The Effects of Collective Efficacy in Media Coverage about the
Refugee Crisis on EU Attitudes
Anna-Maria Leo 10915796
Master Thesis University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Communication Master’s Programme Communication Science
Dhr. Dr. Andreas R. T. Schuck June 24, 2016
Abstract
Despite its great potential, the concept of collective efficacy has received little attention in political communication research. Therefore, this experimental study investigates how collective efficacy of the European Union (EU) in media coverage influences citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. In order to examine conditioning factors and underlying dynamics, the study includes
European identity as a moderator and perceived gains of Europeanisation as a mediator of possible media effects. Moreover, this study distinguishes among different EU attitude dimensions as suggested in prior research. The sample consists of European participants (N = 201) who were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. The first condition included a news article that portrayed the EU as efficacious in solving the refugee crisis (n = 64), the second condition portrayed the EU as incapable of finding a solution (n = 65) and the third condition functioned as a control group (n = 72). The analysis reveals whether being exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal or a low EU-EU-efficacy media portrayal does not affect EU attitudes significantly; also not when considering individual levels of EU identity. The effect between EU-efficacy and EU attitudes is mediated by perceived gains of Europeanisation but only when considering individual levels of EU identity. Participants with low EU identity who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal see significantly more gains in Europeanisation which in turn leads to more positive EU attitudes. This subliminal effect of EU-efficacy shows the
potential of collective efficacy in EU attitude studies, especially in times of increasing opposition to the EU, and furthermore highlights the importance of future research.
The Effects of Collective Efficacy in Media Coverage about the Refugee Crisis on EU Attitudes
The political crises of the last decade have challenged the European Union (EU) in an unprecedented way. Just when the economic crisis seemed to be solved, the current refugee crisis arose. The unexpected high numbers of refugees seeking asylum from war and prosecution caught the political establishment by surprise and led to a fundamental crisis in the EU. Heated debates about national borders, European solidarity and risks of immigration followed
subsequently without finding a solution that was beneficial for all member states. This did not go unnoticed by the European public, and hence, this latest crisis led to a decrease in optimism about the EU’s future (Eurobarometer, 2015) and reinforced a shift to the political right with more Eurosceptic parties in many European parliaments (Pearce & Rousseau, 2016).
There are many explanations for shifts in EU support such as economic considerations (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014), fear of immigration (McLaren, 2002) or reinforcement of national identity (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). However, studies of the Euro crisis have shown that support for the EU in times of crisis is closely linked to the crisis’ impact in the home nation (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014). Hence, EU citizens would also only consider a solution for the crisis as successful when it does not affect their own nation negatively. According to prior research, the more citizens believe in the success of a collective actor, for example believing the EU can find a positive solution for all member states, the more citizens are willing to support a political system (e.g., Finkel & Muller, 1998). This notion is represented in the concept of collective efficacy, defined as the individual’s judgment of the collective actor’s chance of success. Studies found evidence that collective efficacy beliefs play a major role in political participation (Lee, 2006, 2010) which leads to the assumption that it might also be essential in
political support for the EU in crisis situation. The more citizens believe in the success of the EU in being capable of solving a crisis, the more they might support the EU. Moreover, as media is well known for its impact on political attitudes (e.g., Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), and EU attitudes specifically (e.g., Maier & Rittberger, 2008), one can assume that the way media portray the EU in a crisis plays a crucial role in how citizens evaluate the EU’s capabilities. Despite the potential for political attitude studies, collective efficacy is still under-examined in political communication research. Thus, this study aims to learn more about the effects of collective efficacy in media coverage on individual EU attitudes. Furthermore, it focuses on conditioning factors, e.g. EU identity, of such possible media effects as it is well researched that EU attitudes are closely connected to EU identity: The more people identify with the EU, the more they are supportive of closer European integration (e.g., Cinnirella, 1997; Verhaegen, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2014). As EU-efficacy as well as EU identity are community-related concepts, one can assume that EU-identity reinforces the effects of EU-efficacy beliefs on EU attitudes. Hence, the study follows up on the research question: To which extent does media portrayal of the EU’s efficacy in the refugee crisis affect Europeans’ attitudes considering pre-existing individual levels of EU identity?
Moreover, studies suggest that positive EU attitudes depend on underlying mechanisms such as utilitarian considerations: The more benefits Europeans see in the Europeanisation process, the more they support the EU (e.g., Mau, 2005). Citizens learn about politics, such as beneficial policies of the EU, mostly from the media. Furthermore, studies have shown that the way media frame the EU has a major impact on how beneficial the EU is perceived (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, & de Vreese, 2008). Therefore, one can assume that the perceived gains of Europeanisation affect the relationship between EU-efficacy
in the media on EU attitudes indirectly. Furthermore, Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde (2014) found that the more citizens identify with supranational communities, the more gains they see in integration processes. Hence, one can assume that the indirect effect of gains of Europeanisation is even reinforced by individual levels of EU identity. In order to examine whether there are underlying mechanisms and further conditional factors to the above described main effect, a second research question will be the focus of the present study: To which extent do the perceived gains of Europeanisation mediate the effects of media portrayal of EU-efficacy in the refugee crisis on positive EU attitudes considering individual levels of EU identity?
In order to answer these two research questions, I will first give a more detailed overview over previous findings which leads to a deduction of four hypotheses for the analysis. Then a detailed description of the conducted experimental research as well as the data collection will follow. The subsequent section presents the results of the conducted analysis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for future research.
Theoretical Framework The five dimensions of EU attitudes
From its beginning as a simple trade union with merely six member states, the EU expanded within five decades to a large-scale political unit (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Such fast and peaceful growth of a political entity is unique in world history, which makes the EU an area of research with much still to explore. So far, the process of European integration – meaning a closer political, economical and cultural cooperation between EU member states – has yielded the greatest challenge (Verhaegen et al., 2014) as it requires public support. Hence, with rising
numbers of referenda1 being held in member states about the EU’s future, research about causes
for EU support has become increasingly important (Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005).
It is often discussed what public support for the EU exactly stands for (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011). One very commonly used definition for political support is given by the political scientist Easton (1975) who distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. Whilst specific support describes support for a certain policy or political decision, diffuse support stands for fundamental support of a political system (Easton, 1975). Following that definition, public support for the EU rather implies fundamental support of the political system of the EU. Consequently, in this study we could consider EU support simply as diffuse support. However, nowadays, there is a notable decline in numbers of Europeans supporting the fundamentals of the EU which caused Euroscepticism to become a buzzword in the research field about EU attitudes (e.g., Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Meijers, 2015; Usherwood & Startin, 2013). “The term expresses doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general” (Hooghe & Marks, 2007, p. 120) and can be considered the counterpart of support for European integration (Wilde & Trenz, 2012). In prior years, EU support and Euroscepticism have often been used as broad umbrella terms with little empirical clarification of what exactly is implied when using them. This is why, Boomgaarden et al. (2011) suggest avoiding such broad terms and rather trying to understand EU attitudes in their unique dimensions. Hence, after analysing survey data collected through a representative sample in the Netherlands and based on empirical grounds, they recommend distinguishing between five EU attitude dimensions: (1) affection towards the EU (Affection); (2) performance of the EU (Performance); (3) EU identity; (4) strengthening of the EU (Strengthening); and (5) utilitarian support for the EU (Utilitarian
1 Alone since 2005, twelve referenda in eight different member states have been held about EU policies or treaties
Support). The single dimensions differ in their modes of support as well as in their objects of support. Whilst EU Identity and Affection are relating to community-directed support which can be considered as diffuse (affective/input-oriented) support; the other three dimensions are tapping a regime-directed support which can be considered specific (utilitarian/output-oriented) support2 (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). With regard to these suggestions, the present study will focus on these five dimensions of EU attitudes (further referred to as EU attitudes) instead of on diffuse EU support as proposed by Easton (1975). In the following, possible explanatory factors for EU attitudes in crisis situations will be examined.
EU-efficacy in the refugee crisis on EU attitudes
Over the last 20 years, individual support for European integration has changed
frequently (Van Ingelgom, 2014), what shows that EU attitudes are highly fluctuating. Braun and Tausendpfund (2014) found in their study about the effects of the Euro crisis on Europeans’ support for the EU that especially crisis situations can change EU attitudes rapidly. Although it is well researched that crises cause a decline in EU support (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014;
Rattinger & Steinbrecher, 2011), there is insufficient knowledge of what causes this shift to negativity. This is why one of the possible explanatory factor, collective efficacy, will be introduced and discussed in this section.
In the last decade, the EU has been hit deeply by political crises. Just when it seemed the worst of the Euro crisis was overcome, the refugee crisis tapered. This latest crisis led to political division as there has been no unity amongst EU member states in dealing with the massive influx of refugees coming into Europe. Hence, 2015 was accompanied by continuous debates whether the EU is able to find a solution for the current refugee crisis for all member states or if member
2 It should be noted that affection towards the EU is a dimension that clusters in both, in community-directed as well
states should aim for national solutions. Whilst some EU-member states, such as Hungary, closed their borders in order to prevent refugees from entering the country (Watt, 2016), others, such as Greece or Italy, were completely overwhelmed by the massive influx and relying on help from the EU (Rankin, 2016). It does not come as a surprise that previous studies have found that in such times of crisis, nationalistic voices become louder and EU-support decreases. The high numbers of immigrants, caused by the refugee crisis, further play into the hands of radical Eurosceptic parties who often consider immigration as a crucial threat (Usherwood & Startin, 2013). Hence, one can assume that in the current refugee crisis, EU support is closely linked to whether European citizens consider the EU capable of solving the refugee crisis or not. In other words, when citizens believe that the EU is incapable of stopping the massive influx of
immigrants entering Europe, the risk of demarcation processes increases. Presently, it seems that such scepticism about the EU’s capability to solve this crisis is already deeply entrenched within the public as the results of the Eurobarometer 2015 suggest: Nearly half of the respondents consider the worst impact of the crisis is still to come (46%), more than half have a negative feeling regarding immigration from outside the EU (59%) and indicators for EU support, such as optimism for the EU’s future, have declined3 (Eurobarometer, 2015).
Europeans’ belief of the EU’s capability to solve the refugee crisis is closely related to the concept of collective efficacy. Political efficacy – in more general terms – is described as citizens’ perception whether their own political actions have an impact on political processes or not (Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954). There are two dominating notions in the research of political efficacy: internal and external efficacy beliefs. Whilst internal efficacy describes a
3 When asked whether being very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future
of the EU, only 53% respondents of the Eurobarometer survey autumn 2015 were stating to be positive about the future. This scale decreased by 5% compared to the results of the Eurobarometer in spring 2015 (Eurobarometer, 2015).
person’s perception of personal impact on an outcome, external efficacy depicts a person’s perception of the capabilities of an external actor, for instance a social group (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Finkel & Muller, 1998; Lee, 2006; Seligson, 1980). The third notion of efficacy, collective efficacy, is compared to internal and external efficacy a rather young research topic. In non-political terms, Bandura (1997) defined collective efficacy as “a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainments” (p. 477). Whilst the concept has been used in sociological research about group roles (e.g., Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006), it is mostly unexplored in the political field. Yet, in a study about political participation in Hong Kong, Lee (2006) found that collective efficacy is positively related to support for democratic processes. The more people believed that the
collective would be successful, the more they supported the democratic movement (Lee, 2006). However, in contrast to Bandura’s definition of collective efficacy, Lee (2006, 2010) argues that collective efficacy should be considered as an individual attribute rather than as a group attribute, for instance collective efficacy as an individually held belief about the capability of the EU solving the current refugee crisis. She criticises Bandura’s approach and stresses that groups do not share one single belief but consist of various individual beliefs about the group’s capability to achieve a certain goal especially in a large scale group (Lee, 2006, 2010) such as, in the context of the present study, the EU community. Lee argues that these “individual differences deserve our attention because of their potential attitudinal and behavioral consequences” (Lee, 2006, p. 299). Hence, in contrast to Bandura, she defines collective efficacy as the “individual’s judgment of the capabilities and power of the group” (Lee, 2010, p. 395). Although the approach of collective efficacy yields great potential for political attitudinal research, it has rarely been used in the political research field (with some exceptions; see e.g., Seligson, 1980). With regard
to Lee’s (2006) results, we can assume collective efficacy to be of great importance regarding the support for other democratic processes, such as EU integration. Consequently, collective efficacy of the EU is defined as Europeans’ individual perception of the EU’s capability to achieve a set goal (Lee, 2006, 2010; Seligson, 1980). The EU’s set goal in the current refugee crisis is to solve the situation for the benefit of all citizens and member states and the EU as such. Thus,
Europeans need to judge the EU’s capability to solve the crisis for their benefit. According to Lee’s (2006) findings in Hong Kong, we can assume that when judging the collective efficacy of the EU as high (high EU-efficacy), citizens would support the EU more, whilst when judging the collective efficacy of the EU as low (low EU-efficacy), support would decrease subsequently. In order to simplify the terminology of this study, the just described concept of collective efficacy of the EU will be simply referred to as EU-efficacy. In the following section, I will present media as an influencing factor on how citizens evaluate the capabilities of the EU to solve a crisis.
EU-efficacy in the media
The role of media in shaping public opinion is well studied (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Newton, 1999; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). However, there are different notions about the way media politically influence citizens. Some studies found positive effects of news coverage on political mobilisation and participation (e.g., Newton, 1999),
whereas others found that especially negative news could lead to demobilisation and cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996; Price et al., 1997). There are studies about the impact of political news coverage on EU attitudes, such as the effects of media frames on mobilisation (Schuck & de Vreese, 2012), the effects of media frames and media effects on public support for EU
the effects of negative media portrayal about the EU on threat perception of the EU (e.g., Hewstone, 1986). Yet, little is known how media coverage of a crisis situation influences EU attitudes and via what process. Recently, Cross and Ma (2015) examined three prominent crises of the previous decade as an attempt to understand how international media cover such crisis situations. They found that media tend to frame European crises as an existential threat, and thus, advocate that this reinforces scepticism towards EU integration and the entire European project (Cross & Ma, 2015). Hence, this suggests that certain ways of portraying a crisis in the media might affect citizens’ EU attitudes.
In the previous section, it was argued that in order to prevent a further shift to negativity in EU attitudes, it is important that citizens judge the EU as capable of solving a crisis for the benefit of all citizens and member states. Furthermore, prior research proposes that media has a main impact on public opinion, and hence, on how citizens perceive the EU as a political actor (e.g., Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Therefore, one can assume that the way media portray the EU as an actor in the refugee crisis has a major effect on how citizens evaluate the EU. When media portray the EU as capable of solving the refugee crisis (high EU-efficacy media portrayal) citizens should feel more positive towards the EU than when media portray the EU as incapable of solving the refugee crisis (low EU-efficacy media portrayal). Consequently, this leads to the first hypothesis of the present study:
H1 Participants exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will show more positive EU attitudes than participants that are exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal.
The following section introduces possible conditioning factors, such as EU identity, as well as underlying processes, such as gains of Europeanisation, which might have an impact on the relationship between EU-efficacy on EU attitudes.
Digging deeper – Unravelling causes for EU attitudes
Research about EU attitudes has emphasised multiple potential sources for EU support and Euroscepticism such as cognitive mobilisation, institutionalised distrust (McLaren, 2007) or economic factors (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). In recent years, especially the community approach in form of identity theory became increasingly important as an explanatory factor for EU attitudes. However, the direction of the effects of identity is equivocal. Whilst some scholars found that strong national identity leads exclusively to Euroscpeticism (e.g., Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005), others showed that national identity can also come along with EU identity, and hence, can correlate positively with EU support (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Nevertheless, EU identity is considered to be essential for support of the
European project (e.g., Bruter, 2003; Habermas, 2011). EU identity is “defined as the feeling of belonging to a social group, to the EU community” and goes back to social identity theory shaped by Henri Tajfel. Social identity theory describes the notion that membership of a group is an important part of the self-concept. Tajfel (as cited in Cinnirella, 1997) describes social
identity as a concept with a cognitive and an affective aspect. The cognitive aspect stands for a person’s recognition being part of a certain group and the affective aspect for a person feeling attached to this group. Tajfel describes the group a person belongs to as the in-group. By
belonging to a large-scale in-group like the EU, many individuals share a system of beliefs which is considered to be a social representation. As this social representation differs from the one of other groups, the out-groups, individuals are able to make sense of their social environment. Consequently, European identity “implies the engagement of self and motivation with the notion of a European social collective” (Cinnirella, 1997, p. 21). Cinnirella (1997) found strong
identity were more optimistic about European integration than participants with a low sense of EU identity (Cinnirella, 1997).
Furthermore, EU identity can be linked to the concept of EU-efficacy. As collective efficacy is defined as the “judgment of the capabilities and power of the group” (Lee, 2010, p. 395), EU identity can be considered an essential condition for EU-efficacy. Although the levels of individual EU identity can vary (Cinnirella, 1997), one can consider all Europeans citizens to belong to the social group EU. As the evaluation of the in-group is at all times positive, the more individuals consider themselves belonging to the EU, the more they will judge the capabilities of the EU as positive. Hence, one can assume that individuals being exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will be more positive towards the EU in all attitude dimensions the more they identify with the EU. Therefore, EU identity will not be treated as a dimension of EU attitudes as suggested by Boomgaarden et al. (2011) but as a moderator variable. This notion leads to the second hypothesis:
H2 Participants exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will show more positive EU attitudes the more they identify with the EU.
Furthermore, studies stress the impact of utilitarian considerations on EU attitudes. It is assumed that citizens are rational actors that shape their attitudes towards the EU as well as their EU identity according to cost-benefit calculations (Mau, 2005; Verhaegen et al., 2014). The higher the calculated benefits, the higher individual support for the EU (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Mau, 2005; Verhaegen et al., 2014). Thus, utilitarian considerations are one of the most common explanations for EU support and can hardly be detached from individual EU attitudes. Mau (2005) found that “the self-characterization of personally benefiting from EU membership strongly shapes support for EU integration” (p. 306). He argues that European integration has created a system of perceived winners and losers of the Europeanisation process which is
influenced by individual perception of gains and losses such as employment opportunities or security risks. Whether citizens consider themselves as winners or losers in Europeanisation is a main indicator for European support. The more citizens perceive themselves as winners, the more supportive of the EU they are (Mau, 2005).
Global research about international integration processes increasingly focuses on individual perceptions of globalisation and its consequences on political attitudes, such as support for denationalisation. Similar to Mau (2005), scholars have shown that globalisation divides people in groups of perceived winners and losers. Perceived winners consider
globalisation as a personal benefit, whilst perceived losers consider globalisation as a reduction of their chances (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006; Teney et al., 2014). Kriesi et al. (2006) stress that due to these different gain perceptions, winners and losers have generally antagonistic attitudes towards denationalisation, and thus, one can assume also towards Europeanisation. More specific, Teney et al. (2014) found evidence that citizens who feel left behind in the globalisation process are against free-border policies, whereas citizens feeling as winners perceive open borders as an opportunity. Therefore, one can assume that this is also the case in the Europeanisation process: Europeans who perceive themselves as winners of the Europeanisation process might be more susceptible to open-border policies, or further European integration, compared to Europeans who perceive themselves as losers of Europeanisation.
When examining the causes for different perceptions of globalisation, Teney et al. (2014) found that socio-demographic characteristics, i.e. education and income, as well as subjective measurements, i.e. threat perception and subjective deprivation, explain different positions in feeling as a loser or as a winner of globalisation processes (Teney et al., 2014). One can assume that subjective measurements, for example considering the EU as beneficial, are highly
influenced by the social environment such as media coverage. Even more so, as several studies have highlighted media’s impact on EU attitudes: When presenting the EU as beneficial (benefit frame) EU support increases, whereas when presenting the EU as a threat (conflict frame) EU support decreases (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Thus, a solution for the refugee crisis offered by the media that displays the benefits of being part of the EU could make citizens evaluate the cost-benefit calculations positively. More specifically, when media portray the EU as capable of solving the refugee crisis in the benefit for its citizens and member states, Europeans might see more gains in Europeanisation than when media portray the EU as incapable of solving the refugee crisis. Hence, I expect the effects of EU-efficacy on EU attitudes to be mediated by individual perceived gains of Europeanisation: Citizens who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will see more gains of Europeanisation than citizens who are exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal, which then in turn will lead to more positive EU attitudes. Therefore, the third hypothesis of the present study is as follows:
H3 Participants exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will see more gains in Europeanisation than participants exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal which then in turn will lead to more positive EU attitudes.
Furthermore, Teney et al. (2014) found that people who consider globalisation processes as an opportunity are more likely “to identify strongly with supranational communities” (p. 592) whereas people with low supranational identity are more likely to consider globalisation as a threat. This shows that EU identity is an explanatory factor for perceived gains of
Europeanisation. Hence, the more people identify with the EU, the more gains they see in Europeanisation processes. As described above, I expect participants who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal to see more gains of Europeanisation which will then lead to a more positive evaluation of the EU. According to Teney et al. (2014), one can presume this effect to be
reinforced the more participants identify with the EU community. Thus, the following fourth hypotheses is deducted:
H4 Participants exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will see more gains in Europeanisation the more they identify with the EU which then in turn will lead to more positive EU attitudes.
Perceiving the Europeanisation process as gainful depends on how EU policy outcomes are evaluated, e.g. considering open borders as threatening due to increased immigration. Hence, the concept of perceived gains of Europeanisation is linked to specific modes of support which Boomgaarden et al. (2011) define as “concrete policy outcomes or the performance of a polity” (p. 244). Due to this link, I expect the effect of gains of Europeanisation to be strongest on the EU attitude dimensions that are also clustering with specific modes of support: Strengthening, Utilitarian Support and Performance (Boomgaarden et al., 2011).
In Figure 1 the deducted hypotheses of the present study are graphically presented. The following method section presents the design of the experimental study as well as introducing the measurements of the variables.
EU-Efficacy EU attitude dimensions • Strengthening • Affection • Utilitarian Support • Performance EU Identity Gains of Europeanisation EU Identity Main effect Interaction effect Mediation effect
Method Experimental Survey
To test the effects of collective EU efficacy in media portrayals on EU attitudes, an online experiment was conducted. The study employed a single factor between-subjects
experimental design that included a pre- and a post-test. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. The first condition included a positive media portrayal in form of a news article that presented the EU being highly efficacious (high EU-efficacy media portrayal) in the current refugee crisis. The second condition presented a media that displayed the EU as non-efficacious portrayal (low EU-efficacy media portrayal) in the refugee crisis. Both news articles were produced for the purpose of this study. In a third condition, participants were exposed to no news article at all. This group formed the control group.
Procedure. The research was conducted online in May 2016, at a time when all EU countries still struggled with the impacts of the high influx of refugees, yet, the intensity of the crisis had already decreased. The participants of the experiment got to the survey via a link where they first were informed about the general purpose of the study and had to give their informed consent. Then they filled in a pre-test questionnaire including demographics and questions about predispositions about general political attitudes, immigration policies and EU attitudes as well as measurements of EU identity. Afterwards, participants were exposed either to a high or a low EU-efficacy media portrayal4 with a manipulation check subsequently. Where participants were assigned to the control group, they directly continued to the post-test
questionnaire without being exposed to any news article. All participants completed the post-test
4 Due to a timer on the stimulus page, participants were only able to continue to the following questions after 20
seconds. Participants of the high EU-efficacy media portrayal stayed on average longer (M = 203.03s, SD = 403.23s) on the article page than participants in the low EU-efficacy media portrayal (M = 171.14s, SD = 181.69s).
questionnaire which consisted of several efficacy measurements, assessments for each of the dimensions of EU attitudes as well as for the mediator variable Gains of Europeanisation. After completing the questionnaire, participants were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study.
Sample. The survey was published on the platform LAB of the University of Amsterdam where students can participate in online- and laboratory-studies and gain research credits (which are required for certain courses). The survey was online for three weeks and offered students 0.25 research credits for completing the survey which took about 10 to 20 minutes. In this time period, 71 students directed from LAB participated in the experimental survey. Furthermore, the survey was promoted in the internal network of a start up company located in Amsterdam with over 500 mostly European employees. Thus, this study makes use of a convenience sample which nevertheless was varied regarding different socio-demographic dimensions (see below). Overall, 249 people participated in the survey, of which 217 respondents completed it. 16 of them were from non-European countries and were excluded from the sample. Hence, the final sample for this study is N = 201 (68.20% female, age = 18 – 50 [M = 24.88, SD = 4.86]). All participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: “high EU efficacy media portrayal”-condition n = 64; “low EU efficacy media portrayal”-condition n = 65 and control group with no experimental condition n = 72.
Randomisation. A randomisation check showed no significant differences amongst the two experimental groups and the control group in age, gender, education, media use, political interest, political efficacy, involvement in the refugee crisis or fear of immigration. However, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant difference between the high EU-efficacy media portrayal group and the two other groups in political ideology, F(2,98) = 3.17, p = .044, η2 = .03 (Levene’s F(2,198) = 0.22, p = .806; high EU-efficacy media portrayal M =
5.56, SD = 2.00; low EU-efficacy media portrayal M = 4.92, SD = 2.08, control group M = 4.72, SD = 1.95). Hence, in the following analysis political ideology will be controlled for.
Stimulus Material. For the experiment two news articles were used as experimental stimuli in the two treatment groups. The articles were either portraying the EU as efficacious (high EU-efficacy media portrayal) or as non-efficacious (low EU-efficacy media portrayal) in the refugee crisis. The articles consisted of assembled parts of actual news articles found online on the topic but were mainly produced for the purpose of this study. Producing the articles not only gave more control over the manipulation but also excluded the possibility of participants knowing the content. Both articles were inspired by an efficacy-measurement proposed by Seligson (1980): Respondents first were asked to name a community problem, then to explain how the problem occurred and finally to give a plan how the problem can be solved. In the end, respondents should say if they feel able to solve the problem or not. Seligson describes this as a problem-solving efficacy approach (Seligson, 1980). Furthermore, aspects of other efficacy measurements were included, such as citizens being heard and taken seriously by the European government (Acock & Clarke, 1990). This approach seemed well suited for the purpose of manipulating EU-efficacy. Thus, in both articles first the problems of the current refugee crisis were named and described, then it was explained how the crisis arose, and finally, a solution was given how the crisis could be solved. The two articles differed in the offered solution for the crisis as well as in the headlines and teasers but the general storyline was identical. The two articles were presented in the style of typical online news articles inspired by the online news section of the BBC to reinforce authenticity (see Appendix A).
A pre-test of the stimulus material with students (N = 31) showed that the positive stimulus was too provocative and triggered some sort of reversed mobilisation (Schuck & de
Vreese, 2009), i.e. respondents with negative pre-existing attitudes got even more negative after exposure to the positive media portrayal. Hence, in order to prevent such effect in the actual study, the positive stimulus was adjusted to draw a more authentic and less enthusiastic picture. The final stimuli can be found in Appendix B.
Manipulation check. Whether the manipulation was successful or not was tested with four items on a scale from 0 to 100 after participants have read one of the two the news articles. Whilst three items were supposed to measure differences between the two experimental groups, one item was supposed to show equal results for both groups. Yet, only two of the manipulation check items showed significant effects that the manipulation was successful. First, participants were asked how much the following statement represents the content of the article: “The
European Union is able to resolve the refugee crisis for its member states”. The two experimental groups showed significant differences with a medium to strong effect size on the manipulation check, F(1,127) = 16.39, p < .001, η2 = .12 (high EU-efficacy media portrayal M = 58.67, SD = 27.26; low EU-efficacy media portrayal M = 38.57, SD = 29.10). Thus, respondents in the high efficacy condition indicated significantly more that the EU is able to resolve the refugee crisis than respondents in the low efficacy condition. Second, participants were asked how much the statement “The wave-through mentality on European borders has to stop” represents the content of the article. No significant difference between the groups was found, which was expected as the statement represented the content of both articles, F(1,127) = 1.04, p = .311, η2 < .01 (high EU-efficacy media portrayal M = 60.67, SD = 28.12; low EU-efficacy media portrayal M = 55.82, SD = 26.02). Hence, the manipulation check items demonstrated that the manipulation was successful. It should be noted that the assumption of equal variance in both analyses hold as the Levene’s tests were insignificant.
Main Variables
Dependent variable. To measure the dependent variable EU Attitudes in this study, the attitude dimensions as distinguished by Boomgaarden et al. (2011) were used. These dimensions are described as “unique components of the overall notion of EU attitudes” (Boomgaarden et al., 2011, p. 212) and give the opportunity to capture the slender differences in opinions. Only four of the dimensions were used to measure EU attitudes as one overlapped with the moderating variable EU identity. All items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = low on support, 7 = high on support). The first set of five items was tapping Affection, i.e. “I am afraid of the EU” (M = 5.24, SD = 1.38) with a reliability scale of Cronbach’s α = .92. All items for Affection were reverse recoded. The second set with four items was measuring Performance with items such as “The EU functions well as it is” (M = 3.74, SD = 0.99). The items were tested for reliability, Cronbach’s α = .77.5 Utilitarian Support were also tapped with a third set of four items, i.e. “The EU support peace and stability” (M = 4.90, SD = 0.99). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .79. One last set of five questions measured Strengthening, i.e. “The EU should become one country” (M = 3.86, SD = 0.96) with a reliability scale of Cronbach’s α = .72. The full item list can be found in Appendix C.
Moderating Variable. In order to measure the moderating variable EU Identity, also a scale from Boomgaarden et al. (2011) was used that consists of five items tapping EU identity with items such as “The European flag means a lot to me” (M = 4.24 SD = 1.21). All items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = low EU identity, 7 = high EU identity). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .85. The full item list can be found in Appendix C.
5 The original scale includes a fifth item “The European Union wastes a lot of tax money”. As this item decreased
Mediating Variable. The mediating variable Gains of Europeanisation was measured with two items tapping perceived personal benefits of EU membership in the past and in the future (Mau, 2005): “Do you think your country being a member of the European Union has brought you personally…?” (M = 5.29, SD = 1.35) and “With a long term view, do you think your country being a member of the European Union will bring you personally…?” (M = 5.20, SD = 1.34). As both items were assessing the perceived gains of the Europeanisation, they were combined in one item (M = 5.25, SD = 1.28). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = .90. Control Variables
Pre-Existing EU Attitudes. In order to account for the possibility that participants might have strong pre-existing attitudes towards the EU that might affect the results, a pre-existing EU attitudes assessment was integrated. It included six items from the Eurobarometer 2015 tapping EU benefits such as “The EU contributes to democracy in my country” (M = 4.68, SD = 1.06) on a seven-point scale (1 = no benefits, 7 = many benefits) with a reliability scale of Cronbach’s α = .84. The full item list can be found in Appendix C.
Attitudes to Refugees. Attitudes towards refugees were assessed with a self-developed scale that was inspired by the threat measurement of Stephan, Ybarra, Martnez, Schwarzwald and Tur-Kaspa (1998) who measured perceived threats posed by immigrants. As this
measurement meant to capture general attitudes towards refugees, the items were phrased neutrally without focusing on specific problems. Hence, participants’ attitudes towards refugees were measured with three items on a seven-point scale such as “Our society should do more for refugees” (M = 5.39, SD = 1.20) (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), Cronbach’s α = .82. The full item list can be found in Appendix C.
as political ideology (M = 4.99, SD = 2.01; 0 = left; 10 = right), political interest (M = 7.17, SD = 2.32; 0 = no interest; 10 = completely interested), political efficacy (M = 4.42, SD = 1.25;
Cronbach’s α = .79; 1 = low efficacy; 7 = high efficacy), personal involvement in refugee crisis (M = 3.43, SD = 1.05; 1 = no involvement; 5 = completely involved) as well as fear of
immigration (M = 3.46, SD = 1.16; 1 = not afraid at all; 7 = completely afraid). The full item list is provided in Appendix C. In the following section the results will be presented.
Results Main effect analysis
The first hypothesis (H1) states that participants who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will show more positive EU attitudes than participants who are exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal. In order to test this hypothesis, an ANOVA was carried out with each of the four dimensions of EU attitudes (Boomgaarden et al., 2011) as dependent variables and EU-efficacy as independent variable. The descriptive group means for this analysis can be found in Table 1. H1 is rejected as the analysis shows that the exposure to EU-efficacy media portrayal does not affect individual EU attitudes. Detailed findings are presented in Table 2. Moderation analysis
The second hypothesis (H2) assumes that the main effect will be reinforced by individual levels of EU identity. More precisely, I expect that participants who are exposed to a high EU- efficacy media portrayal will show positive EU attitudes the more they identify with the EU. In order to test H2, four two-way ANOVA were carried out with each of the four dimensions of EU attitudes (Boomgaarden et al., 2011) as dependent variables and EU-efficacy as well as EU identity as independent variables. A detailed presentation of the descriptive group means is given in Table 1. The analysis rejects H2 as there are no significant interaction effects between EU-
Table 1
Descriptive group means of EU attitude dimensions for respondents in different EU-efficacy groups (high, low, control) and with different levels of EU identity (low, neutral, high)
Affection Utilitarian Support Strengthening Performance n M SD M SD M SD M SD EU-efficacy High EU-Efficacy 64 5.21 1.25 4.95 0.96 3.66 1.03 3.54 1.01 Low EU-Efficacy 65 5.10 1.56 4.77 1.17 3.95 1.03 3.82 1.10 Control 72 5.38 1.30 4.98 0.83 4.98 0.96 3.84 0.83 EU Identity low 36 4.46 1.39 4.05 1.05 3.42 1.13 2.96 0.89 neutral 111 5.23 1.35 4.89 0.84 3.81 0.88 3.83 0.94 high 54 5.76 1.19 5.49 0.83 4.23 0.87 4.06 0.88 Table 2
Effects of EU-efficacy as well as EU identity on each EU attitude dimension Sum of Squares df Mean Squares F p η2 Affection EU-efficacy 1.27 2 0.63 0.36 .698 <.01 EU Identity 33.34 2 16.67 9.48 <.001 .09 EU-efficacy * EU Identity 2.70 4 0.68 0.38 .820 <.01 Error 337.46 192 Total 5889.04 201 Utilitarian Support EU-efficacy 1.57 2 0.79 1.03 .359 .01 EU Identity 40.95 2 20.47 26.80 <.001 .21 EU-efficacy * EU Identity 2.82 4 0.71 0.92 .451 .01 Error 146.70 192 Total 5025.94 201 Strengthening EU-efficacy 1.97 2 0.985 1.14 .322 .01 EU Identity 12.94 2 6.468 7.49 .001 .07 EU-efficacy * EU Identity 2.14 4 0.535 0.62 .649 .01 Error 165.84 192 Total 3168.48 201 Performance EU-efficacy 1.92 2 0.96 1.14 .323 .01 EU Identity 25.18 2 12.59 14.94 <.001 .13 EU-efficacy * EU Identity 1.92 4 0.48 0.57 .685 .01 Error 161.79 192 Total 3000.38 201
efficacy and EU identity on any of the EU attitude dimensions. A detailed summary of the results of the conducted ANOVA can be found in Table 2.6
Interestingly, the descriptive group means for the interaction effect between EU-efficacy and EU identity on EU attitude dimensions (see Appendix D) indicate controversial results. Independent from their individual levels of EU identity, participants seem to rate certain EU attitude dimensions more positively when they are exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal than when they are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal, i.e. all participants,
independent from their EU identity level, are more supportive of Strengthening when exposed to the low EU-efficacy media portrayal. These results will be further discussed at a later stage of the study. In the following, the underlying effect analyses will be presented.
Mediation analysis
In order to formally assess if the effects of EU-efficacy on EU attitudes are mediated by perceived gains of Europeanisation, the bootstrapping technique recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004) will be applied to assess indirect effects. I expect that participants who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will perceive the gains of Europeanisation as more
positive than participants who are exposed to a low EU-efficacy media portrayal which in turn will lead to more positive EU attitudes. This third hypothesis (H3) of the present study is tested
6 However, an additional analysis revealed an interaction effect between political ideology and EU-efficacy on the
dimension Utilitarian Support of medium strength, F(4,195) = 2.78, p = .028, η2 = .06. Participants in the control
group who indicated to be politically right (>7) significantly supported the EU more (M = 5.17, SD = 0.60, n = 9) than right-wing participants that were exposed to the high EU-efficacy media portrayal (M = 4.50, SD = 0.92, n = 19) or to the low EU-efficacy media portrayal (M = 4.20, SD = 1.10, n = 15; Levene’s F(8,191) 1.47, p = .172). A second ANOVA showed another significant interaction effect of moderate strength between political efficacy and EU-efficacy also on Utilitarian Support, F(4,196) = 3.25, p = .013, η2 = .06. Participants that indicated to be neutral
in political efficacy (3.40 – 5.10) and who were exposed to the low EU-efficacy media portrayal showed significantly lower levels of utilitarian support for the EU (M = 4.32, SD = 1.13, n = 29) than participants with neutral political efficacy in the high EU-efficacy media portrayal group (M = 4.95, SD = 0.80, n = 40) and the control group (M = 5.15, SD = 0.78, n = 36). Yet, it has to be noted that the assumption of equal variances was violated, Levene’s F(8,192) = 2.32, p = .021.
with the PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 4; 5000 bootstraps; 95% BcaCI; Hayes, 2013) with EU-efficacy coded as 1 (high EU-EU-efficacy) and 0 (low EU-EU-efficacy). However, H3 is rejected as the analysis reveals that there is no significant indirect effect of EU-efficacy on the dimensions of EU attitudes through perceived gains of Europeanisation. In Figure 2 the results of the mediation analysis are presented in detail.7 Next the results of the moderated mediation analysis will be displayed.
Moderated mediation analysis
Although the simple mediation hypothesis was rejected, EU identity might still influence the mediation process, in the way outlined in hypothesis 4 (H4). Hence, I will test the following moderated mediation model, expecting that participants who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal will see more gains of Europeanisation the more they identify with the EU which will lead to more positive EU attitudes. This assumption is displayed in Figure 3.
This last hypothesis is tested by running PROCESS SPSS macro (Model 7; 5000
bootstraps; 95% BcaCI; Hayes, 2013), again with EU-efficacy coded as 1 (high EU-efficacy) and
7 It should be noted that gains of Europeanisation as a covariate leads to a significant main effect on the c-path
between EU-efficacy and Strengthening, b = -0.35, SE = 0.16, p = .034, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.03], as well as Performance, b = 0.35, SE = 0.16, p <.001, 95% CI [-0.66, -0.03]. Gains of Europeanisation EU attitudes EU-efficacy b = 0.16 a Indirect Effect Affection: b = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.46] Utilitarian Support: b = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.38] Strengthening: b = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.23] Performance: b = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.28] c’ Affection: b = 0.68*** Utilitarian Support: b = 0.59*** Strengthening: b = 0.42*** Performance: b = 0.42*** b Note. N = 129, * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001.
0 (low EU-efficacy). However, no support for H4 is found. Although, the overall moderated mediation model is significant (see Table 3), the conditional indirect effects analysis shows that the results are contrary to the expected direction. There is no significant interaction effect between high EU-efficacy media portrayal and high EU identity on EU attitudes through
perceived gains of Europeanisation but a significant positive interaction effect between high EU-efficacy media portrayal and low EU Identity. The conditional indirect effect of EU-EU-efficacy on EU attitudes through perceived gains of Europeanisation were examined at three values of EU identity: the mean (2.04), one standard deviation above the mean (2.72) and one standard deviation below the mean (1.36; see Table 4). This analysis evinces that only for participants who had a score on the moderator variable EU identity of 1 standard deviation below the mean, the indirect effect via gains of Europeanisation is significant. Thus, participants with low EU identity who are exposed to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal see more gains of
Europeanisation which leads in turn to significantly higher levels of Affection, b = 0.46, SE = 0.21, 95% CI [0.09, 0.93], Utilitarian Support, b = 0.40, SE = 0.18, 95% CI [0.07, 0.77], Strengthening, b = 0.23, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.06, 0.48], and of Performance, b = 0.29, SE = 0.13, 95% CI [0.06, 0.59] compared to participants with low EU identity who are exposed to the
Gains of Europeanisation EU Attitudes a b EU-efficacy c’ EU Identity
Figure 3: Moderated Mediation model of EU-efficacy and EU identity on EU attitudes through perceived gains of Europeanisation.
Table 3
Results of moderation mediation analysis of high EU-efficacy and EU identity on EU attitudes through Gains of Europeanisation
Table 4
Conditional indirect effect of EU-efficacy on EU attitude dimension through Gains of Europeanisation on three levels of EU Identity
Note. N = 129; with the lower levels (LL BCA) and upper levels (UL BCA) bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap indicating significance
low EU-efficacy media portrayal.8 The expectation that the effects of perceived gains of Europeanisation to be the strongest for dimensions that are classified as specific support and
8 This effect only exists in comparison between high EU-efficacy and low EU-efficacy. There are no significant
differences between high EU-efficacy and the control group nor between low EU-efficacy and the control group.
Gains of Europeanisation Affection Utilitarian Support Strengthening Performance b* b* b* b* b* EU Identity 0.97*** EU Identity * EU-efficacy -0.62* Constant 1.67*** 1.84*** 2.03*** 1.50*** Gains of Europeanisation 0.68*** 0.59*** 0.35*** 0.42*** EU-efficacy 0.26 <0.01 0.09 -0.35* -0.34* R2 .28 .41 .54 .22 .30 F* 17.50*** 43.03*** 71.53*** 16.32*** 27.07*** Note. N = 129, * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p <.001.
EU Identity Affection Utilitarian Support
Conditional indirect effect SE LL BCA UL BCA Conditional indirect effect SE LL BCA UL BCA - 1 SD (1.36) 0.46 0.21 0.09 0.093 0.40 0.18 0.07 0.77 M (2.04) 0.18 0.14 -0.08 0.48 0.15 0.12 -0.07 0.40 + 1 SD (2.72) -0.11 0.16 -0.41 0.22 -0.10 0.14 -0.35 0.19
EU Identity Strengthening Performance
Conditional indirect effect SE LL BCA UL BCA Conditional indirect effect SE LL BCA UL BCA - 1 SD (1.36) 0.23 0.11 0.06 0.48 0.29 0.13 0.06 0.59 M (2.04) 0.07 0.12 -0.04 0.24 0.11 0.09 -0.05 0.30 + 1 SD (2.72) -0.05 0.09 -0.24 0.10 -0.07 0.10 -0.28 0.13
regime-related is not confirmed. The conditional indirect effect of the moderated mediation analysis shows the strongest effect on Affection, a dimension that is classified as diffuse support.
Furthermore, the positive effect on EU attitudes of participants with low EU identity and exposure to a high EU-efficacy media portrayal can be explained mainly by the mediator
variable Gains of Europeanisation. There is a difference of an entire scale point for the means of perceived gains of Europeanisation of participants with low EU identity between the two
experimental conditions. Whilst participants with low EU identity, who were assigned to the low EU-efficacy media portrayal, saw neither advantages nor disadvantages in the Europeanisation process (M = 3.58, SD = 1.30), participants with low EU identity being exposed to the high EU-efficacy media portrayal saw clearly more advantages (M = 4.57, SD = 1.09, see Appendix D).9 These results will be discussed in the following section.
Discussion General findings
In the present study, I investigate to which degree collective efficacy of the EU in times of crisis influences individual EU attitudes. The findings show that EU-efficacy beliefs indeed influence EU attitudes, yet, only when taking conditional factors, i.e. EU identity, as well as underlying mechanisms, i.e. perceived gains of Europeanisation, into account.
Based on prior research (Lee, 2006, 2010), I proposed the high EU-efficacy media portrayal would affect EU attitudes positively. However, I found that neither media portraying the EU as efficacious nor as inefficacious in solving the crisis had a direct effect on participants’ EU attitudes. Furthermore, previous research found that Europeans with high EU identity are more supportive of the EU than those with low EU identity (e.g., Cinnirella, 1997). Therefore, I
expected EU identity to reinforce the effect of EU-efficacy on EU attitudes. Whilst there was no interaction effect, the analysis showed that EU identity is an important conditional factor for EU attitudes anyway as will be shown in the following paragraph.
As expected, there are underlying mechanisms influencing the relationship between EU-efficacy and EU attitudes. Mau (2005) found that perceiving Europeanisation processes as beneficial leads to more support for European integration. Hence, I assumed that participants who are exposed to the high EU-efficacy media portrayal would see more gains in
Europeanisation processes, which in turn would lead to more positive EU attitudes. Furthermore, I expected this indirect effect to be reinforced the more participants identify with the EU. The effect between EU-efficacy and EU attitudes is indeed mediated by perceived gains of
Europeanisation but only when considering individual levels of EU identity. The analysis revealed a significant effect of high EU-efficacy media portrayal on EU attitudes through perceived gains of Europeanisation considering individual levels of EU identity. Yet, the findings are contrary to the expectations: Participants who identify very little with the EU saw significantly more gains in the Europeanisation process when they were exposed to the high EU-efficacy media portrayal compared to when seeing the low EU-EU-efficacy media portrayal. This led to more positive EU attitudes via the suggested route. These results will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
Putting the findings in context
Although the findings are not as expected, they are consistent with previous research. Hence, in an article about EU identity, Cram (2012) stresses the relevance of implicit EU identity as a stabilising force for the EU. She emphasises the fact that citizens who do not explicitly identify with the EU might be unconsciously attached to the EU anyway as citizens are
surrounded by European symbols every day, i.e. EU-labels in supermarkets. Although implicitly feeling attached to the EU, some citizens might not state to identify themselves as Europeans when asked (Cram, 2012), e.g. in a survey. Thus, maybe some of the participants who stated low levels of EU identity in the present study, might already have identified stronger with the EU without being aware of it. Cram (2012) stresses that such unconscious identification could become more explicit when citizens recognised the EU as a beneficial establishment. The high EU-efficacy media portrayal presented the EU as beneficial and efficacious which could have turned implicit into explicit EU identity. Hence, such a process could explain why participants who indicated low levels of EU identity evaluated the EU more positive when being exposed to information that presented the EU as beneficial and efficacious than when being exposed to information that presented the EU as disadvantageous and inefficacious.
Another possible explanation for the unexpected findings of this study, might be the element of surprise when participants with low EU identity were confronted with positive information about the EU. The theory of motivated reasoning stresses that people with high levels of political sophistication seek congruent information and refuse counter arguments, whereas people with lower levels of political sophistication are more likely to accept contrary information (Taber & Lodge, 2006). As Cram (2012) states that “identification with the EU should not be confused with support for the regime or its policies” (p. 73), people with low EU identity are not necessarily limited to a negative attitude towards the EU either (Cram, 2012; Weßels, 2007). The EU-critical news headlines in the last years might have led to negative feelings about the EU and might were translated by some participants into low levels of EU identity. However, such negative feelings are not necessarily deeply entrenched. Hence, one can assume that some of the participants with low levels of EU identity might have been open to
contrary information due to lower levels of political sophistication. Hence, participants with low EU identity might have been rather surprised reading in the news article that the EU is capable of solving the refugee crisis after all and gained a more positive, hopeful attitude.
Furthermore, there was no increase in positive EU attitudes nor in perceived gains of Europeanisation for participants with high EU identity who were exposed to the high EU-efficacy media portrayal. Yet, it is noticeable that this group’s EU attitudes are partially very positive. Hence, there is some indication for a possible ceiling effect, “which refers to the inability of the scale to record satisfaction higher than the scale’s highest option” (Voutilainen, Pitkäaho, Kvist, & Vehviläinen-Julkunen, 2016, p. 948). Due to the limitations of the scale, it might have been difficult for participants with high EU identity to indicate a change in EU attitudes. This could be part of the explanation why participants with high EU identity were unaffected by the manipulation. However, for the EU attitude dimensions Strengthening and Performance a ceiling effect is rather unlikely as participants with high EU identity evaluated these dimensions only slightly positive in both experimental groups. Thus, for these two dimensions an indication of change would have been possible. This suggests that participants with high EU identity might simply have not been surprised enough by the high EU-efficacy media portrayal to increase their positive EU attitudes.
Interestingly, the low EU-efficacy media portrayal partially reinforced more positive EU attitudes than the high EU-efficacy media portrayal – independent from EU identity levels. For the high EU identity group, these results underline the notion of motivated reasoning as citizens with strong political opinions apply reasoning to defend their beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006). Hence, participants with high EU identity might have reinforced pre-existing positive EU attitudes by countering the negative arguments
about the EU presented in the low EU-efficacy news article. For participants with low levels of EU identity, however, motivated reasoning can not explain such reactions. Hence, one possible explanation for the positive effects of the low EU-efficacy media portrayal for participants with low EU identity levels could be reversed mobilisation. Schuck and de Vreese (2009) found that positive news frames during a EU referendum campaign mobilised sceptics instead of supporters which the scholars explain with individual differences in risk perception (Schuck & de Vreese, 2009). Although low EU identity is not necessarily synonymous with Euroscepticism (Cram, 2012; Weßels, 2007), one can still assume that some participants of this study with low levels of EU identity might have been sceptical of certain aspects the EU, i.e. open border policies for immigrants. Such sceptical participants might have perceived information about the EU solving the refugee crisis as threatening which might have reinforced their sceptical attitude. In the following section the scientific and societal implications of the results will be illustrated. Scientific and societal implications
Unlike previous studies, in this article the effects of efficacy portrayal in news on individual EU attitudes were examined. In political attitude research no study has manipulated efficacy before in order to see its direct effects on political attitudes. This is mainly due to the fact that although internal and external efficacy have been subject of many studies, the two concepts have great limitations when it comes to their measurements. This has already been extensively discussed by several scholars (e.g., Morrell, 2003; Seligson, 1980). Seligson (1980) subsequently introduced a problem solving approach measurement for collective efficacy which remained mostly unnoticed. A quarter of a century passed before Lee (2006, 2010) resumed the work for collective efficacy in political attitude research and found that collective efficacy is an explanatory factor for political participation. The present study continues the work of collective
efficacy in political communication by demonstrating its potential for future research of EU attitudes. Although no main effects were confirmed, the subliminal effects of collective efficacy on EU attitudes show the concept’s potential. The results stress that a more nuanced examination of collective efficacy is required in order to understand its underlying mechanisms better.
Furthermore, future research should also investigate the conditions for collective efficacy in the cultural context as Lee (2006) highlights the notion that collective efficacy could be more relevant in collectivist cultures. To test this, a European cross-national comparison of collective efficacy beliefs could bring more clarity as studies have shown that some EU member states have collectivist cultures and others have individualist cultures (Dür & Mateo, 2010). The current disunity within the EU (e.g. the recent EU-resignation of the United Kingdom), furthermore, stresses the relevance of collective efficacy studies in order to gain deeper understanding of group dynamics.
Although the causes for EU attitudes are well studied, there is still much to explore. Especially in crisis situations, it is more important than ever to understand explanatory factors for EU support for those who intend to keep the EU united. This study contributed to the
research field by presenting collective efficacy as a significant influencing factor for EU attitudes in crisis situations. Furthermore, recent research about public opinion in the EU suggests being more distinguished in EU attitudes and avoiding umbrella terms (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). This study follows this notion and focuses on four different EU attitude dimensions. This approach helps by uncovering a more diverse picture of EU attitudes, for example that
participants of the present study rated certain dimensions more positive than others. Particularly remarkable is the difference between Affection and Performance which could be interpreted as a trend to more community-directed (or diffuse) support of the EU and less regime-directed (or
specific) support (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). This is in line with prior research which indicates that performance and strengthening of the EU are especially vulnerable to political events (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010), i.e. a political crisis. Hence, examining EU attitudes as a concept with distinct and independent dimensions gave deeper insights into individual EU attitudes. However, as Boomgaarden et al. (2011) rightfully state, this list of EU attitude dimensions is not exhaustive and could be expanded on in future research.
The present study also contributes to media effect research. The exposure to media content that either portrayed the EU as efficacious or as inefficacious led to an attitudinal change – at least for participants with low EU identity. Participants with high EU identity seemed unaffected by the manipulation. Thus, future research should aim to gain a more nuanced picture of media effects on EU attitudes considering different levels of EU identity.
This study demonstrates that despite all negative polls about the EU’s future, there is still hope for advocates of the EU to increase public support even in times of crisis. This is especially important considering Europe’s current uncertain future regarding the impacts of the refugee crisis or of the referendum vote of the United Kingdom to leave the EU. The results of the present study show that citizens who feel especially distant from the EU are able to change negative EU attitudes into more positive ones, which can proof beneficial in times of crisis and rising scepticism. Furthermore, this study also demonstrates the potential of media to create more support for EU policies especially when a crisis arises. Yet, pessimistic media content could also lead to the contrary, hence, more negative EU attitudes. In times of crisis, the notion remains that media tend to be more negative than positive (Cross & Ma, 2015). In order to understand the dynamics of the current crisis and the actual impacts of media fully, future research should analyse the media atmosphere regarding the role of the EU in the current crisis.
Limitations of the present study
This leads to the list of limitations which is of course not exhaustive but focusing on the most significant shortcomings of this study. Firstly, the decision to use the refugee crisis to manipulate the EU as efficacious posed a risk. Media has been reporting about the crisis for almost a year in depth and one can assume that every European was at least once involved in a debate about the impacts and aftermath of the millions of refugees coming to Europe. When planning the study, it was clear that there is no such thing as a political ‘tabula rasa’ and I was expecting participants to have political predispositions. However, the refugee crisis seems to be an exceptionally polarising topic and many participants demonstrated unusually strong
opinions.10 Thus, the results of the study might be context and time specific due to the political atmosphere during the refugee crisis and might be different when the study was conducted at another time. Therefore, future research of collective efficacy should examine a different crisis and explore it at different stages to see if the underlying effect mechanisms change or stay the same. Secondly, it would have been valuable to measure gains of Europeanisation in a more differentiated way. As the study has shown, there is a conditional indirect effect of EU-efficacy on EU attitudes through gains of Europeanisation. In the present study, gains of Europeanisation was measured in a rather simplistic way. Yet, there are many different ways the EU is
influencing citizens’ everyday life, how citizens benefit from it and what is perceived as
beneficial. Future studies should not measure gains of Europeanisation in a one-dimensional way but try to gain a more detailed picture. Thirdly, another shortcoming of the present study is the limited time of finding participants which led to a convenience sample consisting of mainly
10 This became very clear when reading the answers to the open question integrated in the survey after the news
article. Many participants of the pre-study already had very strong attitudes about the refugee issue or were even fed up reading more about it.
