President Obama's Justification of his Inconsistent Foreign Policy towards Syria: an Analysis based on the Securitisation Theory

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President Obama’s Justification of his Inconsistent Foreign Policy towards Syria: an Analysis based on the Securitisation Theory

Charon van der Ham, BA S1466569

MSc Thesis Crisis and Security Management

Leiden University, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Supervisor: Dr. B. Schuurman

Second Reader: Dr. D. Weggemans 8 June 2018

17362 words (excluding title page, abstract, references) 18785 words (including title page, abstract, references)

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Abstract

During and in the aftermath of the Syrian civil uprising, former President Obama has been criticised for his inconsistent foreign security policy. The Obama administration retreated from military intervention against Bashar al-Assad when he crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of using chemical weapons against citizens. However, when the notorious terrorist organisation ISIL conducted similar atrocious acts, President Obama ordered the employment of the extraordinary measures from which he retreated when it concerned Bashar al-Assad. How did President Obama legitimise this inconsistency to the American public? This thesis examines President Obama’s justification processes through the lens of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. Eight Presidential Addresses are subject to a deductive discourse analysis. This analysis is divided into two separate parts, one concerning American foreign policy aimed at the Assad regime and one concerning American foreign policy aimed at ISIL. Specific linguistic performances such as othering, dominant framing patterns, marginal

framing patterns and also silenced framing patterns demonstrate the extent to which the Assad regime and ISIL were subject to securitisation. The analysis indicates that within a

pre-defined ‘threat’ frame, President Obama has significantly securitised the threat posed by ISIL while the threat posed by the Assad regime was eventually subject to less compelling levels of securitisation, and even to de-securitisation. Resulting into the understanding that

securitisation theory is of great significance in explaining how President Obama justified his inconsistent security policy.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 President Obama’s Inconsistency

“The Ad Hoc Executive: Obama´s Troubling Foreign Policy Inconsistency”, “On Foreign Policy, a Consistently Inconsistent President” and ¨Obama’s Syria Strategy Is the Definition of Insanity” are three out of many media headlines that display the concern and confusion among the public and media that started to arise due to President Obama’s highly conflicting and contradictory foreign policy decisions regarding the Syrian civil conflict (Larkin, 2016; McManus, 2013; Lister, 2016). These raised concerns were not unreasonable, why would President Obama threaten to use extraordinary measures against Bashar al-Assad

and subsequently recourse to diplomacy, but then do choose to employ force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant when they roughly conducted the same atrocious acts?

While the Syrian uprising was perceived a local conflict, international actors were not backing away from demonstrating their interests in either supporting the Assad regime or the democratic uprising. As a powerful international actor and a known supporter of conforming to liberal democratic values, the United States has initially been upholding its international position as a support for democratic regime change by proclaiming their rhetorical

encouragement of the opposition in the civil uprising.Herein, the Obama administration has condemned the Bashar al-Assad regime for its repressive and violent actions towards its own citizens, which led to Obama calling for Assad’s leave of office in August of 2011 (Copur and Kaymak Avci, 2016; Ukman and Sly, 2011). Subsequently, Obama clearly drew a so-called ‘red line’ by which he argued that if Bashar al-Assad would use any form of chemical weapons against his civilians, the United States would be obligated to militarily intervene. Eventually, the Obama administration retreated from the self-proclaimed obligation to employ military force as he favoured diplomatic strategies in dealing with the Assad atrocities. Even when Assad crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ in August of 2013 and killed more than 1300 people with Sarin – a chemical gas – in the suburbs of Damascus, Obama remained loyal to his generally employed diplomatic strategy (Chulov, 2017).

When the Syrian conflict aggressively progressed due to fragmentation within the opposition “through the recruitment of foreign fighters and defections from other rebel groups”, the importance of jihadist groups significantly increased (Jenkins, 2014, p. 2).

Extremist inter-group warfare took over the nature of the Syrian conflict as Islamist extremists affiliated with Al-Qaeda and eventually identified as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

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– further referred to as ISIL, began dominating the rebellion (Jenkins, 2014). In response to ISIL’s rapid territorial expansion and their performance of multiple executions and human rights abuses, the employment of American military force against ISIL was authorised by the Obama administration. Hence, Obama abandoned his diplomatic non-interventionist strategy that he had been employing towards Syria and displaced it with a military strategy. Thus, besides the difference in actors who performed the atrocious acts, the similar performances of violence against civilians were approached in different manners by President Obama.

Obama’s change in strategy required legitimisation to the public and the media. Why was the Obama administration moving away from the diplomatic non-interventionist strategy and towards employing military force?

Justifications of foreign policy strategies by Obama’s predecessors such as Clinton and Bush were based on clear doctrines. Whereas the Bush doctrine focused clearly on his declared ‘War on Terror’, the Clinton doctrine primarily encompassed ‘enlargement of the community of democratic states’ and the rejection of isolationism (Parmar, 2013). Hence, the administrations of Bill Clinton – who sat in office for two terms from 1993 until 2001 – and George W. Bush – who similarly had two subsequent years in office – both associated American security policy with the spread of American values. Based hereupon, the appeared international interventions such as Bill Clinton’s invasion of Haiti in 1994 and George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and also decisions to disengage have been historically rationalised (Meernik, 1996; Russett, 2005).

Obama broke with the manner as clarified above in which former American presidents justified specific foreign security policy decisions. In contrast to the Clinton and Bush

administration, the foreign policy of the Obama administration – especially regarding his security policy decisions towards Syria – cannot be defined within a specific doctrine. Obama’s security policy was not based on a combination of American values and security interests, these were rather dissociated as “the general tone was that democracy was a cherished value, but there was no special role for America to spread it by force” (Santos and Teixeira, 2015, p.131). Obama’s approach can better be understood as a leadership style that was referred to as ‘Leading from Behind’ in which “security and values were treated

separately” and in which “security was the main concern” (Santos and Teixeira, 2015, p.141). Hereby, the diplomatic support of the democratic uprising of Syrian civilians and the decision to retreat from military support fitted the category of refraining from spreading American ideals – which was not a security interest anymore under the Obama administration. While Obama’s decision to employ military force against ISIL fitted his focus on American security

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since “ISIL [was] perceived [by Obama] as a major threat to American security interests” (Santos and Teixeira, 2015, p. 139). It is for these explanations that the aim of this study is not to provide explanatory factors for the discrepancies between Obama’s foreign policy agenda setting and that of his predecessors, rather, it is to explain in what manner and to what an extent Obama publicly legitimised his decision to frame the Islamic State as an American security interest without a clear framework of a doctrine. “This [framing] process has been described by the Copenhagen School as ‘securitization’: claiming an issue as a security issue – when done by security-providing actors –, makes it so” (Leijten, 2017, p.5). In the case of a securitised issue, employing exceptional measures such as military power is perceived to be acceptable (Leijten, 2017).

1.2 Research Question

This study will focus on how Obama created a diplomatic reality in which military force against Assad was perceived as undesired while it was deemed as necessary against ISIL. Herein, it will use the specific lens of securitisation theory for researching Obama’s

legitimisation acts. The aim will be to answer the following research question: To what extent can securitisation theory explain the United States’ inconsistent policies towards Syria under President Obama in the period of 2011-2016?

1.3 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

For clarification purposes, this section will briefly address the theoretical framework in which this thesis will be situated and the method via which the analysis will be performed. Both subjects will be discussed thoroughly in subsequent chapters.

As the research question suggests, the study will be conducted within the framework of securitisation theory as proposed by the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998). This theoretical framework has been chosen based on its primary argument, namely that language is capable of constructing a nation’s understanding of security (Williams, 2003). It is expected that this argument will be proven and put into action by President Obama in his attempt to justify his deviating foreign policy decisions towards the Assad regime and ISIL.

Since this study will examine linguistic performances as posed by the theoretical framework of securitisation, the methodology will regard a discourse analysis of eight Presidential Addresses given in the period of 2011 until 2016. These eight texts will be divided into two sections. The first section will concern the discourse analysis of four

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Presidential Addresses that are related to Obama’s foreign policy aimed at the Bashar al-Assad regime. The second section will concern four Presidential addresses that are related to Obama’s foreign policy aimed at ISIL. The discourse analysis will be deductive, meaning that the texts will be analysed within a predefined ‘threat’-frame (Dekker and Scholten, 2017).

1.4 Academic and Societal Relevance

Understanding the actions of Obama through the theory of securitisation will contribute to the existing academic and public perception on the relevance of speech acts in international politics. Securitisation theory is criticised by scholars and professional diplomats on its perceived inability to provide a framework for understanding how to conduct international diplomacy (Taureck, 2006). However, arguing that the successful securitisation of issues – hence, framing an issue as a security interest – is actually at the basis of validating exceptional policies – such as military intervention – will counter the above mentioned critique and

demonstrate that with the securitisation of an issue a political actor’s entire security policy stands or falls. Examining how securitisation theory can validate Obama’s actions towards Syria, can hereby contribute to this academic notion. Furthermore, as argued by Watson (2012), security scholars have been primarily employing framing theory, which is different than securitisation theory however it does similarly argue for the construction of a threat. Hence, securitisation theory has been limitedly considered as a theoretical framework for studying security issues and policy changes in the United States (Watson, 2012). It is for this reason that this thesis will contribute to academic research within American security studies by performing a study of security policy within a framework of securitisation.

In addition to the academic relevance of this study, an analysis of how securitisation theory is used to justify President Obama’s seemingly inconsistent foreign policy has a significant societal relevance. As advocated by Hillary Clinton (2017), it is important that political leaders – and especially the Head of State and Commander in Chief – are held accountable since political accountability is perceived as one of the building blocks of a well-functioning democracy. Therefore, it is necessary to understand President Obama has

legitimised his seemingly illogical and erratic foreign policy concerning the Syrian conflict. A clear comprehension of how Obama endorsed particular policy changes towards the Assad regime could grant the Obama Administration the accountability that it required, especially since the rise of public confusion and discontent. Since the issue resides within the field of international security, performing a discourse analysis based on a securitisation framework

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provided by securitisation theory offers the appropriate linguistic tools to examine how President Obama framed – and hereby legitimised – his foreign policy decisions regarding Syria.

1.5 Thesis Composition

This research is composed as follows: First an in-depth account of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory will provide all the theoretical knowledge, including the theory’s

deficiencies, that is required for analysing the securitisation processes that Obama performed in order to legitimise his actions. Subsequently, the research design and methodology of this thesis will be defined. This will demonstrate the manner in which the actual analysis will be performed. Addressing the methodology subsequently to the theoretical framework is done deliberately, as the methodology is dependent on the theoretical lens through which this study will be conducted. Securitisation theory focuses on linguistic performances and the meaning that is created accordingly, this research therefore requires a method that is concerned with the study of language and especially its functions. Simultaneously, it is for this reason that the methodology chapter will be addressed within the context of securitisation theory. Then, a selection of Presidential Addresses to the Nation and to the United Nations by Barack Obama will be subject to a deductive discourse analysis. These Presidential Addresses concern both terms in office of President Obama since the Syrian conflict took place during Obama’s first and second term. This chapter will simultaneously provide a thorough discussion of the findings. The final chapter will provide a conclusion with a focus on reaching the answer to the research question and avenues for future research.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This chapter will provide an in-depth account of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory. Herein an analytical approach will be taken since the objective of this study is to explain specific changes in American foreign security policy and highlight what indicators of such a policy change are used for justification purposes. Evidently, the use of securitisation theory as the lens through which this thesis will approach Obama´s justification of his inconsistent foreign policy does not imply that it will be claimed that securitisation is the solely possible framework for conducting this study.

First, the theoretical underpinnings that contributed to securitisation theory as we know it today will be put forward. This will be done in a brief manner since it moves beyond the aim of this thesis to do an in-depth analysis of the foundations of securitisation theory. Second, the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory will be systematically reviewed by analysing the specific mechanisms that are being activated when performing securitisation with the purpose of creating an outcome of justification. Third, contemporary criticism will be evaluated and simultaneously put in context of this particular case. It will also be examined in what manner these criticisms will be overcome in this thesis.

2.1 Theoretical Foundations: Constructivism and Speech Act Theory

2.1.1 Constructivism

According to Balzacq (2010), constructivist thinking has become predominant in “examining security practices” (p.56). Herein, constructivism provides key insights that have been taken in by the theory of securitisation. In the broadest sense of the concept, constructivism – which originates as a social theory within the field of International Relations – argues that the reality of world politics is socially constituted (Jackson and McDonald, 2014). This is seen as the result of interactions between agents – primarily states – and the meaning they give to their actions (Jackson and McDonald, 2014). The creation of such meaning is highly influenced by idealistic factors such as norms, values, rules and identities (Jackson and McDonald, 2014). Essentially, constructivism argues that one’s reality is not given by nature and is therefore subject to human interpretation and change. Regarding the theory of securitisation,

constructivism has been influential in arguing that the language – on which securitisation focuses - is constructive of the security reality (Balzacq, 2010). The understanding of

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‘security’ by an actor – hence, state – and the interaction hereof with other states is the result of this actor’s ideals, norms and identity and therefore constructed. Securitisation therefore builds upon this constructed notion of security by arguing that linguistic practices convey the actor’s understanding of the issue as ‘security’. Subsequently, actions taken in response to the security issues can hereby be justified.

2.1.2 Speech Act Theory

Speech act theory entails a specific definition of the function of language as it poses that it has not only a communicative purpose, but also a performative purpose. In other words, language can be used to communicate information to an audience but also to carry out actions (Austin, 1979). Austin (1979) defines this as “performative utterances” (p.235). For instance, when uttering ‘I apologise’ the actor does not report on the apology, he or she actually performs the apology (Austin, 1979). Key to Austin’s (1979) performative utterances is that the focus is not put on whether the utterance is perceived as true or false (Doerge, 2013). Rather, the focus lies on the action the linguistic statement performs and the meaning the utterance hereby creates.

Similarly to Austin’s (1979) speech act theory, securitisation theory relies on the focus on which action the utterance performs. It emphasises the reality the performative utterance constructs. In the case of Obama’s foreign policy towards Syria, uttering that ISIL poses a severe threat to American security creates the reality that it does, despite it being actually true or not. Hence, when analysing constructivism and speech act theory in relation to

securitisation, the primary element seems to be that the use of language or a speech act is constructive of a social and intersubjective accepted reality.

2.2 Securitisation Theory

This section of the theoretical framework will grant a detailed overview of key authors and their insights on what entails securitisation theory. This overview will follow the structure of securitisation with as endpoint the reached legitimisation of actions taken in response to the securitised issue. Furthermore, its criticisms will be addressed and destabilised if possible. Throughout this section, securitisation theory will be put into context of this study’s case of former President Obama and his foreign policy towards Syria.

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2.2.1 Theoretical Synopsis

According to securitisation theory, the conception of ‘security’ is perceived as a socially constructed and an explicitly and implicitly intersubjective phenomenon (Williams, 2003). This means that both by law and by social convention, an agreed understanding of the

meaning of security among actors – hence the securitising actor and the audience – is reached. Securitisation, as argued by Buzan, Waever and Jaap de Wilde that are contributory authors of the Copenhagen School, is defined as a speech act that linguistically constructs an issue into an acknowledged security issue (1998; Stritzel, 2007). Thus, the speech act or securitisation is “a component of the intersubjective construction of security” as it creates the reality of what issues are perceived security issues (McDonald, 2008, p. 566). Speech acts “do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such” to the public (Williams, 2003, p. 513). Thus,

“securitisation [refers] to [a] form of linguistic representation that position[s] a particular issue as an existential threat” to a state’s security (McDonald, 2008, p.566). This demonstrates the influence of speech act theory on securitisation. By uttering that something is of great security interest, or a threat to the security of a society, one does not only communicate this message. Rather, it causes the issue to develop from ordinary to actually being a threat to security.

Within securitisation theory, speech acts that transform specific issues into security issues are referred to as ‘securitisation moves’ (Taureck, 2006). Possible instances of such speech acts will be discussed in chapter 3. The securitisation move, “entails the claim that something is held to pose a threat to a valued referent object that is so existential that it is legitimate to move the issue beyond the established games of ‘normal’ politics to deal with it by exceptional, i.e. security, methods” (Stritzel, 2007, p.360). Theoretically, the political securitising actors are hereby capable of explaining or even justifying all forms of measures – in most cases hard power measures – that they employed in response to these threats

(Williams, 2003).

Importantly, while various types of issues (however, not all) can become subject to securitisation, it must be argued that securitisation moves cannot be performed by just any actor (Taureck, 2006). Securitisation processes are “largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat” (Taureck, 2006, p.55). A head of state, such as President Obama, is a worthy example of such a politically powerful and capable actor, especially due to his legitimacy as executive power within the United

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States government. However, as argued in chapter 1.4, while successful securitisation has the ability to grant a political actor legitimacy, this actor in question needs to prematurely enjoy a particular level of legitimacy to make securitisation possible in the first place.

However, the performance of a securitisation move by the ‘rightful’ or capable political actor does not complete the process of securitisation. The securitisation moves will only develop into ‘securitisations’ or securitised issues when public consent is reached. If President Obama could have successfully de-securitised the oppressive regime of Bashar al-Assad and securitised the threat that Islamic State posed to American security, he would have created a perceived reality in which military intervention against IS was deemed acceptable. The question whether such securitisation occurred will be analysed in chapter 4. However, Stritzel’s (2007) suggestion implies that President Obama’s justification of his foreign security policy towards IS in Syria can be explained via his performance of securitisation processes.

2.2.2 Criticism

The relevance of speech acts in international politics has been academically minimised by arguing that the study of speech acts – such as securitisation theory – are observational studies. As indicated in the introduction, securitisation theory has therefore been criticised based on its perceived incapability to provide practical insights on how to perform diplomacy (Taureck, 2006). In other words, securitisation theory is commonly perceived as a theory that cannot provide a framework that outlines the practice of international politics by which desired policy outcomes are created. In contrast, this thesis argues that securitisation theory is actually capable of doing just that. Language use, as it can create an intersubjective

understanding of reality, gives useful insights in how to legitimise policy decisions and actions. Hereby, the acceptance or refutation of these policy decisions are at stake.

Securitisation theory may not provide a foundation on which the content of policies can be based, it does however provide a framework for an efficient justification of policy decisions which is just as important for the eventual success of the employed policy.

Additionally, various scholars have outlined securitisation theory and especially the conception of security as vague or failing in conveying what the criteria of a successful securitisation actually are (Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, 2006; Emmers, 2004; Jackson, 2006). This critique is not misplaced since the Copenhagen School perceives securitisation as successful when there is an “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a

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saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.25). In other words, the Copenhagen School presents a successful securitisation when an agreed

understanding – that may have a significant effect on policies – of the threat as an security issue is reached. This is highly ambiguous since an agreed understanding among actors on the security threat and the possible “substantial political effects” are obscure concepts. In order to bypass this issue in the context of this study, a clear operationalisation of securitisation and what this study regards as reaching public understanding and acceptance will be provided in chapter 3.

2.3 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the framework that will form the theoretical basis of this study was identified and thoroughly discussed. It is primarily argued that the linguistic performance of

securitisation results in the construction of security itself, hence, which issues are accepted a security threat and which are not. To examine the applicability of this theoretical framework and to determine whether former President Obama conducted such a linguistic performance, eight Presidential Addresses will be subject to a discourse analysis. This specific method and the associated research design of the study will be discussed in the following chapter.

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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

This chapter will provide an overview of this study’s research design, including its unit of analysis and unit of observation, and an operationalisation of key concepts that will contribute to the understanding of securitisation processes within the eight Presidential Addresses. Furthermore, the methodology by which this thesis will abide will be discussed. Within this methodology, Hansen’s (2006) four dimensions of structuring research will be analysed and applied.

3.1 Research Design

3.1.1 Type of Design, Unit of Analysis and Unit of Observation

This thesis will concern a qualitative research with a holistic, longitudinal case study design. A holistic case study is relevant since the research goal is to provide a theoretical explanation of Obama’s justification of his allegedly inconsistent foreign policy in the period of 2011-2016. Obama’s foreign security policy towards Syria within this timeframe will be the sole unit of observation of this study. The units of analysis will regard the following Presidential Addresses to the Nation and to the United Nations: Statement by the President on Syria (2012), Statement by the President on Syria (2013), Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria (2013), and a section of Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly (2013), a segment of Statement by the President on ISIL (2014), Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian

Opposition (2014), Letter from the President - Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2015), and a part of Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism (2016). These units of analysis are deliberately selected based on their capability to clearly

demonstrate Obama’s inconsistency in his security policy concerning Syria and the extent to which ‘securitisation moves’ or ‘securitisation speech-acts’ are used to justify the use of exceptional measures against ISIL in Syria.

A singular case study has a low external validity – hence, the level of reachable generalisation – as a consequence. However, this will not be problematic since this study has an explanatory focus within one context. The internal validity – or the existence of causal relationships – of this study is of more importance since it attempts to demonstrate that

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Obama’s securitisation of Islamic State resulted in a legitimisation of exceptional measures. Therefore, the external validity of this thesis is expected to be high.

3.1.2 Operationalisation

In this sections, the concept of securitisation is translated into three measurable units. First, the securitisation of a threat – as a concept – is defined in a manner that demonstrates how this study understands it. Then, assumed key concepts related to the concept of a threat will be provided and defined. These key concepts will be initially used in examining securitisation moves within the eight Presidential Addresses in chapter 4.

As identified within the theoretical framework of securitisation theory, the concept of securitisation will – within this study – be referred to as “the process through which an issue is [linguistically] presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and

justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.24). This thesis will largely follow Taureck’s (2006) three variables that the securitising speech act needs to abide by in order to reach a full securitisation: (1) “Identification of existential threats”; occurrence of the securitisation move (Taureck, 2006); (2) “Emergency action” or extraordinary measures (Taureck, 2006); (3) “Effects on inter-unit relations [– securitising actor versus audience –] by breaking free of rules” (Taureck, 2006). Herein, “breaking free of rules” indirectly implies the resort to non-diplomatic measures such as military strikes

(Taureck, 2006).

However, this thesis will only speak of a complete securitisation when Taureck’s (2006) operationalisation of securitisation is complemented with the actual employment of exceptional measures by the securitising actor since the aim of the securitisation initially was to legitimise such measures (as cited in Vuori, 2011).

3.1.2.1 Existential Threat

As argued above, a key concept within securitisation is that of an ‘existential threat’ (Buzan et al., 1998). To define a threat as existential implies “that security discourse constructs a sense of heightened priority and drama, arguing that if a ‘security problem’ is not addressed it will have fatal consequences” (Hansen, 2006, p. 31; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Hence, the security problem hereby becomes politically salient (Hansen, 2006). Both direct linguistic utterances such as referring to ‘security’ and citing “sub-security concepts” such as ‘strategic interests’ and ‘national interests’ are indicators for constructing an issue as an existential threat

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(Hansen, 2006, p.30; Weldes, 1999). As argued by Weldes (1999) and Hansen (2006), the mobilisation of these sub-security concepts are of high discursive importance. Therefore, measuring the level of securitisation speech acts will incorporate both direct and indirect references to the conceptions of ‘security’ and ‘threat’ and related sub-concepts. The table below will display and define key words that are assumed to be used for securitisation purposes in the eight texts that are subject to discourse analysis in chapter 4. Therefore, these key concepts are connected to securitisation. Importantly, the discourse analysis may put forward additional or other concepts.

Concept Definition

Threat An issue that leads to the “authoritative invocating of security” (Balzacq, 2010).

Terrorism “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (“United States Code”).

Resilience “the ability to adapt in the face of adversity” (“Center of Excellence”).

Security The move by which “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a referent object”, traditionally the state (Buzan et al., 1998).

Table 1. Operationalisation sub-concepts 3.1.2.2 Extraordinary measures

An extraordinary measure concerns an action that “moves beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations” (Taureck, 2006). In other words, the operational definition of extraordinary measures regards unproportional measures that can be replaced by less extreme measures that “infringe the rights of the target groups to a smaller extent and do not clash as much with the basic values of the target group” (Uhlig, 2015, p. 30). Linguistic utterances such as ‘military actions’ and ‘strikes’ refer to the variable of extraordinary or emergency measures.

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3.1.2.3 Inter-unit Relations

To reach a successful securitisation, the securitisation move needs to have an effect on the audience in which they are convinced of the securitising actor’s need to go beyond diplomatic policies (Taureck, 2006; Buzan et al., 1998). This portrays the operational definition of inter-unit relations. The securitisation move affects the relations between the securitising and receiving unit as the audience accepts the exceptional measures. The measurement of the inter-unit relations and whether the American public has accepted foreign policy decisions will be done via examining outcomes of public opinion polls conducted by CNN and New York Times between 2011 and 2016. The outcome of particular questions raised in these polls will shed light on the extent to which the American public has accepted the securitisation of the issue posed by the Assad regime and by ISIL. Hence, the outcomes will be put into context of Obama’s securitisation processes and then a conclusion will be drawn on the level of public acceptance.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Deductive Discourse Analysis

As Buzat et al. (1998) clearly put forward, since this thesis is interested in when and in what manner a security threat is linguistically established or constructed, discourse analysis is the only logical method to adhere to. Furthermore, a discourse analysis fits the qualitative nature of this study as it will provide the desired qualitative data. As Brown and Yule (1983) argued, discourse analysis must be understood as the “analysis of language in use” (p.1). It does not examine the form or structure of language, it rather analyses its function, what the language is being used for (Brown and Yule, 1983). Key to discourse analysis is the interaction between the speaking actor and the audience within a specific context, as it is believed that the function of discourse is meaning-making or, in other words, to create a particular reality (Abrams and Harpham, 1999). Within the context of President Obama’s Presidential Addresses concerning his Syrian policy, the function of official – as in presented by the state – discourse is believed to be creating a security reality. It is for this reason that discourse analysis is the right method for analysing Obama’s Presidential Addresses within securitisation theory as the aim is to identify how Obama used securitising speech acts to establish a reality that seemingly caused public consent regarding his foreign policy decision to militarily intervene against ISIL.

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This thesis will adhere to a deductive discourse analysis, indicating that the analysis will be conducted within a pre-existing frame. This study will incorporate the threat frame that is formerly identified as an immigration-specific ‘master-frame’ by Dekker and Scholten (2017). Nonetheless, the threat frame, which is defined as a frame in which the issue at hand is an “ inherently negative phenomenon [...] [that poses] a threat to receiving countries”, must be perceived as highly applicable to the case of Islamic State and American security (as cited in Dekker and Scholten, 2017, p.205). The threat frame is often used to legitimise policy change, which makes it a worthy frame for the legitimisation of Obama’s seemingly inconsistent security policy regarding the Syria conflict (Dekker and Scholten, 2017). The discourse analysis of the Presidential Addresses will only take the threat frame into account, meaning that other discourses that are possibly present in the texts will not be included in the analysis.

3.2.2 Structuring Discourse Analysis

To avoid an analysis that focuses on a too large selection of data, this thesis adheres to Hansen’s (2006) four dimensions for structuring research. This implies defining the dimensions of intertextual models, number of Selves, temporal perspective and number of events in selecting the data – or texts – that will be subject to the above-mentioned deductive discourse analysis (Hansen, 2006). Via applying certain criteria these dimensions construct the study of discourse that will be performed in chapter 4:

Image 1. Reprinted from Hansen (2006, p.67), Dimensions for Discourse Analysis

First, Hansen (2006) has identified four intertextual models for foreign policy analysis, namely with the focus on either official discourse (model 1), wider foreign policy debate

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(model 2), cultural representations (model 3a) and marginal political discourses (model 3b) (p.57). These intertextual models function as a framework in which the analytical focus, object of analysis and analytical goal are attained in a structural manner. Hereby, the scope of the discourse analysis will be narrowed down.

Image 2. Reprinted from Hansen (2006), Intertextual Research Models

When referring to the analytical focus and object of analysis as presented in Hansen’s (2006) Table 4.2 Intertextual Research Models, the discourse analysis of this thesis adheres to model 1. As posed by Hansen (2006), the analytical focus of model 1 is that of political leaders with high levels of authority and responsibility, especially regarding the development and employment of foreign policy. This thesis’ analytical focus concerns the former Head of State President Obama of the United States of America which directly relates to Hansen’s (2006) categorisation. The object of analysis, already referred to as the unit of analysis, are

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single-authored speeches or texts by officially published by the Office of Press Secretary of the White House under the Obama administration (Hansen, 2006). Furthermore, the aim of this discourse analysis is to determine how official discourse establishes particular identities and understandings of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Hence, the analytical goal of this research aligns with Hansen’s (2006) understanding of the goal of analysis that fits model 1.

Second, the number of Selves is defined by Hansen (2006) as the number of “foreign policy subjects one wishes to examine” (p.67). Since this research focuses on American foreign policy and Obama’s justification hereof, there is no counter discourse to examine. This resulted in the selection of only one Self.

Third, the temporal perspective concerns the time frame of the study. As identified earlier, this thesis concerns a longitudinal study. Since the goal of this research is to examine the legitimisation of President Obama’s seemingly inconsistent foreign policy between 2011 and 2016, the concerning time frame will be these six full years. Accordingly, the selected texts were published within this period. The examination of changes in foreign policy is more qualified within the temporal perspective of a longer time period than within a framework of one particular moment (Hansen, 2006).

Fourth, related to the temporal perspective is the number of events. When the temporal perspective of an analysis is one particular moment, the number of events is logically one. However, when the temporal perspective concerns a larger time frame, as is the case for this thesis, the number of events is multiple (Hansen, 2006). Within a multiple events study, Hansen (2006) identifies two dimensions: a study in which events take place at different points in time but are related by issue, and a study in which the events are related by time however differ in the nature of the issues. Regarding the examination of Obama’s foreign policy towards the Assad regime and towards ISIL, it concerns the first dimension. When analysing how Obama justified his seemingly different approach to the likely similar

atrocities performed by the Bashar al-Assad regime and by ISIL, the issues are rather related by their nature than by time.

Concluding, a developed version of Image 1. Dimensions for Research provided by Hansen (2006) including the four dimensions as applicable to this thesis is displayed below as Image 2. Dimensions for this Thesis’ Discourse Analysis. This image schematically

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Image 3. Dimensions for this Thesis’ Discourse Analysis

3.3 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the type of research design, the unit of analysis and unit of observation of this study were addressed. This is required for structuring purposes to avoid an incoherent

research. Furthermore and most importantly for the subsequent chapter, the method by which the analysis of this study will be performed has been discussed. As a crucial part hereof, the concepts that will be used in identifying utterances of securitisation within the eight

Presidential Addresses were operationalised. A thorough discussion of the definition and the manner of operation of a discourse analysis was required before actually performing this type of analysis in chapter 4 and for reaching a complete conclusion in chapter 5.

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Chapter 4: Analysis and Discussion

This chapter will encompass a detailed discourse analysis – as explained in chapter 3.2 – of a set of official speeches performed by former President Obama. The analysis will be divided into two separate sections. Firstly, part one will consist of the deductive discourse analysis of four speeches concerning American foreign policy towards the Bashar al-Assad regime. The following speeches will be analysed: Statement by the President on Syria (2012), Statement by the President on Syria (2013), Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria (2013), and a section of Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly (2013). Secondly, the second section will analyse four speeches regarding American foreign policy aimed at ISIL in a similar manner. This section will regard the following speeches: a segment of Statement by the President on ISIL (2014), Statement by the President on Congressional Authorization to Train Syrian Opposition (2014), Letter from the President – Authorization for the Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2015), and a section of Remarks by the President on the

Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism (2016). This structure is deliberately chosen with the purpose of reaching a comprehensive analysis that reveals the seemingly inconsistent American foreign policy approaches to both the Assad regime and ISIL. By doing so, the manner in which the Obama administration understood both the Assad regime and ISIL will be demonstrated. This is of great significance since their understanding of these particular actors has a large impact on the administration’s policies and their legitimisation thereof. The deductive discourse analysis aims at identifying processes of ‘othering’, ‘self-identification’, and dominant and marginal discourse frames within the context of the Syrian civil conflict. Furthermore, the linguistic inquiry may simultaneously present discourses that typically fit the deductive threat frame but are excluded from the units of analysis. To structurally reach this aim, the data analysis – and hence the remaining part of this chapter – will follow a particular structure. First, the ‘self’ and ‘other’, dominant, marginal and silenced representations will be schematically classified. Second, these representations will be

characterised into more abstract discourses. As stressed earlier, this step is done within Dekker and Scholten’s (2017) predefined master threat-frame. Third, the dynamics of the discourse will be analysed. Fourth, the function of the discourse will be subject to scrutiny. In other words, the effect that the employed discourse generates will be questioned. Fifth and finally, the produced discourses will be criticised to reach a comprehensive analysis.

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4.1 Data Analysis – Part One

This subchapter will comprise of a systematic data analysis – following the demonstrated structure – of four Presidential Addresses that concern the American foreign policy decisions and approach in general towards the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The analysis will shed light on how the Assad regime is understood by former President Obama. The transcripts, or the concerning sections, of the speeches are attached in the Annexes. The arguments made will be substantiated with evidence directly from the Presidential Addresses.

4.1.1. Classification

As addressed earlier, this section will develop a classification of particular linguistic performances of the Obama administration concerning the implementation of ‘self’ and ‘other’-representations, dominant framing patterns, marginal patterns and silenced patterns. Doing so will form a clear image of the linguistic processes that may contribute to a possible securitisation performed by President Obama.

4.1.1.1 ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Representations

A deductive discourse analysis of President Obama’s Presidential Addresses with a pre-defined focus on Dekker and Scholten’s (2007) threat frame and securitisation has brought forward clear ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations. Herein, securitisation has created the ‘self’ as the national who is in need of protection against a threat posed by the foreign ‘other’

(Campbell, 1992). All four Presidential Addresses play a significant role in displaying these representations. Hereby, these ‘self’ and ‘other’ identifications must be perceived as

discourses that are purposely claimed and ascribed by the Obama administration to establish a particular intersubjective understanding of the United States itself and the Assad regime as the ‘other’.

First, the four Presidential Addresses highly differentiate between the United States of America – hence, the ‘self’ – and the Bashar al-Assad regime – the ‘other’ – based on their modes of governance. This indicates that the conception of democracy is key for the Obama administration in determining the superior and inferior positions of the two governments. As the ‘self’, President Obama claims to be inherently democratic. In the majority of the

speeches, President Obama explicitly stated his role as the President of “the world’s oldest constitutional democracy” which is positioned as a government “of the people, by the people,

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and for the people” (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2013; “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). While these statements primarily functioned within the texts as a manner through which the Obama administration portrayed the United States as superior to the Assad regime, it simultaneously enforces the position of President Obama himself as a successful democratic leader undeterred by the partisan nature of the American government. This notion is put forward particularly in Statement by the President on Syria (2013) as it refers to Obama’s willingness to incorporate the democratic institutions such as Congress in his foreign policy decisions, despite his “authority to carry out [...] military action without congressional authorization” (2013).

A second ‘self’ representation that the Presidential Addresses suggest are concerned with the nation’s military strength. The majority of the texts refer to the ‘self’ as militarily strong by arguing that America’s power does not only originate from its democracy, but also from its “military might” (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2013). According to President Obama, America’s capacity to execute military power is “not time-sensitive”, meaning that American military power is and will remain effective when it needs to be employed (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2013). This self-identification develops as the text refers to the United States as the “anchor of global security” and as the leader in the field of international relations and diplomacy (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). References to military strength and global leadership convey the notion of American exceptionalism, which has been a dominant belief of former American Presidents and the public. However, a subsequent section of the discourse analysis will demonstrate that other discourse patterns will moderately diminish the validity of this expressed self-representation.

In contrast to advocating for the intrinsic democratic character of the United States of America, the texts positions the Bashar al-Assad regime as being highly undemocratic.

Assad’s oppressive tendencies are highlighted by stating that Syria could be – without the rule of Assad – a nation in which “all Syrians are subject to the rule of law and where minorities are able to exercise their legitimate rights and uphold their identities” (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2012). This indicates that Obama believes that the Assad regime does not act in accordance with a governance approach that fits the American democratic notion of ‘for the people, by the people’. Especially since marginally represented population groups have been subject to oppression for years under the Assad regime. This eventually led to the

initiation of the civil revolt. Furthermore, to emphasise Assad’s undemocratic nature, the texts often refer to Bashar al-Assad using terms as “dictator” (“Remarks by the President in

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Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). This positions the Assad regime in an inferior position to the democratic government of the United States. However, a critical perspective towards this notion is necessary. While taking the repressive tendencies of an authoritarian dictatorship into account, viewing democracy as superior to any other form of governance must be perceived as a western biased perception. Nonetheless, since the Presidential Addresses generate official discourses, the belief of democratic America as superior to authoritarian Syria will be most likely accepted by the audience. The western belief that democracy is the ultimate form of governance in combination with the linguistic power of official discourses may generate or enforce public support for foreign policy decisions aimed at the inferior, non-democratic government.

A second manner in which the ‘other’ is frequently represented in the Presidential Addresses regards the identification of Assad as an illegitimate head of state (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2012). Regardless of Assad’s type of administration, Assad has been portrayed as illegitimate due to his widely condemned actions. By stating “Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community”, the Obama administration portrays the Assad regime as invalid and undeserving to govern

(“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2012). Choosing to convey this message with such strong language is of great significance for the eventual congressional and public support for Obama’s initial decision to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime. The Presidential Speeches reinforce this representation of the ‘other’ by arguing that the Assad regime is militarily weak and incapable. With addressing that the “Assad regime does not have the ability to seriously threat our military” and directly describing Assad’s “inherent weakness”, the Obama

administration indirectly identifies the ‘other’ as illegitimate and unworthy of being a leader (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013; “Statement by the President on Syria”, 2012).

4.1.1.2 Dominant Patterns

In addition to the above analysed ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations, the four Presidential Addresses established three varying dominant paradigms that ultimately shape the policy discourse in which the Obama administration portrays the Assad regime. These dominant patterns play a key role in formulating the understanding of the Assad regime within

American foreign policy discourse, which is a leading factor for the Obama administration in determining exact foreign policy decisions.

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First, the paramount pattern that is represented in the texts of the Presidential Addresses, and that fits the predefined threat-frame, is that of national security. In the early stages of the conflict in Syria, especially in 2011 and 2012, the speech acts conducted by former President Obama portrayed the Assad regime and his violent oppression of the civil revolt as a threat to international and American national security. Especially Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his civilians has been interpreted as a threat to Syria’s surroundings and American national security. In August 2013, ten days after the Assad regime employed chemicals as a weapon to suppress the Sunni Islamist uprising, President Obama clearly referred to the Assad regime as a “danger to our national security” and a danger to “our friends and our partners along Syria’s borders” (“Statement by the President on Syria”). All four texts continuously refer to the Assad regime and its employment of chemical weapons within the master-frame of a threat by stating “we consider the use of chemical weapons in Syria to be a threat to our own national security” and Assad’s actions are “not only a violation of international law, [but] also a danger to our security” (“Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 2013; “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013).

These speech acts demonstrate a high linguistic repetition of constructions such as ‘danger to our security’. This is of great importance since these repetitions stress the

understanding of the Assad regime as inherently dangerous and existentially threatening to the American public and the international order. Hence, the decision to extensively use

repetitional formulations linguistically constructs a threat. Herein, the establishment of this intersubjective understanding is necessary for the securitisation of Bashar al-Assad in order to reach public consent regarding the initial American desire to topple the Assad regime and use military force in the process. However, the securitisation of the Assad regime was eventually nullified when the Obama administration retreated from employing extraordinary measures to overthrow Bashar al-Assad.

Second, the presented dominant pattern of diplomacy or diplomatic orientation

represents President Obama’s decision to disengage from employing military strikes and other forms of extraordinary measures. Hence, it represents the shift away from Obama’s initial aim of toppling the Assad regime. Importantly, this dominant pattern is solely represented in the Presidential Addresses published in September 2013, not in the Presidential Addresses that preceded and directly followed Assad’s chemical attack against his civilians. This indicates a modest shift away from the predominant security-frame and towards diplomacy. President Obama refers hereto by stating “my preference has always been a diplomatic resolution to

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[the Syrian] issue” (“Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 2013). Furthermore, addressing “America’s diplomatic efforts” and “diplomatic path” concerning the Syrian conflict and Assad’s atrocious acts functions as a manner by which Obama linguistically emphasises the above-mentioned shift and his preference for diplomacy over extraordinary measures. Thus, rather than continuously performing securitising speech acts, this particular dominant pattern indicates attempts by the Obama administration to de-securitise the Assad regime.

Additionally, this dominant pattern simultaneously reinforces the ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations as superior and inferior. By positioning America’s diplomatic foreign policy in opposition of Assad’s violent policies, President Obama emphasises the understanding of Assad as being unqualified as a head of state since he chooses violence over a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This is not the predominant function of this frame, however it must not be overlooked as it contributes to the political and public understanding of Assad. The most important function of this frame is to put American foreign policy decisions – especially that of retreating from employing extraordinary measures against the Assad regime – into context. Creating the notion that diplomacy is the path that the United States will always choose first, before performing military actions, is an attempt to legitimise Obama’s decision to change or modify his foreign policy approach towards Syria. This was particularly

necessary after President Obama stated that if Assad would cross the red line of using

chemical weapons the United States would militarily intervene, while eventually he retreated from doing so.

Strikingly, the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime was highly securitised within the predominant threat-frame, however, this was barely de-securitised after Obama’s decision to withdraw from enacting military measures. The master threat-frame continued to be the frame in which Assad was portrayed, however, the Obama administration solely shifted towards a diplomacy pattern. Thus, it cannot be argued that President Obama aimed at

nullifying the understanding of Assad as threatening. Rather, the administration aimed at reshaping this understanding towards a conception of Assad as less existentially threatening to national security that it no longer required extraordinary counter-measures. Hereby, the

securitisation of Assad and his use of chemical weapons was highly challenged by the established diplomacy frame.

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4.1.1.3 Marginal Patterns

An analysis of how the Obama administration understood the Assad regime brought various marginal patterns of linguistic representations forward. The patterns that will be analysed below concern the discourses of outrage, condemnation, international cooperation and

humanity. The majority of these marginal patterns are related to the diplomatic position of the United States concerning the Syrian conflict and the barbarous acts employed by Bashar al-Assad.

First, throughout the duration of the Syrian civil conflict and – importantly – also before Assad’s employment of chemical force against revolting citizens, the United States has showed their disapproval of Assad’s violent suppression of the Syrian Uprising. Within the four Presidential Addresses, the Obama administration has referred to the Assad regime with linguistic utterances related to outrage. The texts cite the Assad’s violent performances as “brutal killings” and “unspeakable outrage” and the Assad regime as a “government that brutalises and massacres it people” (“Statement by the President on Syria”, 2012; “Statement by the President on Syria”, 2013). Hereby, the Obama administration clearly formulates a pattern of outrage that concerns the modus operandi of the Bashar al-Assad regime. This frame of outrage is linguistically reinforced by President Obama via calling for an American approach that will “ultimately destroy” Assad’s chemical weapons and hence his authority (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013; “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 2013).

Not surprisingly, the pattern of outrages evolves into a linguistic pattern of

condemnation. Therefore, the above-mentioned linguistic utterances simultaneously represent both the frame of outrage and condemnation. However, the notion of condemnation has been reinforced linguistically as it has been directly appointed by President Obama, stating “I strongly condemn the Syrian government’s unspeakable assaults against the people”

(“Statement by the President on Syria, 2012). Despite it being a marginal discourse pattern, it deserves to be highlighted since outrage and condemnation may have been highly influential in determining America’s initial approach to the Assad regime and the red line that was called for by President Obama. Establishing an intersubjective position or understanding of

condemnation among the American public and members of Congress may have had a positive influence on the acceptance of Obama’s willingness to militarily intervene against Assad when the red line was crossed.

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Second, throughout the four texts, references to international cooperation and the international community were frequently made. Often, this was linguistically done by directly addressing the partnership of the United States of America and the “international community” (“Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 2013; “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). The use of such terms strengthens the notion of international cooperation and that the United States has showed that America has “worked with allies” regarding the Syrian conflict (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). However, as argued above, the United States is represented within these texts as a leader of the international order by identifying itself as the “anchor of global security” and by especially by stating “the burdens of leadership are often heavy, but the world is a better place because we have borne them” (“Remarks by the

President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). Therefore it must be argued that, while it does not immediately nullify this particular ‘self’ representation of the United States as the global leader, it is challenged by the marginal discourse pattern of international cooperation and community.

Third, Assad’s violent acts against his own citizens have been portrayed in the texts as “a crime against humanity” (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). The understanding that the Obama administration hereby attempted to create is that Bashar al-Assad was insensitive to ‘normal’ or the western understanding of humanity. As of 2013, 189 governments in total – which “represent[s] 98 percent of humanity” – approved and support the Chemical Weapons Convention that prohibits the use of chemical weapons

(“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). Hence, as posed by the Obama administration, Assad’s indifference to this convention hereby violates America’s “sense of common humanity” (“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria”, 2013). Such linguistic formulations generate the effect that Assad will be positioned in contrast to the international community and their collectively accepted norms concerning humanitarian issues. Hereby, he is presented as the ultimate evildoer which may likely have had a positive effect on the acceptance of the initial forceful American response.

4.1.1.4 Silenced Patterns

For the establishment of intersubjective understandings, both discourses that are explicitly referred to and discourses that are being left unsaid are of great importance. Excluded representations or patterns also create meaning and therefore a collectively accepted

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understanding. Hence, as included discourses, silenced patterns influence political and social “judgements of what is acceptable and what is not” (Thiesmeyer, p.2). Therefore, silenced discourses are similarly important as represented discourses.

As argued in sub-chapters 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2, the four Presidential Addresses

frequently represent the ‘other’ within a threat frame or security frame. Continuously doing so reinforces the importance of this representation. Additionally, it simultaneously questions the extent to which the United States can be perceived as resilient regarding the threat that Assad seemingly poses to American national security. Therefore, a representation that is silenced within the four Presidential Addresses is that of resilience. Representing the ‘self’ as a military might is not the same as representing the ‘self’ as resilient. Failing to represent the ‘self’ as such gives rise to the notion that the United States lacks a required level of resilience. This may have been done deliberately to moderate the threat posed by Assad. Nonetheless, it is problematic for the understanding of the ‘self’. It diminishes the superior position the Obama administration attempted to proclaim. It is for this reason that incorporating a resilience frame when representing the ‘self’ would have established a stronger discourse regarding the public understanding of the United States itself.

4.1.2 Characterisation

In order to clarify the frames and patterns that were established in the four Presidential Addresses, the ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations and dominant and marginal patterns will be mapped into more general themes based on their shared characteristics. The broader themes that the four Presidential Addresses discuss, display the general ideas that the Obama

administration wants to convey. Hereby, the functions and the dynamics of the discourse can be better addressed.

First, the dominant pattern of national security and one of the ‘other’ representations concerning the Assad regime as illegitimate and violent must be mapped together within a more abstract theme of security. This theme is of foremost significance within the deductive discourse analysis as it largely fits the master ‘threat’ frame. The high frequency with which the Obama administration refers to this theme indicates President Obama’s desire to

communicate the severity of the issue. However as argued earlier, without neglecting

America’s security interests regarding Assad’s employment of chemical weapons, this general theme has been challenged by the dominant pattern of diplomacy. Making it less convincing as a securitisation speech act.

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Second, three marginal patterns – that of outrage, condemnation and humanity – together may be characterised within a larger theme of morality. When addressing Assad’s violent attacks and especially his employment of chemical weapons against his own citizens, the Assad regime is positioned as unethical as it violates the principles of common-sense morality. Importantly, common-sense morality is an ambiguous concept since it is highly western biased and vaguely defined. However, within the context of the four Presidential Addresses, morality primarily regards the protection of humanity and their rights. Therefore, the texts position the United States as moral in doing so, and the Assad regime amoral since the regime violates internationally accepted human rights. Frames of outrage and

condemnation fit this theme since they concern the American response and the position of the United States towards Assad’s amoral behaviour.

Third, the ‘self’ and ‘other’ representations of the United States as highly democratic and the Bashar al-Assad regime as undemocratic are logically characterised within a broader frame of democracy. Addressing democratic norms and values has been an uniform pattern within the four texts. While the United States is a profound promoter of democracy, it is not the sole reason why it is of importance. In this case, the general theme of democracy fits the master ‘threat’ frame on which securitisation is based. The texts pose that the violent nature of the Assad regime disregards, and therefore, threatens American democratic norms.

Furthermore, two patterns – that of international cooperation and diplomacy – remain uncharacterised within a larger theme. They rather form such a theme individually than that they fit within one of the above posed themes. The United States’ diplomatic orientation would fit the more abstract theme of democracy when it concerns America’s modus operandi for promoting democracy abroad. However, the theme of democracy within the four

Presidential Addresses does not claim to be promoting democratic values in Syria. Rather, it differentiates between the United States as an inherently democratic nation and Syria – under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad – as autocratic. Hence, the discourse of diplomacy, and also that of international cooperation, remain separate of one of the mentioned larger themes.

4.1.3 Dynamics

Examining the dynamics of the established discourse primarily concerns an analysis of the underlying power relations of the four Presidential Addresses. The aim hereof is to answer the following questions: What kind of othering occurs?; Who is accepted to speak and on whose behalf?; What is accepted as knowledge and truth? This set of questions will provide a clear