Bifurcating Strategy
Strategic Illiteracy in Uruzgan
MA Thesis Political Science: International Relations Final Draft, June 2018
Student: Thijs Hamers, 11151684 Supervisor: dr. A. A. Steele Second Reader: dr. D. V. Vigneswaran
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Table of Contents
Introduction
3
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
7
1.1 Strategy and Strategic Illiteracy
7
1.2 The Bifurcation of Strategy
11
Chapter 2: Research Design
15
Chapter 3: The Assessment Framework
19
3.1 Aligning ends and ways
20
3.2 Aligning means and ways
23
3.3 Aligning ends and means
24
Chapter 4: The Process of Decision Making
29
4.1 The Process
29
4.2 Aligning ends and ways
35
4.3 Aligning means and ways
38
4.4 Aligning ends and means
39
Conclusion
43
Literature
46
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Introduction
In January 2015 Jim N. Mattis, the former Commander of the United States Central
Command, issued a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, in which he said that "we have lived too long now in a strategy‐free mode. To do so America needs a refreshed
national strategy. [...] There is an urgent need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation."1 Three years later Mattis, now the US Secretary of Defense, created a new US
National Defense Strategy to emerge "from a period of strategic atrophy".2
The problem that Mattis addresses, is the lack of military strategy, which has been termed strategic atrophy, strategic illiteracy and strategic dyslexia. This phenomenon can be defined as the inability to formulate achievable political objectives and connect them to realistic military planning.3 In practice, this means that the strategic trinity of ends, ways and means are misaligned, as will be explained later. In other words, we speak of strategic illiteracy when the political objectives cannot be translated into military plans, usually as a result of unclear or even absent political objectives.
However, strategic illiteracy is hardly just an American problem.4 On the contrary,
most Western militaries have lacked a military strategy for the past 30 years.5 The British, for instance, did not devise a strategy for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 Similarly, the
Norwegian, Dutch and German armies lacked a strategy in Afghanistan.7 Even peacekeeping
missions with a robust mandate, like in the Democratic Republic of Congo, failed to develop a cohesive strategy.8
Strategy is the crucial link between the civilian and the military in the context of war. Strategic illiteracy, therefore, is highly problematic. The war in Iraq serves as an example: the Iraqi army was defeated quickly and decisively, but the country fell into chaos. A violent aftermath erupted that lasts until today. According to Hew Strachan, a military historian, this can be attributed to the fact that post-conflict planning was rejected by both soldiers and
1 Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of James N. Mattis before the Senate Armed Services Committee (January 2015), 1, 2. 2 Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America; Sharpening the American Military's
Competitive Edge (January 2018), 1.
3 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Strategisch Analfabetisme. De kunst van strategisch denken in moderne militaire operaties (June 2013), 5. 4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ben Barry, "The utility of force in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond," in: Ben Barry, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing
Character of War (2016); Robert Egnell, "Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?," in: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 87, no.2 (March 2011), 306.
7 The Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (June 2016); Herman Amersfoort,
"Nederland, de weg kwijt; over de teloorgang van de militaire strategie en de noodzaak van geschiedenis," in: Militaire Spectator (2016); Timo Noetzel, "The German Politics of War: Kunduz and the War in Afghanistan," in: International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 2 (March 2011).
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politicians.9 The political ends of the war could not be achieved by the purely operational way the war was conducted.10 According to him strategy was under-appreciated.11 However, Strachan argues that we risk losing "the tool that helps us to define war, to shape it and to
understand it" if we abandon strategy.12
Given the importance and the magnitude of this problem, this study is an attempt to understand the origins of strategic illiteracy. If strategy is that important, why is it not being developed properly? Numerous scholars have tried to answer this question, but most of their explanations are unconvincing.
First, it is argued by some scholars that strategy is no longer just a national matter. Rather, because of the rise of international organizations, alliances and coalitions of the willing, strategy has become an international issue and is made as such.13 However, as
Duyvesteyn argues, despite international cooperation, states are still responsible for their own future and, therefore, should always devise their own strategy.14 Especially if international
organizations fail to develop a proper common strategy, as is the case in most contemporary military operations.15 For example, NATO's 'strategy' in Afghanistan is merely an operational
plan. The ISAF commander even concluded that himself in a report in which he stated that
"the OPORD [Operational Order, auth.] contains much detail but does not explicitly link the Regional Commands (RC) operations under a coherent, single, nationwide strategy."16 So if international organizations do not develop a common strategy, it is still up to nation states to develop one, meaning that the rise of international organizations and the rise of strategy as an international issue do not explain strategic illiteracy.
Second, some scholars argue that strategy disappeared due to the Cold War. After all, both world wars had shown the destructive potential of 'total war' and the advent of nuclear weapons only spread the fear of another total war. The reaction was a political strategy of deterrence, in which the application of force for political goals was no longer necessary, as it focused on preventing wars, rather than fighting them.17 This, in turn, allowed the military to focus completely on the operational level, "a policy-free zone, in which military expertise was
9 Hew Strachan, "Making Strategy: Civil-military relations after Iraq," in: Survival, vol. 38, no. 7 (2006), 63. 10 Ibid.
11 Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," in: Survival, vol. 47 no. 3 (2005), 51. 12 Ibid., 48.
13 Amersfoort, Nederland de weg kwijt, 224. 14 Duyvesteyn, Strategisch Analfabetisme, 13.
15 Barry, The utility of force; Egnell, Lessons from Helmand; Norwegian Commission, A Good Ally; Amersfoort, Nederland de weg kwijt;
Berdal, State of UN Peacekeeping.
16 Stanley A. McChrystal, COMISAF Initial Assessment (2009), A-2. 17 Strachan, The Lost Meaning, 43.
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unfettered and where armies reasserted their authority over war’s conduct."18 The problem
with this explanation, however, is that it is not relevant for the post-Cold War era. After all, the threat of nuclear and total wars became less serious, making the political strategy of deterrence nowhere near as useful as it used to be. This should have led to the reestablishment of the strategic connection between the political and the military levels. The fact that there was no attempt to reestablish this strategic link, suggests that the Cold War cannot explain strategic illiteracy.
Another explanation that scholars have put forward, is related to the institutions that should be responsible for developing strategy. Amersfoort, for example, points out that the Dutch state does not have such an institution.19 He also argues that the political responsibility for military operations is shared by two government departments - Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - which makes the interaction that strategy requires more difficult, due to interdepartmental competition.20 Strachan makes a similar case for the United
Kingdom.21
Even though these explanations have some merit, they fail to see the common denominator, which is the civil-military divide. After all, if one was aware of the absence of an institution to make strategy, and the problems that arise from it, one would simply create such an institution. Strategic illiteracy, therefore, is not just an institutional problem. It is conceptual.
That, at least, is the theory proposed by Lukas Milevski in 'Grand Strategy and
Operational Art: Companion Concepts and Their Implications for Strategy'.22 He argues that the introduction of the concept of grand strategy separated the political and the military levels that used to be united in strategy. Grand strategy came to be limited to policy, while
operational art came to be limited to the military aspect. This separation meant a splitting up of the trinity of strategy: means, ends and ways. "Bifurcating strategy is to divide the
consideration of war into two elements, the application of violence or operational art, and political purpose, which is frequently labeled grand strategy."23 And that, he argues, often
results in violence without a purpose.24
18 Hew Strachan, "Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War," in: Survival, vol. 52 no. 5 (October–November
2010), 160.
19 Amersfoort, Nederland de weg kwijt, 223. 20 Ibid.
21 Hew Strachan, Lost Meaning, 66.
22 Lukas Milevski, "Grand Strategy and Operational Art: Companion Concepts and Their Implications for Strategy," in: Comparative
Strategy, vol. 33, no. 4 (2014).
23 Ibid., 351. 24 Ibid.
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In this essay I will put this theory to the test. I will investigate if strategic illiteracy is indeed caused by this conceptual bifurcation of strategy into grand strategy and operational art. To answer this question, I will study the Dutch contribution to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The reasons for selecting this case are twofold. The first reason being the extraordinary process of decision-making in the Netherlands with regards to military operations. The constitution requires the government to inform parliament about its intention to deploy Dutch troops in an international military operation.25 This involves an assessment framework in which the government answers military and political questions about the conflict.26 This procedure is unique but, more importantly, it ensures at least a minimal strategic dialogue between civilian and military decision makers.27 This makes it less likely to find evidence that supports Milevski's theory. The second reason is practical: the mission has been concluded, which makes relevant data more accessible.
The first chapter will consist of a more detailed definition of strategy and its function to get a better idea of the importance of strategy and the consequences of strategic illiteracy. The strategic trinity, strategic illiteracy, strategy as an art and the nature of war will be discussed with the help of secondary literature, mainly drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz. The concepts of grand strategy and operational art will also be defined and discussed, mainly drawing on the literature of the theorists who introduced them: Julian Corbett, John Frederick Charles Fuller, and Basil Liddell Hart.
In the second chapter the research design will be discussed. The third chapter contains an analysis of the Assessment Framework along the lines of the elements of the strategic trinity, as discussed in the first chapters. The case of Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) will be studied in the fourth chapter, by tracing the process of decision-making. This process has been extensively studied by Mirjam Grandia in her dissertation, on which my analysis will be based.
25 Christ Klep, Uruzgan: Nederlandse militairen op missie 2005-2010 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011),81. 26 Ibid., 81, 82.
27 Algemeen Overleg, Nederlandse deelname aan vredesmissie, Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2013-2014, 18
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
In this chapter the concepts and theories that are most important to this study will be defined and explained. The most important concept that needs to be defined is strategic illiteracy. This, however, can only be understood once strategy as a concept has been defined. These two concepts will be discussed in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph Milevski's theory will be explained along with the concepts of grand strategy and operational art.
1.1 Strategy and Strategic Illiteracy
In order to be able to explain Milevski's theory on the bifurcation of strategy, strategy must be defined first. Defining strategy, however, is "notoriously difficult".28 Apart from the
difficulties that are inherent to defining concepts, the term 'strategy' has the additional problem of being used in non-military contexts whether appropriate or not. Governments or companies, for example, use the term inappropriately to describe a certain policy or business model.29
Moreover, even when used in a military context, 'strategy' has multiple meanings. First of all, strategy can refer to the analysis of a conflict. Strategy, then, is a dialogue between the political ends and the military means and ways of a conflict, which will be explained later.30
This is strategy as a concept.31 This analysis usually results in one or more options for action,
each of which can be called a strategy as well.32 A final meaning of the word strategy is the
process of execution of these options.33 It is important to note that strategy as the activity of
conducting warfare is not simply the execution of a plan. War involves at least one adversary, which means that strategy includes the interaction with adversaries who try to reach their own political goals by military means.34 In this sense, strategy should be flexible and constantly changing, requiring a constant analysis.
It is clear that these three military meanings of strategy form a chronological order when combined. It is a process of analysis, planning, execution and adaptation. Since the main question of this essay revolves around the causes of strategic illiteracy, this essay will
28 Williamson Murray, Mark Grimsley, "Introduction: On strategy," in: The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, eds. Williamson
Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.
29 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),
27.
30 G. Teitler, "Inleiding," in: G.Teitler, J. M. J. Bosch, W. Klinkert et al., Militaire Strategie (Amsterdam: Mets en Schilt, 2002), 15; Emile
Simpson, War from the Ground Up (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2015), 91.
31 Lukas Milevski,"The nature of strategy versus the character of war," in: Comparative Strategy, vol. 35, no. 1 (2016), 441. 32 Teitler et al., Militaire Strategie, 15.
33 Ibid., 16.
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focus on strategy as an analysis of the conflict. After all, strategy as an activity (execution and adaptation) is intrinsically linked to this analysis, because it is merely the outcome of this analysis.
So what then is this strategic analysis or dialogue? To explain this, the nature of war as a whole must be discussed. For this purpose I will introduce Carl von Clausewitz, the
influential Prussian military theorist. He famously stated that wars always have a political objective and, thus, are "a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse,
carried on with other means."35 This quote has often been misinterpreted as the subordination of the military to politics, but Clausewitz himself states that this, "however, does not imply
that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration."36 Thus, war and policy mutually influence each other.
This relation between policy and war, is key for strategy. After all, wars are not fought for the sake of fighting wars. Instead, wars serve a purpose: they are conducted to achieve a certain political goal. This gap between policy and military force can be bridged by asking questions about the nature of the conflict, the use of force in that conflict and the purpose to which force is employed.37 Clausewitz refers to these questions as strategic questions, all revolving around the strategic trinity of ends, ways and means.38
'Ends' refer to the political goals that a belligerent wants to achieve by the use of force. Formulating these political ends is the first step in developing a strategy and it is usually done by politicians. Although policy is leading when it comes to formulating ends is, the "political
aim is not a tyrant."39 The military should also be involved in the process to ensure that the intended goals are clear and can be achieved by employing military means.40 The strategic dialogue that follows between politicians and military leadership should result in a concrete formulation of political ends that can realistically be achieved by the use of force.
When the political ends have been formulated, it is time to think of ways these can be achieved using military means. This requires a thorough analysis of the conflict as a whole, including the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. According to Clausewitz "the most
far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish [...] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to
35 Strachan, The Direction of War, 50-53; Milevski, Nature of strategy, 440; Clausewitz, On war, 87. 36 Clausewitz, On War, 87.
37 Milevski, Nature of strategy, 441. 38 Clausewitz, On War, 88. 39 Ibid., 87.
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turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."41 Once the conflict as a whole has been analyzed, a certain approach must be developed.42 This approach is usually some form of operational art, and therefore this is mainly a military matter. Yet, again, the political ends remain to be leading and are not to be ignored. Moreover, policy dictates which tactics the military is allowed to use.43
The third part of the trinity is 'means'. This refers to the military means that are being employed. This is important because this is about "understanding both the potential as well as
the limits of military force."44 The military has to propose which type of force it wants to use and in what quantity. Policy, then, dictates to what extent this request is granted.45 Needless to say this is also an important part of the strategic dialogue between politics and the military.
In essence, strategy is all about aligning these ends, ways and means. It is "the
reciprocal interaction between policy, in the sense of the political decisions and intentions of the state, and how policy is articulated as actual operations: the interaction between what is desired and what is possible."46
Now that it is clear what strategy is and what it does, it is time to turn to the concept of strategic illiteracy. The term was first used by Hew Strachan in a lecture in 2004, but he does not explain how he invented it. In her oration Isabelle Duyvesteyn used a translation of the term to bring the matter to attention in the Netherlands.47 It seems the term strategic illiteracy may be explained by a paragraph in that oration in which she explains strategy, using the different strategic levels: the tactical, the operational and the strategic level. She compares them to language, stating that the tactical level is like the individual words in a sentence. The operational level, then, is like the structure of the sentence, organizing the order of the words and punctuation. The strategic level provides the grammar, that gives meaning to the
sentence.48 The term strategic illiteracy seems to refer to this analogy of strategy.
But what is strategic illiteracy? Strategic illiteracy can be defined as the inability to formulate achievable political objectives and connect them to realistic military planning.49 In other words, strategic illiteracy is the inability to align political ends with military ways and means. As is shown in Figure 1.1 it is not just the formulating of unrealistic political
41 Clausewitz, On War, 87.
42 Duyvesteyn, Revitalizing Strategic Studies, 30-33. 43 Milevski, Nature of strategy, 444.
44 Ibid., 442.
45 Duyvesteyn, Revitalizing Strategic Studies, 33, 34. 46 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 91.
47 Duyvesteyn, Strategisch Analfabetisme. 48 Ibid., 4.
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objectives that is troublesome. In fact, all elements of the strategic trinity can be misaligned. For example, it is possible to apply a military approach to a conflict that does not fit the means. Think of a force that is deployed to engage an enemy, without having armored units or air support at its disposal; the means and ways would not be aligned. If ways and ends do not align, the military approach cannot be expected to achieve the political ends. An example would be the attempt to end an insurgency by seeking to destroy the enemy in a conventional battle. Since insurgents tend to avoid open battle, this approach is incorrect. The last
possibility is the misalignment of ends and means. Imagine the political aim of a war to be the annexation of a large territory, when the force is too small to occupy it. These are all
examples of how strategic illiteracy might look. In reality strategic illiteracy can be any or multiple misalignments within the strategic trinity.
Figure 1.1 Strategic illiteracy and the strategic trinity
The consequences of strategic illiteracy should not be taken lightly. The balance between ends, ways and means is toppled, meaning that contemporary military missions are undertaken on the basis of unachievable political goals or even no goals at all.50 Also the military can be provided with insufficient means or inappropriate ways. Not only does this endanger the lives of those involved, it also undermines Western credibility and prestige, as Western armies are no longer capable of achieving the goals they have set themselves.
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1.2 The Bifurcation of Strategy
In 'Grand Strategy and Operational Art: Companion Concepts and Their Implications for
Strategy' Lukas Milevski develops his theory that the strategic trinity of ends, ways and
means has been bifurcated by the introduction of the concept of grand strategy. According to him it was assumed by strategists that the introduction of the concept of grand strategy would just add another strategic level, without altering the meaning of strategy as a whole.51 He argues that the concept of grand strategy requires the concept of operational art and that "the
necessary combination of grand strategy and operational art subsume within themselves the totality of the basic ends,ways, and means trinity of strategy. The result is the bifurcation of the totality of strategy into two distinct concepts. [...] The discipline of strategy thus loses coherence and meaning, as such an ideational division inhibits holistic thinking."52 In this paragraph the concepts of grand strategy and operational art will be explained along the lines set out by some of the most influential strategic theorists. Afterwards Milevski's theory will be discussed in greater detail.
In the introduction, the new American National Defense Strategy was briefly mentioned. It serves as a typical example of grand strategy, because it has two characteristics. First, it is a long-term vision that identifies threats, allies and neutrals and suggests how to deal with them, which is characteristic for grand strategy.53 In this example, Secretary of Defense Mattis identifies China, Russia, North Korea and Iran as threats, European countries as allies and formulates an approach to this strategic environment.54
The approach, or the strategy, is the second characteristic.55 It distinguishes itself from regular strategy in that it is not limited to military means.56 A belligerent state can, for
example, also employ economic, diplomatic or even social and cultural means in an effort to win a war. In our example, Mattis acknowledges this by arguing that "a long-term strategic
competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power— diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military."57
51 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 342. 52 Ibid.
53 G. Teitler, "Algemene beschouwingen over strategie," in: G.Teitler, J. M. J. Bosch, W. Klinkert et al., Militaire Strategie (Amsterdam:
Mets en Schilt, 2002), 29.
54 Mattis, National Defense Strategy, 2-11. 55 Teitler, Algemene beschouwingen, 29. 56 Ibid.
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This is the essence of grand strategy: to define ends and align them with the appropriate means.58
This becomes evident, when we study some of the most influential theorists on grand strategy. Julian Colbert, for example, suggests that grand strategy, or 'major strategy' as he called it, should revolve around the "selection of the immediate or primary objects to be
aimed at" and the "selection of the force to be used".59 Also economy and diplomacy should play a role in major strategy, according to Colbert.60
Basil Liddell Hart, another important strategic theorist, had similar ideas on grand strategy: "the role of grand strategy is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation
towards the attainment of the political object of the war - the goal defined by national policy.
[...] This should take account and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure,
commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will."61
A third influential theorist on grand strategy is John Fuller.62 He also had a very
similar view of grand strategy. He argued that grand strategy was the "directing of all warlike
resources towards the winning of the war" and that it should be called political strategy
instead.63 What all of these influential theorists have in common in their definition of grand strategy, is that it determines political goals and gathers resources. In other words, it defines ends and provides means. Ways - as a more military concern - are left out. Consequently, grand strategy is dominated by civilian policy. Indeed, it is policy. Milevski argues that this is why grand strategy requires operational art as a companion to complete the strategic trinity by filling in the ways.64 According to Milevski it is no coincidence that all of these theorists wrote about grand strategy and operational art, albeit under different names.65
So how do we define operational art? Operational art is the link between tactics and strategy. It "spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major
operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations."66 It serves strategy by using tactics.67 In other words, it is what connects a series of battles to the achievement of a strategic goal.
58 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 343.
59 as cited in: Milevski, Grand Strategy, 343. 60 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 343, 344.
61 Basil Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber), 187, 188. 62 Teitler, Inleiding.
63 as cited in: Milevski, Grand Strategy, 344. 64 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 345.
65 Ibid., 346.
66 John A. Olsen, Martin van Creveld, The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the present (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), 1.
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Corbett called this minor strategy, which was limited to movements in a theatre of war.68 He also argued that minor strategy did not aim to achieve a political goal, distinguishing it from strategy.69 Fuller used the terms grand tactics or field strategy, also emphasizing troop movements and winning tactical battles in service of strategy.70 Liddell Hart named it the strategy of the indirect approach and defined it as "the art of distributing and applying
military means."71 In terms of the strategic trinity, operational art is called 'ways'. This division of the strategic trinity in ends, means - being represented by grand strategy - and ways - as in operational arts - is not just limited to those historical strategic theorists. They are omnipresent in military theory, military education and military doctrine. A relatively recent example of a military theorist who divides the strategic trinity would be Edward Luttwak. His book 'Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace' has become one of the foundational works in contemporary literature on strategy.72 He argues, for example, that
"ultimate ends and basic means are both manifest only at the level of grand strategy".73 It is
clear that he leaves out ways, splitting up the strategic trinity. And he is not the only author, with this view.74
It is no surprise that the concept of grand strategy is taught in military education, when it is discussed in the literature. The Netherlands Defence Academy, for example, currently offers a masters program in which two of the four core courses use the book "Strategy in the
contemporary world" by John Baylis et al.75 The authors of this book borrow Liddell Hart's definition of grand strategy.76
In the Dutch Defense Doctrine the concept of grand strategy is called the political strategic level, which "is tasked with the coordinated, systematic development and application
of all power resources (grand strategy) to a state, an alliance or coalition, to protect national or allied interest. [...] Formulating this strategy is the exclusive responsibility of the
government, regardless of whether it acts independently or cooperates with other
governments in international organizations or in an ad-hoc coalition."77 Again, the ends and means are formulated and aligned, while ways is left out. The fact that grand strategy is the
68 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 346. 69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 347.
71 as cited in: Milevski, Grand Strategy, 347. 72 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 348.
73 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 70.
74 See for example: Amersfoort, Nederland de weg kwijt; Teitler et al., Militaire Strategie; William C. Martel, Grand strategy in theory and
practice: the need for an effective American foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
75 Netherlands Defence Academy, Study Guide Masters Military Strategic Studies (Breda: 2017), 27, 35; John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S.
Gray, Eliot Cohen, Strategy in the contemporary world (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
76 Baylis et al., Strategy in the contemporary world, 4.
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exclusive responsibility of the government also suggests that it is completely decided by policymakers and without military influence.
Consequently, Milevski argues that the introduction of the concepts of grand strategy and operational art created a bifurcation of the strategic trinity into ends and means on one side and ways on the other.78 The bifurcation is visualized in Figure 1.2, which shows the strategic trinity being divided by grand strategy, developed by policymakers, and operational art, developed by the military.
Figure 1.2 The Bifurcation of strategy
Milevski continues his argument by stating that: "the genesis of grand strategy as a separate
and higher level of strategy [...] places a buffer between strategy and policy or politics. Such a placement of grand strategy hinders the strategist from thinking politically by giving him another, nominally strategic, master. This threatens to undermine the strategist’s core purpose of translating military means and ways into political ends."79 This is devastating for
strategy as this bifurcation impedes the strategic dialogue between civilians and the military, and thus the alignment or the balancing of ends, means and ways, the very essence of strategy. According to Milevski, the result may be setting unrealistic political goals for the employment of force and/or the application of force without a purpose.80 In other words, the result is strategic illiteracy.
78 Milevski, Grand Strategy, 348. 79 Ibid.
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Chapter 2: Research Design
The objective of this study is to find evidence for or against Milevski's theory for strategic illiteracy. In previous chapter strategic illiteracy was defined as the inability to formulate achievable political objectives and connect them to realistic military planning. Milevski's theory, in short, was that the concept of grand strategy divided the strategic trinity, resulting in a lack of strategic dialogue between civilian and military decision makers on the strategic level.
If this theory is indeed true, there would be no or insufficient strategic dialogue between civilian and military decision makers on the strategic trinity as a whole. This means that we would expect ways to be misaligned with ends and/or means, as the divide between grand strategy and operational art runs along this line. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
However, if ends and means are misaligned, this would be evidence against Milevski's theory. After all, Milevski argues that it is the divide between grand strategy and operational art that causes strategic illiteracy. If we would find the strategic illiteracy within grand
strategy, as depicted in Figure 2.2, his theory could be falsified. These indicators will serve as the hypotheses in this study.
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Figure 2.2 Misalignment within grand strategy
Additionally, since strategy is the product of a strategic dialogue between military and political actors, the interaction between these groups is of vital importance. The theories of grand strategy and operational imply that these are separate domains, in which the developer is the sole determinant. In that sense grand strategy is developed by political actors, as they formulate the political ends and provide the means. The ways, or operational art, are designed by military actors. The bifurcation of strategy promotes this division of actors, which
Milevski calls "professional isolation".81 It follows that if Milevski's theory is true, we would
expect to observe a lack of interaction between those actors who develop grand strategy and those who develop operational art. Honesty is crucial in this matter, since the elements of the strategic trinity can only be aligned properly when all actors are well-informed. Military actors, for example, have to be honest about the means they think are required if they intend to accomplish the assigned mission. Political actors, in turn, have to formulate clear political goals, if they want the military to translate them into operational goals. Consequently, the third hypothesis will be a lack of honest interaction between military and non-military actors.
In order to test these hypotheses, a case needs to be studied. After all, the theory implies a misunderstanding of strategy on a conceptual level, which cannot be tested in a quantitative research. Moreover, the national context plays an important role in the process of
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decision making and it cannot be neglected. A case study is the only appropriate option. The case that will be studied in this essay is the process of decision making leading up to the Dutch contribution to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This is an interesting case for two reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the Dutch operation in Uruzgan is deemed strategically illiterate by numerous scholars.82
The second reason is that the Dutch constitution requires the government to send an informative letter - the so-called 'artikel-100 brief' - to all members of parliament to inform them of the governments' intention to deploy troops in an international military operation.83 The letter builds on 'het Toetsingskader', an assessment framework that requires the
government to answer a number of political and military questions about the conflict that serve as an analysis.84 The outcome of this analysis should determine whether or not the troops are to be deployed. This Assessment Framework was introduced in the aftermath of the humanitarian disaster in Srebrenica in 1995, when Dutch peacekeepers were deployed, but failed to prevent the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims.85 The purpose of the
Assessment Framework is to prevent such a tragedy from happening again, by careful
analysis of the feasibility of the operation.86 This procedure is unique and draws considerable international attention.87 In theory, it should encourage at least the civilian decision makers to interact with the military in a strategic dialogue, making it less likely to find evidence for Milevski's theory. It follows that if evidence for his theory is found in this case, it is stronger.
So what would be evidence supporting Milevki's theory? Since his theory centers around the splitting up of the strategic trinity into ends and means for the civilian decision makers and ways for the military decision makers, this divide is what should be looked for. This can be done in two ways. The first and most obvious place where evidence is to be found is the Assessment Framework in the article-100 letter itself. A clear separation of the strategic trinity along the lines of grand strategy and operational art in this letter to parliament would provide evidence for Milevski's theory, whereas the absence of this separation would provide evidence against his theory.
However, by the time the government sent the letter to parliament it has already done a lot of preparatory work. Thus, the most important part of the strategic dialogue actually took place, or should have taken place, before the letter was drafted. The process of decision
82 See for example: Amersfoort, Nederland de weg kwijt; Duyvesteyn, Strategisch Analfabetisme; Klep, Uruzgan; Grandia,Deadly embrace. 83 Klep, Uruzgan, 81.
84 Ibid., 81, 82.
85 Ibid.; Grandia, Deadly embrace, 96, 97. 86 Grandia, Deadly embrace, 97.
87 Algemeen Overleg, Nederlandse deelname aan vredesmissie, Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2013-2014, 18
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making up to the drafting of the letter, therefore, needs to be analyzed as well. In this case the supposed separation of the strategic trinity is likely to be less evident, as it is not written down in a document. However, the actual decisions that were made will reveal strategic illiteracy and, thus, the type of misalignment can also be identified. This in turn allows us to see to what extent the strategic illiteracy can be attributed to the bifurcation of strategy.
Mirjam Grandia has studied this process of decision making leading up to the deployment of Dutch troops to Uruzgan extensively in her dissertation.88 She analyzed documents from the Dutch Defence Archives and conducted interviews with 48 people that were involved in the process on the strategic level, which she calls the civil military
interface.89 An analysis of the process she describes should provide insights into the potential bifurcation of the strategic trinity. Also the interviews cited in her dissertation could be very helpful, as they give us an insight in how actors understand strategy.
88 Grandia, Deadly embrace, 97. 89 Ibid., 21.
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Chapter 3: The Assessment Framework
To analyze the extent to which the strategic trinity has been split up in the strategic dialogue prior to the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan, the Assessment Framework and the process of decision making process will be studied. Even though the Assessment Framework is the outcome of the decision making process, it makes sense to analyze it first, because it will serve as a guide through the process of strategic dialogue, which will be analyzed later. In this chapter each of the three connections between the elements of the strategic trinity in the Assessment Framework will be analyzed.
The Assessment Framework was introduced in order to prevent another tragedy like the massacre Srebrenica. It is supposed to give parliament a more important role by informing them about the conflict and the proposed operation.90 If that is interpreted strictly, the framework should be viewed as a list of criteria that should be met before the decision is made to either accept or reject the request for participation.91 But what should this framework look like? The framework should address a number of aspects related to the conflict: the reasons for deployment, the mandate, other contributing countries, the extent to which the Netherlands can influence the operation, political aspects and military aspects.92
The political aspects include an explanation for why a military operation is the most suitable course of action given the circumstances.93 It also contains a number of options that may be included for analysis, such as the political context, the involved parties, the character of the conflict, previous negotiations, the risks and lastly, the role of the military in the political process.94 The military aspects are analyzed as well. This includes an analysis of the
feasibility of the operation, the military capacities of the belligerent parties, climate and terrain, the required size of the deployment, the concept of operations, the rules of engagement and the command structure.95
For the purpose of this study the size of the deployment and the concept of operations are most important. The concept of operations is especially interesting as it includes a
description of the military goals, a definition of how 'success' would look like in that
90 Klep, Uruzgan, 102. 91 Ibid.
92 Assessment Framework 2001, Betrokkenheid van het parlement bij de uitzending van militaire eenheden, Brief van de Ministers van
Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 13 July 2001, Kamerstuk 23591 nr. 7.
93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid.
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particular case. Also the manner of action should be described.96 This means that even though the political and military aspects are clearly separated, a strategic dialogue is required. After all, when the size of the deployment and the concept of operations are combined, the strategic trinity of ends, means and ways is completely included in the Assessment Framework.
The reality, however, was rather different. The letter mainly consisted of a thorough analysis of the conflict and the province of Uruzgan. Also the risks, the mandate, the allies, command structure, rules of engagement and the size of the force to be deployed, which I will go into later, were discussed. The ends and ways were either left out or were too abstract to be translated into operational objectives, as will become clear in the analysis.
3.1 Aligning ends and ways
The political goals - stated in the article-100 letter - were either unrealistic or too abstract to be translated into a plan. The letter mentions that ISAF's long-term goal is to turn Afghanistan into a stable democratic state, in order to prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism.97 The problem with this goal is that it is so ambitious that it is no longer realistic. And especially not within the timeframe of two years. The Dutch government seems to have realized this as well and adapted its 'more specific' goals to "assisting the Afghan authorities
in promoting safety and stability."98 Of course this is less ambitious, but nonetheless it is still
a very abstract goal, leaving it unclear when these goals were considered to be achieved or whether that was even possible.
Moreover, both Grandia and Amersfoort concluded that the main reason for deployment was not to support Afghanistan, but was actually to prove to NATO and the United States that the Netherlands was a reliable ally: "from the perspective of most of the
military and civil respondents of this study, both the relationship with the United States and ‘responsible alliance behavior’ were foundational for their respective choices with regard to the deployment of Dutch forces to Uruzgan." 99
A statement by one of the military planners - interviewed by Grandia - serves as illustration: "We needed to get a political mandate for at least two years, but knew we needed
more time to achieve the goals set for the mission […] The political objective was to
participate in ISAF […] not difficult in terms of providing military advice but unsatisfactory. We joined the mission on the basis of incorrect thoughts; it was more important to provide
96 Ibid.
97 Article-100 Letter, Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Defensie en voor
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 22 December 2005, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 193, p. 4, 5.
98 Ibid., 13.
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troops for at least two years instead of achieving a certain objective like a stable environment."100
The problem with these political goals, or 'ends', is that they are merely political and not about Afghanistan at all. These goals are grand strategic and they cannot be translated into a plan of operations. No operational goal can be derived from these abstract ends. After all, if the goal is to deploy troops in Afghanistan, the goal has been achieved as soon as the troops arrive. The irony is, of course, that these troops would not have to do anything to reach this goal. Their mere presence would have already achieved it. In other words, there would be a lack of guidance to what it is that they would have to achieve. And if the objective is unclear, one cannot find a way to accomplish it.
The more specific goal of assisting the Afghan authorities in promoting safety and stability is an attempt at solving this problem of unclarity. However, even this goal is still too abstract, because it cannot be defined when the Dutch troops have provided sufficient
assistance to the Afghan authorities. After all, the goal was not a safe and stable Uruzgan - which would be a well-defined end - but providing assistance in itself. But when would this goal be achieved? When would the Dutch troops have provided enough assistance? These questions remain unanswered. Consequently, the operation lacked a specific goal the military could pursue: these ends could not be translated into a plan of operations.
This brings up the topic of 'ways', or how the government thought the deployment of a Dutch force was going to achieve this vague goal. The 'ways' can be divided into two
components: the operational plan and the reconstruction policy. With regards to the operational plan, it is mentioned in the letter that it was being designed and approved by NATO.101 The letter provides no additional information on what this plan looked like or what the Dutch forces were going to do.102 It seems the government was not too interested in the operational aspect, as this responsibility was given to NATO. The letter could have at least mentioned the inkspot-method, the effects-based approach or the fact that the operation would be a counterinsurgency operation.103 That would have given the members of parliament a better idea of what would be expected from the troops.
The reconstruction policy, on the other hand, was discussed in great detail. The letter states that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were going to be involved in "activities
with regards to CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation, auth.) and reconstruction, as well as
100 Lieutenant Colonel Hartog, as cited in: Grandia, Deadly embrace, 135. 101 Article-100 Letter, 13.
102 Ibid., 13-15.
103 Willem M. Klumper, De effects-based approach to operations in Afghanistan: meten van het onmeetbare (Doctoral thesis Universiteit
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facilitating reconstruction."104 These CIMIC activities revolved around small aid projects and establishing contact with the local population, the local authorities and NGO's.105 The PRT was going to be involved in training the Afghan National Army and the police force, a disarmament program and reconstruction programs by NGO's, supported by the Ministry of Development Cooperation.106 The exact role of military forces in this process was unclear, as this work is usually carried out by civilians. But "due to the security situation these activities
will be executed by primarily military personnel at first."107 The letter states that the actual reconstruction work, mainly carried out by NGO's and the Ministry of Development Cooperation, will start "as soon as possible".108
So what does this mean for the alignment of ends and ways? If the ends of the operation are unclear, it is hard or even impossible to come up with a suitable way to reach them. In the article-100 letter this becomes evident when the role of the military in the operation is examined. First, the operational aspect is ignored in the letter. The only mention of an operational plan is that it was being designed by NATO. This implies that at the time there was no operational plan, as it was still being designed. And how could one secure and stabilize an area in order to allow civilian personnel to start reconstruction activities without a plan of operations? Because even though the reconstruction policy was carefully laid out in a three-page explanation, the security situation would prevent its execution. Even the three ministers themselves admitted in their letter that reconstruction would be limited to CIMIC-activities, carried out by soldiers, as long as the security situation was too dangerous for civilian personnel.109 However, if the security situation prevented civilian personnel from reconstruction, it is doubtful whether reconstruction was even the right way to achieve stability at that particular time.
In other words, the reconstruction policy depended on an operational plan, which had not been developed at that point. The ways and ends were clearly misaligned, because the ways could never achieve the ends. This misalignment is exactly what we would expect to find if Milevski's theory was true. Moreover, the fact that a government letter described the reconstruction policy quite clearly, and yet had no concept of operation for the military aspect of the operation, only provides further support for Milevski's theory. It shows that the political decision makers were mainly interested in the grand strategic goal of being a valuable ally and
104 Ibid., 14. 105 Ibid., 20 106 Ibid., 20, 21.
107 Ibid., 21; translated by author. 108 Ibid.; translated by author. 109 Ibid.
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that they did not think through how this could be translated to an end that was related to Uruzgan. Consequently, they also did not develop a way to achieve this end. Instead, they were merely developing policy for the operation, while the operational aspect was left to the military decision makers, within the confines of NATO. Milevski would argue that this is the bifurcation of strategy at work.
3.2 Aligning means and ways
The means that the government assigned to the Task Force were 1400 to 1600 soldiers, six Apache attack helicopters and six F-16 fighter jets.110 In case of emergency the PRT's in
neighboring provinces could help deploying extra maneuver units.111 But as the letter did not
contain a plan of operations, it is not possible to find out on the basis of this letter whether or not these means were aligned with the ways.
The reconstruction policy is a different matter. Right after the PRT was deployed, the troops would start CIMIC-projects to gain the population's trust.112 This would enable NGO's to employ their reconstruction projects - in cooperation with the PRT - in a relatively safe environment. For the reconstruction policy one NGO was already active in the province and another was named as a potential partner for reconstruction.113 Furthermore, the ministers reported that "a number of Dutch NGO's" were interested in talking about a potential
cooperation in Uruzgan.114 It is also mentioned in the letter that the Ministry of Development Cooperation could help fund reconstruction projects.115 For CIMIC-activities a budget of €500.000 is reserved.116
Considering that the plan was to get NGO's to do most of the reconstruction projects, it is remarkable that only one active NGO was willing to cooperate, while only one other NGO was seriously considering to employ its activities in Uruzgan. At that point in time, only a number of other NGO's were merely interested in talks about possible cooperation. As was pointed out earlier, this meant that military forces had to take up reconstruction work.117 At least for the time being.
110 Ibid., 16. 111 Ibid., 18. 112 Ibid., 20. 113 Ibid., 22. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., 21
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This is problematic for two reasons. The first being that military forces are not trained to do reconstruction projects. That does not mean that they are unable to do this type of work, but they are certainly not as well suited for it as NGO's are. Soldiers are not a neutral party in the conflict, for example, which may make it harder to gain the population's trust. Their expertise may also be lacking, compared to NGO's that are often specialized in certain fields.
The second reason is that the reconstruction projects that were conducted by soldiers, were CIMIC-projects. The budget for these activities was limited to €500.000. In comparison, the Americans spent four to six million US dollars a year on reconstruction projects in
Uruzgan.118 Thus, even though at least in the early stages reconstruction projects would be mainly CIMIC-projects, the Dutch budget was rather small. This seriously limited the amount of projects that could be carried out in Uruzgan.
All in all, in the article-100 letter the means and ways were insufficiently aligned. In the original reconstruction plan the Task Force would do CIMIC-projects to gain the population's trust, which would enable NGO's to start their reconstruction projects in a relatively secure environment. The means for this approach, however, were unsuitable. There was only one NGO that agreed to cooperate and, consequently, the reconstruction projects had to be carried out by soldiers. Needless to say, these were not as specialized as NGO's and their budget was very small. As the ministers did not discuss the operational way the troops were going to be active in Uruzgan, it is impossible to determine to what extent they were aligned.
This misalignment of ways and means is what we would expect to find if Milevski's theory would be true. Again, the fact that this government letter described the reconstruction policy quite clearly, and yet had no concept of operation for the military aspect of the
operation, only provides further support for Milevski's theory. It seems that the ministers were merely interested in policy and not in operational art.
3.3 Aligning ends and means
But to what extent were the ends and means of the operation aligned, according to the letter? In the previous paragraphs it was concluded that the ministers stated that the ends of the mission were to assist the Afghan authorities in promoting stability and security in Uruzgan, even though the actual ends were to be a trustworthy ally. With regards to the reconstruction
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policy the means were rather limited and even though the way the troops were going to operate is left unclear, we may conclude the same for the military means.
Because even though the letter states that "the Dutch armed forces have sufficient units
at their disposal to complete the assigned tasks," a closer look at the letter may call this into
question.119 After all, the letter reveals that the American forces had established four military bases in Uruzgan during Operation Enduring Freedom, but the Dutch forces would only take over two of them.120 The other two would be occupied by troops of the Afghan National Army (ANA). This suggests that the Dutch forces were actually insufficient to assist the Afghan authorities in the entire province of Uruzgan.
Grandia's respondents confirmed this: "there is a tendency within the military,
stemming from their anticipation of political approval for deployment of their forces, to keep their demands low. [...] The limitation of the troop numbers was described by many
military respondents as a ‘self-inflicted wound’. Anticipating possible political rejection when requesting permission to compose a robust task force, the Defence staff had come up with a number of 1000 troops. Minister of Defence Kamp recalled this number to have been presented to him by the military staff and explained that once the number was
communicated within the political levels, there was no way back."121 Also Klep confirms that the size of the force was insufficient.122
This shows how problematic a too abstract formulation of ends can be. On one hand, the goal of assisting Afghan authorities was met by operating in the area surrounding the two military bases in Southern Uruzgan. On the other hand, it is clear that the assistance provided by the roughly 1500 troops was far from optimal: the Dutch troops were only present in half of the military bases and could not possibly assist the ANA in the northern two bases as well. This, of course, raises the question of how much assistance was required to meet this goal. However, regardless of the answer to this question, the means were definitely insufficient to optimally pursue stability and security in Uruzgan. Even the intermediate evaluation of the operation by the involved ministries confirmed this: "it turned out that expanding ADZ's [Afghan Development Zones, auth.] meant risking overstretch, by spreading out TFU
capacity. Expelling insurgents from territory without sufficient capacity to hold it, could lead
119 Ibid.; translated by author. 120 Ibid., 15.
121 Grandia, Deadly embrace, 121. 122 Klep, Uruzgan, 96.
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to its recapture by insurgents."123 In other words: the operational capacity of the TFU was insufficient to provide optimal assistance.
With regards to the means for the reconstruction policy a similar conclusion can be drawn. As was already established earlier, only one NGO that was active in Uruzgan, wanted to cooperate with the TFU. One other NGO was considering employing its activities in the province, while only a number of other NGO's were interested in exploratory talks. In practice, this meant that the soldiers would have to take up reconstruction by employing CIMIC-activities on a larger scale.124 The budget for CIMIC-projects, however, was limited to €500.000, which would seriously inhibit the potential for reconstruction.
Counterinsurgency operations, however, rely on winning over the 'hearts and minds' of the population and, thus, isolate the insurgents from its base of support.125 Reconstruction projects, and especially the CIMIC-projects, are essential in these type of operations, as they show the population that it is in their own interest to support the legitimate authorities instead of the insurgents.126
Again, if the end is to provide the Afghan authorities optimal assistance in stabilizing the province, a budget this small would jeopardize the efficiency of the assistance provided by the TFU. Consequently, the ends and means were also misaligned. This, however, is what we would not expect to see if Milevski's theory was true. After all, he argued that the bifurcation of trinity would split up strategy into policy, decided by civilian decision makers, and
operational art, decided by military officials. In terms of the trinity this would mean that strategic illiteracy would be located in the interaction between ways and both means and ends. Means and ends, on the contrary, should be aligned. The fact that this is not the case, means that evidence against Milevski's theory has been found.
To conclude, the article-100 letter has shown that none of the elements in the strategic trinity were aligned properly. This provides evidence for as well as against Milevski's theory. This raises the question if these misalignments can be explained by other factors. With regards to the misalignment of ends and means, there is an alternative explanation. The military
planners, interviewed by Grandia, suggest that the Defense staff gave Minister Kamp a low
123 Tussentijdse Evaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage ISAF, Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, Brief ministers ter aanbieding van de
tussentijdse evaluatie van de Nederlandse bijdrage aan ISAF in Afghanistan, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, 11 September 2009, Kamerstuk 27925 nr. 357, p. 29; translated by author.
124 Article-100 Letter, 20.
125 Baylis et al., Strategy in the contemporary world, 180. 126 Ibid.
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number of required troops on purpose, as they feared the mission would be cancelled if the financial costs would be too high.127 Klep draws the same conclusion.128
Klep's analysis of the Assessment Framework offers another useful insight. He points out that the framework was supposed to be a list of criteria that should result in a decision to either accept or deny the request for troop deployment, but that the framework was used the other way around: first a decision was made and only then followed the Assessment
Framework.129 According to Klep, if objectively assessed, the Assessment Framework should have resulted in a rejection of the participation request, because three important criteria were not met.130 One of these criteria is relevant for this study and it revolves around a supposedly clear distinction between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). ISAF would focus on assisting the Afghan authorities in promoting stability and safety. Offensive operations were allowed, but only if Opposing Military Forces (OMF) endangered the reconstruction work.131 OEF, on the other hand, would remain active in the area to perform counterterrorism
operations. This included hunting down, capturing and/or eliminating OMF leading figures.132
As a result, the Dutch government insisted on a clear distinction as a protection measure for their own forces.133
The proposed solution was to give the command over both operation to one
commander, so as to align them.134 In theory, the distinction between these operations is clear. Especially if one commander can align them and make sure they do not overlap. However, in reality this distinction was rather blurred. As Major-General Van Reijn, at the time head of military intelligence, pointed out: "in a theater of operations, where two military operations
are being conducted at the same time, there has to be cooperation, even if the only purpose is to prevent accidents. Evidently, the operational reality in Uruzgan and the political reality in the Netherlands, do not always coincide".135 This was especially problematic for the Afghan population, as they perceived coalition action in general to be inappropriate.136
The fact that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation assured parliament in the Assessment Framework that "ISAF and OEF will operate
completely separate", shows a serious lack of appreciation for the operational aspect.137 After
127 Grandia, Deadly embrace, 121. 128 Klep, Uruzgan, 96. 129Ibid., 102. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid., 103. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid., 103, 104.
135 J. A. van Reijn, "De missie Uruzgan: politieke besluitvorming nader bezien", in: Carré, vol. 30 no. 5 (2005), 25. 136 Klep, Uruzgan, 105; Article-100 Letter, 11.
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all, this distinction between operations was unclear to the Afghan population whose hearts and minds needed to be won. The distinction was blind to the operational reality and a purely political formality.138 This lack of appreciation for operational art is no evidence for
Milevski's theory, but it does confirm the existence of a split between those who perform operational art and those who dictate policy. If that split is caused by grand strategy, remains to be seen.
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Chapter 4: The Process of Decision Making
In last chapter the Assessment Framework was discussed as the outcome of a strategic dialogue. In this chapter the process of decision making, rather than its outcome, will be analyzed. First, the process of decision making will be described. This is followed up by an analysis of the decisions that involved the alignment of ends, means and ways. The interviews conducted by Grandia will help to identify actors, their influence on decisions and sometimes even their motives. This enables the search for Milevski's bifurcation of strategy in the
decisions, as well as some of the actors. After all, if his theory is true we would also observe a bifurcation between military and civilian actors. This would mean that the military actors would be reluctant in getting involved in matters of grand strategy, and focus on operational art instead. For civilians, then, an opposite focus would be expected.
4.1 The Process
In 2001 the United Nations authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force by NATO in order to provide security in the area of Kabul.139 In the subsequent years the operation was expanded to assist in the stabilization of other parts of Afghanistan as well. In 2003 the UN agreed that ISAF should expand to Southern
Afghanistan, which required the deployment of extra troops.140
In 2004 the Dutch director of operations, general Cobelens, was first consulted in an informal way about a possible deployment of Dutch forces in support of ISAF.141 In the interview with Grandia he states that he had anticipated this request, as Dutch special forces were already active in the province of Kandahar, South Afghanistan.142 Acting on his
anticipation, Cobelens had started informal talks with the British and the Canadian directors of operations.143 In his interview with Grandia Cobelens stated that the Minister of Defence,
Henk Kamp, was frequently updated on the idea, as he needed his political approval to make decisions.144
It is important to note that the initial preparation was mainly a matter for the military. Only in January 2005 was the steering group military operations (SMO) informed of the
139 UN RES/1386. 140 UN RES/1510.
141 Grandia, Deadly embrace, 115. 142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 116, 117. 144 Ibid., 115.
