Criminal entrepreneurs as pioneers, intermediaries, and arbitrageurs in borderland economies

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

International

Journal

of

Drug

Policy

journalhomepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/drugpo

Research

paper

Criminal

entrepreneurs

as

pioneers,

intermediaries,

and

arbitrageurs

in

borderland

economies

Eric

Dante

Gutierrez

Erasmus University Rotterdam International Institute of Social Studies, Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX The Hague, Netherlands

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Keywords:

Criminal entrepreneurs Coca and cocaine Interdependency State formation Colombia Bolivia

Violence and conﬂict

a

b

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t

r

a

c

t

Manydiscussionsofmaﬁaandcriminalentrepreneurstypicallyfocusonviolenceandillegality,andlessontheir possiblerolesinruraltransformation,evenwhentheyarelocatedinborderlandeconomieslinkingthesubsistence cultivatorsofillicitcropstoregionalandglobalmarkets.Thispaperassessesthelifestoriesofdruglords,the CastañobrothersofColombiaandRobertoSuárezGomezofBolivia,todrawinferencesintohowsuchruralelites intheillicitdrugstradearenotonlyspecialistsincrimebutarealsoactorswhoregulateandmanipulate,often coercively,accesstolandandresources,mobiliselabourandshapeitsdivisions,andpromotecertainformsof capitalaccumulation.Thispapercontendsthatabetterunderstandingoftherolesoftheseruralelitesaspioneers forcapital,intermediariesincommoditychains,andarbitrageursbetweenstateandborderlandsmayprovide waysofunpackingkeychallengestopeacebuildingandeconomictransformationinborderlandswhereillicit economiesthrive.

Introduction

This paperargues thatbecauseillicitcropsarecommodities pro-ducedmainlyinmarginalisedborderlands(UNODC, 2019 : 62–74),it isnecessarytolocateandanalyseitscriminalentrepreneursintheir ru-ralcontexts.Howdotheyshapeandareinturnshapedbyconﬂictand contestationoverthecontrolofterritory,theregulationand manipu-lationof accesstolandandresources,thereorderingoftheagrarian laboursupply,andtheoutcomesofstateformation?

Suchemphasisisoftenlostbecausekeypublicationsthatshape pol-icy,like the SystematicCountryDiagnostics producedby theWorld Bank, and the World Drug Reports published by the UN Office on DrugsandCrime,oftenignorethepolitico-economicrolesofcriminal actors,especiallyinagrariansettings(Gutierrez, 2020 ).Thesesustain assumptionsthat‘warisdevelopmentinreverse’oreconomicgrowth isthebestsolutionfortacklingandpreventingconflictandcriminality (Collier et al., 2003 );orthatsincethecentralactorinconflictsisthe state,investinginstatecapacityandpresenceinborderlandareas neces-sarilyleadstoconflictprevention(United Nations & World Bank, 2018 ). Theseassumptionsnotonlycreateblindspotsontheroleofillicit ac-tors,butalso,assomescholarshavepointedout,precludehowlicit ‘eco-nomicgrowthanddevelopment’canitself‘beviolentandbethesource ofcriminalityandconflict’(Thomson, 2011 :322),anddistortthe under-standingofspacesdepictedas‘ungovernable’or‘stateless’whenreally theseareterritories‘wrackedbyextra-legalregimesofruleinwhichthe stateissimplyoneactoramongstothers’(Ballve, 2019 :211).

E-mailaddress:ericdantegutierrez@gmail.com

Inaddition,thereisapaucityofliteratureonillicitcropenterprise anditsmainactors.Keyworksonorganisedcrime,forexample,are typ-icallyfocusedonviolenceandillegality,withlittleornoemphasison agrarianspaces.Gambetta’sclassicworkonthemafiaanalysesa priva-tisedindustryofprovidingprotection(Gambetta, 1993 andDiego 2011 : 2).Varese’sstudyelaboratesonthemigrationofcriminalenterprisein aglobalisingworld(Federico 2011 ).Volkov’s‘violententrepreneur’ re-makingRussiancapitalismexplainscrime‘asaresultofthefailureof differentsocialinstitutionstoensurethepropersocialintegrationof in-dividualsandgroups’(Volkov, 2002 :17).Lessing’swell-arguedstudy unpackshowdrug cartelviolenceisusedtoconstrainthestate’s be-haviourandinfluencepolicyoutcomes(Lessing, 2015 :1486).In crit-icalagrarian studies,there arefewmaterials, evenwhenafocuson illiciteconomiescancontributetotheapproachesandlacunae enumer-atedbyBernsteinandByresintheirinauguralessayintheJournalof AgrarianChange(Bernstein and Byres, 2001 );andtotheperspectives, frameworksandmethodologieslistedbyBorrasinthe2009relaunch oftheJournalofPeasantStudies(Borras, 2009 ).Examiningruralillicit entrepreneurscancontributetothe‘newdirectionsinagrarianpolitical economy’discussedbyFairbairnetal.on‘thevariegatedtrajectoriesof agrarianchangeacrossspaceandtime’(Fairbairn et al., 2014 :653).In thesamewaythatMcMichaelpresentedfoodregimeanalysis,illicitcrop enterpriseanalysismayalso‘explainthestrategicroleofagriculture… intheconstructionoftheworldcapitalisteconomy’(McMichael, 2019 : 139).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.103091 Availableonlinexxx

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Interna-Classifyingentrepreneursoftheillicitcropstradeasruralactors

Placing criminal actors within contexts of rural transformation, therefore,wouldusefullycomplementthepolicyandbroaderliterature, andmayalsoprovidewaysofunpackingkeychallengesto peacebuild-ingandtransitionsfromwareconomiestopeaceeconomiesintypically conflict-affectedborderlandswhereilliciteconomiesthrive.Indeed,a growingnumberof studieshave demonstrated theneed forthis ap-proach.AkeycontributionfromMcSweeney,et.al.ondrug trafficking-relatedagrarian change asks, ‘whydo narcos invest in rural land?’, ‘whynow?’and‘whythere?’,andconcludethatdrugtraffickers ‘has-tenthe transformationof landscapes of smallholder production into the“rentier-agribusiness” nexusoflandspeculation,cattle,andexport monocrops’(2017 :5–6,16).Richaniusedthelabelnarcobourgeoisieto differentiatedrugtraffickersfromotherbourgeoisfactions(2013:196– 215).Ballve’sconclusionon‘narco-frontiers’,thattheillicitdrugstrade isinducingviolentagrarianchangeallovertheworld,isparticularly relevant(2019:211).

Thisarticleisanattempttoexamineviolentagrarianchangeof nar-cobourgeoisiesandnarco-frontierswithincontextsofrural transforma-tion.Itsargument– drawnfromBlok (1974) andkeyliteratureonbandit studies(Hobsbawm, 2000 [1959]; Gallant, 1999 )– isthatcriminal en-trepreneursofillicitcropsarenotjustpredatoryactors,orexceptional criminalsascommonlydepicted.Theycanbecategorisedasopposites ofHobsbawm’ssocialbandits;orasGallant’spredator-merchantswho performimportantbutcuriouslyunacknowledgedroles‘inthespread andglobaltriumphofcapitalism’.Theyalsoshapestateformation, be-causeputsimply,‘banditshelpedmakestates,andstatesmadebandits’ (Gallant, 1999 :25–26).

IntheMafiaofaSicilianVillage(Blok, 1974 ),Blokcontendsthat criminalactorsareessentiallyembeddedinsociety,theeconomy,and stateinstitutions,andarethereforenecessarilyengagedor lockedin interdependentrelationships,whetherfriendorfoe,withotheractors. Becausetheymake decisionsthataffect thepublic, theyarenot just plaingangstersorracketeers.Blokshowedhowmafiososbecamethe ‘forceforchange’thatshapedtheeffectivedistributionofland,patterns oflanduse,andtheconsequentdivisionoflabourresultingfromshifts intolivestockraising,thusprincipallyre-organisingpeasantsocietyinto morecommercialformsofagriculture(Blok, 1974 :6;andtableson245– 252).Inotherwords,theywerenotonlycriminalsbutarguably,also Polanyianchangeagentswhousedtheircoercivecapacitytobreakup thebondsandinstitutionsthatheldpeasantsocietytogether,inthe pro-cessenablingtheintroductionofmorecapitalistformsofdevelopment intothelocalareastheyinhabited(Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 171–172) . Anoteonmethods

Todevelopitsargument,thispaperexaminesthelifestoriesofthe CastañobrothersofColombiaandRobertoSuárezGomezofBolivia.A lifestory,asOjermarkexplains,isanaccountofaperson’sstoryofhisor herlife,orasegmentofit,astoldtoanother;whilelifehistoriesisthe ac-countofalifebasedoninterviewsandconversations(Ojermark, 2007 : 4).Theuseoflifestoriesasaunitofanalysishasbeenshowntooﬀer meaningfulinsights(seeforexample McCoy, ed. 1994 :1–11)andcan belinkedtoHistoricalInstitutionalism,theapproachtostudying poli-ticsandsocialchangeelaboratedbyThelenandSteinmo,whoposited thatsocialoutcomesareultimatelyshapedandmediated,constrained andrefracted,thoughneversolely,byinstitutionsdesignedandchosen bypeople.Hence,politicalevolutionisinﬂuencedbytheintentionsof itssubjects(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992 :1–3). Thus,usinglifestories canilluminate on‘branchingprocesses’,particularlypointsof depar-turefromestablishedpatternsthatleadtooutcomeslikethemediation ofstatecontrolorresiliencetodrugprohibition.

Theexaminationoftheselifestoriesenablesinferencestobedrawn intohowdruglordsactasruralelitespromoting,whetherintentionally orotherwise,speciﬁcformsoflocalandeconomicorder.Inaddition,the

systematicselectionoflifestoriescanbeusedtoharnessesrich,localised knowledge.Comparinglifestories canexpand the‘political imagina-tion’anddevelopconceptualmodels,andasexplainedbyMollingaand Gondhalekar, bring intoview newpossibilities (Mollinga and Gond- halekar, 2014 :183).

Butlike othermethods,thereareofcourselimitations.Often, in-formationaboutcriminalactorsishiddenormayremainincomplete, uneven,orpiecemealwhenveriﬁed.Hence,thestoriespresented nec-essarilyprivilegesonesetover others,andreﬂectstheagendaof the researcher.Often,thematerialgatheredmaynotconstitutegroundsfor making ordisprovinggeneralisations.Nevertheless,life stories, espe-ciallywhencomparedwithothers,canstillbeusefulsourcesespecially since,asHosperselaborated,inordinarylifeweclaimknowledgenot onlyfromobservationbutfrominference: whenweseebeartracksin themud,wecaninferthatabearhasbeenthere,evenifwedidn’tsee one(1990:72).

Thenexttwosectionselaborateonthelifestoriesandcriminal ca-reersoftheCastañosandSuárez.ThemainsourcesfortheCastañosare thebiography(ofCarlos)byAranguren;courtcaserecordsand deci-sions;andvariednewsreports.Aranguren’sbookissometimesreferred toasCarlos’autobiography.ThemainsourceforSuárezishisbiography writtenbywifeAydaLevy,supplementedbyfamilyrecordsfromthe MyHeritage.comwebsite,memoirsofMichaelLevine(aformeragentof theUSDrugEnforcementAdministration),andnewsreports.To miti-gatetheobviousbiasofthesesources,theinformationhasbeencarefully cross-referencedwithothersourcesandtreatedcritically.

DecipheringtheCastañosofColombia:1979to2007

TheCastaño-Gilswereabroodof12childrenfromaranching fam-ilywithrootsinAntioquia(Verdad Abierta, December 2008a ).From 1980,threebrothers– Fidel(bornin1950),Vicente(1957)andCarlos (1965)(McDermott, 2008 ; Verdad Abierta, 2008b ; Philip 2009 )– shot toinfamyasfearsomeparamilitaryleaderswhousedextremelevelsof violenceandcoerciontofightagrowingleftistinsurgency,andinthe process,appeartohavecontributedsignificantlytothetransformation ofnorthernColombiaintoasupplychainfortransnationalagriculture. In1995aftertheMedellinandCali‘cartels’wereeliminated follow-ingaUS-ledwarondrugs,Colombia’sthen-scatteredillicitdrugbusiness didnotcrumble.Instead,itwaspickedupbyorphanedcriminalsand theproletariatoftheillicittradewhohadtheknowledge,skills,and connectionstocarryonwiththebusiness(Crandall, 2002 :160).Inthe middleofthistransformationweretheCastaños.AfterFidel,theeldest, waskilledin1994,itfelluponCarlosandVicentetoconsolidatetheir influenceandpower.Buttheydidmorethanjustrebuildtheillicit busi-ness:theysourcednewalliesandbuiltanimportantpoliticalplatform forit– theparamilitarynetworkAutodefensasUnidasdeColombiaorAUC (UnitedSelf-DefenceForcesofColombia),whichpridesitselfasa self-created‘movement’ofitsmembers,andnotatoolmadeorinstigated bythestate(Aranguren, 2001 :Chapter5).

TheriseoftheCastaños

TheeightboysandfourgirlsoftheCastaño-Gilbroodwereraised inLaBlanquita,anestateinAmalfi,amunicipality143kmnortheastof Medellin.Amalfi liesadjacenttothesub-regionknownasUraba,which coversnorthernportionsoftheprovincesofAntioquiaandChoco (in-cludingtheentirelandborderwithPanama),andwesternportionsof Cordoba. Urabaretainsitsidentity, not onlybecauseofits long his-toryofracialisedcolonialviolenceasthesiteofSpain’sfirstcolonial settlementwhereenslavedAfricans weresent tomineforgoldalong theAtratoRiver(Ballve, 2020 :49),butalsobecauseitbecamea ‘drug-traffickingrealestate’sittingastridethekeydrugmovementcorridors fromthecentreofColombiatowardsdeparturepointsinboththePacific andAtlanticseaboards(McDermott 2014 ).

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Carlos’biographystatesthatsometimeinJuly 1979, thefamily’s patriarch,JesusAntonio,waskidnappedbytheleft-wingrebelgroup FARC(FuerzasArmadasRevolucionarias deColombia orRevolutionary ArmedForcesofColombia).This cameasabitterdisappointmentto thefamily,sincetwobrothers,RamiroandManuel,socialisedwiththe guerrillas,andtheirfatheralsolettherebelscampontheirEl Hundi-dorfarm.Threeransomnotesweresent,andtheﬁrsttwowerepaid. Thethirdransomnotefor50millionpesos(about$20,000)camein February1980,butitappearsthefatherwasdeadbythen.Apparently, Jesusrebelledincaptivity,didnoteat,andbecameill.Afterasurprise skirmish,theguerrillassuspectedamilitaryrescuewasafootand be-cameconvincedtheirhostagewasvaluabletothemilitary,hencehe wasshot.Apeasantwhosawthebodybeforeitwasremovedbythe guerrillasconﬁrmedthedeathtothebrothers.Thebodywasnever re-covered(Aranguren, 2001 :38–40).

‘Ourrevengelastedtwoyears,’saidCarlos,whoatthetimewas14, whileeldestbrotherFidelwas29.FirstfoundwasConradoRamirez, oneoffourseentakingtheirfatherfromLaBlanquita.Theinformation wasrelayedtotheArmy,whopromptlyarrestedRamirez,buta magis-tratethoughttobesympathetictotheFARCsaidFidel’sevidencewas hearsay,hence,orderedRamirez’srelease.ThreedayslaterasRamirez emerged from theFujiyama residences, Fidelshot him dead.It was the‘ﬁrstextra-judicialexecutionof theAutodefensasin thenameof agenuinejusticethatdoesnotyetexistinColombia’,claimedCarlos (Aranguren, 2001 :44).TheCastañoskilledintotalsevenFARC mem-berslinkedtotheirfather’skidnapping.

Thekidnappingis‘whereitall began’,explainsCarlos. Soon,the brothersset up thevigilante group‘LasTangas’, namedafterFidel’s ranch.Beforelong, LosTanguerosenjoyedthebackingoflocal ranch-ers,businessmenandthearmywhofoundthemausefulforce check-ingguerrillaactivity(McDermott, 2008 ; Verdad Abierta, 2012 ).The Tangueros, however,weremore thanjust simpleprovidersof protec-tion,andthecontextinwhichtheyemergedoﬀerscluesintothelogic andpurposeof theirviolence.Anumberof casesheardatthe Inter-AmericanCourtonHumanRights(CorteIDH),whichactsalongsidethe Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRights(IACHR),providedetails. Thecourt’s178-pagejudgementonthePuebloBellomassacreheard ex-perttestimoniesthatthelocationofFidel’sranches,includingLas Tan-gas,servedasastrategicdeterrenttoguerrillaexpansion.Notonlydid theranchesanditsvigilantessitinacattle-raisingregionwhere guer-rillascollectedwartaxesfrombusinessmenandlivestockowners,they werealsolinkedtotheroadnetworksthatcomprisedtheextremely prof-itableEjeBananero(bananaaxle),thecentreofwhichwasthehighway fromMedellintotheportcityofTurbo(CorteIDH, 2006 :46–47).

Thedevelopmentofthehighway,theCourtheard,changedthe eco-nomicstructureanddemographicsoftheregionandconsequently cre-atedrisingsocialandpoliticaltensions.Inthe1950s,forestedareaswere thinnedoutbyloggingoperationsthatextendedsouth,openinglandto moreunplannedsmallholderpeasantsettlements.Inthe1960s, how-ever,thelargelysubsistencepeasantagriculturewasdisplacedbythe arrivalofFruteraSevilla,therenamedUnitedFruitCompany.The com-panyintroducedabananacontract-growingschemetoUraba landown-ers,mostofwhomwereraisingcattle.Thetransitionwasaidedby gen-erousloansprovidedbytheCorporacionFinancieraColombianade De-sarrolloIndustrial,whichreceivedUSbankcreditsundertheAlliance forProgress,aUS$20-billioninitiativetoprovidea‘peaceful, demo-cratic,capitalistalternativetotheCubanRevolution’.Underthenew scheme, FruteraSevilladidnot growits bananas,butbought itfrom contractgrowerswithanassuredminimumprice.Thecompanythen in-vestedinroad,canal-anddrainage-building,deepenedseveralstreams, andacquiredbargesandtugsthatcarriedthebananastoitsocean-going ships(CorteIDH, 2006 :25–47;New York Times, 1971 ;US Congressional Record, 1964 ).

Thisperiodof‘development’,however,createdachainofintended and unintended consequences. With land values increasing rapidly, predatoryspeculatorsdisplacedanddispossessedthesmallholder

peas-antpopulation.Eventually,manysurvivedbybecomingwageworkers forthebananacontract-growers,typicallywithoutthebeneﬁtoflabour standardsandlegalprotection.Meanwhile,cattleranchingserved fur-thertoholdandcontrollandwhilewaitingforexpectedhugerisesin propertyvalues.Thus,theconversionofperipheralareastothenorth andeastof thehighwayforcattle farmingcreatedfurtherland con-ﬂictsandpeasantdisplacements.Eventually,socialandpoliticalforces emergedtoconfronteachother:tworebelgroups,theFARCandtheEPL (EjercitoPopulardeLiberacionorPopularLiberationArmy)thatdeclared supportforthepeasants;andgovernment-authorisedandoften Army-armedcivilianforcesthatsupportedthecattleranchers,bananagrowers andplantationowners.Thisbecamethecentralelementof confronta-tionintheregion(CorteIDH, 2006 :24–26and45–47).Accordingtoa 1988reportfromDAS(AdministrativeDepartmentofSecurity),itled ‘tothepolarizationofpositions,transformedtheareaintoawarzone, andgeneratedapowervacuumthatencouragedallmannerofatrocities’ (IACHR, 1994 :3–4).

ItwaswithinsuchcontextthattheCastañobrothersemerged.After theirfather’sdeathandduetotherisingtensionswiththeguerrillas,the brotherssoughtanewareainwhichtoregroup.LedbyFidel,Carlos stressed theywantedastrategiclocationnearthebananaplantations thatwasequidistanttothethreedepartmentsofCordoba,Antioquia, andChoco,andwhich hadaccesstotheseaandborderareas.They triedSanJuan,onthecoast,butabandonedtheeffortafterguerrillas killed‘someofourboys’.Instead,theymovedclosertoCordobawhere theycouldbetterendureguerrillaretaliation,andwheremanyranches hadbeenabandoned.Eventuallytheyfoundthe2100-hectareestateLas Tangas,nearMonteria,theprovincialcapital.Fidelpurchasedthe prop-ertyin1983,buttheprosecutorinacaseagainsthimsaidFidelonly paidthefirstinstalment,andlaterkidnappedthesonoftherancher, ‘recovered’hispayment,andthenmurderedtheoriginalowners( Ver-dadAbierta,14September2012).LasTangas,saidCarlos,wasthefirst areathey‘liberated’,whichbecamearefugeandtraininggroundforthe paramilitariesthereafter(Aranguren, 2001 :70and110).

AnexpertwitnessinthecasesagainstFideltoldthecourtthatthe Castaños’ paramilitaryarmy wasfinancedbydrug profits(CorteIDH, 25–26).AstheCastañosexpandedtoadjacentmunicipalitiesuntilthe GulfofMorrosquillo,expellingEPLguerrillasintheprocess,ranchers started returning, claimedCarlos. ‘Ifit is abusiness for the guerril-las toimpoverishtheregions’,headded,‘Fidelconsideredita thriv-ing business to enrich those regions’. Fidel, said Carlos, was essen-tiallyacapitalist(Aranguren, 2001 :113).Whetherintended or unin-tended,theTangueroseffectivelycontributedtothetransformationof thesmallholder-ledagrarianeconomyintoasupplychainforcapitalist, commercialagricultureononehand,andillicitcocaproduction,onthe other.Violenceandterrorweretheirtoolsindestroyingopposition.

Between1988and1990,theparamilitariescommittedmorethan20 massacres,alllinkedtosocialtensionsarisingfromtheregion’s agricul-turalcommercialisation.Carlosclaimednotalltheseweretheirdoing: somewerecommittedbyparamilitariesoutsidetheCastañonetwork; andsometookplaceevenbeforetheyestablishedpresenceincentral Uraba(ibid.,109).Themainatrocitieswere:

• Currulao(Turbo),March4,1988:17people,allactivemembersof SINTAGRO(theUnionofAgrarianWorkersofAntioquia)were mur-deredtointimidatevotersfromvotingfortheUnionPatriotica, con-sideredthelegalpartyoftheFARC(IACHR, 1994 ).

• Buenavista(Cordoba),April3, 1988: 28 peopleexecutedas the TangueroslookedforanEPLleaderinvolvedinkidnapping. • PuntaCoquitos(Turbo),April11,1988:27banana workers

mur-dered,apparentlybykillersundercontractfromACDEGAMor As-sociationofFarmersandCattlemenofMagdalenaMedio(El Espec- tador, 2018 ).

• Canalete(Cordoba),August30,1988: 16victimskilled.

• Pueblo Bello(Cordoba),December1989– 43peasants were kid-napped,broughttoLasTangas,interrogatedandtortured.

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Thirty-sevendisappearedandonlysixbodieswerefound(CorteIDH, 2006 : 26;47–52).

ThemutationoftheCastaños

Fidelwas thefamily’smainentrepreneurwhomademoneyfrom mining, land speculation, art trading, and drugs trafficking, subse-quentlyinvestinghisprofitsinLasTangas(Verdad Abierta, 2008a ). His-businessnetworkbroughthimintocontactwithPabloEscobar.Asthe relationshipexpanded,Fidelwasgivenchargeofmaintainingasupply chaininBoliviaforwhatwasthenthelargestcocaineprocessing net-workintheworld.Carlos,meanwhile,rosetobecomeaprolificsicario (assassin)oftheMedellincartelandthefamily’schiefenforcer.Vicente wasdeployedtoLosAngeleswherehehandledthedistributionendof thedrugbusiness(McDermott, 2008 ).

WhenEscobarbroughttheMedellincartelintowarwiththe Colom-bianstatein1989, Fidelwasamongstthosewhodisagreed.Inearly 1992when Escobar was in prison undera negotiatedsurrender, he summonedFidel,FernandoGaleanoandGerardoMoncadatoa meet-ing.OnlyGaleanoandMoncadaturnedupandendedupdead,believed killedbyEscobarhimself.ItwasthenthatFidelsetupPEPESorPeople PersecutedbyPabloEscobar(Aranguren, 2001 :97–99).Fidel’srebellion wascriticaltothedownfallofEscobarbecauseasMcDermottexplains, ‘Fidelsetaboutprovinghecouldbe evenmorebrutalthanEscobar’. Withsupportfrom Colombia’ssecurityforces,andallegedlytheDEA itself,Fideltypicallysetoff twobombsforeverybombEscobarsetoff, targetingtheMedellinchief’sproperties.FidelalsoattackedEscobar’s accountants,lawyers,andsupporters.Afterhisescapefromprison, Es-cobarwasfinallytrackedandshotdeadbyapolicesniperinDecember 1993(McDermott, 2008 ).

TheemergenceoftheCastañosascriminalentrepreneurswhowere atthesametimefearsomeparamilitaryforcesgavethemconnections andapowerfulallyprovidingstrategicprotection– themilitary.By be-comingacredibleforceagainstleftistguerrillas,theytransformedfrom huntedgangsterstocriminal entrepreneursserving a usefulpolitical purpose.Thischangeisdemonstratedinacaseinwhichbusinessmen eyeingpalmoilplantationsapproachedVicenteandhisparamilitariesin thelate1990stobepartnersinaproject.AccordingtoBernal-Bermudez, thebusinessmenfoundtheCurbaradoandJiguamiandoriverbasinsin Chocotobeidealforpalmoilplantations– ithadtherightclimate, soil,asupplyofcheaplandandlabour,andwasclosetoPacifictrading ports.Vicente’srolewastoensurethatlandandlabourwouldremain availablethroughouttheproject.Thiswassignificant,explains Bernal-Bermudez,becauseitwas thefirst caseofbusinesstakingthe initia-tivetoapproachtheparamilitariesforapartnership,whenpreviouslyit wasalwaystheotherwayaroundwhenparamilitariesapproached busi-nessesofferingsecurityinexchangeforfinancialcontributions(Bernal- Bermudez, 2017 :228–229).

OnJanuary6,1994, justamonthafterEscobarwas killed,Fidel washimselfshotdeadinanaccidentalclashwithEPLguerrillas(not theFARCaswidelyreported),whichaccordingtoCarlos,werealready nearlydefeated.ButCarloskeptFidel’sdeathasecret,fearing demorali-sationamongsttheirranks.Heevenansweredaquestionnairesentbya reporterinMay1994pretendingtobeFidel.Onlyafterthat‘interview’s’ publicationdidthefamilyrealiseFidelwasdead.Atwistinthisstory isthatwhentheidentityofFidel’skillerwasfound,themanhad aban-donedtheEPLandwasalreadyﬁghtingforCarlosagainsttheFARC.He wasidentiﬁedasCommanderSarley(FranciscoMoreloPeñata),who neverknewthemanheshot.FidelthefounderoftheAutodefensasdied inanonymity.CarlosforgaveSarley,whorosetobecomehissecondin command(Aranguren, 2001 :Chapter1).

Afterburying Fidel,Carlos took the reinsof LosTangueros, and launchedsustainedattacksonFARCstrongholdsinUraba.Carlosthen established,alongwithVicente,theAutodefensasCampesinasdeCórdoba yUrabá orACCU(PeasantSelf-DefenceForcesofCordobaandUraba), incorporatingintotheirranksformerEPLmembersandFARC

desert-ers.ByterrifyingthelocalpopulationintodenyingFARCevenaglass ofwater,ACCUexpandedandbytheendof1996,‘haddonethe impos-sible– itdroveFARCrebelsoutofUraba’(McDermott, 2008 ).FARC’s setbackinUrabahadfar-reachingimplications– processesofpeasant displacement,landdispossession, andlandspeculation werenow en-abledwithoutsigniﬁcantopposition.

Themulti-purposefranchiseofaparamilitarybrand

ThecreationofACCUmarkedaturningpoint,notesGrajales, be-causeforthefirsttimeinColombia’slonghistoryofarmedconflict,‘a paramilitarygroupwasendowedwiththeimageofapolitico-military organisation,withinternalhierarchies,subdivisionsandmilitaryranks’. TheACCUdefined itselfas‘acounter-subversivearmedorganisation’ anda‘civilresistancemovement’.Carlosthenstartedpushingforcloser coordinationbetween thecountry’sparamilitarygroups.In1997,the national networkAUC wasestablished,withCarlosasitsspokesman (Grajales, 2015 :7).

ButVicenteandCarlosappeartohavehaddifferentviewsonAUC’s purpose.WhileCarlosbuilttheAUCintoapolitico-militaryforce, Vi-centeuseditasanetworkfordrugstrafficking.Vicentestartedselling ‘franchises’todrug traffickers andotherarmedgroupsby highlight-ingakey‘benefit’:anAUCaffiliationcouldchangeadrugtrafficking organisation’s statusfromcriminaltopoliticalactor.Becausea ‘fran-chise’allowedthebuyertherighttousetheAUCnameandlogo,and getanofficialrankwithintheorganisation,itpotentiallyoffers immu-nityfromprosecutionorextraditiontotheUS.Itturnedcommon mob-sters,followingpaymentofafranchisefee,intoarmedpoliticalactors (Grajales, 2015 ).Thesedifferencesbetweenthebrothershavebeen sug-gestedinVerdadAbiertaaccountsbutcouldnotbeconfirmedordenied inAranguren’sbookwhich,strangely,hasnomentionofVicenteatall inits242pages.This,initself,maybeanindicationofthebrothers’ estrangement.Carlosapparentlystruggledwiththedilemmaoftaking drugmoneytofund‘thecause’.Forexample,inChapter14,heclaims losing sleepover using drug moneytobuy4500rifles from Central America, butwentaheadbecausehedidn’twanttobe‘theidealistic commanderwholostthewar’.

Forsomecriminals, thefranchisenotonlygavesomeform of le-gitimacy butalso provided cover andprotection. amongstthe fran-chiseeswere‘theTwins’(LosMellizos)– enterprisingcocaine traffick-ersfromCalicaughtinconflictbetweencompetinggroupswhosought theprotectionoftheCastaños.In2001,apoliceraidononeoftheir apartmentsinBogotayielded$35millionincash.By2004,theyhad been namedin thelist of 12 most-wantedtraffickers by theUS. By establishing theparamilitarygroupBloque Vencedoresde Arauca and buyingafranchisefromtheAUC,theyeffectivelyavoidedextradition (Verdad Abierta, 2008c ).

Thus,atypeoffuzzyactoremergedwhocouldclaimtobeapolitical activistbutatthesametimewasneitherexclusivelyaparamilitarynor exclusivelyanarco.Effectively,theycontinuethe17thcentury tradi-tionidentifiedbyGallantaboutbanditswhobecamepatriots,andvice versa,dependingontheirrelationshipswiththestate(Gallant, 1999 ). Somefranchiseescallingthemselves‘transitionalarmedgroup’further blurredboundaries.Grajales (2015) importantlyarguesthatcontraryto theircommonimageas‘outlaws’operatingoutsidethestateandformal economy,theseactorsoperateverymuchlikepoliticiansand business-menwhoinvesttimeandeffortinbuildingthelegitimacythatenables survivalandexpansion.amongsttheirvariousmechanisms,themost usefulhasbeentheAUCfranchise,whichshapesthesocialconstruction ofwhatconstitutesillicitbusinessandcriminalityinquiteunexpected ways.

Thedeathofthebrothers

Bytheendof2002,Carloswasnegotiatingwiththenational govern-mentforthedemobilisationoftheparamilitarystructuresthathehelped

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create,therebyincreasinglystraininghisrelationshipwithVicente.AUC paramilitaries,manyofthemwantedforextraditiontotheUS,worried aboutwhatCarlosmighttelltheAmericans.OnApril16,2004,Carlos wasreportedkilled.Vicente’sright-handman,JesusIgnacioRoldanor Monolechelaterconfessedtocarryingouttheassassinationunderorders fromVicentehimself(McDermott, 2008 ).

ByNovember2006, over 30,000 paramilitarieshaddemobilised. Vicente himself applied to demobilise but in early 2007 went into hiding withHernan Hernandez to organisea retaliation againstthe government.He canvassed support,askingAUC commanders to do-nate$250,000eachforawarchest,butonlyreceivedtworesponses (Verdad Abierta, 2008b ).Hernandezhimselfwashesitant. OnMarch 11,2007fourmenreportedlykilledVicente.ManybelievedHernandez orchestratedthekilling,buthedeniesit,triggeringrumoursthat Vi-centedeliberatelyorganisedhisowndisappearance(McDermott, 2008 ). However,proofthathewasindeeddeadwasthescramblethatensued amongstvariousparamilitariesunderVicente’sinﬂuencetotake posses-sionoftheCastaños’housesandaccumulatedlandholdings,including LasTangas.

Carloswantedapoliticalparamilitaryasananti-thesistotheFARC, withwhomtheybattledbitterly.Vicentecreatedtheinfrastructurefora decentralisedcapitalistenterpriseinillicitdrugs.Despitediﬀerencesin intentions,theCastañoscanbecollectivelycreditedforconsolidatinga particularformoflocaleconomicorderintheterritoriestheyinhabited.

SuárezandBolivia’supper-classdrugbarons:1970–1988

‘Thedrugsindustry,’accordingtoTheEconomist,‘issimpleand prof-itable.Itssimplicitymakesiteasytoorganise;itsprofitabilitymakesit hardtostop’(The Economist 2018 ).Butprofitabilityaloneisinsufficient inexplainingitsremarkableresilience.Withoutprotection,profitability willnotlast.Profitabilityisnotautomaticinmanycontexts– itneedsto becarefullyconstructedandmaintained.Abusinessthatactsasauseful intermediatorandkeepstherightpartnerswillcontinuetobeneeded. ThesearethebeliefsandideasofRobertoSuárezGomez,Bolivia’s‘King ofCocaine’inthe1980s,asdocumentedbyhisbiographer,wifeAyda Levy(Levy:, 2012 ).

Robertowasamemberoftheelitewhomovedsociallyatthetopof Bolivia’shighsociety.HewasanheirofCasaSuárez,afirmfoundedby hisgreatgrandfatherPedroFedericoSuárezCallaú (1837–1908),who movedfromSantaCruztoBolivia’snortheastfrontierinthe1850sand startedthefamily’sexportsofquinine(Levy, 2012 :Chapter1).In1880, Pedro’syoungerbrotherNicolas(1851–1940)exploredandmappedthe rivernetworkfurtherdownstreamandbuiltbarracksforrubbertappers onastrategiclocationthatcametobeknownasCachuelaEsperanza, fromwhereCasaSuárezestablishedamonopolyonthetransportation ofrubberduringitsworldwideboominthe1880s.In1883,CasaSuárez expandedtoLondon,whereanotherbrother,Francisco,registeredthe publicly-listedfirmSuárezHermanosLtd(laterrenamedSuárez& Co. Ltd),andtookchargeofraisingcapital,purchasingproperty,and organ-isingthedeliveryofcargotoandfromCachuelaEsperanza.By1890,the firmhadbecometheworld’sbiggestrubberfirm,supplyingupto70% ofglobaldemand.Operatinginanisolatedborderareathatcouldnot besecuredbythestate,CasaSuárezwonfavourableconcession agree-mentswithanational governmentthateffectivelydelegatedmanyof itsrolestothecompany. Bytheturnofthecentury,thefirmowned orcontrolledupto6.5millionhectaresoftropicalforests,grasslands andfarmsinBeni,Pando,andSantaCruz,aswellasinCochabamba (Fifer, 1970 ;Lehman, 2018 ; Levy, 2012 ;andfamilyrecordsofNicolas SuárezCallaú in www.myheritage.com ).

CasaSuárezfunctionedasapara-stateinremoteareaswithahistory of chroniceconomicandsocial restructuring(Lehman, 2018 ).Faced withconstantlabour shortageson account of itsisolation, it weath-eredmanycrisesovertheyears:(a)the1899–1903Acreborderwar withBrazil;(b)the1920–1940economicdislocationtriggeredbythe fallofglobalrubberprices;(c)the1932–1935Chacoborderwarwith

Paraguay;(d)thesubsequentseriesofcoupd’etatsfollowingthe hu-miliation of defeat in the border wars; and (d) the rise of various political groups,including theMovimientoNacionalista Revolucionario (MNR),whichcametopowerin1952andimplementedsweeping agrar-ianreformpolicies,includingrevertingsixmillionhectaresof Suárez-controlledlandbacktogovernment.Thoughreducedbythesecrises, theCasaSuárezempireweatheredthroughbecause,asLehmanargues, amidstsuchuncertaintiestheﬁrmlearnedtoprioritisefoodproduction andlivingconditions,cancelleddebts,andreliedonalternativessuchas cattleraisinginordertoavoidthedepopulationoftheregion.Inother words,Lehmancontinues,CasaSuárezdevelopedtheviewthatthe ru-ralworkforceisinitselfaresourceandkeyassettobepreservedin or-dertosurviveharshanduncertainborderlandconditions(Fifer, 1970 ; Lehman, 2018 ).

Cattlefarming,therefore,encouragedsettlementandthe consolida-tionofruraltowns.Italsobenefittedfromstill-existingCasaSuárez in-frastructure,sincelivecattle,likerubber,wereexportedviathefirm’s fleetofbargesandportstationsintoBrazil.In1939,Robertospenta summerholidaywithgreatgranduncleNicolasatCachuelaEsperanza, whoat88remainedactiveandstrongandthussavedtheyoungRoberto fromdrowningbypullinghimfromtheswirlingBeniriverbackinto theboat(Levy, 2012 :Chapter2).Robertowouldgoontoexpandthe family’s cattlebusiness.Afterhis marriagetoAydaLevyin 1958,he inheritedHaciendaSanVicenteinSantaAnadelYacuma,with5000 headsofcattle,andstartedexportingcattletoBrazil,usingsteamboats rentedfromrelativesinjourneysthattypicallytook3daysdownstream. Withbusinessgrowing,Robertowentontopurchasemorehaciendasfor hiscattlestockslikeSanManuelfromhisbrothers,ElChaviusfromthe Montejosfamily,andElCarmenfromtheCastedos,amongstothers.By the1970s,thecoupleownedabout250,000hectaresofgrazingland and50,000cattleheads(ibid.,Chapter7).

Coca’sriseineasternBolivia

Thoughthepost-1952agrarianreformbecametheﬁnalblowthat led to theoﬃcial dissolutionof Suárez and Co. Ltd in London, the familyseemstohavesecuredsomeform ofsettlementwiththe gov-ernmentofVictorPazEstenssoro.By1962,Robertowaselected sub-prefectofYacumaprovinceinBeni,whileolderbrotherHugowas ap-pointedMinisterofStateforAgriculture(Levy, 2012 :Chapter14).The Suárez family’seconomicandpoliticalpresencein Beni,SantaCruz, andCochabambacontinued.Theywereseenbyanationalgovernment basedinthemoredensely-populatedwesternhighlandregionsnotonly aspartnersin forgingstrongerpolitical andeconomiclinks withthe sparsely-populatedeasternlowlands,theywerealsoregardedaskey ac-torsforstrengtheningfoodsecurity(Painter, 1994 :3).

The reasons for Roberto’s entry into the drugs business remain unclear, butitappearstohave started inthe mid-1970s, enabledit seems bytheexpansionof cocafarmingintoCochabamba. Untilthe 1940s,upto97%ofcocafieldswereinthemountainousYungasarea (Painter, 1994 :3).Bythe1950s,however,theflateasternlowlandsof theChapareinCochabambastartedgrowingcoca.By1967, Chapare hadmorehectaresundercocacultivationthanYungas.Akeyreasonfor theshift,explainsPainter,wasthatroadsstartedtopenetratethe low-lyingareasofCochabambaaspartofgovernmenteffortstoencourage settlementintoeasternBolivia,deemednecessarytoavoidarepeatof thelossofterritoryintheAcreandChacowars.Whenapavedhighway fundedbyinternationalaidwasfinishedinthe1970s,whichcoincided withtherapidexpansionofinternationaldemandforcocaine,Chapare’s vastflatlandshadbecomecriss-crossedbyamyriadofsmallpathsand roadsrunningoff amainartery.ThiswasunlikeYungas,whereno air-planecouldland(Painter, 1994 :3–4; Laserna, 1995 ).

Roberto’sextensivegrazinglandsandcattlebusinessareessentialto anunderstandingnotonlyoftheinfrastructureuponwhichhebuilthis drugsbusiness,butalsooftherelationshipsofaccommodationand pa-tronageheestablishedandmaintainedwithcocafarmersintheeastern

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lowlands.Robertowasnotsimplyanimpersonaldrugtraﬃckeror gang-sterbuyingandsellingcocaintheconventionalsense:hewasalsothe patrónorgodfatherwhohaddirectandindirectpersonalrelationships withmanyofthesefarmers, someofwhomwerelikelytobe tenants allowedtogrowcrops,ratherthanjustraisecattle,ontheland.

Inthesamewaythatcattlefarmingbenefittedfromthefoundations builtbyrubber,Roberto’sdrugbusinessbenefittedfromhiscattle infras-tructure.Robertotrainedasapilotandmodernisedthecattlebusiness bybuildingairstripsonhisranchesandinvestinginwhatbecame Bo-livia’slargestprivatefleetofsmallaircraft.Withtheaircraft,Roberto wasabletotransportmeatquicklytoBolivianandBraziliancities,and gainedconsiderablevalueadded.Thesamefleetwouldlaterrunthe supplychainsthatbroughtcocabasetoPabloEscobarandtheMedellin cartelinColombia,aswellascocainetoFrenchpartnersinMarseille (Levy, 2012 :Chapter12).In1982,theReaganadministrationestimated Roberto’sdrugsturnoverat$400millionayear(The Economist, 2000 ). On26December1982,RobertohostedapartyinSanVicente,which hasa2.2-kmairstrip,ostensiblytocelebrateeldestsonRoby’sbirthday, butwhichwasalsoameetingoffamiliesfromAntioquiathatbanded togetherunderMAS(MuerteaSecuestadoresorDeathtoKidnappers). MAS,formedforself-protectionafterthekidnappingofMarthaNieves Ochoabytheleft-wingM-19guerrillas,wouldlaterbecometheMedellin Cartel.Fortheparty,airplanesweredispatchedtoSaoPaoloandRio deJaneirotopick up celebritychefs; toPanamatocollectboxes of whisky,champagne,andotherspirits;andtoColombiatobringin Esco-barandGonzaloRodríguezGacha.WhenEscobardisembarked,agroup offourth-generationmariachisfromTecalitlán(Mexico)descendedfrom asecondplaneplayingrancheramusic.Asthepartystarted,aprized ThoroughbredhorsenamedPiropoarrivedonaSuperDC-3plane,agift oftheOchoastoRoberto,whoinreturnimpressedtheColombianswhen heshowedoff hisfully-grownpetjaguar namedKayan(Levy, 2012 : Chapter10).Itwasevidentthatthesewerenoordinarymobsters driv-ingfancycars.

ThegeopoliticsofRoberto’scocainebusiness

Important parts of Roberto’sbiography arethestories Levy tells aboutthegeopoliticsofthecocainebusiness.Apparently,theseaccounts werepiecedtogethernotjustfromwhatshepersonallyknew,butalso fromanunpublished500-page‘Coca-CocaineThesis’inwhichRoberto provideddetailsabouthiscriminalexploits(Levy, 2012 :Chapter18).

Becausethe Cubangovernmentplayed a decisiverolein the lib-erationof MarthaNievesOchoa fromtheM-19kidnapping, Escobar acceptedan invitationtovisitHavana inJanuary1983andbrought Robertoalong.InHavana,theyweretoldabouttheCastrobrothers’ stronginterestinusingdrugtraﬃckingasaweaponagainstUS imperial-ism.Adealwasthereforestuck,inwhichthecartelwouldpay$1-million adayforaccesstoCubanterritorialwatersandairspace.Inreturn,the Cubannavywouldnotonlyallowcartelshipsandplanessmuggling co-cainetoFloridatoreplenish,thedrugtraﬃckerswillalsobeprovided withintelligencedrawnfromRussian-suppliedradarsontheprecise lo-cationofAmericanCoastGuardshipsandaircraft(Levy, 2012 :Chapter 11).

Thedealwentsmoothlyfor16months,enablinghundredsoftons ofcocainetobesmuggledintotheUS,whileCubaearnedawindfall. InJune1984,however,itendedafterCubanintelligencefoundthat RobertoandEscobarwerealsoplayingwiththeCIAandLt.Col.Oliver North,inadealbrokeredbyPanama’sManuelAntonioNoriega. Appar-ently,NorthandtheCIAsoughtwaystocircumventtheBoland amend-mentsintheUSCongress,whichnotonlylimitedtheamountbutalso setconditionsontheaidthattheUSgovernmentcouldprovidetothe ContrasﬁghtingtheSandinistas,Cuba’salliesinNicaragua.Robertowas totakechargeofproduction;theCIAwillorganisedeliverytoUS ter-ritory,viaLimonProvinceinCostaRica;andUS-basedMedellincartel operativeswilldodistributionandsales.Eachthentakesa30%shareof

theproﬁt,withtheCIAshareusedexclusivelyforfundingtheContras (Levy, 2012 :Chapter12).

Inordernottomixthingsup,Robertosetupanewdruglab,called VillaMosquito,inthemostswampyandinhospitablepartofBallivian ProvinceinBeni.Thecomplexwasbuiltsothatthelaboratory, ware-houses,houses,hangarsandotheroutbuildingsforelectricgenerators andpumpswouldnotbeseenfromtheair;theonlythingvisiblewasa smallhouse,acorralandasmallherdofﬁvehundredcattle.Acatering companysuppliedfuel,foodandotherneeds,includingBrazilian pros-titutes.Thelabproducedathousandkilosof cocaineeachday.Two HerculesC-130aircraftownedbytheCIAbutregisteredundertheUS aircompanySouthernAirTransport,whichtheBolivianscalled Aero-coca,departedeachweekfromVillaMosquitototransportseventons ofcocainetoPuertoLimon(ibid.,Chapter12).

TheCubans,angeredathowtheirSandinistaallieswerebeing un-dermined,urgentlyinvitedRobertoandEscobarforconsultationsin Ha-vana.Theplanwastoarrestthepairinordertoscuttletheoperation. However,officialswhonegotiatedthedeal– GeneralArnaldoOchoaand ColonelAntoniodelaGuardia– warnedthepair,allowingthemtoleave beforethearrestingpartyarrived.Bothofficials,bemedaledheroesof theCubanRevolution,werelaterexecutedinHavanabyfiringsquad (Levy, 2012 :Chapter11;Chapter12;and New York Times, 1989 ). Cocaine,Inc

Levytook painstohighlightthather husbandwas diﬀerentfrom thecriminalsandwarlordswithwhomhepartnered.Hewasthe mild-manneredbutcunningpatrón,sheemphasises,whohad‘thetouchfor thecommonpeople’and‘helpedthepoorgetoutoftheirmisery’.Levy lamentedthebetrayalbyGeneralLuisGarciaMeza,whocamebecame presidentviaaJuly 1980coupthatRobertofunded, onlytocavein toUSpressurebypublishingalistofwanteddruglordswithRoberto andsonRobyontop.Thepublicationcauseddamage,becauseRoberto’s knownpropertiesandassetswerefrozen,promptingLevytostartthe te-dioustaskoflegallydissociatingthefamily’sassetsfromthoseacquired throughherhusband’sillicitbusiness.Thisalsoledtotheseparationof thecouple,althoughtheyremainedfriends,statesLevy,andwereseen togetherinpartiestheyhosted(Levy, 2012 :Chapter5;Chapter18).

RobertohadaparticularhatredfortheUS,citinghowtwo Ameri-cancompanies,tobaccogiantPhilipMorrisandﬁrearmsmanufacturer SmithandWesson,kill morepeoplethancocaine(Levy,Chapter5). Moreimportantly,RobertobelittledtheUS-led‘warondrugs’because hebelievedthat‘noonecaneliminatethelargestbusinessintheworld’. Themostthatanti-drugoperationscanachieve,hesaid,istochangethe brokers orintermediarieswhoorganiseandproﬁtfromthebusiness, pointingoutthatwhenspecialpoliceandtheDEAestablishedbasesin Bolivia’scoca-producingareas,cocaleafgrowingincreasedratherthan diminished(Levy, 2012 :Prologue).

Robertowantedtoendthetendencytocreateamonopolyin the drugstrade,haltaslidetodeadlycompetition,andsmoothen relation-shipswithgovernment.HedidthisbysettingupLaCorporacion,which theAmericanseventuallycalledthe‘GeneralMotorsofCocaine’.It func-tionedmorelikealoosepartnershipinanindustrywhereentryisnot diﬃcult.Itsincorporators,drawnfromtheBolivianelite,essentially re-mainedautonomousbutpooledtheirresourcestogethertoreduce mu-tualcosts,soldmaterialsandservicestoeachother,sharedinformation, distributedorders,andcoordinatedwherenecessary(Levy, 2012 : Chap-ter7)

Perhapsitsmostimportantinnovationwastoattachtheillicitdrugs trade to theinfrastructure andbusiness links of licit enterprise. For Roberto, itmeant not just using theassets of his ranches, but also thefamily’sriverinfrastructure.Steambargesoperatingfromportson theMamoreRivertoGuayaramerin,forexample,wereusedto trans-portbulkcocaleavesforprocessing.LaCorporacionreliedon already-existingbusinessinfrastructure– lettersofcredit,bankaccounts, pro-curement lines,warehouses, insurance premia, legal andaccounting

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firms,andsoon.Robertoexplicitlywantedtotransformthe‘ant’traffic incocaintoacentrally-coordinatedcorporateenterprise.Atitsheight whenmillionsofdollarsincasharrivedonplanesfromColombiaeach day,thecoupleandtheirassociatesjokedthat‘itwaseasiertodrainthe MamoreRiverthantoendtheflowofmoney’(ibid.,Chapter7).

Askeyinvestment,LaCorporacionboughtpropertiesontheoutskirts oftheMadidiNationalParkneartheYataRivertosetupanetworkof laboratoriesforcocaprocessingthatitspartnerscoulduse.Afleetof30 CessnaSTOL206(shorttake-off andlanding)aircraft– typicallywith li-censenumbersmuddiedtoavoididentificationandflownbypilotswho paidbribesof$10,000toobtainlandingrights– wereusedtobring inthecrudecocabasefromtheChapare.Theprocessedcocainepaste sulfatewasthentransportedtoColombiausinglonger-rangeturboprop DC-3aircraft.Thepilots(maruchos)typicallyearned$15,000perflight. AkeychangeRobertointroducedwastoincreasethesalepriceof co-cainebasesulfatefrom$1800perkiloto$9000perkilo(ibid.,Chapter 7).

Politicalconnections

Robertohadmanypoliticalinvolvementsandwasevenfaultedby wifeAydaandbrotherHugoforsquanderingmoneybyplayingpolitics. AccordingtoPainter,thentheBBC’scorrespondentinBolivia,Roberto waswidelybelieved tohavefinanced the1978campaignof General JuanPereda.StrongevidencealsosuggeststhatRobertofinancedthe brutal‘CocaineCoup’of1980whichputintopowerGeneralLuis Gar-ciaMeza, andusheredinwhat wasperhapsthemost violentperiod incontemporaryBoliviawhenthecountrysawextra-judicialkillings, disappearances,andtorture,particularlyofunionleadersandleft-wing figuresopposingthecoup(Painter, 1994 :58–59).Onassumingpower, GarciaMezaquicklyappointedColonelLuisArceGomezasInterior Min-ister,whosefirstactwastoauthorisethereleaseofkeydrugtraffickers fromjail(Levine, 1993 ).ArceisacousinofRoberto(Levy, 2012 : Chap-ter2).

However,Robertodeploredtheviolenceand‘uselessmurders’.There wereover500murdersanddisappearances,andthousandsoftortures andimprisonment.Behinditwasthemafia-likeorganisationNoviosdela Muerte(LoversofDeath)ledbytheinfamousNaziwarcriminalKlaus BarbieandArgentinemilitaryadvisers.TheNovioswereagroupofabout 600mercenariescontractedbyArcetohuntdown140smalland mid-leveldrugtraffickers,apparentlytoshowtotheUSthatonthecontrary, Bolivia’snewrulerswerealso‘tough’againstdrugs.Inreality,theNovios simplyclearedthefieldoflower-levelcompetitors(Levine, 1993 :loc. 1156).

LevyconfirmstheNoviosalsoworkedforRoberto,mainlyto pro-videprotection forthedrug shipmentstoColombiabyensuringthat theColombianspaidfirst,beforeoff-loadingthecargoes.TheNovios, shesaid,wereknownlocallyastheAguilasNegras(BlackEagles),on accountoftheimagesofthosebirdsonthewingsofRoberto’splanes. Levy,whohasJewishroots,listednamesofthemostprominentNovios andcalled them‘adiversesampleoftheinternationalextremeright’ (Levy, 2012 :Chapter6).

PoliticalconnectionstotheCIAalsocameinhandyforthedrug traf-ﬁckers.InMay1980,LaCorporacionwastargetedbyajointUS-Bolivia stingoperation,adeceptionoraruseintendedtocatchcriminals actu-allycommittingacrimetomountasuccessfulprosecution.Itwasledby DEAspecialagentMichaelLevine.Thestingoperation– inwhichatrial 500kgsofcocainewaspickedupbyplaneand$9millionincashpaid insidethevaultofaBolivianbank– resultedinthearrestoftwoLa Cor-poracionpartners,JoseRobertoGasserandAlfredo‘Cutuchi’Gutierrez, whowereextraditedtotheUSandindicted.However,Gasserwassoon quietlyreleased fromjail,andsubsequently,theUSAttorney’sOﬃce inMiamidroppedallcharges.Gutierrez’sbailrequirementwaslowered from$1-millionto$10,000,whichhequicklyposted(Levine, 1993 :loc. 683).Levinelaterfoundthereasonfortherelease– Gasserand Gutier-rezwereassetsoftheCIA.The1980swerealsotheperiodofLaGuerra

Suciaorthe‘dirtywar’againstcommunisminLatinAmerica,andthe CIAwasprotectingitsallies.ToLevine’sdismay,thetargetsofthewar ondrugsweredeemedbytheCIAasthealliestheUSneededinitswar againstcommunism(ibid.,loc.1429).

Theendoftheking

Robertobrokeoff withtheMedellincartelinmid-1984.His-declared reasonwasthatMedellinoperatorswereundermininghisbusiness,but LevysaysitwasbecauseRobertodeploredhispartners’violenceand regretted enrichingEscobar.The timingwassignificant fortwo rea-sons.First,in Marchthatyear,theMedellincartelsufferedaserious blowwhentheDEAandColombianpolicedestroyedTranquilandia,the sprawlingruralcomplexwith19laboratoriesand8airstripsthat pro-ducedcocaineexportstotheUS.ThisleftRobertowiththeonlysizeable junglelaboratoryfacilitiesinMadidi,Yata,andVillaMosquito.Second, theCubanandCIAsmugglingdealsended.ButRobertobythen, with-outtheknowledgeofEscobar,hadalreadyestablishedtieswithajovial Colombian,CesárCano,whohadgoodconnectionsintheBahamasand knew thecoastsandbeachesof southernFlorida. Overthenextfew months,businesswithCanoflourished,earningRobertonetprofitsof about$250million.ButtheAntioqueñoscaughtupwithCano:12 hit-menkilledhimandhisbodyguardsinAugust1985onthedoorsteps ofhismother’shomeinBogota.Cano’sdeathunnervedRoberto,who promptlyabandonedhisillegaldrugsbusiness,andattemptedtogolegal byrevivinghisproposaltogovernmentofanewmultinational corpora-tion,modelledafterCasaSuárez,capableofprocessingBolivia’sexcess cocaleafproductionintomedicinalandotherproductsforamass mar-ket(Levy, 2012 : Chapter13; Painter, 1994 :1).Bythattimehowever, Robertowasalreadytootaintedforhisproposaltobeconsidered seri-ously.

InJuly1988,attheendofBolivia’scocaboom,Robertowasarrested inaraidinElSujo,oneofhisranchesinBeni(Painter, 1994 :27–28). Hewas convictedto15 yearsandputina prisonnear LaPazthat, accordingtoLevy,was morelikeaparadisewithoutfreedom,rather thanapurgatory.Robertowashoweverreleasedin1996becausehis healthdeterioratedinthehighlandenvironment.Putunderhousearrest inthelowlands,hespenttimeworkingwithajournalistandghostwriter toproducehismemoirs,entitledSiempreRey(AlwaysKing),whichwas turneddownbypublishersandﬁlmmakersbecauseitbarelymentioned hiscriminalexploits.LevylaterdiscoveredthatRobertohadalsowritten alongerTesisCoca-Cocainathatprovidedmanyofthedetailspublished inElReydelaCocainainwhichLevyelaboratedonRoberto’scriminal background,butmoreinthemouldofanupper-classRobinHood(2012: Chapter18andEpilogue).

BeforehediedinJuly2000,aterminally-illRobertoattempted sui-cidebybarricadinghimselfinhisroom,brandishingagun.Butan am-bulancearrivedwithdoctorsthatsucceededinconvincinghimtobe broughttoaprivateclinic,wherehediedﬁvedayslater.Thousandsof people,narratesLevy,attendedhiswakeinSantaCruz.Hewasburied inCochabambaalongsideeldestsonRoby,whowaskilledinpolice cus-todyin1990(ibid.)

Conclusion:deconstructingarbitrageandintermediation

Detailsfromtheseprecedinglifestoriesaffirmthatdruglordsare more thanjust gangstersandracketeers, theyarealsoimportant lo-calpoliticalandeconomicactorswhomediatestate,society,and mar-ketrelationships.Thoughruralelitesintheillicitdrugtradedefyeasy classification,itisevidentthattheCastañosthroughtheirtoolsof vi-olenceplayedkeyrolesintheconsolidationofcommercialagriculture inUraba;whileRobertowasthemainsupplychainintermediary,who providedthebusinesslinks,transportassets,politicalconnections, in-cludingaloosepartnershipofgentebuena(upperclass)traffickersthat transformedcocacultivationandcocaine-baseproductionfrom house-holdactivitytocommercialisedindustry.

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Themainpropositionadvancedbythisarticleisthatcriminal en-trepreneurssurviveandthrivebecausetheyestablish interdependen-ciesaspioneersforcapital,intermediariesincommoditychains,and ar-bitrageursespeciallyinthedangerousplacesatthemarginsofstateand market.

Robertoemergesasanarchetypalpioneerforcapital– hewasa crimi-nalentrepreneurwhowasalsoaninformalbuteffectivesourceofcredit, employmentandinvestmentsinterritoriesthathavebeenhistorically isolatedfrommarketnetworks,havelittlestatepresence,andgoverned differently.Gallant’spointapplies– banditsandpiratesbroughtcash intotypicallymarginalisedareas,thusenablingthoseterritoriestobe connecteddirectlytooutsidemarketsovertime(Gallant, 1999 :37–38). AndexpandingonMcSweeney,et.al’s.restatement,ratherthanbeing anathematoprivateinvestmentintheruralsector,narco-entrepreneurs ‘createtheveryconditionsforsuchinvestments– noteverywhere,but importantlyintheverylandscapesmostlikelytohavebeenclosedoff tocapital investmentprior to thedrug traffickers’ involvement’. In-deed,thenarcobourgeoisieusethevastwealththeycapturefroman illicitcommoditychaintoactasneoliberalpioneers,spreadingcircuits ofcapitalintonewterritories:communal,reserved, andpubliclands (McSweeney, Richani, Pearson, Devine & Wrathall, 2017 :16).

ItwasduringtheheightofLaCorporacion’soperationsthatthe coca-cocaineeconomyprobablypreventedacompletecollapseofa convuls-ingBoliviannationaleconomy.Asidefromadeeprecessionmarkedby unemploymentandhyperinﬂationcausedbytheplungingpricesofits mainexports,gasandminerals,Boliviawasinapoliticalcrisisthatsaw threeelectionsandtenchangesofgovernmentbetween1978and1982 – fourbymilitarycoup,threebylegitimateprocessesthroughCongress, andthreebyinternaldisputesintheArmedForces(Laserna, 1995 :31). Duringthistime,cocacultivationandcocaineproduction‘clearlyacted asahugesocialsafetynet,absorbinglabourfromthecollapsedmining andindustrialsectors,andreplacinglargeportionsofdollarspreviously generatedbyminerals,gas,andotherexports’(Painter, 1994 :54).High farmgatecocaprices,triggeredbythestrengthofdemandfromLa Cor-poracion’spartners,not onlyled tothegreatestrelativeincreasesin cocaproductionvolumesrecorded,butalsoacceleratedmigrationinto theChapare.In1975,populationgrowthrateintheChaparewasonly 3.48%.In1980,itgrewdramaticallyto29.25%(Laserna, 1995 :19). Theimpactofthenarcobourgeoisiewasonfulldisplayatthisparticular historicalmoment.

Asintermediariesincommoditychains,criminalentrepreneurscan be‘fixers’whousecunning,innovation,violenceandtheirconnections toenabletheflowofproducts, profitandpeople acrossthesechains thatrunacrossborders.ThiswasseenmostclearlyinVicente’sselling oftheAUCfranchise,whichprovidedcover,protection,andapolitical statustoenterprisingcriminals.TheCastañosandSuarezcanalsobe regardedasagentswholinkillicitcropfarmstothelegionsofseasonal ormigratingagriculturalworkersnecessaryfortheprocessingofcoca baseandcocaine.TheCastañosenabledbetteraccesstothehighway networksforbananagrowersandcattleranchersaftertheygainedthe upperhandoverEPLandFARCforces.Robertohadhisfleetofplanes andriverbargesforthetransportofproduceandillicitcommodities. InBlok’sstudy,themafiawerethegatekeepersandpowerbrokerswho decidewhowinsorlosesinthecontestationsandcompetitioninlocal economies.

Finally,asarbitrageurs,criminalentrepreneursarewhatAhramand King,quotingBraudel,describedas‘creaturesoftheborderlands,where statesandempireshaddiﬃcultyextendingtheirownpower’.Theyare, … uniquelygiftedboundary-crossers,conductingbothviolentand non-violent transactions across political, economic, and cultural dividing lines. Despite the popular image of warlords as sword-swingingbarbariansrulingdespoticallyfromusurpedthrones,the mostsuccessfulonesturnedouttohavesomethingthateveryoneelse wanted:theabilitytoserveasmiddlemenacrossuncertain

bound-arieswhile,intheprocess,reapingsomeoftheproﬁtsforthemselves (Ahram & King, 2012 :170).

Gutierrez-Saninaddsakeyattributeofarbitrageurs,arguinginhis comprehensive studyofColombian paramilitariesthat theywere en-forcersof indirectrule,i.e. ‘non-bureaucraticallymediatedterritorial controlandpresenceofthestate’.Itisastrategyofrule,especiallyin borderlands,‘markedbyathinbureaucracyandthicksystemofpartisan networks’(Gutierrez Sanin, 2019 :15).

Akeylessonforpeacebuildingthatemergesfromthisexamination istheneedtoidentifythesourcesofpowerofcriminalentrepreneurs andaddresstheseaccordingly.Thismaybepossiblebyconsideringtwo steps.First,recognisingandtacklinghowcriminalentrepreneurs con-trol ormanipulateaccesstoland andotherresources,become gate-keepers for themobilisationof rural labour,anddevelopnew ways ofaccumulating capital.Secondisacknowledgingextra-legalregimes of ruleinwhich they, likethestate,areonlyanactoramongst oth-ers(Ballve, 2019 );andthattheyserveausefulpoliticalroleforthose inpowerandultimatelyshapestateformationasenforcersofindirect rule(Gutierrez-Sanin, 2019 ).TherecommendationoftheUNandthe WorldBank’sPathwaystoPeace(2018 )– thatcriminalnetworksare ac-tors,withagency,thatshouldbetakenintoaccountinassessingrisks topeacebuilding– needstobetakenupseriously.

Ethics

Tothebestofmyknowledge,Ihavecompliedwithalltheprescribed ethicalstandardsinthepreparationofthisarticle.

DeclarationsofInterests

None.

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