‘The Role and Importance of Sri Lanka in the Geopolitical Strategies
of China and India’
Bachelor Thesis Political Geography Name: Stan Goudsmit Studentnumber: 10755446 Supervisor: Dr. N.P.C. Beerepoot Second reader: Dr. J.M. Bavinck Study: Sociale Geografie & Planologie Words: 16935 Date: 19-06-2017Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 2 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework ... 4 2.1 Introducing the Balance of Power Theory and Power Transition Theory ... 4 2.1.1. A brief general overview of both theories ... 4 2.1.2 Similarities ... 5 2.1.3 Differences ... 6 2.2 The extended alliances theories ... 10 2.3 The different Powers ... 11 2.3.3 Great Powers ... 11 2.3.2 Middle Powers and Regional Powers ... 12 2.3.3 Small Powers ... 13 2.4 Conclusion ... 14 Chapter 3: Methodology ... 15 3.1 Research design and approach ... 15 3.2 Method ... 15 Chapter 4: The geopolitical strategies of China and India ... 17 4.1 Military-security ... 17 4.2 The diplomatic field ... 19 4.2.1 Diplomatic battles in the Asian Organizations ... 19 4.2.2 The latest foreign policy under Modi and Xi Jinping ... 20 4.3 Economic Field ... 21 4.4 Conclusion ... 23 Chapter 5: The importance and role of small power Sri Lanka ... 24 5.1 The Sri Lanka relations in the past ... 24 5.1.1 Sino-Sri Lanka relation ... 24 5.1.2 Indo-Sri Lanka relation ... 25 5.2 The importance and concern of Sri Lanka’s geographical location ... 26 5.3 The influence of Sri Lanka’s domestic policy on the New Great Game ... 28 5.4 Conclusion ... 29 Chapter 6: Conclusion ... 30 6.1 Findings theory ... 30 6.2 Role and importance of Sri Lanka ... 32 References: ... 34
Chapter 1: Introduction
"Whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters” (The Indian Government 2002). That is what Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan said a century ago. He was an American naval officer during the 19th century and, moreover, one of the most celebrated naval historians of his era. In 2002 the Indian government used the quotation in its press release ‘Guarding the coastline of the country’ to emphasize the importance of the Indian Ocean. The prediction of Captain Mahan now looks to be more true than ever before. The blue waters of the Indian Ocean host some of the most important and busiest sea-lanes of the world. Approximately 50% of all the container traffic and 70% of all petroleum products go through the Indian Ocean (Sellstrom 2015). Therefore, a lot of countries have an interest going through the Indian Ocean. One of those countries with a rising interest in the Indian Ocean is China. The arrival of China results in rivalries in the Indian Ocean. Kaplan (2010: 8) writes in his book Monsoon that there is no ocean in the world that is more in need of strategic stability. He continues by mentioning that the Indian Ocean is the platform for two rivalries. On the global scale China and the US are competing with each other in the Indian Ocean and India and China are the two main players in the regional rivalry. According to Admiral Scott Swift, US Pacific Fleet commander, is the presence of China in the Indian Ocean adding to a sense of ‘anxiety’ in the region (The Times of India 2016). This thesis, however, will focus on the regional rivalry between India and China. The rivalry between India and China has been labeled in the media as the New Great Game (See: BBC 2011 & Mullin & Poplin 2015). In this game China and India are struggling for political and commercial influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries have started strategies, as will be shown later in this thesis, to rule the regional rivalry in its favor. In the past both countries had mainly continental aspirations (Mohan 2015). However, both countries are these days more focusing on their maritime aspirations. Whereas 70% of India’s energy requirements are going through the Indian Ocean, China has an even bigger share with 82% going through the Indian Ocean (Sokinda 2015). This shows the high interest of both countries in the Indian Ocean. The existing literature is mainly focused on the military capacities of India and China (Sellstrom 2015). However, both countries have made clear that war will not be the solution (Mullen & Poplin 2015). Mullen and Poplin (2015) argue in their article in Foreign Affairs that this fight will be fought with the use of soft power diplomacy. Nye (2004) defines soft power as the ability of a state to make its own interest the interest of another state without using force. One of the countries that is subject to the soft power diplomacy of both India and China is Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is one of the islands that has a central location in the Indian Ocean. Although it is a small island in a big ocean, it is one of the focus points for both countries in their geopolitical strategies. Evans (2016) calls Sri Lanka in his article a place where India’s and China’s sphere of influence overlap. Therefore, this thesis will further analyze the role and importance of Sri Lanka in the geopolitical strategies of China and India. It will answer the main research question by using the power of balance theory and power transition theory as theories. Thesetheories, with extensions, and necessary definitions will be reviewed in chapter 2. In the next chapter the methodology will be explained that is used to conduct this research. Chapter 4 will study the strategies of India and China on an international scale to answer the sub-question: How are China and India competing with each other for geopolitical power in the New Great Game? In Chapter 5 Sri Lanka will be analyzed on a national scale to answer the sub-question: How is Sri Lanka playing a role in the strategies of China and India? These two sub-questions will answer the main research question of this thesis: Why is Sri Lanka of great importance for India and China in their regional rivalry in the Indo-pacific region? By answering the main question this thesis will contribute to the existing literature on the rise of both China and India and its implications. Krishnappa and Sisodia (2009) argue that only since 2009 India has been part of the debate on the developing construction of a new security order in Asia. Before 2009 this academic debate was only focused on the rise of China. Therefore, this thesis is a contribution to an academic debate that just started to develop since 2009. The rise of these two new powers in Asia has fueled the theoretical debate about which theory in international relations has the highest credibility in explaining the emerging reality for policymakers (Goswami 2013). Moreover, Walt (1998) argues that there is an unavoidable link between the abstract theories and the policies of states in the real world. Policy makers rely on the existing theories in their policy-making. This thesis uses the original theories of Morgenthau and Organski to examine the role and importance of Sri Lanka in the geopolitical strategies of India and China. Morgenthau developed in 1954 the balance of power theory, which was challenged by Organski in 1958 with his power transition theory. According to Walt (1998) realism, on which the balance of power theory is based, provides the most powerful framework to understand world politics. On the contrary, Danilovic (2002) shows that other scholars argue that the power transition theory gives a better framework to explain world politics. However, both Walt (1998) and Danilovic (2002) have written their article more than ten years ago. To understand twenty-first century world politics it requires up-to-date information (Kegley 2008). This thesis, therefore, will use the most up-to-date articles to know the most recent actions of China, India and Sri Lanka. By using the most recent information this thesis is an extension of the academic literature and debate on the explanatory power of the two theories in the 21st century. In the next chapter both theories with extended alliance theories and necessary definitions will be introduced and explained. After the theoretical framework the research design and method of data collection will be described and justified. Chapter four will research the geopolitical strategies of India and China in three fields. It will start with the military-security field followed by the diplomatic field and economic field. In the diplomatic field will be paid extra attention to the foreign policy under the two most recent leaders Modi and Xi Jinping. In chapter five the situation of Sri Lanka will be reviewed. It will do so by first analyzing the past relations of Sri Lanka with both India and China. After it continues by looking at the geographical location of Sri Lanka and the effect of the domestic politics under Rajapaksa and Sirisena. The thesis will finish with a conclusion and discussion.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis and discussion of the theoretical perspectives used for this study and expectations guiding this study. Both theories, the balance of power theory (Morghentau 1954) and the power transition theory (Organski 1958), will be used to theorize the behavior of the specific states researched in this study. These two theories are written by two major scholars in the field of world politics. Morgenthau (1954) is considered to be the founding father of political realism (see Kunz 2010: 189), and Organski (1958) was the first, and most important, international relations scholar to challenge Morgenthau’s balance of power theory (see Danilovic 2002). In 2.1 both theories will be introduced. First a brief general overview of the theories will be given. After the theories will be explained in more detail by researching the similarities and differences. The extended alliances theories of Snyder (2007) and Kim (1991) for both theories will be explained in 2.2. This chapter will finish by defining the terms great, middle, regional and small powers. 2.1 Introducing the Balance of Power Theory and Power Transition Theory A significant amount of researchers has written on world politics the last couple of centuries with a specific focus on the rising power of China (see: Brown et al 2000 & Huisken 2009). Two major international relation theories are the balance of power theory (Morghentau 1954), and the power transition theory (Organksi 1958). These theories deal with the changing patterns in the world politics. To be more specific, both theories try to show the history and logic of major power relations (Danilovic 2002). These theories in their original form discuss the patterns and logics on the global level. Lemke et al. (2002), however, argues that the power transition theory could also be used on a regional scale, and the same is argued for the balance of power theory by Fortmann et al. (2004). They argue that the same principals as on the global level are in force at the regional level. Therefore, these theories can be used in this thesis to study the strategies of India and China in the Indo-Pacific region. In this paragraph both theories will be explained. It starts by giving a brief general overview for both theories. By presenting the similarities and differences on the basis of power and assumed world pattern in the paragraphs 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 it will show how the power transition theory functions as a rival theory to the balance of power theory. 2.1.1. A brief general overview of both theories The balance of power theory of Morgenthau (1954) written in the politics among nations has a central role in the realism school of thought in the field of International Relations (Williams 2004). Realists believe that power is the main interest of states in world politics (Slaughter in Wollfrom 2013). Morgenthau (1954: 5) argues in his book that when people want to understand world politics they have to see politics as the interests defined in terms of power. Power gives states the ability to defend themselves and states can therefore survive. According to the balance of power theory of Morgenthau (1954: 155), this constant struggle for power to survive causes a necessary phenomenon that he called the balance of power. In the theory Morgenthau (1954) argues that the balance of power is an essential factor to stabilize the affairs in world politics. The system of world politics in the balance of power theory has a certain ‘equilibrium’, which meansthat whenever the system is destabilized it will automatically try to restabilize to the situation where the power between the sovereign states is balanced. Organski (1958) published his first edition of the power transition theory in his book world politics. This theory also uses power to explain the structure of organization between states on global and regional scales. However, the structure is based on a hierarchic system in which the more powerful states try to dominate and influence the world politics. Moreover, Organski (1958) argues with his theory that the there are recurring patterns in the past that show power shifts, and those are likely to happen again in the future. The world politics are changing continuously and therefore results in different formations and relations over time. Organski (1958) argues that a world pattern with dominant countries is the ideal situation to maintain a peaceful situation. 2.1.2 Similarities DiCicco et al. (2003) show that these two distinct theories share a set of common assumptions despite their major differences. The first point both theories agree on is the role of states in the world. Both Morghentau (1954) and Organski (1958) argued that sovereign states are the key actors in world politics. The states act rationally to enhance their power, security, and wealth in an international system full of conflicts. According to the two scholars, the international system is furthermore lacking a powerful international institution to regulate conflicts or to enforce agreements. Organski (1958) mentions that everyone who wants to understand the world politics with its power structure has to deal with nations. Morgenthau (1954: 220), moreover, blames the substitution of democratic for aristocratic responsibility and the substitution of nationalistic standards of action for universal ones for the deterioration of international morality. Since the replacement of the aristocratic ruling for democratic ruling, government officials can no longer only be chosen from an exclusive group but are chosen from the whole population (Morgenthau 1954). Their actions are now responsible for a whole nation, and the nation will replace the government officials when a public opinion changes. With this change, the structure, and within the morality, of international society changed. Morgtenhau (1954) speaks about an international system of moral restraints changing from a reality into a mere figure of speech. He concludes by saying that with governments the responsibility is widely spread over a great number of individuals with different conceptions of what is morally required in international affairs. Therefore, a foreign policy on basis of international morality becomes impossible. Moreover, Morgenthau (1954) speaks about the victory of nationalism over internationalism. Morgenthau (1954: 229) explains this by showing three dramatically changed factors. First of all, the development of instruments to mold public opinion caused an increased ability of the nation-state to exert moral coercion upon the person living in the nation-state. Secondly, these days are part of atomic times. Therefore, the loyalty to the nation requires a person to disregard the universal moral of conduct. One person can now kill thousands of people by doing an atomic attack. Since such an order with enormous consequences can be demanded, the supranational ethics have
weakened. The last factor is actually a result of the previous two. These days an individual should have a great moral strength to overcome the previous two factors. Most members of a state will for that reason chose in favor of the nation. Organski (1958: 17) shows this with an example. He argues that patriotism will, for example, demand an Englishman to be loyal to the Western Alliances in which England is a member. However, this loyalty is only to some extent. The Englishman will never side with America, which is also a member of the alliance, in a dispute with England because he thinks his own nation is damaging the Western Alliances. Since such actions will accuse him of being ‘pro-American’, he will always follow his orders from the nation. Organski (1958) concludes by saying that his example shows that loyalties to humanity can be dangerous for nationalism, and honest concerns for other members will always be unpopular. “Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences.” (Morgenthau 1954: 9) The other similarity both theories share is that state leaders act rationally. Since nations can't act but only individuals do, it is important to look at the state leaders (Organski 1958). However, national goals are still coming from a person’s acts. Since national goals exist in someone’s mind, and individuals can share common goals, and because national governments are acting on behalf of the nation, Organski (1958) argues that speaking about individuals is the same as speaking about national goals. The ruling people, the government, have therefore the main task of making their goals the national goals. Morgenthau (1954: 4) explains in his six principles of political realism that realism believes in politics that can distinguish truth and opinion. It believes in a rational theory that can ascertain facts and give it meaning through reason. It, therefore, assumes that foreign policy can only be ascertained through the examination of the political acts performed and the consequences of these acts (Morgenthau 1954: 5). In other words, by examining the previous acts of state leaders it is possible to predict their objectives. Moreover, Morgenthau (1954) argues that abstract moral principles can’t be applied to politics and it can only be seen as an influential factor on the rational acts of state leaders. It is prudence, the weighing of the consequences, that is the supreme virtue in politics. To conclude, both theories argue that with the change of the political systems within states the international standards of world politics these days changed. The prioritizing of national goals damaged the international morality. Nationalism has become more important than universalism in a global and regional structure without a powerful international body to regulate the international affairs. Moreover, since the national goals are expressing the goals of the state leader, it is important to analyze the state leaders of the country. The theories even argue that by studying the state leaders actions their objective could be predicted. Therefore, the state leaders will be researched in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 2.1.3 Differences Since the two theories differ in many aspects, this paragraph will study the most important differences on the basis of ‘power' and the ‘assumed world pattern'. By
showing the differences, this study can later compare the explanatory power of the theories for the actions of China and India in Sri Lanka. By showing the difference between the two theories about power, one more similarity shows itself. Power plays a significant part in both theories. However, their perception of power in world politics differs dramatically. Morgenthau (1954: 26) defines power as ‘man's control over the minds and actions of other men. Morgenthau (1954) continues by defining political power. ‘The mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large' (Morghentau 1954: 26) is his definition in which psychological relations between two minds are the essence. Force is seen as physical violence and is not included in political power. According to Morgenthau (1954) physical violence, with war as its extremist form, is a substitution of the psychological relation between two minds. Physical violence will be used if the psychological relation is not strong enough to control another's mind and actions anymore. Organski (1958) adds to this definition that power is not a thing, but it is a part of a relationship. A powerful nation is not defined by its size of its population, not by its wealth, but by its ability to influence the behavior and actions of other nations in accordance with their own desire. According to Morgenthau (1954: 25), international politics are the constant struggle for power. Every political action can be seen as an action for power. An action can be presented by a state as one with an economical or social ideal, but will actually always still have power as its main aim. The nature of the constant struggle for power is the human nature itself. Morgenthau agrees with Hobbes' vision of the nature of human written in his major work ‘Leviathan' (Toledo 2005). They both argue that a man's feeling of insecurity is prevalent, and therefore people are seeking power to overcome this insecurity. So the power struggle of the states is coming from the result of human nature to always seek for power in a society full of insecurity and fear. Statesmen are assumed by realists to think and act in terms of interest, which is defined as power. Organski (1958) doesn't agree that all nations' main aim is to maximize their own power. In his opinion, nations have many different goals, and power is simply one of them. He criticizes the balance of power theory for arguing that every state, small or big, is just focused on maximizing their power. This assumes that all the nations are in conflict with each other for the maximization of power. Organski (1958: 63) argues this is an oversimplification of the reality. He divides national goals into four categories: power, wealth, cultural welfare, and peace. Having a wealth goal doesn't mean the other goals are excluded. Moreover, he argues that one goal is sometimes necessary to achieve another goal. For example, wealth may bring power, and power may bring peace. However, he continues by distinguishing competitive goals and absolute goals of a nation. In this regard, the national power goals are competitive, because these goals have only a relative meaning. Organski (1958: 63) gives the preservation of the national culture as an absolute goal. The other major difference in both theories is about the assumed world pattern. The balance of power theory is assuming an anarchistic world pattern, in which there is no leading country. According to Morgenthau (1954), two factors are at the basis of the international society: multiplicity and the antagonism between the nations. He continues by saying that these two factors cause two different patterns that balance the power in the world.
Morgenthau (1954: 160) calls the first one ‘the pattern of direct opposition'. In this pattern, the desire of a nation to prevail its policies over another nation is forming the balance. Nation ‘X' can, for example, try to increase its power in relation to nation ‘Y' to such an extent that nation X can control the decisions of nation Y. Nation Y, furthermore, will increase its power to resist the attempt of nation X, and even try to extent its power over nation X. These reactions of both nation X and Y will keep the balance. However, in the study in this thesis the battle for political power is happening in a third country (Sri Lanka), in the next example called country ‘Z'. Morgenthau (1954) now argues that if nation X pursues an imperialistic policy over nation Z. Nation Y will also react to this because nation Z is now a goal of the imperialistic policy of nation X. The reaction can be the result of the desire of nation Y to have the control over nation Z itself or to preserve the status quo. It is the pattern of the continuation of opposing forces. The increase of power of one state makes the other state also grow in power due to the necessary resistance. This will go back and forth between the countries until both nations change their imperialistic policies or one nation believes to have an advantage over the other country, which will result in a surrender of the weaker nation or a war to balance the power game. Furthermore, Morgenthau (1954) argues that the unstable and dynamic balance in his model is naturally and always there. In his second pattern, the pattern of competition, the mechanics are exactly the same. This pattern basically shows that the weaker nation Z is protected by nation Y to maintain its independence. Morgenthau (1954) calls country Y in this example the ‘status quo country'. However, Morgenthau argues in this pattern that the independence of country Z, in the example above, is a mere function of the power relations existing between X and Y. Moreover, Morgenthau (1954: 164) continues by arguing that all small nations have always owed their independency either to the balance of power, or the protection of another greater country, or the lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations. In this pattern, Morgenthau also introduces the ‘buffer states'. These are weak states that are located close to powerful states and serving their military security (Morgenthau 1954). Korea, as a country Z, is used as a concrete example in the past. Japan was the imperialistic country (country X) and would try to set foot on Korea. However, it was China, as the status quo country, that tried to keep Korea independent. In other words, this theory shows that alliances will be made to prevent that one country will be the hegemonic power in the area. Organksi (1958) doesn’t believe that such a ‘status quo country’ or ‘balancer’ exists. Organski (1958) argues that there has never been a country, and never will be, that has maintaining the balance as the main goal in its foreign policy. In his theory, the world or region has a hierarchy with one leading country as can be seen in figure 1. The power is divided over the countries, and every country recognizes the power of another country. The leading country will create an international/regional order in which every nation gets a place. Moreover, Organksi (1958: 299) says that a nation selects its friends on the basis of its own interest. A satisfied country will support the order, and therefore automatically the countries that also support the current order. States that insist on another rivalry order will be opposed. However, Organski’s (1958) argues that even in the diplomatic relations patterns can be found, every state knows what kind of behavior can be expected from other nations and which state is supporting which state. Some countries are leading some areas and trade is only being transported via agreed and
familiar trades. Organski’s (1958) assumed world pattern is full of stable patterns and ties within a hierarchy from a dominant nation to the small powers. Figure 1: The power transition pyramid (Source: https://www.slideshare.net/yovianney/kugleer1-presentation) Satisfaction is another important factor in Organski’s (1958) power transition theory. According to Organski (1958) peace is threatened when a dissatisfied rising power is powerful enough to try to change the existing order. Morgenthau (1954) and Organski (1958) are not agreeing on the best situation for peace. Whereas Morgenthau (1954) argues that the balance of power is the best situation for peace, Organski (1958) counters that especially those situations are the scenarios for war. Organski (1954) continues by mentioning that the greatest wars in world history started when a challenger nearly balanced the power of the leading country or at least thought to have the same power. In Organski’s theory a situation with the highest chance for peace is one with a stable leading power. For example, the English and French preponderance from 1815 to 1914 was a century with peace (Organski 1958: 299). Morgenthau (1954), however, said that the key to peace is with the holder of the balance. Recent scholars and analyzers (See: Yang 2013 & Mullen and Poplin 2015) on this subject argue that the theories are too dated. They argue that there will be no war between India and China and that only soft power diplomacy will be used. Coming to a conclusion, both theories do not share the view on power in world politics. Morgenthau (1953) sees every political move as an attempt for more power. Organski (1958), on the contrary, argues that states have more goals than only gaining more power. Moreover, the behavior of states in the theory of Morgenthau (1953) is based on an anarchistic world pattern, while Organski (1958) argues it to be a hierarchical world pattern. In the former, the power is balanced between states and in the latter one state dominates the regional order and every state knows its place in that order. As a result Morgenthau (1953), on the one hand, sees a situation with a country becoming too powerful as a threatening situation. On the other hand, Organski (1958) argues that a situation with one dominant state is the ideal situation.
2.2 The extended alliances theories Since both Morgenthau (1954) and Organski (1958) do not analyze external links of a state thoroughly in their theories, this paragraph will introduce two extended theories on alliances. It will present the alliance theory of Snyder (1990) followed by the alliance theory of Kim (1991) to gain more knowledge about the process of alliance forming. Before this thesis will introduce the alliance theory of Snyder (1990) it has to be clear what is meant by alliance(s). Snyder (1990: 104) defines an alliance as a formal association for the use or non-use of military force intended for either security or accumulation of their members against other states. Wolfers (1968) defines an alliance as a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states. However, Snyder (1990) makes an important division between alliance and alignment in his work ‘Alliance theory: a neorealist first cut’. He mentions that alliances are only the formal subset of alignment. Alignment is the broader and more basic phenomenon. Snyder (1990) argues that alignment is the set of mutual expectation between two or more states that they will have each other support in disputes or wars with other states or alignments. These expectations are commonly the result of the same interest of two or more states. Since the difference between alliance and alignment is only the formal (or informal) setting, both terms will be treated equally in this thesis. Moreover, does Snyder (1990) make a distinction between ‘peacetime alliances' and ‘war alliances’. War alliances are made during war and are sometimes called coalitions. This thesis will only focus on the peace alliances for two reasons. First, the area, Indo-Pacific region, being researched is not an area with a war between India and China at the moment. Second, Snyder (1990) argues that the war alliances lack many of the political functions. As could be seen in 2.1.2 Morgenthau (1954) takes alliances short in account in his theory. The paragraph showed that Morgenthau (1954) argues that alliances will be made when there is a threat of one country becoming a hegemonic power, or a smaller country’s independence is threatened by a bigger power. However, Snyder’s (1990) theory will be included in this thesis to get more depth in the theory of alliances. Looking at the ‘Indo-Pacific power game' two countries, China and India, are playing a part. This thesis leaves the US out of consideration because the study only focuses on the regional rivalry. Therefore, this thesis will look at the alliance theory of Snyder (1990) in a bipolar system. Snyder (1990) argues that in a bipolar system the two big countries will not ally with each other because there is no third country to threaten them both at the same time. For that reason, the two countries will seek to align with the lesser states around the own country. Alignments are playing a bigger role in bipolar systems because the smaller states are confident that one of the two bigger states will defend them when the other will attack. There is less need for formal alliance than in a multipolar system. This bipolar system gives the other states, other than China and India, more power. It's called the abandonment factor in the ‘alliance security dilemma’ (Snyder 1990: 113). It is the fear of the fellow allies that one of the allies will leave, and even realign. On the one hand, smaller states can use this threat for realignment to get more aid. On the other hand, China and India can use the flexibility to break up the other alliance, which will eventually make it weaker. Moreover, greater powers can use aid and sales programmes to make the smaller states more dependent, and exchange these programmes for more influence in the political choices of the country.
Organski (1958) argues in his power transition theory that alliances will have no effect in the power transition. On the contrary, Kim (1991) argues that alliances are a clear alternative for internal economical and political development to gain more power. He even continues by arguing that it is not the power of the states itself that causes a power transition period, but the equal power of the alliances is a determining factor. The rising challenger's alliance power and the dominant state's alliance are the real instruments to measure the power. The most stable period, therefore, is one in which the dominant power alliance is significantly bigger and better than the alliance of the challenger. This is a revision of the original power transition theory in which Organski (1958) only saw the augmentation of power through internal development. Comparing both alliances theories with each other results in the following conclusions. Both alliance theories show that alliances are made when there is a feeling of threat or mutual interest. Snyder (1990) argues in his theory that China and India will not realign with each other, but will establish ties with the other countries in the region. Moreover, in the bipolar system it is easier to weaken the alliances of the other because the other countries are more flexible. Kim (1991) shows that the forming of alliances is also a form of gaining power. Therefore, not only the state should be reviewed to analyze its power but also his alliance. 2.3 The different Powers In both theories the terms great, regional, middle, and small power are regularly used. However, both Morgenthau (1954) and Organski (1958) fail in defining great, regional, middle, and small powers. This paragraph will, therefore, use other academic literature to define the four concepts. The definitions of the powers can contribute to the explanation of the behavior of the states that will be studied in this thesis. It will start by defining great power. Then it will continue with regional and middle powers. The paragraph ends with defining small powers. 2.3.3 Great Powers Nolte (2010) starts by saying that there is a lack of instruments to differentiate great, middle, and small powers from each other. Levy (1983) wrote in his book ‘War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975’ that scholars in the past took the concept of great powers for granted, and did little to no effort to define it. The scholars that tried to define it have mainly used military strength to define it (see: Taylor 1954 & Modelski 1978). However, without doing it on purpose it was already at the Congress of Vienna that great powers were distinguished by giving them other responsibilities (Levy 1983). These days the great powers are still the dominant actors in the international politics, and particularly in the security governance. According to Giplin (1983), great powers are establishing and enforcing the basic rules and rights that influence their own behavior and that of smaller states. However, Levy (1983) continues by saying that it is problematic to define the concept of great power, because of its wide variety of factors ranging from military strength to national morale. This thesis will use both Levy (1983) and Giplin (1983) to form a concept for great power. The concept of great power in this thesis will be: ‘great powers are states that are playing a major role in international
politics, and thereby establishing and enforcing the rules and rights, particularly in security-related issues.’ Mead and Keely (2017) wrote an article for the ‘the American interest’ in which they argue the eight great powers of 2017. In this article it is still the US in the first place, followed by China and Japan both on the second place. The others countries are Germany, Russia, Israel, India, and Iran. India takes the sixth place in this ranking. However, giving a country a label remains an arguable point. Miller (2013) for example argues that India is not a great power, because of a lack of vision on how to become a real strong global power in the future. China, on the contrary, has been seen as the foremost threat to the US (See: Lim 2015). 2.3.2 Middle Powers and Regional Powers In the existing literature it is sometimes hard to have a clear division between middle powers and regional power (Nolte 2007). Yalcin (2012) adds that middle power is probably one of the most controversial definitions in the study of foreign affairs. Therefore, this paragraph will try to define and distinguish both terms. The middle is relative, and to define middle people need greater and smaller states (Yalcin 2012). It is not possible to define middle without the boundaries of small and great states. An example of this is given in the definition of Holbraad (1971). He identifies middle power as a state much stronger than smaller states and significantly weaker than the greater states. This definition remains too vague and basically comes down to all the countries that are left are middle powers. However, there is another approach to define middle powers. Evans and Grant (1991) and Neack (2013) are both using the behavior of states to define middle powers. They call it ‘niche diplomacy’. This niche diplomacy is best described by Evans and Grant (1991: 19) as: ‘the tendency of middle powers to embrace multilateral solutions to international problems, and to embrace notions of good international citizenship to guide middle power’s diplomacy. Neack (2013), moreover, argues that middle powers define themselves as coalition builders, the mediators and the peacekeepers of the world. The term ‘middle power is a self-identification used by countries as Canada, Denmark, and The Netherlands. Spero (2009) adds that middle powers are still playing a pivotal role in the current world system that is dominated by great powers. The reason he gives for the importance of the middle powers is their affect on the regional security dilemma. In other words, middle powers exert their influence by foreign policy alignment with great powers. This theory of Spero (2009) offers an alternative theory in which middle-states are not only used by greater states as buffer states but as states that can reduce the regional security dilemma. Spero (2009) calls it the ‘other-help theory' instead of the older ‘self-help alignment theory'. In the older self-help theory alignments were made to balance or to bandwagon (see: Walt 1987). In this alternative theory, middle powers can also align to reduce the regional security dilemma. Middle powers are aligning with each other to secure the region against any threat. For example when the Soviet Bloc collapsed it was Poland that tried to align with countries for cooperation instead of just conflict and competition.
Spero (2009) shows a theory in which middle power can do ‘regional bridging'. Does this make a middle power automatically a regional power? Nolte (2012: 889) gives four factors that make a state a regional power. The first one is it must be a state that is geographically part of a delineated region. Nolte (2012) continues by saying that it has to be a state that is powerful enough to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region and being highly influential in the disputes and affairs in the regions. The last criteria, however, makes the important distinction between a regional power and a middle power. A regional power, according to Nolte's (2012) fourth criteria, can be a great power on the global scale. This is not the case for a middle power, which does not play a significant role on the global scale. 2.3.3 Small Powers The last powers to be defined are the ones at the bottom of the pyramid. Rothstein (1968) defines small powers by their reliability on great powers. He argues that a small state can't provide it's own security, and is, therefore, relying on the help of other states. Keohane (1969) adds that a small state has leaders that know they need leaders of other states because acting on their own will not bring them far. Contrary to the great powers that can influence the system, the small powers can only adapt to it. Now the term of small power is briefly defined this paper will now turn to the possible roles for small power in international politics. Sweijs (2010) is arguing that the role of small powers is arguable in both positive and negative way. He argues that a great number of small powers in an area causes a greater polarization. Smaller states will align with a great power quickly to secure their safety. It will result in two opposing blocs in which the smaller allies will support one of the two greater powers. However, the security dilemma is smaller with small powers. A small power that will leave an alliance has less affect than a middle power leaving an alliance. Although a small power has not much effect on the power of the alliance, some small powers are important for great powers to stay aligned with them. Some small powers will experience high rivalry because of its political, strategic or economical value (Sweijs 2010). He, therefore, argues that small states are important in the system of world politics. However, great powers will leave small states alone if that's to their advantage, and only if the other great powers are not having the intention either.
2.4 Conclusion This chapter will conclude by providing expectations based on the reviewed literature. These expectations provide a clear overview of the theory. However, the expectations do not have to count for the situation studied in this thesis. In their attempt to explain the behavior of states in the world politics the theories share two assumptions. The mutual assumptions are: - States, the key players, are acting without moral restraints in world politics. - The national goals are prioritized above the universal goals. - State leaders act rationally and their objectives can therefore be predicted by analyzing their actions in the past. Both theories, however, have more points of disagreement. The major differences were to find in the views on power and the assumed world pattern. Moreover, the extended alliance theories have a different meaning in both theories. Based on the theory of Morgenthau (1954) and the extended alliance theories these are the expectations for the rest of this study: - States are operating in an anarchical world/regional pattern in which no state is dominant. The power is divided over several states. - Every action of a state has the aim to gain more power - Allinaces are made when there is a threat of one country becoming a hegemonic power in the area. The alliance has the purpose of balancing the power. The power transition theory of Organski (1958) and extended alliance theories provide a different point of view on the behavior of stated in world politics. The expectations of this theory results therefore in the following expectations: - States are operating in a hierarchical world/regional pattern in which one stated is the dominant state. This state sets the rules in the area. - The aims of actions of states can be divided in wealth, power, cultural welfare and peace. - Alliances are made to gain power to overtake the dominant state or to resist the rise of a challenger. The last expectations will be drawn from the division of states. In the theory states are divided in great power, middle powers, regional powers, and small powers. The expectations for the different power are: - Great powers are playing a major role on the global scale and thereby try to establish and enforce certain rules and rights. These rules and rights can mainly be seen in the security field. - Middle powers are trying to stabilize the international affairs. They are performing the so-called ‘niche diplomacy’. - Regional powers are powerful enough to stand against a coalition of other states in the area. Moreover, they are influential in the regional affairs. - Smaller powers can’t provide their own security and therefore depends on great powers. They can only adapt to the system and have no influence on the system.
Chapter 3: Methodology
This chapter will give a brief overview of the methodology used in this thesis. First the research approach and design will be discussed. Then it will explain and justify the method of data collection. 3.1 Research design and approach This study has been done according to the Process Tracing theory used in the field of International Relations (Bennet & Elman 2009). The Process Tracing in this thesis involves a deductive study of the role of Sri Lanka in the geopolitical strategies of China and India. The theories used in this thesis are explained in the theoretical framework. The case study will be based on a literature study and can, therefore, evaluate the existing theory. Moreover, this thesis can use the case study to propose alternate explanations to the existing theory. By using a case study this thesis can do a more detailed and intensive analyses on the role of Sri Lanka (Bryman 2012). So the deductive Process Tracing design in this study can analyze whether the theories in the theoretical framework are an accurate explanation of the case (Bennet &Elman 2009). Crasnow (2017) adds that with this research the mechanisms in the existed theories can be tested. The mechanisms are in force between the cause and its effect. Therefore, this design can be helpful in explaining the causes and effects of the behavior and actions of states researched in this thesis. The generalizability, however, is low with a case study because it is uncertain that the situation at one place, in this thesis Sri Lanka, can also explain the situation at another place, for example Myanmar. Though Eckstein (2000) argues that the use of case studies is the best research design when political phenomena are being studied on a macro level. Moreover, the case in this thesis would be an exemplifying case (Bryman 2012). The role of Sri Lanka will not be precisely the same for other countries with the same power as Sri Lanka but will provide a certain context that is suitable for other countries comparable with Sri Lanka. 3.2 Method The data in this thesis is purely gathered from existing literature. In order to gain the profound knowledge about the topic and an overview of the current state of the affairs a literature study has been undertaken. Therefore, scientific journals, press releases, newspaper articles, and the publications of research institutions have been viewed. This method of data collection has been chosen due to high financial costs of doing fieldwork in the area. The academic literature is used to find and analyze theories about the geopolitical strategies in world politics. Newspapers are useful to analyze for the most recent activities and actions of India and China in Sri Lanka. However, working with newspaper articles carries a risk with it. A researcher has to consider the reliability of the source. The Indian and Chinese newspapers are possibly providing a biased media coverage of the situation that is being studied in this thesis. When a researcher ignores to consider the source of the article, it can result in false arguments. Therefore, the use ofnewspaper articles is limited in this thesis. Most of the information is coming from academic journals, academic literature and publications of research institutions. Moreover, this thesis will try to find a balance between the articles used in this thesis. It will balance and try to get an unbiased coverage of the situation by including newspaper articles of external countries as the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Despite the potential bias of articles coming from the countries researched in this thesis they can also add value to the research. First, it shows how the media is covering the situation in the countries and how they are presenting the consequences to their readers. Second, the domestic media has sometimes more access to key persons. Therefore, they can provide this thesis with citations of important people of the governments. By using both the existing academic literature and the newspapers articles it is possible to analyze if the recent activities and actions fit in the theories written in the academic literature. Adding official government releases in the research will give an image of the countries own motives and goals behind the actions.
Chapter 4: The geopolitical strategies of China and India
To make music artists need instruments, to exert power a state need instruments. This metaphor shows the importance of instruments, without the instruments an artist can’t make music and a state can’t exert its power. Organski (1958: 112) argues that there are four instruments of exercising power: persuasion, rewards, punishments, and force. Spero (2009) is mentioning diplomacy, neutrality, appeasement, collective security, arms build- ing, and alliance formation, or aggression and even conflict leading to war as ways to exert power. Scott (2008) is less specific about the possibilities to exert power. Scott (2008) gives three fields how states can exert their power beyond their own borders. The military-security field, the diplomatic field, and the economic field are his three categories of how states influence the world politics. Moreover, the US Defense Department (2016: 1) wrote in its annual report to Congress that China's leaders seek to leverage their military, diplomacy, and economical clout to advance its ambitions to establish regional preeminence and to be more influential internationally. Since the categories of Scott (2008) and the US Defense Department (2016) are broader, and therefore give this research more possibilities, this paragraph will work with these three categories to analyze how India and China are trying to increase their geopolitical power in the area and their main motivation behind it. This chapter will start with the military-security field. Later the diplomatic field and economical field will be analyzed. The chapter will finish with a brief conclusion 4.1 Military-security War, as the ultimate form of physical violence, has been described earlier as a substitution of the psychological element of political power. This thesis, however, will take the military-security field in consideration for the next reasons. First of all, the military-security strategies and actions have been non-violent so far (Markey 2015). Yang (2013), moreover, argues not to expect a violent power transition in Asia in the future. The military actions have more been a way to secure the stability in the region so far. Secondly, this military-security field shows a good example of how China and India are geographically competing with each other in the area. Therefore this paragraph will not focus on the increase of the military strength but on the geographical strategic used. Leaving this field out wouldn’t give the overall picture of the New Great Game in the Indo-Pacific region with all its factors. According to Scott (2008), both states are increasing their military strength by deploying it more widely according to strategic effectiveness. China and India find themselves in a classic security dilemma these days (Malik 2012). Both countries are defining the actions of the other country as a hegemonic pursuing action. Burgess (2015) adds that China and India feel like the other country is not respecting the status quo and try to undermine the other’s strategic position. Malik (2012), furthermore, states that both countries are not accepting the other’s power in the region. China is not accepting to view South-Asia and the Indian Ocean under Indian sphere, and India doesn’t accept China as the regional power in the Southeast and East Asia. Scott (2008) argues that as a result of the relation, mainly built on mistrust, between India and China both countries are geopolitically encircling each other.Colonel Gurmeet Kanwall (1999) wrote in the last year of the 20th century that China made effort in the last few years to create a ring of anti-India countries around India through military, among economic and diplomatic, programmes in for example Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Since China was supplying these countries with defense material, they became more dependent on China. This dependency gave China a strategic advantage over India in what was supposed to be India’s region. According to Scott (2006) the Indian government sees the Indian Ocean as India’s ocean. However, particularly the supply of Pakistan, India biggest rival in South Asia, was seen as a threat for India (Rehman 2009). Tkacik (2011) describes Pakistan, in a Congressional Testimony, as China’s biggest strategic ally to reach the Indian Ocean. They made the alliance formal on the 5th of April in 2005 by signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly-relations (Rajan 2006). Rajan (2006) continues by mentioning the rejection of India's request for a Treaty of Peace, Security, and Friendship by Pakistan. China found in Pakistan a strong ally for its strategy to counter India in its area. With the support of China, Pakistan can now stand up to India, and more important counter the preeminence of India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. ‘China’s strategy is to divert India’s attention from East Asia and to prevent it from reaching out beyond South Asia, by keeping it focused on the western front, and by using Pakistan as a form of “proxy deterrent” against India in its own backyard.’ (Rehman 2009) Besides the dependency on the defense supplies, the encircle strategy of China has been increased by developing ports with possible naval access facilities in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, and some in Myanmar (Colonel Sokinda 2015). However, both countries have so far been cautious with the naval presence in each other’s spheres, and China disregarded Pakistan’s offer to build a naval base in its country (Brewster 2014). Adding to that, Malik (2012) says that the smaller countries around India are having a positive view on the rise of China, and the countries around China sharing a positive opinion about the rise of India. This would balance the power in the area between India and China. Moreover, it would serve both countries to encircle the other. India started responding to the increasing Chinese influence in South Asia and tried to copy China's strategy in East Asia. However, both governments deny any encircling strategy (Scott 2008). According to Rehman (2009) India is focused on deepening the military ties with countries that don’t accept China’s dominancy in the region as for example Vietnam and Mongolia. Whereas China could profit from the reputation of ‘regional bully’ of India in South Asia, India can profit from the same reputation through the disputes of China with countries in the South China Sea. Rehman (2009) continues by mentioning that Singapore and Philippines, which have always been good allies to the US, are now supporters of the Indian counterweight. In 2006 India signed a Strategic and Global Partnership with Japan. This agreement was followed by the Roadmap for New Dimension to the strategic and global partnership between Japan and India. In this later agreement was written that a strong and prosperous India was in the interest of Japan, and the other way around (Joshi 2013). India, moreover, has been helping Vietnam to increase its naval power, and resist the Chinese supremacy in the Chinese South Sea (Rehman 2009). India has shown to be
willing to sell Vietnam Brahmos Cruise Missiles. If this deal goes through, Rehman (2009) argues that Vietnam will be a serious threat to China's naval dominance in the South China Sea. It is clear that in this field both countries are acting according to the expression ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Although both governments are denying any encircling strategies, it is obvious that both countries are strengthening ties with countries that are wary about the Chinese or India's dominance in respectively East Asia and South Asia. China tries to keep India busy by strengthening particularly with Pakistan in South Asia, and India has Japan and Vietnam to counterweight China in East Asia. The alliances, researched in this paragraph, are made out of a mutual feeling of threat and same interests. 4.2 The diplomatic field The diplomatic field is built with the regional organizations across Asia. According to Rehman (2009) the special thing about this Great Game between India and China is the competition in and through organizations. This paragraph will have a look at the organizations in Asia to show their diplomatic battle for power. Later, it will finish by looking at the foreign policies adopted by the most recent leaders Xi Jinping and Modi. 4.2.1 Diplomatic battles in the Asian Organizations ‘SAARC Membership: India blocks China’s entry for the time being’ (The Economic Times, 2014), ‘China's SAARC foray aimed to contain India (The Sunday Guardian), ‘Pakistan seeks bigger SAARC to counter India's influence (DAWN, 2016) are three headlines that briefly summarize the story showed in the media of the battle between India and China, with Pakistan, in SAARC. SAARC, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, was established on 8 December 1985 and had Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as its members (SAARC). However, in 2005 Pakistan used the request of India to include Afghanistan to give China observer status in SAARC (Scott 2008). India's first reaction was to refuse the option of giving China observer status, but had to accept it later. India found another way to lessen the effect of China in SAARC by successfully allowing Japan, and eventually the US, observer status as well (Lanteigne 2009). By giving Japan and the US the observer-status it prevented China from becoming to dominant in SAARC. The same situation could be seen with India and SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India has needed five years, 2009-2014, to enter the SCO (The Diplomat, 2016). China had been reluctant to India's membership and used several obstacles to prevent India from entering the SCO. The SCO is an organization with six members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India, however, will become a full member at the next summit in 2017. The only surprising fact is, or arguably unsurprising, is the other member gaining full membership: Pakistan (Fedorov 2016). Fedorov (2016), a Russian analyst, expresses his fear that both countries will use the SCO and SAARC as platforms to attack each other, while indeed the organizations are established for regional security. He even continues by saying that some people view the
request for full membership of India as the prevention of Pakistan turning it into an ‘anti-India' organization. On the contrary, The Global Times (2017) wrote an article in which it argues that the entry of India and Pakistan will give a boost to regional stability. The ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations, is another platform in which China and India are battling each other. The focus on the ASEAN organization was for India part of its ‘Look East’ policy, which was launched in 1991 (Haokip 2011). Haokip (2011) argues moreover that the Look East policy of India was based on the recognition of the strategy focused on the rise of China and economic importance of Southeast Asia to India's national interest. Scott (2008) adds that his review of the Look East policy as part of India's total foreign policy shows that one of the most important goals behind the policy was to balance China's power in South East Asia. China, however, felt the counter presence of India and Chinese diplomats have been lobbying in the Southeast Asia countries in 2005 to prevent the participation of India at the East Asia Summit (Rehman 2009). The countries refused to cooperate with China's idea, but China didn't give up. China pushed the idea to institutionalize two blocs within the ASEAN organization forward. As result, it created ASEAN and ASEAN+3, and thereby sidelined India, Australia and New Zealand (Rehman 2009). In this way, China made sure that India could only play a limited role in ASEAN. The three examples above are only part of all the examples. Scott (2008) shows some more examples in his article. One of his other examples is the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program, set up in 1992, to bring together China, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. India was left outside this cooperation. On the contrary a few years later the Mekong Ganga Cooperation was set up and gave place to India and five South East Asian countries, but China had not received any invitation. The organizations in Asia, set up for cooperation, have indeed become the battleground for India and China to get an advantage over the other by limiting the other’s influence in the organizations. 4.2.2 The latest foreign policy under Modi and Xi Jinping The two current leaders of China and India are just recently performing their tasks as leaders. Xi Jinping became the president of China in 2013 (BBC 2013), and Modi became prime minister just a year later (BBC 2015). However, both leaders changed the foreign policy the last two years in a significant way in the diplomatic field. These recent developments are important to analyze how the current situation of the New Great Game is. ‘We do not choose our neighbors; we have to learn to live with them’ (Muni 2003) According to Chang-Liao (2016) Xi Jinping changed the main theme of Chinese diplomacy. He argues that the main theme changed from passive external diplomacy to one based on one that strives for achievements. At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Xi Jinping promoted neighborhood diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2014). Xi Jinping emphasized the need to promote friendships
and partnership with China’s neighbors to turn China into a community of common destiny. The focus on the relations with great powers has changed to focus on the relations with its neighbors (Godbole 2015). Goldbole (2015) moreover explains this change to the Asian neighboring countries by mentioning that Asia will be the driver of the world economy. This was completely different from the foreign policy of the former Chinese Presidents, which was based on hiding China's power and waiting for the right time. Zhang (2015) adds that the new foreign policy is still aimed at the rise of China to become the leading great power in the world. However, he continues by mentioning that under Xi Jinping a peaceful external environment has become a fundamental factor for the rise of China. Burgman (The Diplomat, 2016) agrees with Zhang about the focus on the neighbors, but emphasizes the global goal behind it. This new foreign policy is mainly aimed at replacing the US as the strategically important security partner of China's Asian neighbors. Xi Jinping wants to create a security framework with Asian characteristics. In this way, China's regional diplomacy has actually a more global goal. Xi Jinping’s colleague in India, Modi, became prime minister one year after Xi Jinping. Godbole (2015) argues that the agendas and actions of both leaders overlap. Modi’s foreign policy is termed the ‘Neighborhood first policy' (See: Business Standard 2017 & The Hindu 2016). Prime Minister Modi invited all heads of the South Asian states to join his inauguration as symbol to express his foreign policy (Pal 2016). Bhutan was Modi’s first destination to visit after his inauguration, and later he visited Nepal and Sri Lanka. Godbole (2015), however, mentions that all Modi’s visits to neighboring countries have a Chinese element. The Bhutan-China relation was developing in a bad way after another border dispute, Nepal, on the contrary, was becoming closer to China, and Sri Lanka was just before for the first time visited by a Chinese President. Das (2016) argues that India previously failed to create a relationship with its neighbors to see India as a powerful trustworthy friend, indeed India gave the countries the impression that it was seeking power to rise at the cost of all others in the neighborhood. At the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly Modi said cooperation and friendship with the direct neighbors have the government's highest priority right now, because a nation's destiny is linked to its neighborhood (United Nations 2014). Both Modi and Xi Jinping have changed the focus of the foreign policy to one that is more focused on the neighborhood. However, whereas China has still a global goal with it, India goals look to focus more on South Asia and the Indian Ocean. 4.3 Economic Field The economic field differs from the other categories in the way that in this field the competition is accompanied by the need of each other for economic wealth. This paragraph will show the two sides of the India and China relation in the economic field. This paragraph will cover the ‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR) and the ‘maritime silk road initiative’ of China. This paragraph will not consider whether the plan is realizable, but will use the economical plans to complement China’s and India’s future aspirations and anxieties towards each other.
From 1903 till 1940 Germany was planning on realizing the ‘Bagdhad railway’ (McMeekin 2010). According to Brewster (2016), it was the British press that started the idea that Germany was not economically orientated, but used the railway to expand Germany’s influence and challenge the British supremacy in what is currently India. These days that India is raising the alarm about the Chinese initiatives that are supposed to be economically. In the article of Pitlo and Karambelkar (2015) can be seen that the Indian media is anxious about the plan being more than just economic. The players changed, but the situation is comparable. However, the ‘belt and road’ strategy will be analyzed in this economic paragraph, because there is no hard evidence that China is using it to extend its influence in the area. The ‘one belt, one road’ is China’s newest economic initiative to connect China over land and water with Europe and Africa. Nalbantoglu (2017) argues that unsustainability of China’s current economic model, environmental problems, and an increasing energy demand are the main initiatives for the new strategy. However, as can be seen in figure 2, the maritime way is going through the Indian Ocean and is encircling India. India is hesitating to participate in the ‘one belt one road’ plan. Hu (2017) blames the war with China in 1962 for the sensitivity of the Indian policy makers. This past makes the Indian people wary about joining the OBOR initiative. Hu (2017:115) continues by setting out India’s fear in three areas. First, India worries that OBOR will give room to China to influence the own country and its sphere of influence. Second, it would help China to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean. The third, and last, area is based on the geopolitical competition between India and China. India feels a possible realizing of OBOR as a victory for China in their competition. On the contrary, Raghavan (Hindustan Times, 2017) argues in the Indian media that India must join the OBOR to stay in the game. The Indian government has refused to participate in the two-day forum about the OBOR. However, China is in the economic field a supporter of the participation of India, because an important part of the OBOR passes through Kashmir (Hindustan Times, 2017). This area is claimed by India, and could therefore without India become a struggle to include in the plans. However, China is trying to connect the Asian countries with each other and with Europe. India is a booming economy, and could actually profit by being also connected. Hu (2015) adds that the participation of India would create more employment opportunities for the Indian population. Figure 2: The ‘one road, one belt’ initiative of China (Source: Hu 2015)
India is considering the pros and cons of the OBOR initiative. So far India has been reluctant about the OBOR initiative because of the increased power and influence it would give China in India’s area. India though could also profit by joining the OBOR and accelerate its economic rise. 4.4 Conclusion Based on the literature examined in this chapter it can be argued that India and China are trying to contain the power of the other in the region. In the military-security field both countries reached out to the neighboring countries of the other. China found in Pakistan a strong ally to contain India in South Asia and India had with Japan and Vietnam a counter alliance in China’s sphere of influence. Some scholars and media termed these strategies as the ‘encirclement strategies’. Both countries, however, denied such strategies. Moreover, China and India used the organizations that were meant for cooperation as another platform to sideline the other. SAARC, SCO and ASEAN are used to limit the political power of the other. This diplomatic climate though changed under Modi and Xi Jinping. The foreign policy under the two latest leaders is more focused on its own area. The own neighborhood became a focus point in the diplomatic relations of India and China. These neighborhood policies, however, has two different goals and motivation behind it. Whereas China launched their neighborhood policy with a global goal behind it, India has a regional goal to remain the regional power in South Asian and the Indian Ocean. In the economic field, moreover, China launched the OBOR initiative to link Asia with other parts of the world. This field showed again the global aspirations of China and the fear of India. India has been reluctant so far because of the additional spread of China’s power into its own sphere of influence. Modi prioritizes India’s preeminence in South Asia over its economic prosperities on the global scale.
