities and African governance, I have come to a set of conclusions that will form the theoretical foundation of my research but remains open to inferential rearrangements in the face of compelling evidence. As illustrated by Figure 2, my suggested societal sequence begins with rooting the Afar-Issa conflict in Galtung’s multidimensional triad of violence; a cycle that builds momentum due to mutually heightening dimensions. First of all, their cultural violence is embodied by an inherent ancient hatred and a tribalised political identity that is further exacerbated by their regional identity as ethnic nationalists. All these elements of cultural violence are evidently conflicting on their separate societal levels but are also interconnected.

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Secondly, a structural violence is seen in the way that the Djiboutian political system has been constructed to present a power imbalance over politics and resources. Lastly, direct violence is demonstrated as governmental assaults towards the people but also guerrilla assaults towards the government.

To reverse violence and induce a convergence between the two ethnic groups, one must balance it with a complementary triad of peace. I assume a Djiboutian civic nationalism has been used to facilitate the peace development of the nation. This is primarily done through a social recategorisation that works as a cultural peace tool. Through a collaborative common ingroup identity of ‘we’ as Djiboutians and a reorientation of the ‘other’ to foreign entities, a culture of peace is enacted that reduces the mental distances invoked by their once exclusive identities and experiences. However, as mentioned before, structural peace is also imperative. Therefore, the next element to my Djiboutian civic nationalist model is characterised by a political justice process that introduces political pluralism and is capable of reparations of oppression from the past. Furthermore, to prevent the likelihood of conflict in the future, a reformation and enactment of legislations that institutionalise equitable socio-political opportunities are introduced. Direct peace will be both the overarching transition from violence to non-violence but also proactive collaborations between the Afars and Issas to ensure state stability.

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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY

Proceeding the construction of a set of understandings specific to the Afar-Issa conflict within the Djiboutian context, this chapter will build a research design that provides a set of methods that will be used to carry out my research. Furthermore, it will pose inferential questions to evaluate trustworthiness and ethical underpinnings.

Methods

Producing a body of knowledge relative to this Afar-Issa discussion must be inductive and fixate on the plurality of human reality. A positivist perspective orbiting the universal laws of natural sciences are not suitable to measure human phenomena as it ignores the importance of the meaning behind actions (Schutz 1962: 59). We cannot make inferences on human behaviour if we do not attempt to understand the experiences and intentions behind it; in other words, we need to see things from the subject’s point of view. Grabbing the essence of the phenomenon cannot be done through quantifying measurements. Our assumptions ring truer through contextualised qualitative observations. Therefore, I will be conducting a case study that critically analyses recurring patterns of political operations and discourse within the Afar-Issa conflict.

To be more specific, this case study will be longitudinal. This is done through an evaluation of data sources over a prolonged period of time (Zainal 2007: 2). What separates it from other historical analyses and case studies is that it is temporally inferential. It does not explicitly provide a chronological rendition, rather it uses time as a scale to infer on the developmental nature of cultural phenomena by locating patterns and changes (Winiarska 2017: 6-7). A common criticism is that case studies often provide little scientific generalisability (Zainal 2007: 5). However, this is not a setback because the aim of most case studies is to provide idiographic theories that value the importance of context in phenomena (Zainal 2007: 2). This research type is adequate for my task because I do not wish to generalise my theory to other societal contexts. I wish to explicitly understand the

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reconciliatory process of the Afar-Issa conflict in Djibouti. Moreover, rather than making simple comparisons between moments of violence and peace, a longitudinal case study will allow me to understand the transition between the two concepts and how civic nationalism has facilitated this.

The first step to create my research design will be to define my units, i.e. the Afars and Issas. To do so, I will take a methodological holistic approach as it is the most compatible with my topic. This approach holds importance to the social processes of institutions, structures and groups as units rather than individuals since they cannot explain large social phenomena (Halperin & Heath 2017: 37). This is especially salient in the Afar-Issa conflict for two key reasons. The first reason is that these ethnic groups have a culture deep-rooted in communitarianism (Abbink 2005: 401), thus, we cannot impose Western concepts of individualism. Secondly, all significant tensions such as conflict, education, class and social privileges within Djibouti were characterised and mobilised on ethnic lines, not individual grievances.

Defining my timeline to evaluate the transition from violence to peace, my theoretical model will be evaluated on a chronology of six critical periods in Djiboutian history; the Second Independence Referendum in 1967, Djibouti’s Independence in 1977, the governmental transition to a one-party system in 1981, the Civil War of 1991-1994, the peace process of between 1992-2001, and the current state 2001-2020. The first four periods have been moments of high tension between the Afars and Issas that have shaped Djiboutian society. In comparison, the final two periods have been much more peaceful but have equally shaped the nation.

To actually conduct my longitudinal case study, I will do be doing two stages of analyses. The first will be done through thematic and discourse coding schemes that will help me evaluate and contextualise the relationship between violence, peace and subjective experiences. I will collect primary data from online transcripts of the state-issued Journal

Officiel de Djibouti4 and reports from the US Department of State, to review the political operations of the nation over time. To complement this, I will use secondary data from the French newspaper of record, Le Monde, to inspect opposing guerrilla operations. Le Monde will also provide discursive data through interviews and speeches from Djiboutian, FLCS,

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RPP and FRUD political officials5. To evaluate this dataset, a thematic analysis is ideal as it will systematically identify patterns/themes across dataset (Winiarska 2017: 14). In addition, it aids in contextual evaluations as it allows the researcher to select and prioritise their own themes according to the particular research question (ibid). In my case, this will be translating my theoretical model into a research tool by treating the Afar-Issa conflict and Djiboutian civic nationalism as two overarching and separate themes6. The Afar-Issa conflict will be represented by its three variables as categories in my analysis; Cultural violence, Structural violence and Direct violence. Similarly, Djiboutian civic nationalism will also be represented by three variables; Social recategorisation (cultural peace), Political justice (structural peace) and Political justice (direct peace). All these categories will be further divided into 21 codes7 in order to break down the data collected into manageable summaries on which I can reflect on.

1. Cultural violence will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Ancient hatred - This refers to a narrative of an inherited animosity that predates colonialism and alludes to their relationship being an existential foundation in their respective identities.

b. Tribalised political identity- The referral of a domestic political antagonism during French colonialism and the present-day Republic. This code is characterized by an Afar-Issa grievance dimension that separates the Djiboutian context from the regional.

c. Ethnic nationalist identity - Solidarity with kinfolk across national borders rather than their compatriots. A regional mindset that believes in the Greater Somali State or Afar Country and neglects Djiboutian interests.

d. Territorial delegitimisation – This is a verbal assault that clearly denies the territorial rights of the opposing ethnic group. An unequal representation of territorial rights justifies an unequal distribution of power and resources.

5 FLCS, RPP and FRUD are selected as they are the biggest ethnic political parties that have greatly determined

the degree of contention between Afars and Issas. Derivative and smaller entities will also be considered.

6 Refer to Appendix A to view the thematic coding agenda

7 Codes about third-parties were established during data collection as a result of the transnational nature of the

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e. Third-party bias – The validation received from foreign entities that justifies the violence inflicted on either the Afars or Issas.

2. Structural violence will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Political power imbalance - Political operations that assert power of one ethnic group over the other.

b. Resource share imbalance - Legislation that unequally distributes resources across the nation (e.g. food, water, jobs, housing). I have also included more contemporary forms of resources and material that are present in modern states and defines whether an African Government is fair according to the indicators set by IIAG.

3. Direct violence will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Government- Direct assaults enacted by the Djiboutian government.

b. Guerrilla - Direct assaults enacted by political dissidents.

c. Third-party - More specifically this pertains to the actions of states (France,

Ethiopia, Somalia) and foreign Afars and Issas.

4. Social recategorisation (cultural peace) will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Common ingroup identity - An ethnically inclusive identification of what it means to be Djiboutian.

b. Common outgroup perception - The exclusion of individuals beyond national borders. More solidarity amongst compatriots. This highlights a cleavage between the Afars and Issas and their regional kinfolk.

c. Dialogue of reconciliation - Acknowledgement of past grievances and the desire to resolve matters. This code will illustrate the reduction of mental distancing caused by victimisation

d. Dialogue of cooperation- The discussion to work together in order to improve the development of the nation for both the Afars and Issas. It is a forward-thinking advancement after the period of reconciliation.

5. Political justice (structural peace) will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Political pluralism - Legislation that emboldens the variety of political voices

and expressions in governmental affairs and thus, monopoly of power is broken down and distributed amongst the Afars and Issas

b. Reparations for oppression - Legislation that undoes the structural oppression caused in the past. Directly reconciling the sources of grievances.

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c. Legislation for equality - Closing the ethnic cleavage on social, political and economic standings. This is an advancement from the previous code. It is forward-thinking and is characterised by any legislation that creates a level of equality that has not been seen before.

d. Third-party structural peace – This will code any involvement of third-parties in strengthening Djibouti’s structural peace level. For example, UN and IGAD development initiatives.

6. Political justice (direct peace) will be exemplified by these codes:

a. Absence of direct violence - The comparison of violence levels from the Civil

War to the present day. From a basic level, one will be able to assert that there is indeed peace development in Djibouti by a transitional reduction of assault between the government and guerrilla entities.

b. Domestic peace-keeping operations - Operations to maintain state stability.

(e.g. border control, refugee management). This is characterised by any collaborative operations between the Afars and Issas to maintain the stability of Djibouti.

c. Third-party direct peace – This code indicates any third-party involvement in

reducing the chances of conflict.

This thematic analysis will be to establish monumental changes in the Afar-Issa conflict. To complement this, I will be analysing the discursive nature of political dialogues between the Afars and Issas to evaluate their experience to change. This will also use the same sources,

Journal Officiel and Le Monde. Unfortunately, due to restrictions caused by the COVID-19

Pandemic of 2020, collecting a variety of data was challenging. Both the Netherlands and Djibouti went into lockdown, which meant that I was not able to visit libraries in both countries to expand my dataset. To make up for it, conducting more than one analysis on a limited set of evidence allows for a triangulation that will render my research a lot more reliable amidst these difficult circumstances (Halperin & Heath 2017: 161). Since it is apparent that the two have not seen eye to eye in the administration of Djibouti and the nature of the conflict itself, we must be able to read between the lines of texts to understand the full extent of mental distances and fortunately, analysing their discourse help. To do so, I will aim to assess Van Dijk’s four principles in discourse: accentuate the positive traits of “us”; minimise the positive traits of “them”; minimise the negative traits of “us”; accentuate the negative traits of “them” (Jahedi et al 2014: 33). There are various frameworks suggested to

Djibouti avant tout: Sustainable peace development through a civic nationalist framework enforcing Afar-Issa rapprochement