Economic sanctions and the path to the nuclear deal : to what extent can economic sanctions, which were imposed on Iran, explain why the nuclear deal was signed?

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Economic Sanctions and the Path

to the Nuclear Deal

To what extent can economic sanctions, which were imposed on Iran,

explain why the nuclear deal was signed?

Master thesis Political Science, International Relations

Research Project: Development in Comparative Perspective

June 24

th

_{, 2016}

Author: Pepijn Maas (10059059)

Supervisor: Farid Boussaid Second reader: Said Rezaeiejan

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Abstract

On the 14th_{of July 2015 the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was}

signed between the P5+1 and Iran. This thesis presents an extensive analysis of the process that led to this agreement. Focussing on economic sanctions it tries to examine to what extent the sanctions regime, imposed on Iran, can explain why the agreement was signed. The main objective is to examine whether economic sanctions can sufficiently explain why the nuclear agreement was signed. Furthermore, changes in the domestic-, regional-, and international context will also be examined. The different contexts are investigated; also in interplay with each other, in order to find out to what extent the economic sanctions can be held responsible for the signing of the nuclear agreement. This thesis acknowledges that the sanctions did not bring any direct change to Iran’s nuclear program, and neither did it change Iran’s attitude when the sanctions were imposed unilateral and incomprehensive. However, when the sanctions regime toughened after 2010, and all the P5+1 countries were actively backing these sanctions, it did exacerbated Iran’s economic problems to the extent that this might have created the domestic economic and political context under which Rouhani could be elected president. The argument that has been put forward in this research is that economic sanctions were merely a singular component in a very complex interplay of factors that led to the JCPOA; it cannot be held responsible for the eventual signing of the nuclear deal. The process that led to the eventual agreement is too complex to be able to argue that the sanctions were the main driving force behind the nuclear agreement. In describing the extent to which economic sanctions can explain why the nuclear deal was signed, this thesis looks at the economic sanctions as a piece in a very big, complicated puzzle.

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Acknowledgements

Wring this thesis has been a long and interesting journey, and without the support of my supervisor Farid Boussaid, it would not have reached this point. Farid helped me with his honest feedback, extensive knowledge, and especially in structuring my thoughts. I therefore wanted to take this occasion to thank Farid for his patience and guidance during the last five months. Additionally, my gratitude goes to the second reader Said Rezaeiejan for taking his time to thoroughly read this research. I furthermore would like to thank Daisy for her editing and spelling checks, and Stella for her straightforward opinions and trust in my academic skills over the last semester. I am proud that I managed to get at least a bit of a grip on a subject that is so complex.

Pepijn Maas June 24th 2016

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List of abbreviations

Abbreviation Meaning

EU European Union

EU-3 France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IR International Relations

IR-1 Less advanced Iranian centrifuges IR-2m More advanced Iranian centrifuges IRI Islamic Republic of Iran

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps JPOA Joint Plan of Action

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries P5+1 China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom,

and the United States

SWIFT Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WNA World Nuclear Association

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1. Introduction

Tuesday the 14th_{of July 2015 a historic accord was signed between the P5+1 counties}

and the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran agreed to disassemble most of their nuclear infrastructure on the condition that the United Nations (UN), the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) would lift most of the economic sanctions that they had imposed on Iran. This thesis will concentrate on the process that led to this nuclear agreement by focussing on the economic sanctions that were imposed on Iran. Multiple authors have argued that economic sanctions rarely work and that the desired effect is seldom reached (Pape, 1997; Pape, 1998; Carter & Farha, 2013; Allen & Lektzian, 2013; Peksen, 2014). The idea behind this research is that it is intriguing to look at the discrepancy between academics and policy makers when it comes to economic sanctions. Most recent literature written on sanctions argues that they are not effective, and thus they do not serve the purpose they were designed to deal with. Nevertheless, economic sanctions are a widely used foreign policy tool.

Different kinds of economic sanctions are highlighted, followed by the pros and cons of these different types of sanctions. In order to understand how economic sanctions influence foreign policy this thesis will look at the specific case of the Iran nuclear deal. Several authors have already written on the subject of economic sanctions with a specific focus on Iran, but these authors were writing it before the nuclear deal was signed. With the signing of the nuclear deal it has become interesting to examine the case of Iran again, in order to discover what the main driving forces behind the agreement were. Studies show the consequences that follow-up on the signing of the nuclear deal, but the specific driving forces that led to the signing of the nuclear deal have not yet been sufficiently researched.

The internationally imposed economic sanctions on Iran are not the only issues that are highlighted in this research. Most of the literature written on the nuclear deal is concentrated on the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the lifting of the economic sanctions that were imposed on Iran because of their nuclear program. It might seem convincing to point at a possible causal link between the imposed sanctions and the deal that was signed, however several other important changes could have been a possible driving force, which resulted in the nuclear deal.

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In order to understand to what extent the economic sanctions can explain why the JCPOA was signed, the focus not only revolves around the imposed sanctions, but also changes occurring in the international-, regional-, and domestic context will be examined. On the international level the focus will be on the election of Obama, and his foreign policies that were concerned with both the negotiations, and the geopolitical changes in the Middle East region. The US play, arguably, the largest role in the negotiations of all P5+1 countries, therefore it is interesting to look at the extent that the election of Obama, whether or not in interplay with other contexts, changed the course of the negotiations. It is also mentioned what role Russia played in the sanctions regime imposed on Iran, and the role that Saudi Arabia and Israel took in opposing the US’ new realignment in the Middle East. In the regional context several major geopolitical changes will be used to look at how strong the causal link is between economic sanctions and the agreement that was signed on Iran’s nuclear program. This thesis will also look at the extent to which domestic changes can explain why the nuclear agreement was signed. Finally, the argument is put forward that in order to understand the complexity of the run-up towards the JCPOA that it is impossible to look at just one context or factor; rather, it is the complex interplay of these levels and factors that might explain why a deal could be reached. It is the interplay between the domestic-, regional-, and international context that is important when studying why the nuclear agreement was signed.

At this stage in the research, economic sanctions are generally defined as the restriction of economic relations with a target country, individuals, or other entities, in order to persuade the targeted country to change its policies. The main objective is to look at if economic sanctions can explain sufficiently why the nuclear agreement was signed, while exploring the alternative driving forces behind the nuclear deal. Process tracing will be used to look at the possibility of a causal relationship between economic sanctions and the nuclear agreement signed in July 2015. In order to understand if economic sanctions influence foreign policy, the possible causal relationship between economic sanctions and the nuclear agreement signed in July 2015 will be studied. Therefore, the following main question has been formulated:

 To what extent can economic sanctions, which were imposed on Iran, explain why the nuclear deal was signed?

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In order to answer the main question, the following sub questions are formulated:

 Firstly, to what extent did the economic sanction, imposed on Iran because of their nuclear program, influence Iranian domestic politics? And, to what extent can domestic political changes explain why the nuclear agreement was signed?

 Secondly, what geopolitical changes occurred during the imposition of the sanctions on Iran, and to what extent can these changes explain why the nuclear deal was signed?

 Thirdly, what is the role of international factors in explaining why the nuclear deal was signed?

The structure will be as follows: Firstly, a literature review will be provided on the general subject of economic sanctions. Secondly, a theoretical framework is presented, in which the interplay between the sanctions and the domestic, regional and international is highlighted. This is followed by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach of International Relations (IR). Thirdly, in the methodological framework the data selection will be shown. This is followed by the pros and cons of doing a case study, and finally process tracing is introduced as the means to answer the main question posed. Fourthly, the case study will be introduced with a short historic overview of Iran as a country, followed by literature on putting sanctions on Iran. Furthermore, the extent to which economic sanctions might have brought a direct change in Iran’s nuclear program will be shown. Sixthly, the question is discussed if economic sanctions influenced Iranian domestic politics, and if so, to what extent can these domestic changes explain why the nuclear deal was signed? Seventhly, the extent that geopolitical changes had an influence on the negotiations and the outcome of the nuclear deal will be examined. Eighthly, several international factors will be put forward, in order to understand to what extent Russia, Saudi Arabia, Israel and especially the US, in interplay with other factors, could possibly explain why the nuclear agreement was signed. Finally, in the conclusion the main question, in relation to the sub-questions, will be answered.

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2. Literature review: sanctions

Policy makers and scholars have contested and defended the possible utility of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Since the 1920’s there has been a steady rise of using economic sanctions as an important tool of coercive influence. After a small decline of the usage of sanctions in the 1980’s, economic sanctions became a very important foreign policy tool after the Cold War ended (Allen, 2005: 119). This trend is the result of the movement towards more collective security communities and international organizations, which preferred non-violent forms of coercion to direct military action (Allen, 2008: 256). Dozens of bilateral and multilateral sanctions were put in use to prevent, manage or resolve political conflict (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000: 105). During the last decades sanctions have become a highly popular foreign policy tool, for that reason studying these sanctions has become of great importance in the field of IR. In this thesis economic sanctions are defined as the restriction of economic relations with a target country, individuals, or other entities, in order to persuade the targeted country to change its policies.

The classic work written about sanctions, for example Pape (1997), Hufbauer et al (1990), and Drezner (1998), is accompanied by more recent academic literature, to look at both the proponents and the opponents of economic sanctions, in order to come up with a comprehensive literature review. The critique on the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool is extensive. In recent literature it is mostly highlighted that sanctions are not effective in reaching their ultimate goal: changing the behaviour, or seated governments, of the targeted countries. Rather, it is being argued that sanctions mostly affect the innocent populations of these sanctioned countries (Pape, 1997; Pape, 1998; Carter & Farha, 2013; Allen & Lektzian, 2013; Peksen, 2014). Therefore, it is an indirect way to reach the objective. Warnaar (2016) argues that the use of sanctions makes populations disgruntled, and thus sparks a turn against their regime from within the country. This is a very indirect and uncontrolled way of pressuring a government to alter their behaviour. She argues that sanctions aren’t the most effective tool and consequently have a host of rather horrible side-effects (Interview Maaike Warnaar1).

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Furthermore, it is also argued that democratic leaders are more constrained and more susceptible to sanction pressures than autocratic leaders (Allen, 2008: 255). Both democratic and autocratic leaders have the same main objective: to stay in power. Leaders are therefore mainly interested in how these economic sanctions might threaten their position. “Leaders, looking to maintain their hold on power, will primarily be concerned with how sanctions might threaten their position” (Allen, 2008: 259). In order to explain how economic sanctions can influence leaders it is important to understand how different regime types are susceptible to economic sanctions. Leaders of both autocratic and democratic states are looking to get support from the people who possess political rights; Allen (2008) calls this the selectorate (Allen, 2008: 259). Leaders will try to make decisions and implement policies that are favourable to their selectorate. Leaders do not need the support of all individuals, rather do they need a smaller subset: the winning coalition. In autocratic states the leaders only need the support from a few people to stay in power, the most efficient means to maintain support is by giving private rewards to these chosen few (Allen, 2008: 260). In autocratic states the winning coalition is relatively small, has high rewards, but if the leaders are not in power anymore they might be excluded from the rewards, this makes them very loyal to the leaders. “The risk of being excluded from the winning coalition in a democracy is significantly less, and therefore, loyalty is not as strong. Fearful of losing support, democrats concede to sanctions pressure” (Allen, 2008: 261).

Another critique that the opponents point out is the fact that countries adapt to financial change caused by economic sanctions, by looking for different trade partners and changing their internal market (Allen, 2008: 256). Although, countries use coercion in order to impact the sanctioned countries, the targeted leadership often finds ways to mitigate the impact of this coercion (Peksen, 2014: 2). In several cases the leaders and their supporters benefitted from the imposed sanctions: “they are able to collect rents from the altered terms of trade” (Allen, 2008: 260). This links with the argument that economic sanctions can actually strengthen an economy; it can also benefit certain elite groups controlling the economy (Maloney, 2010: 139). It is, furthermore, argued that sanctions are rarely on their own responsible for a change in policies of the targeted countries, as in most cases sanctions are followed by a threat, or actual military force (Morgan et al, 2009: 101-102).

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Although the critics of sanctions dominate the recent literature about sanctions, this framework will also take into consideration the view of some authors that economic sanctions can be an alternative or effective foreign policy tool (Marinov, 2005; De Jonge Oudraat, 2000). Proponents of economic sanctions provide several arguments why, and how, economic sanctions are useful.

Sanctions are seen as a more peaceful or humane way of foreign intervention in a country. For foreign policy makers it is an alternative to military foreign intervention (Marinov, 2005: 564). By using sanctions, states and international institutions are able to coerce and force other nations to change their policies without having to use military means. Economic sanctions are not just used as a tool to resolve certain political conflicts, but also to destabilize governments of the targeted countries. Sanctions are successful if they change the behaviour of a foreign government with limited costs (Marinov, 2005: 564). “The leader of a government who comes under economic pressure in a given year is more likely to lose office than a leader who does not” (Marinov, 2005: 564).

Another argument is that for sanctions to be successful it is very important that sanctions are not imposed unilaterally but rather, multilaterally. “Universality is the key to making sanctions work” (Esfandiary & Fitzpatrick, 2011: 151). Maloney (2010) also argues in favour of multilateral sanctions. According to her it is clear that in the case of Iran, the unilateral nature of the sanctions happened to be the main reason why, up until 2010, the economic sanctions did not achieve the required effect (Maloney, 2010: 140).

Another success factor of economic sanctions links with the crucial vulnerability of the targeted country. “For sanctions to influence behavior, it is imperative that the target state be vulnerable to economic coercion” (Allen, 2005: 120). According to Bapat et al (2013), there is a positive association between the costs for the targeted country, and the effectiveness of sanctions. The extent that sanctions cause pain to the targeted country is, therefore, important for the success of the sanctions (Bapat et al, 2013: 87). Allen (2005) argues that in order for sanctions to generate change they should also be politically costly for the imposer of the sanctions. Both the imposer of the sanctions and the sanctioned country should value the benefits that are gained with an agreement (Allen, 2005: 121). Allen furthermore argues that sanctions can only be successful if they are correctly linked with the actual outcome they were designed to serve (Allen, 2005: 121).

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The general literature on the subject of economic sanctions shows great distinction, both proponents and opponents provide arguments in favour or against the usage of economic sanctions. This thesis has described both sides and will finish this chapter with several concluding remarks concerning economic sanctions. One argument, proposed by the opponents of sanctions, is that autocratic states are less susceptible to sanction pressures. It is argued that autocratic leaders do not need the support of the majority of the population; rather, they only need support from a few elite individuals. The second argument, proposed by the opponents, is the argument that countries can adapt to economic pressure; it can do so by diversifying the economy or looking for different trade partners. The proponents of economic sanctions show that the last problem can be overcome by making a comprehensive and multilateral sanctions regime. Furthermore, the proponents argue that sanctions can only be successful if a clear objective has been outlined. Also, an eventual change in policy will only occur if the dismantling of the economic sanctions is both valuable to the imposer of the sanctions and the sanctioned country.

In the paragraph about the direct influence on Iran’s nuclear program, and the chapter on the indirect effect that sanctions might have on domestic political change, the literature that has been written on the general subject of sanctions will be used to understand the extent to which sanctions interplayed with domestic changes in order to affect a change, and possibly, the nuclear deal.

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3. Theoretical and conceptual framework

3.1. Foreign Policy Analysis

The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach of IR is used, in order to look at how countries formulate their foreign policies. The central characterization of FPA is that it has an actor-specific focus, which means that everything that occurs between and across nations happens as a result of human decision makers, acting either in groups or as individuals. The actual policies that come forth from this interaction will be studied in this thesis. In IR it is of great importance to understand how people perceive and react to the world around them, how they are shaped by the world and also how again they shape the world (Hudson, 2005: 1). However, the general grounded theory of IR theories writes mostly about rational unitary actors, which are mostly states. FPA tries to contribute to the grounded theory of IR by making the assumption that the human decision makers do not act as purely unitary rational actors equivalent to a state (Hudson, 2005: 1-2).

FPA has several characteristics; the most important for this thesis are the following. Firstly, FPA sees foreign policy decision making as multifactorial, which means that there are multiple factors that influence foreign policy. Secondly, all levels of analysis are important for FPA, from the most micro to the most macro are of interest if you analyse the decision making process. Lastly, actor specificity is the third characteristic of FPA. Humans do not make decisions purely as rational utility maximizers; rather they act out of a complex combination of knowledge and influences (Hudson, 2005: 2-3).

Foreign Policy Analysis is the right approach for this thesis for the following reasons. Firstly, one of the main characteristics of FPA is that it sees foreign policy as multifactorial; this means that multiple factors influence foreign policy. Multiple domestic-, regional-, and international factors are studied, that might have led to the final nuclear agreement; therefore, this approach is useful for our research. Secondly, according to FPA all levels of analysis are important, accordingly from the most micro (domestic) to the most macro (international) are of interest if you study foreign policy. In this research it is important that all levels of analysis are analysed in depth. Firstly, the domestic level will be looked into, and how the internationally imposed sanctions might influence this domestic level. This will be followed by several

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geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Lastly, the third level of analysis will be highlighted: the international level. Thirdly, this theory argues that humans are not purely rational utility maximizers; rather humans act out of a complex combination of influences and knowledge. Foreign policy is than influenced by these different changes in the domestic, regional and international contexts. Also, the knowledge that is acquired to formulate foreign policy is formed by these different changing contexts and different factors. This theory therefore is ideal for studying the complex dynamic that might have led to the signing of the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and the IRI.

This theoretical framework will be helpful in trying to provide an answer to the main question. It will attempt to explain how certain foreign policies can be understood when looking at the economic sanctions that were imposed on Iran. Certain domestic-, regional-, and international changes will be considered, and that knowledge will be used in order to understand whether foreign policies were changed because of the economic sanctions, either directly or indirectly, or if the deal was signed because of other forces than the economic sanctions. This thesis is interested in the policies in the run-up towards the JCPOA, it is not interested in the actual policy makers that took part in the negotiations and how these actors were influenced; it focuses, therefore, on the foreign policies of countries, and not so much on the foreign policy makers involved in the negotiations.

3.2. Interplay between different factors

This research will concentrate on how different contexts and factors influence foreign policy. Therefore, there will be not only a focus on how economic sanctions might have been the main driving force behind the signing of the nuclear deal; rather, it is argued that multiple factors and different contexts, combined with the interplay between these factors and contexts can explain why the nuclear deal was signed between the P5+1 and Iran. The dynamics between the imposed sanctions, and changes on the domestic-, geopolitical-, and international level are to be examined in this research. The interplay between the economic sanctions and the domestic-, regional-, and international changes will be studied in order to find out why the nuclear deal was signed.

Before the 1950s it was commonly acknowledged that foreign policy was a reaction to external stimuli. After the 1960s more academics concentrated on the idea that domestic sources influence foreign policy. When we look at the current state of

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the debate it becomes clear that both the domestic and the international stimuli influence foreign policy (Alons, 2007: 213). “It is commonly acknowledged that in order to understand the preferences and behavior of states in international relations, we need to take both domestic considerations and international considerations of states into account” (Alons, 2007: 211). The preferences and behaviour of states are formed by the idea that states want to avoid a decline in international power, and that governments want to remain in office. It is this interplay between external and internal variables that produce foreign policy (Alons, 2007: 212-213). Therefore, not only the internationally imposed sanctions will be studied, but also the different changes at the other levels of analysis will be looked into. In order to understand how these dynamics between the international-, the regional-, and the national context work, the theory by Putnam (1988) of the two-level game will be put forward.

Putnam (1988) discusses “a conceptual framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact” (Putnam, 1988: 430). In the field of IR it is clear that domestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa. The two-level game theory adds to this theory the idea that both spheres, domestic and international, are actually integrated into each other (Putnam, 1988: 433). This means that negotiations at different levels affect each other simultaneously (Patterson, 1997: 142). Negotiators of a certain government act on both the domestic and the international table simultaneously. At the domestic level the negotiators are pressured by interest groups to come up with foreign policies that best suit these interest groups. At the international level the negotiators have to balance between the domestic pressures on the one hand, and have to try to minimize adverse consequences of the negotiations on the international level on the other hand (Leps, 2003: 108; Putnam, 1988: 434). The goal of a negotiator is to come up with a package that is acceptable on the international level and for the domestic actors involved. This research adds to the general theory of the two-level game, by providing a third level, the regional level. Several geopolitical changes will be discussed in order to understand if regional changes might have influenced the domestic and international level. This theory is used to understand the dynamics between economic sanctions, the international-, the regional-, and the domestic level.

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Figure 1, Interplay of factors

In figure 1 it is shown how the different international-, regional-, and domestic levels react in interplay with the economic sanctions, and how this might have led to the nuclear agreement. This interplay of domestic-, regional-, and international changes will be studied in order to find out to what extent economic sanctions can explain why the nuclear agreement was signed.

3.3. Operationalization

Can economic sanctions explain why the nuclear agreement was signed? Looking at the intensity and comprehensive sanctions regime, imposed on Iran, and the way in which they are imposed, it will be tested out if these sanctions did effectively change the foreign policy concerned with the signing of the nuclear agreement, so that the agreement could be signed.

The signing of the nuclear deal was highly complex, and therefore, we need to investigate not only the internationally imposed sanctions, but also the other levels of analysis need to be investigated in order to come up with a sufficient answer as to what extent economic sanctions can explain why the JCPOA was signed. The domestic-, regional-, and international level will be looked into; with doing so it tries to understand the difficult and complex ways in which these levels were in interplay with each other.

Firstly, it is argued that domestic political changes occurred during the sanctions regime that might have played a key role in altering the negotiations. Certain internal changes within Iran that might explain why the nuclear deal was

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signed will be studied. The focus will be on one major domestic political change, the election of Rouhani after the Ahmadinejad era. Several domestic changes will be investigated in order to understand the major domestic political change. It will start by showing the extent that economic sanction might have played in changing the domestic environment. Furthermore, the domestic balance of power is too complex to just look at the president level; therefore, the internal balance of power will also be studied in order to understand how this complex domestic context might have played a part in altering the negotiations towards the JCPOA.

Secondly, the extent that geopolitical change in the region can explain why the nuclear agreement was signed is examined. Geopolitics will be defined as the interaction between certain political processes and geopolitical settings; it looks at settings and processes, and how they influence each other. If a change occurs in the geographical setting of the region, than this will also affect the political sphere (Cohen, 2003: 12). The Iraq war in 2003, the Arab Uprisings and the rise of Daesh are the geopolitical changes that are investigated in order to find out if these changes can explain why the nuclear was signed. These geopolitical changes are chosen because they occurred during the same time period as the nuclear negotiations, and because these changes influenced of the most important actors involved in the negotiations: Iran, the US, and the EU-3 countries.

The last chapter concentrates on the international context. Since the US plays, arguably, the largest role in both the negotiations and Middle East geopolitics, it is interesting to look at the extent that the election of Obama changed the course of the negotiations. The extent that Obama, in interplay with the other levels of analysis, played a part in negotiations that led to a final agreement will be studied. Furthermore, the role that Russia has played in the negotiations and especially the rejecting attitude of the Russian’s towards an Iranian sanctions regime in earlier instances will be studied. Finally, also the role that Saudi Arabia and Israel played in the region, which had an influence on the regional geopolitical level, is researched.

By combining all different levels of analysis, this thesis hopes to find the ultimate answer to the question: To what extent the economic sanctions imposed on Iran played a significant role in the eventual signing of the JCPOA?

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4. Methodological framework

4.1. Data selection

To understand the difficult interplay between the different contexts, various secondary data will be extensively investigated. All relevant data available on the subject of sanctions will be used, and especially what is written on the subject of the nuclear deal in combination with sanctions and the changes on the domestic-, regional-, and international level. The data that will be analysed include academic literature, policy documents, newspapers, academic journals, and websites. In addition, several expert interviews are conducted on the general subject of sanctions, and more specific on the nuclear deal case.

Firstly, an extensive study on secondary data will be provided in order to gain sufficient knowledge on the domestic-, regional-, and international context. Besides academic literature, articles in newspapers and websites that are written on the subject will be closely examined. These secondary data is necessary in order to understand how these domestic-, regional-, and international changes, whether or not in interplay with sanctions and one another, might have had their impact on the nuclear talks. It should be mentioned that only secondary data written in English has been used. Unfortunately, it is a shortcoming of the author of this research that he cannot read in Farsi; therefore the research is limited to Anglophone literature.

Besides the secondary data, a few policy documents are used to understand how sanctions are implemented and what the reasoning behind the imposition of the sanctions was. Complimentary to these policy documents, several governmental websites, and interviews, are used to look more specific at domestic changes in Iran and how geopolitical changes might have influenced the region. Furthermore, several speeches held by Obama or Bush in their terms are analysed to understand how their actions regarding the geopolitical changes in the region, but also regarding the signing of the nuclear deal, can be understood. The US is extensively looked into because they have a long history of imposing sanctions on Iran, and compared to other countries they always had the most comprehensive and fierce sanctions imposed on Iran. Therefore, it is important to look at the these policy documents and speeches held by the US, because they were the most important country that initiated the

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sanctions regime, but they also had a large impact on regional issues, and the negotiations that finally led to the JCPOA.

These documents will be complemented by interviews. These interviews are conducted to better understand the general subject of economic sanctions. Secondly, the interviews will also function as a way to understand how domestic-, geopolitical-, and international changes might have led to the nuclear agreement. Moreover, these academic interviews are useful because they might help in understanding the complex interplay between all the different contexts. Although it should be noted that the researcher is aware of the fact that interviews can provide subjective views from the interviewee, in order to minimize this limitation the researcher should be well prepared and always prepare critical follow-up questions. By combining these academic interviews with both policy documents and an extensive literature review, triangulation takes place. Triangulation is important for the validity of the research because two separate methods of data gathering will be used to look at the extent that sanctions can explain why the JCPOA was signed.

4.2. Case study

This thesis will use a within-, in depth case analysis on the nuclear deal, in order to unravel the complex mechanisms of economic sanctions. “A case study is a research strategy based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations” (Vennesson, 2008: 226). In this research, the specific case will be an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of events (Vennesson, 2008: 226). Case study research creates valuable knowledge that other research methods might not come up with. Cases produce context dependent knowledge, and since there is only context dependent knowledge it is necessary that cases are studied (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 225). “The advantage of the case study is that it can ‘close in’ on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 237).

The event, which will be studied, is the nuclear deal; the different forces that might have led to this deal are carefully investigated. The nuclear deal will be used in

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as the specific case where economic sanctions could have played a major role altering Iran’s foreign policy.

Because this research tries to refine the existing theories about sanctions, by looking at the recently signed nuclear deal, we call this a hypothesis refining case study. The researcher uses this case to look at certain causal mechanisms, and besides that it will also look at alternative causal mechanisms and if some interaction affects have been overlooked (Vennesson, 2008: 227-228). Using the nuclear deal as a case, the goal is to develop and evaluate theories by looking at certain causal mechanisms that are either present or absent. In the next paragraph the main method is discussed, process tracing.

4.3. Process tracing

4.3.1. Using process tracing

Process tracing is used in order to understand certain descriptive and causal inferences between the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran and the nuclear agreement signed in July 2015. Process tracing is a method that is often used by scholars who carry out within-case analysis based on qualitative data (Collier, 2011: 823). Process tracing is defined as the precise exploration of diagnostic evidence which is selected and analysed, in order to contribute to describing political phenomena and to evaluate certain causal chains (Collier, 2011: 823). Firstly, process tracing examines whether an event or a process took place, secondly if a subsequent outcome also occurred, and finally if the former was caused by the latter. In other words, “the researcher’s focus is on learning whether a particular factor can be traced and linked to another” (Vennesson, 2008: 233). For the use of process tracing it is very important that the pieces of evidence are collected diagnostically. By using the most fine-grained details the causal effect of the event or process that led to the eventual outcome can be discovered (Bennett, 2010: 288-289). Process tracing helps to evaluate empirically what the actors, involved in the nuclear talks, want, know and compute. These preferences and perceptions of the involved actors are empirical questions, which can be uncovered by using a thorough empirical investigation, based on an intensive document analysis (Vennesson, 2008: 233). This document analysis helps to uncover certain causal mechanisms that were previously not thought of and helps to observe to

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what extent economic sanctions had a sequential causal effect on the eventual outcome of the nuclear deal (Vennesson, 2008: 234).

The ‘explaining-outcome process tracing’ method is used; this form of process tracing has the goal to understand how a particular outcome or event occurred (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 18). “Explaining-outcome process-tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case-specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 19). Theory-testing process tracing only makes inferences about if a mechanism is present or absent. Rather than theory-testing process tracing, explaining-outcome process tracing, looks at if the causal mechanism is sufficient (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 18).

Process tracing is used to look at why the nuclear deal was signed and the extent that economic sanctions played a causal role in the eventual outcome of the negotiations. Process tracing is not only used to look at economic sanctions; rather, it will also look at certain domestic-, regional-, and international changes that alternatively might explain why the nuclear deal was signed. By doing so this thesis tries to find out what the main driving forces were behind the signing of the nuclear deal, signed on the 14th of July 2015.

4.3.2. Challenges with using process tracing

Critics of process tracing as a method have pointed out several challenges or issues that researchers should be aware of using process tracing. The first issue is concerned with the amount of data that should be gathered before we can talk about a sufficient explanation (Checkel, 2006: 368). Because process tracing is such a fine-grained detailed method the information gathering can lead to an infinite regress of studying (Bennett, 2010: 289). Using explaining-outcome process tracing is an iterative process and the research will be updated until it provides what can be thought of as the best possible explanation for the question at hand. “We can never confirm a theory with 100 per cent certainty; instead, we stop when we are satisfied that the found explanation accounts for the most important aspects of the outcome” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013: 21).

The second challenge is concerned with the time intensity of most process tracing research. Because, process tracing requires an enormous amount of information, it also requires a lot of time. The researchers should be well aware of his

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temporal constraints. And although all research should be well aware of their temporal constraints, these dilemmas are particularly the case for process tracers (Checkel, 2006: 368).

The last challenge is concerned with the confirmation bias. “In the course of process tracing, the researcher might seek information that confirms her beliefs and gloss over what could contradict them” (Vennesson, 2008: 237-238). The best way to deal with this confirmation bias is to look at alternative hypothesis that could lead to the outcome, in this case the nuclear deal. Using alternative hypotheses can help with building counterfactuals.

Although process tracers might face a lot of problems, there is also a huge benefit. “The signal benefit of process tracing is that it places theory and data in close proximity. One quickly comes to see what works and – equally important – what does not” (Checkel, 2006: 369).

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5. Case study: the Iran nuclear deal

5.1. The Islamic Republic of Iran, a historic overview

The nuclear deal will be used to see if sanctions or other factors were the main driving force behind the signing of the nuclear deal. Although, it is not argued that the chosen case, the Iran nuclear deal, can represent all thoughts about if economic sanctions influence foreign policy, the ambition is to be representative for other cases, to a certain extent. The author has the aspiration, by using this case, to show if economic sanctions can be used as an effective foreign policy tool. First, a short historical overview of Iran will be provided; this is followed by the relevance of the chosen case. Furthermore, in this chapter it is argued that Iran is an extreme case when it comes to sanctions, but although this is the case, the outcome of this research can still be relevant for both academics and foreign policy makers. Finally, the nuclear progress during the sanctions regime will be examined, in order to find out to what extent the economic sanctions achieved their ultimate goal, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program.

This historic overview will start in 1951, when Mohammad Mossadeq became Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadeq initiated a policy where the entire oil industry would be nationalized (Zahrani, 2002: 93). Because British and American companies had huge interests in this oil industry they wanted to change the government. In 1953 the British and American intelligence services staged a coup, and Mossadeq was overthrown, making room for the return of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Zahrani, 2002: 93). This is, arguably, the start of the complicated relation between Iran and the US that have made the nuclear negotiations more difficult. In the years that followed, Iran forged closer ties to Europe and the US, which resulted in westernization policies that were denounced by a large part of the Iranian society and the clergyman, who did not like this process of westernization and secularization. During the 1970’s the Shah was under much pressure of the growing opposition to his leadership (Cottam, 1979: 3-5). In January 1979 the Shah’s family went into exile, this was followed by the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini out of 14 years of exile. He formed a government, and after two months, April 1979, the IRI was proclaimed (Sanasarium, 1995: 192).

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On November 1979 a group of Iranian students took 52 American embassy workers hostage in the US embassy. This lasted 444 days until in 1981 the hostages were released. This hostage crisis strained the relation between the two countries severely, and the first sanctions were imposed on Iran as a result of this crisis (Nikou, 2013). The Iraq – Iran war (1980 -1988) also made the relation between the US and Iran more difficult, because of US’ secret support on the Iraqi side (Kurzman, 1998: 65-66). Relations between states are the product of historical interactions; therefore it is necessary that we keep in mind that the Iran – US relation is built up by suspicion and distrust. Considering this long history it is interesting to see why these actors did come to an agreement despite of their shared tumultuous history.

5.2. Relevance of the case

Extensive literature has been written on the possible effects that economic sanctions have on the countries on which the sanctions were imposed. The Iran nuclear deal will be thoroughly investigated in order to find out if economic sanctions did indeed influence the country on which the sanctions were imposed. Several authors have already written on the subject of economic sanctions with a specific focus on Iran, but these authors have done so before the nuclear deal was signed. The extent that economic sanctions could have been a driving force behind the signing of the nuclear deal in July 2015 is examined in this research. This research also looks at the different domestic-, regional-, and international changes during the nuclear talks in order to find out if economic sanctions were indeed the main driving force. By researching this, the aspiration is to expand the knowledge on the general subject of economic sanctions and their effectiveness.

5.3. Iran as an extreme case

Iran is considered an extreme case because it endured one of the most heavy and comprehensive sanction regimes ever imposed on a country. In most cases sanctions are imposed on certain parts of the economy or focussed on certain individuals within a country or a specific group in a country. The sanctions imposed on Iran targeted almost the entire Iranian economy (Website The Economist). Also, most of the time sanctions are imposed unilaterally, in the case of Iran, from 2006 onwards; the sanctions were imposed multilaterally by the UNSC as well as by countries individually (IISS, 2010: 25-26). “An extreme value is understood here as an

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observation that lies far away from the mean of a given distribution; that is to say, it is unusual” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 299). It is, however, argued that although Iran is an extreme case, the outcomes might still be relevant to the broader knowledge about sanctions. This thesis has the ambition that the chosen case can add to the general theory about sanctions so it can reflect on a broader population of cases, and it might be a good starting point for new research on the topic of economic sanctions (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 294). Maybe it is possible to draw conclusions from the fact that if sanctions are imposed in such a heavy and comprehensive matter that it becomes useful to use it for foreign policy makers. But also the contrary can be interesting, if sanctions did not force the nuclear deal to be signed, than the whole idea of using sanctions as a foreign policy tool might be reconsidered. In the next paragraph a summary of the sanction regimes imposed on the IRI is put forward.

5.4. Iran under sanctions

There is a large amount of literature written on the subject of sanctions imposed on the IRI. Economic sanctions imposed by the US have been targeting Iran’s economy for more than 30 years. Since the emergence of the IRI, the US has imposed sanctions on the regime, first for promoting terrorism and insecurity in the region, and later to target their nuclear program (Van der Meer, 2009: 5). Only 8 months after the IRI was established, the first US sanctions were imposed due to the Iranian hostage crisis, which started in November 1979, when Iranian students took over the American embassy. These first sanctions were followed by economic sanctions because of Iran’s alleged support of terrorist organizations (Terhalle, 2015: 600). It was argued by the US that Iran was supporting terrorist movements such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah (Macaluso, 2014: 4). The majority of sanctions since 2003 imposed on Iran have the main goal of ending Iran’s nuclear program (Van der Meer, 2009: 5).

The evolution of the sanction regime imposed on Iran can be described by two different trends. Firstly, the expansions of the sanction package in order to broader and deeper the impact on Iran’s entire economy and financial sector. Secondly, the trend that first the sanctions were imposed mainly unilaterally by the US, towards a more multilateral sanction regime (Macaluso, 2014: 3). This multilateral effort started in 2006 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to impose sanctions on Iran because Ahmadinejad pronounced Iran a nuclear state (Patrikarakos,

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2012: 232). Before 2006 the international community in general, and the EU in particular, were not keen on following the coercion strategy of the US. Until 2005 the EU continued to have economic relations with Iran, and concentrated on diplomatic efforts. The US refused to join these diplomatic efforts, and instead it imposed even tougher sanctions on Iran. When the EU-3 countries failed to come to an agreement with Iran over their nuclear program the EU joined the strategy of imposing sanctions on Iran (Macaluso, 2014: 6-7). After 2007 the EU not only followed the sanctions that were imposed by the UNSC, but also imposed several rounds of sanctions unilaterally. The EU followed the example of the US, and imposed sanctions that made it nearly impossible to do business with Iran. These sanctions were an addition to the general economic sanctions imposed on Iran according to the UNSC (Terhalle, 2015: 600). The most important EU sanction was the total oil embargo on Iran in 2012; this included the provision of equipment and services for the total petrochemical industry (Macaluso, 2014: 8). Since 2012, the UNSC also prohibits Iran from the Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), that essentially prevented Iranian banks from international transactions (Macaluso, 2014: 8). In November 2013, the Joint Plan of Action was signed, which ended years of severing sanctions and Iran continuing its nuclear program (Albright & Stricker, 2015: 7).

Most pre-nuclear deal articles, written on the sanctions imposed on Iran, mention the negative sides of sanctions and how these sanctions did not bring changes, the sanction imposing countries were hoping to achieve. One reason that several US sanctions over the years have not worked is the lack of strategy; “there has been a persistent lack of strategic approaches, and the objectives that sanctions have pursued have been varied and inconsistent” (Macaluso, 2014: 3). This links with O’Sullivan’s idea (2010), where she argues that sanctions can only work if there is a clear strategic goal (O’Sullivan, 2010: 11). “For sanctions to be effective, they also need a clear objective, and once this objective is set, they require a targeted strategy” (Macaluso, 2014: 3). In the case of Iran, it seems that the imposed sanctions did not have such strategic goal (Macaluso, 2014: 3; O’Sullivan, 2010: 11-12). Another argument is that the imposed sanctions worked counterproductively by creating less feasible ground for a possible compromise on Iran’s nuclear program as these sanctions were strengthening the hardliners in Iran (Takeyh & Maloney, 2011; Maloney, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2010). The idea is that the government of Iran might

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actually borrow their legitimacy from a sense of political and economic isolation. “This is partially due to the state’s ideological raison d’être and sense of mission: resistance to the West and the US in particular” (Nader, 2012: 214).

Every country involved in the nuclear talks concerning Iran’s nuclear program have pointed out that their main objective was to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, in exchange the heaviest sanctions that were imposed on Iran, because of the sanctions, would be lifted. The agreement that was to be signed had the aim to ensure that the world would become a more peaceful place (Websites Bundesregierung & France Diplomatie; Hammond, 2015). It seems like all the economic sanctions combined could not bring a change to Iran’s nuclear program.

5.5. Nuclear progress during the sanctions

The core strategic goal of the EU, the UNSC, and the US was to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, in order to limit Iran’s nuclear development to purely peaceful purposes (Katzman, 2013: 49). Therefore, in this paragraph it is firstly investigated to what extent the economic sanctions achieved their core strategic role, i.e. did it directly influenced Iran’s nuclear program over the years. This is important knowledge because it was the declared objective of the sanctions that it would prevent Iran from nuclear breakout capability (Macaluso, 2014: 13). Breakout capability refers to the time it takes to produce a sufficient level of enriched uranium that is needed to build a nuclear weapon. The main goal is to prevent Iran from a short breakout capability; rather it tries to increase this breakout time (Website The New York Times). Since 2006 the UNSC is building up an international sanction regime that had its aim to guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme would be strictly for peaceful purposes (United Nations Security Council, 2006: 7). The UNSC approved several measures that included an embargo on all material and technology used in Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, it also blocked the financial transactions that were concerned with Iran’s nuclear program (Website Council on Foreign Relations1_).

In Resolution 1737, adopted in December 2006, it was stated that Iran should suspend all enrichment related activities within 60 days (United Nations Security Council, 2006: 7).

There is no data that suggests that the nuclear program slowed down during the imposing of the sanctions from 2006 to 2013. The sanctions did cause consequences for Iran, but they did not bring forth a decline in Iran’s nuclear

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program; rather, “Iran’s nuclear program has, overall, steadily grown over the course of recent years, making progress in achieving domestic nuclear and missile capability and skills” (Macaluso, 2014: 13). According to the IAEA, Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium has grown almost tenfold between November 2008 and February 2013 (IAEA, 2013: 4). There was also an increase in the number of installed centrifuges, both the more sophisticated IR-2m models, and the more basic IR-1 models were more frequently installed. Even more important, in February 2010 Iran began enriching uranium to 19.75 per cent (IAEA, 2013: 4; Khajehpour et al, 2013: 26; Website Nuclear Threat Initiative). This level is dangerous since it is far more difficult to reach this 20 per cent level of enrichment, than to go from 20 per cent to 90 per cent, which is necessary for a nuclear weapon (Website World Nuclear Association). Furthermore, in 2006, when the multilateral sanctions were first imposed on Iran, the nuclear reactor in Bushehr was completed, and the nuclear facility in Fordow has started its activities. This thesis argues that sanctions have failed to stop or deescalate Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities (Macaluso, 2014: 13).

It is even argued by Khajehpour et al (2013) that the sanctions had the negative consequence that it had actually increased Iran’s commitment to the program and that it reinforced the domestic political immunity (Khajehpour et al, 2013: 27). Iran did not yield to the pressure that was put upon them with the sanctions regime, rather it responded to this pressure with pressure, by reinforcing their nuclear program. “The program appears at best entirely unaffected by the sanctions or at worst partly driven by them in the sense that escalating sanctions as a bargaining chip also gives Iran the incentive to advance its program for the same reason” (Khajehpour et al, 2013: 26-27). So although the P5+1 countries created added leverage, they could lift the sanctions as part of a deal, by increasing the sanctions, it is easily forgotten that Iran also increased its leverage. Iran provided itself with added leverage over the P5+1 countries, by expanding its nuclear capabilities (Parsi, 2014). By reducing the breakout time for the Iranian nuclear program to gain a sufficient level of uranium to build a nuclear weapon, it is argued that this might have driven the negotiating partners towards the negotiations table. “Some in Tehran content that Iranian centrifuges forced the United States to the table” (Parsi, 2014).

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The first multilateral sanctions had the primary objective of changing Iran’s nuclear program by raising the cost for the continuation of this program; rather it seemed that these sanctions had increased Iran’s willingness to continue and expand their nuclear program. Iran defended its right to develop a nuclear program, even when its population was subject to the heaviest sanctions regime in contemporary history (Macaluso, 2014: 14). It is shown here that, although the sanctions intended to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program; they did not

succeed in bringing a direct change to Iran’s nuclear program up until the very end. If you look at figure 2 (Website The Economist) you see that when the oil embargo was put in place in 2012 the amount of nuclear centrifuges did not decline, rather, it increased. It seems that the comprehensive oil embargo did not result in a direct change when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program

This chapter tries to show that economic sanctions cannot be directly linked to the JCPOA, because the sanctions did not bring any form of dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. It is not possible to look at one single factor, the economic sanctions, when it comes to the negotiations and the eventual nuclear deal. This section links very well with FPA theory that all different factors should be studied, and all levels of analysis are important when studying foreign policy (Hudson, 2005: 2-3). Decisions are made out of a complex combination of knowledge and influences, and therefore, it is impossible to look at just one possible explanation for the signing of the JCPOA. Rather, it is the interplay between the domestic-, regional, and international level that is important to study, and by doing so it will try to understand to what extent we can examine what caused the JCPOA to be signed.

In the next chapter the domestic changes that occurred during the sanctions regime are highlighted. Although, sanctions did not bring a direct change to Iran’s nuclear program, did economic sanctions directly or indirectly influence domestic politics, to the extent that it can explain why the nuclear agreement was signed?

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6. Domestic changes

6.1. Introduction domestic changes

From 2005 to 2013 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president of Iran, during these years Iran and the P5+1 countries could not come to an agreement on the nuclear issue. With the election of Rouhani, on the 14th of June 2013, it seemed that the willingness to come to an agreement increased on both sides of the negotiations table. Process tracing is used to look at the pre- and current Rouhani period in order to possibly understand how different domestic changes might have led to a change in the negotiations. The researcher recognizes that the chosen domestic political change is not exhaustive but due to the limited time and scope of the research this change is chosen because of its, arguable, large influence on the final agreement.

The consequences the economic sanctions had on Iran’s economy will be discussed, with doing so, a link is provided between Iran’s economy and the domestic changes. Although, the sanctions did affect Iran’s economy it is argued by several academics that it did not change the behaviour of the government elites (Giumelli & Paul, 2013; Khajehpour et al, 2013; Parsi, 2014). It is interesting to find out to what extent domestic economic changes triggered domestic political changes; therefore, the upcoming paragraphs will try to provide a linkage between the changing Iranian economy with domestic changes. It is interesting to look at the interplay between these economic and political changes, and how these changes might have affected the negotiations that led to the final nuclear agreement.

Although, it might seem obvious that there is a causal link between the worsened condition of Iran’s economy and the election of Rouhani in 2013, alternative reasoning why a change could occur is also put forward. Sherrill (2014) for example, argues that Rouhani was elected because of how Ayatollah Khamenei approached the 2013 presidential elections (Sherrill, 2014). He states that Khamenei wanted Rouhani in office “to rebuild the regime’s legitimacy, ensure clerical supremacy over the IRGC, and unify the conservatives” (Sherrill, 2014: 65). This paragraph tries to show that the election of Rouhani can not only be explained by looking at the domestic level, the changing balance of power in the domestic political context is also important to examine.

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In the next paragraphs the first sub-question will be answered in a twofold way. Firstly, it will be examined to what extent economic sanctions, imposed on Iran because of their nuclear program, influenced Iranian domestic politics. Secondly, as a follow-up on the last question, the extent that these domestic political changes can explain why the nuclear agreement was signed is studied. As pointed out earlier, this research will not only concentrate on the effect the economic sanctions might have had on the domestic area, and the election of Rouhani, it will also look at alternative explanations for the internal shift of power.

6.2. Economic sanctions and domestic political change

6.2.1. Unilateral and incomprehensive

This paragraph will start with a brief outline of the impact the economic sanctions had on the Iranian economy in the first years of the sanctions regime. The focus is on the sanctions that were imposed on Iran because of their nuclear program, therefore, a time period from 2003 towards 2015 will be analysed. It will start with a period up until 2012, which can be described as a unilateral and incomprehensive sanctions regime. It will than be followed by the sanctions regime from 2012 onwards.

Before 2006 the economic sanctions imposed on Iran did not have much effect on the Iranian economy. At first, these economic sanctions were mainly concentrated on targeting directly those aspects in the economy, and those people who are involved with the nuclear program. The direct objective of the sanctions was raising the cost for the continuation of the nuclear program. It included an embargo on all technology and material that Iran used in the nuclear program (Macaluso, 2014: 13; Reynolds & Wan, 2012: 79). Furthermore, it also put targeted sanctions on individuals who were involved with the nuclear program (United Nations Security Council, 2006: 7). In 2006, when the UNSC started imposing sanctions on Iran, the main goal was to guarantee that Iran’s nuclear program would be strictly peacefully (United Nations Security Council, 2006: 7). The main objective of the imposed sanctions was to limit Iran’s nuclear program directly, by targeting those individuals involved in, and those aspects involved with the nuclear program. However, because these sanctions were only targeting the aspects of the Iranian economy that were concerned with the nuclear program, it did not bring a huge change to the broader Iranian economy.

Economic sanctions and the path to the nuclear deal : to what extent can economic sanctions, which were imposed on Iran, explain why the nuclear deal was signed?