Talking and trading : an assessment of the European Union’s human rights policy

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Talking and Trading

An Assessment of the European Union’s Human Rights Policy

on China

Casper Verma (10020675)

24-6-2016

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader

Second reader: Dr. Seiki Tanaka

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Abstract Abbreviations

The People’s Republic of China has one of the worst human rights records of all countries. According to Amnesty International, the Chinese government carries out the death penalty more often than any other country. Other NGOs report that fundamental human rights (e.g. freedom of expression, religion, association) are frequently violated in China. The European Union is dedicated to protect human rights everywhere, including China. In order to improve the human rights situation in external countries, the EU has several mechanisms at its disposal. Two of these mechanisms, political conditionality and political dialogue, are used in this thesis to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU’s human rights policy on China. It appears from the analysis that the political conditionality mechanism is not applied in China due to the fact that there is disunity among the EU member states and because China is a strong economic and political power. The political dialogue mechanism, which is implemented in the EU’s policy, seems to be ineffective if one compares two EU objectives, the freedom of on- and offline expression and the ban on torture, with the current human rights situation in China. If the EU wants to achieve actual improvements on the ground in terms of human rights practices in China, it must recognize that political rights are unattainable in China due to the fact that political rights for Chinese citizens cannot coexist with the current political system. Instead, it must carry out human rights projects that focus on issues where the Chinese government and individuals are eager to learn.

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Abbreviations

ACP countries African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries

CHR Commission on Human Rights

CHRD Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

ECB European Central Bank

EU European Union

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICT International Campaign for Tibet

IMF International Monetary Fund

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPC National People’s Congress

PTS Political Terror Scale

SIIO State Internet Information Office

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Committee

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Introduction

Over the years, China is seen as one of the worst human rights violators of all countries (Peerenboom, 2005:72). According to Amnesty International, the censorship of Chinese internet is one of the strictest of all countries. Furthermore, China imposes the death penalty more often than any other country (Amnesty International, 2015a). Human Rights Watch states that China is an authoritarian state that frequently violates fundamental human rights (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion) if individuals “threaten” the rule of the Communist Party (Human

Rights Watch, 2015). Researchers argue that it seems like China underwent a worsening of individual

freedoms under current president Xi Jinping’s rule, consequently naming him the most authoritarian Chinese leader since Mao Zedong (The New Yorker, 2015).

The Chinese government defended its human rights record by placing the value of the collective over that of the individual (The Daily Signal, 2015). It does not address the “traditional” (i.e. western) type of human rights, such as freedom of movement or religious freedom. Rather, the Chinese government emphasizes on poverty alleviation or improvements in terms of peace, stability and prosperity of the country as a whole (Ibid.). Indeed, one cannot deny the fact that China has elevated a large part of its population out of poverty and achieved other appraisable goals, such as the decrease of illiteracy rates from 35% in the 1980s to 4% in 2015 (Ibid.). However, these achievements came at a cost: individual human rights.

The European Union1 (EU) acknowledges the violation of human rights in China: in their 2014 annual report on human rights in the world, the EU expressed its worries in regard to “a wide range

of human rights issues in China, such as the right to adequate housing and reform of the Hukou system, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression (off-line and on-line), freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the due process of law, arbitrary detention and the death penalty” (EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, 2014). The Council of the European Union states in its

“Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” that the EU is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and stability and to create a world where respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law prevail (Council of the European Union, 2012). Due to its economic size and ideological norms, the EU has both the leverage and will to alter China’s human rights practices. However, there are several difficulties for the EU to overcome in order to succeed.

1_{For the sake of clarity, the European Union and its predecessors (e.g. European Community) will be referred}

to as the European Union in this thesis with the exception of few references or when needed to explicitly state the difference.

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This thesis aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to improve human rights practices in China. The research question that stands central throughout this thesis is: ”Is the

European Union's human rights policy towards China effective?”. As the human rights situation in

China is reportedly deteriorating and the violations of human rights in China affect the lives of over one billion individuals on a daily basis, it remains an important and urgent topic to conduct research towards. In what follows, I will show that the current EU policy on human rights in China is not effective as there are no improvements on the grounds (i.e. tangible improvements) in terms of certain human rights practices. Further, I will provide a strategy to achieve these on the ground improvements.

I will start this thesis by introducing the European Union’s view on human rights, its normative power and its tools used to alter another state’s behavior. The EU has a vast set of mechanisms at its disposal to modify a country’s position or policy on certain issues, ranging from naming and shaming to sanctioning, which all will be presented in this section. Secondly, I will spell out the functioning of two specific mechanisms in the theoretical framework, namely political conditionality and political dialogue. Both of these mechanisms will be used in the remainder of this research in order to analyze the effectiveness of the EU policy. The third section consists of the empirical analysis. I will start this section by giving an overview of the history and evolution of the EU human rights policy in China. From there, I come to the conclusion that the political conditionality mechanism is not applied by the EU, whereas the political dialogue mechanism is implemented in the EU’s policy. In the second part of the empirical analysis I will provide explanations for the fact that the conditionality mechanism has been kept out of the EU’s policy and, further, argue that the political dialogue has not been effective by looking at the factual improvements on the ground in terms of human rights practices in China. In the fourth section, I will come to a policy recommendation in order to improve the human rights policy of the EU. The recommendation is based on interviews with experts on human rights in China from different backgrounds. Lastly, I will summarize the findings and answer my research question whether or not the EU´s human rights policy towards China is effective.

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Chapter 1. Background of the European Union’s

perspective

The EU attaches great value to the proliferation of certain norms, such as the universality of human rights. Indeed, in many EU policy documents, reports and statements made by EU leaders one can find examples of those objectives. Why does the EU care about human rights violations on the other side of the world? And what means does the EU have to accomplish its goals? In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the issue of human rights in China, it is necessary to elaborate on the EU’s position. Therefore, in this section, I will discuss the EU’s perspective on human rights, the reasons why the EU believes it is important to diffuse human rights norms and the tools the EU possesses to achieve this goal.

The European Union’s perspective on human rights

From the 1940s until the 1990s, the human rights agenda has been subjected to rapid growth and change, especially in western societies (Cmiel, 2004:117). Prior to 1940, the term was hardly used (Ibid.). However, as liberalism - led by the Unites States - picked up momentum, new norms of moral universalism were introduced (Dams & van der Putten, 2015:8). These norms were based on liberal values such as human rights and democracy and, as a consequence, the promotion of human rights and democracy became an important objective in US foreign policy (Ibid.). As the European states were strongly influenced by the US, human rights gained importance in Europe from the 1960s onwards (Von Bogdandy, 2000:1307). In 1986, political consensus was reached between the European Council, the European Foreign Ministers and EU institutions concerning the matter of human rights (Horng, 2003:682). A declaration stated that “respecting, promoting and guaranteeing

human rights is a key factor in international relations, a cornerstone of European cooperation as well as of relations between its member states and other countries” (Ibid.). Then, in 1993, the EU

integrated human rights and other democratic principles in its foreign policy with the signing of the “Treaty on European Union” (European Commission, 2007:6).

What do these human rights exactly entail? According to the European Commission, human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent (Ibid.). Human rights entail civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and are set out in a broad spectrum of international and regional instruments (Ibid.). The EU calls upon states to implement the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and to implement key international human rights treaties, while taking action towards any attempt that undermines respect for the universality of human rights

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(Council of the European Union, 2012). These human rights include, among other rights, the right to life, security, liberty, equality, property, education and religion. Further, every individual has the right to freedom of thought, movement and peaceful assembly (United Nations, 1948). In sum, the EU attaches great value to a broad spectrum of rights that individuals all around the world are entitled to.

The European Union’s normative power

Why does the EU care about what is happening to individuals in countries at the other side of the world? This is a question that has to be answered before turning to the explanation of the actual means the EU uses to reach its objectives. According to the European Commission, human rights strengthen the dignity of individuals and allow them to reach their full potential (European Commission, 2007). Human rights allow societies to develop stably and peacefully. Further, the states that respect human rights tend to be more reliable partners in international politics. Finally, the European Commission argues that there can be neither peace nor development without human rights (Ibid.). The justification of implementing all of this in the EU’s foreign policy can be found in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which states that “the EU’s action in international affairs shall be guided by

the principles which lie at its foundation and which it seeks to advance in the rest of the world, namely: democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, human dignity, equality and solidarity, and lastly, respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law”

(European Commission, 2008). Thus, respecting human rights is appropriate by international law and brings benefits to both individuals and countries.

How should this reasoning be understood exactly? One finds an answer by taking a step back and looking at the greater picture, namely: the normative power of the EU. This concept entails the idea that the European Union pursues the spread of particular norms, rather than other traditional goals (e.g. military superiority or geographical expansion), whereby it relies on civilian power, instead of military or other coercive power (Diez, 2005:613). The European Union can be called a normative power due to the fact that the Union is based on normative principles (Gerrits et. al., 2009:4), a notion which is reflected by the Lisbon Treaty statement given earlier. Change is an essential element of normative power. In the end, it is about “changing” the other and making the other adapt to European norms and standards which, from the European perspective, are considered normal (Gerrits et. al., 2009:5). In contrast to economic or military power, which respectively use remunerative and punitive means to achieve a certain end, normative power uses ideational means which create the ability to shape others’ conception of “normal” (Manners, 2002:29).

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Where does this normative power have its origin? According to Manners (2002), the normative basis of the EU has been developed over the last five decades through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions (Manners, 2002:32). He identified five core norms which comprise the so-called “acquis communautaire” and “acquis politique” (i.e. the constitution and practice of the EU), namely peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Peace and liberty were key elements of European policy during the post-war period. The other three norms cultivated later, during the Cold War period, when western Europe distinguished itself from eastern communist Europe (Ibid.). These developments resulted in the formation of special features of a polity which created its identity as being more than a state. In other words, the formation of these special features and norms lead to the possibility for the EU to display itself as being more than the sum of its parts (Ibid.).

The European Union’s external governance mechanisms

The Council of the European Union states in its “Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human

Rights and Democracy” that the EU is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and

stability and to create a world where respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law prevails (Council of the European Union, 2012). However, the EU realizes that respect for these principles cannot be taken for granted due to cultural differences and because modern technologies massively increased the coercive power of authoritarian states. The EU is conscious of these challenges and, more importantly, resolved to throw its full weight behind advocates of liberty, democracy and human rights worldwide (Ibid.). Therefore, these principles are the basis of both the internal as external policies of the EU. To be concise, it is since 1992 that the EU included a human rights clause in all its agreements with third countries (Horng, 203:678). The clause prescribes that respect for human rights and democracy are so-called “fundamental elements” in the relationship between the EU and other countries and that respect for human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) underpins the policies of the negotiating parties (Ibid.). The clause, along with other foreign policy principles created by the European Union, was established upon the ideas that stood at the basis of European integration: letting go of the Westphalian norms and, instead, respecting human rights, democracy and rule of law (King, 1999:313). From the Copenhagen Declaration in 1970 up until today, the EU has developed certain “tools” and “mechanisms” to diffuse these and other values. In the remainder of this section, I will provide an overview of these EU external governance instruments.

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Political conditionality

The first tool which can be used by the EU to alter another state’s behavior is political conditionality. Through political conditionality the EU tries to manipulate cost-benefit calculations by creating positive and negative incentives (Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008:10). Until the end of the 1980s, the EU’s foreign policy consisted of preferential trade agreements and financial aid to former colonies of European countries (Börzel & Risse, 2004:3). Back then, the EU had its focus on economic issues, instead of democracy, human rights or rule of law. The first forms of political considerations came into play during the Lomé III Treaty which was signed in 1984 and in which European and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries announced the commitment to human dignity and economic, social and cultural rights (Börzel & Risse, 2004:3-4 & Amao, 2009:407). However, it was the Lomé IV agreement which meant the start of economic and political conditionality in the EU’s external governance. For the first time in history, provisions on democracy, human rights and the rule of law were included in an agreement. In case of violation, the EU would consider “appropriate” measures to counter an “improper” policy (Börzel & Risse, 2004:3-4). Later, Lomé IV received an upgrade (Article 5) during a mid-term revision where democracy, human rights and the rule of law were turned into an essential condition for development cooperation with the EU. These and other principles were actively promoted and complemented by sanctions in any case a country violated one of these principles (Börzel & Risse, 2004:4). For example, Article 366 of the treaty included a procedure to halt the cooperation between the European countries and the state that violated one of the principles. The European Community referred to this article several times during the 1990s against several African countries (e.g. Nigeria, Rwanda, Niger and Sierra Leone) for violations of democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Holland, 2002:134). In most of the cases, sanctions laid upon a third party by the EU were economic in nature. The use of sanctions finds its legal basis in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provisions (Wessel, 2000:1157). To be precise, Article 301 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) prescribes how the European Community is able to implement economic sanctions towards other countries, which pursue political ends (Ibid.).

An example of sanctioning as a means to alter a state’s behavior can be found after the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. There were sanctions laid upon the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the incident occurred, namely that EU countries would raise Chinese human rights in international forums, EU member states would halt military cooperation and place an arms embargo, ministerial contacts between EU and China would be suspended, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation would be ceased, the visas of Chinese students who did not want to return to China would be extended and lastly, EU countries would not let China obtain new World Bank credits (King, 1999:323).

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Political dialogue

Political dialogue, which uses persuasion and learning strategies to diffuse human rights norms (Börzel and Risse, 2009:24), is the second tool that will be discussed in this section. Human rights are frequently discussed within the political dialogue framework adopted by the EU. In this framework, the EU enters consultation and diplomatic talks with other countries or regional groups (European Commission, 2007:9). According to the European Commission, human rights dialogues and consultations are important mechanisms for the EU to improve the process of integrating its objectives (e.g. human rights and democratization) into all of the EU’s external policies (Ibid.). These dialogues are carried out at the level of high ranked human rights officials and are mostly conducted towards countries with which the EU has no form of a human rights clause (Ibid.).

An example of the human rights dialogue can be found in the EU’s democratization policy towards Central Asia states after both sides came to an agreement in June 2007 (Axyonova, 2007:1). In this case, dialogues were held on a bilateral basis with all of the Central Asian countries. The objectives portrayed by the EU were, amongst others, to raise the concerns felt by the EU in relation to fundamental human rights principles in the Central Asian countries, gather information and establish initiatives to improve the human rights situation in the countries concerned (Ibid.). Meetings are held once every year, alternately in the headquarters of the EU in Belgium and in the countries concerned and are attended by high-level human rights official of the European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat, the European Union Presidency and delegates of related departments of the Central Asian countries. Further, the EU dialogue with these countries has the objective to incorporate human rights activists, NGO’s and academics from both regions into the talks through seminars in between the “official” sessions (Ibid.).

Programming

Next to the conditionality and dialogue mechanisms, the EU uses so-called “programming” mechanisms to bring other countries in compliance with the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Börzel and Risse, 2004:5). Programming entails the concept that EU funds are to be distributed to programs instead of individual projects and that resource allocation is conditional upon certain criteria (Ibid.). To be concise, EU financial assistance is conditional upon performance of the “other” country in terms of certain indicators (e.g. reforms on democracy, human rights, good governance). In comparison to other agreements (such as Lomé IV), the EU wields great leverage and discretion in the allocation of its development funds (Ibid.). Since the criteria for resource distribution are not fixed by an agreement, countries that negotiate with the EU are strongly

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encouraged to comply with the principles as laid out by the EU foreign policy (Ibid.). Studies have shown that in the field of programming the influence of the European Commission has been significant since the EU reformed its funding policy and that the European Commission was able to negotiate major changes to policy choices of other countries (Bachtler & Mendez, 2007:556).

Naming and shaming

Another tool which was used by the EU to alter state behavior is “naming and shaming”. By using this tool, the European Union attempts to create an incentive for policy reforms by relying on peer pressure (Cabus & de Witte, 2012:2). This pressure can be placed under the banner of the naming and shaming framework where the best performing countries are portrayed as an example and the worst performing countries are discredited as so-called “laggers” (Ibid.). The European Commission uses the naming and shaming framework in the evaluation of member states’ policy outcomes, for example in terms of poverty, unemployment or education level. As a result, countries are ranked by performance and consequently, the ranking has the objective to encourage the performance of the weaker performing countries (Ibid.). Hafner-Burton (2008) statistically analyzed the method of naming and shaming and came to the conclusion that this mechanism is not at all cheap talk, as is argued by some (Hafner-Burton, 2008:690-691). She found that countries which were named and shamed as human rights violators improved certain political rights after being criticized. However, she also found that naming and shaming seldom lead to the halting of political terror, and sometimes even lead to an increase of political intimidation (Ibid.).

To conclude, the European Union has a vast set of tools to exert its external governance and to diffuse human rights, democracy and the rule of law, principles the EU attaches great value to for clear reasons. These mechanisms have proven to be successful in different scenarios. Whereas the political conditionality mechanism was used towards ACP countries, the naming and shaming strategy proved to be successful within the European Community itself. However, I will focus on the EU-China bilateral relations and how the EU tries to alter China’s behavior in the field of human rights. It appears from the literature that the political conditionality and the political dialogue mechanism are most frequently used to diffuse human rights norms elsewhere. Therefore, in this thesis, I will focus on how these two mechanisms are applied in the EU’s human rights policy towards China and analyze whether the policy mechanisms proved to be effective in improving human rights practices in China. In the next section, I will spell out how the two mechanisms exactly work.

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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

In this section, I will spell out the political conditionality and political dialogue mechanisms. I will use secondary literature to expand on the theoretical reasoning behind these mechanisms and will provide examples where the mechanisms proved to be effective for the EU in its foreign policy.

The political conditionality mechanism

The first tool or mechanism which will be analyzed and spelled out is the political conditionality mechanism. By applying political conditionality, an actor tries to force cost-benefit calculations through creating positive or negative incentives for its counterpart. As Smith (1998) puts it: “it entails

the linking of perceived benefits to another state (e.g. aid, trade concessions or international organization membership), to the fulfillment of principles relating to the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and other democratic principles” (Smith, 1998:4).

Smith also makes a distinction between positive and negative conditionality. Whereas positive conditionality guarantees benefits to a state provided that the state fulfills the previously mentioned principles or conditions, negative conditionality refers to reducing, halting or suspending those benefits if the other state violates these principles (Ibid.). According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), political conditionality can be placed under a rationalist bargaining model, whereby the actors involved are expected to be “utility-maximizers” which have the goal to reach the optimization of their own interest (e.g. power or welfare) (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004:663). If one connects the conditionality mechanism to the European Union, one can argue that the EU follows a strategy of conditionality, whereby the EU sets certain rules or norms as conditions that the other party should fulfill before receiving EU benefits (Ibid.). Thus, the EU’s mechanism of political conditionality works through reinforcement by reward. The EU grants a reward if the other party complies with the principles and vice-versa denies a reward if the other party fails to comply. For example: democracy, human rights and the rule of law could be turned into a condition for trade with the EU.

However, the EU does not intervene to manipulate the cost-benefit assessment of the other party by imposing additional costs (i.e. reinforcement by punishment) or providing additional benefits (i.e. reinforcement by support) (Ibid.). Hafner-Burton states that coercion (which she refers to as “hard standards”) could prove essential in bringing about better practices in terms of human rights governance within countries. She found that material and political rewards are often an effective incentive structure to support the first stages of compliance and that preferential trade

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agreements proved to be an essential tool in enforcing better human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005). The EU cannot only provide gains or rewards for the other party; sanctions can also be imposed in the case of violation of certain conditions. Goodman and Jinks argue that coercion theory is useful to change the behavior of states, because of the material rewards and punishment that are the result of states’ actions. On the one hand, states are induced to act “according to EU norms” because of the potential gains. On the other hand, states are coerced to alter their behavior if there are negative sanctions laid upon them (Goodman & Jinks, 2004).

There are examples where the EU put forward the political conditionality mechanism and managed to bring about changes in other countries. As mentioned previously, political conditionality was first included in EU foreign policy during the Lomé IV agreement. However, successful examples can be found after the end of the Cold War when conditionality was applied towards Central and East European states. By exerting its political and economic means on a conditional basis, the EU expected Eastern European states to carry out domestic reforms (Smith, 1998:8). To be concise, the European Union first used trade and cooperation agreements to simulate political reforms. The European Community made association agreements with several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) which included five principles, namely human rights, a multi-party system, democratic elections, the rule of law and a market economy (Smith, 1998:9). Countries that were acting according to the Community’s demands (e.g. Hungary and Poland) were provided a more favorable treatment. Countries that were lagging in the reform process or did not respect certain democratic principles (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania) were not given any prospect of an agreement with the European Union (Smith, 1998:9). In the end, the success of the transformation countries, such as Hungary and Poland, underwent has been crucial for stability and security in the whole of Europe in the long run (Ibid.).

As I have shown above, political conditionality is used by the EU to diffuse human rights in other countries. Through conditionality, the EU tries to apply cost-benefit calculations by creating either positive or negative incentives for the other party. By doing this, the other party is induced to act according to EU norms because of the potential gains, or the other party is coerced to alter its behavior if there are negative sanctions laid upon it. During the empirical analysis, the conditionality mechanism is the first tool that will be put forward in order to analyze the effectiveness of the EU human rights policy in China.

The political dialogue mechanism

Political dialogue is used by the EU to diffuse human rights norms through persuasion and learning strategies. Dialogue fosters the exchange of information and the development of a mutual

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understanding of the meaning and application of the principles and strategies that are laid down in political agreements (Börzel & Risse, 2004). Goodman and Jinks (2004) refer to this process as “persuasion”. Persuasion theory prescribes that state behavior is influenced by processes of social learning and other forms of information flows. It is possible for states to internalize new norms and rules of appropriate behavior as a consequence of persuasion and redefine their interests and identities as a result (Goodman & Jinks, 2004). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that the social learning model adheres to key elements of social constructivism and that it “constitutes the

most prominent alternative to rationalist explanations of conditionality” (Schimmelfennig &

Sedelmeier, 2004:667). According to them, the social learning model infers a logic of appropriateness: states are motivated by certain internalized identities, values, norms and principles. Whether another state accepts EU rules, principles or norms, depends on the extent to which it sees the EU tenets as appropriate in light of its identity, values, norms and principles (Ibid.). Therefore, a state will adopt EU norms and principles, such as human rights, if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of these norms and principles. Political dialogue is the means of achieving this.

The European Union wields a political dialogue framework wherein it enters consultation and diplomatic talks with other countries (European Commission, 2007:9). It seeks constructive engagement with other states and, by doing so, the EU hopes to expand on these dialogues and consequently achieve concrete results (Council of the European Union, 2012). These objectives may vary from one country to another and are to be set up on a case-by-case basis (European External Action Service, 2009). However, the European Commission did identify general objectives that are to be pursued. These objectives are seeking information concerning the human rights situation in a country, expressing EU concerns about a country’s human rights record, identifying solutions to improve the human rights situation on the ground (e.g. through human rights projects), discussing questions of mutual interest and, lastly, enhancing cooperation on human rights in multinational forums such as the United Nations (UN) (European Commission, 2007:11). Furthermore, political dialogues can be useful to identify early stage problems which might possibly lead to conflict in the future. The issues covered during these dialogues are also determined on a case-by-case basis.

Nonetheless, the EU has general priorities it wants to pursue or deal with. These priorities are the signing, ratification and implementation of human rights instruments, combating the death penalty, halting torture, stopping all forms of discrimination, respect for children’s rights and women’s rights, freedom of expression, good governance, rule of law and the protection of human rights defenders (European External Action Service, 2009). According to the EU, the key challenge for these political dialogues entails the notion that the dialogues needs to go further than rhetoric and the exchange of talks. Ultimately, the EU aims to achieve substantial improvement of the human rights situation on the ground (European Commission, 2007:11).

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Proponents of the political dialogue mechanism emphasize the fact that bilateral dialogue is the only platform for political actors to discuss sensitive issues, such as human rights. Therefore, a political dialogue could be a useful opportunity to talk about the countries’ different perceptions of these rights. Another advantage of the political dialogue is that it is accompanied by “compliance” rather than “enforcement”. Political dialogue is a cooperative approach and allows for a common understanding on the condition of mutual consent. In terms of achieving results, socialization tends to be more promising due to the benign and friendly logic behind it (Börzel and Risse, 2004:21).

In sum, political dialogue fosters information flows and develops mutual understanding, which in turn may lead to the adaption to new norms and new identities. The EU seeks engagement with other states through political dialogue in order to achieve results in terms of certain norms, such as: respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy. Next to the political conditionality tool, the dialogue mechanism will be used in the empirical analysis. Both mechanisms constitute the framework to analyze the effectiveness of the EU human rights policy in China. In the next section, I will elaborate on the research strategy and methodology after which the empirical section follows.

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Research design and methodology

In this section, I will lay out the strategy which will be used to conduct the empirical research and, further, elaborate on the data used in this thesis. The empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, I will display China’s position towards human rights and provide an overview of the actual EU human rights policy towards China. From there, it becomes clear that the political conditionality mechanism is not applied by the EU. Instead, the overview indicates that political dialogue, in the form of the EU-China human rights dialogue, is used by the EU as the tool to improve human rights practices in China. The second part entails the analysis in which I will evaluate both of the mechanisms. In the case of the political conditionality mechanism, I will look at the underlying reasons why this mechanism is not applied by the EU. With regard to the political dialogue mechanism, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU-China human rights dialogue, I will look at two objectives the EU has during the dialogues and analyze whether these objectives have led to factual improvements on the ground.

An objective the EU has during the dialogue is the freedom of on- and offline expression and will be analyzed first. The freedom of expression, an essential human right, is a difficult topic within the human rights debate in China and is presented as a least likely case in this thesis. It is a least likely case and difficult objective to achieve due to the fact that any form of criticism towards the government in Beijing constitutes a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) primary goal: survival (The Diplomat 2014 & Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). If there are noticeable improvements linked to the freedom of expression, I can draw the conclusion that the political dialogue is effective not only for this right, but for other rights in general, due to the difficultness of the objective (Gerring, 2007:233-237). In order to say something about the extent to which the EU policy has proven effective, I will look at three indicators: freedom of the press, freedom of the internet and the situation concerning human rights activists.

The ban on torture and other forms of ill-treatment is a special priority the EU has during the human rights dialogue with China (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a). This objective will be analyzed as the second case during the empirical analysis. The eradication of torture and ill-treatment is an easier objective for the EU to realize due to the fact that it does not hold a direct threat towards the survival of the CCP. One could argue that torture is used to deter citizens from challenging the CCP’s rule, however the CCP could call upon other more “humane” means of doing so. This, together with the fact that the EU prioritizes this issue, makes it a most likely case. If there are no improvements linked to this case, I can draw the conclusion that the dialogue is not very effective due to the fact that if there are no improvements here, it is unlikely to obtain results in regard to other rights (Gerring, 2007:237-238). In order to assess to what extent the EU realized its

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objective, I will look at the Political Terror Scale scores of two different institutions: Amnesty International and the U.S. Foreign State department.

Secondary literature and EU documents will be used to put forward the history and evolution of the EU human rights policy in China and to analyze why China is exempted in terms of the political conditionality mechanism. For analyzing the effectiveness of the political dialogue mechanism, I will look at reports and data of Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Amnesty International and CIRI (U.S. State Department). After the analysis, I will put forward a policy recommendation which aims to improve the EU human rights policy. This policy recommendation is based on interviews with experts on human rights in China who all have first-hand experience in terms of possibilities and infeasibilities concerning human rights policymaking in China. The interviews were semi-structured and were conducted via Skype (NGO policy director and human rights policy officer) or in person (China expert). The output of the interviews with the human rights experts will be synthesized in the chapter after the empirical analysis.

Limitations on conducting research towards this topic exist. Firstly, the human rights dialogue take place behind closed doors. Despite the fact that this brings along certain advantages (e.g. it is easier for the both parties to talk openly), it makes it impossible to find out what happens exactly or what is said during the talks between the officials of both parties. Although detailed data on the dialogue rounds is confidential, pieces of information can be obtained through the analysis of press releases, EU documents and interviews with experts who have experienced the dialogue personally or know others that have first-hand experience. Second, it is difficult to assess to what extent the EU influenced Chinese human rights practices in case there are any improvements. There are many other alternative explanations (e.g. U.S. influence or domestic factors) that could explain a positive shift in China’s human rights record. Isolating the EU’s influence from the influence of international or domestic actors would be an impossible mission to carry out. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so, because the analysis will show that there are no factual improvements on the ground in terms of freedom of expression or the eradication of torture and other forms of ill-treatment in China.

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Chapter 3. Empirical Analysis

I identified several mechanisms used by the EU for its external governance towards other countries. Two of them, political conditionality and political dialogue, will be used to explore the effectiveness of the EU human rights policy towards China. This section is divided into two parts. First, I will display China’s position towards human rights and, further, provide an overview and evolution of the actual EU human rights policy towards China. In the second part, I will analyze why the conditionality mechanism is not implemented in the EU’s policy and, further, assess whether the dialogue mechanism is effective by looking at factual changes on the ground in terms of human rights practices.

The European Union’s human rights policy towards China

Over the years, the rise of China in international relations generated both challenges and opportunities for the EU. The opportunities mostly lie in terms of economic benefits, such as trade and European investments in China. On the other hand, the challenges lie in “understanding China” and working with China on potentially divisive issues, of which human rights is one (Rees, 2009:31). The differences between the European and Chinese perspectives on this issue are considerable. How does the EU try to cope with this matter? And how did the EU establish its human rights policy vis-à-vis China? Answering these questions is essential for understanding the actual policy.

The Chinese principle of non-interference

The EU’s normative power, which forms the basis of the EU human rights policy, stands opposite of China’s ideology regarding foreign policy, namely: non-interference or nonintervention. Compared to western countries, China has a particular view on international politics due to the adherence of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Pang, 2009:238). China has always defended the principle of non-intervention and is known worldwide as the primary advocate of this principle (Ibid.). Even when it comes to decisions made by the UN, China rejected the legitimacy of a considerable amount of resolutions on its internal affairs, stating that the resolutions “interfered in

China’s domestic affairs, constituted an attempt to pressure China and were not compatible with the principles as portrayed by the Charter of the United Nations” (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:45).

However, recent changes might provide a sense of optimism (from a western perspective) for the future. For example, if one looks at the case of Sino-Sudanese relations. Since 1959,

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non-interference stood central to Beijing’s relations with the several governments that held office in Khartoum, Sudan (Large, 2008:93). Nowadays the Chinese interest and involvement in the Sudanese oil sector combined with the political instability of the country lead to an unprecedented increase of Chinese activity in Sudan’s domestic politics (Large, 2008:104). If one takes a look at other African countries, one may come to the same conclusion. China supported UN Resolution 1970 and allowed the passage of Resolution 1973 by abstaining from voting, this in turn, gave green light for a military intervention in Libya (Garwood-Gowers, 2012:14). Further, it allowed France to military intervene in both Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (Verhoeven, 2014:60).

In the last decade, China did not only allow other countries to place military troops on other countries’ soil, the country itself has become an active contributor to UN peace-keeping missions. Of all permanent UNSC members, China has provided the largest input of military personnel: it has sent over 2,000 servicemen to Liberia, Darfur, South Sudan and Mali (Ibid.). Furthermore, China developed itself as a meaningful military partner by supplying arms and giving military training to countries such as Algeria, Angola and Nigeria (Ibid.). It has also dispatched navy vessels to join European anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and supported international endeavors to combat Islamic rebels and jihadists in Somalia (Ibid.). All of this is remarkable if one bears in mind the fact that China is a strong proponent of the nonintervention principle and compares China’s current international involvement with the situation two decades ago.

Whereas the European Union has the objective of diffusing certain norms, such as human rights, and to shape others’ conception of what is normal, China prefers the idea that countries are to be responsible for their own domestic affairs. Although China seems to have made little steps away from the non-interference principle, it still remains ambiguous whether the European Union is able to influence Chinese domestic affairs, for example on the issue of human rights.

China’s version of human rights

Whereas the EU sees human rights as a universal and broad set of rights, China holds a different view towards human rights and what these rights consist of. Firstly, China seems to prioritize socio-economic rights over civil and political rights (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:7). In 1991, the Chinese government published a white paper, stating that the right to subsistence is the most fundamental of all human rights and that without it, the implementation of other rights is impossible. While China is criticized for taking this position, Chinese officials are frustrated due to their opinion that China is not sufficiently credited for its astonishing economic growth and the lifting of millions of people out of poverty (Ibid.).

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Secondly, China believes that human rights are to be adhered by a country according to its level of development, rather than treaties or human rights instruments as proposed by western countries (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:8). Although China officially accepted the universality of human rights, it stated that a country’s human rights situation could not be evaluated according to a certain model or compared to another country’s human rights situation. Instead, the Chinese government affirms the idea that it is not unusual for countries to differ on human rights issues due to differences in level of development and other social, cultural or historical particularities (Ibid.).

A third difference entails the disagreement with the European view on human rights (Ibid.). China has its focus on collective rights which states have (e.g. right to development and right to self-determination) and disagrees with the notion that an individual should place his or her own rights and interests above those of the state and society (Ibid.).

The fourth and last difference relates to China’s view that a state is obliged to maintain public order and safety as a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:9). In other words: it is permissible for a state or government to violate fundamental human rights in order to maintain peace and stability as one might have seen during the Tiananmen Square incident or the crackdowns in contemporary Xinjiang.

To conclude, there are differences between the European and Chinese version of human rights on several aspects. Whereas the European concept of human rights has its focus on a broad spectrum of rights for individuals all around the world, the Chinese version places emphasis on stability and socio-economic rights for the collective state. Although these differences with the European countries are considerable, China signed numerous treaties on human rights and became a party to eighteen human rights instruments (Wan, 2007:729). At the same time, it rejects the idea of interference on human rights in its internal affairs and those of other states (Sceats & Breslin, 2012:1), making monitoring and implementation of human rights in China difficult. If one wants to assess the EU’s success of diffusing human rights practices in China and attempts to improve the EU policy, these different perspectives must be taken into account.

The evolution of the European Union’s human rights policy towards China

Human rights did not play a significant role in EU-China relations before the Tiananmen incident in June 1989 (Baker, 2002:47). This was not a very rare occurrence: it seemed that the entire international community and most of the NGO’s exempted China from any type of human rights analysis or criticism before this date (Ibid.). However, this was not because there was a lack of evidence of human rights abuse in China. In fact, there was enough evidence to justify allegations of abusive human rights practices in China, despite the fact that the amount of human rights reports on

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the period prior to 1989 is relatively small in comparison to the huge amount of human rights reports after the Tiananmen massacre (Ibid.).

Indeed, human rights violations were abundant if one takes a closer look at some of the events that took place before the Tiananmen incident. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) millions of Chinese were victims of persecution and public abuse (Cohen, 1987:448). Most of the victims were those with higher education and professional skills (e.g. teachers, scientists, doctors, managers) and were accused of having bourgeois sympathies, revisionist ideas or supporting the capitalist roads. Punishment consisted of torture, imprisonment, forced labor, exile and even executions. Years later, Chinese press and Chinese officials reported that many of the 1.13 million people who were convicted during the Cultural Revolution had been convicted in an unjust and incorrect manner (Ibid.). In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the violation of human rights continued. For example in the summer of 1982 when a law and order campaign resulted in a large scale execution period in which nearly 20,000 people were killed (Baker, 2002:47).

Nonetheless, the topic of human rights played a limited role in China’s international relations. The first time an NGO wrote a report on this topic was in 1978, when Amnesty International published “Political Imprisonment in the People’s Republic of China” (Baker, 2002:47). Later, in the 1980s, other international NGOs began to publish on human rights related issues in China, primarily on Tibet (Baker, 2002:48). The first time a western government (in this case the U.S.) issued a statement concerning human rights in China was at the end of 1978 (Cohen, 1987:450). However, the statement was limited to welcoming Chinese admissions of abuses and expressing hope for further improvement (Ibid.): the US seemed to be cautious in condemning China due to the strategy of containing Soviet expansion in the world (Zhou, 2005:106). Next to containment of the Soviet Union, there were other reasons for western countries to exempt China from any form of criticism, including the lack of information on the human rights situation in China, guilt about Chinese suffering under imperialism, respect for the Chinese civilization and the absence of a Chinese human rights lobby in western countries (Wan, 2001:4). This can be confirmed by looking at the European policy statements relating to China and human rights in the period between 1985 and 1989. The meager amount of four documents could be found, all of which were questions in the European Parliament (Baker, 2002:48). In sum, the international community did not pay much attention to human rights in China. However, the Tiananmen incident on 4 June 1989 changed the situation completely.

China’s exemption from human rights criticism ended abruptly when the Chinese government brutally repressed demonstrations at the Tiananmen Square. The crackdown, which was televised around the globe, pushed human rights in China onto the agenda of western countries and NGOs (Wan, 2001:4-5). Another helpful factor was that communist governments in Eastern Europe

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collapsed around that time. Consequently, western governments did not longer feel the need to cooperate with China to contain the Soviet Union and its communist threat (Ibid.). Next to the fact that the Tiananmen massacre was broadcasted in the full view of the world’s media, the incident entailed the breach of several fundamental human rights, including the right to life, freedom from arbitrary detention, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the freedom of organization (Baker, 2002:49). In the end, the brutality of the events at Tiananmen turned out to be too extreme to ignore.

The initial responds by the EU, which consisted of twelve member states at the time, was strong. The leaders of the member states gathered in Madrid and released a press statement on June 6 wherein they condemned the “violent repression used against peaceful demonstrators, which

resulted in widespread loss of life” (Ibid.). Further, they stated that high-level contacts were halted

and that developments in China were being followed in detail. The statement was succeeded by several specific measures which were adopted during a meeting of the European Council on 27 June 1989, these included raising human rights issues in international forums, halting the military cooperation and trade of arms between EU member states and China, stopping high-level contacts (e.g. ministerial contacts), postponing new cooperation projects and lastly, prolonging the visas of Chinese students who wished to stay in EU countries (King, 1999:323 & Baker, 2002:49).

Although these measures were not mild, they were not as pressuring as measures taken by the United States, which led the way in exerting pressure on China by linking human rights to trade (Wan, 2001:6). European countries surely joined Washington in publicly criticizing China, but were becoming less confrontational as time passed by (Ibid.). Further, the measures that were taken by the end of June 1989 quickly fell apart (Baker, 2002:50). The ban on high-level contacts was almost immediately interrupted by the United Kingdom (UK) due to the negotiations concerning Hong Kong. Then, in October 1990, the EU agreed to ease the ban on high-level contact and cooperation projects, while keeping the arms embargo and ban on military cooperation in place. The justification behind these political decisions were Chinese assurances of compliance with human rights, China’s important role during the Gulf War and China’s helping hand during the Cambodian crisis (Ibid.). By the end of 1990, the EU announced that relations with China would be normalized (Smith, 1998:323).

Nonetheless, the European Union continued to address and condemn human rights abuses in China by proposing two resolutions in the UN’s Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The first one, which was put forward in 1991, was blocked in the years after due to several “no-action” resolutions (Baker, 2002:53). The second one, which was drafted in 1995, was co-sponsored by all EU member states and failed due to the fact that the Russian delegation changed their minds overnight (Baker, 2002:53 & Möller, 2002:21). In order to achieve results, the EU changed its strategy and proposed to act at three different levels (Möller, 2002:23). First, the EU would support efforts from within China

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to open up. Second, the EU would (together with the rest of the international community) engage China in international forums such as the United Nations. Third, and most important to this research, the EU would focus on addressing human rights issues in a political dialogue with China (Ibid.). Until this day, the political dialogue remains the primary policy tool for the EU to tackle the human rights issues in China.

The EU-China human rights dialogue

From 1995 onwards, the EU institutionalized the EU-China human rights dialogue (Wiessala, 2009:94). It was agreed between the EU and China that the human rights dialogue was to take place twice a year, alternately in China and Europe (European Commission, 2007:11).The first meeting took place in Brussels, where the EU was represented by the Troika (which consists out of three countries, namely the current Presidency, its predecessor and successor). The second EU-China dialogue took place in Beijing in January 1996 (Baker, 2002:58). Afterwards, the dialogue was interrupted by the Chinese government because several EU member states put forward a resolution criticizing China at the 1997 UN CHR. However, later in 1997, China gave its consent to resume the human rights dialogue (Men, 2010:4).

When the dialogue started in 1995, the EU refused to share information and details about its new policy (Kinzelbach, 2014:9). Since it was a process of quiet diplomacy, the dialogue was behind closed doors and the EU kept its lips clinched concerning the specific goals of the dialogue, the agenda of the dialogue and participants at the meetings. Further, the EU did not elaborate on the specific topics that were discussed during the meetings and concerns, if any, would be prioritized (Ibid.). In 1998, the EU promised to publish information surrounding each round of the dialogue in order to elaborate on its common approach to public opinion, media and NGOs. However, many details on the human rights dialogue were (and are) still kept behind closed doors (Ibid.). After the dialogue was restarted in 1997, meetings took place in Beijing that year, in London in May 1998, in Beijing in October 1998, in Berlin in February 1999, in Beijing again in September 1999 and in Portugal in 2000 (Baker, 2002:59). The EU-China human rights dialogue would continue to take place twice every year until 2010, in Europe and China alternately. After 2010 it was reduced to once a year, because China refused to attend these dialogues more frequently (Kinzelbach, 2010:188).

From 1995 until 2010, the dialogue was managed under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was thus the responsibility of the rotating EU Presidency. After 2010, the European External Action Service, a newly established agency around that time, took over this role (Kinzelbach, 2014:9). The dialogue consists of several components. The primary session is a well structured dialogue at the high-level of senior human rights officials and diplomats (European

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Commission, 2007:9). Further, it is complemented by EU-China human rights legal seminars where academics, officials and representatives of the NGO community are brought together (European Commission, 2007:11).

Perspectives on the political dialogue: the EU and the critiques

The European Union states that it is committed to the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms all over the world and that human rights are a vital condition for a social and politically stable country (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a). Therefore, the EU supports China’s transition to an open society based on the rule of law and believes that respect for human rights and other democratic principles remains key elements in EU-China relations. To achieve this end, the EU wants to promote human rights in China in an “active, sustained and constructive way”. As a consequence, constructive dialogue is the EU’s preferred means for working towards the improvement of human rights practices in China (Ibid.). The EU sees the human rights dialogue as a useful channel of communication, a stage for the European Union to address its concern over sensitive issues and a possibility to gain information concerning human rights developments in China (European Commission, 2007:11). Further, the dialogue proved to be a useful asset to expose Chinese decision-makers to international human rights standards and EU practices. The dialogue has allowed agreement on both sides on human rights projects that will be carried out in the future and it has allowed the European Commission to pinpoint human rights priorities (Ibid.).

Thanks to the human rights dialogue, the European Union is able to channel several issues it is concerned about (e.g. the death penalty, ethnic minorities’ rights, civil and political freedoms etc.) in a forum where China is strongly committed to responding (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a). In terms of objectives, the European Union has a list of priority issues that are included on the agenda for every dialogue, which include the signing, ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments, combating the death penalty, combating torture, combating discrimination, respect for children’s rights and woman rights, freedom of expression (on- and offline), protection of civil society and human rights defenders, promotion of democratization and good governance, promotion of the rule of law and the prevention of conflict (European External Action Service, 2009).

In terms of specific goals towards China, the EU states that “the fight against torture and all

other forms of ill-treatment is a particular priority of the EU’s human rights policy” (Delegation of the

European Union to China, 2016a). Ultimately, the EU aims to achieve substantial improvement of the human rights situation on the ground (European Commission, 2007:11). According to the EU, positive steps have come out of the dialogue, these include greater engagement with UN human rights

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mechanisms in China, the signing of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the signing and ratifying of the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, prisoners releases and the fact that several European Commission cooperation projects have been set up (European Commission, 2007:11 & Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a).

In the past, the European Commission supported several cooperation programs and human rights seminars where European and Chinese experts exchanged views and experiences. Other cooperation programs involve legal and judicial assistance projects, which focused on improving the rule of law and good governance in China, and the EU-China village governance program, which aimed at improving civil, social and economic rights (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a). While the European Union proudly presents its achievements, it is well aware of its weaknesses: “On the other hand, the dialogue remains an incremental process which aims to

generate long-term improvement. Progress is therefore rather slow. On many issues, the dialogue is not likely to generate immediate change but to contribute to establishing a favorable environment for gradual improvements” (European Commission, 2007:11). Furthermore, the EU stated that its wants

to realize more tangible improvements on the ground (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016a). Ultimately, while the EU recognizes its caveats, the Union’s Council of Ministers concluded that the dialogue together with its seminars remained a useful mechanism to interact with China on the issue of human rights and to generate improvements in the long run (European Commission, 2007:11).

Thus far, the dialogue has been viewed from the EU’s perspective, but what do others (i.e. non-EU related actors) have to say about the EU-China human rights dialogue? Human Rights Watch (HRW) criticized the dialogue for having limited utility, lacking clear benchmarks for progress on human rights practices in China and that it lacked coercive pressure from European governments (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Lotte Leicht, EU director at HRW, stated that the dialogue “remains a comfortably low-level

exercise where the EU can say it is challenging China over human rights concerns, and where China can claim it is willing to discuss human rights issues with the EU – with no true pressure for reform”.

Further, Leicht argued that random statements and private diplomacy will not induce the Chinese government to change its policy or develop into a firm strategy to achieve progress. Instead, the EU must live up to its words as laid down in the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy (Ibid.). The Framework affirms that the EU will throw its full weight behind advocates of liberty, democracy and human rights all over the world (Council of the European Union, 2012:3). Consequently, the EU must put forward its concerns and establish transparent benchmarks for improving human rights practices. Leicht ended her critics by stating that the EU-China relationship is mature enough to withstand an assertive EU position on human rights and that is up to the Union to

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show determinism and strategic thinking to reverse the downward spiral for human rights practices in China (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Kinzelbach & Thelle (2011) argue that the EU-China human rights dialogue is based on a false assumption that negotiation is taking place between equal partners. Instead, “A aims at changing B,

while B knows it and does not accept it” (Kinzelbach & Thelle, 2011:79). They further state that the

EU does not hide the fact that the dialogue is about improving human rights practices, while the Chinese government plays the equality-and-mutual-respect card. However, the dialogue is neither systematic nor constructive. For example, the legal seminars do not provide a safe space for open talks, the cooperation projects are not linked to the political level and the content of the dialogues are not up-to-date in terms of political events that occur during that specific time (Ibid.). Not only do Kinzelbach and Thelle criticize the dialogue for being ineffective, they go further by stating that “the

current set-up of the dialogue risks running counter to the goal of improving human rights protection in China” (Ibid.).

Baker acknowledges these statements and argues that the Chinese are using the dialogue as a way of fending off criticism (Baker, 2002:60). He disagrees with the EU that the dialogue produced successes over the years. Instead Baker argues that the claimed results were causes by other factors. For example, the signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are not the result of the EU dialogues. Rather both signings were implications of Sino-US relations (Baker, 2002:61).

EU liaison officer Jean-Marie Rogue claims that the EU-China human rights dialogue has had a negative outcome (Rogue, 2012). He states that the process of having a dialogue and avoiding upsetting China and its government has trumped the desire to achieve results. Moreover, the Chinese government has become more self-confident in imposing its opinion and principles on the topics that were discussed during the dialogue sessions and has become less cooperative on certain areas (Ibid.). Rogue contends that the Chinese government is not willing to allow any change in terms of human rights, “due to the policy of the Chinese Communist Party to preserve at all costs its hold on

political power and social control” (Ibid.).

In sum, although human rights abuses occurred on a large and frequent scale in China, the EU, together with the rest of the international community, refrained from criticizing the Chinese government. The few remarks that were made by governments and NGOs towards Beijing in the late 1970s were null or cautious at the most. The events at Tiananmen in June 1989, however, changed the stance of the international community. The brutal crackdown, which was broadcasted on television, violated fundamental human rights and, as a consequence, sanctions were laid upon China by the EU. However, the sanctions did not last long and were not as pressuring as sanctions put forward by the US, which linked trade to human rights. Also, resolutions in the United Nation’s CHR

Talking and trading : an assessment of the European Union’s human rights policy