China and the evolution of power: What is
motivating China to adopt soft power
strategies and how effective have these
strategies been?
By William Kennedy
Master Thesis, Political Science: International Relations
June 2016
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Candidate Number: 11126019
Supervisor: Dr Julia Bader
Programme: Power Transition in the 21
stCentury: The Rise of China in
International Relations
ii Abstract III Abbreviations IV List of Graphs V Contents 1. Introduction 1
2. Chapter 1: Conceptualizing soft power 5
2.1 Origins of soft power theory 5
2.2 China’s adoption of soft power 8
2.3 Research on Chinese soft power throughout the world 13 3. Chapter 2: Theory - Foundation of empirical analysis 17
3.1 China Threat theory 17
3.2 Regime Security theory 20
3.3 Migration theory 24
4. Chapter 3: Methodology and analysis 28
4.1 Method and Data 28
4.2 Disadvantages of methodology 29
5. Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis Case Study - Central Asia 31 5.1 Chinese soft power policies in Central Asia
5.1.1 Culture 32
5.1.2 Aid and investment 33
5.1.3 Institutions 36
5.2 Survey results and analysis
5.2.1 China threat 37
5.2.2 Regime legitimacy – Xinjiang 41
5.2.3 Regime legitimacy – Cultural Superpower 43
5.2.4 Economic interests 49
6. Conclusion 52
iii Abstract
This thesis aims to explore the rise of soft power in Chinese foreign policy, detailing how soft power forms have been reinterpreted from its classical understanding under Nye to a broader definition of the topic which has come to form one of China’s most important foreign policy tools. The thesis investigates issues surrounding the
different motivations China has in developing and implementing its soft power strategies. By contextualizing soft power, we can examine how various theories receive and understand the benefits of soft power. Four different motivations have been put forward, each derived from a different theoretical perspective.
The research undertaken is framed against China’s broader rise in International Relations, and the consequence of this rise is taken into account when studying the findings against the different motivations. Firstly a literature review will be done, which focuses on previous work carried out when looking at Chinese Soft power, both generally and to specific regions in Africa and Asia. By using a case study of Chinese-Central Asian relations, a topic which has been neglected and understudied by previous scholars. The thesis will then allow me to show whether the theory holds up and can be put forward to other specific regions in the world.
The research is based on survey results supplied by Central Asian Barometer, primary sources such as aid statistics, government statements and secondary literature, including newspaper articles and peer reviewed journals.
iv Abbreviations
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ART ASEAN Plus Three
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference EAS East Asia Summit
FAGIA Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment FTA Free Trade Agreement
IMF International Monetary Fund OBOR One Belt One Road
PRC Peoples Republic of China
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
v List of Tables, Figures and Pictures
Table 1: Types of Power 5
Figure 1: Which countries pose the biggest threat for Kazakhstan? 39
Picture 1: Map of Central Asia 41
Figure 2: In your opinion what role do the following countries play in Central Asia?
(Tajikistan) 45
Figure 3: What language would you want your children to learn and why?
(Tajikistan) 46
Figure 4: What role does the U.S, Russia, China and the European Union play in
Central Asia? (Kazakhstan) 47
Figure 5: What role does the U.S, Russia and China play in Central Asia?
(Kyrgyzstan) 48
Figure 6: In your opinion which of the following countries might be a model for
development of Kyrgyzstan? 49
Figure 7: Where should Tajikistan get its investment from? 51
1
Introduction
Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is fluid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong.
- Lao Tzu
This thesis, using various theories from International Relations, will look at the reasons motivating the Peoples Republic of China (hereafter known as China) to pursue soft power. To answer the question: what is motivating China to adopt soft power policies and how successful has it been?, the first part of this thesis
conceptualizes the different definitions of soft power in the current academic literature, and will look at other explanations from scholars about why China is embracing soft power and how this is already having an effect in places such as Southeast Asia. The second part will look at the four motivations, derived from different IR theories, to see how they are compatible with soft power theory and how each theory uses soft power to explain why a state will adopt soft power policies. The thesis will then use Central Asia as a case study to discuss Chinese soft power, examining Chinese-Central Asian relations from 2012 to the present day to infer what the reasons are behind the growth of soft power in the region, and whether these polices can be deemed a success. This will help shed new light onto Chinese soft power strategies, and better understand China’s soft power approaches to other regions of the world.
Soft Power is the ability of a political body, such as a state, to indirectly attract other countries to wanting and behaving in a way that it deems acceptable. Few Western international relations phrases have penetrated as deeply or broadly into Chinese vocabulary in recent years as soft power (Berkofsky, 2007). Since 2006, when Hu Jintao first publicly mentioned the role of soft power in Chinese foreign policy,
academic journals and policymakers have increasingly paid homage to Chinese soft power and soft power strategies. This new focus on Chinese power (seen through hard, smart and soft power) is in conjunction with China’s rise, and how China views itself in regards to its great power status and territorial issues towards regions such as Taiwan, Xinjiang and the South China Sea.
2 China’s rise has been predicted by scholars and academics since the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping first announced the opening up of China’s economy to outside
markets and foreign investment. Today, China is currently the world’s second largest economy, the world’s largest exporter, second largest importer, second in annual military spending and attracts the greatest share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the world (World Bank, 2014). Whilst this transformation is impressive, it has also created concerns amongst both China’s neighbours and western powers, such as the U.S, who have come to view a resurgent China with suspicion.
When looking at the context of China and its growing soft power, it is important to turn to current debates within International Relations that have focused on what the implications and consequences are for the existing governance system, discussing whether China will be able to fit into this system, or whether it will challenge the status quo.
Some ‘power transition’ theories argue that war is an inevitable outcome of power transition, because the rising power seeks to alter the existing governance system or the current power will launch a pre-emptive strike to preserve its hegemonic position while it still maintains greater capabilities vis-à-vis the rising power. John
Mearsheimer has argued to this affect, saying that a power transition between China and the U.S will not be peaceful because China’s designs are to ultimately become the regional hegemon in Asia. Mearsheimer points out that states are not capable of knowing what each other’s intentions are and cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. This means that ‘China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility (Mearsheimer, 2010). Aaron Friedberg, also arguing from a realist position, warns that there is ‘a struggle for mastery in Asia’ (Friedberg, 2000). Under the anarchic system that realists adhere to, one need only look at Imperial Japan or Germany at the turn of the 20th century to see that
3 On the other hand, scholars such as John Ikenberry have countered the possibility of China’s zero sum rise, and have argued that even as power and authority move away from the West ‘it doesn’t have to be a struggle where at the end point we see an overturning of liberal international order… in the recent decade at least China and other rising states, are rising up inside rather than working around the rules and institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank’ (Ikenberry, 2014).
Constructivists, who argue that International Relations assumptions and objective variables have meaning because they are ‘constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs’ (Slaughter, 2011), argue that China will be viewed as a threat depending on the shared interests and norms (or lack of) that China develops with other counties. Whilst China’s domestic norms are illiberal compared to the more liberal international system, if China’s external identity is pacifistic and cooperative, then greater mutual trust and shared norms can flourish. China’s transition to new forms of diplomacy, such as being more vocal on the international stage, providing genuine aid to developing regions and soft power forms, has meant that regional Asian powers and the United States have been cautiously optimistic about China’s rise. In fact China has shown growing
commitment to strengthening multilateral and bilateral ties in the region through the establishment of numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTA), hosting the Six Party nuclear proliferation talks and becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asian Summit (EAS) bodies. China’s need for a favourable international environment is designed to aid its domestic economic stability, with an interest in its overseas markets, the growing demand for natural resources and the opening of new export markets meaning a stable regional environment is imperative for a ‘harmonious Chinese society’ (Shiping & Acharya, 1998). China’s attempt to grow peacefully, different from other past rising powers, has meant greater emphasis has been placed on soft power as a means of
transforming China’s image from that of a threat to a benign regional power. China has shown great flexibility in modifying its strategies to maximize its national
interests and improve its international image (Zhu, 2010). By using soft power globally and in a smart way, China will be able to frame its rise as a status quo power, and better present its rise as a ‘win-win’ to other countries who engage with China. The growing appreciation within China towards different forms of power can
4 be seen with the establishment of ‘Comprehensive National Power’, which was designed by China to quantify hard and soft power.
The greater emphasis placed on research into Chinese soft power has meant that Chinese initiatives abroad to present a positive image of itself, using culture and public diplomacy, in places such as Africa and Southeast Asia, have been widely studied. However, China’s soft power in Central Asia, a region that has grown in strategic importance to China since the turn of the century, has been largely ignored. When Central Asia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, China identified the region as important both economically (importing natural gas from the Caspian Sea, establishing the Silk Road Economic Belt) and from a security
perspective (using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a vehicle to combat the ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism and terrorism in the region). I will thus use the Central Asia region as a case study to better understand how different
geopolitical challenges have forced China to adopt soft power.
The thesis will examine four motivations, arguing China is pursuing soft power for different reasons, ranging from mitigating the security dilemma posed by China’s rise, helping the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gain legitimacy at home by improving China’s international image and using soft power as a component of ‘national rejuvenation’ to help China become a cultural superpower. Each motivation will be grounded in a particular theory, which will then discuss how soft power is used to aid China’s foreign policy.
5 Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Soft Power
In the following section I will look at soft power and its rise in academic literature. The term soft power will be contextualized to better understand what is meant by soft power when talking from both Western and Chinese perspectives. This review will frame the analysis of soft power in the wider academic debate, which will then be used when discussing soft power in relation to International Relations theories in the next chapter.
1. Origins of Soft Power Theory:
The first person to explicitly place soft power in academic thinking was Joseph Nye, whose seminal work on soft power, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics was published in 2004. Nye groups power into three categories as a way of
showing how power can be wielded. According to Nye, power can be ‘threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducements and payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes others want what you want’ (Nye, 2008). It’s this last form of power which Nye uses to define soft power – as a means not of coercion or forcing a state to act in a certain way, but making a state aspire to ones level of prosperity and openness. The three pillars which Nye holds up as the structure of a state’s soft power are culture, public diplomacy and foreign policy. Nye says that ‘In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in a large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others’ (Nye, 2008). As shown in Table 1, command power (hard power) is replaced with co-optive power (soft power), with military threats re placed with agenda setting as the most important tool a state can wield when engaging with various other states (Nye, 2004).
Table 1: Nye - Types of Power (Liu & Tsai, 2014)
Behaviours Primary
Currencies Government Policies
Military Power Coercion Deterrence Protection Threats Force Coercive Diplomacy War Alliance
6 Behaviours Primary
Currencies Government Policies
Economic Power
Inducement Coercion
Payments
Sanctions Aid, Bribes, Sanctions
Soft Power Attraction Agenda Setting Values, Culture Policies, Institutions Public Diplomacy
Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy
The relationship between hard and soft power is not mutually exclusive, with the two being able to work in tandem. Nye claims that ‘Hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other... soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power... Both are aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behaviour of others’ (Nye, 2004). In order to have soft power, you have to have means to be able to communicate and promote its use. Hard power can be a way of doing this, with theorists such as Samuel Huntingdon pointing out that soft power is in some respects merely a manifestation of hard power, being nothing more than the soft ‘face’ of hard power. This is rejected ultimately by Nye, who points out that whilst there is some relationship between the two, soft and hard power can work in isolation to each other. Nye’s definition, based on the behavioural perspective, is descriptive and normative.
Soft power can have both negative and positive connotations depending on how the soft power is received by foreign states. For example, if a country cannot avoid the association between its cooperation in development and the discourse of
manipulative colonial practices of interference, that country cannot present its cooperation regarding development in a good light (Kivimaki, 2014). Therefore a country’s soft power strategy can fail to make aid policies attractive, and thus fail to influence other countries’ attitudes towards its aid.
Another example of soft power shortcomings is the barrier placed around civilization. A country’s soft power attraction will likely be more successful when directed to allies and countries which share common world views. American postmodern culture for example has a stronger chance of being accepted by countries which share
7 Muslim countries which have a fundamental opposition to U.S culture and
unilateralism. Popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar (Nye, 2004).
Although soft power sometimes has a direct effect on specific goals, it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks (Nye, 2004). This means we can place soft power in a relational power structure, which can be
understood in terms of agent-structure relations. Katharina Kronenberg says that ‘in order to understand this relationship it is important to not only understand the
structural location and positioning of these states in relation to each other but also in the context of regional or other power configurations as well as in the internal power dynamics within the state that is at the receiving end of the soft power’ (Kronenberg, 2012). An example of this is the United States and its continued support for Israel. This support has negatively affected its relationships with other states in the region who do not recognise Israel’s existence. Therefore, US soft power in the Middle East is constrained by its support for Israel, and has been tied to its diplomatic
relationship in the region.
Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. The way soft power can impact and be received differently by various sections of society has not yet been fully understood. Nye and others discuss to some extent the way that soft power can have different outcomes depending on whether it is being received by the elites or masses. The internal relations between the elites and masses, and the disjuncture between the state and society can have a real impact on the effectiveness of soft power (Kronenberg, 2012). For example, western culture in the Cold War seems to have been much more appealing to the general Soviet population at the time, whereas in comparison, the effects on the Soviet leaders were not as pronounced. Whilst soft power
strategies such as Radio Free Europe and Hollywood films were extremely popular with the general public, the Soviet government continued to refuse greater economic and political contact with the West.
In essence Nye’s theory of soft power is ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opting people rather than coercing them’ (Nye, 2008). The strategies Nye describes with which a country can pursue to obtain soft power are through
8 culture and public diplomacy. These resources are used as tools to communicate deeper understandings about a state, or what its foreign policy objectives are. An example of this type of public diplomacy is the United States promoting Hollywood films abroad or China’s attempts at slogan diplomacy, such as framing its growing power under the spectre of ‘peaceful development’.
2. China’s adoption of Soft Power:
Soft power has been discussed and articulated by senior Chinese governmental ministers on a regular basis over the past two decades. Party chief and President Hu Jintao made it clear at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting in 2006: “The increase in our nation’s international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as in soft power such as culture (Ma, 2006).” Others, such as Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman and a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, urged the CCP to further strengthen its commitment to Soft power strategies and to “deeply understand the importance of national soft power with cultural construction as the main task in order to both meet domestic demands and enhance China’s competitiveness in the international arena” (Yue, 2007).
Chinese academics who write about soft power have focused a great deal on images such as pandas, Peking opera, martial arts and heritage sites such as the Forbidden Palace. As well as these cultural associations, Chinese scholars have focused on traditional Chinese culture, which boasts an unrivalled history in Asia, spanning different centuries and developing new traditions, symbols and texts. Li Mingjiang argues that Chinese soft power has focused on cultural soft power due to its core value of ‘harmony’, which is the basis for China’s appeal in a globalized,
individualistic world. According to Li, ‘cultural glory was a prominent feature (of the Chinese Nation)… The socio-economic success of East Asian “dragons” and, now, the success story of China’s own economy are evidence of Chinese cultural merits. While China and East Asia are in ascendancy, the West has started a cultural
reflection and readjustment, which provides China with a good opportunity to expand its cultural influence’ (Li, 2008).
However Nye has been critical about Chinese attempts at pursuing soft power
9 claims that although spending billions on cultural institutes around the world,
attracting sporting and business events to China, China has fallen short of gaining any long lasting impact from these ventures because of its domestic problems involving limiting free speech and human rights, environmental degradation and the suppression of minority cultures. Events such as the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and the 2008 protests in Tibet are good examples of how the Chinese state faces a continued struggle surrounding its perceived image within the international media. Many have attributed the deficiencies in China’s soft power to its domestic
weaknesses (Nye, 2012). The 2015 report by soft power 30 Index points out that the lack of democracy, free press, and access to information that many people around the world take for granted weighs heavily on perceptions of China around the world (Yun, 2015).
According to Nye ‘Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests, but it's not an easy sell when the message is inconsistent with their domestic realities’ (Nye, 2012). Nye argues that the states who are more likely to be successful projecting soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism and autonomy (Nye, 2000). Soft power has been controlled and directed by the CCP since its introduction in 2007. This has meant that soft power which is traditionally defined by Nye has struggled to fully resonate beyond the Chinese state. According to Nye, the overreaching guidance the state places on soft power strategies has meant that has been little room for manoeuvre when
implementing or creating co-optive methods of power between China and foreign states. This top-down strategy has, in Nye’s view, propagandized Soft Power, to the extent that civil society and human to human soft power interaction have been taken over by "the party which does not buy into the view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal"(Nye, 2013).
However the danger for Nye’s version of soft power is that it is seen as merely an extension of cultural power. Although culture can play a large role in the formation and deliverance of soft power, it is not the only mechanism that is useful for its application. Politics, economic development, the creation and participation in
10 international institutions and aid have all fallen under the rubric of soft power
diplomacy. Nye’s soft power is also problematic in this example of Chinese soft power because it tends to be seen as a western notion of power. Nye’s emphasis on soft power elements such as democracy and human rights, are seen as western constructs by authoritarian governments in Asia and Africa, and so are not widely used or assimilated into soft power strategies.
Nye has been challenged on his more limited reading, and pro-western view of soft power, with scholars such as Joshua Kurlantzick calling for soft power definitions to be widened in scope when looking at non-western foreign policy. More traditional hard power forms, such as aid and investment, along with traditional soft power forms are becoming increasingly dominated at the state level and have been identified as new forms of soft power by countries such as China. If a state is attracted and swayed by another’s stature in the world and economic might, rather than its domestic political reality, is that not soft power too? What a state may or may not be attracted to is completely objective in a globalized world, where a tapestry of different cultures, political regimes and foreign policies can be disseminated from each other.The debate about the sources of or deficits in Chinese soft power— particularly in the realms of policy and political values—thus implicates deeper disagreements regarding the normative standards that determine what deserves acknowledgement, recognition, status, and admiration within international relations (Hall, 2016).
Kurlantzick argues that ‘In the context of Asia today, both China and its neighbours enunciate a broader idea of soft power, the idea that soft power implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid’ (Kurlantzick, 2006). An example of this is the greater importance placed on economic power as a competent of soft power. This is a significant modification of Nye’s more narrow focus on soft power, where economic ‘carrots, such as aid’ are seen as more closely tied with hard power strategies. This argument has been supported by other scholars, who argue that in order to study Chinese soft power, we first have to de-westernize its meaning, and critically look at soft power from a neutral angle to better understand what a state wants to achieve from soft power, and the insecurities that drives these policies (Rawnsley, 2012). Liu also adds to this new narrative surrounding Chinese soft power, arguing that, far from the rigidity of Nye’s three pillar approach towards soft
11 power, it is a more malleable term, which is ‘… that aspect of diplomacy that involves a government’s efforts to transmit its national culture to foreign publics with the goal of bringing about an understanding of national ideals and institutions as part of a larger attempt to build support for political and economic goals’ (Liu 2008).
This broader definition of soft power has been exhaustively discussed in China as an element of a nation’s “comprehensive national power”. Huang describes
comprehensive national power as comprising hard power (economic power, national defence power, and natural resource power); soft power (political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational power); and coordinating power (political structures, government leadership, organizational decision-making power,
management capabilities, and reform coordination capabilities) (Cho, 2008). Men Honghua notes that, "Whether or not China can truly rise depends not only on hard power, but also requires an emphasis on soft power. A true rise is one in which both types of power complement each other” (Wuthnow, 2008). Men notes that the rise of prior great powers, including ancient Rome, imperial Britain and France, and the two Cold War-era superpowers (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union), relied not simply on coercive power, but also on attractive values, cultural influence,
institutional innovation, and economic persuasion (Wuthnow, 2008).
Some Chinese commentators argue that this is an area where China may enjoy some advantages vis-à-vis the United States (Huang, 2013), for instance in its increasing aid donations to African countries, which has meant China is now the largest donor to the continent. By spreading the availability of learning about Chinese language and culture, drawing on the attractiveness of Chinese developmental
model and economic successes and focusing on nations whose bilateral
relationships with the United States are faltering, China has been able to effectively challenge U.S supremacy in soft power in areas where it has strong historic ties, such as Southeast Asia or Africa (Kurlantzick, 2006). China has also gone beyond historic regions to spread its influence, using a diverse range of tactics to better articulate its wider message about its peaceful rise, and China as a global cultural superpower.
The increasing interest paid towards how China articulates and defines its soft power means terms such as ‘Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics’ have been
12 Western conceptualizations of soft power. For China, soft power penetration serves its diplomatic objectives. China’s diplomacy can be divided into three levels: great power diplomacy, border diplomacy, and resource diplomacy. Based on different diplomatic requirements, China’s “soft power” penetration falls into three different categories: economic aid, economic cooperation, and cultural penetration (He,
2012). Take for example China’s diplomacy toward the Central Asian countries on its borders. First, China established political and economic relations with Central Asian nations through increased foreign aid; it then developed comprehensive cooperation frameworks through plans such the Silk Road Economic Belt, and greater
cooperation on economic and security issues through the SCO; and, finally, through semi-official projects, which have enhanced China’s cultural appeal as well as advanced a pro-China stance (He, 2012).
Whilst Nye’s soft power framework has been met with some scepticism, especially from neo-realists in the West, soft power has been readily accepted by the Chinese academic community. An explanation for this is that Chinese culture is the most important component of soft power, and due to China’s history of exporting
Confucianism to other East Asian regions, China can use culture to gain influence. One possible explanation is that soft power theory can is compatible with traditional Chinese concepts; for example, Confucianism extols a king who relies on moral force not physical force, believing that the ‘kingly’ will triumph over the hegemon’s way (Glaser, 2012). For the leading proponent of the culture school, Yu Xintian, soft power includes thoughts, ideas, and principles as well as institutions and policies, all of which operate within the context of, and cannot be separated from, a nation’s culture (Glaser, 2012). Yu argues that Confucianism is an attractive option because of the shared ideals it has with other East Asian societies and that “the more
fashionable the ideology, the more people will accept it and the greater the possibility to build the country’s soft power” (Glaser, 2012). China’s ancient history and
traditional culture are viewed by most scholars as a valuable source of soft power for attracting not only East Asian neighbours with whom China shares a Confucian heritage but also the wider international community.
Another explanation is favourable timing. Nye’s theory was introduced into China as the country was undertaking an in-depth investigation into the rise and fall of great nations, seeking not only to escape the fate of the Soviet Union but to transform
13 China into a great power (Glaser, 2012). China’s increasing fascination with rising powers in history, and their demise, has heightened policymakers consciousness surrounding how a state is perceived vis-à-vis its neighbours and the positions it holds in terms of military force and economic weight. Scholars such as Shen Jiru have studied the collapse of the Soviet Union, in an attempt to learn how great powers can use soft power in an attempt to secure national interests. According to Shen Jiru, the Soviet Union could not compete with the U.S because it had “lost the whole game due to a flaw in its soft power” (Jiru, 1999).
3. Research on Chinese Soft Power throughout the world:
Further academic research has been taken to examine Chinese soft power towards specific regions. Most of the literature has focused on Chinese soft power attempts in Southeast Asia and Africa. Chin-Hao Huang argues that soft power is notoriously hard to measure, but using surveys and opinion polls, finds that Chinese soft power has been more effective in Southeast Asia than areas such as East Asia, where historical issues and domestic political circumstances still play a large role in creating anti-Chinese sentiment. China’s massive push to project soft power in East Asia has not directly translated into more supportive views of its quest for status and
legitimacy. This is because of two reasons deriving from (1) Beijing’s decision to demonstrate its resolve on regional territorial disputes with military coercion and (2) the lack of serious political reform in China (Huang, 2013).
Others have focused on China’s policies towards the ASEAN countries, with Lum, Morrison and Vaughn writing from a U.S policy position, arguing that before the pivot to Asia, the U.S had left a vacuum in Southeast Asia which China is attempting to exploit using soft power. This analysis points to a growing ‘concern over China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia, and beyond, is leading some in the United States to be increasingly wary of China and its motives out of a fear that if China’s power and influence continue to increase, Beijing will eventually seek to constrain and/or undermine America’s ability to promote and protect its interests in the region’ (Lum 2008). This view is shared by other academics, who view Chinese attempts through agenda setting and encouraging greater following of its developmental model as a way to exert greater influence in Southeast Asia. Through the use of soft power,
14 particularly in terms of rule-making and agenda setting, China has the chance to gradually push out US influence from Southeast Asia while reducing the security concern of neighbouring states. For ASEAN, not only could China's rise be beneficial for its economic development, the participation of China in regional affairs could also increase the status of Southeast Asia (Liu, 2014).
In other regions, such as Africa, further study has placed Chinese soft power as having a direct correlation with the increase in Chinese dependence on natural resources and migrant labour. Adams Bodomo argues that the introduction of Confucius Institutes has offered ‘a chance of helping Africa-China relations to move away from the skewed economic focus’ and that this reversal away from a rigid focus on trade has meant ‘Cultural diplomacy, especially the soft power version of it with Chinese characteristics, is giving China a more human face in its relations with Africa’ (Bodomo, 2009).
Much of the literature surrounding China and Central Asia have focused on
geopolitics, and placed the increasing presence of China in Central Asia in narratives such as the ‘War on Terror’ or the ‘New Great Game’. When looking at prior
academic text concerning Chinese soft power in Central Asia, there has been a few notable scholars who have examined particular policies or strategies towards Central Asia, such as using Confucius Institutes or China’s vast population as soft power resources. Most of the literature is in agreement that China is increasingly seeking to export Chinese soft power to Central Asia through cultural and educational
exchanges. However, whilst Chinese soft power policies have produced some results, the region’s resentments against China-mainly due to Chinese occupation and colonizing policies of the past and increasing tensions over China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority-will continue to endure (Berkofsky, 2012)1.
In his detailed article towards Sinophobia and Sinophilia in Central Asia, Sebastian Peyrouse argues that by using Soft Power in Central Asia, China is fast becoming the most important actor in the region and is challenging Russia’s influence, both culturally and politically (Peyrouse, 2016). The use of the term “China’s soft hegemonism” has also grown when describing China’s relationship with Central
1 The Uighur Diaspora probably totals some 11 million, approximately 10 million of whom live in China—the
vast majority of these in Xinjiang. Between 300,000 and 1 million Uyghurs also live in the five Central Asian states.
15 Asia, whereby China has managed to become a regional hegemon merely through aid, investment and public diplomacy, rather than coercion or conquest. Nicholas Swanstrom also points out that Chinese soft power in Central Asia is challenging Russian supremacy in the region, but that more needs to be done by the CCP to better integrate Central Asia into Chinese trade networks. According to Swanstrom ‘shuttle trade, growing people-to-people contacts, and historical ties have served to reinforce the natural synergy that exists in the region, even though China’s
burgeoning influence has caused some unease there’(Swanstrom, 2007). From a Chinese academic perspective, new focus has been placed on Chinese development and soft power in Central Asia after a highly influential piece published by Peking University professor Wang Jisi. Wang argues that China should not confine itself to engaging with its traditional partners and rivals in the East, but should balance this policy by ‘moving westwards’ and ‘establish a new international geostrategic pillar for its (China) Western Development strategy’(Wang, 2014). Wang argues that due to the Chinese-US relationship becoming increasingly zero-sum over issues such as the South China Sea, the westward strategy will help build mutual confidence between the two nations as China faces favourable opportunities being involved in multilateral coordination and contributing to its international image. There is also a soft power dynamic behind this strategy, as Wang argues that
greater attention can be placed on ‘the environment, people’s livelihood and employment in the invested countries’ (Wang, 2014). Yun Sun has also expanded what is defined by Wang’s ‘March West’ strategy, and claimed that it can be a vital part of Chinese soft power because ‘to turn China’s economic muscles into political strength and soft power, China will allocate more resources into forging closer ties with countries in the region through diplomatic engagements, human exchanges, foreign assistance, and academic research projects. Furthermore… China will also design comprehensive social, religious and foreign policies to reinforce its national security and improve relations with the ethnic minorities’ (Yun, 2013).
4. Conclusion:
There are two sources of tension in the academic literature towards China and soft power. One argument is that soft power use by China is incompatible because of China’s lack of democracy and human rights, with Nye and others presenting soft power as an extension of western liberal values. This argument has been criticized
16 by both Chinese and Western scholars, who read soft power as a larger body
encompassing attributes which goes far beyond the foundations set out by Nye. The second argument is the level of success China has found in its strategies of building up soft power. Whilst certain areas have been documented to have been more receptive to Chinese soft power, such as Southeast Asia, others are still wary of China because of historical grievances and present day realties. More work needs to be done to address and validate these arguments in the future.
17 Chapter 2: Theory – Why China is motivated to develop its Soft Power
This chapter will focus on the motivations China has for developing its soft power. By using different theories as analytical tools, we can better understand what might be motivating China to develop its soft power. These different theories will then be used to look at the case of Chinese soft power in Central Asia in chapter four. By
examining how each theory incorporates soft power, we can better ascertain why China is acting in the way it is, and to better understand and predict what its future policies in this area will be.
1. Motivation 1: China Threat Theory:
Western realist scholars, such as Iain Johnston (Chinese Realism) and Yuan-kang Wang (Offensive Realism and the rise of China) have increasingly discussed the ‘threat’ posed by China’s rise over the course of the past two decades, with many offensive realist scholars arguing that because of China’s hard power capabilities, it is only a matter of time before conflict breaks out due to China attempting to overturn the international political status quo. The China Threat Theory can be placed inside the framework of Realism, whereby China, seen as the rising power, is challenging the hegemon, in areas such as Southeast and Central Asia, where the U.S and Russia have historically been the most influential states. Realism holds that states are concerned with their relative power in the international system. The absence of a superordinate authority (i.e. a world government) in the international system has forced great powers to pursue their national interests by increasing their power. Indeed, when national interests can only be pursued by power, the pursuit of power itself becomes a national interest, or in Morgenthau’s terms, statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power (Yee, 2002).
Realists argue that when one state gains greater economic and military power, other states are not capable of knowing how this state intends to act with the new material power it has gained because of the anarchic state system, and the state’s primary resolve to survive. The rise of the ‘China Threat’, and the unease felt towards a rising China has created a security dilemma for its neighbours and the United States. A security dilemma is rooted in a state’s uncertainty as to its neighbour’s intentions. In its basic form such a predicament stems from the anarchical international order that causes countries to be anxious about other states harming their sovereignty and
18 national interests. The result is a penchant for self-help, which can take the form of mercantilist economic strategies, power politics, etc.
A first variable that determines the outcome of a security dilemma is the evolution of material capabilities. It is the relative change of economic or military means, shifts in the balance of power, which intensifies the security dilemma. Mutual perceptions form a second factor of importance. A security dilemma is aggravated when an increase in capabilities of another state is identified with hostile intentions or negative historical precedents (Holslag, 2009). However some realists maintain that China’s power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed and that its ambitions are, and are likely to remain, modest, even conservative. As to the security dilemma,
optimistic realists argue that there may be a variety of other factors at work that will mitigate its effects and help keep relations between Washington and Beijing from spiralling out of control (Friedberg, 2005).
"China threat" arguments should then apply when China is in a position to challenge the U.S, or becomes increasingly hostile over territorial issues. An increase in
China's aggregate power could be relative, brought about by the decline of other powers such as the Soviet Union (Russia) and Japan, or it could be absolute,
brought about by China's economic growth and military build-up. Although China has settled various border dispute since the 1980s, it is still seen by some as a revisionist power hoping to create a ‘Greater China’. Realists argue that China hasn’t given up the possibility of using force to retake Taiwan, has suppressed political rights in Hong Kong and Macao and has acted indifferently to border disputes in its western regions.
The ‘China threat’ perspective has taken several forms and can be categorized as ideological, economic, and military. The anti-China hands point to rising nationalism and anti-America propaganda as evidence of the ideological threat that the last remaining powerful communist nation presents to the rest of the world (Broomfield, 2003). Scholars such as Friedberg and Mearsheimer also dismiss the idea that comprehensive engagement of China, largely through economic partnership, will, over time, liberalize its political system and incorporate it in the global order as a legitimate, stable, and peaceful force. Instead, the China threat theory argues that China’s emerging economic strength will give it a position that allows it to do the absolute opposite: threaten peace and security and challenge the status quo on
19 issues like Taiwan. The ‘China threat’ school of thought seems to equate a state of preparedness with a state of war and China’s perception of a threat as antagonistic (Broomfield, 2003). Li Jie claims that China, as the only country having developed outside of the Western system in modern history, has structural contradictions with the West, and is therefore regarded as “alien” to Western norms. With a
misunderstanding and misinterpretation surrounding the ascent of China, and its aims and ideological convictions in Asia, China has been placed under a “soft
containment” policy from the Western countries, who perceive China with a ‘cold war mentality’ (Li, 2006). Academics and officials recognise that the increase in
international hostility to China’s rise has the potential to limit development and progress. This has increased the need to develop a theoretical understanding to effectively wield soft power.
According to this motivation, it can be argued that China is increasing its soft power so as to make its hard power look less threatening. China Threat Theory has
emerged in the past decade because of China’s hard power capabilities and intentions. The inclusion and promotion of soft power in this time, especially using slogan diplomacy, such as focusing on China’s ‘peaceful rise’, has been used to counterbalance China’s perceived threat against the existing international order. According to Li soft power ‘is primarily utilized to refute the “China Threat” thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic socio-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise’ (Li, 2011). Nye also supports this view, suggesting soft power is a way of mitigating the risk of regional coalitions balancing against China (Nye, 2011). By attempting to increase its soft power, China is presenting itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in Asia, seeking to diffuse the security dilemma in the region, and persuading states not to increase their security ties with other regional powers such as India, Russia and the U.S. Soft Power is seen as a way of blunting China’s military threat by presenting China as a benign hegemon, that seeks to work with the U.S and its regional powers, rather than having any territorial or economic aspirations that would negatively impact any state. William Callahan argues that Chinese culture is a positive ‘treasure box’ of soft power resource (Callahan 2014). China’s domestic policy of ‘harmonious society’ and its foreign policy of ‘peacefully rising’ in a ‘harmonious world’ are all based on the idealised view of Chinese civilisation. ‘Peaceful rise’ can be viewed as not only a
20 strategy that refers to China’s immediate future, but also its imperial history when China was an imperial power and had strong relations with smaller, neighbouring tributary states. Chinese soft power discourse, in the context of China’s growing power, thus looks to traditional Chinese civilisation as a resource for the country’s values in the twenty-first century, such as the values of peace and harmony, but also as the cultural hegemon in the region (Callahan, 2014).
2. Motivation 2 & 3: Regime Security Theory
Regime Security Theory can also be used as a foundation for showing the reasons behind why the CCP has become more concerned with Soft Power. While Nye sees soft power as a positive force that is useful for a state’s foreign policy, using Regime Security to interpret Chinese discussions of soft power is interesting because it does the opposite: soft power is negative rather than positive, and is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign policy (Callahan, 2015). Regime Security
Theory can be understood within the neoclassical realism paradigm. According to neoclassical realists, ‘systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviours’ (Schweller 2006).
Regime Security focuses on the ruling government or coalition, rather than the state, as the key unit of analysis and identifies internal security threats as a key motivator for foreign policy strategies. This theory is also useful to examine soft power
diplomacy because a country will form partnerships with external states that may help deal with threats that are directed towards the ruling regime. Contrary to balance of power or balance of threat theories, which stress the role of external threats in influencing alliance choices, regime security theory predicts that rulers facing intense internal threats will choose allies who are best able or most willing to provide assistance in countering these domestic challenges (Koblentz, 2003). The ‘Regime’ refers to the small number of elites that have control over the
machinery and decision making processes of government. According to this theory, governments that retain power through non-democratic means frequently face a high level of regime insecurity due to a combination of lack of legitimacy, political
fragmentation, inadequate social cohesion, and lack of consensus on fundamental political, social, and economic issues, institutional deficits, and domestic sources of
21 instability. While these states might be well equipped with military hardware, their security ‘software’, in the form of political legitimacy, social and political integration, and policy capacity, is usually deficient (Koblentz, 2003). For instance, national regimes, especially authoritarian, non-democratic regimes, are most often
overthrown internally, rather than from a foreign force. These regimes are usually toppled by popular movements, ideological rivals or through military coup d’état. Leaders facing this insecurity dilemma place more emphasis on regime security and legitimacy, as an unplanned transfer of power would place severe consequences on them. Thus the interests of the regime lie in its self-preservation, which means that the interests of the ruling regime may not extend beyond its own self-preservation and enrichment.
When discussing Regime Security with soft power analysis in relation to China, I will use Kingsley Edney’s article, which attempts to link China’s soft power motives with the CCPs insecurity over its perceived illegitimacy and regional tensions amongst minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. According to Edney, ‘soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant component of the moral justification for maintaining the current system is based on regimes ability to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction that is associated with a rise in soft power make it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the truth of its claims that the country’s international status is improving under its leadership, where “status” is defined not only in terms of material capabilities, but also in terms of social recognition’ (Edney, 2015). The Chinese government has long claimed that foreign policy must be an extension of domestic policy and that diplomacy should serve domestic politics.
A second motivation argues that the regime is increasingly concerned about national cohesion. For the CCP to remain legitimate, it must show that it is a uniting force, and will uphold China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Interestingly, analysts who explore these two components of soft power—national cohesion and regime legitimacy—do not describe them as sources of American soft power but simply offer them as prescriptions for China’s development of soft power (Wang, 2008).
One of the main challenges to national cohesion, and thus the legitimacy of the CCP, is the challenged posed by separatism, which is predominant in regions such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Edney argues that a strategy of soft power is to be
22 counter-insurgent, so as to enhance regime security by making it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain material support from both local and foreign (e.g. ethnic Uyghur diaspora, Dalai Lama supporters) populations (Wang, 2008). By exporting soft power abroad, China is creating an indigenous ideology that can be seen as superior to foreign influences and ideas which may prove harmful to China’s sovereignty. Jia and Zhao claim that ‘illegal religious activities’ in Xinjiang, under the influence of external hostile forces such as Islamic extremists, can pose a threat to cultural security because they can undermine the identification of ethnic minorities with the national polity, reduce their trust in the CCP and encourage separatism (Wang, 2008).
When deriving a motivation from Regime Security, we can see two possible motivating strategies explaining why China is focusing its Soft Power resources towards Central Asia. By seeking cooperation from external states, through both ‘hard’ security cooperation and ‘soft’ public diplomacy, China is hoping to handle the growing calls for greater freedoms and separatism from its minorities in the West, which form a large diaspora in Central Asia. China sees soft power as a strategy to help increase its economic partnerships with Central Asian countries, which in turn will create better economic opportunities for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, mitigating their desire to separate from China. Regime Security theory, which is best applied to authoritarian governments, finds that the CCP is worried about its standing
domestically, and thus aims ‘to improve the international status of the national unit’ (Edney, 2010). China also seeks cooperation from the outside to a) handle domestic minorities and b) push for regional economic integration so as to mitigate economic incentives for minorities to seek separation from China. Increasing anti-Han
demonstrations by minorities has put pressure on the CCP to show that it is fighting against separatism and terrorism, and so have adapted soft power strategies to tackle this problem when partnering with other states.
Regime security theory is also useful when explaining another motivation for soft power. Unlike the previous motivation which focused on inward forces which could disrupt the power base of the CCP, the third motivation focuses on external factors and the cultural aspect of soft power. This motivation states that China is increasing its soft power as part of its wider aims of national ‘rejuvenation’. The motivation also argues that the CCP is using soft power to assert its legitimacy to its domestic
23 audience, with the wielding of soft power becoming part of a wider attempt to make China a global cultural superpower, which is in tandem with its rise in other military and economic spheres.
After the ‘century of humiliation’, China sees its rise as a way of regaining the lost status it endured during the 19th century at the hands of western imperialism. The
psychology behind this fall from grace, from a Chinese perspective, means that China will not be satisfied until it resumes its superpower status. Some in China see this restoration of power not as a means to exert its influence unfairly, but rather as a degree of fairness in restoring China’s relative power in international affairs. By seeking to use present China’s tradition, language and heritage as one of the world’s preeminent cultures, the CCP is both challenging the dominant position of Western culture and securing its own position in China as it is seen as improving China’s standing within the international community.
The CCP has identified and defined Chinese civilization as something anti-Western. Official pronouncements from Chinese leaders have long played up the notion that Western culture is an aggressive threat to China’s own cultural sovereignty. By playing to this fear, the CCP is able to strengthen its own place within Chinese society, as it positions itself as the defender of traditional culture and soft power. It has thus taken a myriad of internal measures to ensure the country’s post-Mao reforms remain an exercise in modernization without “westernization.” Since the 1990s, for example, ideological doctrine has been increasingly infused with a new cultural nationalism, and the Party’s previously archaic propaganda system has been massively overhauled. Hu Jintao highlighted similar themes in early 2012 when he warned that ‘international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of
Westernising and dividing China … Ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration” (Dynon, 2013).
Due to China’s position as a regional power, and its history as a regional hegemon until the mid-19th century, the CCP hopes to use soft power as a way of increasing
China’s influence abroad, which will help maintain its legitimacy domestically. A communiqué released after the Central Committee meeting of the Chinese
Communist Party in 2011 announced that “it is a pressing task to increase the state’s cultural soft power” and to “build our country into a socialist cultural superpower” (The Economist, 2013).
24 3. Motivation 4: Soft Power and Migration
A fourth motivation focuses on the link between soft power and economic activity and migration, and whether there is a link between the volume of investment and migration to a state and the soft power directed towards said state. With a population totalling over 1.3 billion, China has promoted migration across the world with its ‘Go Outward’ campaign, to help deal with over crowdedness, unemployment and
providing labour for Chinese companies. This has created internal problems in these states, especially ones with weaker, less centralized governments. The increase in Chinese migration has depressed wages for indigenous labours, increased
unemployment in the host state and created ‘parallel communities’ between local populations and Chinese workers. China has also been accused of neo-imperialism in its trade and investment strategy in developing countries, where natural resources are increasingly been diverted out of the country to feed China’s growing energy demand.
China’s economic interests have been adversely affected by the backlash in certain countries around the world, where China’s economic dominance and high migration have led to troubles implementing projects. Examples of this have been the Zambian presidential elections in 2011, where President Sata was elected on the platform of protecting workers from malpractice and discrimination under Chinese owned mining companies. Sata warned that Chinese mining companies “needed to adhere to the labour laws” and would chuck out investors if they did not pay adequate wages to local staff. In 2010, Chinese manager opened fire on protesters at a coal mine, and though the Zambian government initially indicated that the Chinese mangers would be punished, the charges were later dropped (The New York Times, 2011). This further emboldened Sata’s campaign, and allowed for increasingly the hostile rhetoric towards China. Another prominent example of Chinese economic interests and migration hampering bilateral ties and China’s economic investments is the proposed Myitsone Dam in Myanmar. The dam has seen a growing domestic opposition to Chinese involvement in the project, with many arguing that Beijing is exploiting the international sanctions surrounding Myanmar’s economy to harvest Myanmar’s natural resources. According to Thant Myint-U, author of Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, "Burma can benefit
25 enormously from Chinese trade and investment, but there is almost bound to be a backlash if Chinese projects are undertaken with zero transparency and little
concern for their impact on local communities" (BBC, 2011). The proposed plan was later cancelled by the Myanmar government due to large scale protests surrounding Chinese economic and environmental standards.
This division between indigenous labourers and Chinese migrants has the potential to create a negative image of China, and hamper closer economic cooperation between China and other states. This motivation argues that China is worried about the perceived negative effects its economic interests may have on host states, and aim to create a better understanding so as to aid Chinese companies and workers in securing investment and a hospitable atmosphere to work within.
Chinese migration towards Central Asia is predominantly split between three different groups; entrepreneurs who have set up companies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, migrant workers who are employed by Chinese companies in the energy and infrastructure sector and local traders who inhabit numerous bazaars throughout the region. It is this third group which poses the biggest problem for Central Asia. Because of the large border separating China and Central Asia, and China’s transformation into the ‘factory of the world’, cheaply assembled products from China are increasingly finding their way into local markets, and are competing with locally made products. The introduction of the Eurasian Customs Union, which includes Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus has ‘weakened the competitiveness of China's export goods in Kazakhstan. The unification of import tariffs between these three countries has led to an increase in tariffs on goods imported by Kazakhstan from China’ (Belt and Road, 2016). Kyrgyzstan, with Chinese border trade being responsible for 1/3 GDP, also joined the Custom Union in 2015. As trade from China has continued to grow extensively over the past decade, states who are becomingly increasingly dependent on China have enacted balancing strategies by increasing economic integration and trade deals with Russia. Rafael Pantucci, an expert in Central Asia-China relations at Open Democracy, says that ‘the erection of a Russia controlled tariff barrier between China and Kyrgyzstan is likely to have a chilling effect on trade coming out of Kashgar, at a time when the Chinese government has invested a great deal into trying to develop the southern city’ (Pantucci, 2013). This is especially problematic for the CCP, as much of the trade which flows to Central
26 Asia is directed through the part of Xinjiang that has faced heightened ethnic
tensions for decades with large tranches of money going towards re-developing and establishing a Special Economic Zone with the aim of turning it into a hub for Central Asian trade.
Although it is hard to precisely quantify the number of Chinese migrants in Central Asia, estimates have put the numbers of migrants at 75,000 in Kazakhstan, 60,000 in Tajikistan, 40,000 in Uzbekistan and 100,000 in Kyrgyzstan, where the Chinese diaspora have recently become the fourth largest ethnic group. Chinese workers have been increasingly employed to work on strategic economic projects, such as gas pipelines from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, and other infrastructure projects which make up the Silk Road Economic Belt, a key trade initiative for China in the 21st
Century.
The negative view of the Chinese population in Central Asia is nothing new, with anti-Chinese sentiment stretching back as far as the 13th Century, with the creation
of the Silk Road. In the 20th century, anti-Chinese propaganda was regularly issued
in the region by the government of the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet split. This cultural wariness and suspicion, which has fed into the narrative of anti-Chinese sentiment is still relevant today. The vacuum of Chinese understanding in the region has caused greater consternation given the increase in migrant Chinese labour. A recent study of attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan showed that the respondents demonstrated weak knowledge of Chinese culture (literature, art, traditions), as well as insufficient knowledge of its current affairs. Though the knowledge of China’s current economic, social, and political life increased from 39 percent to 49 percent between 2007 and 2012, their familiarity with Chinese culture and history remained at the same low level: 9 percent in 2012 and 10.2 percent in 2007 (Sadovskaya, 2015). It is then no wonder that this vacuum is being filled with subjective images, not based on fact and often brought in from outside. A particular concern for Central Asian states is the lack of reliable information and difficult access to migration
statistics on China and analytical data on its economic presence in the region, as well as the social practice of Chinese migrants’ “parallel existence” in receiving communities accompanied by an absence of communication with local people (Sadovskaya, 2015).
27 Conclusion:
The main source of tension between the different motivations is the distinction between whether soft power is a resource that is used to aid the state to strengthen its relationships with external states or the regime to maintain power. China threat theory and China’s economic dominance of certain foreign regions and sectors, both support the former, arguing that soft power is a tool to better articulate a country’s message and intentions, and is primarily used to mitigate the security dilemma posed by China’s rise. This view has been supported by a wide range of academics, such as Joseph Nye and Bonnie Glaser, who argue for the need to divert away from traditional power politics and zero-sum conflicts by diversifying how power is both realised and implemented. For Rawnsley and others, this shows that soft power is a ‘reactive, defensive’ tool which has become increasingly popular in China in tandem with the ‘threat’ discourse that has emanated from the West (Rawnsley, 2012).
28 Chapter 3: Methodology and Analysis
The following chapter will outline the methodology used and how the empirical analysis will be structured and presented. My analysis will focus on a case study involving Chinese soft power towards Central Asia, examining what policies China has initiated and the wider reasons about why these policies may have been introduced. The reason I have decided to focus on Central Asia is because of the lack of research that have focused on Chinese-Central Asian relations. Central Asia is likely to become more important to China in the coming years, with natural
resources, terrorism and the growing power competition in the area all having a real impact on China, and it’s soft power strategy in the region. The empirical analysis will question and examine the motivations of China head on when looking at the range of different sources, before examining whether these have been effective in creating Chinese soft power.
1. Data Analysis:
I will examine my motivations by using a range of different methods and sources. These methods will involve using survey and opinion poll data, content analysis and data analysis.
Firstly, I have found a large amount of secondary sources, such as newspaper articles, academic journals, books and radio sources that will allow me to analyse examples and outcomes of soft power. Primary sources such as government
sources, such as white papers, multilateral and bilateral meetings, minutes taken at these meetings, interviews with senior policy makers and press statements have also been used to help give greater context on the situation regarding soft power and its different cases. These sources are mostly in English, with some sources being translated from Mandarin to English.
This will allow me to see if the Chinese government is taking action on soft power to target specific issues, such as greater cooperation towards Xinjiang and Muslim extremism, or more generally towards the wider population. If necessary,
contradicting views are both included in the analysis to reduce the risk of interpretative bias by the author.
I will use qualitative data when looking at things such as the change in levels of aid and loans from China to Central Asian countries. I also have some questionnaire
29 results that look at public opinion towards China. I have been in contact with the Central Asian Barometer, a non-profit organization that specializes in looking at Central Asian attitudes and public opinion in the region towards a variety of different issues. They have sent me data surrounding China/Central Asian relations, and public opinion polls towards things such as Chinese economic development projects and whether China is seen as a threat to sovereignty. These surveys were carried out from 2012-2014 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The surveys in each country have a sample size of 1000 people, have a gender split of 50:50, includes participants from different regions of these countries, and a range of different age groups. The use of opinion polls and surveys will help me explore the first motivation, as the surveys will determine whether there is anxiety towards China’s rise, and thus aid the argument that Chinese soft power is designed to help mitigated its hard power. The surveys will also be used to look at general attitudes of Central Asians towards China in relation to other foreign powers. Whilst soft power is hard to empirically study, surveys and opinion polls are regularly used by academics because they give a good indicator about how a country is perceived by a population from another state, and whether a country’s culture and public diplomacy is seen in a positive or negative light. A more advanced statistical analysis using SPSS will also be used to analyse some answers, and to see if there is any correlation between factors such as whether China is seen as a threat and the willingness to learn Mandarin.
2. Disadvantages of methodology:
It is difficult to properly quantify soft power behaviours, and its effects, because soft power is sometimes based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Whilst Hard Power is usually direct and visible, soft power is indirect, and can take years for the desired affects to appear.
The opinion polls used however do have some disadvantages to them. For example some results show that the option of ‘Don’t Know/no answer’ can sometimes be as high as 40%, leading to skewed or imbalanced results. This may be that some of the questions posed were either too difficult to understand or were not relevant to the respondent. This means that the opinion polls that I am using may lack validity. Some scholars also argue that opinion polls and surveys provide an immediacy that
