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Civil-Military Relations in Egypt and Syria: The Determinants of Successful Coup-Proofing

Bachelor Thesis

Student: Rowan Berg s1853678 Instructor: Kevin Köhler

14-05-2019 7500 words

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1 Table of contents

Introduction ... 2

Theoretical framework ... 2

Exploitation of social bonds ... 4

Creation of parallel security institutions ... 5

Material incentives ... 5

Hypothesis ... 7

Research design ... 8

Case selection ... 9

Empirical findings ... 10

Timeline: How the Arab Spring unfolded in Syria and Egypt ... 10

Egypt: No support for Mubarak ... 10

Syria: The survival of Bashar al-Assad ... 11

The application of coup-proofing strategies ... 11

Coup-proofing in Egypt ... 12

Coup-proofing in Syria ... 13

The consequence of coup-proofing strategies ... 14

Conclusion ... 17

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2 Introduction

When Tarek el-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi, a poor Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010 in protest against police corruption, he could not have imagined

the consequences his self-immolation would have. Bouazizi’s action inspired many Tunisians who resented the regime and took to the streets to protest. The demonstrations rapidly spread across Tunis, and, eventually, the whole Middle East. This wave of civilian uprisings, which confronted many countries, like Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Yemen, led to the overthrow of several leaders of authoritarian regimes by the military and became known as the Arab Spring.

One of the biggest fears for the leader of an authoritarian regime is being toppled by its military through a coup d’état (Sudduth, 2017). For this reason, it has become a day-to-day activity of authoritarian incumbents to prevent its military from staging a coup by applying coup-proofing strategies. However, as the events of the Arab Spring exemplify, the degree of success differs across regimes; not all regimes that applied coup-proofing, managed to stay in power. Therefore, it becomes interesting to look into what factors determine this success.

This thesis looks into what factors influence the success of coup-proofing strategies. First, a theoretical background is provided in which the concepts of coup, coup-proofing and coup risk are defined and examined. Moreover, this section focuses specifically on coup-proofing in the Middle East. On the basis of this theoretical framework, the hypothesis is formulated. Then, the research design which is established to test this hypothesis is described, after which the empirical findings will be outlined and analysed.

Theoretical framework

Edward Luttwak’s book, Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook, has become one of the most influential sources of literature on the thinking about coups. A coup, according to Luttwak, can be defined as ‘the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder’ (Luttwak, 1969, p.12). The Middle East has proved to be fertile ground for coups: between March 1949 and the end of 1980, fifty-five coups were attempted in Arab states, half of them were successful (Quinlivan, 1999). Syria was one of the most coup-prone states in the Middle East between 1949 and 1970, with fifteen successful coups. In 1949 alone, the year of Syrian independence, three successful coups occurred. By 1960, the vast majority of the Arab states was established and led by soldiers. Coups became a regular thing in all states: ‘the quasi-ordinary form of change of a regime or a government in the Arab states had become the military coup’ (Be’Eri, 1982, p.69).

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By 1980, it seemed that coups were becoming less frequent among Arab states and the number of coups has steadily declined since then. This can be explained by a variety of reasons, among which ‘the inability of military regimes to solve their countries’ problems, the declining prestige of the officer corps in the face of military defeat and an increase in the importance of civilian technocracies’ (Quinlivan, 1999, pp.133). Another explanation is that those who staged a coup to take power ‘learned to take preventive measures to forestall their recurrence’ (Be’Eri, 1982, p.75). These measures are called coup-proofing: ‘the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup’ (Quinlivan, 1999, p.133).

Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in Syria through a bloodless coup in 1971, was one of the first authoritarian leaders in the MENA-region to impose measures to prevent a military coup. Through the trial-and-error adaption of coup-proofing techniques, its application started to grow in Syria and beyond. The remarkable decline in coup attempts in the Middle East reveals its significance and high state of development (Quinlivan, 1999). Coup-proofing strategies have, consequently, become self-reinforcing: ‘they created networks of powerful military actors whose influence and interests were dependent on making the reversal of the established pattern of civilian-military relations difficult’ (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.259).

Despite the declining number of coup attempts and the increased application of coup-proofing strategies, and regardless of the fact that an authoritarian leader faces multiple threats from both within and outside the political system, the threat of being toppled through a coup remains the most crucial for a leader’s survival, as a majority of the leaders in authoritarian states loses power through a coup rather than a civil war or protest (Sudduth, 2017, p.53). Moreover, the consequence of being toppled as the result of a coup are severe; ‘unconstitutional removals by coups often result in exile, imprisonment, or death of the former leader’ (Sudduth, 2017, p.53). Therefore, the implementation of coup-proofing strategies is essential for an incumbent whose priority is to remain power (Sudduth, 2017). However, coup-proofing carries risks – like civil war or the reduction of military effectiveness to the extent that it cannot defend the state against external threats – and it does not guarantee the absence of a coup (Albrecht, 2015b).

Coup-proofing strategies are applied by authoritarian leaders to lower coup-risk. Coup-risk is not necessarily about the weakness of the regime, but rather about ‘the likelihood of regime incumbents to experience coup attempts’ (Albrecht, 2015b, p.660). It, thus, does not focus on the success of a coup, only on the probability of a coup attempt (Belkin & Schofer, 2003).

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Coup-risk is based on two factors: opportunity and motives. Opportunity relates to the question of whether the military is able to stage a coup, while motives relate to the extent to which the military wants to stage a coup. When motivation is absent, the possibility of a coup is low, because there exists no incentive within the military force to stage a coup. However, when the opportunity is low, but motivation is high, coup risk can remain high (Finer, 1988).

The two rationales that underlie coup-proofing, integration and segregation, focus on both aspects of coup-risk to effectively lower coup-risk. Integrative measures try to take away the motivation for a coup by binding the officers close to the incumbent. Measures based on segregation try to eliminate the opportunity to stage a coup by moving the officer corps out of the political arena and removing their access to political influence (Albrecht, 2015a).

There is a whole array of coup-proofing methods – based on integration and segregation – that can be applied by the incumbent. These methods are not exclusive; they can be mixed into a combination of segregation and integration strategies (Albrecht, 2015a). In general, three dominant coup-proofing strategies are employed by regimes (Bou Nassif, 2015).

Exploitation of social bonds

A regime can secure officer loyalty with social bonds. The central mechanism within this coup-proofing strategy is that the idea is created with the military corps that they have a better future when staying loyal to the incumbent than when they defect; in other words, the military cannot imagine a world without the incumbent. This can be done in two ways. The leader could create a ‘community of trust’ by granting a certain group within the population favours and placing individuals from this group on high-ranked positions within the military. Hence, the group is tied to the regime. Often, this takes place within a minority group in need of protection by the regime (Makara, 2015). Another way is to create the perception of a common threat or a shared aversion/worldview which weds the military to the regime. Incumbents manipulate political ideology or identity-centred solidarity bonds to earn the loyalty of the military. If the military shares a common threat perception with the regime, they are more likely to identify with the regime and defend it during a crisis. Thus, ‘when an autocrat in power becomes the symbol of a value system or an idea that is held dear by the soldiers serving under him, they are less likely to threaten his rule, especially if the vacuum created by this downfall could be filled by a loathed “other”’ (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.256). The incumbent could exploit these two forms of social bonds to secure military loyalty.

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This strategy is an integrative method of coup-proofing. If the military shares a common threat perception with the regime, they are more likely to identify with the regime and defend it during crises. By making the military believe that their future is secured with the incumbent, the motivation is taken away and thereby, coup-risk is lowered.

Creation of parallel security institutions

Some regimes create autonomous, parallel security institutions, in addition to the military, which are tasked with the protection of the regime and serve as a balance against the regular army. The goal of these new security forces is to prevent coups. As these parallel security institutions will resist dissidents in defence of the regime, coup attempts are discouraged since the cost of intervention for the military are significantly raised. Moreover, these parallel security forces have the capacity to monitor the regular army, allowing them to uncover a coup plot before it occurs (Makara, 2013).

However, these forces also enhance the chance of a coup. The military is removed from internal security missions, as this becomes the responsibility of the new security forces. As a result of this, military personnel will perform duties that do not include internal repression. Inevitably, they will refuse if the regime asks them to perform repressive duties to counter civilian uprisings or other internal problems, as this is the role of the new security forces which replaced them. In addition to this, the marginal status that the military forces occupy within the regime’s coercive apparatus leads to a neglect of their interests. This will unite the military elite with the junior and mid-ranking officers in their resentment of the regime, which makes their loyalty to the regime even more questionable. This will be problematic when the regime is in need of military support during a civilian crisis (Bou Nassif, 2015).

This method of coup-proofing is defined as a method of segregation, as the goal of the strategy is to minimize the influence of the military. The role of the military is marginalized, and their activities are monitored to take away the opportunity to stage a coup. Therefore, this strategy focuses on the opportunities side of coup-risk. The risk can, nevertheless, remain high.

Material incentives

Incumbents keep military officers loyal by providing them with material incentives. Officers’ various sectors are kept well-funded since a large defence budget keeps the military happy. Additionally, politicians will often buy the loyalty of military officers with material benefits, such as medical care, housing and economic opportunities, which are not available to the rest of the population (Makara, 2013). Moreover, only autocrats can prevent senior officers from

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being prosecuted, and they can only do this by staying in power (Bou Nassif, 2015). Thus, by the granting and protection of economic benefits to the military elite, the regime takes away the incentive by the military to stage a coup; when the military does stage a coup, they will lose their economic benefits. Hence, the fate of the officers is tied to that of the regime (Makara, 2013). However, on the other side, the regime often lacks the recourses to also benefit the mid-ranking and junior officers. Consequently, the military becomes divided, and this might leave the regime vulnerable during crises (Bou Nassif, 2015).

This strategy is an integrative form of coup-proofing, as the goal is to bind the military to the incumbent by buying their loyalty. The method is thus also focused on eliminating the motivation to stage a coup and thereby lowers coup-risk.

Whether the officer corps will defect or support the regime is dependent on the convergence of views within the corps. The divergence between the military elite, mid-ranking and junior officers is natural; however, its extent is decisive. This is determined by the strength of the linkages between autocratic rulers, the military elite and the mid-ranking and junior officers. Coup-proofing strategies mould these linkages in such a way that they predetermine which choice the military will make when the authority of the regime is threatened (Bou Nassif, 2015).

It is found that strategies that are solely based on creating parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives weaken the strength of the linkages between the incumbent, military elite and mid-ranking and junior officers as these strategies create competition within the military and enhance divisions between the military elite and lower-ranking soldiers. (Makara, 2013). Strategies that focus on the exploitation of social bonds mitigate these effects. These strengthen the bonds between the military and the incumbents. Therefore, the military is more likely to stay cohesive and loyal to the regime (Makara, 2013)

The exploitation of social bonds is therefore decisive, because it ties the interest of the military elite as well as the lower-ranking officers to the regime, while providing material incentives only benefits the military elite as regimes often do not have the financial resources to also benefit the lower-officers, and the creation of a parallel security apparatus alienates the military from the regime. If civil protests arise, the military elite will, despite their economic interest, withdraw their support of the regime as they will otherwise lose control over their subordinates, since they will not be so eager to defend in the regime (Bou Nassif, 2015).

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Thus, ‘by shaping civil-military relations into different moulds, coup-proofing tactics predetermine the disposition of the military elite, as well as that of the mid-ranking and junior officers, toward autocratic rulers and, consequently, the senior officers’ incentive and capacity to defend the regime – or the lack thereof’ (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.275).

The assumption that a higher coup-risk leads to a greater level of coup-proofing does however not take into account the possibility that the application of coup-proofing might prompt a coup. The aim of coup-proofing strategies is to reduce the capabilities of the military to stage a coup and minimizing its political influence. The military will try to prevent this reduction by staging a coup; it becomes essential for the military to stop the regime’s coup-proofing by removing the leader (Sudduth, 2017).

The dilemma for the leader is therefore two-fold: on the one hand, the leader tries to increase his share of power at the expense of the military, while, on the other hand, the military will try to deter this by threatening to stage a coup. For this reason, incumbents are less likely to impose coup-proofing strategies when they already face a high coup risk, as such measures are likely to spark a coup (Sudduth, 2017).

Hypothesis

It was found in the theory that strategies solely based on creating parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives create competition and division within the military and the security apparatus in general. Thereby, the cohesion of the military is lowered, which in turn can make the military susceptible to defection when the authority of the regime is threatened, as the military elite will not defend the regime at the cost of losing the power over their subordinates. Strategies that focus on the exploitation of social bonds, to the contrary, tie the interest of the whole military apparatus to that of the regime, and thereby mitigate these effects. Every individual in the military is convinced through this exploitation of the importance of the incumbent staying in power, as this secures their future within the military. When the incumbent is toppled, this might lead to a ‘loathed other’ coming to power, an option that the military will not look forward to. The most important factor of this strategy is that the lower-ranking officers will not turn against the regime, as is the case with the other two coup-proofing strategies, but instead will defend. Thus, when the army is ordered to defend the regime, both the lower-ranking and junior officers as well as the high ranked officers will follow these orders, as it is in their interest. For this reason, the exploitation of social bonds is found to be decisive for the survival of the regime.

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On the basis of this theory, the hypothesis is formulated that the variance in the success of proofing can be explained by the fact that incumbents implement different coup-proofing strategies and focus on different aspects of coup-coup-proofing. It is expected that in regimes where the incumbent was toppled despite the application of coup-proofing strategies, the incumbent implemented coup-proofing strategies which did not include or did not stress the exploitation of social bonds and instead emphasized the building of parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives. Authoritarian rulers who stayed in power despite their authority being threatened will have applied coup-proofing measures which included or focused on the exploitation of social bonds, possibly in addition to providing material incentives and/or the establishment of parallel security institutions.

Research design

To test this hypothesis, establishment of the coup-proofing measures should be analysed extensively. It becomes possible to test whether the success of coup-proofing measures is dependent on what proofing measures were implemented by looking into what coup-proofing measures were applied specifically, and how. In order to do such a contextual analysis, a case study must be conducted. Additionally, the hypothesis can only be tested by analysing a case of successful coup-proofing, as well as a case of a failure. It can only be argued that applying social bonds leads to success when it is proved that when social bonds are ignored in the coup-proofing strategy, this leads to failure, and when they were applied, it led to success.

As the aim of the analysis is to explain a difference in the outcome between the two cases both cases, namely the difference in the success of coup-proofing, a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) is chosen. An MSSD design compares very similar cases which only differ in the dependent variable, as this makes it easier to find the explanatory variables that explains the difference in the dependent variable. The advantage of an analysis of rather similar cases is that all factors except for the dependent variable are kept constant, making it easier to find the explanatory variables. This design thus fits the research question best, as the goal is to explain the one varying aspect (Anckar, 2008).

The independent variables in this research are the several coup-proofing strategies that are stated in the theoretical framework. The dependent variable is the degree of success. This is measured on the basis of the aim of coup proofing – preventing a coup from happening – and success is therefore defined as the absence of a coup (Makara, 2013).

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Case selection

To answer the research question, two cases should be selected that have applied coup-proofing methods and have suffered some kind of threat to the legitimacy of the authority of the regime. The cases that have been chosen for this aim are Syria and Egypt. Both regimes have intensively applied the coup-proofing strategies that have been stated earlier; thus, they perfectly fit within the theoretical framework. Moreover, both regimes faced similar problems, the uprisings of the Arab Spring of 2011, and as a result thereof a similar threat to the authority of the regime.

Essential for a Most Similar Systems Design is that the two countries are relatively similar with the exception of one factor, the phenomenon that the research question tries to explain: the success of coup-proofing strategies. Regarding the former: Egypt and Syria shared a number of core characteristics prior to the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. Both states were authoritarian regimes that executed coup-proofing measures prior to the Arab Spring uprisings. Moreover, the regimes came into existence through anti-establishment coups by the army. Additionally, both militaries played a significant role during the first decades of state-building and socio-economic modernization and have retained their influence ever since. Also, the regimes encountered similar problems during the Arab Spring: civilian uprisings which showed the discontent of the people with the regime (Albrecht, 2015a).

Regarding the latter: Syria is seen as a successful case of coup-proofing. Structural causes for a coup had been present prior and during the Arab Spring, but the regime had effectively implemented coup-proofing strategies and therefore did not experience a coup as a result of the civilian uprising (Belkin & Schofer, 2003). Egypt, to the contrary, was confronted with two coups during the Arab Spring (2011 and 2013), which proves that coup-proofing strategies were applied ineffectively (Albrecht, 2015b). This makes the combination of the two cases perfect for an MSSD-design.

The timeline of the research is not focused on the Arab Spring uprisings themselves, as coup-proofing strategies were applied before these events took place. This research takes the civil uprisings of 2011 and their consequences only as the crucial turning point, as these showed the (in)effectiveness of the application of coup-proofing strategies. However, the scope of the analysis is much broader as it focuses on coup-proofing in the regimes of Mubarak (1981-2011) and al-Assad (2000-present).

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10 Empirical findings

Prior to the Arab Spring, it was assumed that rulers in the Middle East had successfully applied coup-proofing strategies to solve the civil-military problematique. However, during the Arab Spring, Egypt witnessed its military replace a long-serving incumbent, while officers in Syria, to the contrary, intervened to protect the Assad-regime (Albrecht, 2015a). The question that arises therefore is why coup-proofing was successful in some cases and not in others. Theory implies that this difference can be explained by the application of different coup-proofing strategies. This part of the thesis will start with a short description of how the protests in Syria and Egypt unfolded, after which the application of coup-proofing strategies will be analysed.

Timeline: How the Arab Spring unfolded in Syria and Egypt

The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests that began in Tunisia in the end of 2010 and spread across the Middle East. The uprisings had grave effects in many regimes; Tunis witnessed regime change and in Yemen, president Saleh resigned under the pressure of an emerging civil war. Other regimes, such as Algeria and Saudi-Arabia witnessed severe civil protests but managed to survive. Egypt and Syria too witnessed severe civil protests but different outcomes. This section will shortly describe how events unfolded in both countries.

Egypt: No support for Mubarak

In January 2011, tens of thousands of Egyptians, inspired by the successful uprising in Tunisia, went to the streets to call for the end of the rule of Hosni Mubarak as they were unhappy with economic conditions, police brutality and the political repression in Egypt (Nepstad, 2011). The president called out his internal security services to repress the demonstrations, but the size of the protests overwhelmed the security personnel. Consequently, the internal security service of the regime as well as its core political institution, the National Democratic Party, broke down (Albrecht, 2015a). Mubarak, in turn, tried to satisfy the people by announcing that he would not participate in the next elections. However, this could not stop the demonstrators (Nepstad, 2011). Thus, Mubarak ordered the military to intervene and to secure strategic locations in Cairo. However, as a large part of the military personnel had family and friends participating in the protests, they refused to follow the orders given by Mubarak (Varol, 2012). Mubarak realized that he started to lose the loyalty of the military and promised more concessions. This was nonetheless not enough for the people: they wanted Mubarak to leave entirely and asked the military to depose Mubarak. The military leadership, organized in the Supreme Council of

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Armed Forces (SCAF), released a communiqué that they would comply with the wishes of the people and take over political power (Nepstad, 2011). Mubarak and his second man, Omar Suleiman, resigned on January 25, 2011, and the SCAF consolidated its power in the following months (Albrecht, 2015a).

Syria: The survival of Bashar al-Assad

The civil protests in Syria were sparked in March 2011, when people in Dera’a, angry over the arrest of schoolchildren who had painted anti-government graffiti, took to the streets. The army responded with opening fire on the demonstrators. Assad promised conciliatory measures and released dozens of political prisoners. However, the protests continued to spread rapidly across the country from the initial demonstration in Dera’a to Homs, Hamas, Deir al-Zur and Aleppo (Albrecht, 2015a). The focus of the protests shifted from the release of the political prisoners to the regime of Assad; people protested against high unemployment rates, declining standards of living, human rights abuses and the nearly 50 years of emergency rule that had severely restricted political freedoms. By late March, protests occurred everywhere in Syria, with hundreds of thousands of civilians taking part. With these increased demonstrations also came expanded repression: the military deployed snipers, bombs and tanks to clear the protests. Although Assad made concessions, he primarily relied on violence as a tool of control (Nepstad, 2011). In the end, the military’s uncompromising reaction, with a continued upscaling of violence, and the rebel attacks in Aleppo and Damascus, have pushed Syria into a civil war in 2012, with the rebels being supported by the international community and the regime losing control over large parts of the country’s territory. The officer corps, nevertheless, remained loyal to the regime under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad. Only low-ranking officers defected and established the Free Syrian Army; defection among higher officers remained isolated incidents. In general, the military remained loyal to Assad (Albrecht, 2015a).

The application of coup-proofing strategies

Assad and Mubarak employed a mix of inclusion and segregation coup-proofing strategies. The main difference between the two cases pertain to economic coup-proofing, counterbalancing and the social composition of the officer corps. The Syrian regime used coup-proofing strategies to tether the officer corps to the regime whereas the Egyptian army was distanced from the regime and politics (Albrecht, 2015a). This section will analyse which and how coup-proofing strategies were applied in both regimes and how this application differed.

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12 Coup-proofing in Egypt

The coup-proofing strategies applied by Mubarak focused on two methods: the promoting of material incentives and counterbalancing. Throughout Mubarak’s tenure, new, parallel security forces were established and kept growing – both in numbers and in budget – under the lead of the Ministry of Interior (Bou Nassif, 2015). The largest among these were the Central Security Forces (CSF), a unit which was roughly equal in size to the military and primarily responsible for repressing domestic opposition and monitoring the military. Additionally, Mubarak employed a secret police force, the State Security Investigation (SSI), which was responsible for domestic security and monitoring. The SSI was also tasked with checking the Ministry of Interior and the military (Makara, 2013). The military openly resented these parallel security forces and the Ministry of Interior (Bou Nassif, 2015).

When Mubarak became president in 1981, he discarded the ideological message of Nasser and the frequent reshuffling tactic of Sadat. He upheld the privileges of the military elite; Mubarak continued providing the military with material incentives, something started by Nasser and Sadat (Bou Nassif, 2013). In the decades prior to the Arab Spring, Mubarak had activated the establishment of a parallel military-business economy. He sealed a deal with his Minister of Defence which led to the creation of an economic empire that only the military would control. This empire later became known as Military Inc. (Albrecht, 2015a). The military economy was not monitored by any agency except for the military, which allowed the military to profit from its existence freely. Military Inc. seeped into every corner of Egyptian society, producing food, gasoline, vehicles and infrastructure (Hashim, 2011). It provided senior officers with the perfect opportunities for self-enrichment in the absence of any oversight (Albrecht, 2015a).

Moreover, senior officers were assured post-retirement appointment to high-placed civilian positions in the bureaucracy. Between 2000 and 2011, 44% of the provincial governors were senior military officers, against 36% civilians and 20% police officers (Bou Nassif, 2013, p.517). The regime argued that the officers’ military background better enabled them to deal with defence-related issues in their governorates than civilians, thereby justifying the appointments of military officers as governors. Moreover, several chiefs-of-staff of the Egyptian military secured a job as president or director of a big company, ambassador, governor or minister. By guaranteeing officers a wealthy future within the bureaucracy, Mubarak tried to buy their loyalty. Mid-ranking and junior officers, however, did not do as well. They earned low wages; around 333 dollar a month. The military offered housing and medical care, but an officer had to wait three to five years before receiving a modest apartment (Bou Nassif, 2013).

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13 Coup-proofing in Syria

As coup-proofing strategies are not mutually exclusive, Assad applied a combination of three strategies: counterbalancing, promoting of material incentives and exploitation of social bonds. To increase his counterbalancing capabilities, Assad improved the five parallel security units in charge of security which were established by Hafiz al-Assad, his predecessor, after coming to power. These units functioned independently of the armed forces (Bou Nassif, 2015). Many officers resented this development: the military was weakened and marginalized as a result of these parallel security units. Moreover, they felt that they were inappropriately affected by Assad’s anti-corruption campaign (Makara, 2013).

In Syria, the military’s involvement in economics was established through informal channels rather than via a formalized military economy as with Military Inc. in Egypt. Assad allowed the military elite to profit from their economic partnerships with businessmen as the regime could not provide the senior officers with the benefits by itself (Bou Nassif, 2015). Thus, Assad had carefully opened the economy to allow military personnel to engage in the private sector and with private businesses (Albrecht, 2015a). Military personnel received economic favours on an individual basis and not through an independent military economy. These favours were no guarantee; Assad critically selected who had access to these economic favours and could remove these persons from their influential position (Albrecht, 2015a).

To exploit social bonds, Assad applied both legs of the method; he created communities of trust on the basis of a shared aversion. After he came to power, Assad dismissed members of the old guard and installed loyal personnel. He also replaced his chief-of-staff and enforced changes in the leading position of the various intelligence and security apparatuses. He filled up these high positions with members of the Alawi community and, thereby, created a community of trust. In the end, the whole security apparatus became dominated by Alawi, who held many key leadership and logistical positions (Makara, 2013). This enhanced the sectarian bonds which existed within the regime. The family of Assad was Alawi, as well as a large part of the political elite. At times, 90 percent of the higher officers were Alawi, while they comprised only ten to twelve percent of the population. Hardly any Sunnis – which comprised around 75 percent of the population – occupied a high military position or a post within the security apparatus (Albrecht, 2015a).

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Assad did not only create a community of trust, he also ensured regime control over this community. Assad himself became the commander of the Republican Guard and the supervisor of military intelligence. Assad’s brother in law, Assef Shawkat, was given a prominent role behind the scenes to oversee the security establishment. Assad’s brother, Maher al-Assad, became commander of the Presidential Guard (Albrecht, 2015a).

Assad chose to create a community of trust with the Alawi on the basis of their shared ideology and aversion. Assad and the Alawi, and thereby the military, shared the aversion of the (Sunni) Muslim Brothers and other Islamist organizations, which were likely to emerge as contenders for power in a post-Assad Syria. This would threaten the social status of the Alawi, as Sunnis historically had persecuted Alawis (Bou Nassif, 2015).

The consequence of coup-proofing strategies

It has become evident that Mubarak and Assad choose similar coup-proofing methods: the providing of material incentives and counterbalancing. Their execution of counterbalancing did not differ much, and therefore, their results were quite similar: they united the military in its resentment of the regime (Bou Nassif, 2015). The provision of material favours, however, differed. It is not the increased economic involvement of the military itself that guarantees the loyalty of the military to the regime. Rather, it is the creation of a patron-client relationship that is crucial for military loyalty. In Syria, the economic influence of the military officers was dependent on their loyalty to the regime, while in Egypt the military was capable of maintaining their economic empire without the support of Mubarak; their loyalty was not necessary.

This became evident in Egypt when the economic policy of the civilian government started to clash with the interests of the military-led economy. The military started distancing itself from the regime, as it was not dependent on the regime for its economic favours. Moreover, the military started actively torpedoing the policies of the regime to the extent that it led to conflicts between the military and the government (Albrecht, 2015a). This resentment was strengthened by the fact that Mubarak took away budget from the military to support his parallel security forces (Makara, 2013).

In Syria, Assad did not struggle with these kinds of problems. However, although Assad was more successful in distributing material favours, it only bought him the loyalty of the military elite and not the lower ranking officers, as they had no access to these favours (Bou Nassif, 2015).

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The biggest and most crucial difference between the two regimes is that Mubarak did not exploit social bonds while Assad did. Assad managed to tie the survival of the regime to the survival of the Alawi. Sunnis have historically persecuted and repressed Alawis. The Alawis feared retaliation if the regime would fall; when Assad would get toppled, they would lose their protected social status (Makara, 2013). Both higher ranking officers as well as junior and lower-ranking officers were Alawi. This meant that Assad enjoyed the support of the whole military and that the military officers could give the order to repress the protests without undercutting their control over the lower-ranking officers corps, as they shared their aversion of the Sunnis. Moreover, as a result of this sectarianism, Syrian officers always had a role which included repression, while in Egypt this function was taken over by the parallel security forces. In sum, the Syrian military had no reason to turn its back on their embattled president. The military elite could order to shoot at the civilian protesters without putting the coherence of the military at stake or endangering their control over it (Bou Nassif, 2015).

For Mubarak, it was not an option to create a community of trust within the military based on a social group, like the Alawis in Syria, as the Egyptian officer corps was ethnically relatively homogenous – dominantly Arab and Sunni – resulting from the method of recruitment; recruits were targeted from across the entire country from a Sunni-dominated, primarily Arab population (Albrecht, 2015a) Thus, ‘the homogenous nature of the Egyptian society precluded Mubarak from “othering” the protesters the way Bashar al-Assad did in Syria’ (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.266).

This does not mean that the exploitation of social bonds was no option for Mubarak at all. The exploitation of social bonds does not necessarily have to take place within a social group. The key mechanism is that the ruler manages to convince the military that they are better off with than without him. Mubarak was not capable of convincing the military of this idea. This was the consequence of two developments. First, the military resented the increased civilianization of politics. Since the 1970s, the military had enjoyed a position which allowed them to rule without governing: ‘while avoiding the day-to-day responsibilities of running the country, the military had always been the final arbiter of Egyptian politics’ (Makara, 2013, p.346). Mubarak tried to decrease the military’s political influence, which became evident from his growing rapport with the civilian factions of his party, the NDP; a development that the military did not support. The second development was Mubarak’s preparation of Gamal Mubarak, his son, to become his successor. Gamal had strong ties to the younger business elite of the NDP. The military saw this as a threat to its economic privileges; they were afraid that if Gamal would come to power, they would lose their long-enjoyed material favours at the cost

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of this younger NDP-elite. This was exacerbated by the fact that Gamal would be the first non-military president, and, thus, had no ties with the non-military which would allow them to protect their privileges (Makara, 2013).

The distance between Mubarak and his officer corps thereby only became bigger, while it already had been rather extensive. Most of the officers came from the lower and middle class, while Mubarak and his political entourage were seen as members of the upper class. Field Marshall Tantawi, Minister of Defense and in charge of the SCAF, was more seen as a member of the political elite than the man in charge of the military. Moreover, most officers in the SCAF were much younger than the president, had never fought in a war and were exposed to Western training and cooperation as a result of Egypt’s alliance with the United States. Mubarak and Tantawi were the only two remaining representatives of the October Generation, having fought in the 1973 war with Israel, known in Egypt as the October War (Albrecht, 2015a).

Thus, as the above-named developments unfolded, the military started to realize that their current, favourable position could not be protected by Mubarak; on the contrary, it seemed that Mubarak was trying to break it down. The military consequently realized that they would be better off without Mubarak than with him in power. Therefore, when protests broke out and the military had to choose between staying loyal to Mubarak and firing on the demonstrators or defecting and staging a coup, they choose the coup, but foremost for their own future.

Mubarak’s application of counterbalancing and the provision of material favours thus delivered him the loyalty of the military elite; bonds of loyalty between Mubarak and the younger officers were not enhanced like in the case of Syria under Assad. The fact that Mubarak also failed to exploit social bonds, made him vulnerable. The military would only support Mubarak as long as they had the trust that he would be capable of protecting their privileged position. When this trust started to wane, the loyalty of the military elite, next to that of the younger officers, became weakened. Thus, when Mubarak called for repression to deal with the protests and to keep him in power, the military refused as it no longer trusted that its future was better with than without Mubarak. Consequently, Mubarak was deposed. Assad, to the contrary, did convince the military that he could secure their social status in the future and therefore, they were in a better position supporting him than deposing him, as the social status of the Alawis might have suffered had Assad been deposed and lost his power to the Sunni community.

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From this analysis, it becomes evident that the general mechanism of coup-proofing strategies is one of in- and out-group processes. Some strategies gain loyalty from the whole military, creating an in-group comprising the entire military. The out-group, then exists within society. This is the case with the exploitation of social bonds. In this case, the in-group consists of all military personnel and the out-group consists of all the citizens that resent the regime.

Other strategies gain the loyalty of a part of the military and thereby create divisions within the military. This is the case with the provision of material incentives. This strategy only benefits the high-ranked military officers, whereby they become part of in-group. The lower-ranking officers that do not profit, become part of the out-group which exists within society as their loyalty is not bought and they resent the advantages of the higher-ranking officers.

In the case of creating parallel security institutions, the military becomes part of the out-group. The military becomes united in its resentment towards the parallel security institutions that are set up and thereby becomes part of the societal out-group.

Conclusion

Coup-proofing strategies are measures applied by incumbents to prevent the military from deposing them. The results of coup-proofing differ; some leaders manage to stay in power while others were, despite the application of coup-proofing, deposed. The aim of this research was to uncover what determines the success of coup-proofing. It was tested whether this could be explained by the fact that incumbents apply different coup-proofing strategies. The analysis of the two cases, Egypt and Syria, makes clear that this indeed is an explanatory variable. Egypt applied counterbalancing and the provision of material incentives. Thereby, Mubarak gained the loyalty of the military elite only. He could not convince the military that its future was better with him in power by exploiting social bonds, and thus was deposed as soon as protests broke out.

Assad also applied counterbalancing and the provision of material incentives. However, contrary to Mubarak, he managed to convince the military that he was capable of securing their privileged social status. Thus, when protests broke out, the military chose to support Assad as this was necessary to protect their privileges.

It is therefore concluded that the varying results of coup-proofing strategies can be explained by the fact that regimes apply different strategies, and thus, the case analysis confirms the hypotheses. Moreover, the cases affirm that the exploitation of social bonds is decisive; the fact that Mubarak failed to exploit these while Assad successfully applied this strategy, has been crucial for Assad’s survival and Mubarak’s resignation.

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Moreover, it is found that the general mechanism of coup-proofing is based on in- and out-group processes. Some strategies, including the provision of material incentives, create an in-group of privileged officers and push the rest of the military into an out-group within the military by creating competition and feelings of resentment with the officers that are not profiting. Other strategies, such as the exploitation of social bonds, assure that military as a whole is an in-group. The out-group, then, exists within society.

There are two implications for general theory on coup-proofing that can be taken away from this thesis. First, many, including Makara (2013) and Bou Nassif (2015), have taken sectarian bonds for gratned in Syria. Their arguments are based on the assumption that sectarianism exists naturally, and that Assad has exploited these social groups to create a community of trust from a minor social group. However, these sectarian bonds do not necessarily exist naturally. It is argued that Assad has actively created competition between the social groups in the Syrian society and thereby enhanced sectarianism. By making the military Alawi dominated, Assad deliberately created competition and tension between the Alawis and other social groups. Thus, Assad intentionally and actively intensified the resentment the groups felt for each other and thereby deepened sectarianism in Syrian society. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that sectarian bonds are inherent to a society; instead, it should be considered that these bonds can also be created through politics.

Another implication for general theory is that these regard sectarian bonds as the only source for the exploitation of social bonds. Therefore, they argue that the exploitation of social bonds was no possibility for Mubarak. However, the exploitation of social bonds does not have to be based on sect. The key mechanism of the exploitation of social bonds is that the incumbent convinces the military of his capacity of securing their future. The military will therefore support the leader when his authority is threatened, as his leadership guarantees their social status and privileges. This mechanism does not need a social group based on sectarian bonds – the group can be filled with people from different social groups – as long as the incumbent has a group he can convince of the necessity of him staying in power. This means that the exploitation of social groups would have been an option for Mubarak, despite the assumption in the literature by Bou Nassif (2015) and Makara (2013), that it was not. Thus, when looking into the application of coup-proofing, a more general notion of the exploitation of social bonds is necessary.

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There is one critical addition that must be added to this argumentation. Coup-proofing in Syria has been successful in preventing the toppling of Assad. With the support of his military, Assad managed to survive the Arab Spring uprisings and stayed in power. However, Assad’s methods of coup-proofing, which focused on the exploitation of social bonds, bought him the loyalty of the Alawis within the military only. Assad consciously chose to gain the loyalty of a group within his military apparatus, risking the desertion of the rest of the personnel that was not loyal to the regime, primarily the Sunnis. Thus, when civil protests broke out, Assad had to pay the price and faced the desertion of a part of the military apparatus. This left him with a severely marginalized military apparatus and weakened, disintegrated security apparatus. It should be noted, for this reason, that although Assad’s application of coup-proofing methods has been successful in keeping him in power, it also confronted him with the risks that came with the methods he chose. Instead of being deposed, Assad now faces a civil war he has to fight with a severely weakened military.

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20 Bibliography

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Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 20(1), pp.36-54.

Albrecht, H. (2015b). The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’état in the Middle East and North-Africa, 1950-2013. Armed Forces and Society,

41(4), pp.659-687.

Anckar, C. (2008). On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research. International Journal of Social

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Be’Eri, E. (1982). The waning of the military coup in Arab politics. Middle Eastern Studies,

18(1), pp.69-128.

Belkin, A. & Schofer, E. (2003). Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk. Journal of

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Bou Nassif, H. (2013). Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981-2011. The Middle East Journal, 67(4), pp.509-530. Bou Nassif, H. (2015). Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the

Military Elite’s Behaviour in the Arab Spring. Political Science Quarterly, 130(2), pp.245-275.

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Luttwak, E. (1969). Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook. London, United Kingdom: The Penguin Press.

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