NGO-Effectiveness in Russia: Opportunity Structures for Foreign Funded NGOs

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NGO-Effectiveness in Russia

Opportunity Structures for Foreign Funded NGOs

Dr. M. Frear Annika Fründt s1775944 annikafruendt@gmail.com MAIS Thesis Final Version 11 - 02 - 2017 9700 words

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1. Introduction 3

2. Literature Review 4

3. The 'special case' of Russian civil society 7

4. Analytical Framework 8 4.1 Opportunity Structures 9 4.1.1 Ideology 9 4.1.2 Political 9 4.1.3 Legal 10 4.1.4 Economic 10 5. Methodology 11

6. Case Study – WWF Russia 13

6.1 Ideological 13 6.2 Political 15 6.3 Legal 17 6.4 Economic 19 5. Conclusion 22 6. Bibliography 24 7. Appendix 27

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1. Introduction

Russia's increasingly autocratic state structures and their consequences on civil society development are vastly discussed among the Western media. The imprisonment of the Pussy Riot activists, as well as the conviction of opposition leader Alexei Navalny show that the government is not willing to tolerate state critical activism. The social sphere is thus vastly restricted in its scope for activism. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation was established, its civil societal movement was observed with great optimism. Many had hoped that the non-violent protests movements during the Soviet era would develop into organised civil groups ensuring Rus-sia's transition into a liberal democratic system and an open market economy. Funded by Western aid agencies, a vast array of non-governmental organisations (NGO) developed. These NGOs should ensure the transition process, help to reform Russian business and standard of living and fur-ther build a positive relationship with the West. However, after a euphoric beginning the actors on the ground as well as in academia were soon disenchanted. The West had overestimated the univer-sal character of its value and belief system. The NGOs established had developed a vertical in-frastructure of elites competing for funding rather than horizontally attracting grassroots support. Therefore, many of the NGOs established were detached from the social sphere instead of part of it (Belokurova, 2010, p. 458-459). In addition to the weak public support, the increasingly autocratic state structures pose a great challenge to Russian NGOs. Restrictive laws, such as the '2006 NGO law' or the 'Foreign Agents' law, ratified in 2012, vastly restrict any foreign funded NGO's scope of action (Amnesty International, 2016, Chebankova, 2009, p. 402). The laws were classified as politi-cal tools, impeding any civil societal action critipoliti-cal of the state. Consequently, the Western view on civic formation in Russia developed to be quite pessimistic.

However, authors such as Frederik Söderbaum argue that the logic of Western models of civil society cannot merely by applied to any sociocultural context (2007, p. 319). Therefore, Russ-ian civil societal movement has to be analysed within its local, cultural framework in order contex-tualise its developments. Authors have thus increasingly conducted research on the Russian version of civil society. Research has demonstrated that instead of a sphere streamlining the state, Russia's social sphere is rather intertwined with its governmental sphere. It has further been put forward that organised civic groups can still achieve social change (Ljubownikow, Crotty& Rodgers, 2013, p. 162). Whereas it is often argued that, due to restrictive laws, social change can only be achieved by locally funded NGO's, Fröhlich has put forward that, rather than purely the source of funding, the

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ability to adapt to a variety of opportunity structures is crucial for an NGO's ability to act efficiently (2012).

This paper seeks to analyse under what circumstances a foreign funded NGO can act effi-ciently. It examine, whether the opportunity structures as set out by Fröhlich offer appropriate indi-cators to assess an NGO's scope to achieve change. The paper will thus characterise the opportunity structures as set out by Fröhlich (2012), which it will then use as analytical criteria for its analysis. To analyse how far the opportunity structures characterised offer an appropriate tool to determine how a foreign funded NGO can act effectively, the paper will focus on the environmental NGO WWF Russia's efforts to combat illegal logging. The efforts and achievements of the NGO will be assessed according to the analytical framework developed, to offer in an depth analysis on the mat-ter. The paper argues, that a cooperative relationship of the NGO and the state increases chances to achieve change.

The paper is divided into six sections: First, the current state on research explaining the underlying reasons of weak civil societal engagement in Russia is outlined. Second, a very brief overview of the Russian understanding of civil society is given, to contextualise the following analytical frame-work. The analytical framework will characterise the analytical criteria, which are afterwards oper-ationalised in the methodology. The criteria are then applied and critically assessed in the paper's case study. Finally, the paper will evaluate its main findings to answer its research question.

2. Literature Review

NGOs are generally organised civic formations with a specific aim. They are an element of the so-cial sphere and thus civil society. As this paper analyses NGO efficiency in Russia, it is necessary to embed the discussion on NGOs in the specific social context they act within. Civil society in former Soviet states has been subject to various academic debates. Notwithstanding a plethora of varying definitions of the concept have developed. However, this paper will use he definition of civil soci-ety as

a system of groups, organised as a source of political or social power . . . which serve the broad function of promoting citizenship as well as the more specific one of pursuing the group's goals. These groups are voluntary organisations and may spring naturally from the soil of a society or may be founded by groups or individuals higher up in the society. (Hud-son, 2003, p. 212)

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This definition was chosen, as incorporates the element of civic organisation originating from grass-roots movements, as well as more marginalised groups. It furthermore emphasises common goals as unifying factor within these organised groups. Hence, in its idealised form civil society is seen as sphere representing and protecting the citizens interest. Its impact can therefore limit the govern-ments power and ensure representation of public interests to the state level. It should remain an enti-ty separate from the state, as an actor in the system of checks and balances. However, civil socieenti-ty is not independent from the state, as it is reliant on legal protection, securing its existence as well as allowing for its impact (Chebankova, 2009, p. 398; Henderson, 2011, p. 4; Ljubownikov, Crotty& Rogers, 2013, p. 154; Carothers& Barndt, 1999, p. 26).

The proclaimed representation of the social level has made civil society subject to a variety of academic debates studying the link between a strong civil society and democratic state systems. The social movements preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union were studied with great opti-mism, suggesting that civil societal action could set basis for a democratic state system (Carothers& Barndt, 1999, p. 19; Glenn, 2010, p. 27; Henderson, 2002, p. 140; McFaul, 2005, p.13). However, the body of research conducted identified a pattern of 'weak' civil society in former Soviet states (Howard, 2002, p. 158; Ljubownikow et al., 2013, p. 154). Research undertaken seeks to determine underlying reasons for weak civic involvement among the social sphere in former communist states. This paper will focus on Russia's civic movement. Russia offers an interesting case, as its civic or-ganisation is accused of either being foreign funded and detached from grassroots support or merely representing the governments agenda (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 371; Crotty, 2009, 85-86). Civic engage-ment is hence accused of being weak, not representing its citizens and not being a sphere counter-balancing the state. Therefore, academic debates have been increasingly focussed on domestic un-derlying reasons for the lack of civic engagement. The corresponding analyses have vastly focussed on two levels when examining the underlying domestic reasons for a lack of civic engagement: the social level itself and the state level.

On the social level historic reasons are put forward as explanation for weak civil engage-ment. Due to its Soviet history, Russian society does not have a tradition of civic engagement as many other European states do. It is argued that a longing for privacy succeeded the Soviet rule, as the communist system enforced all civic activity under the umbrella of the state. As the former state structures have long restricted any form of civic engagement independent from the state, no culture of organised civic formation separate from the state has evolved (Belokova, 2010, p. 7; Hudson, 2003, p. 215; Hemment, 2012, p. 242; Henderson, 2002, p. 142). While social movements under

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Soviet rule and its aftermath, such as the environmental movement in the following the Chernobyl incident, are acknowledged, they have been classified as local or dedicated to a certain cause or event. Thus, as soon as the cause for the protests was settled, the organisations dissolved instead of developing a long-term strategy or infrastructure across the country (Belokurova, 2010, p. 460; Lubownikow et al., 2013, p. 158). Hence, authors argue that civic engagement never developed a tradition of becoming a permanent body in a system of checks and balance.

Aside from the possible cultural reasons, the state's impact in restricting civil society forma-tion is put forward. The state sphere is blamed of not encouraging civic engagement during the im-mediate transition period, while the current government is accused of actively hampering its devel-opment (Belokurova, 2010, p. 459). Restrictive laws, such as the 2006 NGO law, a lack of legisla-tive protection and enforcement of changes pursued by civil society have created structures which gradually diminish any form of civil societal action critically accessing the actions of the state. Hence, a lack of trust in change and fear have created a toxic environment, discouraging organised civic action (Crotty, 2009, p. 92). Evans further notes that the general public has become increasing-ly suspicious of NGOs independent from the state. The legislation introduced has classified foreign funded NGOs as illegitimate. Due to the social spheres closely intertwined historical relationship with the state sphere, this sentiment has spilled-over to the social level (Evans, 2006, p. 147). Con-sequently, NGOs are not perceived as entities representing public interests but entities pursuing their own agenda. It is thus argued that grassroots organisations lack in actual grassroots support, diminishing their impact and credibility. The lack in state support on various levels results in a lack of state funding. In a struggle for survival, the NGOs have often turned to Western funding. How-ever, Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow have argued that turning to Western funding intensified the de-tachment from NGOs to its grassroots (2014, p. 1255). Instead of public interest, Western funded NGOs were said to be subject to their donors normative agenda. This could vary notably from the domestic cultural belief system, further widening the gap between grassroots representation and NGO action.

In addition to domestic structures hampering civic organisation, authors have noted a West-ern bias in the assessment of civic engagement in Russia. The dominant body of literature evaluates civic activity according to Western normative standards. Thus, varying Russian interpretations of civil society were neglected (Belokurova, 2010, p. 460-461; Crotty, 2009, p. 68). To foster an ade-quate discussion of the concept, authors such as Ljubownikow, Crotty, and Rodgers (2013), Be-lokurova (2010) and Fröhlich (2012) push for analyses to take into account the domestic

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interpreta-tion of the concept. Hence, the concept of civil society as opposing entity to the state is not in line with the Russian tradition of civic engagement. It is thus rather a 'platform for dialogue between state and society' (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 373). Therefore, the element of independence from the state is not as crucial to the Russian interpretation of the concept, as it is in Western definitions. Further-more, it is argued that the Western approach only acknowledges organisations and movements com-plying striving to establish the normative set of values promoted by Western liberal democracies. Grassroots and organisations pushing for a different set of values are hence often not classified within the scope of successful civil societal developments. The authors therefore call for reassess-ment of the movereassess-ments on the ground, as well as approach to their analysis (Belokurova, 2010, p. 460-461; Crotty, 2009, p. 68).

3. The 'special case' of Russian civil society

The acknowledgement of a Western bias in civil societal analysis has produced a shift in the analy-sis of the Russian social sphere. Area studies have highlighted the importance of applying a local framework of analysis when examining a non-Western environment (Crotty, 2009, p. 86; Glenn, 2010, p. 17; Söderbaum, 2007, p. 319). Research has established a particularly strong link between the state and organised civil society in former Soviet Union members (Chandhoke, 2001; Hudson, 2003, p. 216). Contrasting Western models of civic organisation, Russia's social sphere had to be encouraged to develop by a state initiative, hence a top-down movement. Although often accused to hinder any form of civic formation, Putin's establishment of the Civic Forum in 2000 enabled Russ-ian NGO formation. The Forum was supported by the state and encouraged NGO formation as 'main institutions of civil society' outside the scope of Western donors (Hendersson, 2011, p. 3). Putin enabled the development of a domestic NGO infrastructure with decreasing influence from foreign agendas and funding (Belokurova, 2010, p. 461; Ljubonikow et al., 2013, p. 155). Thus, the state level set bases to encourage organised civil society and NGOs.

When the Civic Forum was established, positive connotations towards civil society were dominant. However, a distinction between a pursuable and non-genuine civil society organisations began to develop. Pursuable formations were associations which acted domestically, while Western networks were gradually framed as foreign infiltrate pushing for their own instead of Russian inter-ests. Consequently, restrictive policies were introduced, which eventually lead to the implementa-tion of the '2006 NGO-Law', passed in April 2006. The law increased bureaucratic burdens, the cy-cle of audits, restrictions on foreign donor funding, and reviewing “of the compliance of NGOs with

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their own stated goals [...] to ensure that organisational activities do not threaten the sovereignty of the Russian Federation” (Crotty et al., 2014, p.1254; Belokurova, 2010, p. 466; Chebankova, 2009, p. 402). These laws hampered Western funded organisations work and effectiveness to comply with their goals. It was interpreted as a way of reinstalling the Soviet order, advancing centralisation and silence opposition (Henderson, 2011, p.2). This legislation meant that organisations had to be loyal to the government to be able to act effectively, thereby defying the purpose of the third sector as counterbalance to the state (Belokurova, 2010, p. 467; Crotty, 2009, p. 73; Fröhlich 2012, p. 378). The law demonstrated Putin’s understanding of the functions of civil society: An entity bridging the gap between the people and the state rather than a critical accessor of the government's actions (Johnson& Saarinen, 2011, p. 44).

4. Analytical Framework

It has been established that a local framework is more adequate to shed light on the research ques-tion as it takes into account domestic and systematic factors, as these are crucial to analyse civic organisation in Russia. Thus, the cultural sentiment resulting from the Soviet history has to be con-sidered: The state must be accepting of civic formations. Therefore, it seems as if a precondition of loyalty to the state exists, which determines an NGO's success. This indicates a fault line between domestic and foreign funded NGOs, further promoted by the 2006 NGO law.

The provisions of the 2006 NGO law have harshly restricted long-term, effective work on Russian territory by Western funded NGOs. However, despite unfavourable conditions for foreign funded NGO formation, Christian Fröhlich argues that sources of funding do not by definition re-strict an NGO's ability to implement its goals. Rather, the relationship of the respective NGO with the state determines its chances of success (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 372). He, however, limits his argu-ment to social rather than political NGOs. According to his analysis the likeliness of an NGOs suc-cess is determined by its ability to adjust to 'opportunity structures' (ibid). These opportunity struc-tures are defined as: ideological, political, legislative and economic factors (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 375-376). It is therefore argued that the more an NGO complies with the opportunity structures, the more likely it is for 'NGOs to achieve success' (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 372). The opportunity structures offered by Fröhlich are used as analytical criteria to determine whether they offer an appropriate tool explaining a non-political NGO's success. In order to determine the appropriateness of the framework, this paper will apply its case study of the environmental organisation WWF Russia to the opportunity structures defined in the next section.

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4.1 Opportunity Structures 4.1.1 Ideology

The ideological opportunity structure refers to the NGO's ability to gain the social sphere's support. The precondition to this support is actual interest representation of the general public. While this statement seems fairly logical, the predominant view long was that NGOs have to aspire to imple-ment and spread universal values to gain legitimacy. However, the concept of universal values is subject to a Western bias and mostly refers to a Western set of normative beliefs (Fukuyama, 1989, p.5). Accordingly, large portions of the social sphere might not endorse Western approaches and goals, as some values simply differ between Western and Russian societies. To give an example, while human rights and their protection is of extremely high priority in vast parts of the Western world, their protection is not connected to the same normative belief system in Russian society. Thus, framing the NGOs values and strategy in a way relatable to civil society on the ground is cru-cial for support (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 371, 376). Ideological support from the socru-cial sphere can vary from grassroots, to interest group to corporate representation. It does therefore not mean that the whole social sphere needs to actively promote the beliefs and goals of the organisation. However, vast support for the underlying culture of the NGO ensures its embedding into local society, and thus increases chances of success.

4.1.2 Political

The political opportunity structure describes the relationship between the government and the NGO. Similar to corresponding ideologies between the NGO and the social level, the NGO's sector and goals must be embedded within the political system. Therefore, the state level must accept civic ac-tion within the respective sector. This underlines the contrasting understanding of the concept of civic action in Russia and the West. In Russia, civic action is understood as sphere between the state and the social level. Civic organisations thus shall provide (social) services in case the government fails to do so. If the government approves of the civic action, it well provide funds and support civic formation (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 375). Furthermore, the NGO's underlying set of goals and values must be in line with the dominant government approach on the matter. Civil societal action opposing the state ideology will thus not be approved. Hence, loyalty to the state and its values increase the chances of success. Therefore, political NGOs criticising the state system or challenging the politi-cal status quo are the ones most likely to be suppressed and thus not to attain any of their goals

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(Fröhlich, 2012, p. 376). The framework of the political opportunity structure strongly opposes the Western definition of the concept of civil societal action. Unconditional acceptance of the political status quo opposes the Western ideal of civil societal action as counterbalance to the state sphere. However, the domestic cultural understanding of the concept and the political framework it is em-bedded in demonstrates the need for cooperation of civic organisations and the government.

4.1.3 Legal

Legal opportunities are closely intertwined with the political opportunity structure elaborated upon. They refer to the scope of legal protection of the NGO and their actions. Therefore, legal opportuni-ty structures refer to two different aspects. Firstly, the legal framework has to legitimise the NGO and its purpose. This means that the Russian law must grant protection to the group or case repre-sented by the NGO (Fröhlich, 2012, 375). To give an example, homosexuals are a rather margin-alised group in Russia, who "are not granted specific rights or freedoms under Russian law" (Engle, 2013, p.10). Therefore, an NGO working against discrimination of homosexuals would face a series of obstacles: a legal basis emphasising equality of all people is not existent, suggesting that the state as well as vast parts of general public does not support this notion.

The second element addressed in the legal opportunity structure is the legal protection of any changes an NGO might achieve. Thus, Russian law must be revised in case the government agrees to any claims made by civil society (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 375). This also incorporates the need for legal consequences in case legislation is infringed. Legal protection can by definition only be effective if the legislation provided is applied. Furthermore, it demonstrates the state level's com-mitment to the changes made. Due to the culturally close ideational relationship between the state and the social sphere, the state's support and protection of the decisions made is therefore crucial for its public support (ibid.).

4.1.4 Economic

NGOs are massively dependent on funding. As their working environment is outside the business sector, they cannot produce revenue comparable to businesses acting in the free market. However, funds have become increasingly difficult to receive for Russian NGO's. On a national level, the 2006 NGO law has severely hampered the possibilities to acquire foreign funding. Furthermore, NGOs funded by foreign entities are increasingly regarded with suspicion by the social sphere . On

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an international level, the 2008 global economic crisis, as well as the crumbling Russian economy, due to low oil and gas prices, restricts NGO funding (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 376). Consequently, acquir-ing fundacquir-ing is a great challenge, however, crucial for an NGO's existence.

Therefore, economic opportunity structures refer to the ability of an NGO to acquire suffi-cient funding. As domestic funds have become an increasingly scarce source, NGOs must perform a balancing act. If they seek foreign funding, their goals and ideology has to be compatible with both, the conviction of the donor, as well as the Russian sentiment. Furthermore, the organisation must overcome bureaucratic hurdles ensuing from the 2006 NGO law. Thus, the more an NGO can bal-ance these different aspects, the more likely it is to achieve its goals and act effectively (Crotty, 2009, p. 75; Fröhlich, 2012, p. 376).

5. Methodology

This paper discusses foreign funded NGO effectiveness in Russia by using a exploratory case study approach. It examines the framework of opportunity structures offered by Fröhlich by analysing WWF Russia's evolution in combating illegal logging from 2001 to 2015. The case of WWF Russia was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, it is an environmental NGO. Fröhlich argues that the op-portunity structures serve as an indicator for non-political NGO's success. He further argues that especially social NGOs benefit from complying with the factors set out in the analytical framework. However, the environmental sector is hybrid, as it is neither political nor social in its outlook. It therefore is interesting to investigate, whether opportunity structures offer an adequate tool in as-sessing a non-social NGO's performance. Secondly, WWF Russia is a domestically acting NGO, under the umbrella of a transnational environmental NGO network, WWF. While acting within do-mestic structures, it is predominantly foreign funded. The paper investigates whether a foreign funded environmental NGO can respond to the opportunity structures established, and whether these offer an explanation for its performance. In addition, WWF Russia is the largest conservation NGO in Russia (Kalinicheva, 2016, p.26). This means that one of the biggest NGOs within the sec-tor is mostly dependent on foreign funds. While academic research suggests that foreign funding causes detachment from grassroots and thus inefficiency, this paper will investigate whether the source of funding hampers public support (Crotty, 2009, p. 85; Hendersson, 2002, p. 14).

Despite WWF Russia acting in various fields such as fisheries, biodiversity and nature pro-tection, this paper will focus on forestry, more specifically the NGO's efforts in combatting illegal

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logging. The subfield of the NGO's vast array of action was chosen, to offer an in depth analysis of the NGO's actions in reference to the opportunity structures established. While an overall assess-ment would have been interesting, a sufficient discussion of the NGO's work in relation to the ana-lytical framework would not be possible within the scope of this paper. The component of illegal logging was chosen as it poses a serious threat to the forestry sector throughout Russia. WWF Rus-sia states that illegal logging makes up for 20-30% of the RusRus-sian wood harvest, while reforestation efforts are poor. Furthermore, a vast percentage of the Russian territory consists of forest, while its entire ecosystem is dependent on it. Illegal logging is thus not merely regionally specific threat, thus potentially affecting a broader potion of society (Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 3). Furthermore, tim-ber is an important resource to the Russian economy. The issue's relevance to different groups in society thus makes it an interesting sector to investigate.

The analysis covers a timeframe from 2001-2015. 2001 was chosen as a starting point, as the first Civic Forum was hosted in November, 2001 (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002, p. 147). It there-fore marks the starting point of changing relations between the state level and organised civic en-gagement. The changes from the launch of the civic forum to the implementation of the 2006 NGO law and its effects on WWF Russia's actions are thus interesting to examine. Ideally, the paper would discuss the NGO's developments until 2016, however, the relevant annual reports have not been published when this paper was finalised.

As set out in the analytical framework, the analysis focuses on the opportunity structures established. The case is therefore applied and examined accordingly: Firstly, the NGO's ideology has been identified as crucial in gaining the general public's support for the NGO's actions. By defi-nition, congruence of ideological beliefs between an organisation and its respective social sphere cannot be measured. Therefore, his paper will analyse the ability of WWF Russia to mobilise the general public. This refers to public acknowledgement of the NGO and its project, as well as partic-ipating in campaigns and protests. It will be assumed that the ability to mobilise serves as an indica-tor for a common set of goals and beliefs. Secondly, the paper emphasised the importance of the relationship between the state level and the NGO. The degree of cooperation, similar to an overlap-ping ideology, is difficult to assess in absolute numbers. Thus, this paper will analyse political sup-port in terms of common definition of threats and goals in fighting illegal logging. Thirdly, it as-sesses the body of legislation provided to protect the forestry sector. Thus, the legal means and law enforcement on illegal logging are classified as indicator for the governments protection and knowledgement of the problem, as well as organised civil societal action. Finally, the ability to

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ac-quire funding was put forward as vital for an NGO's existence and success. The paper discusses the NGO's financial reports. It will further evaluate whether the sources of funding have any effect on public support or political restrictions.

The analysis is based on English annual reports provided by WWF Russia. Unfortunately, no English annual report of 2007 could be retrieved. When contacting the organisation to ask for reasons as to why the annual report was not published, WWF Russia stated that the 2007 was pub-lished as a Russian multimedia format. Due to insufficient language skills by the author, the report's section on illegal logging cannot be incorporated into the analysis. However, the assessment of the 2007 financial report will be included.

6. Case Study – WWF Russia

The following section will analyse the accessibility of the opportunity structures established for WWF Russia. It will furthermore discuss, whether a high degree of accessibility offers an explana-tion for the NGO's performance. The analysis is arranged according to the analytical framework outlined. It will highlight relevant aspects to the respective factors discussed.

6.1 Ideological

The ideological opportunity structure refers to the ability of the NGO to address the public's needs and thereby gaining their support. This section distinguishes between two elements of the social sphere. It firstly elaborates on the ability of the NGO to mobilise and incorporate the general public in their efforts to combat illegal logging. It further discusses attitudes of cooperations in the lumber industry towards the organisation and its efforts. Aside from the general public, the economic sector is a influential player within the social sphere.

Preservation of forests can be considered a local task, as it directly affects the people living within a region. Thus, the aim of combating illegal logging is not an abstract, foreign concept, but an issue of local concern. As environmental protection widely resonates with Russian society, the NGO presumably faces favourable conditions in legitimising its aims and existence (Crotty, 2009, p.65). An NGO's capability to mobilise protest generally serves as an indicator for support. While the organisation, government and social sphere agree on the need to diminish illegal logging, there is ample disagreement on the legislative framework ensuring this process. The Russian law

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govern-ing forestry, the Forest Code, generally holds provisions on forest management and judicial conse-quences in case of infringement. The stricter provisions are, the less scope for legal loopholes con-cerning logging are created. However, in 2007, the forest code cancelled a provision on the protec-tion of Korean pine timber. Alarmed by the possibly tremendous consequences for the Korean pine timber population, WWF Russia launched a campaign striving to ban logging of the tree. The peti-tion gained 17,000 signatures and was forwarded to the governor of the affected region, Primorsky Krai. The efforts of the campaign proved to be successful: a ban of logging Korean timber was in-corporated into legislation in 2010 (Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 16). Furthermore, 700 people protested, while 25,000 signed an appeal forwarded to President Putin, appealing a similar provision on Birkin forest logging in 2011. While not immediately amending legislation, the president launched a work-ing group to provide a forum reviswork-ing the provision on Birkin forests. The workwork-ing group consisted of various government officials, as well as technical experts from WWF Russia as well as represen-tatives from the lumber exporting industry (Kalinicheva, 2012, p. 12-13). Although the effects of the working group are not discussed in the following reports, the NGO's campaigns can be consid-ered a success. The grassroots support for the campaigns launched resulted in amendment and revi-sion of legislation. Furthermore, mobilisation of the general public suggests support of the organisa-tion and its goals.

In addition to mobilising individuals, WWF Russia incentivises the economic sector to commit to responsibly harvested timber. WWF Russia advocates forest certification through the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) of forests as well as timber products. Certified forest areas vol-untarily commit to responsible forest management and logging practices in the lumber industry. From the FSC's launch in 2001 until 2015, there is constant growth of certified areas (see Figure 1). The voluntary commitment to responsible forest management standards demonstrates a public statement against illegal logging. It thus suggests that WWF Russia's efforts are supported. Howev-er, the actual effects of FSC certification are highly questionable. As an independent study by Greenpeace from 2002-2013 ascertained, FSC certification has no effect in ensuring protecting and responsible forest management in Russia (Greenpeace, 2014). According to the study, the scope for illegal logging activities in certified areas remains high and likely. Although companies demonstrate commitment through their membership of the FSC, means of control ensuring protection of the conditions set by the council are not sufficient. Therefore, WWF Russia's efforts in incorporating the social sphere in diminishing illegal logging must be classified as limited.

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Figure 1: FSC certified forest areas 2001-2015, data collected from WWF- Russia. 1

Note: Adapted from Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 6; 2003, p. 6; Pal, Prokhorova & Voronkova, 2004, p. 6; Kalinicheva, 2005, p. 18; Kalinicheva, 2006, p. 16; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 3; Kalinicheva, 2009, p. 8, Kalinicheva, 2010, p. 24; Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 11 ;Kalinicheva, 2012, p. 8; Kalinicheva, 2015, p. 15, Kalinicheva, 2016, p. 10

6.2 Political

Political opportunity structures refer to the level of cooperation between the government and NGO. The government's approval of the NGO was established as precondition for an organisation to exist and work effectively in the long run. Due to the asymmetrical relationship, cooperation between the two entities is thus especially relevant for the NGO. However, the Russian Federation generally ac-knowledges the relevance of environmental protection (OECD, 2006, p.7). The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation and its various Federal Agencies are essen-tial players guiding environmental legislation and protection (Pal et al., 2004, p.7). The first annual report analysed defined 'illegal logging' as one of the main threats to Russian forests and its timber production (Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 4). Whereas the Ministry of Natural Resources and Envi-ronment is more careful in its choice of words, it generally agrees with WWF Russia that illegal

List of compiled data given in the appendix

1 0 12,5 25 37,5 50 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 Million Hectares FSC certified

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logging constitutes a 'serious threat' (Pal et al., 2004, p.7). Hence, both entities acknowledge the need to address the issue, which suggests favourable conditions for cooperation.

Despite the state level recognising the risks of illegal logging, its means to reduce illegal harvesting in 2001 were classified as extremely ineffective by WWF Russia. A study conducted by the NGO deemed mobile anti-poaching brigades as “the most progressive form of combating illegal logging”, as opposed to the federal forest security service, which was in charge (Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 4). To increase effectiveness in combating illegal logging, WWF Russia supported state lead anti poaching brigades. The brigades supported identified 166 cases of illegal logging between 2001 and 2003 (Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 4; Kalinicheva, 2003, p. 7; Pal et al., 2004, p. 7). No information on how many illegal logging activities were identified before WWF Russia supported the units is given, therefore, a statement on the NGO's impact to increase their effectiveness cannot be made. However, the joint efforts suggest a fruitful level of cooperation. While the brigades sup-ported are not listed in the following annual reports, cooperation between the two spheres contin-ued. In 2015 a remote sensing system to monitor changes through satellite images was developed under WWF Russia leadership (Kalinicheva, 2016, p.10). The new technology was approved to be implemented by representatives of the federal agency (WWF Russia, 2015b). In addition to the joint monitoring efforts, WWF Russia supports custom controls as tool to diminish exports of illegally logged timber. The NGO published a book, offering tools to identify illegally harvested goods. This book has become part of the curriculum of the Russian Costums Academy (Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 12). These joint efforts show a cooperative relationship between the two spheres. Furthermore, the incorporation of the NGO's efforts on various levels demonstrates acknowledgement and trust in the organisation's work by the government level. Therefore, a positive working relationship between the state and NGO can be identified. It can thus be assumed the the government approves of the efforts undertaken by WWF Russia.

Despite cooperating and defining common goals the WWF and state also vastly disagree. While official data provided by the Russian Federal Forestry Agency in 2011 suggested that illegal logging made up about 1%, independent assessments of the World Bank and WWF Russia suggest-ed that it actually accountsuggest-ed for 20% of total timber harvests (WWF Russia, n.d.). Although illegal logging was condemned by the state and the NGO, its severity to the forestry sector is depicted dif-ferently among the two entities. This poses various challenges to WWF Russia in tackling logging. If the official numbers provided by the government differ from the figures published by the organi-sation as vastly as they do, the official need to tackle the threat seems much smaller than the NGO

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claims. Therefore, government funding and acknowledgement of the problem, especially on the so-cial sphere, will decrease. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the Russian Federal Forestry Agency has an agenda in claiming the threat of illegal logging is prominently smaller than the environmen-tal organisation suggests. The underlying agenda is open to a vast body of speculation and hence will not be discussed in further detail. However, it is important to note that the lack in government acknowledgement has consequences for the NGO, even if the government level does not actively try to harm the respective NGO.

6.3 Legal

Legal opportunity structures refer to the legislative framework protecting an NGO and its achieve-ments. Therefore, the design and enforcement of legislation on illegal logging is crucial in WWF Russia's efforts. It's dependence on cooperation with the state level is therefore very high. This sec-tion will focus on Forest Code, and whether or not its provisions effectively address the problem of illegal logging.

The Forest Code provides the legislative framework on forestry in Russia. It was first rati-fied in 1997. The law provided extensive discretion towards regions in terms of policy. WWF Rus-sia claimed that in order to fight illegal logging effectively, a nation-wide legal framework had to be created. This way legislation and conviction upon infringement could be followed through with less regionally specific bureaucratic efforts. Furthermore, it would criminalise illegal logging for the whole state, which according to WWF Russia, would contribute to decreased illegal action (Kalinicheva, 2003, p. 6). When a new Forest Law was ratified by President Putin in 2006, scope for a stronger legislative framework to fight illegal logging was in the cards. However, when the law came about, the government had not taken the NGO's recommendations into account. Conse-quently, WWF Russia denounced the procedure through which the law established, as it was de-tached from public discussion. Aside from the procedure, WWF Russia strongly criticised the laws provisions, describing it as harmful 'to preserve biodiversity, high conservation value forests and tackle illegal logging and forest fires, imposes problems on small business development both for timber and non-timber use" (Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 10). Its provision enabled the privatisation of forests formerly owned by the state. The organisation views privatisation as a massive threat to sponsible logging, as a lack of control over forest management could lead to the exploitation of re-sources and hence increase mass logging (Pal et al., 2004, p. 5). Therefore, rather than protecting the projects and programmes implemented by WWF Russia, the new Forest Code created

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provi-sions challenging the organisations ongoing efforts. The law illustrates the NGO's dependency on legal protection, while having limited power to influence legislation. Despite cooperation in moni-toring programmes and the acknowledgement of illegal logging as a threat to the Russian timber industry, the NGO had little means to actively change the provisions of the Forest Code.

In spite of the asymmetrical power relation between the two spheres, a collective campaign by a variety of environmental NGOs to amend the law succeeded in creating a 'forum of dialogue'. In 2009, a working group consistent of the Ministry of Agriculture and the public was created, to amend provisions of the law. The results of the cooperation were then incorporated into the New Forest Code by 2010 (Kalinicheva, 2010, p. 24). After almost 10 years of urging the government to adjust the Forest Code the 'voice of the community was heard and considered to some extent' (Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 10). The Forest Code was further amended in 2013, following rec-ommendations published in a comparative case study on illegal timber exports carried out by WWF Russia (WWF Russia, 2015a). However, while the ability to influence legislation was deemed a success, WWF Russia continued to urge the government to include further changes into the Forest Code. The law still lacked essentials definitions of e.g. illegal logging and forest, creating great scope for legal loopholes contributing to mass deforestation and logging (ibid.). Therefore, while the government did show willingness to cooperate with the social sphere, the fruitfulness of this co-operation in reducing illegal logging is highly questionable. The laws provided do not sufficiently protect the efforts of the NGO.

It is worth noting that WWF Russia openly criticised the government for the provisions im-plemented throughout the time period analysed. However, the NGO did not seem to face increased bureaucratic or political burdens as a consequence of these critical remarks, as they are not men-tioned in the reports. Although the NGO's efforts were met with a degree of ignorance, willingness to cooperate through working groups was demonstrated. This is very interesting to acknowledge, considering Fröhlich's framework emphasises the need for congruity of the organisation's and state's goals and ideas. A possible explanation for the continuing level of tolerance and cooperation be-tween the state and social sphere could be that, while WWF Russia did criticise actions by the gov-ernment, it did not question the legitimacy of the government. Therefore, the NGO did not question the political status quo, which is essential to the state level tolerating civic organisation, as Fröhlich pointed out (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 381).

Aside from suitable legislation, the enforcement of law is crucial to enable efficient NGO action. Although illegal logging of forests is not defined in any Forest Code, unsupervised logging

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was forbidden throughout the time period analysed. However, judicial consequences and the en-forcement of laws was generally weak. WWF Russia aimed to strengthen the system, as their re-search had shown that weak systems of control fostered logging activities. In 1999 less than 3% of the cases of illegal logging identified were trialled (Kotlobay& Ptichnikov, 2002, p.10). WWF iden-tified inaccurate legislation, ‘non-observance of existing laws”, as well as inefficiency in conviction for illegal activities as crucial factors for this scale of weak law enforcement. Therefore, the organi-sation launched monitoring programs to increase identification and trailing of any illegal logging actions. Through the programmes introduced, WWF Russia constantly increased the number of cas-es of logging identified and later trialled. Thus, legal enforcement and cooperation increased the chances of success in diminishing illegal logging from 2001 onwards (Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 5; Kalinicheva, 2003, p. 6). The NGO had to assist the state in protecting its goals, rather than the other way around. Fröhlich's framework suggests that a strong legislative enforcement can poten-tially strengthen the NGO's legitimacy, as it acknowledges the organisation's projects and efforts. In this case, the NGO secured the protection of its goals, through strengthening the state. This can fur-ther be interpreted as a positive joint effort between the two spheres.

However, despite the trials and successes mentioned by the WWF Russia reports, the pre-cept percentage of illegal logged timber has remained 20-30 percent throughout the period investi-gated (Kalinicheva et al., 2002, p. 5; WWF Russia, n.d.). This suggests that law enforcement and identification of illegal logging sites remains weak, in spite of the projects launched by WWF Rus-sia and other environmental NGOs.

6.4 Economic

An NGO's efficiency and survival is ultimately determined by its ability to acquire funding. While this holds true for NGOs all over the world, funding in Russia has become increasingly difficult. As elaborated above, the bureaucratic hurdles for foreign funding introduced by the 2006 NGO law, as well as a suspicion against Western funded NGOs, has made sufficient funding while maintaining civil societal support a difficult balance. However, WWF Russia has seemingly managed to main-tain this balance. While the reports analysed do not provide any information on which fund was spent on which projects, the general provision of funds and their sources of income will be an-alysed.

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Throughout the time period analysed, WWF Russia has maintained sufficient funding for its survival. While its annual income did not constantly increase, the overall tendency of income ac-quired is positive (Figure 2). The budget increased from an annual €5,755,000 in 2001 to € 10,843,000 in 2015. Accordingly, the annual income of WWF Russia almost doubled within 15 years. However, when analysing the sources of income, it is striking that WWF Russia hugely bene-fits from being part of the transnational network WWF. WWF entities, such as WWF international, WWF Germany, or WWF Netherlands have made up for the majority of the budget. From 2001-2015 between 47.51% (2015) and 80.5% (2002) of the budget was provided by sources from the organisation itself. This shows a vast dependency of WWF Russia on a variety of other WWF entities to gain sufficient funding. It is thus extremely reliant on the success of WWF as a whole. In addition to the foreign funds provided by international WWF entities, WWF Russia received do-nations from international governmental organisations and aid agencies. Between 2001 and 2014 these contributions vary between 24.22 percent (2009) and 11.85 percent (2012) of the respective annual budget. It is worth noting that no trend in contributions by governmental organisations can be identified. Their donations fluctuate and have neither a overall decreasing nor increasing rate. Underlying reasons could be governments funding specific projects, or varying budgets on develop cooperation of the respective governments. As the specific attributions of the funds are not listed, the underlying reasons remain subject to speculation and have to be investigated at another point in time.

Although international funding makes up the vast majority of WWF Russia's budget, it is worth not-ing that domestic contributions by corporate and private donors have vastly increased durnot-ing the time period investigated. Corporate and private donations only made up 2.82-5.3 percent of the an-nual income from 2001-2003. However, WWF Russia became a national organisation in 2004, which enabled increased domestic financial support from Russian citizens (Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 64). From 2006 onwards, domestic contributions made up at least 13.34 percent of the budget. Al-though the absolute amount of domestic donations fluctuates, an overall positive trend can be iden-tified. Domestic donations increased by more than 1000 percent in 15 years, from €162,000 in 2001 to €1,626,000 in 2015, while peaking in 2014 contributing € 2,618,000 to the annual income. This rise in domestic contributions indicates support of the social sphere, which is crucial for an NGO's survival on various levels, as set out in the analytical framework. However, although domestic do-nations are overall increasing, it has to be noted that contributions by the Russian government are only listed in 2008. In that year, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology contributed

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€83,000 to the NGO's income, which made up for roughly 1 percent of the annual income (Kalinicheva, 2008, p. 50). Therefore, domestic government support through funding is basically non existent. It can thus be concluded that, while the political opportunity structure seems to corre-spond relatively well, the Russian government does not support WWF Russia's actions in totality. The global economic crisis in 2008 as well as the 2006 NGO law was highlighted as particularly harmful incidents to NGO funding. However, the overall income of WWF Russia constantly in-creased from 2005 to 2012. It can thus be assumed that WWF Russia either was not affected by the 2006 NGO law, or the NGO's high level of institutionalisation could sufficiently comply with the bureaucratic hurdles introduced by the law. Therefore, WWF Russia attracted support from a vari-ety of different international, domestic, governmental and private donors, securing its existence. Figure 2: WWF Russia Income Sources 2001-2015 2

Note: Adapted from (Kalinicheva & Pal, 2002, p. 23; Pal, Prokhorova & Voronkova, 2004, p. 35; Kalinicheva, 2005, p. 46; Kalinicheva, 2006, p.31; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 31; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 13; Kalinicheva, 2009, p. 50; Kalinicheva, 2010, p. 50; Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 61; Kalinicheva, 2012, p. 69; Kalinicheva, 2013, p. 43; Kalinicheva, 2014, p. 38; Kalinicheva, 2015, p. 63; Kalinicheva, 2016, p. 25);

Corresponding table can be found in the appendix

2 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 0 3000 6000 9000 12000 WWF sources

Foreign Governmental Organisations and Aid Agencies Russian Corporate and Private Donations

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5. Conclusion

This paper analysed conditions under which foreign funded NGO act efficiently and achieve change in Russia. It has done so by using the opportunity structures set out by Fröhlich as analytical guide-lines to structure its case study. The analysis has identified a generally cooperative relationship be-tween WWF Russia and the state in combating illegal logging. However, the state remains highly selective on what issues it is willing to work together with the NGO. Thus, WWF Russia-projects through which the government was assisted were generally perceived positively. Assistance in mon-itoring, or the provision of training material for the Federal Customs Academy was accepted by the state. These efforts helped to identify illegal logging activities on the ground. However, the state was less cooperative when the NGO asked the government to implement stricter legislation on ille-gal logging, as well as ensuring stronger law enforcement for existing legislation. Therefore, al-though the state showed willingness to work with the foreign funded NGO, its efforts to actively protect the achievement of the organisation's projects remain limited. This demonstrates the fault line of state and social sphere cooperation within the local context, as well as the particular context of illegal logging. Without appropriate protection by law, the NGO's efforts to fight illegal logging will most likely not remain successful in the long run.

Aside from political cooperation, the NGO has managed to gain public support to combat illegal logging. Contrasting research suggesting an internationally funded NGO was deemed suspi-cious by the general public, the organisation managed to mobilise relatively large amounts of peo-ple protesting for very specific law provisions on trees. This suggests strong trust and ideological congruence between the social sphere and the NGO. Furthermore, the rise in domestic funding demonstrates a strong approval for the NGO and its overall work by the local population. This strong back up by the public showed demonstrated its strength against the state level, when the protests mobilised resulted in amendments of law and the introduction on technical working groups to amend further provisions. Hence, the strong public support proved to be a counterweight to the state power. Therefore, effectiveness of the NGO was rather enabled through mobilisation of the people than close cooperation between the organisation and the state.

It is important to note that the NGO's efforts to maintain cooperative relationship with the state most likely assures its ability to possibly amend national legislation. It is further suspected, that the cooperative relationship protects the NGO from political restrictions on its work. However, it has to noted that the NGO's independence from Russian government funding, as well as the gen-eral support by the public, ensures the organisation some leverage and independence, when it comes

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to achieving its goals. This demonstrates that, the fulfilment of the economic and ideological oppor-tunity structures can make up for some limits in the legislative opporoppor-tunity structures. However, due to the asymmetrical power relationship between the state and the social sphere, favourable condi-tions between the state and the NGO have to be maintained, to secure chances of NGO effective-ness.

The findings of this paper remain very limited. The paper focused on a very marginalised aim of one of the biggest foreign funded environmental NGOs in Russia. The findings might there-fore not represent the overall tendency of the relationship between the state and environmental NGOs. Furthermore, the study relied on annual reports, designed for the general public. Therefore, its writing style was aimed to be entertaining and acquiring donations. Hence, a variety of projects, as well as difficulties while implementing them, was probably not mentioned. Due to insufficient language skills, government reports on the matter could not by investigated. These could have cre-ated a more complete picture of the relations between the state and social sphere. To retrieve more accurate results, field work should be conducted. Interviews with members of NGOs as well as the social sphere could offer a more accurate depiction of the situation on the ground. Furthermore, a comparative case study could offer a better insight on patterns in the relationship between environ-mental NGOs and the government. Therefore, a greater variety of various environenviron-mental NGOs, domestically and foreign funded, should be investigated. The findings could then assess whether any certain type of NGO is more likely to achieve its goals in the Russian setting.

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7. Appendix

Table 1. Data summary for FSC certified forest areas 2001-2015.

Note. Data compiled from Kalinicheva& Pal, 2002, p. 6; 2003, p. 6; Pal et al. , 2004, p. 6;

Kalinicheva, 2005, p. 18; Kalinicheva, 2006, p. 16; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 3; Kalinicheva, 2009, p. 8, Kalinicheva, 2010, p. 24; Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 11 ;Kalinicheva, 2012, p. 8; Kalinicheva, 2015, p. 15, Kalinicheva, 2016, p. 10 

Year Million Hectares

FSC certified 2001 0,25 2002 1,0 2003 1,7 2004 3,7 2005 7,8 2006 13,7 2007 no data 2008 20 2009 22 2010 24,3 2011 30 2012 39,6 2013 no data 2014 40 2015 41,8

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Table 2. Data summary of WWF Income Sources 2001-2015, in thousands of Euro.

Note. Data compiled from Kalinicheva & Pal, 2002, p. 23; Pal et al. 2004, p. 35; Kalinicheva, 2005, p. 46; Kalinicheva, 2006, p.31; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 31; Kalinicheva, 2007, p. 13; Kalinicheva, 2009, p. 50; Kalinicheva, 2010, p. 50; Kalinicheva, 2011, p. 61; Kalinicheva, 2012, p. 69;

Kalinicheva, 2013, p. 43; Kalinicheva, 2014, p. 38; Kalinicheva, 2015, p. 63; Kalinicheva, 2016, p. 25

2001-2004 financial reports were published in thousands of US Dollar. They were converted ac-cording to the average exchange rate from US Dollar to Euro of the respective year.

2015 financial report was published in millions of Roubles. It was converted according to the aver-age exchange rate from Rouble to Euro in 2015.

Table 3. WWF Russia Income Sources 2001-2015, in percent.

Total Income WWF sources Foreign

Governmental Organisations and Aid Agencies Russian Corporate and Private Donations Other Sources 2001 5755 3956 1152 162 485 2002 4386 3365 686 194 141 2003 5030 3828 696 266 240 2004 4951 3069 920 776 186 2005 4523 3179 828 304 212 2006 5395 3527 892 673 339 2007 6411 3716 1073 1359 263 2008 7827 5240 1169 1044 374 2009 8472 4401 2052 1196 832 2010 9176 4697 1476 1783 1220 2011 9430 4606 2026 2234 564 2012 9998 5138 1185 2147 1528 2013 9205 4990 1677 1623 915 2014 9712 5152 1345 2618 597 2015 10843 5808 not listed 1626 3409 WWF sources Foreign Governmental Organisations and Aid Agencies Russian Corporate and Private Donations 2001 68.7 20.02 2.82 2002 80.5 15.63 4.44

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Note. Calculated by the author on basis of Table 2. 2003 76.1 13.84 5.30 2004 62.0 18.6 15.67 2005 70.3 18.31 6.72 2006 65.4 16.53 12.47 2007 58.0 16.73 21.2 2008 66.9 14.94 13.34 2009 51.9 24.22 14.00 2010 51.2 16.09 19.44 2011 48.84 21.48 23.70 2012 51.39 11.85 21.48 2013 54.21 18.21 17.64 2014 53.04 13.85 16.66 2015 47.51 non listed 15.82 WWF sources Foreign Governmental Organisations and Aid Agencies Russian Corporate and Private Donations