A
A Mayor’s Letter
German Deserters in Bergen, The Netherlands, during The First World
War (1914-1918)
S. G. J. Houwer
1
A Mayor’s Letter
German Deserters in Bergen, The Netherlands, during the First World War
(1914-1918)
S.G.J. Houwer Hooigracht 27 A 2312 KM Leiden Tel. : 0615315371 E-mail : s.g.j.houwer@gmail.com Collegekrt. : s1112732 Master ThesisCities, Migration and Global Interdependence
Leiden University 30 June 2019
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Index
1. Introduction 3
2. A Warm Embrace? Laws, Rules and Regulations 9
3. Refugees, Internees and Deserters, 1914-1916 14
4. Letters on German Deserters, 1917 22
5. Letters on German Deserters, 1918 32
6. Epilogue, 1919-1921 40
7. Conclusion 42
8. Bibliography 44
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1. Introduction
A Mayor´s letter
On the fifth of April, 1917, the local government of Bergen sent a letter assigned to the national government in The Hague in response to their intention of building a new detention camp to shelter German deserters.1 Bergen, a town in the Dutch province of Noord-Holland near the city of Alkmaar, was a small and quiet community. Therefore, the camp proposed by the national government was met with serious objections, doubts and criticism by the locals. This disapproval becomes particularly clear after examining the following statement in the letter that was sent a century ago:
All members of the local council share the opinion that the establishment of a camp in Bergen is not in the best interest of the community due to the following:
1. The town of Bergen can only designate valuable farmland as a possible location for a camp. Farmland that will be needed to counter the already serious issues with food shortages.
2. Bergen is a popular holiday destination for people who are looking for a seaside resort. During the summer months, the population of the town rises with approximately 2000 foreigners. With the supply of essential provisions at a low, the local government would not like to increase the number of foreigners with the establishment of a camp.
3. The camp will for the most part offer shelter to people of lesser wellbeing and lower class who will not offer anything in contribution to the community in return.
4. The establishment of the camp will not benefit the tranquillity in the community.2
Despite these clear objections from the local government of Bergen, the national government in The Hague decided to begin establishment of the new camp as early as July 1917, aiming to get the camp fully operational at the end of the same month. Although the local mayor of Bergen, Jacob Van Reenen, was promised by the commander in chief of the camp, major A. Ter Cock, that the presence of the new camp would not cause any trouble for the community or would do any harm to the reputation of the small town of Bergen, he was most displeased with the situation. In fact, the mayor was the first to address small problems when they occurred and the relationship between the local government and the commander of the camp worsened over time. Van Reenen addressed the first minor problem in a letter to commander Ter Cock dating from the 23th of July, 1917:
When I mentioned my serious concerns regarding the establishment of a deserters’ camp in Bergen, which in regular opinion still stands as a disaster for our community, you ensured that I as the mayor of this community would not encounter any trouble or problems in relation to the camp.
1 E. de Roodt, Oorlogsgasten. Vluchtelingen en Krijgsgevangenen in Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog
(Zaltbommel 2000) 230.
2 Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA)
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 973, Vestiging interneringsdepot in Bergen. 1917-1920. For the original Dutch letter, see attachment I.
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Yesterday it occurred to me that certain problems already existed when a woman was sent to me by your doing. This woman travelled here together with one of the German deserters who was offered shelter in the camp. This particular woman though, could not be offered the same attendance. I fear these problems will increase over time when more women end up in our community and no proper action is taken. These women are in no way capable of taking care of themselves (…) the morality and tranquillity, which already suffered from the presence of foreign military deserters, will only suffer more with the arrival of women without proper means of maintaining themselves and if proper action to counter this problem remains absent.3
Major Ter Cock reacted in his following correspondence on the rude attitude of the mayor and his poor choice of words. Ter Cock saw the problem as miniscule and criticized the mayor’s exaggerations. Why is it possible that a small group of German deserters caused so much trouble for local policy making in the small community of Bergen in the Netherlands during the First World War (1914-1918)?
After analysing this particular correspondence, a few things stand out. First, it is remarkable to notice that three different parties with seemingly different degrees of authority were concerned with the matter. The Dutch national government, the local government of Bergen represented by mayor Van Reenen and the commander of the camp major Ter Cock had to work together. Clear interaction between these different levels of authority would be needed to counter problems effectively. Second, it seems that Ter Cock and Van Reenen started out on the wrong foot. Future correspondence between the different parties involved, shows that cooperation on matters concerning the camp, the internment of German deserters and the managing of these ‘forced migrants’ was difficult.
Gap Theory
This matter makes for an interesting question surrounding the topic of authority and policy making on a national and local level while these different parties have different interests. In this particular case, a mayor is trying to do what is best for his community while the national government searches for solutions on matters concerning the benefit of the whole country in which they are unable to satisfy everyone. Therefore, a centralised policy established by a central government will not always deliver the desired result on a local level. According to Martin Kraaijestein, local communities had to deal with dozens of divergent issues during the War. In solving these issues, municipalities were confronted with interference from different parties. First, the different departments of the general government but also the provincial government, local council, committees and charity organisations. Also, the local economy and voice of the citizens had to be taken into consideration. Mayors and regional governments had to operate in this confusing web of regulations and demands, confronted with the execution and maintaining general government laws in which there was little room left for the incorporation of local needs. Civilians expected solutions on local matters from the mayor and local governors, but their power, authority and financial resources seemed somewhat limited. As the tasks and responsibilities of local governments increased during the War, the need for local
3 Letter from mayor Van Reenen to commander in chief of the camp for German deserters general-major Ter
Cock, 23 July, 1917. RAA
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 973, Vestiging interneringsdepot in Bergen. 1917-1920. For the original Dutch letter, see attachment II.
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regulations became increasingly necessary.4 Peter Gatrell asks: ´Should the central government be responsible for managing refugee relief (in this case the German military deserters sheltered at Bergen) or should responsibility be devolved on voluntary agencies, the military and local institutions? What impact would the presence of large numbers of refugees or foreigners have on social and economic life in the host community?` According to Gatrell, these questions have attracted too little attention from historians whereas these issues concern mass migration. He states that most WWI historians overlooked the ‘migration issue’ because of more important subjects such as the Great War itself or institutions such as armies, governments and political parties. The migration issue which occurred during the First World War5 has been overlooked.6
Then there is the issue of public opinion among the national population of the Netherlands. During the first months of the First World War, refugees, deserters and war victims were welcomed with open arms by the Dutch. Deserters especially were seen as pacifists who had turned their backs to violence and the terrors of the War. Dutch voluntary organisations together with the national government tried to arrange food, care and shelter for these individuals. This sympathy began to fade away as the War dragged on; more and more refugees and deserters stayed in the country for longer periods of time and problems such as theft, criminality and espionage became more and more common.7
Public opinion as well as authorities with different kinds of interests concerning a certain topic or matter, can be of great influence in practicing and implementing foreigner policies. It is possible that due to these two factors a gap exists between how a policy should work in theory and how it is implemented in the field. This so-called ‘Gap Theory’ or ‘Gap Hypothesis’ could be implied to the policy making concerning the shelter of German deserters and internees in Bergen during the First World War. It is possible that this ´gap´ between centralised policy and local needs caused trouble in handling German deserters in Bergen. In an article by Wayne Cornelius and Takeyuki Tsuda, the two historians argue that most policy gaps are of two kinds: Those caused by the unintended consequences of policy and those caused by inadequate implementation or enforcement of policy.8 According to Saskia Bonjour, who reacts to
Cornelius’ and Tsuda’s statements in a recent article The Power and Morals of Policy Makers: Reassessing the Control Gap Debate (2011), migration history benefits and should focus more on the research of case studies and local studies reconstructing decision making to contribute to its theory-building regarding policy making.9 Cornelius focused the discussion on the gap between policy-making and policy outcomes on the interests of politics, political institutions and the relation between immigration and international relations. All these factors could have an effect in the implementation of foreigner policies and therefore on the possible existence of a gab.10 Although the current debate focusses on the migration of the working class after WOII and which policies were implemented by national governments on this working immigrants arriving in countries, it is interesting to see if the same theory can be applied in the case of the German deserters in Bergen. In theory, the general policies on German deserters implemented
4 M. Kraaijestein, ‘Lokale Noden en Lokaal Beleid,’ Leven naast de Catastrofe. Nederland tijdens de Eerste
Wereldoorlog (Hilversum 2001) 63-78, there 75.
5 The First World War will be referred to with ‘the War’.
6 P. Gatrell, ‘Refugees and Forced Migrants during the First World War’, Immigrants & Minorities Vol. 26, Nos.
1/2, (March/July 2008) 82-110, there 83.
7 E. De Roodt, ‘Reacties van Nederlanders op vluchtelingen tijdens de eerste Wereldoorlog,’ Leven naast de
Catastrofe: Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Hilversum 2001) 51-62, aldaar 55.
8 W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, ‘Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention,’ Controlling
Immigration, A Global Perspective (Stanford 2004) 3-48, there 4-7.
9 S. Bonjour, ‘The Power and Morals of Policy Makers: Reassessing the Control Gap Debate’, The International
Migration Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2011) 89-122, there 117-118.
10 W. A. Cornelius, M. R. Rosenblum, ‘Immigration and Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8
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by the Dutch national government could be inappropriate for the particular situation in Bergen. According to Saskia Sassen, policies on foreigners are nowadays affected by the needs and desires of second parties. The national governments have lost some authority in their policy-making capabilities. NGO’s and the European Union can influence what action is to be taken against immigrants.11 This maybe also the case in Bergen, were the camp commander and local mayor had to deal with local issues concerning German deserters and foreigner policy. All the factors above will be taken into consideration to determine if the gap theory is applicable to the problems with German deserters in the Bergen region. It will be interesting to see if the German deserter problem in Bergen was caused by a gap between policy and its implementation on a local level. Bergen could be a unique case because different authorities with different interests played a role in implementing policy. The problems with German deserters in Bergen cannot simply be explained by the gap theory alone. A combination of policy implementation, local and national interests as well as personal decision making could in fact be the reason for the deserter problem. To test this theory, the interaction between the different authorities involved has to be investigated.
Historiography
Dutch historical literature and investigations on migration and refugee issues during the First World War focus on the Belgian refugees. Belgian refugees started to come into the Netherlands in the beginning months of the War in reaction to the German invasion of their country. Only Evelyn de Roodt and Maartje Abbenhuis discuss in some length German deserters and internees as a separate and unique group within the large pool of refugees and internees in The Netherlands during the War. Therefore, their work will be the main source of information in understanding the motives and personal situations of German deserters. What becomes notable after examining historical literature concerning the migration issues during the War is that German deserters and internees are frequently mentioned as a separate group. What makes the case more interesting is that the German soldier who ended up in the Netherlands during the War could not simply be defined as an internee. They were divided between internees and deserters, which makes ´German deserters´ a hybrid group consisting of internees and deserters. Furthermore, historians are struggling to determine how many deserters apart from the officially interned soldiers stayed in the Netherlands during the War. The exact number of German soldiers and deserters interned during the War in the Netherlands remains controversial. Historians provide us with various data. According to Paul Moeyes, the following numbers of soldiers from different nationalities were interned and officially registered by the Dutch:
Table I: Numbers of Internees, 1914-1918 12
Nationality Total Number of Internees
Belgians 33105 Britons 1751 Germans 1461 French 8 Americans 4
11 S. Sassen, ‘Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy Making Today,’ Social Justice : a Journal of Crime,
Conflict and World Order, Vol. 23, issue 3 (1996) 9-20, there 15-16.
12 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, 105. Even these numbers remain controversial. H. Obdeijn and M. Schrover mention
1662 Germans interned. H. Obdeijn and M. Schrover, Komen en Gaan. Immigratie en Emigratie Beleid in
Nederland vanaf 1550 (Amsterdam 2008) 153.
M. Abbenhuis, The Art of staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918 (Amsterdam 2006) 106.
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Historians are struggling to determine how many deserters apart from the officially interned soldiers stayed in the Netherlands during the War. Determining the exact numbers of German deserters seems difficult due to the fact that not all deserters were officially registered or could not be registered by local government agencies. According to Maartje Abbenhuis, tens of thousands of German soldiers defected and made their way to the Netherlands between 1916 and 1918.13 C.J.M Kramers and J.H. Van Zanten both believe that around 10,000 German
deserters lived in The Netherlands during the War.14 Bob Moore believed the number was actually double that,15 while B.W. Huebsch points towards 15,000-20,000 German deserters in the Netherlands by the end of 1917.16 Evelyn de Roodt goes even further and states that out of
a total of 150,000 German deserters, 80,000 stayed in the Netherlands.17 A letter dating from 20 December 1918, written by mayor J. Van Reenen of Bergen assigned to the Department of Health, mentions the following numbers of foreigners and deserters present in Bergen at the camp for internees and deserters:
Table II: Number of deserters and internees present in Bergen camp 1914-191818
Date Number of Foreigners
31 December 1914 115 31December 1915 140 31December 1916 112 31December 1917 707 31December 1918 494 Total 1568
If historians nowadays are unable to determine how many German internees and deserters were present in the Netherlands during the War, imagine how difficult it was for the Dutch national government a century ago. How is it possible for a national or local government to implement effective policies on a group of foreigners when their exact numbers are unknown or constantly changing? The lack of information on the numbers of German deserters in the country could be a reason for ineffective implementation of policy. This could be an additional factor that explains why a gab can exists between policy and its effectiveness.
Material and Method
In order to investigate why problems with German deserters existed, this thesis will focus on the analysis of letters supported by local newspaper articles mentioning German deserters.
13 Abbenhuis, The Art of staying Neutral, 111.
14 C.J.M. Kramers, ‘Internering in Nederland 1914-1918,’ Mars et Historica 28, No. 3, July-Sept. 1994, 23-32,
there 23.
J.H. Van Zanten, ‘De Zorg voor Vluchtelingen uit het Buitenland tijdens den Oorlog,’ In: H. Brugmans (ed.),
Nederland in den Oorlogstijd. De Geschiedenis van Nederland en Nederlands-Indie tijdens den Oorlog van 1914 tot 1919, voor zoover zij met dien Oorlog verband houdt (Amsterdam 1920) 324-352, there 352.
15 B. Moore, ‘The Netherlands and Sweden: the experience of Neutrality,’ In: Peter Liddle, John Bourne, Ian
Whitehead (eds.), The Great World War 1914-45: Volume 2, The people’s experience (London 2001) 316.
16 A German Deserters’s War Experience. New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1917, 188. 17 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, 242.
18 Letter from mayor Jacob van Reenen to the Department of Healt conserning the number of foreigners in the
Bergen camps, 20 December, 1918 RAA
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
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These letters and newspaper articles are all obtained by searching the databases and archives of the Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA). The search was conducted by digitally looking for local newspaper articles and correspondences between 1914 and 1919 in the region of Bergen mentioning the terms ‘(Duitse) deserteurs’ ((German) deserters) and ‘interneringskamp’ (internment camp). These letters will be analysed, categorised and presented in chronological order to determine which policies were implemented by the Dutch national government and in which way they were translated on a local level. The letters will be categorised in four distinctive categories. First, letters mentioning data on the numbers of German internees, deserters and other foreigners entering and leaving the local area of Bergen. Second, letters mentioning national policy in correspondences on a national level. Third, letters mentioning local policies and authority in correspondences on a local level. Fourth, letters mentioning problems, criticism, criminality and espionage in relation to the presence of German deserters and internees in and around Bergen19. The additional newspapers will be used in conjunction with the letters. Newspapers have the ability to describe problems and issues from a different perspective. They also mention problems not important enough for the authorities to correspond about. Therefore, the combination of newspaper articles and formal letters by authorities give an interesting and dynamic inside on the foreigner policies. Although the search resulted in 50 local newspaper articles20 and 76 letters that have been reviewed and analysed in order to do this investigation, only the most important or interesting ones in answering the main question will be presented in this paper. By analysing these letters and local newspapers, this investigation will provide inside in how national policies concerning the internment of German military personnel and deserters were implemented on a local level, what diverseness and problems occurred, who had the highest authority in these matters and how problems were treated and dealt with. As mentioned before, the letters will be presented and analysed in chronological order according to their year of appearance. They will be divided in the categories mentioned above. This investigation will start with a historical overview of the Dutch general policies and neutral position at the outset of the First World War.
Table III: Letters
Letters by category Number of consulted letters
Data and Numbers 13
National Policy 25
Local Policy 9
Problems, Criticism, Criminality 29
Total 76
Table IV: Local Newspaper Articles
Local Newspaper Number of consulted articles
Heldersche Courant 17
Schager Courant 17
Ons Blad Katholiek Nieuwsblad 10
Texelsche Courant 5
Wieringer Courant 1
Total 50
19 See ‘Table III’ on the next page. 20 See ‘Table IV’ on the next page.
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2. A Warm Embrace? Laws, Rules and Regulations
GOVERNMENT, DO YOUR DUTY!
Among the German soldiers interned in the camp in Bergen, there are still approximately thirty German deserters who have not been given their freedom although this has been frequently insisted.21
The first German soldiers that were interned in the Netherlands, arrived as early as the 10th of
August 1914, just six days after the beginning of the German invasion of Belgium on the 4th of August 1914. This group of 36 men, were moved to the region of Alkmaar, which was initially the only place destined by the Dutch government to house internees of all nationalities.22 As the War progressed and especially during the siege and fall of the Belgian city of Antwerp, it became clear that just this one location to house internees did not meet the essential requirements. For example, between the 9th and 15th of October, 1 million Belgians crossed the border into the Netherlands which caused the population to grow from 6.2 to 7.2 million just within a few days. This enormous growth of the population in a very short time resulted in chaos in the border regions of the country as described by W.H. van Terwisga, commander in the Dutch army23:
Everything that is expected to happen during a refugee crisis was exceeded in terms of scale and misery. I can give a small impression of the situation by stating that it took me approximately two and a half hours by car to get to the border as fast as possible along the road from Hoogerheide towards Putten (A distance of approximately 10 kilometres). The whole road was packed with people, animals, vehicles etc. over the length and width of the road. The chaos stretched as far as the eye could see. The car had to force itself a way through a mass of people. 24
‘Belgium was invaded by an army; Holland was invaded by a people’, wrote Ruth Fury in her account of Quaker relief work in wartime Europe, referring to the numbers of different foreigners crossing the border of Belgium into the Netherlands during the first months of the War.25 The exact number of German soldiers and deserters interned during the War in the Netherlands remains controversial, as shown in the introduction.
Before we can explain why the Netherlands were such an appealing country during the War for refugees and deserters and what kind of policies and laws were to be implemented on them, we have to determine why historians make a clear distinction between German internees and German deserters. Although every deserter could at some point be interned, not every interned German was a deserter. According to article four from the official Dutch declaration
21 Schager Courant, 11 December, 1915, 3.
22 P. Moeyes, Buiten Schot: Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog, 1914-1918 (Amsterdam 2001) pp. 104 23 M. Abbenhuis, ‘Als de oorlog aan de deur klopt: de aantrekkelijkheden, gevaren en mogelijkheden van
neutraliteit aan de grenzen van Nederland, 1914-1918,’ In: M. Kraaijestein & P. Schulten, Wankel Evenwicht:
Neutraal Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog (Soesterberg 2007) 36.
24Alles wat men kon verwachten dat zou gebeuren tijdens een vluchtelingencrisis werd in grootte en ellende zwaar
overtroffen. Het geeft maar een beetje indruk van de situatie wanneer ik zeg dat het mij ongeveer twee en een half uur met de auto kostte om zo snel mogelijk naar de grens te gaan langs de weg van Hoogerheide naar Putten (een afstand van om en nabij 10 kilometer). De hele weg stond stampvol met mensen, dieren en voertuigen etc. Over de lengte en de breedte. De chaos strekte zich uit zo ver als je kon zien. De auto moest zich letterlijk een weg banen tussen een opeenhoping van mensen. Abbenhuis, Als de oorlog aan de deur klopt, 36.
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of neutrality from the 4th of August, 1914, all soldiers and military personal of warring nations who in one way or another ended up within Dutch territorial borders, were to be disarmed and interned as long as the War progressed. Furthermore, this internment should take place as far away from the battlefields as possible.26 The same treatment was applied to sailors and pilots who violated Dutch waters and airspace. This declaration resulted in the initial capture, disarmament and internment of 35,000 Belgian, 1500 English and 200 German soldiers and enlisted men after the fall of the Belgian city of Antwerp. Another group of internees consisted of POWs who were sent to the Netherlands during the year of 1917. This action was the result of a meeting in The Hague between British and German authorities in which they decided that 16,000 POWs were to be exchanged to the Netherlands who would stay there for humanitarian the remaining duration of the War.27 One could ask why the Dutch government accepted these POWs exchange and internment of thousands of British and German POWs. Historians argue different reasons for answering this question. According to Evelyn de Roodt, the Dutch government committed itself to internment because this gave them bargaining power in asking for supplies from the British and the Germans, which were on a low especially during the last two years of the War. According to historians Bent Blüdnikow and Carsten Due-Nielsen, the Dutch internment of POWs benefited and justified their neutrality. These historians argued in regard to Denmark that: ‘Warring states saw neutrals reaping the benefits from the War without contributing to the war effort or suffering any of its horrific consequences. By looking after POWs, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway and the Netherlands could make themselves look humanitarian and useful.’28 It is possible that this humanitarianism played a role in allowing
deserters of warring nations into the country together with the aims of securing and maintaining neutrality. Before we continue with the description and handling of deserters by the Dutch government, this neutrality has to be explained.
Although the Netherlands were still a colonial power at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dutch politicians were starting to wonder what foreign politics and policy their country had to maintain. Surrounded by European superpowers and with the lack of military means to properly defend itself against invaders, the Dutch conducted a consistent policy of neutrality and passive attitude towards other countries. Unlike other European countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, the Dutch neutrality did not depend on the guarantee or protection of other European superpowers.29 Minister of war, Nicolaas Bosboom even spoke of an ‘idealistic neutrality’ during a government seating on the 1st of October, 1914. Although neutral and
secured by German claims that neutrality would be respected, the Dutch army was mobilised and took up positions in the border provinces as soon as August 1914. The army was one of the first to deal with refugees, foreigners and deserters.30
The position and treatment of deserters was much more difficult for the Dutch government. Not expecting the large number of refugees and deserters entering the country during the War, the Dutch declaration of neutrality contained no laws or regulations dealing with this category of foreigners. The Dutch government decided that foreign deserters entering the neutral Netherlands were no longer members of a warring army and were not to be treated or interned according to the rules and regulations stated in the declaration of neutrality. Deserters were allowed to stay in the Netherlands out of humanitarian reasons and they were to be treated as and had the same rights as civilian refugees, which were determined by the outdated Aliens Law drawn up on the 13th of August, 1849. This measure caused for another
26 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, 104.
27 C. Smit, Hoogtij der Neutraliteitspolitiek. De Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland 1899-1919 (Leiden 1959)
136.
28 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 110. 29 Moeyes, Buiten Schot, 27-28.
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problem: how do you know for sure if someone who claims to be a deserter actually is one? In order to solve this problem, every individual crossing the border into the Netherlands claiming to be a deserter, underwent personal investigation to determine if his claims were valid. This was in order to stop foreign soldiers who ended up in the Netherlands from escaping internment, which could subvert the rules and regulations in the Dutch declaration of neutrality and jeopardize Dutch neutrality itself.31
Questions arise when examining the Aliens Law of 1849 in regard with the acceptance of German deserters and foreigners in general. The first five articles of the Aliens Law determine which individuals were to be allowed into the country:
Art. 1.
All foreigners, who have sufficient means of subsistence or can attain these by labour, are allowed into the Netherlands on the basis of the following four articles. Art. 2.
Admittance is granted to those who are in possession of a valid alien passport A passport is valid in case:
a. issued by the national government of the foreigners nationality
b. checked by a Dutch diplomat or consular before travel to the Netherlands from foreign countries
c. not outdated Art. 3.
Also the possession of a permit can allow admission, if this permit can validate and identify its holder, where he is from and what his intensions are.
Art. 4.
Foreigners can even be allowed admittance by plain notification of their person and what their intensions are. In this case, an identity form has to be signed by two or more individuals already known to the police.
Art. 5.
The admittance is given by the head of police of the community at the border or in the community of first arrival, with the handing of a travel and residence permit. This happens after the foreigner whether or not hands over a passport or permit.32 After examination of the first 5 articles in the Aliens Law from 1849, two problems can be pointed out. First, to apply the rules and regulations of the Aliens Law in practice and on a local level, six different parties with different degrees of authority and responsibility with regard to foreigners and deserters had to be informed in what actions or measures had to be taken. The different parties and levels of authority are shown in the figure below:
31 E. De Roodt, ‘Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog’, De Grote Oorlog. Kroniek
1914-1918. Essays over de Eerste Wereldoorlog Vol. 1 (Soesterberg 2002) 122-161, there 138-139.
32 Vreemdelingenwet van den 13den Augustus, 1849, Staatsblad van Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden
12
Figure I: Authorities responsible for the implementation of the Alien Law in 191433
All these parties had to be informed by letter correspondence and all could have a certain say in matters, problems and issues concerning foreigners, refugees and deserters. This system became even more difficult when another party was added. In the middle of 1915, Major-General M. Onnen became head administrator of the newly established Internment Bureau and the Dutch army provided security in the now ready permanent internment camps for foreign soldiers far away from the border regions.34 This problem becomes even more obvious when analysing a correspondence consisting of six letters in order to solve a problem which will be referred to as ‘The Marckevka Case’. The problem started when Albert Adam Marckevka was sent to the Bergen internment camp by request of the Head of Police of Roermond, a town in the Dutch province of Limburg. Marckevka was arrested by local authorities because of the fact that he was caught in the prohibited act of transporting working clothes. The commander in chief of the camp in Bergen, A. Ter Cock, received a letter from Mrs. Marckevka in which she asked if her husband could be set free.35 What followed is a correspondence between commander Ter Cock, mayor Van Reenen of Bergen, the secretariat of the minister of home affairs and the secretariat of the minister of justice. This correspondence lasted for a period of two months and remains without conclusion due to the fact that not all the letters concerning this case have been preserved. Nevertheless, it still shows that decision making was slow and it
33 C. Van Eijl, Al te Goed is Buurmans Gek. Het Nederlandse Vreemdelingenbeleid 1840-1940 (Amsterdam
2005) 115.
34 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 103.
35 Letter from Major A. Ter Cock to Mayor J. Van Reenen explaining the ‘Marckevka Case’, 10 April, 1918.
Minister of
Justice
Attorney Generals
Head of Local Police (responsible for everything exept public order)
Minister of
Home Affairs
Commissionary of the Queen Local MayorsHead of Local Police (repsonsible for
13
took a considerable amount of time and people of different parties and authorities to determine the future of one individual.
Although the Alien Law described clear rules and regulations, the Dutch government ordered local police departments, soldiers and border control to apply these regulations with a certain leniency. Deserters were offered excess to the country despite not having any means to sustain themselves. The Dutch attitude towards strangers was generous and charitable.36 This national attitude is confirmed by queen Wilhelmina’s speech from the 15th of September, 1914:
(…) deeply concerned with the fate of all the nations dragged into the war, the Netherlands, willingly, bears the extraordinary burden which is imposed upon her, and welcomes everyone who seeks refuge within its borders.37
During the year 1916, German deserters were even given total freedom of movement after the Dutch government was notified by the German authorities that they would not offer any financial support concerning internment. In August of the same year, the minister of justice asked urgently not to send German deserters back to Germany because of the probability that they were to be shot for committing one of the most disgraceful crimes a soldier could.38
But if general laws, regulations and declarations made it so that deserters were to be set free and live their lives in the Netherlands as they seemed fit, then why did a small community like Bergen ended up with two internment camp: one for the housing of German internees and one for the shelter of German deserters and other foreigners. What happened when a German deserter reported himself at the border to the Dutch authorities present there and how where rules, laws and regulations implemented on them. To understand the process of internment and how some German deserters ended up in a specialised camp in Bergen after its completion in July 1917, the next chapter will feature historical research on German deserters in the Netherlands. In describing the faith of German deserters in the Netherlands during the War, this chapter will depend heavy on historical research by Evelyn de Roodt and Maartje Abbenhuis, for they are the main historians who emphasized the case of German deserters and internees in the Netherlands during the War.
36 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, 215-216.
37 H.L.M. Obdeijn, M. Schrover, Komen en Gaan: immigratie en emigratie in Nederland vanaf 1550
(Amsterdam 2008) 151.
14
3. Refugees, Internees and Deserters, 1914-1916
Attracted by that conversation, a Dutch patrol, a sergeant and three men, came up. The sergeant questioned me, and I told him all. He put his hand on my shoulder and said, "Be glad that you are here—wij Hollanders weuschen de vrede (we Hollanders wish for peace), and you are welcome here in hospitable Holland."39
This quote, dating from March 1916, describes the encounter of a German deserter with Dutch soldiers after successfully crossing the German border entering the Netherlands near the Dutch city of Venlo. After carefully planning his escape to the Netherlands, during which he gathered information from locals concerning border patrols and acquired false papers, he was able to escape the horrors of the War. When he arrived in the Netherlands and lost his German pursuers, the Dutch soldiers greeted him with hospitality, offered him breakfast and a place to stay. Thereafter, he travelled from Venlo to the major Dutch city of Rotterdam were he, as stated by the journal, was ‘soon to obtain a well-paid position and became a man again.’40
At first notice, this fragment creates a slightly romantic image of a deserters escape and friendly reception in the Netherlands. It seems that the deserter even managed to obtain a well-paid job in the city of Rotterdam. But after consulting historical literature and research, one has to conclude that there is a much darker side to the story. As confirmed in the previous chapter, deserters formed a separate category of foreigners apart from refugees (mostly Belgian) and internees.
The first category, Belgian civilian refugees, arrived in large numbers during the first months of the War, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Most of them returned to Belgium after the fall of Antwerp. At the end of December 1914, it was estimated that approximately 200,000 Belgian refugees still remained in the country. By May 1915, this number had dropped to 105,000, which would stay the same until war’s end.41 During the first month of the war, the Dutch government remained passive in handling refugee related issues and in the caring for refugees. It was believed and generally accepted that the task of caring, supplying, aiding and sheltering refugees rested in the first place with the locals and local charity organisations. When locals and local refugee organisations were unable to cope with the problem due to the large number of refugees flooding the country in a very small timeframe, the government would provide extra support, which consisted mostly in the form of financial gifts. The Amsterdam Committee was formed from private initiative with the task to govern and lead the organisation surrounding the local aiding of Belgian refugees. This committee was expanded with two more committees: one handling the housing of the wealthier refugees and a committee responsible for the advocacy of the refugees. Money, clothing and food was distributed by the Amsterdam Committee to the local aid organisations existing along the border region of the Netherlands and Belgium.42 20,000 refugees who were not able to find shelter during the year 1915 were to be housed in permanent camps. These ‘Belgian villages’ as they were called by Dutch locals, were established in Ede, Gouda, Nunspeet and Uden.43
The handling and internment of foreign soldiers on the other hand, was entrusted to the military authorities by the Dutch government. Not expecting the large number of internees, the Dutch military initially only created an internment camp to house all kinds of foreign internees near the city of Alkmaar, which was established on the 1st of August, 1914. But the camp was
39 A German Deserter’s War Experience. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1917, 339-340. 40 To read the full account of the deserters escape, see attachment III.
41 Obdeijn, Schrover, Komen en Gaan, 152.
42 E. A. van den Heuvel-Strasser, ‘Vluchtelingenzorg of Vreemdelingenbeleid. De Nederlandse Overheid en de
Belgische Vluchtelingen, 1914-1915’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 99, No. 2 (1986) 184-204, there 186-188.
15
soon to be closed after concluding that it was inappropriate to house internees of different warring nations in the same camp. Therefore, new camps were established. German internees were housed in Bergen. Belgian soldiers were interned in camps located mainly in the middle of the country of which the first one to be established was in Gaasterland. British soldiers were mainly interned in camps located in the provinces of Gronigen and Friesland.44 Internees tended to be treated humanely by the Dutch military. In time, interned officers were given the opportunity to live outside of the internment camps with little supervision. Ordinary soldiers were able to work for a wage and sometimes live with their families in special build sites. At first, feeding, housing, guarding, and clothing of the internees in the camps seemed difficult due to the unexpected large number of (especially Belgian) internees and an existing lack of supplies and resources. During the first months of the War, escapes and breakouts of internees were common, but as supervision of the camps improved, administration became decent, weekly entertainment was provided in the camps and living conditions overall improved.45 The Belgian camps (Gaasterland, Zeist, Amersfoort and Harderwijk), which were the biggest and housed over 30,000 Belgian soldiers in total, grew to become true communities complete with schools, shops, a church and a canteen. Family members of interned soldiers were sometimes given permission to settle themselves near the internment camps.46 The following pictures,
dating from 1916, give an impression of the camp for German internees in Bergen. This camp also had the luxury of a mess hall and schooling and entertainment in the form of drawing lessons for the interned soldiers. But when examining pictures, one should always consider the possibility that the pictures are being posed and that the situation in the camp was not always tranquil and exemplary as is shown. Nevertheless, these pictures offer a valuable source for depicting the looks of the Bergen camp for German internees.
Five interned soldiers attending drawing lessons, Bergen 1916.47
44 Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral, 101-102. 45 Ibidem 104-105.
46 Obdeijn, Schrover, Komen en Gaan, 153. 47 RAA, Negatievencollectie Bonda, FO1400135.
16
Meeting of German internees in the banquet hall of "De Rustende Jager".48
Interior of the mess hall. On the wall there is a portrait of Emperor Wilhelm II.49
48 RAA, Negatievencollectie Bonda, FO1400138. 49 Ibidem, FO1400128.
17
Overview picture of the internment camp at the Breelaan, Bergen.50
Generally, one could state that internees were housed in the different internment camps and refugees in their turn in the refugee camps. So where did the German deserters fit in? What exactly happened to a deserter when he crossed the border into the Netherlands? Did they all enjoy the same hospitable treatment as the German deserter in the journal addressed at the beginning of this chapter? For the most part ,the answer seems to be negative and this is one of the reasons why deserters should be depicted as a separate and distinct group within Dutch WWI history.
With the arrival of the first deserters in August 1914, the Dutch government decided that deserters were formally no longer part of a warring nation, as already stated in the previous chapter. After a short internment of approximately one or two months, used to determine whether a soldier really was a deserter as claimed and not a spy, smuggler or criminal, he was set free to go wherever he liked. This process of determining a deserters’s true nature, origin and intentions took time because of the different parties involved, as stated in chapter two. According to Evelyn de Roodt, deserters were all aware of the hospitable attitude and laws of the Dutch government towards deserters and found it very strange that they were interned anyways when they crossed the border. This led to critical questions by the Dutch press, newspapers and Dutch civilians concerned with the fate of German deserters now housed at the camp for German internees in Bergen. This can be seen in the local newspapers Schager Courant, Texelsche Courant and Helderse Courant which make frequent mentions throughout the years 1915 and 1916 of the release of German deserters from the German internment camp in Bergen.51 For instance, on the fourth of May, 1916, the Helderse Courant and the Katholiek Newsblad published a plea signed by 2500 Dutch civilians in which they asked for the quick release of German internees in the Bergen camp of whom could be determined that they were
50 RAA, Negatievencollectie Bonda, FO1400125.
51 Schager Courant, 11 December, 1915, 3, Texelsche Courant, 19 December 1915, 2, Helderse Courant, 18
18
indeed deserters.52 After the temporary internment, German deserters were free to go. Voluntary civilian organizations such as the ‘Bergen Committee’ then provided the deserters with civilian clothes which were supplied by the state. When the Dutch government decided to stop this supply of clothes after hearing that the German government was unwilling to cover the financial costs made by the Dutch state caused by the internment of these in their eyes ‘traitors of the fatherland’, the decision was made to demilitarize the uniforms of the former German soldiers instead. Now that the German deserters were free in the Netherlands and seen as civilians, they were expected to find work or in other words, not cause any trouble.53 This is one of the reasons why Bergen eventually ended up with a second camp for German soldiers apart from the one camp that already existed, which was heavily criticized by the mayor of Bergen as seen in the introduction. To understand why the second camp especially destined to house German deserters was established in the summer of 1917, we have to explain what happened to the German deserters after their release from initial internment during the years 1915 and 1916.
After their release, German deserters had to find a way to financially sustain themselves. This was not an easy task due to the fact that available jobs were initially offered to Dutch civilians in order to protect the Dutch economy. However, there were exceptions. For instance, one shipyard in the harbor of Rotterdam decided to hire only German deserters. Remarkably, this yard was of British origin. Others were financially supported by friends and family back in Germany or were voluntarily offered housing by Dutch civilians and farmers. A large group ended up working in the mines in the Dutch province of Limburg. This was a filthy and exhausting job that the Dutch were remarkably willing to exploit to foreign workers which were difficult to find because of the ongoing war.54 As a last resort, some German deserters even tried to sell their war stories, flight to the Netherlands and reasons for desertion to local Dutch newspapers hoping to make some money out of it.55 One of these stories, published by the Helderse Courant on the 18th of April 1916, tells of the release of five German deserters from the internment camp in Bergen. Among these five German deserters, there was an officer who had already served 19 months at the front and had earned the iron cross for his services. His mother received 10 Marks a month from the German state as financial support. When he was on leave away from the front, the officer asked the local mayor if this financial support could be raised. The mayor agreed to his proposal. Later he noticed that the financial support to his mother had indeed been raised but only by the outrageously small amount of 60 cents. In addition, his two brothers were already scarred for life: one missing an arm, the other a leg. These coincidences made the officer decide to desert from the German army and leave for the Netherlands where upon arrival he was sent to the Bergen internment camp by the border commander.56
The German deserters who were unable to find a job or a house became dependent on criminal activities in order to stay alive. Espionage activities in employment of their own country or that of the enemy was a way to make money. Theft, burglary, pickpocketing and smuggling became especially common in the southern provinces of the Netherlands and in and around the major city of Rotterdam. Dutch newspapers frequently depict these criminal activities by German deserters, such as the Helderse Courant on April third, 1917:
(…) Theft and burglary have become more and more numerous over the last months. Also, deserters exploiting the hospitality of people, leaving unnoticed
52 Helderse Courant, 4 May, 1916, 2, Katholiek Nieuwsblad, 4 May, 1916, 1. 53 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, 216-218.
54 E. De Roodt, ‘Duitse deserteurs in Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog’, De Grote Oorlog. Kroniek
1914-1918. Essays over de Eerste Wereldoorlog, 140-142.
55 Ibidem, 143.
19
without paying their stay with them and taking valuables as they go becomes more and more common. They are especially attracted to the art of smuggling and some of them even jeopardize public security. Recently, in one of the villages around Valkenburg, a German deserter assassinated a farmer and his wife, who, in their pity, had hired him as a servant.57
From a total of 50 consulted local newspaper articles, 10 of them mention criminal activities by German deserters concerning escapes from the internment camp in Bergen, theft, burglary and disruption of the public order between 1916 and 1918. An interesting question occurs when examining the consulted letters between Dutch government officials58 who are dealing with the
presence of German deserters in the country, the province of Noord-Holland and Bergen where the internment camp is located. From a total of 76 letters between these different government officials and institutions, none of them mention the kind of criminal activities and problems caused by the German deserters who are roaming free in the province that the newspapers do. One could argue that the newspapers and government officials had different priorities in addressing and mentioning the deserter problem. According to Evelyn de Roodt it was this negative publicity that changed the general attitude of the Dutch population from hospitable and charitable to anti-German. But this was in practice very selective. The Dutch population did not necessarily disagree with the government policy of the internment of foreign soldiers and sheltering of refugees, but the problems and criticism occurred on the local level when these foreigners were actually stepping into the public sphere. De Roodt continuous by arguing that local newspapers were somewhat selective in publishing criticism from Dutch civilians on the presence of refugees, deserters, internees and the policies implied upon them by local and national government to keep the national opinion in check. She also argues that although the Dutch population gradually developed an anti-German attitude during the War, a German interned officer who behaved himself would receive respect in contrast to an unemployed Belgian refugee.59 Therefore, one could argue that there is doubtfulness in the attitude towards
foreigners in the Netherlands during the War. In general, the Dutch were hospitable, but on a local level this could be very different. The newspaper articles from local newspapers gathered for this investigation do in fact lean more towards a general negative attitude and opinion towards German deserters and internees. This may be caused by the presence of an actual internment camp in the province where these newspapers were distributed. This would also further justify the criticism in the letters of mayor Van Reenen of Bergen when the construction of a second camp was announced in the year of 1917. Before the establishment of the second camp for German deserters, the deserters who awaited their release or were arrested due to criminal activities, were housed together with German internees in the already existing camp. Obviously, this was the cause for a lot of problems and uneasiness in the first camp.
The first camp at Bergen housed German soldiers who were not deserters, but ended up within Dutch territory and were interned by the Dutch border guard. They saw their fellow deserter countrymen as traitors and an insult to the German nation. Serious bullying and fights occurred on a daily basis and ruined the routines of the camp life. The Dutch military who was
57 Heldersche Courant, 3 April, 1917, 2
Gevallen van diefstal, soms met inbraak, komen gedurende de laatste maanden ongewoon talrijk voor. Dat zulke deserteurs ten nadeele van menschen, die hun uit medelijden onderdak verschaften, hun slag weten te slaan en plotseling verdwijnen met medeneming van soms waardevolle zaken en soms zonder hun ‘pensionnota’ te hebben betaald, is een zeer gewone gebeurtenis. Tot het smokkelbedrijf voelen zij zich bijzonder aangetrokken, terwijl de openbare veiligheid door sommigen van hen bijzonder in gevaar wordt gebracht. In een der dorpen rond Valkenburg werd zelfs onlangs door een Duitschen deserteur een moordaanslag gepleegd op een boeren echtpaar, dat hem uit medelijden als knecht had aangenomen.
58 Local mayors, camp commander, Department of Defense, national court and secretary of Home Affairs. 59 Roodt, Reacties van Nederlanders, 60-61.
20
responsible for guarding the camp even spoke of a ‘civil war’ that had broken out between German inmates of the camp.60
In the summer of July, 1917, the new build camp was taken into use. It was known as ‘Depot voor Duitsche Deserteurs en andere buitenlanders’61 and its primary usage was to house
German deserters and other foreigners who were unable of maintaining themselves after they were initially set free or had acted in contradiction with public order and the law. Therefore, one could argue that the camp came as a reaction to the negative opinion towards German deserters, criminality and the problems they caused on local levels. Local mayors and civil communities saw the new camp as a chance to tackle their own local problems with German deserters. This resulted in unfair transfers of German deserters and sometimes their wives and children to the new camp in Bergen. They lost their jobs and their families were left unsupported. This changed when the minister of home affairs declared that henceforth every deserter who arrived at the new camp in Bergen, needed to hand in a letter signed by the mayor of the town from which he came, that described exactly why he was sent to the new camp. Over the years 1917 and 1918, the camp slowly became what can be described as a concentration camp. Because of the presence of large numbers of German internees in the original camp, German deserters were not allowed to leave the camp except when sufficient escorts could be arranged, something which was hardly the case. There was a lot of uneasiness among the German deserters housed in the camp, because they had the feeling that they were housed in the camp unfairly. Services and food supplies were low due to the fact that the camp was rushed into service, although this gradually improved over time. Some German deserters even asked to be escorted back to Germany and take their chances, instead of staining in the internment camp. Fights, riots and protests from the German deserters were brutally dealt with by the Dutch guards who tried to maintain order. Also, escapes from the camp became commonplace. According to General Onnon of the Dutch army and who was responsible for maintaining the camp together with camp commander major Ter Cock, there was only one solution to the chaos. He suggested to put the inmates of the camp to work on local projects such as road maintenance, forestry and farming in an effort to take them away from the harsh conditions and tense atmosphere in the camp. But this seemed rather difficult to arrange due to the following reasons: First, the local mayor of the region around Bergen, Jacob van Reenen, wanted the German deserters to stay away from the public sphere as far as possible. He only saw them as troublemakers for his community, which in his eyes had suffered enough already when the first camp was established in the region. Secondly, the Dutch military could not guarantee the safety of the German deserters outside the camp nor could they gather the sufficient number of guards to escort them. Third, available work was first to be offered to Dutch workers and farmers in order to protect the local economy.62
A question that has importance throughout this thesis is who or what institution was responsible for making the policies, rules and regulations in regard to deserters. The minister of home affairs, the minister of defense, the local camp commander, the local mayor of Bergen, all seem to have influence of some sort in determining rules and regulations regarding deserters. When examining local newspapers and letters from 1916, one could argue that the military was the main institution in setting up rules and regulations for deserters and for the local community in handling with these foreigners. On the 12th of April, 1916 a declaration of military authority was sent to the community of Bergen signed by the commander in chief of the Dutch armed forces, General C. J. Snijders. In this declaration, all the rules and regulations where drafted up on how civilians were expected to handle internees and foreigners in the regions which were
60 Roodt, Duitse deserteurs in Nederland, 140. 61 Depot for German deserters and other foreigners. 62 Roodt, Oorlogsgasten, 230-235.
21
held under military supervision. This declaration was an addition to previous rules and regulations that were already in force and set up by the military high command who had been given authority by the minister over the regions that housed internment camps. For instance, this declaration stated that:
‘Art. 1 It is prohibited to offer any aid or support of what kind howsoever to internees which could or could not benefit their possible escape.’
‘Art. 3 It is prohibited, except by written military authorization, for any person of foreign nationality to stay in the community of Bergen for a period longer than 24 hours.’63
After examination of this military declaration, one could argue that the military forbad Dutch civilians to have any contact with foreign internees. However, previous chapters determined that deserters formed their own category of foreigners apart from interned soldiers and therefore did not fell under the military supervision. The building of the second internment camp in Bergen was destined to house only German deserters apart from the ones already housed in the first internment camp. This second camp was an initiative of the minister of home affairs who had the responsibility in matters concerned with civilian refugees and deserters. However, the new camp was guarded by military personal and had a military commander. Therefore it was difficult to make one individual or organization directly or indirectly responsible for these German deserters. This makes this category of foreigners interesting because they form a somewhat grey category between military internees and civilian refugees. This can be one of the reasons that policy making concerning German deserters caused troubles and insecurities due to the fact that it was unclear who was actually responsible for them.
The next two chapters will focus on the question how a small group of German deserters near the small community of Bergen caused problems in policy making during the years 1916, 1917 and 1918 and how the local community reacted to their permanent presence. To answer this question, these chapters will focus on the analysis of letters between the local mayor of Bergen, the commander of the camp and high-ranking officials in the Dutch parliament and military. The different letters will be handled in chronological order and in four different categories: Central Policy64, Local policy65, Data and Numbers66 and Problems67. These categories have been chosen to create a clear overview of the different matters and subjects that the 76 letters depict.
63 Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA)
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 973, Militair Gezag in de Gemeente Bergen (N.H.). July 12, 1916. For the original Dutch letter, see attachment IV.
64 Most of these letters contain a top-down orientated correspondence from Dutch government or military
officials addressed to local officials in and around the town of Bergen.
65 Letters concerned with policy making on deserters in the community of Bergen.
66 Letters providing information on the number of internees and deserters who enter and or leave the region of
Bergen/country.
22
4. Letters on German Deserters, 1917
Data and Numbers
Although this chapter will focus on letters concerning German deserters in Bergen in the year 1917, we start by examining a letter written in the previous year mentioning some information in relation to the number of German deserters present at that time in the region. On May 22, 1916, major Ter Cock, the commander of the internment camp68, asked mayor Jacob van
Reenen of Bergen to provide him with a list of all foreigners who were currently staying in the community apart from the ones already in the camp. The day after, Van Reenen responded by sending a letter which contained an additional list with all foreigners registered in Bergen.69
Despite the fact that the list was not present in the consulted archive and therefore no numbers can be given on the officially registered foreigners present at the time, some conclusions can be made from these two letters. First, foreigners had to be registered when they had a permanent place to stay outside the camps. However, it remains questionable whether all foreigners underwent registration. Second, it is remarkable to notice that the commander of the camp needs to ask for a foreigners list instead of being informed. Third, this is the only letter that takes notice of foreigners in relation to their numbers present in the community over the year 1916, and it is questionable if this is adequate especially when considering the time of crisis Europe was in. Furthermore, these letters make it clear that two different officials with different circles of influence, interests and authority have to work together on the same matter, namely internment of German soldiers.
The letters from the archive do not mention the numbers of deserters leaving and entering the region of Bergen until October 10th, 1917. On this date, the Queen’s commissioner in the province of Noord-Holland, Antonie Röell, sent a letter to the mayor of Bergen in which he asks in the name of the minister of home affairs to provide general-major M. Onnen70 with a list on German deserters who were staying in/arriving/or leaving the region of Bergen. No notification is to be made of the German deserters already present in the existing internment camps around Bergen, because of the fact that they are already registered and known by the Department of Internment in The Hague.71 Six days later, mayor Van Reenen of Bergen mentions in a letter a total of five German deserters who are currently staying with Dutch civilians in the region of Bergen. All of them arrived around the same period in the Netherlands during the summer of 1917 and stayed no longer than a month in the internment camp for German deserters in Bergen. The list mentions the exact day and place where the German deserters arrived in the Netherland, in the camp in Bergen, how long they stayed in the camp, where and when they were born and in which profession they were trained.72 The first letter was sent with the intention ‘to obtain a clear overview of the German deserters present in the country.’73 No mention had to be made of German deserters that were already present in the
68 This was the first initial internment camp before it was decided that a second camp was needed to house
deserters separate from interned soldiers.
69 Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA)
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 806, Lijst Vreemdelingen, May 22, 23, 1916.
70 General-major Marc Onnen was head of the Department of Internment in The Hague from 7 August 1917 until
27 December 1918.
71 Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA)
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 973, Duitsche deserteurs. October 10th, 1917.
72 Regionaal Archief Alkmaar (RAA)
0337 Archief van de Gemeente Bergen
Inventory Number 973, Duitsche deserteurs, October 16th, 1917. For the original Dutch letter, see attachment V
