High North, High tension?

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High North, High Tension?

Analysing the underlying reasons for Russia’s increased militarisation of

its Arctic Zone from 2007 onwards

Ekaterina Lyulina, s1489224 Supervisor: Dr. M. De Haas

2nd Reader: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

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Abstract

Over the course of the past decade, the Arctic has increasingly re-emerged as a region of strategic importance and international attention. After a relatively quiet period following the end of the Cold War, in which it developed into an area of peace and international cooperation, the second half of the 2000s has witnessed a substantial strengthening of military presence and capabilities in the region on behalf of all five Arctic nations. Focusing on the Russian Federation, this thesis provides an in-depth exploration of one particular instance of such Arctic militarisation. Drawing on the main policy documents forming Russia’s policy course in the region, as well as official commentaries from the key political actors involved in the formation of the state’s Arctic strategy, this research analyses Russia’s military posturing in the Arctic region through the Copenhagen school’s framework of securitisation. The results demonstrate that for the period between 2007 and 2015, a correlative relationship can be identified between the way economic and military issues in the Russian Arctic were framed in the official policy discourse and the increased militarisation undertaken in response. However, the same did not hold for policy challenges identified within the societal, environmental and political sphere - their role can thus be considered negligible in providing an explanation for Russia’s militarisation of the region.

Key words: Arctic region, Arctic militarisation, securitisation theory, Russian Federation, Russian Arctic Zone.

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List of abbreviations

ATS Antarctic Treaty System

CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EU European Union

GDP Gross Domestic Product

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

RAZ Russian Arctic Zone

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

List of figures, tables and images

Figure 1: The Russian Arctic Zone……….. 11 Figure 2: The embedded single case design ……… 27 Table 1: Selected empirical indicators of securitisation………... 30 Table 2: Overview of the main documents relevant to the study Russia’s Arctic policy…. 35

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research area and problem description

Over two decades ago, American professor of international governance and renowned Arctic expert Oran Young expressed his concerns over a serious lack of attention for the region amongst policymakers and academics in the field of social sciences (Young, 1992, p. ix). Nowadays, quite the contrary seems true. The High North has moved far beyond its image of an isolated area home to indigenous peoples and adventurous scientists. Anno 2017, the Arctic has become a ‘hot topic’ and its future is frequently portrayed as one of the main global challenges of the 21st century. As the temperatures rise and the polar ice caps dwindle, human accessibility to these previously remote areas is greatly facilitated, bringing with it the potential for increased maritime transport and the exploitation of the region’s abundant natural resources. Indeed, scholars, government officials and journalists alike have recognised the rapidly changing dynamics of the Arctic, contributing to its re-emergence as a region of strategic importance and international attention (see for example: Atland, 2014, p. 145; Blunden, 2009, p. 121; Huebert, 2010a, p. 29 - 30). Not only has the melting ice in the Arctic Ocean sparked a surge of interests from the perspective of climate change and environmental protection, it has also given rise to concerns over a return of geopolitics to the region.

After a relatively quiet period following the end of the Cold War, in which the Arctic developed into an area of peace and international cooperation, many fear that the prospect of controlling newly navigable strategic sea-lanes and profitable energy reserves could lead to political frictions at best and a ‘new Great Game’ at worst.1 While international relations on the earth’s most southern continent are regulated by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which essentially grants it the status of a scientific reserve and bans all forms of military or nuclear activity, the Arctic is not governed by one single agreement and remains a contested territory between Russia,

1_{The term ‘Great Game’ is often used by historians and scholars of international relations to refer to a}

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Canada, Norway, Denmark and the United States (ATS, 1959). The media have been quick to pick up on this narrative, with headlines like “Cold War 2.0” or a “scramble for the Arctic” suggesting that the region is bound to become the new stage for international conflict (Comte, 2015; Myers, 2015). These concerns do not appear completely out of thin air - press reports look like that because states are acting like that. All five Arctic nations have started taking an increasingly assertive stance in the region, not only by re-establishing their military presence, but also by issuing specific foreign- and defence policies regarding Arctic security (Huebert, 2010a; Mazo & Le Mière, 2013).

One major player that has received particular attention from the international community is the Russian Federation. Possessing by far the longest Arctic border and the largest Arctic population, Russia has presented vast sovereignty claims to the United Nations (UN), which, if accepted, would put over 1.2 million square kilometres of Arctic territory under its control (Kefferputz, 2010, p.2). Correspondingly, the region takes up a prominent place in Russian political discourse and policy. In recent years, Russia has redoubled its military interest in the Arctic - both at the level of official rhetoric and in practice, through regular patrols of Arctic waters and unannounced military exercises (Flake, 2014, p.101). The theatrical planting of a titanium flag on the North Pole seabed in 2007 is often presented as the symbolic starting point of a new era of Russian assertiveness in the Arctic region. The question arises whether Russia and the other Arctic states are preparing themselves for the looming possibilities of future disagreement and conflict, or if their behaviour is driven by some other considerations. If not deemed necessary during the post-Cold War period, why then did the need for an increased military presence emerge now? Through a case study of the Russian Federation, the aim of this thesis will be to provide insight into this matter, resulting in a comprehensive explanation of a state’s move towards increased Arctic militarisation.

1.2 Research question

In order to fulfil the abovementioned purpose of this research project, the following research question has been formulated:

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“Why has Russia substantially increased its military posturing in the Arctic region starting from 2007 onwards?”

1.3 Sub-questions

In order to focus the study and form a guiding principle through the chapters of this thesis, the overarching research question has been broken up into several sub-questions:

1. How should the (Russian) Arctic region be defined?

2. What is the historical context of Russia’s Arctic involvement? 3. What is Russia’s current formal policy line towards the Artic?

4. How and on which grounds has Russia changed its approach towards the Artic?

1.4 Knowledge gap

With the recent surge of interest in the region, much has already been written on the dynamics of interstate relations in the Arctic, including the increased military efforts undertaken by the ‘Arctic five’.2_{Several articles have already provided detailed} descriptions of the renewed military activity in this fragile region (see for example: Blunden, 2009; Huebert, 2010b; Mazo & Le Mière, 2013). Yet the issue of intent is often left untouched - to this point, there appears to be very little understanding as to why it is actually taking place. In an attempt to fill this knowledge gap, this thesis will seek to elucidate Russia’s military posturing in the Arctic region through the Copenhagen school’s framework of securitisation.3_{In essence, securitisation refers to} the process in which governments or individual political leaders present an issue in security terms (that is, as a potential threat to the state’s national interests), hence justifying the implementation of ‘extreme’ measures such as the increase of militarily capabilities or even the use of violence in response (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 214). The focus of this research will thus be to examine the perception of present challenges and opportunities arising in the Arctic region from a security point of view.

2_{The ‘Arctic five’ or simply ‘A5’ is a moniker for the group of five countries bordering the Arctic}

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A preliminary review of existing literature shows that Russia presents a particularly viable case study. Most academic studies either rely on non-Russian sources or apply pre-existing notions of Russia’s aggressive and supposedly expansionalist foreign policy to the Arctic. Of course it is important to acknowledge that Arctic politics cannot be seen separately from the broader context of international relations and that the current low in Russia’s relations with the West is capable of significantly influencing events in this region. Still, it would be erroneous to conflate the situation in the High North with “the larger geopolitical struggle of the countries involved” (Schlanger, 2015, p. 18). Kefferputz (2010) reaffirms this view and aptly points out that the academic community has a tendency to focus primarily and exclusively on the military aspect when discussing the rationale behind Russia’s Arctic policy. By employing the Copenhagen school’s broad notion of security, which encompasses not only the military, but also the political, economic, societal and environmental sphere, this thesis aims to provide a more nuanced view. This will result in an explanatory type of research, which will focus on how Arctic issues across these different sectors are framed and developed in the policies of the Russian Federation. Due to my Russian background and ability to read the Russian language, this thesis will be able to offer a non-western perspective on the topic, taking into account the full array of local Russian sources.

1.5 Scientific and practical justification

Even though the Arctic region is currently stable, the possibility of future confrontation cannot be entirely ruled out; as is often the case with security issues, risk perceptions can be as important, if not more important, than factual risk assessments. This research looks into how Russia’s security- and foreign policy in the Arctic is formed and what threat perceptions underlie this process. The link with Crisis and Security Management is illustrated through this focus on the social construction of security - that is, the analysis of its assumptions, implications and the practices through which it is produced. The case study presented in this thesis could provide insight into some of the key questions in the field, namely how security issues come into being and what the political consequences of this process are. From the broader perspective of Public Administration, which focuses on “the study of government decision making, the

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analysis of the policies themselves, the various inputs that have produced them, and the inputs necessary to produce alternative policies”, the relevance of the present research is also clear (McKinney & Howard, 1998, p. 62). The above relationship between inputs (in the form of perceived security threats) and the process of policy change (Russia’s decision to substantially increase its military posturing in the Arctic region) is strongly highlighted in this thesis. The results of this research therefore contribute to the academic knowledge on the dynamics through which policy statements are translated into actions.

Aside from the abovementioned scientific relevance, a profound theoretical understanding of Arctic militarisation is of great practical importance. Overstating Russia’s aggressive motivations and offensive capabilities could hinder policy-makers’ abilities to adopt a suitable response, increasing the risk of an arms race and consequent escalation to conflict in an already sensitive region. On a societal level it is thus necessary to limit the negative consequences of such ‘demonising’ rhetoric among western governments. The results of this research could contribute to a more balanced perception of the Kremlin’s strategies, preventing the isolation of Russia as one of the Arctic powers. In order to counter the slide back into Cold War style confrontation in the High North, it is also important to raise awareness among policy-makers on how their own “defence and security policy moves in the region” might be perceived by others and “how they may reduce the risk of miscommunication” (Atland, 2014, p. 146). This becomes increasingly important with more and more new players entering the scene, including the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kefferputz, 2010, p. 2). Overall, awareness of the region’s security dynamics could make “Arctic states better equipped to maintain stability throughout the twenty-first century” (Atland, 2014, p. 162).

1.6 Limitations

Focusing on such a broad and complex issue as states’ military activity in the Arctic leads to some obvious limitations. This section will therefore briefly outline what can be expected from this thesis and, even more importantly, what not. First of all, this thesis will focus exclusively on Russia and will thus result in an in-depth exploration

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Although some of the findings might be applicable to these cases, the generalisability of this study is still fairly low; Russia’s behaviour might not constitute a representative example of Arctic rearmament. Arguably, the stakes are much higher for Russia than for the other Arctic nations: besides the earlier mentioned geographic and demographic factors, the region is perceived as a future main base for strategic natural resources, making it crucial to the country’s economy (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. vii). The goal of this research will not be to compare the different Arctic policies, nor will it focus on explaining why certain Arctic issues are framed in terms of national security by some states, but not by others. While such comparative analyses could provide useful insights into the variations between states’ military presence in the Arctic, it goes beyond the scope and objective of this thesis.

Another limitation concerns the methodology of this research: it relies completely on the analysis of political texts in order to gain insight into Russia’s attitudes towards the Arctic. Although these can be considered a “concrete by-product of strategic political activity” and can therefore reveal important information about the policy positions of their authors, a lot is dependent on the individual interpretations of the researcher (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003, p. 311). The subjectivity of findings and heightened risk of analytical bias are indeed some of the well-known critiques of such analyses. However, more direct data-collection methods like interviews with experts or government officials involved in the process of Arctic policy-making would prove to be infeasible in the context of this research. Besides the obvious limitations in terms of the available time, the accessibility of such sources presents substantial challenges. Russia’s security and defence field can be characterised as a relatively closed environment that is unknown and inaccessible to outsiders, with policy-makers highly reluctant to share their intentions and strategies with the outside world (Atland, 2011, p. 274). The analysis of existing textual data also has some positive implications. Because political- and media texts are “easily, cheaply and almost instantly available”, the research presented in this thesis can be easily reproduced in follow-up projects; other scholars could produce new analyses using exactly the same tools, thereby supplementing the findings of this research and increasing their reliability (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003, p. 311).

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1.7 Reading guide

This thesis consists of eight chapters, of which this was the first. In what follows, chapter 2 will provide some background information on the terminology used in this research and the adopted delineation of the Circumpolar North. Moreover, it will further contextualise this study by addressing the growing importance of the Arctic, as well as Russia’s current and historical interests in the region. Chapter 3 sets out to review existing scholarly literature on Arctic security and assess some commonly held beliefs on Russia’s increased military involvement. The following chapter will then move on to lay the theoretical groundwork for the remaining analysis by presenting the Copenhagen school’s concept of securitisation and its potential for providing an alternative view on the topic. Chapter 5 will outline the research design and the concrete methods of data collection, describing how the various elements of the chosen analytical framework will be applied to the case study. Chapters 6 and 7 present the empirical analysis of selected sources and report on the results of this research. These findings will then be briefly summed up in chapter 8, culminating in an answer to the central research question of this study. This final chapter will also critically reflect on the conducted research, its main findings and the applicability of the securitisation framework to Russia’s Arctic policies, as well as offering potential suggestions for future research.

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2. The Arctic region: a brief contextualisation

The Arctic region forms the northernmost area of the world and includes both the territorial and marine areas that extend southward from the North Pole. Its central part is formed by the deep Arctic Ocean and the shallow seas that lie at its borders (Czarny, 2015, p. 12).The land part of the Arctic is made up by the numerous islands scattered over these waters and the northern territories of the eight Arctic states: Russia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. While ‘the Arctic’ may be considered a single region, it can be defined in various ways. Indeed, the understanding of its territorial reach differs widely across nations and scientific disciplines. The Arctic’s southern boundaries can be delineated based on criteria ranging from geographical latitude to average temperature and types of vegetation. Natural scientists focusing on the Arctic region as their area of study tend to favour physical and biological factors, of which the most common are the 10-degree isotherm and the so-called northern tree line (Czarny, 2015, p. 12). According to the former approach, the Arctic region contains the area where the average daily air temperature during the warmest month of the year does not exceed 10 degrees Celsius; the latter perspective includes a somewhat larger territory, based on the line separating the frozen tundra landscapes from the boreal forest biome. However, these concrete demarcations make little sense to social scientists, who focus on the human and political processes in the Far North (Young, 1973, p. 2). As a result, there is very little consistency when it comes to the specific areas defined by the common term ‘Arctic’. Even the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established to address issues in the region, handles varying boundary lines depending on the specific topic or agreement in question.

It is clear that the definition handled in this thesis requires some clarification. This paragraph will therefore address the first sub-question of how the (Russian) Arctic region should be defined. The most obvious and probably also most widely used approach to denoting the Arctic relies on the earth’s most northerly circle of latitude, known as the Arctic Circle. Defined this way, the Arctic region comprises all areas that fall above the imaginary line that lies at approximately 66°30' N (Czarny, 2015, p. 11). The present research will adhere to a more limited conceptualisation and

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mimics the perspective of the Russian government. The 2008 document outlining the foundations of Russia’s policy in the Arctic argues that:

“The Arctic region comprises the Arctic Ocean, the marginal seas and the territories of five Arctic states - Russia, Canada, the United States of America, Norway and Denmark” (Arctic Policy Foundations, 2008, article 2).

The Russian definition supports the view that the Arctic states are limited to the five coastal nations, because they are the only ones that possess part of the polar continental shelf and maintain an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Policy Foundations, 2008, article 2). Arguably, these states are also most relevant in light of the changing Arctic landscape and its re-emergence as an area of strategic importance: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants them sovereign rights over the Arctic seabed that lies within 200 nautical miles of their shoreline, including the freedom to exploit all natural resources found in this area (Czarny, 2015, p. 209). In line with this view, the present research will thus refer to the northern parts of Alaska, the Yukon, Nunavut and northwest territories of Canada, parts of Greenland, the northern territories of Norway and all of what Russia treats as the Russian Arctic Zone (RAZ) when speaking of the Arctic land areas. According to the most recent decree by President Putin, this includes:

“The entire Murmansk Oblast, the northern territories of the Archangelsk Oblast, the autonomous regions of Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Chukotka, the northern districts of the Sakha Republic and the Krasnoyarsk Krai and all the lands and islands in the Arctic Ocean” (Decree on the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone, 2014).

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This thesis makes no distinction between the terms ‘Arctic’, ‘High North’ and ‘circumpolar North’, which all refer to the above-described areas and are used interchangeably.

2.1 The transforming Arctic landscape

Having shed some light on the geographical delineation of the Arctic region, the following two paragraphs will clarify the present and historical context of Russia’s Arctic involvement, thereby answering the second sub-question of this research. There is little doubt that the Arctic has been subject to transformative changes during the past few decades, increasing its potential strategic importance and enabling human activity in the region. This is largely the result of three broad trends: global warming, technological advances and the constantly growing demand for natural resources (Järvenpää and Ries, 2011, p. 129). The effects of climate change have been particularly visible in the Arctic: temperatures have been rising at “twice the global average since the 1980s”, leading to a 30% reduction of the Arctic ice cap (UNEP, 2013, p. 6). The increasingly ice-free Arctic Ocean has opened up the playing field for many commercial activities in the region. Beyond the offshore exploitation of oil, natural gas and valuable minerals, this includes the opportunity for commercial transport of goods along the Northern Sea Route and the emergence of new areas for industrial fishing (UNEP, 2013, p. 5). The development of modern technologies in the field of energy production, telecommunications and shipping constitutes the second important driver; techniques such as hydrologic fracturing have made the extraction of certain natural resources in the Arctic significantly less challenging, while special ice-reinforced ships facilitate the transport of cargo across the region (Järvenpää and Ries, 2011, pp. 130 - 132). Finally, the last driving force is the increasing global scarcity of key commodities available in the Arctic. Much of the industrial activity in the region remains highly capital-intensive and still figures in the early stages of development. However, scholars predict that both the interest and will to “exploit the Arctic” is bound to increase (Järvenpää and Ries, 2011, p. 130). Faced with rising demands and a lack of alternative opportunities, more and more companies could find the costs and risks associated with resource extraction in the Arctic economically bearable. Admittedly, in the case of oil and gas this development has been somewhat set back by the shale gas revolution and oil production boom in the United States,

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which have led to increased supplies and a sharp decline in energy prices (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. 26). The current state of the global energy market is therefore likely to put a pause on the exploration and production of Arctic energy. Yet even if the development of hydrocarbons in the Arctic will play a limited role in the near future, the mere fact that controlling energy-rich territories can be considered an important source of political power serves as a major impetus for Arctic states to establish their dominance in the region (Järvenpää and Ries, 2011, p. 130). This is further strengthened by the intensified scientific and political presence of non-Arctic states and intergovernmental actors in the region, most notably China and the EU (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. 26).

Aside from the prospect of potential financial gains and other economic consequences, the three trends currently shaping the Arctic have profound strategic implications that may alter the present security environment. The increased interest in the region has fuelled conflicting sovereignty claims and territorial disputes between the circumpolar nations. The most important source of disagreement pertains to the delimitation of each states’ continental shelf. In addition to the EEZ of 200 nautical miles, Article 76 of the UNCLOS grants states the opportunity to extend their sovereign rights over the Arctic seabed to an extended 350-mile boundary; in order to do so, a state needs to prove to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that this submarine territory forms an extension of its continental shelf (Czarny 2015, p. 209). Besides the United States, which has not ratified the UNCLOS treaty, all the littoral states have submitted requests to the Commission or are currently in the process of resubmitting their claims - many of them overlapping (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. 18). Several other legal issues in the Arctic region could become potential points of tension. Among the five Arctic states, there are unsettled maritime borders in the Beaufort Sea, the Lincoln Sea, the Barents Sea and the Bering Strait, as well as conflicting perceptions over the status of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (Huebert, 2010b, pp. 41 - 42). Many of these disputes have been dormant for years and were considered of relatively low priority due to the remoteness of the Arctic region; but as the Arctic is becoming more important, so is the exact determination of its borders. Along with the vast amount of disagreements

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instruments to regulate them. In 1996, this led to the establishment of the Arctic Council: a non-treaty Arctic-specific regional forum aimed to launch cooperative measures between all relevant actors. Its permanent members consist of the eight earlier mentioned Arctic states and six separate organisations that represent the indigenous peoples of the region; in addition to that, the forum allows non-Arctic states and non-governmental groups to take up an observer role. While it is becoming an increasingly prominent actor in Arctic issues, its governance functions remain low and are not “entrenched as hard law through a treaty” (Huebert, 2010b, p. 40). Because the Arctic Council is merely a forum, it cannot enforce its guidelines or recommendations; the responsibility to do so remains with the governments of the individual member states. Moreover, its mandate explicitly excludes matters of military security. The settlement of disputes also falls outside the responsibility of the CLCS - its sole function is to determine whether a territorial request is in line with the legal requirements of the UNCLOS treaty, not to provide any normative judgements over the legitimacy of one states’ claims over those of another (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. 18).

2.2 Russian activity in the Arctic

While the transformative changes currently underway in the Arctic have certainly increased its strategic importance, it should be noted that Russia’s interest in the region did not arise in recent years. In fact, Soviet leaders were already convinced that control over the Arctic was of vital importance to achieve the goals of “state political, economic and military power” (Josephson, 2014, p. 1). Based on the Marxist ideology of industrialisation, significant efforts were directed towards modernising and urbanising Arctic regions; moreover, industrial processes and production facilities for the extraction of resources like “ore, timber, gas and coal from the tundra” were widely stimulated in order to benefit the Soviet economy (Josephson, 2014, p. 4). During the Cold War, the Arctic adopted an additional role as one of the strategic fronts between the Soviet Union and the United States - not least because the shortest route for intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles was over the North Pole (Mazo & Le Mière, 2013, p. 82). As the front line in a potential nuclear face-off between the two superpowers, the polar region became a key location for strategic air defence bases and other deterrence systems. The Arctic was also of great importance

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for the Soviet Navy, since the Northern Fleet was stationed in Severomorsk, a coastal town in the Murmansk Oblast. Consequently, the region became characterised by a large military build-up of nuclear submarines, naval aircrafts and surface vessels (Mazo & Le Mière, 2013, p. 83). In fact, by 1981 57% of all Soviet submarines were based in what is now considered the RAZ (Flake, 2014, p. 102). The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to the Cold War rivalry and hence the Arctic also ceased to be an area of military competition. What is more, the economic poverty of the post-Soviet years led to an overall loss of interest in Arctic affairs among the Russian government. This changed since Presidents Medvedev and Putin “have redoubled efforts in the twenty-first century to secure the Arctic region, extract valuable resources from it … and build on Arctic assimilation … by mobilising state resources and authority to do so” (Josephson, 2014, p. 2). The Arctic region takes up a prominent place in Russian economic policies: estimates show that 22% of the total Russian exports and close to 20% of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) are derived from “north of the Arctic Circle”; moreover, as much as 70% of the undiscovered natural gas reserves are believed to be concentrated in the Russian sector of the Arctic (Järvenpää and Ries, 2011, p. 138). Indeed, in recent years the Kremlin has issued various strategies regarding the Northern Sea Route and Arctic oil and gas, but also environmental and social issues (Josephson, 2014, p. 2). Like their predecessors in Soviet times, the new leaders of the Russian Federation increasingly viewed the Arctic as a crucial part of Russia’s identity and are determined to re-establish a strong military presence in the region.

Before this thesis will move on to discuss the renewed role of military force in Russia’s Arctic strategy, it is important to put it into a wider perspective. Firstly, Russia’s security moves in the Arctic appear less grandiose when set against the context of “the nation’s larger trend to reform and modernise its armedforces” (Flake, 2014, p. 103). Increasing military capabilities in the Russian Arctic form only one component of an ambitious programme initiated by President Putin during his second term in office. Announced at the beginning of 2008, these broad reform plans were targeted towards restructuring Russia’s military personnel, strengthening the Air Force and Russian Navy, replacing old equipment with modern military hardware and

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Arctic (Conley & Rohloff, 2015, p. 70; Flake, 2014, p. 103). Ensuring a strong and modern military was seen as a key element in the process of re-establishing Russia’s international standing as a great power. Overall, the growing military footprint in the Arctic is thus “largely proportional to the overall increase in military spending” that took place in recent years (Flake, 2014, p. 103). Secondly, while the efforts to improve the capabilities of the Northern Fleet and to rebuild Russia’s northern presence in general might seem particularly expansive, this is partly due to the fact that they are occurring after a period in which Russia’s Arctic military infrastructure was at a historic low (Mazo & Le Mière, 2013, p. 87). After the fall of the Soviet Union the focus shifted away from the Arctic as a stage for Cold War confrontation, leading to a stark decrease in military expenditure and presence in the region. The Northern Fleet found itself in a state of decay: its surface vessels and submarines were not maintained and the lack of funding resulted in an abandonment of regular aviation and naval patrols (Mazo & Le Mière, 2013, p. 84). Faced with tight military and defence budgets, government officials chose to direct the majority of resources towards unstable and problematic regions like the Russian Caucasus, which at the time presented a far more pressing security concern than the High North (Zysk, 2011, p. 102). As a result, “capacity was still being drained from the Arctic” as late as 2006 (Flake, 2014, p. 102). When compared to a region that was essentially demilitarised in the post-Cold War context, the renewed visibility of Russia’s military could easily be overstated. Finally, Russia’s increased military posturing in the Arctic is not unique and is largely mimicked by the other four littoral states. In recent years the Norwegian government has directed significant funds towards arming and upgrading the operating capabilities of their naval vessels in the Arctic, as well as expanding their air force with expensive fighter aircrafts designed specifically for “high intensity environments” (Huebert, 2010a, p. 52). Similarly, Denmark has bolstered the amount of combat-capable forces in the region, including patrol vessels that are able to operate in icy surroundings (Huebert, 2010a, p. 53). For the United States, Alaska has continuously constituted a location of strategic importance; in the 2009 Arctic Policy, securing the region was even identified as the number one priority for the American government (Huebert, 2010a, p. 55). Last but not least, Canada had begun to redirect its efforts towards Arctic security as early as 2005 and has aimed to establish a regular presence in the High North by building “better surveillance and enforcement

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capabilities” (Huebert, 2010a, p. 57). Establishing a new fleet of eight Arctic patrol vessels, opening training bases on Arctic territories, developing sensors to monitor activity underwater and increasing the amount of troops for northern operations are some of the efforts undertaken to achieve this goal (Flake, 2014, p. 104).

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3. Academic explanations of Russia’s Arctic policy

Despite the abundance of written works on the increased military activity in the Arctic and the broader security-related developments in the region, which have originated from both the academic community and international media alike, Russia’s contemporary Arctic strategy remains somewhat of a mystery for the western world. As has already been briefly touched upon in the introduction of this thesis, the majority of existing analyses focusing on Russia’s growing military sophistication in the High North leave the question of why this development is actually taking place untouched. However, a number of scholars have attempted to shed light on Russia’s intentions in the Arctic, providing some potential explanations and theoretical assessments of its shifting policies. The most widespread accounts on this topic will be described and summed up in the following paragraphs.

3.1 Russia’s involvement in the Arctic: common explanations

Russia as a ‘revisionist’ Arctic power

One of the most commonly held interpretations of Russia’s increasingly assertive stance in the Artic region is based on the belief that it is just another manifestation of the revisionist, expansionist and aggressively anti-western policy course taken by the Kremlin in recent years. It is argued that its traditionally pragmatic foreign policy has recently been accompanied by an unapologetic tone towards western governments, causing Russia’s military presence in the High North to be placed within the context of a Cold War style confrontation (see for example: McCain, 2015; Schepp & Traufetter, 2009). Recent examples of Russia’s ‘aggressive’ dealings in the post-Soviet space are often put forward as evidence, most notably its manipulation and use of the energy sector as a strategic leverage, its disregard for states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the overall ‘bullying treatment’ it adopts towards its neighbours. When perceived through this lens, the recent increase in Russian military activity in the High North easily leads to the assumption that Moscow is set to conquer the Arctic and expand its northern borders to make gains against the west. It is sometimes even explicitly suggested that Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia should serve as a clear warning sign to its Artic neighbours about the measures the Kremlin might be willing to take in order to support its territorial claims in the region (Huebert, 2009, p. 23).

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While this view is mainly voiced in newspaper articles and popular science magazines, there are also some scholars who actively support the idea that Russia’s actions in the Arctic are best explained as a desperate pursuit of regaining ‘great power’ and a way to challenge the current international order (see for example: Kraska, 2009, p. 1117; Smith & Giles, 2007, p. 10; Tayloe, 2015, p.1).Its proponents argue that in the eyes of Russia’s leadership, securing control over the Arctic would form a rightful compensation for the loss of hegemony over Eastern Europe suffered following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Smith & Giles, 2007, p. 10). In other words, it serves as a symbol of the nation’s “recovery from the embarrassment of the Yeltsin years” (Tayloe, 2015, p. 3). Due to the alleged economic weakness and political backwardness, an overreliance on military-coercive instruments is considered the only means by which the Kremlin can realistically achieve this goal (Tayloe, 2015, p.1).

Despite enjoying high popularity because they “draw upon already established means of translating Russian behaviour”, such explanations are overly simplistic and “impede a fulsome understanding of Russia's motives” (Roberts, 2010, pp. 972 - 975). The assumption that Russia wants to be an aggressor in the region is misleading, since there is not a lot for it to gain from military conflict in the Arctic. Quite the contrary, scholars have pointed out that it could seriously jeopardise Russian territorial ambitions, since “demonstrations of military force would work against the normal legal resolution of Russia's claim to its extended continental shelf” and hence appears a risk the Kremlin would be unlikely to take (Whitney Lackenbauer, 2010, p. 884). Moreover, as was already discussed in the previous chapter, Russia’s activities have not been inconsistent with those of the other Arctic nations, which have all undertaken efforts to strengthen their military standing in the region. Simply depicting the Russian state as an anti-western autocracy seeking to destabilise the peaceful status quo leaves the broader trend of militarisation unexplained.

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Arctic domination through the lens of domestic politics

Related to the first argument is the notion that Russia’s projections of military power in the Arctic are a means to reinforce Putin’s authority domestically. Similar to the narrative adopted by some western commentators towards Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine, this assumption rests on the idea that such moves present Putin as a strong leader and reinforce his authority at home. Moreover, it contributes to the re-assertion of Russia’s position on the global stage - a nationalistic message that resonates deeply with large parts of the country’s electorate (Blunden, 2009, p. 125). Indeed, the idea that Russia should adopt a stronger political standing to compensate the territorial and ideological losses suffered after the fall of the Soviet Union appears to be a recurring theme underpinning the Kremlin’s broader foreign policy. Following this logic, the dominant narrative presented to the domestic public is likely to be focused on the danger of conflict in the Arctic, accompanied by an overwhelmingly confrontational rhetoric and the overstatement of other Arctic nations’ hostile intentions. Given that most of Russia’s major news outlets are directly or indirectly controlled by the Kremlin, this discourse should be strongly mirrored in the mass media.

However, several scholars analysing Russian news outlets have presented empirical evidence that stands in stark contrast with this assumption. Studying Russia’s policy discourse towards the Arctic, Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud (2014) have systematically reviewed over 300 articles published in the Russian-language newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta and identified the frames adopted in its coverage of the Arctic. They reach the conclusion that a rhetoric focusing on “conflict does not dominate the Russian actors’ perception of the region” and that “the amount of media attention given to conflict-oriented narratives diminished between 2008 and 2011” (Wilson Rowe & Blakkisrud, 2014, p. 76). Contrary to the line of argumentation presented by those supporting the so-called ‘domestic politics view’, the Arctic is branded as a zone of peace and cooperation. Gritsenko (2016) reaches a similar conclusion in her inquiry into 3 federal- (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Izvestiya) and 3 local- (Vecherniy Murmansk, Krasniy Sever, Yakutia) Russian-language newspapers. Seeking to gain more insight into the dominant Arctic narratives “served for domestic consumption to the general public in Russia”, she concludes that between 2011 and 2015, the chosen newspapers primary discussed the Arctic in

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relation to “the development of hydrocarbon resources” and as a “thriving economic hub for energy production” (Gritsenko, 2016, p. 11).

Militarisation as a means to secure economic gains

Rather than focusing on national or international political considerations and more in line with the evidence presented by Gritsenko (2016), this point of view places the renewed military activity in the Arctic within the framework of economic competition. Its supporters argue that since the region provides access to hydrocarbons and other valuable resources, as well as advantageous maritime trade routes, it is bound to unleash a so-called race for resources (see for example: Kefferputz, 2010, p. 2; Zysk, 2011, pp. 95 - 96). In this context, states’ military capabilities and overall presence in the High North have increased in an attempt to secure the resources and profits the Arctic region can produce. While it might sound plausible, upon closer look such motives appear an unlikely driver for the Russian government. With regards to the emerging fishing stock in the High North, Russia already enjoys the “exclusive and undisputed rights to all living organisms in the water column to 200 nautical miles of its shoreline”; as for the immense energy reserves believed to be located under the Arctic icecaps, Russia holds sovereign rights over all seabed resources located in its EEZ (Flake, 2014, p. 108). Hence, Flake concludes that “there is simply not much to fight over” (2014, p.108). Moreover, since the large majority of the undiscovered natural oil and gas reserves are thought to be concentrated in the Russian sector of the Arctic, it is highly improbable that an enhanced military presence is tied to the desire to secure additional natural resources on disputed territories. Scholars like Le Mière and Mazo (2013, p. 96) have also pointed towards the counter-productivity of applying military instruments to further economic goals. They suggest that, from a purely economic perspective, collaboration in the Arctic would be a more likely scenario than military confrontation or ‘gunboat diplomacy’4_{, since it is more rewarding from a commercial point of view. Based on} the above, it thus seems that arguments relying purely on economic intent and the desire to maximise profits do not hold up, or at least fail to provide a complete picture of Russia’s behaviour in the Arctic.

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3.2 Preliminary assumptions

As the review of previously conducted research has shown, a large amount of existing academic accounts fall short in providing a convincing and comprehensive assessment of the key drivers underlying Russia’s current Arctic policies. In trying to present an alternative perspective, some scholars have suggested that it would make more sense to interpret Russia’s actions in defensive, rather than offensive terms. Statements made by Huebert (2010a, p. 22), who argues that the strive for military presence in the Arctic is caused by a fear of states “that force will be needed to protect their interests” and Atland (2011, p. 269), who claims that military activity in the High North depends on state’s “threat perceptions and strategic priorities”, suggest that this could

be a useful research lens for the study of this topic. However, no (known) efforts have been made to develop this line of argumentation any further through empirical research, with the majority of articles only mentioning it in passing.

Taking the abovementioned view as the point of departure, I argue that far from an open call for armed confrontation, Russia’s Arctic policy is rooted in the (exaggerated) perception that interstate relations in the region are becoming more confrontational and hostile, hence requiring increased measures to protect Russian national interests. Consequently, the main assumption upon which this thesis rests, is that Russia’s present military developments in the Arctic are primarily driven by security concerns relating to the region and should therefore be seen as a response to perceived pressures from the outside world. As the previous chapter has made clear, Russia has a long history of Arctic involvement and has numerous, multidimensional interests in the region. In order to understand why Russia has begun to openly re-establish its military presence in the High North, one therefore needs to focus on the ways in which the Kremlin has perceived and framed the wide range of challenges and opportunities it has been faced with in the region.

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4. Theoretical framework

Owing to the preliminary assumptions made above, the theoretical argumentation underlying the analysis presented in this thesis will be founded upon the Copenhagen School’s approach towards security. Its concept of securitisation is considered a particular helpful analytical tool for the objective of this research, since it illustrates the relationship between the way an issue is framed and the range of policy options that are considered in response. The following paragraphs will illustrate how the notion of securitisation can be applied to the study of Russia’s military efforts in the Arctic.

4.1 The social construction of security

The Copenhagen School of security studies emerged as a response to the narrow, realist conception that had long dominated the academic discourse on this topic.5 It finds its roots in the 1983 book by the International Relations scholar Barry Buzan titled ‘People, States and Fear’ and is built around the belief that (in)security is a socially constructed and hence inherently contested concept, which cannot be defined in objective terms; rather, its meaning varies based on individual perceptions and the political context of the referent object in question (Buzan, 1983). Consequently, Buzan called for a discursive approach to the study of security, with a focus on how threats come to “manifest themselves as security problems on the political agenda” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 34). The analytical framework through which this can be achieved is referred to as the process of securitisation. As defined by its founders, securitisation is “the move that […] frames an issue as a special kind of politics or even above politics” (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 23). More precisely, it is argued that any public issue can be located on a spectrum that ranks them from ‘non-politicised’ (meaning that it is not considered an issue of public debate and that the state does not make any efforts to address it), to ‘politicised’ (implying that it requires some form of governance, whether in the form of government decision-making or the

5_{Traditionally, the study of security focused exclusively on the use of force and was based on the}

assumption that states’ primary interest is to maximise their power in relation to other actors in the international system; from this point of view, security threats originate solely from (military) conflicts

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allocation of public resources) and finally ‘securitised’ (signalling that the issue is no longer treated as a regular policy problem, but as an existential threat that needs to be tackled with extreme means “outside the normal bounds of political procedure”) (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 23 - 24). According to Buzan and his colleagues, almost any issue can end up on the outer end of the spectrum and become designated as a potential threat to security, as long as it is presented and addressed as such; hence, it is argued that “security is a self-referential practice” - labelling something as a security issue gives it the potential of becoming one, irrespective of whether a real existential threat exists or not (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 24). Securitisation can thus be understood as a linguistic speech act - by writing or speaking about an issue in terms of security, it is being constructed as a threat; the speech act can in turn be considered successful if the problem raised becomes recognised as such in the wider policymaking discourse. This move towards securitisation is made by so-called ‘securitising actors’, which commonly take the form of political leaders, governments, or lobby- and interests groups. Summing up, the exact definition of securitisation can be phrased as “the inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 25). Here it is important to note that the term ‘militarisation’, which is used frequently throughout this thesis, should not be interpreted in a similar sense (e.g. as the framing of certain issue in military terms or requiring military measures). Within the context of this research, it is used to refer to the process of equipping a particular region with military forces and defences6 _{- that is, through the mobilisation of troops, the development of military} infrastructure or the increase of military equipment.

4.2 The securitisation of Arctic issues

As the above paragraph has made clear, the securitisation of policy issues has a substantial impact on the measures deemed appropriate for their management. By successfully placing a particular problem or development within the domain of security, it is not only attributed a higher priority, but also the necessity to be treated with emergency means in order to prevent the alleged threat from developing any

6_{Definition derived from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:}

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further. Taking the case of the Arctic, it can thus be argued that the securitisation of regional issues pertaining to the RAZ could play a key role in “legitimising the use of force” and enabling the state “to mobilise, or take special powers” in response (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 21). In identifying these perceived threats, theorists adhering to the Copenhagen School argue that it is important to adopt a wide understanding of national security that encompasses all key sectors of society. Both the referent object and the source of potential threats vary greatly depending on whether they pertain to the military, political, economic, environmental or societal sphere (Buzan, 1983, p. 74). Following this assumption, the below bullet points provide a short overview of the nature of threats within the five different sectors, as well as some suggestions on how these could potentially materialise within the Arctic context.

 The military sector has traditionally been the prime concern of national security and encompasses all threats originating from the use of armed force. The state is the most important referent object of security in this sector. For Russia, perceived threats in the High North are likely to emerge from uncertainties concerning the military intentions of other Arctic nations, such as a fear that offensive capabilities will be used to seize territory or otherwise limit Russia’s standing in the region.  The political sector is somewhat similar to the military one. Here too, the referent

object is the state, specifically its sovereignty and the ideology through which it is ruled. However, political threats are strictly non-military, and rather stem from the ‘battle of ideas’. In the Arctic, these could revolve around the denial of Russia’s economic rights and territorial claims in the region, as well as a general disregard of its position in interstate governing institutions.

 The economic sector encompasses all threats endangering the economy and thereby also the domestic stability of the target state. The referent object can thus range from the national economy in the broadest terms, to the individual wellbeing of a state’s citizens. For Russia, which is highly dependent on the export of raw materials, any limitations to its access of Arctic resources are likely to be perceived as the main threat in this sector.

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environment. The referent object can range from certain biological species, to specific eco-regions or even the planetary biosphere as a whole. In the Arctic, perceived threats that fall within this sector could include environmental hazards like oil spills, pollution and the overall effects of climate change on the region.  Finally, in the societal sector the referent object is a nation’s (or community’s)

collective social identity and self-conception. Any development that hampers societies from maintaining or reproducing their culture, language, religion or specific behavioural traditions can consequently be constituted as a threat. In the Arctic context, this can be linked to concerns over preserving Russia’s identity as an ‘Arctic nation’, or developments endangering its large Arctic population.7

7_{Based on a 2014 research project on the development of the Russian Arctic Zone carried out within}

the Russian Academy of Sciences, over 2.5 million people live on the Arctic territory of the Russian Federation. Among them are approximately 82,000 indigenous peoples, including the Yakuts, Karelians, Nenets, Chukchi and many others (Tishkov, Novikova, Pivneva & Stepanov, 2014, p. 9).

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5. Research design

Having established the theoretical foundations of this thesis, the following chapter will focus on discussing the chosen research design and methodology, as well as explaining what empirical indicators will be used to assess whether or not certain policy issues have been securitised within Russia’s Arctic discourse. Throughout this chapter, specific attention will also be paid on the impact these choices have on the validity and reliability of the study.

5.1 Single-case study analysis

In order to provide an answer to the central research question, this thesis will follow a qualitative methodology based on an embedded single case-study design. Case-study research is known to be especially suitable for the study of complex social or political phenomena, especially when it concerns explorative research driven by how and why questions (Yin, 2003, p. 1). It is an approach in which one (or a selected few) particular instance of a broader development or overarching type of event is studied intensively and in great detail. Rather than evaluating this single case through simplified causal models or quantitatively measuring a certain variation, the aim is to “illuminate a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result” (Yin, 2003, p. 12). Therefore, a case study is considered the preferred strategy to explore a subject area in which very little prior knowledge exists or that would benefit from a more holistic understanding (Kumar, 2011, p. 126). Owing to the above, the decision to opt for a case-study design logically follows from the set out objective of this research, namely to provide an in-depth

exploration of Russia’s Arctic

militarisation, which ultimately

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The choice of Russia as the single case in this study is motivated by several factors. Not only is Russia’s behaviour considered a representative example of Arctic militarisation, comparative multiple-case analyses would prove difficult to achieve due to the fact that Russia is the only non-western, non-NATO member among all five littoral state. To a certain extent, the case selection was also driven by the personal interests and prior knowledge of the researcher, given that the language, but also the political, cultural and historical context of the Russian Federation are most familiar to me. This ensures that I will be able to easily access and understand all the documents necessary to carry out this analysis. The research design is embedded, meaning that several different units of observation will be studied within the context of a single case. In light of this thesis, it implies that the overall securitisation of Arctic issues will be analysed separately for the five earlier-mentioned sectors of security. Figure 2 shows a schematic visualisation of the selected research design.

Like any other approach, the single case-study design has some obvious flaws, most notably its low external validity. Although it is true that it is impossible to make any meaningful generalisations based on the analysis of one individual case, the intention to do so is never claimed with this type of explanatory research - its goal is to provide ‘particularising’, rather than generalising insights. More and more scholars have started to point out that general, causal theories are not the only source of academic progress; depending on the research goal, concrete and context-dependant knowledge can be just as valuable (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 7).

5.2 Methodology and data collection

Since securitisation takes place through linguistic processes and materialises itself in the rhetoric of policy actors, it has to be studied through “discourse and political constellations” (Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 25). Consequently, the designated scientific approach to conduct the present research is discourse analysis - a method broadly defined as “a rigorous study of writing, speech and other communicative events in order to understand political, social or cultural dynamics” (Salter & Mutlu, 2013, p. 263). The data necessary to conduct such analyses can stem from a variety of textual and visual primary sources, including newspaper articles, government publications and memos, policy documents, speeches, interviews and even video footage of official addresses. In order to assess whether the dynamics of

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securitisation have been present in the framing of the Arctic in the Russian policy discourse, I draw primarily on the official Arctic Development Strategy of the Russian Federation published in 2013 and the 2008 Policy Concept outlining the main provisions of Russia’s intentions in the Arctic region. Other official documents, including (but not limited to) the National Security Strategy, the State Military Doctrine and the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation are however also consulted in order to provide the necessary background information on the issues discussed. While this research does not include data derived from first-hand interviews with actors directly involved in Russia’s Arctic policymaking (i.e. the President, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs-, Defence- and Energy, members of the Security Council and State Duma), it does rely on transcripts of their commentaries, addresses and speeches published on the government website of the Russian Federation, as well as in reputable Russian newspapers such as Kommersant, Vzglyad and Rossiiskaya Gazeta. The time frame in which Russia’s official discourse towards the Arctic is studied has been delimited to the period between 2007 and 2015. As mentioned earlier, there is a widespread belief in the international community that the planting of the Russian flag on the North Pole seabed in 2007 symbolised the growing geopolitical and strategic important of the region in the policies of the Russian Federation, making this event a logical starting point for this research. Since the militarisation of the Arctic is still an on-going development, the information cut-off date has been set at 31 December 2015, meaning that more recent data sources were not taken into consideration for the purposes of this research.

Using a wide variety of different sources of evidence is of vital importance when opting for a qualitative singe case-study design, since there is an increased risk that the data used in this kind of research permits too many different interpretations and hence gives the researcher too much freedom in drawing conclusions that fit his or her predetermined objectives (Swanborn, 2010, p. 108). This occurrence is somewhat mitigated by using a so-called ‘triangulation’ of data-collection methods, which complement each other and allow for the comparison of results from different perspectives, thereby increasing their reliability. It goes without saying that any finding or observation is likely to be “much more convincing and accurate if it is

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5.3 Operationalisation

As the previous chapter has made clear, the collected data will be analysed through the conceptual framework of securitisation. In order to do so, it is first necessary to convert this abstract analytical tool into easily recognisable variables and establish what linguistic cues can be relied on to recognise the securitisation process. Therefore, the below table will present the empirical indicators that will be employed to classify the various statements made in relation to the Arctic and eventually assess whether or not the discourse can be classified as securitised:

Framing of the issue

 The issue is presented as a threat to Russia’s (national) security interests or linked to other previously recognised threats.

 The issue is referred to using confrontational rhetoric-, metaphors- or analogies.

 Arguments are made concerning the priority or urgency of the issue.

Framing of the solution

 A case is made for the necessity of extraordinary measures (which fall outside the range of policy options normally considered in this sphere) to mitigate the negative effects of the issue.

 The use of force is presented as a legitimate means to tackle the issue.

Table 1: Selected empirical indicators of securitisation (derived from the conceptualisation presented in Buzan, De Wilde & Waever, 1998, p. 23 - 26).

It is important to keep in mind that even with the help of concrete indicators, the assessment of securitisation remains a subjective process. To name just a few examples, one could question how many of the above characteristics need to be present in order for an issue to be considered securitised, and whether the rhetoric has to be replicated across different sources. Therefore, the abovementioned linguistic cues should merely be considered as signs of various degrees of securitisation, which then need to be carefully examined and evaluated in their given context.

High North, High tension?