Do elections matter?
The effect of electoral systems on attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and
perception of effective governance
Master’s Thesis Graduate School of Communication Master’s programme Communication Science
University of Amsterdam
Deborah Juliard 10807780
Supervisor: Dr. Alessandro Nai Word count: 7981
Abstract
There is a growing disconnection between voters and the government all across Western democracies. One of the reasons for this disconnection is the increase in discontent of voters. Literature pointed out that discontent of voters consists of three elements, namely attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance. However, the current found another important element of discontent, namely feelings towards the elections. Thus, discontent of voters consists of four elements in the current study. Multiple scholars found differences in attitudes among the electorate in different electoral systems, however most of the studies focused on the aggregated level. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether these
differences also appear on the individual level. The current study tries to discover whether differences in electoral systems participate to explain differences in discontent. Specifically, three electoral systems are under investigation, namely first past the post (winner takes all), proportional representative list (a proportional distribution of votes) and single transferable vote (ranking the candidates). In addition, the moderating role of political sophistication was studied to see whether differences in electoral systems especially matter for high sophisticated citizens, in comparison to low sophisticated citizens. To test the research question, an experiment was conducted. Only feelings towards the elections found a significant effect on different electoral systems. Firstly, participants that were exposed to the FPTP system had more negative feelings towards the elections than participants that were exposed to the PR list. Finally, participants that were exposed to the STV system had more positive feelings towards the elections than participants that were exposed to the PR list.
Keywords: electoral systems, majoritarian system, proportional representative,
Introduction
All across Western democracies, citizens are becoming less involved in politics and a disconnection between citizens and government is increasing, which can be seen in the long-term decline of voting participation (Livingstone & Markham, 2008). Various elements contribute to this growing discontent. For example, there is a decrease in trust regarding political institutions (Torcal & Montero, 2006), but also regarding political actors in the sense that they are becoming less responsive (Morlino, 2010; Torcal & Montero, 2006) and have a lack of accountability (Norris, 1999). In addition, a decrease can be seen in attachment to political parties (Norris, 1999) and last, political discontent increases due to globalization (Bussmann & Schneider, 2007). In sum, due to many reasons a growing discontent can be seen and voters feel no longer represented.
Discontent can be primarily seen in three different aspects, namely voters’ attitudes towards democracy, levels of cynicism and their perception of effective governance (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015). The issue of voters discontent is one across all democratic systems, however not to the same extent. This is because there are two main democratic models to be found in the Western world: the majoritarian model and the consensus model (Lijphart, 2012). These democratic models also have different electoral systems. Three electoral systems are being researched in the current study, namely the ‘first past the post’ (winner takes all), ‘proportional representative list’ and ‘single transferable vote’ (ranking candidates). These electoral systems will be further discussed in the theoretical framework, however it is worth noting that
proportional representative list and the single transferable vote are variants of the same
to the majoritarian system. In short, there are two main democratic systems, but the discontent of voters is present in both, albeit not to the same extent (Blais & Carty, 1990; Golder, 2005).
The expected levels of the discontent of voters are not the same for all three systems for a number of reasons. Firstly, attitudes to democracy, scholars showed that the more proportional an electoral system is, the more positive people are with the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999; Blais & Loewen, 2007; Blais, Morin-Chasse & Singh, 2017; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Karp & Bowler, 2001). In addition, voters that voted for the losing parties in majoritarian systems show more negative attitudes towards democracy than voters that voted for losing parties in proportional representative systems (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Thus, electoral systems can play a part in the peoples’ attitudes towards democracy.
The same can be seen with cynicism. People are becoming more cynical towards the government over the years (Dekker, 2006). Although it is a growing trend, scholars do find that trust towards the government differs per electoral system (Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999; Bowler & Donovan, 2012; Blais & Loewen, 2007; Dassonneville, 2012; Karp, Nai & Norris, 2018). For example, citizens become more cynical because they have unheard demands (Norris, 1999). These demands will probably stay unheard in a first past the post system, because it is either one party/candidate that will govern or the other. Voters in a proportional representative list system, on the other hand, can vote more precisely according to their believes. Thus, differences in electoral systems are expected in levels of cynicism.
Thirdly, a difference can be found in levels of perception of effective governance, since party systems also differ. For example, in majoritarian systems, there is only one party/candidate, whereas there is a coalition in proportional representative systems. Whether someone perceives a
government as effective can be influenced by the party systems that electoral system has (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006; Norris, 1997). In a majoritarian system, for instance, effective governance is perceived as more important than in a proportional representative system
(Lijphart, 2012). Thus, perception of effective governance is taken into account in the current study.
Next to the differences in discontent of voters, a difference can also be seen in political sophistication, since some electoral systems are more complicated than others. For example, the distribution of votes is more complicated. In order to understand a difficult system, a voter has to have some knowledge and interest regarding the political system. Karp, Nai and Norris (2018) note that high political sophisticated people tend to understand politics and the political system better than their low sophisticated counterparts. Therefore, a difference is expected in electoral systems for political sophistication.
Research on comparing discontent of voters on the systematic level, by comparing voting systems, is not new. However, it has been mostly been done in very similar manners and on the aggregated level with the country as unit of analysis (for a good overview see source Blais, Morin-Chasse, Singh, 2017). What has not been tried is an experimental setting to uncover whether voters on the individual level differ in their attitudes towards democracy, levels of cynicism and perception of effective governance based on the voting system (either first past the post, proportional representative list or single transferable vote) supplied to them in an
experiment. This gap in the literature needs to be investigated because only then can it be seen whether different systems, of which voters usually have no experience with, matter. Secondly, while attitudes towards democracy and cynicism have been researched to a large extent,
level. This despite the fact that these perceptions have been found to be linked to discontent to a large extent (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015). The current research deliberately includes this measure in a comparative way with attitudes and cynicism to come to a more comprehensive picture on the relationship between these three factors and the specific democratic system.
From this it can be seen that the systematic level of the different democratic systems matters for the discontent that voters feel with the government. Therefore, it becomes important to see how these levels differ and if the systems are indeed a powerful explanation. Thus, the research question of the current study becomes:
What is the influence of three different types of electoral systems on attitudes towards
democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance? To what extent does this
relationship exists especially for high sophisticated voters?
The effects of electoral systems on the discontent of voters will be discussed more thoroughly in the theoretical framework. In the method, the participants and data will be discussed, followed by the results. Last, the conclusion and discussion will be examined at the end of this study.
Theoretical Background
Discontent in democracies
Discontent of voters, the area of interest to this research, can be primarily seen from attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and perceptions of effective governance (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015).
Several scholars have investigated attitudes towards democracy around different topics such as at the institutional level, like the media (Nisbet, Stoychef & Pearce, 2012) or at the macro level (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999; Blais & Loewen, 2007; Blais, Morin-Chassse & Singh, 2017; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Karp & Bowler, 2001). Following the study by Farrell and McAllister (2006) attitudes towards democracy can be defined on the basis of three dimensions “voter attitudes to the role of political parties, (…) the extent to which voters believe that the politicians are responsive to and knowledgeable about their needs” and last, “the perceived fairness of the electoral system” (p. 738). Thus, in the current research citizen’ attitudes towards democracy will be explored on those three dimensions at the individual level. The variable attitude towards democracy is an important determinant of discontent of voters because citizens, that are dissatisfied with how democracies works show lower levels of political participation and are less interested in politics (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015).
The second important determinant of voters discontent is cynicism. This concept has often been discussed at the institutional level, for example regarding the media (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2015; De Vreese, 2008). Besides the institutional level, cynicism was also investigated at the individual level, in reference to support of populist parties (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004) and in terms of political participation (Hochwarter, James, Johnson & Ferris, 2004). Cynicism can be defined as “an individual’s attitude, consisting of a conviction of the incompetence and immorality of politicians, political institutions and/or the political system as a whole” (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2015, p. 706). Cynicism is also an important element, because it is a growing trend (Norris, 1999) and this belief of incompetence of immorality might decrease
electoral turnout and political engagement (Hochwarter, James, Johnson & Ferris, 2004; Norris, 1999).
Last, perception of effective governance will be taken into account in the current study. Some studies examined effective governance on the basis of the public officials itself, advanced democracies in comparison to new democracies (Plattner, 2015) and a comparison between local governments (Udayaadithya & Gurtoo, 2014). Only few studies were found that look at the perception of effective governance at the individual level of voters (Birnbaum, 1991; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015; Lijphart, 2012; Schuster, Smith, Corak & Yamada, 1994). Perception of effective governance, in the broadest sense, is “satisfaction with the actual performance of the political system” (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015, p. 19). Schuster, Smith, Corak and
Yamada (1994) specify this satisfaction on the individual level as the perception of the voter that the government has the competence of making a quality decision. When voters perceive the government as effective, they are more satisfied with the way democracy works (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmber, 2015) and voters with positive attitudes towards democracy show higher levels of political participation. Therefore, perception of effective governance is included in the current research.
In short, the discontent of voters will be looked at on the individual level, but also on the systematic level and be tied to the specific electoral system.
Types of democracies and electoral systems
According to Bormann and Golder (2013), a regime can be called a democracy if; 1) the chief of state is elected 2) the legislature is elected 3) there is more than one party competing in elections and 4) a change under identical electoral rules has taken place. Lijphart (2012) explains democracy on the basis of eight dimensions. The right to vote, the right to be elected, the right of
political leaders to compete for support and votes, elections that are free and fair, freedom of association, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and institutions for making policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. Although all democracies must consist of those dimensions, democracies also differ on certain aspects.
One of those differences is the electoral system. According to Lijphart (1994) an electoral system can be defined as “a set of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy”(p. 13). There are three types of electoral systems, namely majoritarian, proportional representative and mixed. The website Fairvote (http://www.fairvote.org/research_electoralsystems_world) tracks which democracies are most commonly used. Of the 195 countries in the world, the majoritarian (64 countries) and proportional (89 countries) are the two democracies that are most commonly used. Therefore the current study will solely focus on those and the effects those democracies can have on the
discontent of voters. The majoritarian and proportional democracies also know multiple different electoral systems of which all of them will be discussed briefly.
In the nineteenth century elections, in most countries, were held under the majoritarian democracy (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). In a majoritarian democracy winner takes all, which means that the candidates/parties that gets the most votes, win. However, a relative majority (receiving more votes than any other candidate) can also be sufficient to win (Bormann & Golder, 2013). This is the case in the ‘first past the post (FPTP)’ electoral system. This is, under the plurality and majority formulas, the simplest one (Lijphart, 2012). Another example is the
‘majority-runoff’, which means that there are two rounds (like in France) if there is no majority in the first round. Last, the ‘alternative vote’ has a preferential type of voting system; voters can range their candidates according to their preference (Karp, Nai & Norris, 2018; Lijphart, 2012).
Within the proportional representative model, proportional representation plays the biggest role. The idea of ‘majority rules’ is not applicable for the proportional representation system, because the principles of inclusion are more important within this model. In addition, in proportional elections, the number of votes any party/candidate receives is translated into an equivalent number of seats. Small parties can be elected in parliament and therefore the principles of inclusions are met. As like in the majority formula, three systems are distinguished. The first one is the ‘proportional representation list (PR list)’, which is the most commonly used PR system (Lijphart, 2012). Different parties nominate (multiple) candidates (it depends if it is a closed or open list PR system) and voters can cast their vote for one party/candidate on the ballot. Another formula is the ‘mixed member proportional’, which means that elections will be conducted according to both the majoritarian and the PR system. For example in Germany, half of the representatives are elected according to the plurality rule, whereas the other half is elected by PR list (Lijphart, 2012). Last, the ‘single transferable vote (STV)’ is similar to the alternative vote, except that the STV falls under a PR model whereas the alternative vote belongs to the
majoritarian; therefore the determination of the winner differs. The STV system is employed in some countries for the legislative election, for example in Ireland, Malta and the Australian Senate (Norris, 1997). Parties choose as many candidates on the list and the voters can rank their
preferences among the candidates. A quota is calculated by dividing the total number of votes with the total number of seats (Norris, 1997). Every candidate that received the quota is elected. All the votes that candidates received more (the surplus) will be transferred to the second preference. In addition, the weakest candidate is dropped and his or her ballot is transferred to the second preference (Lijphart, 2012).
For the current study the focus lies on the FPTP and the PR list system, because these systems occur in most countries. Also the STV will be examined, because this system gives a good reflection of the diversity of opinion among the electorate (Tideman, 1995).
Discontent of voters across different electoral systems
The electorate of New Zealand voted, in 1993, in a binding referendum to replace the electoral system they had for 138 years (Vowles, Aimer & Catt, 1995). After this, the
majoritarian system, FPTP, was replaced by the proportional representative system (Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999). After this transformation, different scholars showed changes on individual level among the electorate. The electorate had the idea that elections were conducted fair and there was an increase in overall turnout and trust in government (Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999; Bowler & Donovan, 2012). This reform shows that an electoral system can have an influence on different attitudes and believes. However, for the current study, different
determinants are being investigated; therefore it is interesting to see whether different types of electoral systems also have an influence on the discontent of voters.
The discontent of voters will be firstly examined on the basis of the, FPTP and PR list electoral systems. Citizens under the PR list system are found to have more positive attitudes towards democracy than citizens in the FPTP system (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Blais, Morin-Chasse, Singh, 2017; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2015; Hoffman, 2005; Farrell & McAllister, 2006). This difference can be ascribed to a couple of reasons. First of all under the PR list system less votes are wasted, in the sense that more parties/candidates make it to parliament or even government (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999; Bowler &
Donovan, 2012). This affects, for example, citizens who prefer smaller parties, like minorities or citizens who are more outside of the political centre. This manifests itself in more positive
attitudes towards the democracy. Minority parties under the majoritarian system, on the other hand, will be deprived of representation. The greater the disproportionality of the system is, the more negative the voter’ views of how the system operates (Farrel & McAllister, 2006). In other words, citizens will have less positive attitudes when they vote for a party that is
underrepresented in the legislature. This means that the more proportional the system, the more positive the attitudes towards the democracy become (Blais, Morin-Chasse, Singh, 2017). Secondly, building on the argument above, the variety of parties is bigger in a PR list system than a FPTP system, which leads to greater representation of diverse values (Hoffman, 2005). Thus, the representation of the public will increase which leads to more positive attitudes towards democracy (Hoffman, 2005).
Next to the attitudes towards democracy, cynicism matters. A decrease in political trust and an increase in cynicism can be seen since 1980 in different democracies (Norris, 1999). One of the reasons for this increase in cynicism is the feeling of unjust outcomes. For example the feeling that the government is not responsive or the feeling that certain groups are more privileged than others. These feelings can increase the discontent regarding the government (Norris, 1999). Obviously these feelings can exist in both electoral systems, yet due to the fact that voters have more choice in a PR list system, they can focus on the views of parties they deem most important. Especially since distrustful citizens are less likely to vote for major parties than citizens that do trust the government (Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In short, citizens can be distrustful towards the government because the government is not responsive and creates
differences between groups. Yet, this lack of trust can be pushed back in a PR list system,
two big parties. Thus, it is believed that citizens are more cynical in FPTP systems in comparison to PR list systems.
Although it is believed that people have less positive attitudes towards democracy and are more cynical in FPTP systems, the FPTP systems also has its benefits. Since there is only one party in government, citizens might see this type of governance as effective (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006; Norris, 1997). For example, in a PR list system, parties will have to negotiate for their coalition agreement, whereas in a FPTP system the winner can implement it without
engaging in such (Norris, 1997). However, in a PR list system proportional representation is seen as more important than effective governance (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). In short, citizens in FPTP electoral systems perceive their governance as more effective, but in PR list systems fairness to minority parties and diversity in social representation is better which increases positive attitudes towards democracy and decreases cynicism (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006; Norris, 1997). Thus the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1: Compared to the FPTP, citizens that vote under PR list have more positive attitudes towards
democracy, lower levels of cynicism, but lower feeling of effective governance.
Next, two of the three determinants of the discontent of voters will be examined on the basis of a comparison in proportional representative electoral systems, namely the PR list system and STV system. It is expected that citizens in the STV system will have more positive attitudes towards democracy due to two reasons. Firstly, the STV system is a ‘preferential voting’ system. Preferential voting systems can be defined as “systems characterized by candidate- based voting and high degrees of ordinality” (Farrell & McAllister, 2006, p. 727). These types of voting systems can make a difference in terms of how satisfied someone is with the democracy, because preferential voting systems increase the perception of how fair the election outcome is (Farrell &
McAllister, 2006). Citizens will have more positive attitudes towards democracy because they are given much more freedom on the ballot paper, in this case, in terms of ranking the candidates (Farrell & McAllister, 2006). Secondly, because voters can vote for different candidates, the group of elected candidates reflects the diversity of views in the electorate (Tideman, 1995). Obviously this is also the case in the PR list system, but due to the fact that citizens under STV can vote for multiple candidates, the reflection of the diversity is even more prominent in the STV system.
Next to the expected increase of positive attitudes towards democracy, an indirect decrease in cynicism is expected because of two reasons. Firstly, the STV system gives voters a greater sense of efficacy due to the fact that they feel greater empowerment after the voting act (Farrell & McAllister, 2006). The cause of this empowerment lies within the voters; they can express an opinion as to how they believe the direction of the party should go (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). For example, if there are different tendencies within one party, a voter can choose to vote for the candidate(s) who’s believes are more in line with theirs (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). Thus, the STV system in comparison to the PR list will lead to a greater sense of efficacy, which in turn will lead to a decrease in levels of cynicism (de Vreese, 2005). Secondly, the STV system guarantees that a voter can vote sincerely, which means that a voter knows that, although its first preference is an unpopular candidate, that vote will not be wasted since it then will be assigned to their second preference (Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 2006). If voters can vote sincerely, they feel represented and have the feeling that the power is in their hands (Bowler & Donovan, 2012). Thus, due to sincere voting efficacy will increase, which in turn will decrease levels of cynicism in the STV system. In short, STV, in comparison to PR list, will increase political efficacy because voters have the feeling they have greater empowerment in the voting
act because they feel more represented and, according to De Vreese (2005), an increase in political efficacy leads to a decrease in cynicism.
Perception of effective governance will not be taken into account, because the PR list and STV systems are both systems with a possibility for a coalition. Consequently no differences are expected on this determinant. Thus, the following hypothesis is formed:
H2: Compared to the PR list, citizens that vote under STV have more positive attitudes towards
democracy and lower levels of cynicism. No differences are expected concerning perception of
effective governance.
The moderating role of political sophistication
Political sophistication is defined in many different ways, but it always refers to the amount of familiarity that a person has with politics. For example Luskin (1990) defines someone as politically sophisticated one the basis of five dimensions: interest in politics, education, exposure to political information, intelligence and occupation. However, not all scholars used the same definition, such as Lupton, Myers and Thornton (2015), which used three components, namely knowledge, interest and involvement. Karp, Nai and Norris (2018) too used another operationalization, two components to measure political sophistication, namely interest and knowledge.
Some electoral systems are more difficult to understand than others. An example of a more complicated electoral system is the system in Australia. Australia has the alternative vote (AV) system for the national elections. In the AV, a voter can rank multiple candidates/parties on the ballot and the distribution and calculation of the votes into seats is complicated, which poses a great amount of barriers to understand how the system works. In order to understand such an electoral system, a person has to have some political knowledge. According to Karp, Nai and
Norris (2018) formal education and political knowledge will have a positive influence on the political awareness, “the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered” (Zaller, 1992, p. 21), which will increase trust regarding
elections. Political sophisticated citizens, who are politically interested and politically aware, are more likely to understand the system in comparison to low sophisticated citizens (Karp, Nai & Norris, 2018). In addition, voters need more information about the different political parties and their standpoints, because they can vote for multiple parties. In this light, voters who have more relevant knowledge are more likely to take their preferences into account when voting (de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond & van der Eijk, 2011).
In short, some electoral systems are more complicated than others and in order to understand those complicated systems, a person has to have some political knowledge. If voters are knowledgeable/sophisticated, the different effects of electoral systems exist for them. However, for non-knowledgeable/sophisticated citizens the difference in electoral systems does not generate differences in attitudes towards democracy or cynicism. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H3: Differences in electoral systems matter especially for people that score high on political
sophistication.
Method
Research design
The aim of the current study is to uncover the effects of different electoral systems on the discontent of voters. To test the hypotheses and research question, the current study consists of a quantitative experimental design. This design is chosen, because within quantitative research causality can be established (Verhoeven, 2011). In addition, a quantitative study, in comparison
with qualitative, increases the effort to deal with both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ validity (Winter, 2000). Which means that if differences are found in the results, this can be ascribed to the variables that are under investigation (internal validity) and that the results are generalizable to a greater audience (external validity) (Verhoeven, 2011; Winter, 2000).
All participants took part in one study with two elections, a mock election for a fake council of Digital Security and a theoretical Dutch Parliamentary election; these will be explained more thoroughly later in the current chapter. The design used is a 3x1 factorial one, with electoral systems as between-subjects (three levels, namely first past the post, proportional representative list and single transferable vote). The dependent variables are attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance. It is chosen to perform a between-subjects design, because then participants are only exposed to one treatment; the same treatment is repeated for both elections. This is more aligned with most theoretical mind-sets (Charness, Gneezy & Kuhn, 2012), since a citizen is more likely to vote according to one electoral system instead of two.
Selection of participants and media
The survey experiment for the current study was distributed online on two different platforms, Facebook and the LAB of the University of Amsterdam (UvA). On the personal Facebook page of the researcher, participants were recruited through a convenience sample with a snowball method. This would ensure diversity among the participants in terms of age, gender and political ideology. After the first invite, four reminders were posted on Facebook, once a week. The UvA LAB on the other hand gave access to bachelor students from the studies Communication Science and Psychology. The reason why an online survey is chosen as method
is because it is easy for the participants; they can fill out the survey on any device at any time. In addition, this type of recruitment is inexpensive and time efficient.
The recruitment of participants took place from May the 3th till June the 9th. In that period 281 participants, of whom 208 finished, ranging from 18 to 90 years old filled out the survey. The average age was 26,62 years (SD = 1.03) of which 71.2% was female. All
participants were exposed to one of the three electoral systems; 31.7% to the FPTP, 24.1% to the PR-list and 33.7% to the STV. For an overview of the differences per sample, see Appendix A.
There are several advantages for merging two samples. Firstly, the sample is bigger. In every treatment there are at least 50 participants, which allows the researcher to give a more precise average of the results. Secondly, a bigger sample size will decrease misleading statistics (Bryman, 2012). For example, outliers are not considered of great importance in bigger samples sizes. However, the merging of the two samples also has disadvantages. Firstly, the participants in the LAB sample only consist of bachelor Communication Science students. This means that the researcher can interpret the results as such; high educated, young, and currently living in the Netherlands. However, due to the merging of the datasets, it is more difficult to generalize the results. Second, the participants in the LAB sample got study credits for filling out the survey, whereas the convenience sample participants did not. This means that the reason for filling out the survey differs and could endanger the outcomes.
Selection of case study
The Netherlands has been chosen as case study for the current experiment. The
Netherlands is suitable for a couple of reasons. Firstly, in the Netherlands there is a proportional representative (open) list electoral system, which increases the perceived fairness of the election. This is because the electorate has the feeling that they have a greater sense of ‘ownership’ over
the electoral process (Farrel & Mcallister, 2006). Secondly, the Netherlands is one of the few European countries that never experienced a general change in government or the development of two opposite extreme parties in competition (Mair, 2008). This consistency makes the Netherlands a clear and unambiguous context for researching political systems.
Stimulus material
In the survey participants were asked to answer questions regarding their demographics like age, gender, political ideology, factual knowledge regarding Dutch politics and interest. After these questions, participants were randomly ascribed to one of the three conditions. In the conditions, participants were asked to vote according to one of the three electoral systems, FPTP, PR list and STV. In the last part of the survey participants were asked to answer questions
regarding their attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance. The exact questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.
The current survey design asked participants to vote in a mock election first and a
hypothetical election second. In the mock election people were asked to vote for a fictive council that was made up for the purpose of this study. First, participants received an explanation of this new council that was brought to life in order to adjust a bill regarding Dutch intelligence and security service (see Appendix B for a precise description). The topic of the Dutch intelligence and security service was a hot topic in the Netherlands due to the referendum that was held on the 21st of March. The participants were explained that an election is being held for this new council and that they can vote for a type of profession to take place in this council. Participants could vote, for instance, on ‘policemen and detectives’ or ‘university professors and researchers’. The type of electoral system that the participants were assigned to, would eventually determine the composition of this council: a coalition of several professions or a ‘winner takes all’ concept.
Next, the voting rules of the electoral system were explained per treatment. The structure of the explanation was kept the same for every system. First, the name of the electoral system was given, followed by an example of a country that uses this system and how the electoral system works in practice. Secondly an argument in favour of this system was given, followed by a more precise example regarding the distribution of votes, which in turn was followed by a
disadvantage of this system. Before the participants were asked to vote, according to their assigned electoral system, they got to see a short reminder including the name and the advantage of the electoral system. The second part of the survey consisted of the hypothetical Dutch
national elections. The hypothetical election had a similar structure to an actual election in the Netherlands: how would the participants vote if the elections were held tomorrow? Participants saw a list of eleven political parties that are now in the House of Representatives and they were asked to vote according to the same electoral system as they have voted for in the fake council.
Operationalization of variables
All three dependent variables, attitude towards democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance are measured, after the participants were exposed to the treatment, using multiple statements on a 7-point Likert scale ranging, after begin recoded, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
The first dependent variable, attitudes towards democracy was measured, according to Farrel and Mcallister (2006), with the three statements “Political parties are necessary”, “In my country elections are conducted fairly” and “Members of Parliament know what people think”. A factor analysis was performed to test if the three items made a reliable scale. One component had an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 56.12% of the total variance in the three items.
The scale (1= negative, 7 = positive) is considered to be reliable (α = .60), with all three items used (M = 3.02, SD = 1.07).
Next to the abovementioned variable, a second battery of questions is taken into account in the current study, namely feelings towards the elections. Five statements were used, such as “I am satisfied with these elections” and “I am frustrated about the choice that I had to make” (see Appendix B). A factor analysis was performed to test whether the five items made a reliable scale. One component had an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 56.56% of the total variance in the five items. The scale (1 = negative, 7 = positive) is considered to be reliable (α = .80), with all five items used (M = 4.05, SD = 1.21). Although this battery of questions was not based on previous literature, the results do show clearly that the items can be used to denote discontent of voters in the form of feelings towards the election.
Next, cynicism was measured, according to Boukes and Boomgaarden (2015), using fifteen statements, like “Politicians are corrupt” and “Politicians are profiteers” (see Appendix B). In order to compare the coefficients of all statements, all the questions had to be measured in the same direction. Thus, five statements were recoded (see table 2 in Appendix C) because those statements were positively formulated, whereas the other statements weren’t. After recoding the variables, a factor analysis was performed to test if the statements made a reliable scale. Four components had an eigenvalue higher than one, which in total explained 64.39% of the total variance in the fifteen items. The scale (1 = negative, 7 = positive) is considered to be reliable (α = .89), with all fifteen items used (M = 4.21, SD = .90).
The last dependent variable, perception of effective governance was measured with four statements, like “I believe that negotiation a key value of effective governance” and “I believe that the government is able to make quality decisions” (see Appendix B). No scientific article
was found that used this variable in the same way as the current study does. Yet, Birnbaum (1991) explained that governance could be perceived as effective when the expectations of an individual match with the outcome of decision-making of the government. Therefore two statements were developed, asking the participants whether they thought that compromise and negotiation were important determinants. In addition, if a participant believes that the
government is able to make quality decisions, the government can be seen as effective (Schuster, Smith, Corak & Yamada, 1994). Thus, the third statement is developed asking whether the participant believes that the government is able to make quality decisions. Last, Lijphart (2012) argues that effective governance is more pronounced in majoritarian systems, whereas inclusion is in proportional representative systems. Therefore, the last statement is developed asking the participants which they deem most important. After completing the last principal component analysis, one component appeared to have an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 52.73% of the total variance in all items. The scale (1 = negative, 7 = positive) is considered to be reliable (α = .66), with all four items used (M = 5.10, SD = .90).
Political sophistication is used as moderator. Sophistication is measured on the basis of two dimensions: knowledge and interest (Nai, Schemeil & Marie, 2017). Knowledge is measured by five factual questions about the Dutch political system, like “What is the number of chairs in the House of Representatives?” and “Which political parties participate in the current
governmental coalition?” (see Appendix B). Political knowledge is defined on the basis of two principles, namely basic knowledge of the core institutions of democracy and actual engagement in politics (Vettehen, Hageman & van Snippenburg, 2004). The number of correct answers are added on the political sophistication scale. For interest, one item is used, asking participants if they are generally interested in politics, measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7
= strongly disagree). The political sophistication scale includes both two measurements. The higher someone scores on the political sophistication scale, the more politically sophisticated someone is. Regarding the knowledge question, “Who is the chairman of Parliament”, two answers are counted as correct, since Parliament in the Netherlands is the first and second chamber. Thus, the answers Khadija Arib (House of Representatives) and Ankie Broekers-Knol (Senate) are correct. Before combining interest and knowledge to one scale, a Pearson’s r test was conducted to see if there was a relationship between the two. There was a correlation between the two variables, r = .483, n = 208, p < .001. Therefore a scale (0 = low, 1 = high) was made with all items used (M = .54, SD = .29).
Results
Randomization checks
Before testing the hypotheses three randomization checks were performed for age, political sophistication and gender to see whether the variables were distributed equally over the three conditions. Two one-way ANOVA’s were conducted for age, F(2, 203) = 4.10, p = .018 and for political sophistication F(2, 204) =.17, p = .847. For gender, a Pearson’s Chi-Squared was performed, χ2(4) = 3.15, p = .533. The randomization was successful for political
sophistication and gender, but not for age. Therefore, age will be included in the tests as control variable.
Manipulation checks
Next to the randomization checks, manipulation checks were performed to check if the manipulation was successful. Three questions were asked on a 7-point Likert scale (1= strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree. Three one-way ANOVA’s were performed (see table 3 for the mean
differences). The first for FPTP, which showed a statically significant result, F(2, 204) = 56.18, p < .001. The second for PR list, showed a statically significant result, F(2, 204) = 26.98, p < .001 and the third was significant for the STV, F(2, 204) = 114.28, p < .001. To conclude, the
manipulation was successful.
Effects of FPTP and PR list on discontent of voters
Four linear regressions were performed for attitudes towards democracy, feelings towards the election, cynicism and perception of effective governance for the first hypothesis. It was expected that the participants that voted under the FPTP electoral system would have less
positive attitudes towards democracy, less positive feelings towards the election, higher levels of cynicism and higher levels of perception of effective governance in comparison to the
participants that were asked to vote under the PR list system (H1). All regression analyses were conducted with the two electoral systems; exposure to FPTP and PR list as independent variable. For the first regression, with attitudes towards democracy (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as
dependent variable, no significant results were found, F(2,133) = .53, p = .589. For the second regression, with feelings towards the elections (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, a significant model is found, F(2,133) = 18.79, p < .001. It appears that there is a negative
Table 3
Mean differences in the manipulation checks
Condition STV PR list FPTP FPTP Mean 5,82 5,29 1,86 SD 1,71 1,97 1,46 PR list Mean 5,34 2,92 4,11 SD 1,77 1,93 2,10 STV Mean 1,96 4,53 5,00 SD 1,41 1,92 1,68
correlation with feelings towards the election and exposure to the FPTP electoral system: positive feelings towards the election decreases with .99 when participants voted under the FPTP electoral system in comparison to participants that voted under the PR list electoral system, b* = -.45, t(133) = -5.78, p < .001. The third regression was performed with levels of cynicism as dependent
variable (1 = negative, 7 = positive). This regression showed no significant results, F(2,133) = 1.85, p = .161. The last regression, with perception of effective governance as dependent variable (1 = negative, 7 = positive), showed also no significant results, F(2,133) = .49, p = .617. Thus, conflicting with the expectations of the researcher, exposure to the PR list system only differ with exposure to the FPTP system on feelings towards the elections. Therefore, the first hypothesis is partly rejected.
To test the second hypothesis, it was expected that participants that were exposed to the STV system would have more positive attitudes towards democracy, more positive feelings towards the election and lower levels of cynicism than participants that were exposed to the PR list system. Three linear regressions were performed. The first regression, with attitudes towards democracy (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, showed no significant results, F(2,137) = 1.40, p = .251. For the second regression, with feelings towards the elections (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, a significant model is found, F(2,137) = 6.25, p < .01. It appears that there is a positive correlation with feelings towards the election and exposure to the STV electoral system: positive feelings towards the election increases with .61 when participants vote under the STV electoral system in comparison to participants that vote under the PR list, b* = -.23, t(137) = 3.52, p < .01. The third regression, with levels of cynicism as
dependent variable (1= low, 7 = high), showed no significant results, F(2,137) = .27, p = .763. Thus, conflicting with the expectations of the researcher, exposure to the PR list system only
differs with exposure to the FPTP system on feelings towards the elections. Therefore, the second hypothesis is partly rejected.
Moderator
The researcher expected that differences in electoral systems matter especially for people that score high on political sophistication (H3). To test this expectation, three multiple
regressions were performed with the conditions (exposure to STV and PR list) and interaction with political sophistication (0=low, 1=high) as independent variables. The first regression, with attitudes towards democracy as dependent variable showed no significant interaction effect for high sophisticated citizens, t(70) = -.02, p = .987 and no significant effect for low sophisticated citizens, t(60) = -.31, p = .755.
The second regression, with feelings towards the elections as dependent variable, showed no significant interaction effect for high sophisticated citizens, t(70) = -.61, p = .282 and a marginally significant effect for low sophisticated citizens, t(60) = 1.73, p = .089.
The third regression, with levels of cynicism as dependent variable, showed no
significant results for high sophisticated citizens, t(70) = -.77, p = .176, and for low sophisticated citizens, t(60) = .13, p = .901. Thus, conflicting with the expectations of the researcher,
differences in electoral systems do not affect high political sophisticated citizens. However, as expected, it does not affect low sophisticated citizens either. Thus, the third hypothesis is rejected.
Next to the abovementioned tests, several extra tests were performed. Firstly, all the aforementioned tests were also performed separately for the LAB sample and the convenience sample (see Appendix A). Secondly, due to the use of these two samples several robustness checks were performed to make sure that the outcome of the results do not differ when
controlling for specific conditions. For example, a robustness check is performed to check whether the tests gave the same results for only Dutch participants. All the different robustness checks are reported in Appendix D. Lastly, the results of both elections that were held in the current study are reported in Appendix E.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to find out whether there were differences between three electoral systems, namely first past the post (FPTP), proportional representative list (PR list) and single transferable vote (STV) in the discontent of voters. The current study suspected that high levels of political sophistication could moderate the effect of the electoral system on the
discontent of voters. Despite the expectations, no differences were found between the electoral systems (FPTP, PR list and STV) in attitudes towards democracy, cynicism and perception of effective governance. However, feelings towards the elections did show differences between electoral systems. Participants that were exposed to the FPTP system had more negative feelings towards the elections than participants that were exposed to the PR list. Next, participants that were exposed to the STV system had more positive feelings towards the elections than
participants that were exposed to the PR list. Last, no moderation effect was found.
The non-significant results for the hypotheses are conflicting with multiple studies (e.g. Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Linhart, Raabe & Statch, 2018). Firstly, this contradiction could be explained on the basis of the sample. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, most of the studies that assessed differences between electoral systems did so on the aggregated level, cross-national (for a good overview see source Blais, Morin-Chassee, Singh, 2017). This means that every participant with a certain nationality sees the same electoral system.
However this was not the case in the current study, since there were multiple nationalities. For example, a participant from China that currently lives in the Netherlands, was treated the same as someone with a Dutch nationality that lives in the Netherlands. Secondly, participants that live in a PR system might be dissatisfied with the coalition and this might cause a growing alienation, or discontent, with politics (Karp & Bowler, 2001). Last, the discontent of voters might lie in
something else than the electoral systems (Banducci, Donovan & Karp, 1999).
The current study also has some limitations. Firstly, all participants were asked to vote twice in the experiment under the same electoral system. The reason for this decision is that participants would then clearly understand the system and how to vote. However, this could also lead to survey fatigue (Savage & Waldman, 2008). Secondly, citizens did not get the same chance to participate in the current study, due to the convenience and LAB sample. This also explains the relatively young sample. Therefore, it would be desirable for future research, to have a bigger sample with more diverse demographics, or a sample with exactly the same
demographics. Thirdly, building on the second limitation, not all participants got the same incentive to participate in the current study. Participants in the LAB sample, for example, received study credits to participate, whereas participants in the convenient sample did not. For future research it would be desirable to keep the incentive as consistent as possible.
Although the current study did not find many significant results, it does have some important components. Firstly, electoral systems do not have an effect on all the elements of discontent of voters. This means that when policy makers or politicians’ wishes to decrease discontent of voters, they can use this research to see that a solution can only be found in feelings towards the elections. In addition, this outcome might motivate scholars to further investigate this component. Building on this, the current study can be important in the field of political
communication, because it gives insight into parts where politicians should communicate better. For example, although no significant differences were found in the current study, literature does point out that levels of political sophistication matter for understanding electoral systems. Finally, it is always important to be in motion, as a person, as a politician and as a country. Therefore, questioning how democracy can be improved is essential.
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Appendix A
All the different checks and tests that were executed in the current research were also performed for the separate sample underneath. All the different results are put in table 1, at the end of this chapter, for a clearer overview of all the results of the three different samples.
Convenience sample
In the convenient sample, 171 participants ranging from 18 to 90 years old filled out the survey. The average age was 28.23 years old (SD = 8.34) of which 61.8% was female. All participants were exposed to one of the three electoral systems; 29.1% was exposed to the FPTP, 38.2% to the PR-list and 31.8% to the STV.
Factor analysis
A factor analysis was performed to test if the three items for the first dependent variable, attitudes towards democracy, made a reliable scale. One component had an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 65.71% of the total variance in the three items. The scale is considered to be reliable (α = .73), with all three items used (M = 2.89, SD = 1.05), with 1 indicating
negative attitudes towards democracy and 7 indicating positive attitudes towards democracy. A second factor analysis was performed, for feelings towards the elections. One
component had an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 59.09% of the total variance in the five items. The scale is considered to be reliable (α = .82), with all five items used (M = 4.14, SD = 1.27), with 1 indicating negative feelings towards the elections and 7 indicating positive feelings towards the elections.
A third factor analysis was performed for cynicism, to test if the fifteen items made a reliable scale. Three components had an eigenvalue higher than one, which in total explained 61.80% of the total variance in the fifteen items. The scale is considered to be reliable (α = .91), with all fifteen items used (M = 4.04, SD = .97), with 1 indicating low levels of cynicism and 7 indicating high levels of cynicism.
After completing the fourth principal component analysis, for perception of effective governance, one component appeared to have an eigenvalue higher than one, which explained 55.29% of the total variance in the four items. The scale is considered to be reliable (α = .69), with all four items used (M = 5.20, SD = .93), with 1 indicating not so positive perception of effective governance and 7 indicating very positive perception of effective governance.
There was a correlation between the two variables measuring political sophistication, r = .621, n = 110, p < 0.001. Therefore the scale was made with all items used (M = .66, SD = .29), with 0 indicating low levels of political sophistication and 1 indicating high levels of political sophistication.
Randomization checks
A one-way ANOVA was conducted for age, F(2, 105) = 2.16, p = .120 and for political sophistication F(2, 106) =.47, p = .629. For gender, a Pearson’s Chi-Squared found no differences among the three conditions, χ2(4) = 3.95, p = .413. This means that the randomization was
successful for age, political sophistication and gender.
Manipulation checks
A one-way ANOVA was performed, for FPTP, which showed a statically significant result, F(2, 106) = 21.01, p < .001. Participants that voter under a FPTP system scored relatively high on the question if they were asked to vote according to the majoritarian system (M = 2.25, SD = 1.85) in comparison to the questions if they were asked to rank their choices (M = 5.84, SD = 1.73) and vote according to the PR list system (M = 5.31, SD = 2.04). Another one-way
ANOVA was conducted, for PR list, which showed a statically significant result, F(2, 106) = 28.00, p < .001. Participants that voter under a PR list system scored relatively high on the question if they were asked to vote according to the PR system (M = 2.24, SD = 1.34) in comparison to the questions if they were asked to rank their choices (M = 5.29, SD = 1.73) and vote according to the majoritarian system (M = 4.57, SD = 1.99). Lastly, a one-way ANOVA showed a statically significant result for the STV, F(2, 106) = 74.08, p < .001. Participants that voted under the STV system scored relatively high on the question if they were asked to rank their choices (M = 1.74, SD = .98) in comparison to the questions if they were asked to vote according to the PR list system (M = 4.31, SD = 2.08) and vote according to the majoritarian system (M = 5.09, SD = 1.85). To conclude, the manipulation was successful.
Regression analyses
Four linear regressions were performed for attitudes towards democracy, feelings towards the election, cynicism and perception of effective governance for the first hypothesis. For the first regression attitudes towards democracy (1 = negative, 7 = positive) was used as dependent
variable. No significant results were found, F(1,72) = 1.71, p = .195. For the second regression, with feelings towards the elections (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, a
significant model is found, F(1, 71) = 24.52, p < .001. It appears that there is a negative
correlation with feelings towards the election and exposure to the FPTP electoral system: positive feelings towards the election decreases with 1.19 when participants voted under the FPTP
electoral system in comparison to participants that are exposed to the PR list system, b* = -.51, t(70) = -4.95, p < .001.
The third regression was performed with levels of cynicism as dependent variable (1= low, 7 = high). A significant model was found, F(1,72) = 4.41, p < .05. In the FPTP system people are 0.46 less cynical in comparison with the PR list system, b* = -.24, t(72) = -2.01, p < .05. The last regression, with perception of effective governance as dependent variable (1 = low, 7 = high), showed a marginally significant effect, F(1,72) = 3.35, p = .072. Thus, conflicting with the expectations of the researcher, the PR list system does not differ with the FPTP system on attitudes towards democracy and perception of effective governance. However, for feelings towards the elections and cynicism an effect was found. Therefore, the first hypothesis is partly rejected.
To test the second hypothesis, three linear regressions were performed for attitudes towards democracy, feelings towards the elections and cynicism for the second hypothesis. The first regression, with attitudes towards democracy (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, showed no significant results, F(1,75) = 1.11, p = .296. For the second regression, with feelings towards the elections (1 = negative, 7 = positive) as dependent variable, a significant model is found, F(1, 74) = 5.65, p < .05. It appears that there is a positive correlation with
feelings towards the election and exposure to the STV electoral system: positive feelings towards the election increases with .56 when participants voted under the STV electoral system in
comparison to participants that voted under the PR list electoral system, b* = .27, t(73) = 2.38 p < .05. The third regression was performed with levels of cynicism as dependent variable (1= low, 7 = high). This regression showed no significant results, F(1,75) = .34, p = .562. Thus, conflicting with the expectations of the researcher, exposure to the PR list system does not differ with exposure to the FPTP system on attitudes towards democracy and cynicism. However, it does differ on feelings towards the elections. Therefore, the second hypothesis is partly rejected.
Moderator
For the moderator, a new variable was made that divided political sophistication in two (0=high educated, 1 = low educated). After the new variable was made, the file was split in two,
