Bringing the Fight Home: Assessing the Capacity of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

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Bringing the Fight Home: Assessing the Capacity

of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

Master Thesis Written by: Aimee Feeney Student Number: s1986511 Word Count: 18,570 (incl. bibliography)

Supervisor: Mr. Stef Wittendorp 2nd Reader: Dr. Myriam Benraad

Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc Crisis and Security Management

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Abstract

In the twenty years that have passed since the deadly 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Africa has been the target of a number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. As a result, following its creation in 2001, the African Union has made increasing efforts to tackle the threat of terrorism across the continent. Yet, despite these political and military efforts, the terrorist threat in Africa persists. Thus, the question arises of whether the African Union has the capacity, in its current state, to counter terrorism on the African continent. To this end, this thesis aims to assess the extent to which the

African Union has demonstrated the characteristics of actorness identified by Hulse- identity, decision making, preference convergence, presence and capabilities- in its counterterrorism policies.

Using a discourse analysis method, guided closely by the actorness framework, this thesis has found that the extent to which these characteristics of actorness are displayed in the

counterterrorism efforts of the African Union differs significantly depending on which characteristic of actorness is being considered. While the African Union has made notable efforts to cement itself as a legitimate actor in counterterrorism efforts on the African continent, this research is forced to conclude that significant efforts still need to be made, particularly in the promotion of preference convergence between the African Union member states and the development of physical counterterrorism capabilities, before the African Union can be considered a legitimate counterterrorism actor in this field.

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List of Abbreviations

ACSRT African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

APSA African Union Peace and Security Architecture ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASF African Standby Force

AU African Union

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

GWoT Global War on Terror

IS Islamic State

OAU Organization for African Unity

PSC Peace and Security Council

RECs Regional Economic Communities

RO Regional Organisation

SADC Southern African Development Community

UN United Nations

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Countering the Terrorist Threat in Africa

The terrorist attacks on the World Centre and the Pentagon on September 11th₂₀₀₁

precipitated an irrevocable shift in global politics. These attacks severely altered the way that the international community conceived of the nature of terrorism and more importantly, the methods that needed to be employed to counter this threat. As the transnational nature of terrorism has come to be fully realised in the wake of 9/11, this has been matched by a growing recognition that individual states are unable to deal with this threat alone. Despite the fact that "...multilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since the 1960s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions"(Council for Foreign Relations, 2011). Thus to deal with the increasingly transnational nature of the contemporary terrorist threat, there has been a growing responsibility placed on regional and international organisations to supplement and complement the counterterrorism efforts enacted at the national level.

While it was the events of 9/11 that largely fuelled this change and ushered in the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), it was in Africa that Al Qaeda carried out their first large-scale, transnational terrorist attack. On the 7th August 1998, more than 200 people were killed and over 5,000 injured when twin bombs were detonated within several minutes of each other at the US embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya (CNN, 2017). This attack remains one of the deadliest that has ever occurred in Africa and the years since then have been marked by further instances of domestic and international terrorism on the continent. In 2015, African countries represented half of the ten countries with the highest number of deaths as a result of terrorist attacks, accounting for over 25% of terrorism related deaths worldwide (Global Terrorism Index 2016: 17). The final few months of 2017 alone

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have seen numerous terrorist attacks on the continent, including an attack on a mosque in Eastern Nigeria which killed 50 people in November and the deadliest attack on Somali soil to date, when a truck bomb exploded in Mogadishu, killing over 500 people (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017). Despite the substantial threat that terrorism poses to the African continent, and the aforementioned recognition that states are unable to effectively counter this threat alone, there has not always been significant efforts from regional and international actors and organisations to counter terrorism in Africa.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the launch of the GWoT, Africa was considered “a marginal region at best in the global counterterrorism campaign” (Wani in Le Sage, 2007: 41). While North Africa and the Horn were quickly identified as areas of operation in the GWoT, the primary area of focus for the international community’s counterterrorism efforts, led predominantly by the United States, was Afghanistan and Iraq (Benjamin and Slisli, 2007). However, it was partly this focus that would inadvertently result in a rapid increase in the presence of terrorist organisations across Africa, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin and the wider Sahel region, and thus generate an increasing need for regional and international actors to support the counterterrorism efforts of inundated African governments.

The launch of Operation Anaconda in 2002 by the US Government, as part of the GWoT, aimed to “...encircle and capture or kill Al Qaeda fugitives” operating in Afghanistan

(Lambeth, 2005: 163). While this was relatively successful, in the sense that large numbers of these militants were either captured or killed, the knock-on effect was that Al Qaeda needed to source alternate ‘safe havens’ where they could base and train their recruits (Denece and Rodier, 2012: 41). Characterised by the United Nations (UN) as “...threatened by cyclical instability, state fragility and recurring humanitarian crises” (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2014), the Sahel region of Africa fit the bill. Widely considered to be one of the most insecure and unstable regions in the world, it separates the Sahara in the north and the Sudanian Savanna in the south, encompassing large areas of several African states, including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. Many of these Sahelian countries are plagued by a series of interconnected and overlapping challenges, including weak

governance structures, low socio-economic conditions and porous borders (Korteweg, 2014: 252; Denece and Rodier, 2012: 37). This has provided opportune geographic, political and social conditions for the numerous terrorist organisations operating in the region as

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“Borders are neither marked nor patrolled in which movements remain unhindered and there exists innumerable hiding places. People increasingly subscribe to the ideas of radical Islam and because trafficking of all kinds is rife, jihadists can easily

replenish their supplies of weapons and vehicles etc. Corruption also makes it easier for illegals to move around freely” (Ibid)

This reality has led several scholars to label West Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as an ‘Arc Of Instability’ (Alexander, 2017; Cooke and Sanderson, 2016), as groups such as Al Qaeda and Boko Haram continue to be based, train, operate and transit recruits and weapons across these regions, as can be seen in the figure below.

Figure 1- _{New Terrorism Hot Spot: Africa’s Sahel Alexander, 2017, p. 5}

The outbreak of the conflict in Mali in 2012 and the subsequent Islamist takeover of the north of the country has served to further illuminate the severity of the threat, as well as the

potential risk of spillover, to the wider regional and international community. Western countries have voiced concern that “Mali’s vast and lawless Saharan desert could become a launch pad for international militant attacks” (Charbonneau, 2013). For neighbouring countries in particular, this translates into a fear that these terrorist organisations could permeate across their borders with relative ease, both radicalising and targeting their citizens. Long heralded as the ‘poster child for democracy’ and stability in Africa, Mali remains

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relatively unstable as a result of the conflict and “...violence among various armed groups, including Islamist militant factions that were not involved in the peace process, continue in northern and, increasingly, in central Mali” (Freedom House, 2017).

Since the outbreak of this conflict, there has been a marked attempt to strengthen and increase the counterterrorism response in Africa at the national, regional and international levels. The increasing“... incorporation of what were initially national or subnational terrorist groups into regional and even global networks of terrorists and insurgents, and with this an apparent convergence of collective action frames and strategic goals” has increased the fear that terrorist groups operating in Mali could expand their activities beyond the country’s borders (Busher, 2014: 1). In 2012, Somalia based terrorist organisation Al Shabaab pledged their allegiance to the Al Qaeda network. Following this, they have launched a series of

devastating attacks on neighbouring Kenya, including the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi and the 2015 attacks at Garissa University (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). In 2015, the leader of Boko Haram, Abu-Bakr Shekau, declared that the group had pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). By expanding their regional and global network, terrorist organisations are increasingly able to expand the scope and intensity of their operations beyond national borders.

In response to this ever growing internationalisation and cooperation between terrorist organisations, there has been a significant increase in counterterrorism initiatives on the African continent in the last decade or so. A growing number of counterterrorism initiatives and operations are being conducted on the continent by a multitude of actors, including the French, the United States, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations to name a few, not to mention the ongoing efforts of African states themselves.

As the largest, and arguably the most powerful, regional organisation on the continent, the African Union have been engaged in counterterrorism efforts throughout Africa since their creation in 2001. To date, the African Union have developed a relatively broad normative counterterrorism framework comprising of several key documents and policies, such as the 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the 2004 Additional Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the creation of the post of the AU Special Representative for Counterterrorism Cooperation in 2010 (African Union, 2015). Moreover, counterterrorism has also served as a major pillar in

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several African Union led peace support operations. A notable example of this can be seen in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Launched in 2007, and recently having had its mandate extended until the end of May 2018, key tenets of the AMISOM mission focus on the need to “…reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups [and]…to continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups” (AMISOM Webpage, current as of 2017). However, despite these political and military efforts, the security situation in many African countries continues to deteriorate, with “an increase in terrorist attacks… [and] the existence of refugee and

displaced persons camps, likely to be infiltrated by terrorists and the existence of safe havens, a training and logistics supply center for terrorists” (African Union, 2014: 3).

This begs the question of whether the African Union has the capacity, in its current state, to be a viable counterterrorism actor on the continent. If it does not, then these efforts may be doomed to fail from the outset. Moreover, this presents an interesting test case through which to assess the African Union’s ‘actorness’- “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjostedt in Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012: 557). However, before the current capacity of the African Union as a counterterrorism actor can be thoroughly assessed, the development of the African Union as an institution more generally needs to be narrated and placed within a broader historical and political context.

1.2 Introducing the African Union

While the African Union as we now know it has only existed since 2001, its roots can be traced back to its predecessor organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Formed in 1963, the OAU was created out of the necessity for “...an organisation that would seek to harmonise relations between the young states emerging from their colonial

experience, to defend their newly-won sovereignty, and to extend the emancipation

movement into the still ‘unliberated’ areas of the continent” (Legum, 1975: 209). Moreover, the OAU was forged from a desire to promote the Pan-African ideals of commonality and unity between African states and African people and encourage more coordinated foreign policy between its members. Operating for almost 40 years, the OAU made several notable achievements during its lifetime, including “...the construction of trans African highways...a bureau for the placement of refugees [and] the building of a continental system of

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the OAU was heavily criticised due to its inability “...to stop wars among its member states, although this was outlined in the [OAU] charter as an aim, nor was it able to prevent

genocidal violence such as that which occurred in Rwanda in 1994”. (Schalk et al, 2005: 508). It was criticisms such as these, coupled with the desire “...to improve the image of Africa in order to attract foreign investment” in the neoliberal, post-Cold War world order (Tieku in Young, 2016: 276) that contributed to the desire of the OAU member states to reform and rebrand the organisation. Thus, the African Union was born from the ashes of the OAU.

While the AU recognises the importance of the work of the OAU as a foundation for pursuing Pan African ideals, they have “...shifted focus from supporting liberation

movements in the erstwhile African territories under colonialism and apartheid, as envisaged by the OAU since 1963 and the Constitutive Act, to an organization spearheading Africa’s development and integration” (African Union, 2017). The AU is made up of a variety of different organs and committees that work together to promote and attain this vision. These include the African Union Commission (which manages the day to day management of the organisation), the Assembly (in which the Heads of State and Government come together to act as the supreme decision making body of the AU), the Pan African Parliament (currently only an advisory body) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC). It is the PSC that is ultimately responsible for dealing with peace and security issues, including terrorism, armed conflict and natural disasters.

The PSC is a core body within the African Union and acts as the central pillar for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): the umbrella term for all the "...structures,

objectives, principles and values, as well as decision-making processes relating to the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent" (African Union, 2012).

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Figure 2:_{The African Peace and Security Architecture, Vines, 2013: 96}

The key pillars of the APSA, as seen in the diagram above, are comprised of a variety of elements, including the PSC, the African Peace Fund and the African Standby Force (ASF), which shall be further explored in the main body of this thesis. These capabilities and

mechanisms are aimed at coordinating and harmonising the activities of AU member states in the realm of peace and security, as well as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) based across the sub-regions of Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Williams, 2011: 6).

Given the staunch criticisms levelled at the OAU in relation to their inability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict in Africa, it is not surprising that the improvement of their own capacity to deal with peace and security threats on the continent has been a core focus for the African Union since its creation. To go some way in establishing the extent to which the AU has been able to achieve this, this thesis proposes to evaluate the current capacity of the African Union to act in matters of peace and security, specifically in the field of

counterterrorism.

1.3 Research Question

In order to address the research problem identified within this introduction, this thesis will seek to answer the following research question:

To what extent has the African Union displayed the characteristics of actorness, as identified by Hulse, in its counterterrorism policies on the African continent since 2001?

1.2 Sub Research Questions

In order to thoroughly address this primary research question focusing on the characteristics and capacity of the African Union as a counterterrorism actor, the following sub-questions will be used to engage in a comprehensive and structured analysis of the primary research question:

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2. How does the African Union identify itself as a counterterrorism actor?

3. How are policy decisions in the field of counterterrorism made by the African Union?

4. How much do the policies and attitudes of the African Union member states align on the issue of counterterrorism?

5. How is the role of the African Union framed by other actors, such as the European Union and the United Nations, with regards to the field of counterterrorism?

6. What counterterrorism capabilities does the African Union have at its disposal?

1.3 Academic and Social Relevance

1.3.1 Academic Relevance

The exponential increase of regional organisations (ROs) across the globe in the last 60 years or so has generated a significant amount of interest from academics and policy makers into the role that these organisations can play in dispute settlement and the provision of

international peace and security (Elaraby, 1996: 645). As arguably the most well financed and highly functioning RO to date, the majority of scholarly attention on the ability of regional organisations to deal with security challenges has centred on the European Union. Academic inquiry into the EU as a security actor has ranged from a focus on their response to the crisis in Ukraine to their efforts in the field of counterterrorism (Gehring et al, 2017: Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012). However, this has not been mirrored by any substantial investigation into the actorness of other major ROs. To date, there has been no attempt to assess the actorness of the African Union to identify whether they have the capacity to be a legitimate actor in the field of peace and security. Therefore, this research aims to go some way in closing this gap and seeks to provide an assessment of the capacity of the AU in providing peace and security in Africa, focusing specifically on their efforts in

counterterrorism.

1.3.2 Societal Relevance

Over the last 16 years, the AU has developed into a large regional organisation, boasting 55 member states across the African continent. These members cooperate on a multitude of issues, from peace and security to trade and development. While the AU has a large

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geographical reach and a vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena” (African Union, 2017), there has been significant criticism levelled at the African Union since its inception. With conflict and instability persistent across the continent, and African nations representing the bottom 18 countries on the 2016 UNDP Human Development Index, the African Union is persistently dubbed “...a talk shop, rudderless and crucially disconnected from African citizens, like its predecessor [the OAU]” (Essa, 2013).

Despite these criticisms, the United Nations continues to stress the key role that regional organisations, namely the African Union, can play in bringing peace and stability around the globe. In the case of the African Union, this has been institutionalised with the creation of the United Nations Office to the African Union, as well as several peacekeeping operations on the African continent in which the forces of the African Union and the United Nations have attempted to cooperate, from the Central African Republic to Mali (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017; Weiss and Welz, 2014). However, this thesis seeks to go beyond a normative

assessment of the role that the African Union should play in the field of counterterrorism and instead proposes to adopt a more pragmatic approach in assessing whether the African Union currently has the ability to be a legitimate actor in the field of counterterrorism. If it does not, then the current efforts of the UN to promote a regional counterterrorism agenda, in which the African Union is a key player in promoting peace and security, may be fruitless.

Moreover, if the AU cannot meaningfully act in the area of counterterrorism, this presents a significant stumbling block to the wider promises of regionalism as a way of effectively maintaining international peace and security.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

In order to effectively address the above research question centering on the extent to which the African Union has displayed characteristics of actorness through their counterterrorism policies since their creation in 2001, this thesis project will be divided into several key chapters. Chapter 2 engages in a review of the existing academic body of knowledge in order to assess the growing role of regional organisations, such as the AU, in counterterrorism efforts, as well as the evolution of the concept of actorness as a method for evaluating the capacity of regional organisations to act in international affairs. By doing so, this section of the thesis shall outline the theoretical framework of actorness which will act as the bedrock of

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the research, as well as highlighting the lacuna in the academic discourse that it seeks to fill. Chapter 3 lays out the research design of this thesis, identifying the chosen methods and justification for these, as well as the operationalisation of the key concepts used within this research. Following on from this, Chapter 4 will comprise the analysis section of this thesis and will systematically assess the extent to which the African Union has displayed the characteristics of actorness, as identified by Hulse, in their counterterrorism efforts to date. Finally, this thesis shall end with a conclusive chapter in which the sub-questions and primary research question shall be answered and a critical assessment of the limitations of this study shall be presented. Also, recommendations for future research, based on the findings of this thesis, shall be advanced.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review

In order to ground this study within the existing academic discourse and highlight the lacuna which it will fill, this chapter of the thesis will engage in a literature review of past research which contributes to an understanding of the aforementioned research problem. Firstly, the literature review shall begin from a wide perspective focusing on the development of

regionalism and the role which regional organisations, such as the African Union, have come to play in the international world order. Following on from this, an assessment of the

literature relating to the role of regional organisations in counterterrorism efforts, specifically since the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001, shall be conducted. Finally, in order to provide a launchpad for the introduction of the core theoretical framework of this thesis, the development of the concept of actorness as a method for assessing the capacity of regional organisations to be legitimate actors in the international order shall be analysed.

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Like many concepts in the international relations lexicon, there is a lack of consensus on how to define regionalism. At its most basic level, most scholars agree that “...regionalism is a political process marked by cooperation and policy coordination” (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010: 146). This definition is supported and expanded by Fawcett who defines regionalism as a process that is not solely confined to states but as “...a policy whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region” (2004: 433). This cooperation can occur in a multitude of areas, from international trade and development to peace and security issues (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010). This regionalism can be pursued through ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ methods, which are often mutually reinforcing. In the former, the notions of regional interdependence are promoted and encouraged through notions of identity and shared values (Fawcett, 2004: 433, Katzenstein, 2006: 1) whereas the latter sees the creation of formalized inter-state organisations who use legal and political instruments and bodies to promote regional cooperation (Fawcett, 2004: 433).

While early examples of regionalism can be evidenced through the existence of great empires and alliance systems between states, the growth of contemporary regionalism as a method of governance can largely be seen as a reaction to the increasing globalisation which has occurred since the second half of the 20th century (Farrell, 2005: 2). It is impractical to characterise globalisation as either a positive or negative process as it has brought

simultaneous opportunities and threats. As Heine and Thakur highlight, while globalisation facilitates ease of transnational movement for businesses, products, tourists and students, it does the same for terrorists, international criminals, drugs and weapons (2011: 1). Hence, the increase in regional initiatives is largely attributed to the desire of states to “deal with their common problems and shared interests”, collectively reaping the rewards of globalisation while cooperating to mitigate its ‘darker’ aspects (Farrell, 2005: 4).

2.1.2 The Role of Regional Organisations in Maintaining World Order

Initial recognition of the role that regional organisations could play in maintaining world order can be traced to the end of the First World War and the creation of the League of Nations. Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations recognised the role that “...regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, [could have] for securing the maintenance of peace” (1919). Even though the League of Nations failed, the notion of regionalism that it embedded through its creation carried over and was expanded upon by the

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formation of its successor, the United Nations. Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations further institutionalised and legitimised the role of regional organisations in dealing with international peace and security as part of the new world order (1945). However, as Fawcett argues, while the role that regional organisations could play in maintaining

international peace and resolving conflict was formalised in the UN Charter, their exact role and responsibilities were not clearly defined (2005: 28).

Throughout the Cold War, the benefits of this regionalism and by extension, the role that regional organisations could play in the international order, was largely sidelined as the bipolar power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated and cemented “...the strategic and political rivalry between West and East” (Tsakonas, 2003: 568). Little attention was given to the role that regional organisations could play in bringing regional and international peace. However, the end of the Cold War brought about a change in the international order with the recognition that “...regional action as a matter of

decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council [UN Security Council] but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (Boutros Ghali in Tsakonas: 2003, 570).

During this time, nation states and the United Nations were increasingly recognising that regional organisations could bridge the gap between the state level and international level and positively contribute to the maintenance of international order. As a result, the number of regional organisations and the level of institutionalised coordination that they have undertaken has grown exponentially since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the more powerful and well- resourced regional organisations, such as the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union are increasingly being recognised as key players in the international order, which can be evidenced through their being granted observer status at the UN (Barnett: 1995). Moreover, they are increasingly cooperating with each other and the United Nations, both formally and informally, to deal with major areas and challenges which arise in international affairs.

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One of the core areas in which the resources and capabilities of regional organisations have been increasingly called upon in recent years is in the field of counterterrorism. Following 9/11 and the impetus created by former President Bush’s assertion that defeating terrorism “...is the world’s fight...is civilization’s fight...is the fight of all who in believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush, 2001), the global war on terror began. Initially the role that regional organisations could play in this fight was not explicitly realised and the focus was primarily on nation states to act (Ibid). Shortly afterwards, the role that the United Nations could play in devising internationally agreed upon counterterrorism measures was also focused upon. However, while regional organisations were still involved in the

counterterrorism process during this time, it was not until March 2003 that their role became institutionalised. At this time, the UN Security Council noted that “...these organizations have vested interests in and sensitivities to regional situations, can help to instill a sense of

responsibility in member states and strengthen their will to deal with regional problems” (Wani in Le Sage, 2007: 39). As a result, regional organisations have been increasingly recognised as vital participants in this process (Beyer, 2010:47). However, as Beyer

highlights, being an actor in counterterrorism requires more than just the recognition of the international community and there is a need to assess the capacities of a regional organisation to ascertain whether they are an actor in this governance process (Ibid).

2.1.4 Assessing the ‘Actorness’ of Regional Organisations

The concept of actorness is one that has arisen out of the need to make sense of the world that has been described above, in which participants in global governance measures have

extended beyond nation states, and provides a theoretical framework through which to assess “...the capacity [of an actor] to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjostedt in Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012: 557). Since the creation of the European Union, the concept of actorness has been the focus of a growing amount of academic study and consequently the concept has evolved rapidly in a relatively short space of time. Initial scholarship on this issue from the latter half of the 20th century largely focused on comparing the ability of the European Union to act in comparison to nation states through studying key aspects of the EU, such as their capabilities and lack of a military apparatus (Hill, 1993 and Bull, 1982 in Hulse, 2014: 549). However, as the EU is not a nation state, nor does it ever claim to be, later research wished to avoid such a direct comparison and instead moved to create a distinct framework that could assess “...internal policy making

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processes, third party expectations of the EU and capability to carry out foreign policy” simultaneously (Hulse, 2014: 549). Notably, the work of Bretherton and Vogel promotes using a more constructivist lens in order to assess the actorness of the European Union. This can be seen as a growing recognition that as actors other than nation states come to play a role in international relations, traditional realist benchmarks, such as military power and physical capabilities, are no longer the only indicators of an actor’s legitimacy and capacity to operate in the global arena. It is this recognition that ultimately led Bretherton and Vogel to suggest that establishing actorness should be based upon

“...the essentially interrelated concepts of presence, denoting the international reputation of the EU and associated third-party expectations of EU action;

opportunity, denoting the external environment or context that enables or constrains EU action; and capability, denoting internal factors affecting the EU’s ability to capitalise on presence and respond to opportunity” (Bretherton and Vogel, 2013: 376).

However, as Hulse points out, while such reimagining of the concept of actorness has made it more suitable for the systematic study of the EU as an actor in its current state, this body of scholarship has adopted a _{sui generis view of the European Union in which it is presented as}

“_{a unique institution incomparable to other political entities” (Hulse, 2014: 549) and}

therefore, such actorness criteria is not necessarily applicable to assessing the actorness of other regional organisations.

Alarmingly few attempts have been made to expand the application of the concept of

actorness to regional organisations other than the European Union thus far (Adelmann, 2009, Doidge, 2011 and Hulse, 2014). One of the most significant of these is the work of Hulse (2014) who has adapted the actorness framework put forward by Bretherton and Vogel in order to assess the actorness of the SADC and ECOWAS in the realm of international trade. This work has moved beyond an EU centric understanding of actorness and provided an analytical framework which can be applied to a variety of regional organisations. Hulse’s framework focuses on five criteria which have been developed from the existing body of knowledge on actorness detailed above. These five analytical criteria are identity,

decision-making, preference convergence, presence and capabilities (2014: 550), which are further defined in the subsequent section of this chapter. Therefore, by using this framework

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to assess the actorness of the African Union in the field of counterterrorism, this thesis will aim to fill the gap in the academic discourse in two ways: by advancing the study of actorness of regional organisations beyond the European Union as Hulse has strived to do and applying it for the first time to the African Union in the field of counterterrorism.

2.2 Theoretical Framework- Evaluating the Actorness of Regional

Organisations

This section of the thesis project shall endeavour to answer the first of the sub-research questions presented as part of this research: _{what are the characteristics of actorness? This} research shall be based upon the theoretical concept of actorness that has been introduced in the preceding section of this thesis. Specifically, it shall use the five criteria of identity, decision-making, preference convergence, presence and capabilities, advanced by Hulse (2014). In devising these criteria, Hulse has created a framework through to which to assess the actorness of ROs other than the European Union. Rather than existing as mutually exclusive criteria through which to assess the actorness of a regional organisation, these criteria are interconnected and must all operate in conjunction with each other for an RO to be considered a legitimate actor, as is shown in Figure 3 below. However, while these criteria can influence each other, they are not necessarily causally linked (Ibid:549) and only by applying each of the criteria in an individual, systematic manner can a thorough,

comprehensive assessment of how the African Union displays the characteristics of actorness in the field of counterterrorism be ascertained.

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Figure 3: _{Conceptual Model of Actorness (Hulse, 2012: 550)}

2.2.1 Identity

The first of the characteristics of actorness that is identified by Hulse, and that will be explored within this thesis, is that of identity. The creation, maintenance and promotion of a clear and comprehensive institutional identity is necessary for “...an organisation to project itself not only internally and internationally but also temporally, increasing its visibility and relevance” (Oelsner, 2012: 115). Internally, a strong institutional identity is necessary to obtain and retain political legitimacy from members, while externally a defined identity “...contributes towards the organisation’s credibility, recognition and reputation” (Ibid).

Hulse divides this notion of institutional identity into two separate components: corporate identity and social identity. Firstly, corporate identity is the external image that a regional organisation projects as its motivations for acting in the first place (2012: 551). Based on this, social identity is related to how an organisation “...frames and pursues the interests generated by its corporate identity” (Ibid). Together, these two aspects of identity operate in

conjunction with each other to generate the interests of a regional organisation, as well as the manner in which they attempt to realise these interests.

2.2.2 Decision Making

In order to implement an action, ROs must also have the mechanisms in place to make the conscious decision to act in the first place. Effective decision making processes are a key criteria of actorness as they can promote convergence or divergence of the preferences of member states (Hulse, 2012: 551). Hulse points out that the more formalised modes of

decision making, such as supranationalism and majority voting, are generally more conducive to actorness as they generate more definitive and legally binding decision making. Moreover, intergovernmental mechanisms can be slow and ineffectual as they require unanimous

agreement before decisions can be taken (Ibid). As a result, it can be difficult for ROs who adopt an intergovernmental structure to make decisions in a timely manner, if any decisions are made at all.

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However, as Doidge highlights, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that

supranational, majority voting procedures are always more effective than intergovernmental mechanisms when it comes to ROs making decisions (Doidge, 2011: 23).The decision

making mechanisms that an RO chooses to adopt are closely tied to their institutional identity (Wunderlich, 2012). In some instances, intergovernmental modes of decision making can bring about high levels of actorness. For example, if a member of an RO acts as a _{de facto}

hegemon _{and is able to exercise leverage over other member states, then even decisions made}

through consensus can result in high levels of actorness. Therefore, the assessment of whether the decision making structures of an RO lend themselves to high levels of actorness or not needs to be conducted on a case by case basis which takes into account the context of the RO in question.

2.2.3 Preference Convergence

Just as developing a common institutional identity is vital in terms of actorness, so too is the level of coherence between the AU and its member states and indeed, between the AU member states themselves. All ROs have a finite number of resources at their disposal and it is the job of member states to work together to decide how best to utilise these resources. In instances where preference convergence is higher, member states are more likely to develop and implement effective and coherent policy (Hulse, 2012: 552). However, the more the interests of states diverge, the harder it will be to act, especially in cases where ROs utilise intergovernmental decision making mechanisms and rely on unanimity between members (Ibid).

2.2.4 Presence

Moreover, to be considered a legitimate actor in any field, an entity must be able to have some impact on their surroundings and the other actors in the international arena. However, it is important to note that this perceived impact, or presence, is not related to the actions of an RO but rather by sheer virtue of their existence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27). A

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perception of outsiders: their recognition of the RO as an actor and their expectations of it” (Hulse, 2012: 552). This can be referenced through the formalisation of roles for ROs in international organisations, such as the UN. Such formalisation can take the form of ROs being designated as observers or bloc members of these international fora, as well as increasing political dialogue and cooperation between the regional organisation and other actors in the international system (Ibid).

2.2.5 Capabilities

Finally, it is vital to consider that even with the best political will in the world, it is

impossible for any regional organisation to act if they do not have the physical means to do so. Therefore, the final criteria of actorness is an assessment of whether an RO has

“...instruments directly under its control and consist of, first, its budget, and second, its institutionalized instruments for transforming policy- formulated more or less coherently and efficiently through decision making structures- into concrete, real-world action” (Hulse, 2012: 553). These instruments can fall into three different categories: coercive capabilities, incentivising capabilities and the use of moral suasion (Ibid). Coercive capabilities involve some form of force either through litigation or via the threat/use of military force.

Incentivising measures can be either positive, in the form of technical or financial support, or through negative means, such as sanctions. Finally, moral suasion uses persuasion and socialisation to encourage certain behaviours. Examples of this include political dialogue, lobbying and the issuing of statements.

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Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design and Justification

3.1.1 Case Study Design and Case Selection

The aim of this thesis is to assess the extent to which the African Union has displayed characteristics of actorness through their counterterrorism efforts on the African continent since their creation in 2001. In order to do so this research will adopt a qualitative research design, specifically through a single case study focusing on the counterterrorism efforts of the African Union. This chosen design allows the concept of actorness to be applied in a

systematic deductive manner, using the five criteria identified in Figure 1.2 to thoroughly address the proposed research question.

As this research question is context dependent and focuses on a single case, this design allows for in depth analysis of the research problem and gives recognition to the fact that “...the context and other complicated decision(s) related to the case being studied are

integral” (Yin, 2012: 2). Moreover, as has been highlighted in the literature review section of this thesis, the application of the theory of actorness has been largely confined to looking at the European Union as a _{sui generis actor. The primary motivation of this research is to move} beyond such a rigid understanding of the EU as a _{sui generis actor and to begin to apply the} concept of actorness to other regional organisations. Due to the time constraints of this project, this research aims to be a small step in advancing the application of the actorness concept to ROs beyond the EU and the focus on a single RO allows a more comprehensive, thorough analysis than would be possible if multiple ROs were to be analysed.

The choice of the African Union as the actor to be studied was based predominantly on the fact that “...the AU, at least in its institutional set up, strikes a remarkable resemblance to that

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share similar broad goals, despite their different cultural and historical contexts. Generally speaking both Unions seek to utilise “...regional integration to promote peace, stimulate economic growth, achieve solidarity for their people, and strengthen their international profile/stature” (Ibid: 53). While this research aims to move beyond a purely European Union centric focus in regards to actorness, it does not wish to ignore the academic building blocks that have already been laid out. Therefore, the African Union presents an interesting, and somewhat logical, case for the extension of the actorness concept beyond the European Union, due both to their overall similarities and key distinct differences.

3.1.2 Data Analysis and Collection

The chosen methodology for this research is that of discourse analysis based on the

theoretical underpinnings brought forward by Laclau and Mouffe, which asserts that “...all objects, people, societies and polities do not exist _{a priori but are, instead, structured} contingently and produced through the hegemonic articulation and re-articulation of particular discourses” (Rogers, 2009: 836). This thesis focuses predominantly on the declaratory capacities of the African Union and its member states, and how these are perceived and reinforced by external actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union. Due to the time constraints on this project, it has not been possible within the scope of this thesis to assess the extent to which these capacities play out in the real world actions of the African Union. Thus, the crux of this research is focused on assessing how the African Union is constructed as a potential counterterrorism actor, both internally and externally, through the ‘hegemonic articulation and re-articulation’ of discourse related to the five criteria detailed in the theoretical framework section of this thesis.

Informed by initial desktop research of the overarching counterterrorism policies and mechanisms of the African Union, 30 texts have been selected through the use of purposive sampling, based on suitability, language and accessibility of the texts. In selecting suitable texts for the discourse analysis of this thesis, this researcher has chosen texts which are considered to be productive and/or authoritative in relation to the African Union and its role in counterterrorism on the African continent. Guided by the five criteria of actorness which have been identified in the previous chapter, specific attention has been paid to how these criteria are articulated within these texts, through the use of metaphors and other rhetorical devices.

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Secondly, the languages of the analysed texts have been limited to English and French, due to the language skills of the researcher. However, as either English or French (and in some cases both of these languages) are among the official working languages of the majority of

organisations and governments whose discourse has been studied, this does not pose a significant limitation to the outcome of this research.

Finally, the texts that have been analysed within this research come from a variety of different official sources, including the African Union Commission, Peace and Security Council, United Nations, European Union and the member states of the AU. While these texts run the gamut from speech and debate transcripts to official policy documents, declarations and reports, all of the texts that have been used are publically accessible

documents. Hence, as they are readily accessible to the general public and reflect the official public discourse of the African Union and other relevant actors in relation to the issue of counterterrorism, they can be seen as authoritative and reflective of the official positions of these organisations. However, solely looking at official, publicly available discourse does give rise to its own limitations. The first of these is that, particularly in the case of the African Union and some of its member states, not all meeting records are made publically available which can present some logistical challenges when gathering data. The second related limitation connected to this is that the documents that are made publically available can be critiqued on the grounds of being selective and potentially seeking to portray a particular image to the public that may not be reflected in all of the organisation’s interactions. However, in order to overcome this pitfall as much as possible, the researcher attempted to ensure that the findings were corroborated by several different sources, and from different institutions and organisations where possible.

3.2 Operationalisation

In order to translate the theoretical concepts which will inform this thesis into phenomenon that are observable in the real world, this section of the thesis provides an operationalisation of these concepts. Furthermore, while the theoretical framework section of this thesis has introduced the five characteristics of actorness that will guide the analytical portion of this research, it is also necessary to establish empirical indicators that correspond to these

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characteristics. This highlights, in a transparent manner, how the researcher will identify the extent to which these characteristics are present, or indeed absent, in the counterterrorism efforts of the African Union.

Concepts Definition Empirical Indicators Data Sources

Regional Organisation “...organisations with membership drawn from the states of a specific region” (Merrills, 2005: 279)

Organisation consisting of member states from more than one country in a region that aim to coordinate policies on shared interests.

Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) and Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (2014)

Counterterrorism (CT) “...consists of government actions to inhibit terrorist attacks or curtail their consequences” (Enders and Sandler, 2011: 103)

Policies and measures which are subsumed under the heading of CT AU Framework for Counterterrorism (2015): including the Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism and the Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (2002)

Actorness “...the capacity [of an actor] to behave actively and

deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjostedt in Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012: 557

Presence of the five indicators: Identity, Decision Making, Preference, Presence and Capabilities (Individually discussed below) See below

Identity “Corporate identity provides the

Corporate Identity- Identification of

Policy Documents of the African Union and

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motivation for engaging in action in the first place, in pursuit of physical and ontological security and welfare

maximization..._social identity influences how a region frames and pursues the interests generated by its corporate identity” (Wendt in Hulse, 2014: 551)

counterterrorism as an interest of the African Union and the reasons for this.

Social _Identity-

Framing of their ability, legitimacy and willingness to engage in counterterrorism efforts.

speeches made by African Union officials e.g. Agenda 2063: the Africa we want and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy

Decision Making The mechanisms and procedures through which decisions are made.

The decision making procedures of the African Union Peace and Security Council

Decision making procedures outlined in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002), as well as comments on the efficacy of these

Preference Convergence Interests shared between members of regional organization (Hulse, 2014: 552) Declaration of common interests by the member states of the African Union

Policy documents and speeches of the AU and its member states related to

counterterrorism. To limit this, will study the interests of 5 member states (1 from each of the regions recognised by the African Union- North (Egypt), East (Kenya), West (Nigeria), Central (Chad) and Southern (South Africa). Presence “...perception of outsiders: their recognition of the regional organization

Statements and written documents in which other actors make reference to the

United Nations, European Union and foreign government reports and statements

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as an actor and their expectation of it” (Hulse,2014:552)

African Union as a counterterrorism actor and the roles they expect it to perform.

on the role for the AU in counterterrorism.

Capabilities “...institutionalized means to an end...instruments directly under the control of the regional organization...consist of budget and its institutionalized instruments for transforming

policy...into real world action” (Hulse, 2014: 553)

Existing budgetary, coercive, incentivizing and moral suasion mechanisms and initiatives of the African Union which aim or in part aim to engage in

counterterrorism efforts.

Budget reports, initiatives and tools of the African Union e.g. fact-finding missions, working groups, military capabilities and the issuing of political statements which have CT as an objective.

Table 1: Operationalisation of Concepts (Author’s Own Work)

3.3 Validity and Reliability

The primary limitation of the case study method arises from the low level of external validity that it incurs. As a case study is used to analyse a specific phenomenon in a particular

context, it is difficult to generalise to other contexts. However, the findings of this research are in no way intended to be generalised to either the actorness of the African Union in fields other than counterterrorism or indeed any other ROs beyond the African Union. Rather, the goal of this research is to apply the more general concept of actorness to the specific case of the African Union in counterterrorism. Nevertheless, through such in-depth research, it may be possible to gain greater insight into the utility and viability of the actorness framework advanced by Hulse as a tool for assessing the capacity of ROs other than the European Union in a variety of policy fields.

Another fundamental aspect of any quality research is ensuring the internal validity of the research. Internal validity refers to the necessity of measuring or assessing what you set out to measure (Yin, 2003: 36). In order to guide the analysis portion of this research, sub-questions relating to the distinct criteria of actorness have been devised in order to guide the data collection and analysis process. The very nature of discourse analysis necessitates some level

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of subjectivity. In order to be as transparent as possible about the analytical process of this research, the operationalisation table presented above has attempted to provide a systematic scheme of the manner in which the collected data was analysed.

Chapter 4. Analysis of the Capacity of the African

Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

4.1 Identity of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

4.1.1 Corporate Identity of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

At its core, the overarching goal of the African Union, as reiterated in its Agenda 2063 strategy, is the creation and maintenance of an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union Commission, 2015:1). As a regional organisation, the African Union can be seen to have multiple goals, however, the notion of ensuring peace and security recurs as a key aspect of the corporate identity of the AU in several key documents, including the Agenda 2063 Strategy (2015), the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African

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which aims to “...promote peace, security and stability in Africa in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable

development” (African Union, 2002: 5), serves to further cement the centrality of achieving peace and security within the corporate identity of the AU. Moreover, as a consequence of this discourse, it could be argued that peace, security and stability of the African continent is viewed as a necessary prerequisite for the achievement of the other major goals of the AU, such as sustainable development and prosperity. As a result, the maintenance of peace and security can be viewed as a core corporate identity marker of the African Union and its member states.

The classification of terrorism as a major and pressing threat to this desired peace, security and stability of the African continent can be increasingly seen within major policy documents and reports of the AU that have been examined within the scope of this research. Both the 249th Communique of the Peace and Security Council on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2010) and the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism (2014) make multiple references to terrorism as a ‘scourge’ and “...expresses serious concern over the worsening of the scourge of terrorism and the threat that this situation poses to peace, security and stability in Africa” (Peace and Security Council, 2010: 1). By referring to terrorism as a ‘scourge’ and placing it in contrast to the values of peace, security and stability that the African Union is trying to maintain and protect, this discourse frames those who carry out terrorist acts as the “Other”, threatening the shared goals of the AU and providing the impetus for the African Union to “...ensure Africa’s active participation, cooperation and coordination...in its determined efforts to combat and eradicate terrorism” (African Union Commission, 2004: 1).

4.1.2 Social Identity of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor

While the corporate identity of the AU examined above highlights the underlying motivation for the AU to engage in counterterrorism efforts on the African continent in the first place, analysis of the discourse on the social identity of the African Union can shed some valuable light on the key values of the organisation and how this affects the way in which the AU attempts to act in the name of counterterrorism.

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Firstly, the unique historical condition of the African continent can be seen to play a major role in the way that the threat of terrorism is defined and portrayed in the discourse of the African Union. Beginning after the Second World War and continuing until the end of the 1970s, there was a mass move on the African continent towards independence and

self-determination for countries which had been under colonial rule for decades. While some of these transitions to independence were peaceful others, such as Algeria and Guinea-Bissau, were achieved through violence and armed struggle (US Department of State Office of the Historian, 2017). This historical reality can be argued to have impacted upon the decision of the African Union and its officials to voice a clear distinction between the notion of terrorism and the “...legitimate struggles of people under foreign occupation to achieve their inalienable right to self-determination” (Antonio, 2016: 2). As a consequence, a distinction is created between violent acts for the purposes of terrorism “which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural... ” (Organization for African Unity, 1999: 3) which cannot be justified under any circumstances (Antonio, 2016:2) and violence that may be used in the pursuit of self-determination.

The historical reality of colonialism and the relatively recent nature of independence for many African states has had further impact upon the African Union as a regional organisation through the development of their internal operating norms. Specifically, the stress that is placed on the importance of maintaining “...non-interference in the internal matters of Member States” (2004:1), except in cases of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, can be largely attributed to the desire of the AU and their member states to “...safeguard and preserve the hard-won liberties of our peoples [and] the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our countries” (Ibid). This dominant discourse of non-interference and the preservation of sovereignty for its member states transcends into the approach that the African Union promotes in dealing with terrorism on the African continent. In the core documents of the AU, “...the imperative for all Member States of the African Union to take all necessary measures to protect their populations from acts of terrorism” (African Union, 2002: 2) and the fact that “...effectively preventing and combating terrorism requires renewed and firm commitment from Member States” (Peace and Security Council, 2014: 17) is

stressed. As a result, the ultimate onus is placed on Member States to act in the prevention and combating of terrorism.

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While the African Union advocates for respect of the sovereignty of their member states, and consequently non-interference in their internal affairs except in grave circumstances, the discourse analysed within this research also serves to highlight the role that the AU ascribes itself in countering terrorism. As highlighted in the statement of Tete Antonio, the AU Permanent Observer to the UN, the African Union depicts itself as a core actor within counterterrorism efforts and he “reiterate[s] the AU’s commitment to fully shoulder its share of responsibility” (2016: 4). Moreover, the African Union Strategy for the Sahel, a

geographical area in which terrorism is recognised as a major security threat, refers to the African Union as an “...organisation that can very legitimately provide an overall umbrella for regional initiatives in the Sahel... [and] also has a great capacity for resource mobilisation, be it intellectual, technical or financial” (2014: 5). This discourse seeks to imbue the African Union with legitimacy and capacity in the field of counterterrorism. As a result, they portray themselves as an organisation which can add value to the counterterrorism efforts on the African continent, due primarily to their specific regional knowledge of the continent and their available resources and capabilities.

A final key social identity marker of the AU that arises through this discourse analysis is that of a need to unite against the common threat of terrorism. By asserting that the “security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole” (2004:3), the Solemn Declaration of Common African Defence and Security Policy legitimises its own existence by seeking to unify the member states of the AU against common security threats, such as terrorism. By presenting the security of the entire African continent as indivisible from the security of individual member states, this discourse mandates the need for the member states of the AU to be unified against the ‘Other’ of those who commit terrorist attacks.

4.2 Decision Making Procedures of the African Union

Officially established in 2002, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union acts as the standing decision making body on issues of peace and security on the African continent, specifically holding the mandate for ensuring "implementation of key conventions and instruments to combat international terrorism" (African Union webpage, current as of 2017). The Peace and Security Council is composed of 15 member states, who are elected based on

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the principles of national rotation and equal representation across the five regions of Africa: North, Southern, Central, East and West. As an intergovernmental organisation, the decisions of the Peace and Security Council are "... generally guided by the principle of consensus" (2002: 13). However, the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council also highlights that in instances in which decisions cannot be reached by consensus, "...the Peace and

Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting" (Ibid: 13). This would suggest that the African Union places a relatively high degree of emphasis on the importance of consensus and solidarity between its members and

endeavours to promote unanimous decision making between the members of the Peace and Security Council as much as possible. However, the recognition that consensus may not always be possible, as it may impede or even prevent effective and timely decision making, can be seen as fuelling the decision to also include provisions for majority voting to avert inaction from the PSC in the event of serious threats to the peace and security of the continent.

Despite establishing a decision making process which both promotes consensus decision making as much as possible while also leaving room for majority voting in the case of the possibility of being unable to reach a unanimous decision , the decision making process of the PSC has still been the target of some criticism. In a report by Ugandan President Paul

Kagame on potential areas of reform for the African Union, prepared at the request of the AU Commission, he highlights that "...the quality of the Peace and Security Council's

decision-making, engagement and impact do not meet the ambition envisioned in the PSC Protocol" and calls for reform "...reviewing the PSC's membership and strengthening the PSC's working methods" (2017: 9). This would suggest that while the established decision making processes of the PSC are geared towards ensuring that high quality, timely and effective decisions are made, this may not always be true in reality.

4.3 Preference Convergence within the African Union on

Counterterrorism Priorities

The promotion of solidarity and unity as key identity markers of the African Union can be seen as an attempt by the organisation to highlight the common interests and promote

Bringing the Fight Home: Assessing the Capacity of the African Union as a Counterterrorism Actor