Expanding solar energy using a Public Private Partnership model: A single case
study to test the promises
Tes Miedema (10575367)
Course: New perspectives on global sustainability politics Bachelor Thesis: Political Science
Supervisor: Dr. P. Schleifer
Second examiner: Dr. R. Sanchez Salgado 21/06/2017
Word count: 8827 University of Amsterdam
2 Abstract
Developing sustainable energy resources is becoming essential to replace fossil fuels and to meet the increasing energy demand for energy. Solar energy has high potentials to mitigate these problems. Due to high investment costs of developing solar power plants, collaboration between public and private actors is a necessity for almost all projects. However, some scholars argue that setting up a public private partnership for financial feasibility, negatively affects public accountability of national governments. This research starts by drafting a framework to measure accountability. The following four criteria are taken into account in this framework: financial risk-sharing, cost and benefits, social impact and transparency. Secondly, this framework is used to measure public accountability in The NOOR 1 solar project in Ouarzazate, Morocco. Because the theory showed that rigid contracts tend to be the best way to safeguard accountability, the main focus of this research lies within analysing the contractual design of the PPP in Ouarzazate. In this specific case, upward accountability between public and private actors seemed to be well secured in official agreements and contracts between public and private investors. However, downward accountability between public, private sector and the local community seems to be less protected in the contractual design of the PPP.
3 Table of contents
Introduction p. 4
Theoretical framework p. 5
Financial risk-sharing p. 7
Cost and benefits p. 8
Social impacts p. 9
Transparency p. 9
Methodology and data p. 11
The Ouarzazate CSP solar park p. 12
Analysis p. 14
The contractual design p. 15
Safeguarding public accountability in the Ouarzazate CSP solar park p. 17
Conclusion and Discussion p. 21
4 Introduction
Countries all over the world are still heavily dependent on fossil fuels to maintain their current energy consumption (Solangi et al., 2011). However, combustion of fossil fuels puts huge amounts of CO² in the atmosphere leading to a global rise of temperatures. When temperatures rise, existing ecosystems and ecosystem services may face a shift that is irreversible with all its consequences on human health and human wellbeing (Pachauri et al., 2015). Furthermore, earth’s reserves of oil, gas and coal are limited and with the growing consumption rates, renewable energy sources must ensure future anthropogenic energy consumption (Kalogirou, 2013).
Solar energy is a renewable energy resource that has a high potential to meet the future global energy demand. More energy of the sun strikes the Earth within ten hours, than all humans consume in a year, which illustrates the potential of the sun to solve mankind’s energy problem (Lewis, 2007). Investment and technological development have increased exponentially in the last few years. Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), is a type of panel that is currently commercially deployed in several regions in the world. Their success lies in the possibility to store direct solar radiation for around 6 to 7,5 hours which is much longer than regular PV solar panels (IRENA, 2012). Northern Africa is argued to be an eminent region to invest in CSP projects. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), this region could cover between 1,6% and 13.1% of the global electricity demand (Viebahn et al., 2011). Furthermore, it is in the interest of both Europe and the MENA region to develop solar energy because both regions are seeking to secure their energy demand as well as making a transition toward low carbon economies (Tahri et al., 2015) (Patt et al., 2009). The cost of CSP projects are extremely high making a collaboration between several parties necessary (Fisari & Stadelmann, 2015). A possible way to fund a project with this financial burden is through a public private partnership (PPP). PPPs are based on a cooperation between governmental actors and business with the goal to pursue specific or broad policy objectives (Fuchs, 2005). However, some scholars argue that, although PPPs can contribute to efficient financial arrangements and reasonable prices for projects, they undermine public accountability (Forrer et al., 2010). Their main concern is that contracting with a third party will lead to a loss of command and control by the state. Thereby, private parties appear to put their main focus on commercializing public activity while public activities should act in the interest of their citizen. (Börzel & Risse, 2002; Flinders, 2005; Shaoul et al., 2012).
The aim of this research paper is twofold. First of all, it will critically reflect upon the influence of PPP s on public accountability and provide an insight on the mechanisms that affect public accountability. Secondly it will specifically reflect upon a PPP that is set up in Ouarzazate to fund worlds larges solar park. The main question is: how can PPP’s affect the accountability of a national governments when contributing to the deployment of a CSP solar project? Investigating this question provided the following findings. At the Ouarzazate CSP solar
5
project, clear agreements are made about the accountability of the involved actors. The straight forward contractual design of the PPP and the clear structure of the different relationships between the actors that are involved seems to safeguard public accountability very well. However, accountability towards its citizens, is slightly less well protected and those that live in or around the Ouarzazate solar park do not benefit as much as presented in the formal agreements (Bovaird, 2004; Hebson et al., 2003).
The main argument of this paper is, the importance to find out how public accountability in a PPP around renewable energy projects is possibly affected. Because the MENA region is a potential hotspot for similar CSP projects funded by PPPs, governments should be aware of the possible negative consequences (Fuchs, 2005).The theoretical framework will first set a clear definition of PPPs and accountability. Then it will elaborate on existing arguments around erosion of accountability in PPPs. Secondly, the theoretical framework aims at setting up criteria to measure negative accountability shifts within emerging PPPs. The methodology part explains how these criteria can actually be measured in the specific case study and what type of data is used. In the fourth section, a short description of the CSP solar plant in Ouarzazate is given to provide the reader with some general facts about the project. In the analysis, the four criteria are applied to a specific case study of the solar project NOOR I in Ouarzazate, Morocco to investigate if and how this PPPs affected erosion of accountability. The report will finish with a conclusion where the major findings will be discussed about how a PPP that is set up around a major solar project can actually secure or affect public accountability.
Theoretical Framework
Because there are many different interpretations of what a public private partnership entails, it is at first important to clearly explain what definition of a PPP is used here. This research paper defines a PPP as: an arrangement between a government and non-state actor(s) or private companies, where all actors share rights and responsibilities during the duration of the arrangement and where the PPP is directly involved in political steering and governing, either through loose forms of cooperation or by legally binding contracts (Farquharson et al., 2011; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). It is argued that the contractual design of PPPs can provide significant benefits for public actors because its functions as a tool for state actors to efficiently set up public goods and services in a cost-effective way (Bloomfield, 2006; Forrer et al., 2010; Linder, 1999; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). PPPs enlarge the economic and political efficiency and quality of specific projects by sharing their information and expertise (Börzel & Risse, 2002; Linder, 1999). However, there are also scholars that highlight the negative consequences of this newly emerging relationship between public and private actors. Their main concern is that setting up a PPP will negatively influence the political accountability of national governments (Bloomfield, 2006; Coghill & Woodward, 2005; Flinders, 2005; Watson, 2003). To
6
further elaborate on this potential negative influence, first a clear definition of accountability should be provided. This paper defines accountability as:
‘’the willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s action’’ (Bierman & Gupta, 2011: 1857).
Traditional understanding of public accountability makes a distinction in upward accountability, where the public sector holds accountability claims within the public sector, and downward accountability which is the government’s responsibility towards its citizens (Shaoul et al., 2012). In this situation, illustrated in the left part of Figure 1, a simple interdependency exists between public actors and those that receive public services (citizen) (Forrer et al., 2010). Here we define public actors as national or international governments, or those actors that are under the responsibility of governments and receive political guidance and coordination (Gal, 2002; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Public decision makers focus on the procedural way of making political decisions within the political arena and they act based on clear objective rules that ensure public accountability (Hebson et al., 2003).
Public accountability in the context of PPPs requires a different understanding of the concept shown in the right part of Figure 1. Here, mutual accountability exists between private and public parties in the political arena. Private actors are defined as organizations with a commercial purpose, multinational corporations and business associates (Gal, 2002; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). Upward accountability in this context exists of obligations and requirements in the relation between governments and private firms (Forrer et al., 2010). Thereby, downward accountability to the recipients of public services is also carried by both public and private actors (Hebson et al., 2003). Many PPPs involve public sector organizations that get access to private fund, technical expertise or other resources which makes public bodies dependent on private actors. Besides new accountability relationships, also more complex relationships arise, as often more than one private partner is involved (De Schepper et al., 2014). Therefore it should be well understood what an organisation can offer, as well as what they can receive from public actors (Forrer et al., 2010).
7
Figure 1: Traditional accountability versus a new form of accountability within PPPs.
When PPPs are designed well, both parties will benefit equally of the partnership and public accountability is not compromised for the sake of private profits (Forrer et al., 2010). According to several scholars however, these new public private relations shatter the accountability claim of governments (Lund-Thomsen, 2009; Shaoul et al., 2012; Watson, 2003).
Hebson et al., argue that accountability envisioned by political policies is threatened with the incorporation of private parties, because these actors are admitted to the political arena and appeal to a share in policy making an implementation of this policy (2005: 235). Furthermore, it is argued that PPPs contribute to ‘’the hollowing of the state’’ (Flinders, 2005; Shaoul et al, 2012 : 218). Because the public sector outsources services and liberalises the commercialisation of these services to a sovereign PPP, they lose their accountability in these sectors and public services are losing their social base (Börzel & Risse, 2002; Shaoul et al., 2012). To counter this phenomenon, it is highly important that public actors determine how national governments hold private partners accountable but also how they are accountable in relation to their private partners (Bierman & Gupta, 2011). There are many options to measure accountability in PPPs. This paper used existing literature to determine four main criteria that seem to affect public accountability when a public private partnership is set up. When these criteria are not properly embedded in the PPP, national governments run a chance of losing their upward accountability and their downward accountability which will endanger their electoral position (Forrer et al., 2010). The section below describes the chosen criteria and how they possibly affect public accountability when not clearly monitored.
Financial risk-sharing
The first criteria to measure PPP accountability involves sharing under partners because risk-sharing appears to be a major incentive for both parties to join forces in a PPP (Forrer et al., 2010; Willems & Van Doorn, 2011; Hodge & Greve, 2007). Here, risk-sharing is discussed from a financial perspective as private financed capital spending is often the main reason for governments to get involved (Spackman, 2002). When sharing financial risks, partners should discuss and formally
8
capture who is in the best position to bear the responsibility for financial setbacks, before entering in an agreement (Forrer et al., 2010). However, private parties often opt for a high trust relationship that secures mutual accountability in risk-sharing, without any contractual assurance (Van Ham & Koppejan, 2001). This gives private actors the ability to shift financial risks from present generations towards future generations (Hall, 2004). In some cases contracts are negotiated, but in such a way that private parties minimize their financial risk (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). Thus, in the process of setting up a PPP, accountability risk get lost by neglecting the importance of formally establishing clear boundaries. Especially when more than one private party gets involved this seems to be the case (Roehrich et al., 2014; Willems & van Doorn, 2011). Governments tend to ignore these failures of a PPP as they believe they can significantly reduce their financial burden and financial risk by outsourcing a project to private organisations. However, when financial issues arise, for example when the operating part of a PPP fails, public-actors are held accountable for the financial costs and subsequently bare the accountability to defend their choice of setting up a PPP (Papadopoulos, 2010; Van Ham & Koppejan, 2001; Watson, 2003).
It can be argued that sharing financial risk through PPPs contributes to erosion of both upward and downward public accountability (Hodge, 2004). Because financial risk-sharing is often not strongly embedded in the contractual design, it leads to a situation where private actors secure their financial viability within a project without taking accountability for potential risk (Linder, 1999). Thereby, downward accountability is affected, as setting up a PPP seems to be a strategical move rather than a social one.
Cost and benefits
According to several authors, collaborating in a PPP is mostly beneficial for both parties because cost and benefits are shared based on the idea of mutual added value. Additional benefits are expected to outweigh the extra costs and thus lead to a win-win partnership (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Lund-Thomsen, 2009). Possible benefits from PPPs can range from increased access to resources, lower transaction costs, enhanced efficiency in working space, increased transport capacity, knowledge accumulation and image. (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2002).
Other authors however, criticize PPPs because the public parties appear to bear increased costs with no additional benefits (Watson, 2003). Flinders even argues that that PPPs should be seen in the context of a zero-sum partnership, where public actors are the expected ‘’losers’’ (2005). The cost of co-operation can lie in: preparation, adaption of the internal organisation, co-ordination of the project and tuning of objectives (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). Especially the cost of tuning objectives seem to be significantly high. Both national governments and private actors try to avoid rigid contracts, because they are too afraid they have to enrol some of their internal interests (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). Thereby, actors are constantly influenced by their own networks that force them into a specific strategy to pursue these interest. This leads to a situation where collaboration for joint development
9
ends up in loosely linked projects dependent on high levels of trust and dialogue between actors (Nissen et al., 2014). The costs that arise from tuning strategic differences and contradictory interests are paid for by the public sector and thus upward accountability is affected. When expectations and interests of both parties would be specified and formally integrated in a contract, it is much easier to maintain a collaboration between a public and a private partner and to avoid confusion in upward accountability (Forrer et al., 2010). However, a problem that often arises here is the fact that the public body, that is responsible for managing the relation with the private party is often not the same body that negotiated the contract. When the new coming government body does not share the same interest as the negotiating government body a situation of confused and conflicting accountability can occur (Flinders, 2005).
Social impacts
Projects that arise from a PPP are often build in a densely populated environment affecting social and environmental systems (Forrer et al., 2010). This means that there is a likely chance of social opposition (Van Ham & Koppejan, 2001). Citizens fear to become objects of a profit-making organisation rather than one that serves public interest. Their main concern is that governments hastily enter into partnerships, thereby forgetting to fix the capacity and flexibility to make future decisions in the public interest (Hodge, 2004). These fears are not entirely unfounded as increased corruption within the public sector is more likely to appear when governments enter into a PPP (Hebson et al., 2003). Private party capitalist views and profit based motives are appealing to public bodies and push them from their existing legal political structures towards shady business that is more profitable (Hebson et al., 2003). Social restraint towards PPPs is strengthened by the unclear and non-transparent legal standing and regulations around the existence of a PPP (Bovaird, 2004). Private actors seek to minimize their downward political accountability within contracts. When projects lead to social problems they don’t have to take the blame and citizens will most likely hold the governments accountable (Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Van Ham & Koppejan, 2001). For public actors, it is extremely important to asses social and environmental impact because this influences voters opinions and therefore potentially affect electoral outcomes (Forrer et al., 2010).
Transparency
For public parties, involvement in PPPs is profitable because private parties possess specific expertise. What kind of expertise is dependent on the type of PPPs, but it almost always includes knowledge and information about technology, law and management of public relations and internal partnership issues (Forrer et al., 2010). Sharing expertise is seen as a vital component for success of a project that involves a PPP because it takes away uncertainties and fears about the newly emerging partnership (Erridge and Greer, 2002). Hereby, not only public actors but also citizens should have access to information about the long term obligations, through transparent procedures and written contracts (Bloomfield, 2006).
10
However, reliable and consistent data is often absent (Roehrich et al., 2014). Private parties govern in such a way that property rights, including proprietary information, obtain a competitive advantage and is used for commercial return (Watson, 2003). When information is held behind with the claim that it is ‘’commercial confidentiality’’, it is very difficult for public parties to determine if the information is indeed commercially sensitive and therefore confidential, or if it is actually information and knowledge that is simply conveniently labelled as confidential (Flinders, 2005; Watson, 2005;). The existing legal framework around PPPs is not very transparent as citizens often receive inadequate or inaccurate information (Bloomfield, 2006). However, transparency is regarded to be the primary means to secure public accountability (Shkabatur, 2012). Being open towards other actors about policy goals, secures upward accountability because it provides a possibility for the recipients of public policy to also hold decision makers accountable to keep their promises (Shkabatur, 2012). Furthermore, it helps reduce distrust amongst locals towards private actors. Therefore, it is very important that public parties ensure access to the information and expertise of private partners and monitor it in some way (Flinders, 2005; Forrer et al., 2010).
This section described four criteria that can negatively affect both upward and downward public accountability when not captured properly. Table 1 provides a schematic overview of what is discussed in the theoretical framework. It clearly shows the findings on how accountability is negatively affected per criteria. We will call these findings the ‘’variables’’ that resulted from the theoretical research. These variables will be used in the analysis to measure national accountability for each criteria. The next section will elaborate on how data of contractual design between public and private actors is used to actually analyse the case study of Ouarzazate. Furthermore, it will explain what level of measurement is used in the analysis.
11
Table 1. Criteria to measure accountability and their corresponding variables
Methodology and data
As this research starts from an argument that is made in existing literature, performing a critical or single case study is the most effective (Hancke, 2009: 68). This case should help to gain insights in how a PPP in this specific region marginalizes the accountability of national governments. If accountability is negatively affected, the theory is likely to be solid. However, if the case appears to have different outcomes, the theory could have some serious flaws (Hancke, 2009: 68). The case should involve a PPP that is set up to secure renewable energy, as this is the main focus of the research. Therefore, the NOOR I project in Morocco was chosen. This is one of the first CSP solar projects in the MENA region which is also a testing ground for a PPP (Frisari & Stadelmann, 2015). The research applies a deductive research tradition as it tries to prove the existence of theoretical assumptions in reality by analysing a case study (Hancke, 2009: 110). The starting point is the existing scientific discussion that entering into PPPs leads to erosion of public accountability. Firstly this research paper goes in depth on the theoretical debate about this occurrence. Information for this part was derived from scientific papers in databases such as Scholar and Web of Science. Because the theoretical framework explains the importance of formal agreements, the data that is analysed consists mostly of contractual agreements between the public actor and the private actor. The Criteria Financial risk-sharing Cost & benefits Social impact Transparency Upward accountability High trust relationship without contractual assurance Financially outsourcing projects without setting formal boundaries Loosely linked projects dependent on trust and dialogue High costs in tuning objectives Several negotiating bodies Absence of reliable and consistent data Non-transparency Downward accountability Using a PPP as strategic move No fixed capacity to make decision in the public interest Non-transparent legal standing and regulations Absence of reliable and consistent data Non-transparency
12
paper tries to add to the existing literature by analysing if and how contractual design can contribute to the maintenance of accountability of national governments. The International Funding Institutions (IFIs) that fund the project provided general information about the project, as well as specific documents on the contractual relations between the public and private parties. Especially the Sustainable Development Department of the World Bank provide both technical and financial annual reports on the contracts between the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) and the private developer. Furthermore, The Climate Policy Initiative published several working papers about the financial construction of the PPP and about the technical and operational contracts between MASEN and other stakeholders. Reports from the main private developer (ACWA Power) provided data on the specific environmental and social impact of the project in and environmental and social impact assessment. Social assessments published by the African Development Bank and The Wuppertal Institute where also used. More general information about the PPP in Morocco was derived from case studies conducted by the GGBP, The African Development Bank and the World Bank, written in summary reports.
Table 1 is used as a starting point for the data analysis. The provided variables will be measured using three measurement levels: i) presence of the variable(s), meaning that accountability for this criteria is very well established by a contract or a formal agreement, ii) moderate presence, of the variable(s), meaning that accountability is taken into account but the extent to which, is not specified or discussed, or iii) absence of the variable(s) meaning that accountability for this criteria is not at all safeguarded in the contractual design of the PPP. Setting up these measurement levels gives the possibility to actually analyse the contractual agreements between public and private actors, that affect accountability in a positive or negative manner.
The Ouarzazate CSP solar park
The Kingdom of Morocco is a country in the MENA region that is close to the equator. Several studies show that the geographical location of Morocco is critical when it comes to climate change (Kouskou et al., 2015). Over the past decades, annual precipitation has declined leading to regular occurring and prolonged droughts (Schilling et al., 2012). This climate event especially forms a problem for the agricultural sector of Morocco, which provides 17% of the GDP of the country and employs almost half of the working population (Schilling et al., 2015).
Morocco itself is a huge contributor to Global warming. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Kouskou et al., 2015). Energy consumption per capita is estimated at 864 kWh, while the global average lies around 313 kWh per capita (Amegroud, 2015). To secure this demand, Morocco imports large amounts of oil into its country (Amegroud, 2015). Both the growing local demand and the rising global commodity prices, cause import expenses to grow dramatically, putting financial pressure on Moroccan government and on the Office National de l’Ectricicite (ONEE) (Amegroud, 2015).
13
To mitigate public spending and to reduce dependency on oil, the government of Morocco decided to adopt a decree which allowed ONEE to enter into power agreements with privately owned producers. This gives the power sector the chance to improve performance of power generation and offer electricity to consumers at competitive prices (Amerground, 2015). Furthermore, in 2010 the Renewable Energy Law was adopted which promotes renewable investments as well as production, distribution and trade of renewable energy by private actors, to achieve the target of 42% green energy production in 2020 (Amerground, 2015; Tahri et al., 2015). To steer these ambitious objectives, two governmental agencies where set up. The first is the National Agency for the Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ADEREE) that performs a more general task in developing renewable energy in both wind, hydro and solar power. The second is the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy (MASEN) and is in charge of implementing the Moroccan solar Plan. Because 14% of the 2020 target is set to be achieved by investing in solar energy, MASEN took the responsibility in 2009 to develop and implement a 500 MW power plant project called NOOR (Tahri et al., 2015). The total site of this CSP project contains 2500 ha plus 3 plots of 500 ha to meet additional needs. Because of the size of the project, the location is of huge importance for the social impact. Eventually the location of the project site is chosen on a rocky plateau 10 km northeast of the city of Ouarzazate within the commune of Ghassate. This region houses a local population of nomads and non-nomads that earn their living by raising livestock and performing pastoral activities as well as urban life (Kreuer, 2011). The main reason that the Ouarzazate site was chosen to build this CSP project was that this site is currently only used for grazing and has little pasture. Furthermore, the site is located far from main settlements and nomads only sparsely cross it with their herds (ACWA Power, 2014; African Development Bank Group, z.d.). However, a project this size always remains complex as it can easily impact environmental, social and economic aspects of its inhabitants livelihoods (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 2015). For example impact on the water security appears to be very high, which has huge consequences for agricultural activities of farmers that live in this region (Barrow & Hicham, 2000; Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 2015). Other negative impacts are the feeling of economic and social exclusion by the local community. This might enhance conflict in the region, as local communities show resistance to further development of the project (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 2015). However, development of the project led by MASEN was approved by the local municipality, because they did not see potential displacement of the population or potential loss in economic activities (ACWA Power, 2014).
The development of the power plant is split up in three phases. Noor 1 consists of the construction of 160 MW of solar power and is launched in 2013 and achieved in 2014. The second and third phase started in January 2015, should add another 350 MW to the project. These phases should be finished by 2018 and provide a total grid connected system with a capacity of approximately 5000 MW of thermal energy (African Development Bank Group, z.d.) The cost of total project is established at 2.105 billion euros that can only be paid for using financial resources from both the
14
domestic financial sector and international financial sector (Frisari & Stadelman, 2015). Therefore it was decided to set up a public private partnership (PPP) investment model, which makes the country one of the first in the region a PPP (Frisari & Stadelmann, 2015). Phase 1 of the project can be divided into two components. The first phase was setting up a PPP between the borrower (MASEN) and a competitively chosen private actor. Component two was to gather a loan to fill up the price difference at which MASEN would buy the electricity generated by the solar plant and the price at which MASEN could sell this to ONEE (The World Bank, 2011). From here on this research focuses on phase 1 as this part involves setting up a PPP.
The First main task of MASEN in phase 1 was to set up the PPP structure which consists of a contractual mandate between MASEN and a consortium of private developers, that will sign several long term contractual commitments regarding the construction, finance and operation of the NOOR project. This consortium is named the Solar Power Company (SPC) and focusses on construction and operation and selling the generated electricity to MASEN. The SPC entered into a number of contracts with third parties such as: construction contracts, operation and maintenance contracts, power purchase agreements and financing contracts, to fulfil the specific obligations of the PPP (The World Bank, 2011). As figure 1 shows, MASEN owns 25% of the SPC shares and the private partner owns the other 75%. The chosen private partners are ACWA power which holds 70% of the shares, and TSK and Aries which both hold 2,5% of the shares (TSK, 2014).
The second function of MASEN is lending out the fund, gathered by a number of IFIs, to the private developer so that it can execute its assigned tasks (Norton Rose Fulbright, z.d.). The funding associates that are involved are: the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the German KfW development bank, the French Development Agency (AFD), the European Investment Bank (EID), (African Development Bank, z.d.). Although MASEN is the prime contractor for the envisaged solar power projects, involvement of international private stakeholders means that their socio-economic, political and environmental interests also have to be taken into account (Hanger et al., 2016). Therefore the chosen private developer is also subjected by these IFI’s before selected.
The final function of MASEN is as borrower of the generated electricity of NOOR I. MASEN purchases the generated energy by the SPC and sells this to ONEE (The World Bank, 2011).
This section provided some general facts about the solar plant in Ouarzazate. Furthermore it discussed the important stakeholders that are involved and their interdependent connections. The next section will analyse the contractual relations between actors involved in the NOOR I PPP.
Analysis
In the theoretical part of this research paper, all four criteria that possible affect public accountability stress the importance of settling formal agreements to secure public accountability. Therefore, this section will elaborate on the contractual relations between the actors that are described in the previous
15
section. Secondly, it will analyse these relations using the criteria & their corresponding variables that are set up to measure accountability. This way we can gain an insight in how the PPP secures accountability or fails to secure upward and downward accountability.
Figure 2. Overview of the contractual design of the PPP (Norton Rose Fulbright, z.d.).
The Contractual design
Figure 2 presents an overview of the contractual design of the PPP to develop the first phase of the NOOR project. The project company is equal to the SPC described in the previous section. A shareholder agreement between MASEN and the SPC is set up. This agreement defines the allocation of shares, profits and voting rights in the PPP. Furthermore, liabilities and company management risks are set in this agreement. To equally allocate these aspects, and to ensure that the bigger shareholder does not hold all the power, the minority shareholder is equally represented on the Board of the SPC (Falconer & Frisari, 2012). The main goal of this agreement is that MASEN as minority shareholder has the possibility to sell back its 25% shares of the private consortium to other partners against a fixed price when the private developer fails to comply to its predefined obligations (Falconer & Frisari, 2012; GGBP, 2014). Another function of the shareholder agreement is to secure MASEN’s role as borrower in the project if MASEN steps out of its power purchase agreement (PPA) (The World Bank, 2011).
MASEN has a 25 year fixed PPA agreement with the SPC. This agreement requires MASEN to purchase the generated electricity by the SPC at the price fixed in the tender (Carafa et al., 2016). MASEN thus turns up for the financial cost of the energy generated by the SPC which lies at about 97-100 million annually (GGBP, 2014). A second PPA agreement is set up between MASEN and ONEE
16
which in this case requires ONEE to buy all energy from MASEN at grid price. To provide comfort to the private investors, and to secure their participation, the Moroccan government has agreed to pay the difference between the two PPA contracts. Part of the World Bank loan is used to compromise the difference between the price that MASEN pays to the SPC for their generated and the price ONEE pays for this energy (The World Bank, 2011). The price of energy generated by the CSP at this moment transcends the energy price of energy generated by fossil fuels (GGBP, 2014).The price gap represents the increasing cost of the CSP technology for the Moroccan market (Falconer & Frisari, 2012).
To secure technical performance and risk, an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract is set up. This contract passes the risk to the supplier that commits to the responsibility over the manufacturing phase and technical wellbeing of the project for a limited period of time (Carafa et al., 2016; Falconer & Frisari, 2012). At the Noor I project, this contract is signed between the SPC and the private consortium of Spain’s TSK Electronica, Electidad, Acciona Infrastructuras, Accion Igeneria and Sener Ingenieria y Sistemas (Fichtner, 2014). The EPC contract incorporated several rules and guidelines that should maximise beneficial outcome for both the Contractor and other stakeholders. Firstly, the EPC of the NOOR I project has incorporated a Construction, Environmental and Social Management Plan (CESMP). This plan focusses on addressing concerns raised by the population. Environmental problems, air pollution and waste water discharges, waste management, soil and groundwater protection, are addressed in the environmental sector of this CESMP. Securing jobs for local community is addressed in the social sector. Before starting the construction works the CESPM must be set up and signed by both parties to maximise the benefits for the local population, the environment and the economy. A second requirement under the EPC are the Standards and Guidelines for an Archaeological Watching Brief, Institute for Field Archaeologists. This brief is a formal programme that is practiced when a site potentially holds archaeological treasures (Jokadar & Ponte, 2012). Thirdly, the EPC contains a recruitment policy to offer training and enhance the development of skills within the local workforce. The eventual number of local population employed by the project and the training that is provided by the workforce is monitored by ACWA (Jokadar & Ponte, 2012). In general, the EPC must address all community complaints in social-economic, heritage, seasonal and financial field, and should response within an adequate time frame (The World Bank, 2012). The EPC contractor is in charge of preparing the CESMP while the Operational and Managing contractor is responsible for implementing the CESPM (Jokadar & Ponte, 2012). The Operation and Maintenance contract (O&M) of the NOOR I project is set up between the SPC and NOMAC. NOMAC is owned by ACWE power as independent service provider for operation and maintenance of the power generation industry. This contract replaces several obligations towards the private partner. one of these obligations is setting up a Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) management plan (ACWA Power, 2014). In the NOOR I project, this HSE system has to be certified to OHSAS 18001 which stands for: Occupational Health and Safety. This certifications is an
17
recognized guideline that can be used to assess and certify management systems and thus guarantees that the HSE policy is established, implemented and maintained properly (OHSAS Project Group, 2007). A second contractual responsibility is to provide and manage security with regards to the potential impact on local communities. In Morocco, this is achieved by both obligatory training of security personnel in ACWA Power’s human rights policy, as well as formally appointed divisions that manage emergency situations. All these drills and management plans are monitored by ACWE Power itself (ACWA Power, 2014). Furthermore, NOMAC is responsible for a project specific environmental management system and contract.
The final formal relations within the PPP are the loan agreements. MASEN is acting as the lender of the fund they derive from the IFI grantors. IFI grantors provide funds to the Ouarzazate I project based on higher level environmental and development objectives. Around 80% of the total project costs are funded by these IFIs through on-lending arrangements that have a 25 year duration with an interest rate of 3,5% pa which is fixed for the entire duration of the loan. These on lending arrangements mean that MASEN passes on the terms of the IFIs concessional loans to the private developer (the SPC). It requires the SPC to adopt and accounting management system that the IFIs deem acceptable (Falconer & Frisari, 2012). Especially the terms and agreements of The Clean Technology Fund (CFT) are important as this will mainly finance component 1 (the establishment of a PPP). MASEN will on lend this fund to the SPC. Furthermore, component 1 will be partially financed by AFD, NIF, KfW, EIB and for 25% by MASEN itself (The World Bank, 2011). Under these loan agreements, ‘’Subsidiary Loan Agreements’’ exist which is a financial management system that is acceptable to the loan conditions of the World Bank. This extra implementation exists because the World Bank is responsible for the coordination of procedures with the other co financiers mentioned before. When the private developer does not comply MASEN has the right to withdraw the loans (The World Bank, 2011). To ensure that the fund is indeed available for the private developer, MASEN opened a Pooled Designated Account (DA) in Moroccan Dirham. Here the IFIs are asked for an advanced deposit. Funds can only be withdrawn from this account in accordance with the conditions set in the loan agreement. Furthermore, withdraws have to be prepared and signed by the representative of MASEN (The World Bank, 2011).
Safeguarding public accountability in the Ouarzazate CSP solar park
Financial risks for MASEN are marginalized due to several contractual agreements. First of all, conform the shareholder agreement, the public body is legally allowed to step out of the collaboration when the SPC is not adequately doing its job. This means that they cannot be held financially accountable for default payments of the private party. Secondly, the PPA agreement can be seen as a financial de-risking measure as it guarantees a revenue stream for the SPC that is protected from the volatility of energy prices (Carafa et al., 2016). Market risk allocation between public and private parties is determined by the equity partnership between the government (MASEN) and the private
18
developer. The PPA agreement mitigates the market risks by providing a loan. Thereby, the Government of Morocco provides financial security for MASEN as it promised to finance the price difference using a loan of the World Bank. This way both public and private parties are ensured of financial viability, but can also be held accountable when not purchasing the generated electricity (Carfara et al., 2016). Thirdly, the loan agreements mitigate financial risk. On the one hand, these agreements clearly state the financial burden each IFI has agreed upon with a guaranteed duration of minimum 25 years. This means that each IFI knows what he is formally obliged to pay when the SPC meets their terms. The money has to be provided and the risk of default payment is significantly reduced. Furthermore, MASEN is obliged to pass the loan on through the SPC unless they do not comply to its agreements. These agreements secure proper spending of fund and thereby reduce upward public accountability, because clear rules are set for the private parties (Kato et al., 2014; The World Bank, 2012). However, there are still some financial risks arising from the on-lending system. Firstly the IFIs decided to offer a more favourable loan to the private investor meaning that the proportion of equity versus debt is now 20/80%. This increases financial risk for the public sector and subsequently decreased the budget available to absorb potential financial setbacks (Falconer & Frisari, 2012). Secondly, there is the risk of failure and delay. This includes committed loans not being available or being available at a much later stadium. Lastly, there is the uncertainty of project costs that make the requested budget from IFIs might be bigger than expected (The World Bank, 2012). This could potentially lead to a decrease in upward accountability. To prevent payment delays and unpredicted financial downturns, MASEN and the CFI have used information of an IPCC pilot solar park in Ain Beni Mathar, Morocco. This information was mostly used by the CTF to draft the investment plan for the different IFIs (Kato et al., 2014). For the criteria of financial risk-sharing, upward accountability is argued to be protected under the shareholder agreement, the PPA contracts and the loan agreement. Downward accountability under could be protected by the government when they can prove that setting up a PPP is not solely a financial strategical move. However, no contract guaranteed the financial benefits or de-risking measurements for the local citizens thus downward accountability for this criteria is argued to be absent.
As the theoretical framework suggested, contractual design of a newly emerging PPP, that is often set up by a different government body than the body that is actually involved, could be leading to conflicting interests and high public cost. Because MASEN is the public body that is in charge of setting up the contractual design of the PPP around the NOOR project, possible confusion is marginalized (Jokadar & Ponte, 2012). Before the SPC signed the contract they were well informed about the interests of MASEN. This implicates that the costs for tuning interest of both parties would remain significantly low. Subsequently, well-defined qualification criteria and requirements regarding the private investor attracted experienced and reputable companies (Perez et al., 2014). Also under the EPC contract, both public actor MASEN and the private party seem to benefit from the PPP. This contract is set up to efficiently share transaction costs and expertise and makes a third party
19
responsible for the manufacturing phase and technological wellbeing of the project (Jokadar & Ponte, 2012). Here again, the same terms and contracts that where successful in Ain Beni Mathar, where adopted to increase confidence. Furthermore, MASEN was informed about the used engineers and equipment in this project when choosing an EPC contractor. However they opted for another contractor than in the pilot (Kato et al., 2014). The O&M contract established between MASEN and NOMAC hands over full technological and physical responsibility to NOMAC. To establish such contracts, corresponding goals of both parties where guaranteed under MASEN’s watch (Frisari et al., 2013). The O&M contract puts full technological an physical responsibility of the project at NOMAC. Because both parties where actively involved in setting up these O&M contracts, MASEN is ensured of their upward accountability as they can hold NOMAC accountable when they fail to perform the tasks that are involved with this agreement. Upward public accountability in this case is safeguarded for two reasons. Firstly, MASEN is the only public negotiator, meaning that confusion in upward accountability is marginalized. Secondly, objectives are preliminary tuned and set in rigid contracts.
Social uncertainties are taken into account first of all by the loan agreements. IFI’s confirm loans based on specific social and environmental terms. These terms must be adhered before an IFI actually releases its loan. Because the terms are in the interest of each individual IFI, they will be strictly monitored to secure their adequate appliance (Falconder & Frisari, 2012). Secondly, the HSE system, which is part of the O&M contract, obliges health safety and environmental issues in the operating part of the PPP. This HSE is certified according to international certification and provide a clear outline that is globally agreed upon. When a private party commits to such an agreement, it can be held accountable in case of non-compliance (Jokador & Ponte, 2012). Finally, social uncertainties are addressed in the EPC contract. Environmental impact is addressed with the CESPM that is part of the EPC. This section focuses on public policy goals, which receive the attention they need to reassure that future public interest is not pushed to the back. Furthermore, this contract promises jobs and traineeships for local residents which will be monitored by the ACWA. This will affect the way these citizens experience the newly emerging PPP. A potential negative point of view towards the PPP is reduced, when citizens are involved in the project by job offers and led to a moderate positive attitude towards employment directly facilitated by the building of NOOR I (Jokador & Ponte, 2012). A high degree of community acceptance exists partly due to MASEN’s efforts, demonstrating shared values and direct development projects, by increasing the livelihood of local communities. Their aim was to not only to send the generated electricity to the countries South Eastern cities but also to ensure direct advantage for the local community. An example here is the commitment of ACWA to offer a 30 percent local job availability. However actual outcome has not led to local benefits (Carafa et al., 2016). This shows that, the CSP technology investment is not focussed on alleviating regional poverty and as it appears, most of the benefits are of low impact on the local communities (Wuppertal institute; Germanwatch, 2015). Thereby, monitoring under ACWA did not seem to fully take away local concerns as labour mismatch, unequal working condition. This perceived lack of local community
20
engagement led to community protests during the construction of the project, due to some of the mentioned shortcomings (Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch, 2015). Thus, although downward accountability is said to be guaranteed in the loan agreements, the O&M contract and the EPC contract, actual social performance and actions in the interest of citizen, seem to be less promising. Therefore it is argued that downward accountability is moderately protected at Ouarzazate. Finally, the EPC contract states to contribute to the transparency of the PPP in Morocco. On the one hand, the EPC agreement promises to enhance skills and development within the local workforce by sharing their information with local communities. This also counts for the O&M contract. Furthermore, the EPC is set up to take into account all community complaints. Locals have the opportunity to legally hold both the public and the private sector accountable for their commitments which means that the EPC contributes to downward accountability (Flaconer & Frisari, 2012). However, locals state that the promises of the EPC have not reflected in their actual lives. According to local citizens and public servants within MASEN, getting a job is complicated due to the highly bureaucratic and non-transparent procedures (Carafa et al., 2016). On the other hand, the private investor gained specific experience from the consortium by participating under the EPC contract. Knowledge was shared mainly coming from the pilot IPCC, but also from national and international professionals that provided a range of information on challenges in construction, delays and management. This shows the effort to ensure upward accountability that even goes beyond the PPP of this project and also includes other solar projects (Flaconer & Frisari, 2012; Kato et al., 2014). For the transparency criteria, upward accountability is safeguarded because accurate and accessible information in the EPC contract is provided. Furthermore, additional insights are gained from international and national professionals that share their knowledge. Downward accountability is argued to be moderately protected. Although the EPC contract provides locals with the opportunity to intervene, strong bureaucracy and non-transparent procedures prevent them to actually speak up.
Below, Table 2 provides a schematic overview of the analysis of the case. First of all, it shows the measurement levels discussed in the methodology to clarify whether accountability is safeguarded. Presence means that all variables where there to assure accountability. Moderate presence means that either one variable was safeguarded or all were discussed but not clearly safeguarded. Finally absence means that none of the variables was taken into account when contractual design of the PPP was set up. Secondly it shows, if accountability is established, and what contract contributed to safeguarding either upward, downward of both types of accountability.
21 Table 2. Measurement of criteria and their corresponding contracts
Conclusion and Discussion
PPPs are gaining popularity all over the globe on different scales and for different projects. In the MENA region a PPP model is used to set up the Ouarzazate solar park. However, some scholars argue that using a PPP is not as beneficial as it seems because it negatively affects public accountability. Because CSP solar parks have a high potential in the MENA region and a PPP set up is necessary to actually fund a project of this size, it is important to know how public accountability could be affected by these PPPs. Therefore, the aim of this research was to provide an insight in mechanisms that affect public accountability, with a specific focus on PPPs set up to fund solar energy projects. When these mechanisms are clearly established, similar public-private partnerships around solar projects in the region can be designed in such a way that public accountability is maintained. Public accountability was argued to be possibly affected by four criteria: financial risk-sharing, cost and benefits, social impact and transparency. These criteria are projected on the single case study of the CSP solar park in Ouarzazate, Morocco. The main findings in the theory suggested that for all criteria, accountability could be best safeguarded by contractual design. Therefore, this research focusses on the formal agreements and contracts between public and private actors. This specific case showed that especially upward public accountability was well secured using contracts, formal agreements, international certifications and management tools to ensure equal relations between public and private actors. Upward accountability is safeguarded by three of the four criteria. Financial risk is safeguarded within the shareholder agreement, the PPA agreements and the loan agreements. Both
Criteria Financial risk-sharing Cost & benefits Social impact Transparency Upward accountability i) Present - Shareholder agreement - PPA contract(s) - Loan agreement i) Present - MASEN - Shareholder agreement - EPC i) Present - EPC Downward accountability iii) Absent - No data ii) Moderate - O&M - EPC iii) Moderate - EPC - O&M
22
cost and benefits seem to be equally divided mostly under the EPC contract and the Operation and Maintenance contract but also using the shareholder agreement. Thereby, as MASEN is the only contract negotiator from the start, no cases of confused accountability should appear. Transparency toward the public actors can also be found in the EPC contract and from shared information of a pilot project in the same region.
Although downward accountability seems to receive a bit less attention in the contractual design, it is taken into account. Social uncertainties are addressed in the Loan agreements and the EPC contract. Furthermore, transparency towards citizens is formally agreed upon in the EPC and the O&M contract.
As stated before, this research mainly looks at how the contractual design in the PPP in Ouarzazate protects accountability. However, there are other important aspects that should be addressed when conducting a research on accountability. It is for example very important to take into account that, although public accountability seems to be very well embedded into the contractual design of the PPP in Morocco, informal data is also highly important. Because of the limited scope of this research, the contractual design was the main focus but aspects such as how locals actually perceive a PPP like this is also very important for further development of a PPP. Although contractual design can guarantee social benefits, the reality on local scale can often be received very differently. Downward accountability, is easily marginalized when local actors are overlooked in a research paper. Thereby, a feeling of economic and social exclusion by locals makes them resistant to further development of the project. For further investigation in public accountability it is therefore important to not only look at upward accountability but to provide an in-depth analysis of downward accountability. Data about this subject could for example be retrieved form surveys under locals.
23 References
ACWA Power. (2014). NOOR 1 – World’s Largest CSP Plant.Yearbook: Project Finance
International. Downloaded at 19th of May from, http://www.acwapower.com/media/99156/noor-1-pfi.pdf
African Development Bank Group (z.d.) NOORo: the largest concentrated solar power complex in Africa increases the share of renewable energy in electricity generation in Morocco. Morocco.
Amegroud, T. (2015). Morocco's Power Sector Transition: Achievements and Potential. IAI Working paper. Istituto Affari Internazionali.
Barrow, C. J., & Hicham, H. (2000). Two complimentary and integrated land uses of the western High Atlas Mountains, Morocco: the potential for sustainable rural livelihoods. Applied Geography, 20(4), 369-394.
Biermann, F., & Gupta, A. (2011). Accountability and Legitimacy in Earth System Governance: A Research Framework. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 1856-1864.
Bloomfield, P. (2006). The Challenging Business of Long‐Term Public–Private Partnerships: Reflections on Local Experience. Public Administration Review, 66(3), 400-411.
Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2005). Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and legitimate tools of international governance. Complex sovereignty: Reconstructing political authority in the twenty first
century, 195-216.
Bovaird, T. (2004). Public–private partnerships: from contested concepts to prevalent practice. International review of administrative sciences, 70(2), 199-215.
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Government–nonprofit partnership: a defining framework. Public
administration and development, 22(1), 19-30.
Carafa, L., Frisari, G., & Vidican, G. (2016). Electricity transition in the Middle East and North Africa: a de-risking governance approach. Journal of Cleaner Production, 128, 34-47.
Coghill, K., & Woodward, D. (2005). Political issues of public-private partnerships. The challenge of
public-private partnerships. learning from the experience, 81-94.
Erridge, A., & Greer, J. (2002). Partnerships and public procurement: building social capital through supply relations. Public Administration, 80(3), 503-522.
Falconer, A. & Frisari, G. (2012.) San Giorgio Group Case Study: Ouarzazate I CSP. Venice: Climate Policy Initative & Ca’Foscari University.
24
Farquharson, E., De Mastle, C. T., Yescombe, E. R., & Encinas, J. (2011). How to engage with the
private sector in public-private partnerships in emerging markets. Report No. 59461.Washington DC:
World Bank.
Fichtner (2014). Study on Conditions for Development of CSP Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Report No. 7893P01/FICHT-14842732-v1. Summary report for the workshop for mutual exchange. Paris: Africa-EU Energy Partnership Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme RECP.
Flinders, M. (2005). The politics of public–private partnerships. The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations, 7(2), 215-239.
Forrer, J., Kee, J. E., Newcomer, K. E., & Boyer, E. (2010). Public–private partnerships and the public accountability question. Public Administration Review, 70(3), 475-484.
Frisari, G., Hervé-Mignucci, M., Micale, V., & Mazza, F. (2013). Risk Gaps: A Map of Risk
Mitigation Instruments for Clean Investments. CPI Report.
Frisari, G., & Stadelmann, M. (2015). De-risking concentrated solar power in emerging markets: The role of policies and international finance institutions. Energy Policy, 82, 12-22.
Fuchs, D. (2005). Commanding heights? The strength and fragility of business power in global politics. Millennium, 33(3), 771-801.
Gal, S. (2002). A semiotics of the public/private distinction. Differences: a journal of feminist cultural
studies, 13(1), 77-95.
GGBP. (2014). The Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy and the Moroccan Solar Plan. GGBP Case Study Series.
Hall, D. (2004). PPPs: a critique of the Green Paper. Public Service International Research Unit: University of Greenwich.
Hancké, B. (2009). Intelligent research design: a guide for beginning researchers in the social
sciences. Oxford University Press.
Hanger, S., Komendantova, N., Schinke, B., Zejli, D., Ihlal, A., & Patt, A. (2016). Community acceptance of large-scale solar energy installations in developing countries: Evidence from Morocco. Energy Research & Social Science, 14, 80-89.
Hebson, G., Grimshaw, D., & Marchington, M. (2003). PPPs and the changing public sector ethos: case-study evidence from the health and local authority sectors. Work, employment and society, 17(3), 481-501.
25
Hodge, G. A. (2004). The risky business of public–private partnerships. Australian journal of public
administration, 63(4), 37-49.
Hodge, G. A., & Greve, C. (2007). Public–private partnerships: an international performance review. Public administration review, 67(3), 545-558.
IRENA (2012). Concentrating solar power. Renewable energy technologies: Cost analysis series. Volume 1: Power Sector Issue 2/5.
Jokadar Z. & Ponte, C. (2012). Ouarzazate Solar Power Complex, Phase 1 Morocco: Specific
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, 1, Capitals Environmental & Management Consulting.
Kalogirou, S. A. (2013). Solar energy engineering: processes and systems. Academic Press.
Kato, T., Ellis, J., Pauw, P., & Caruso, R. (2014). Scaling up and replicating effective climate finance
interventions. Report No. 2014(1). Paris: OECD
Klijn, E. H., & Teisman, G. R. (2003). Institutional and strategic barriers to public—private partnership: An analysis of Dutch cases. Public money and Management, 23(3), 137-146.
Knill, C., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). Private actors and the state: Internationalization and changing patterns of governance. Governance, 15(1), 41-63.
Kousksou, T., Allouhi, A., Belattar, M., Jamil, A., El Rhafiki, T., Arid, A., & Zeraouli, Y. (2015). Renewable energy potential and national policy directions for sustainable development in Morocco. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 47, 46-57.
Kreuer, D. (2011). Land use negotiation in eastern Morocco. Nomadic Peoples, 15(1), 54-69. Lewis, N. S. (2007). Toward cost-effective solar energy use. science, 315(5813), 798-801.
Linder, S. H. (1999). Coming to terms with the public-private partnership a grammar of multiple meanings. American behavioural scientist, 43(1), 35-51.
Lund-Thomsen, P. (2009). Assessing the impact of public–private partnerships in the global south: The case of the Kasur tanneries pollution control project. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(1), 57.
Nissen, H. A., Evald, M. R., & Clarke, A. H. (2014). Knowledge sharing in heterogeneous teams through collaboration and cooperation: Exemplified through Public–Private-Innovation partnerships. Industrial Marketing Management, 43(3), 473-482.
Norton Rose Fulbright (z.d.). Masen’s NOOR solar energy projects: The achievents of Morocco’s
26
OHSAS Project Group. (2007). Occupational health and safety management systems- Requirements. Report No. ICS 03.100.01; 13.100. Occupational health and safety assessment series: Auteur.
Pachauri, R. K., Meyer, L., Plattner, G. K., & Stocker, T. (2015). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC.
Papadopoulos, Y. (2010). Accountability and multi-level governance: more accountability, less democracy?. West European Politics, 33(5), 1030-1049.
Patt, A., Komendantova, N., Battaglini, A., Lilliestam, J., & Williges, K. (2009). Policy approaches to renewable energy investment in the Mediterranean region. In EGU General Assembly Conference
Abstracts, 11, 11974
Perez, I., Lopez, A., Briceño, S., & Relancio, J. (2014). National Incentive Programs for CSP–Lessons Learned. Energy Procedia, 49, 1869-1878.
Roehrich, J. K., Lewis, M. A., & George, G. (2014). Are public–private partnerships a healthy option? A systematic literature review. Social Science & Medicine, 113, 110-119.
Schäferhoff, M., Campe, S., & Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational Public‐Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results. International
Studies Review, 11(3), 451-474.
De Schepper, S., Dooms, M., & Haezendonck, E. (2014). Stakeholder dynamics and responsibilities in Public–Private Partnerships: A mixed experience. International Journal of Project Management, 32(7), 1210-1222.
Schilling, J., Freier, K. P., Hertig, E., & Scheffran, J. (2012). Climate change, vulnerability and adaptation in North Africa with focus on Morocco. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 156, 12-26.
Shaoul, J., Stafford, A., & Stapleton, P. (2012). Accountability and corporate governance of public private partnerships. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23(3), 213-229.
Shkabatur, J. (2012). Transparency with (out) accountability: Open government in the United States.
Yale Law & Policy Review, 31(1), 79-140.
Solangi, K. H., Islam, M. R., Saidur, R., Rahim, N. A., & Fayaz, H. (2011). A review on global solar energy policy. Renewable and sustainable energy reviews, 15(4), 2149-2163.
27
Spackman, M. (2002). Public–private partnerships: lessons from the British approach. Economic
Systems, 26(3), 283-301.
Tahri, M., Hakdaoui, M., & Maanan, M. (2015). The evaluation of solar farm locations applying Geographic Information System and Multi-Criteria Decision-Making methods: Case study in southern Morocco. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 51, 1354-1362.
TSK. (2014) Annual Report 2013. Spain: Auteur
Van Ham, H., & Koppenjan, J. (2001). Building public-private partnerships: Assessing and managing risks in port development. Public Management Review, 3(4), 593-616.
Viebahn, P., Lechon, Y., & Trieb, F. (2011). The potential role of concentrated solar power (CSP) in Africa and Europe—A dynamic assessment of technology development, cost development and life cycle inventories until 2050. Energy Policy, 39(8), 4420-4430.
Watson, D. (2003). The rise and rise of public private partnerships: challenges for public accountability. Australian Accounting Review, 13(31), 2-14.
Willems, T., & Van Dooren, W. (2011). Lost in diffusion? How collaborative arrangements lead to an accountability paradox. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77(3), 505-530.
The World Bank. (2011). Document of The World Bank. Report No: 64663-MA.Middle East and North Africa Region: Sustainable Development Department.
The World Bank. (2012). Non-Technical Summary: Ouarzazate Solar Power Complex . Report No E2644 v5.
Wuppertal Institute; Germanwatch (2015): Social CSP – Energy and development: exploring the local livelihood dimension of the Nooro I CSP project in Southern Morocco. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy: Wuppertal; Germanwatch: Bonn.
