Between Political Pressure and Personal Agency: Attitudes of Journalists on Autonomy and Self-Censorship in Hungary’s Media Landscape

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Between Political Pressure and Personal Agency:

Attitudes of Journalists on Autonomy and Self-Censorship

in Hungary’s Media Landscape

by

Anne ter Rele

Master Thesis February 2021

Student number: 10784594 Word count: 22976

Supervisor: Pauline van Romondt Vis Second reader: Eline Huiberts

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1. Journalistic report

Solidarity between Hungarian journalists “remarkably high”

in Hungary’s divided media sector, study suggests

Hungarian journalists express a high level of solidarity for peers working at competing news outlets, despite the polarization of the media sector. This was concluded by Anne ter Rele, who investigated Hungarian press freedom for her master thesis. Since Hungary’s press freedom is decreasing, the journalists feel a more united media landscape could protect the sector from external pressures.

Recent shutdowns of critical media outlets like Index (2020) and Klubrádió (2021) raise the question if Hungarian journalists can still work autonomously and if so, how. To study this, Ter Rele interviewed 16 Hungarian journalists, working for private and public outlets at radio, tv, print, and online media. Most of these journalists struggle with political and economic pressures and feel the media sector is very polarized. Also, almost all considered self-censorship as “part of the job”, stating “you have to accept the media landscape is politicized to do your work”.

However, on a personal level, solidarity between individual journalists was high, Ter Rele discovered. During the conversations, most journalists explained they wanted to work objectively and reduce the current polarization between media outlets. Also, journalists understood why others decided to work for outlets with strong political affiliations, such as government media, since these outlets provide much better salaries than badly-paying independent media. Although most believed government media produce “low-quality” journalism, the journalists stated it is sometimes necessary to “prioritize financial security over personal beliefs”.

According to Ter Rele, Hungarian journalists have different public and private views on the state of journalism of their country. Publicly, journalists emphasize the differences between their competitors and disapprove of media outlets with political affiliations. But personally, journalists understand everyone suffers, since the Hungarian media is under threat. This creates a level of solidarity between journalists working for outlets with different ideologies.

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However, self-censorship prevents journalists from publicly supporting peers from other news organizations. They feel political conflict is encouraged by both the government and the audience. This makes it harder for journalists to find common ground.

To strengthen a shared identity, Ter Rele recommends organizing informal meetups for a diverse group of journalists to discuss problems as individuals. Also, journalists should meet up with their readers to build a healthier and more constructive relations with the public. Together, journalists could work more autonomously than they do now and better tackle economic and political pressures. As one journalist stated: “We need to think together to challenge these new social tensions, these new economic financial challenges, and most of all, these misunderstandings.”

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2. Introduction

In July 2020, the Hungarian news site Index.hu became world news after more than 70 of its senior editors collectively resigned. Index was one of the last large government-critical outlets up in the air until then. Last summer, the owner of Index fired its editor-in-chief, only weeks after the company said it felt its independence was "in danger" from external forces. The editors felt they could not guarantee free and objective reporting anymore and decided to leave. Together.

Index.hu was not the first, nor the last Hungarian news outlet to close down. Early February 2021, Klubrádió, one of the last critical radio stations of the country, lost its license to air (NOS, 2021). Press freedom is at risk in Hungary (Griffen, 2020), and the media landscape is characterized by polarization (Broniatowski, 2020; Vass, 2021) between the dependent and the independent, the financially thriving and the financially struggling, the critical and the loyal. Starting my thesis, I expected to see this black-and-white divide in my thesis too.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, reality turned out to be much more complex. The distinction between politically independent and dependent journalists I quickly rejected, as it fails to represent the complexity of the Hungarian media climate. It did not, in any way explain why seemingly independent media struggle with political pressures, or how seemingly unfree journalists develop agency in their work. Also, I let go of the idea that only government-supporting outlets are censored, as self-censorship is a widespread practice that takes place in many forms on national, organizational and individual levels (Ettema et al., 1987).

For this thesis, I conducted 16 interviews with Hungarian journalists, working abroad and in the country, for radio stations, public TV broadcasters, conservative newspapers, left-leaning news portals, and investigative outlets. I asked them about their freedom, their autonomy, and the pressures they experience, from their editors-in-chief, political power holders, and the audience. My research question is as follows:

How do Hungarian journalists balance between working autonomously and accepting a level of self-censorship in their work in the Hungarian media climate?

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Sub-questions:

1. What do Hungarian journalists see as autonomous journalism? 2. What pressures do Hungarian journalists experience in their work? 3. How do Hungarian journalists cope with these pressures?

4. How do Hungarian journalists develop agency and independence in their work and why? The results are structured by three levels: the national, the organizational and the individual. In practice, this structure does only partly reflect the complexity of the journalists’ reality, since the respondents experience pressure from the newsroom, the government, the audience, and even themselves at the same time. In the conclusion, the sub-questions are shortly answered.

In sum, this is a study of how Hungarian journalists struggle with independence and on the other hand, acquire it - or, at least, feel they do. And although some outlets definitely allow for more independence than others, all journalists are part of the same media sector. It is a highly polarized media sector, and its press freedom is at risk (Griffen, 2020). Still, when listening carefully, there was more common ground between journalists than possibly expected in advance.

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3. Theoretical framework

In this theoretical framework, I explore concepts of autonomy, censorship and

self-censorship in a context of journalism studies. For this, I will first study traditional journalism roles, such as the Four Theories of the Press by Siebert and Schramm (1956). These

authors explore media roles from a highly political stance. Besides the audience, the state is considered the most important actor shaping what journalism should be and do. Also when it comes to censoring the press, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm consider the state as the main party to exercise external pressure towards journalists (1956).

Traditional, state-centered media theories form the basis for studying and understanding censorship of the press. Yet, I argue these theories fail to explore how

internal pressure can also, very powerfully, silence journalists. Self-censorship is often more

informal, less demarcated and harder to capture than overt censorship, however this does not make it less powerful. For studying the concept of self-censorship, a key concept within this thesis, I explore Bourdieu’s concept of self-censorship and the influence of habitus on the work of journalists. Central to this exploration is the question: when do journalists smartly adapt their behavior to existing newsroom norms to advance their work, and when does self-censorship go against the values of the free press?

Then, what can make journalists feel autonomous from pressure to withhold information they deem important? For this question, I explore Hanitzsch’ work, studying journalistic roles and the question of how journalists develop themselves as experienced and confident practitioners. Following Bourdieu’s line of self-censorship, I argue the

ubiquity and structural approach towards self-censorship creates a climate of uncertainty in the practice of journalism. As Schimpfössl and Yablokov (2020) show through the concept of adekvatnost, journalists learn to cope with this uncertainty and find a way around it. Furthermore, journalists find new outlets, mostly online, to express their views in freer ways (Stetka & Örnebring, 2008). Still, external pressures from the newsroom, politics or society can be easily internalized amongst journalists, resulting in a self-censoring journalistic field (Lee & Chan, 2008). As Hanitzsch shows, this might even go as far that journalists perform cognitive dissonance to assure themselves they are autonomous and free, whereas clear cases in practice show this is not the case (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). Studying press freedom in Hungary, such cognitive dissonance might hinder journalists as well.

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1. Censorship and self-censorship

Overt Censorship and The Four Theories of the Press

In traditional journalism studies, censorship is defined as a form of direct regulatory intervention by political authorities, such as the state or the church (Muller, 2004). Scholars consider censorship as highly political and ideological, preserving political power through controlling what is published. It is direct and concrete, executed by someone in a position of authority (Muller, 2004). It is a linear, clearly demarcated process of one party exercising power over another. Scholars have followed the assumption censorship

essentially takes place in two forms, namely pre-publication censorship or licensing, and post-publication censorship, when the “dissemination and reception” of material is restrained after it has been published (Muller, 2004, p. 4).

A key theory for the study of censorship is the Four Theories of the Press, by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). Originating from the Cold War peak time, the Four Theories all explore how power between the state and the media should be divided, and which entity should be subordinate to the other (Ostini & Ostini, 2002). It translates a moral vision from World War II, a struggle between authoritarian and libertarian, into a model of journalism (Nerone, 2004). In particular, the authors study “what the press should be and do” (p. 2), describing its relation between the state, the media and the people.

The authors distinguish four journalism models (liberal, authoritarian, social responsibility journalism and Soviet communist) with different views on power relations between the state, the audience and the press. The theory contains a highly politicized view on journalism, accepting one party is allowed to silence the other, when it suits the model. For example, the libertarian model considers journalists as watchdogs of society, therefore holding power over the state and its actions. In this model, censorship from the state is considered unacceptable (Siebert et al., 1956). In the second model,

authoritarianism, society allows more state regulation (Siebert et al., 1956), as it assumes both the people as well as the media are dependent on the state. The social responsibility model sees a moral obligation for journalists towards society to provide the population with valuable information and education. Government intervention is considered acceptable, as long as society benefits from it. The fourth model, traditionally called the

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Soviet communist model, considers the media to be subordinate to the state (Siebert et al., 1956).

For years, the Four Theories of the Press have been a basic model for explaining the relation between the media and the state, especially in Western media theory

(Pietilanen & Strovsky, 2013). As a result, it is assumed censorship is essentially an external and linear process, where one party has the right to execute power over the other. The censorship is explicitly communicated (Muller, 2004). Although the model presents itself as neutral, it implicitly favours a liberal media climate. According to the authors, this is the model where journalists allegedly have the most independence from both state and audience. To overcome censorship, the authors suggest implementing a liberal, Western model in media (Nerone, 2004). Media scholars studying censorship have for a long time referred to this model, framing the concept as state-focused and defining censorship pressure as an external force that actively hinders journalists from doing their work (Muller, 2004).

Bourdieu’s habitus and self-censorship

Although the Four Theories of the Press form an important basis in studying views on censorship, the theory has received a substantive amount of criticism as well (Merrill, 1977, Yin, 2003; Nerone, 2004). Journalism in this model performs a serving function, either towards the state or society (Nerone, 2004). The state-centrism of the theory received criticism, for example by Merrill (1977, 1990), a scholar advocating for the independence of individual journalists. He asked his students: “Who should be the authority in defining what responsible journalism is? Shouldn’t journalists themselves be allowed to make that judgment?” (Merrill, 1990). Furthermore, the model has been criticized for being too focused on the Western world, by subtly prioritizing the liberal model over the other three (Yin, 2003). Lastly, scholars state traditional journalism theories fail to include the influence of non-state actors and social norms on the work of journalists (Nerone, 2004). Nerone (2004) stresses how the theories only focus on political control of media, state power, but are silent on other kinds of restraints on the press. Whereas the Four Theories focus on media’s political freedom, economic freedom from market forces and social norms imposing self-censorship are neglected (2004). In comparison to state censorship, such influence is more ubiquitous, less demarcated and thus harder to capture in a study or definition. In order to understand what withholds

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journalists, more structural power mechanisms should also be explored. In this section, I therefore explore internal and external pressures on journalists in the newsroom, following Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (1990a) and the New Censorship Theory (Bunn, 2015).

Self-censorship can be defined as omission arising from sensitivities in politico-social contexts; these sensitivities can be real or ‘only’ perceived as such (Ho, 2008). For self-censorship, the relationship between authorities and media organizations is less clear-cut than for censorship (Lee & Chan, 2008). Although censorship is inherently linked to direct control from authorities, self-censorship can take place without such intervention. Instead, self-censorship focuses on the perception of control that causes journalists to avoid

offending powerholders, such as the government, business corporations and advertisers (Lee & Chan, 2008). Self-censorship can also be a result from past policies or rules that are no longer in place, but still influence media decisions (Yin, 2003).

Pierre Bourdieu has been one of the first important scholars criticizing the linear, traditional notion of censorship (1990a, 1990b, 1992). His journalism field theory has sparked a vast body of research, studying journalism as a social field in society (Benson & Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 1998, Marchetti, 2005). Throughout his work, Bourdieu searched for unconscious social structures and established classes in the newsroom, that silence journalists without external pressures telling them so. He argues self-censorship among journalists results from subtle, social norms practitioners learn to work with to avoid being left behind (1990a, 2005). Bourdieu considers the practice of journalism as a

dynamic social field in which interests constantly strive for power, influencing day-to-day newsroom decisions and behaviour. In particular, Bourdieu’s concept of news habitus as well as journalistic doxas explain why journalists sometimes decide to withhold

information, even when official policies do not require them to do so.

Firstly, Bourdieu defines the doxas of a workplace as common beliefs or opinions present in a social setting (1990a), that unconsciously shape the behaviour of people in that setting. Our daily tendencies are not just there, Bourdieu emphasizes: instead, there are many social and political structures from which we develop such behaviour. These structures he calls doxas. Without us even noticing, they influence our work and, in the case of a newsroom, encourage journalists to censor unsupportive messages towards powerholders, or advertisers (Bourdieu, 1998).

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By focusing on the ubiquity and the power of these structures, Bourdieu’s doxas closely relate to Foucault’s notion of discourse. Discourse, according to Foucault, gives words meaning by establishing rules of what can or cannot be said therefore the concept is closely related to power (Sam, 2019). Publishing in the same period, both Foucault and Bourdieu shift the idea of agency away from the individual, and instead explore how social structures influence an individual's behaviour.1

Although Bourdieu argues there is no social world outside of power, journalists can through experience develop a feeling for the aforementioned doxas. By gaining experience in a workplace, journalists learn about editorial rules and social norms (Bourdieu, 1990a; Bourdieu, 1990b). They create a routine that helps them survive (and even thrive) in this social and political system. This routine is what Bourdieu calls the

habitus. The habitus is an internalized sense for the everyday rules of their work field,

shaping everyday behaviour in the workplace, conducted, without thinking, making it a subconscious practice. Bourdieu stresses how both doxas and the habitus are inherently political, as they capture underlying power structures that determine our day-to-day practice (Bourdieu, 1990a).

Bourdieu’s theory provided a new perspective that rejected the notion coercive state censorship is most powerful and influential. According to Bourdieu, internalized censorship is more successful at creating desired behaviour than overt censorship, as the latter might invoke hegemony and resistance. When a powerholder successfully implements

doxas on society, people might even want to censor themselves, to advance their career

(1990a). They have learned how following these doxas increases the chances of succeeding in the work field, when it comes to issues like money, prestige or influence. In this way, Bourdieu argued, internalized pressure is more effective than external ones.

1_{Since media are to a large extent responsible for forming public discourse (Hobbs, 2008), both Bourdieu and}

Foucault see media as inherently political. Also, both Bourdieu and Foucault acknowledge the inherently ideological character of discourse and knowledge, and they describe narratives that shape our understanding of the world (Hobbs, 2008). Foucault’s notion of discourse connects media to power, since discourse has the power to shape the world into social, unescapable structures. Although the theories are closely intertwined, Foucault’s notion of discourse arguably is more radical than Bourdieu, as Foucault frames discourse as autonomous and independent from human agency, almost describing it as a separate entity shaping the social world. In this thesis, I focus on Bourdieu rather than Foucault, as Bourdieu’s theory acknowledges social structures are culturally and symbolically created, and can be legitimized through an interplay between agency and structure, which I will study later in this framework (Caldwell, 2007).

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New Censorship Theory

In journalism studies, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and doxas have been regularly applied to build new theories on self-censorship in the newsroom. Following Bourdieu’s narrative, the decline in overt state censorship can be seen as a consequence of the perfection of

structural and impersonal forms of control (Rosenfeld, 2011). Bunn terms this approach ‘New Censorship Theory’ because it goes beyond traditional views on censorship as coercive and repressive (2015). New Censorship Theory’s purpose is not to reject or overthrow the dominant, liberal conception of censorship. Instead, it stresses the

multiplicity of forms of censorship, Bunn argues (2015). Contrary to traditional censorship theory, power is executed less linearly, more diffusely and less centralized (Zeveleva, 2020).

New censorship theorists do not categorize censorship as inherently negative and undesired. Instead, Bunn states its goal is to recast censorship from a “negative, repressive force”, concerned only with prohibiting and erasing, to a more productive force that creates new forms of communication (2015). Looking at Central and Eastern Europe in particular, Schimpfössl & Yablokov apply a similar concept called adekvatnost (adequacy) amongst journalists in post-socialist countries, the capacity to adapt oneself to unwritten rules of the workplace. Here, they argue Central and Eastern European journalists in particular apply this strategy in their work and consider it a skill and an expression of their experience. This type of self-censorship can be described as a ‘feel for the game’, connecting Bourdieu’s theory of habitus to the modern day practice of journalism in the region.

Schimpfössl and Yablokov refer to the concept as a Weberian kind of power (1922), a systematic kind of power that builds on hierarchical structures and routines (2020a). Such a system builds on reciprocity: those who rebel receive punishment, but those who obey are rewarded (2020a). In the next section, I will elaborate further on the concept of

adekvatnost, in particular in relation to media ownership and journalism in post-socialist countries.

Schimpfössl and Yablokov also stress self-censorship is not inherently seen as a negative and unwanted practice by all (2020a). Instead, such adekvatnost, some argue, open up space for “journalistic creativity and negotiated freedom of expression” (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020a, p. 30). In the same line, Lee and Chan point out that although self-censorship is often linked to fear of punishments, implicitly or explicitly, this is not always the case (2012). Instead, they show self-censorship can be produced without the presence of fear or direct threat, making self-censorship an elusive concept with many facets (Lee &

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Chan, 2009). Following this thought, Jungblut and Hoxha distinguish between public and private self-censorship. Here public self-censorship is defined as an “individual reaction to a publicly existing agent of censorship” (Jungblut & Hoxha, 2016, p. 227). Contrary, private self-censorship defines the journalists as both the censorer and the censored at the same time, as journalists decide to withhold information based on an assessment of personal and ethical norms (Jungblut & Hoxha, 2016). In the same line, Cook and Heilman (2012) suggest self-censorship can differ on a private and a public level, which they define as alignment of attitudes. For example, one might be publicly accepting political restrictions, whilst privately being indifferent about it: otherwise, one might show weak alignment by accepting privately but showing indifference on a public level (Cook & Heilman, 2012). A table of Cook and Heilman’s framework of public/private self-censorship can be found below.

As Jungblut and Hoxha point out, a weak alignment can lead to stronger levels of self-censorship, as a lacking public opposition against norms might result in stronger internal beliefs one’s disagreement is unique and therefore less valid (2016). Therefore, avoiding self-isolation is important to avoid over-censoring one’s self.

All in all, the New Censorship Theory has highlighted the multiplicity of forms in which self-censorship can arise. However, the theory has also been criticized for being too vague (Muller, 2004; Zeveleva, 2020). For example, Zeveleva wonders how one can research self-censorship in practice, whilst assuming the practice is both unconscious and ubiquitous. Similarly, Muller captures the dilemma by asking “[w]here authorial revision ends, and where does censorial excision start?” (2004, p. 25). A relevant question, that also has practical implications for this research. Simply asking journalists whether they execute self-censorship, might be an oversimplification of the practice. As a result, these authors argue

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the New Censorship Theory is a theoretical, rather than an empirical concept, as

researchers cannot study a diffuse concept that is always everywhere (Zeleveva, 2020). Scholars have overcome this question by reintegrating direct state power into the Bourdieusian concept of habitus (Zeveleva, 2012; Bunn, 2015). These scholars accept internal self-censorship is, in many cases, more powerful than overt state censorship. However, they acknowledge the state might be an important source in creating those social structures in the first place. State censorship and self-censorship are not two contrary processes: instead, when implemented correctly, they can strengthen each other (Bunn, 2015). This shifts the theoretical concept of ubiquitous power to a more practical one: how does the state execute and transform power into daily newsroom practices?

Zeveleva addresses this issue by supplementing her Bourdieusian approach with Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of strategic action fields. According to Fligstein and McAdam, journalists shift between two poles in their daily work, one of settled and the other of unsettled rules. In a context of conflict and unsettlement, there is uncertainty and powerful actors, such as the state, grab this uncertainty to institutionalize new rules (2012). For example, this can be done by controlling licensing of media to its own interest (Ross, 2004), by sponsoring media outlets they favour or by inviting them to important state events (Rioba, 2012). When settlement takes place, people learn the rules of the game and self-censorship arises, making the practice more unconscious and ubiquitous (Zeveleva, 2020). Accordingly, Ettema, Whitney and Wackman (1997) state that uncertainty underlies the generation of news, as far more content is ‘out there’ than what can be published. Organizations, they argue, deal with such uncertainty by routinizations: typification, reliance on routine sources and adherence to organizational policy (1997). Although these routines hinder journalists to do their work completely freely, as they prioritize routine sources over possibly more relevant sources, they do create structure in the newsroom (Ettema, Whitney & Wackman, 1997).

Uncertainty and self-censorship

As discussed in the previous section, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) suggest uncertainty decreases when practitioners learn the rules of social structures and, as a result, start performing self-censorship. It suggests self-censorship is a sign of stability, as most practitioners are adequately equipped to find their way in this structure, a practice

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and Yablokov (2020b) and Zeveleva (2020) state most journalists eventually tend to find their habitus, their adekvatnost, moving forward in a context of self-censorship.

Knowing how to self-censor thus comes with experience and a level of stability in the newsroom, as both Schimpfössl and Yablokov (2020a; 2020b) and Zeveleva (2020) highlight. At the same time, Lee and Chan (2009) argue self-censorship, in fact, cannot be sustained without a level of uncertainty in the newsroom. They state the aforementioned stability is, in fact, very fragile and based on the wariness of journalists to cross any social norms (2009). This statement is also supported by my previous thesis research on self-censorship in Rwanda (Ter Rele, 2019), suggesting self-self-censorship cannot exist without a level of uncertainty among journalists in the newsroom (Ter Rele, 2019). As self-censorship often stems from blurry social rules that contradict official editorial policies (Lee & Chan, 2012), journalists tend to over-censor themselves in order to reduce risk of losing income, reputation or work (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020; Ter Rele, 2019). This is especially the case for young journalists, who need to learn the professional norms and rules in the newsroom (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020). As a result, uncertain journalists tend to be careful and stay a safe distance away from potentially crossing any lines, sustaining a culture of self-censorship (Ter Rele, 2019).

Research suggests developing media systems, who are in the process of developing newsroom norms, struggle the most with self-censorship (Tambini, Leonardi & Marsden, 2008). Especially in societies where the concept of free speech is relatively new the barriers hindering journalists to speak out might still exist in people’s minds. As post-socialist societies have relatively new media climates, they tend to deal with uncertainty too (Schimpfössl et al., 2020b; Steger, 2004). In various Eastern European countries, Yablokov (2016) for example recognizes a ‘solid double line’ defining the ‘boundaries of the space of possibles’. The existence of this ‘solid double line’ suggests journalists should be sensitive to informal rules of the game. However, since this double line is not clearly demarcated and can fluctuate, as it is part of unwritten social structures, journalists never know for sure if they cross the line when reporting on controversial issues (Nikitinskii, 2017). As a result, Lee and Chan point out self-censorship can be exercised without any direct orders from senior editors (2012). Even more so, the ambiguity of many ‘suspicious’ situations, as well as the security or enjoyment of their jobs, is what makes direct opposition so difficult. As a result, the authors state, some journalists might develop specific tactics to continue resistance (comparable with the concept of adekvatnost), however most journalists simply

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comply with the situation (Lee & Chan 2012). To avoid transgressions, many journalists intentionally or unconsciously adopt self-censorship in their work (Ross, 2004; Skjerdal, 2010).

Even with relatively open-minded official editorial policies, research shows reporting practices can still be restrictive in fragile media climates where levels of uncertainty are high (Skjerdal, 2008). Hanitzsch et al. (2012) point out especially

established journalists in higher ranks could benefit from this, as they are more aware of the rules and have, through experience, learnt how to work with them and use the rules in their advantage (Hanitzsch, 2012). Yet, from a societal level the issue can be seen as problematic: resulting in a lacking diversity of opinions and uncritical media outlets, especially when it comes to sensitive state interests (Ross, 2004). It withholds journalists from reporting on power holders, from creating a diverse media climate and from telling a story without being scared of the consequences (Ross, 2004). Therefore, self-censorship arguably hinders journalists from adequately doing their job, especially when considered from a watchdog role perspective (Hanitzsch, 2011).

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2. Press freedom, Independence and Autonomy

In the previous section, the influence of self-censorship and censorship is discussed, based on Bourdieu’s journalistic field theory (1990, 1993, 1998). As Bourdieu’s work describes the structurality of social norms in which journalists operate, one could easily start seeing journalists as passive order-followers, not having room for personal ideas and growth (Siapera, 2010). Scholars have therefore specified Bourdieu’s work on the field as a “work in progress (Benson& Neveu, 2005) as it has failed to consider the impact of journalists

themselves on their work, and the technical, symbolic and economic characteristics that make the media field “what is is” (Siapera, 2010, p. 84). Siapera stresses how in media approaches like Bourdieu’s, the role of the media workers is already given, as they simply reproduce media logics, either consciously or unconsciously (2010). Accepting this logic a problematic and heteronomous media system could only be sustained, and thus fails to recognize how media systems can change for the better (Siapera, 2010).

As Bourdieu’s theory neglects journalists’ potential for self-determination and agency, this section studies the matter from a reverse perspective. In particular, this section will study how journalists create autonomy and agency in their work, opposing the external or internal pressures they face from themselves, the newsroom and society. It follows the concept of mediatization (Schulz, 2004, Thompson, 1995), based on the assumption media have achieved a degree of self-determination and authority (Hjarvard, 2008). I also explore the concept in relation to journalistic roles, by Hanitzsch et al. (2011; 2013; 2019) as well as the question how autonomy relates to journalistic role perception and performance

(Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011).

Structure-wise, Ettema, Whitney and Wackham (1987) distinguish the concept of autonomy from the institutional (or industrial), organizational and individual level (Ettema, Whitney and Wackham, 1987) and state these levels have different amounts of influence on journalists’ perceptions of independence. Others have taken up and extended this framework by adding more layers, acknowledging the complexity and multiplicity of the concept of autonomy (McDevitt, 2003; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Voakes, 1997; Preston, 1997; Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). As Ettema’s et al.’s original framework is at the basis of these frameworks, I take the original framework as a structure.

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Autonomy on the individual level

Traditionally, journalists consider autonomy as a principle that allows the press to fulfill its civic duty of providing information, free from bias and other corrupting influences

(McDevitt, 2003). According to Hanitzsch et al., press freedom includes both the freedom journalists have in selecting stories they consider newsworthy as well as

emphasizing certain aspects within these stories (2019). Having studied the concept across 18 countries from all regions of the world, Hanitzsch defines autonomy as “a set of

normative discourses and a set of reporting practices aimed at ensuring independence from external and internal influences'' (Hanitzsch et al., 2019, p. 81). A journalist should be ‘in control’ in order to work autonomously, as this is “a core feature” of journalists’ consciousness. Emphatically, this involves both external pressures as well as internal interference (Hanitzsch et al., 2019).

Having this process of control is considered autonomy, a ‘core feature of journalists’ professional consciousness. Especially Western scholars consider autonomy and independence as key concepts for journalists to fulfil their democratic role in society (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011; McDevitt, 2003), a viewpoint closely associated with the libertarian model of Siebert et al.’s Four Theories of the Press (1956). In this viewpoint, autonomy is closely related to freedom, defined as “the sovereignty of editorial decisions, made without the interference from outside forces” (Rupar et al., 2019). Following this logic, an individual journalist is autonomous when it is free to make its own decisions, free from the state, political parties or commercial interests (Sjøvaag, 2020).

A distinction should be made between autonomy and agency, as they are similar but not interchangeable concepts. Autonomy is generally understood as the capacity to be one’s own person and act according to one’s own motives, free from external pressures. It is a central thought in Kant’s moral philosophy, and a basis for mostly Western

philosophy and media theory (Kant, 1795; Deligiorgi, 2012). Agency, on the other hand, is more situational and dependent on the social context one acts in. For example, agents can be deprived of autonomy by fatigue, tiredness, anxiety, brainwashing, censorship or self-censorship, whilst still having the individual freedom to make choices (Deligiorgi, 2012). As a result, one might have agency whilst not fully enjoying autonomy to govern themselves (Deligiorgi, 2012). Some argue, therefore, achieving full autonomy as an individual is impossible, as agents are always influenced by social structures (Westlund, 2005;

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Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Although I do not propose achieving authority is impossible as a journalist, the difference between agency and autonomy should be kept in mind.

Following Bourdieu’s argument, autonomy is not a static, but a continuous process, a dynamic power struggle for space to speak out (Bourdieu, 2005; McDevitt, 2003). He describes the concept as a continuous battle between autonomy, when ‘pure’ journalistic values dominate other forces, like commercial ones; and heteronomy, when commercial considerations dominate editorial policies and news productions. Similarly, Marchetti (2005) contrasts autonomy between two extremes: whereas the intellectual pole prioritizes cultural over economic capital, the commercial pole prioritizes commercial purposes over journalistic values, resulting in a decrease in autonomy (Marchetti, 2005). Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011) present a less binary approach: they define the struggle for autonomy as one between global journalistic worldviews or belief systems, rooted in cultural differences on what role journalism should conduct in a society (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). Essentially, they argue differences between journalists’ professional worldviews fuel the struggle in the journalistic field (2011), rather than solely commercial interests, thereby opposing Bourdieu’s approach (Hanitzsch, 2011). One should not forget to take into account cultural differences in this definition (Hanitzsch, 2011), as well as studying autonomy in a newsroom, which I will do in the following section.

Relational autonomy

When studying journalistic autonomy, many Western scholars associate the concept with having freedom on the individual level (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013; Rupar, 2019, Hanitzsch, 2019). However, journalism is always practiced within the boundaries of the institution, therefore professional autonomy is negotiated within a social and institutional context (Sjøvaag, 2020). Journalists can therefore also create autonomy on the institutional level, being part of the newsroom (Sjøvaag, 2020). One should not oppose newsroom

structures to journalistic autonomy, since social structures can also strengthen professional autonomy for a collective of journalists (Sjøvaag, 2020).

The relation between social structures and the development of agency was originally studied by Giddens (1984). He suggests our ability to act as agents within a larger social structure on the one hand limits us, but successful agents can also affect the compositions of the structures, in this way creating autonomy (Giddens, 1984). Agency, according to Giddens, is the capacity to act otherwise, or to select a course of action

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from a range of options (Giddens, 1976, 1984). Whether agents succeed in changing these social structures depends on the motivation of agents to bring about change, the agent’s hierarchical position in the structure and the resources available to change existing structures (1984). Therefore, agency as a concept is dependent on autonomy: as agents might be able to change existing structures, they are still influenced by constraints of the social context. As experienced journalists learn to find their way within a newsroom system, they can also find ways to change it to their own needs, but they are also

dependent on this system (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020). In this way, as Giddens argues, the rules and resources of a journalistic system work recursively (1984).

Giddens’ findings are supported by Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011), who discovered journalists could most effectively develop feelings of autonomy when supported by

editorial routines and customs of the professions and policies on the organizational level (2011); at the same time, newsroom customs and constraints on space and time could most effectively hinder journalists’ feelings of autonomy. As a result of their worldwide sample, Hantzsch and Mellado found journalists developed autonomy through these routines, for example by climbing up and gaining more editorial freedom (this outcome was therefore most strong for editors higher up in hierarchical rank).

Scholars stress that autonomy is not merely an individual, but also a relational concept (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). In order to enjoy autonomy and personal

development, agents should build constructive social and personal relations. Only when agents are answerable to external, critical perspectives on one’s behaviour, they can build autonomy (Westlund, 2009). Also, social recognition and support strengthen one’s self-confidence, which contributes to the agent’s autonomy (Benson, 2005, Grovier 1993).

For journalists too, relational support from colleagues is needed to build feelings of autonomy (Hanitzsch et al., 2019), such as influences from personal networks. Here, one can think of support from journalists’ peers and colleagues, relatives and other

encouraging social communities (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). Other examples are

encouragement, mentoring, training schemes and the set-up of media communities of practice (Siapera, 2010). To find solidarity in the newsroom strongly helps journalists not only to assimilate to newsroom norms, but also to attach editorial freedom and autonomy within the organization (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013). Furthermore, especially in case of threatened press freedom and antipress violence, journalists support each other to find safety (González de Bustamante and Relly, 2016). So, although

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solidarity amongst journalists can create feelings of autonomy, a lack of safety and press can, in fact, also bring about stronger group feelings. Also, Hanitzsch et al. found

journalists regain control within work environments or societies where human development and personal growth are valued (2019). When journalists feel they have space to develop and when editorial managers allow time and space for such personal development, practitioners express feeling a bigger sense of autonomy in their work (Roy, 2014).

Although freedom and personal autonomy seem highly individual concepts, personal freedom in fact is strongly linked to institutional policies that favour growth of the

organization as well as the individual (Sen, 1999). When institutions create space for such growth, journalists feel more encouraged to resist editorial pressure, ‘pack journalism’ (following journalistic trends in relation to ‘snappy’ news), criticism from business elites and political leaders and customs in journalism (McDevitt, 2003). The autonomy of the

institution thus also serves to secure individual journalists’ autonomy (Sjøvaag, 2020). In short, as McDevitt stresses, the practice of autonomy is ‘powerful, adaptive, and creative phenomenon within the profession’ (2003, p. 161). As systems are seen flexible in terms of goal orientation (Giddens, 1984), newsrooms can change to increase feelings of autonomy on an institutional level. In this way, support by colleagues or beneficial newsroom norms can help journalists to thrive on social structures and in fact, find agency within newsroom norms (Sjøvaag, 2020). The importance of autonomy in the newsroom to the practice of journalism will endure, regardless of both internal and external pressures (McDevitt, 2003).

Autonomy on the political level

Although research suggests journalists value autonomy highly in both Western and Eastern European media climates (De Smaele, 2004) the concept of autonomy can be defined differently from different cultural perspectives (Steger, 2004). Especially since this thesis studies autonomy in Hungary, an Eastern European state with a complex media history and a developing media climate (Steger, 2004), cultural differences should be studied, which I will do here. As a starting point, the Worlds of Journalism (WoJ) research project has studied the concept of autonomy from an international perspective

(Hanitzsch, 2012; 2013; 2019). By focusing on cultural diversity, the project attempts to provide a more intuitive way of looking at “diversity of journalistic practices and

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When studying autonomy, the concept is often defined in relation to the political realm, as journalists are expected to work freely from political power holders, as well as business elites (Sjøvaag, 2020). Surprisingly however, journalists perceived political and economic differences much less influential than factors on the organizational level, although some variation between countries existed (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). In other words, journalists felt more influenced by whether their professional work situation provided room for autonomy, than whether the political situation in their country allowed for a free press (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). Studying different notions of autonomy among countries, Hanitzsch et al. find the relation between perceived influence and professional autonomy is therefore not clear-cut, as some journalists voice criticism and opinions regardless of strong corporate and political influences2_{, whereas others}3_{largely neglected their}

watchdog role despite having relatively high autonomy and weak external influence (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). Simply studying the climate in which journalists operate is

therefore not enough, as journalists have the agency to actively create autonomy in their work if they want to.

To understand what this means for Hungarian journalism, a country not studied in the WoJ project, a closer look should be given to the concept of autonomy in post-socialist Eastern European countries. At a first glance, most CEE-journalists connect a high value to words like press freedom and democracy, working in media climates where freedom from authoritarian rule is relatively new (De Smaele, 2002). As de Smaele highlights, the

dissident movements in Eastern-Europe were generally linked to the desire for press freedom and independent journalism (De Smaele, 2002). Now that journalists are allowed to shape news without the interference of the state, journalists closely associated press freedom with autonomy (Lee and Chan, 2011; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Also, Eastern European journalists believe their independence is necessary to conduct meaningful and truthful journalism (Rupar et al., 2019).

Struggles with ownership changes with oligarchs and financial interests of advertisements have been considered as factors obstructing the objective of press freedom in CEE countries (Duval, 2005). Describing Hungary’s current state of media, Szabo and Kiss4_{, for example, describe a rigorous mindset shift amongst Hungarian editors}

2_{This especially applied to journalists working in a critical change agent milieu (Hanitzsch & De Vos, 2017)} 3_{Particularly journalists performing a populist disseminator role (Hanitzsch & De Vos, 2017}₎

4_{Describing Hungary’s current state of media, Szabo and Kiss outline four developments in journalism that}

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from the beginning of the nineties to the early 2010s, as they first declared to publish objectively and autonomously, but eventually concluded such objectivity is not realistic in Hungarian media (2012). However, it is too easy to conclude autonomous journalism is not possible in post-communist CEE countries; especially when accepting journalists can perform an autonomous role, despite high external pressures from political powers and business elites (Hanitzsch et al., 2019).

Although autonomy is easier to achieve in countries with higher levels of press freedom and lower levels of state intervention (Reich & Hanitzsch, 2013), journalists can develop strategies to gain autonomy in more restrictive systems. For example, journalists who work in media free from commercial and corporate interests generally experience higher levels of autonomy, such as public service broadcasting, smaller publications and radio (Nygren, 2012). Furthermore, clearly demarcated role denominations such as being an expert, a social reformer or a witness help journalists to develop their own practice and gain agency, also in restrictive climates (Nygren, 2012). On the individual level, But also, journalists’ attitudes for change, training and experience can strengthen journalists’ autonomy in politically and economically challenging contexts (Reese, 2001).

Furthermore, advances in technology have been seen to enable autonomy as well (Sjøvaag, 2020). As official channels, such as the national broadcaster, are historically burdened with portraying official narratives, technologies allow journalists to deviate from these narratives (Sjøvaag, 2020). Also, Stetka and Örnebring (2013) suggest online-only news providers take over an important role in providing critical, investigative journalism. Although a lack of resources makes the practice more precarious than when operated by large broadcasters, this suggests journalists are flexible and find back autonomy when it is at risk (2008). It also suggests journalists reach out to non-traditional outlets, such as podcasts and online news sites when traditional political and business powers hinder being critical in more established newspapers (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013). Similarly, Slavtcheva-Petkova (2016) presents the virtual space as a vibrant area for democratic discussions and as an accountability tool for journalists.

channels of political communication; post-objectivity, being the end of the requirement for unbiased coverage and more opinion-based published, the performative turn, being a strong basis on representation of individuals and dramaturgy; and popularization, the convergence of popular culture and politics (Szabó & Kiss, 2012). Szabó and Kiss present a thesis of post-objectivity, arguing that Hungarian editorial pluralism results in a market full of politically laden media. Summarizing, the authors even claim that “apparently, there is almost no market for unbiased media in Hungary” (Szabó & Kiss, 2012, p. 485).

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Research suggests instability in media climates can even create a reaffirmation of media ethics among journalists, as Hájek et al. suggest (2015). Studying journalistic autonomy in the Czech republic, they find ownership changes in media often lead to scepticism. Yet, when professionalism of journalism is at stake, the Czech journalists renew interests in journalistic values and are more aware of journalistic ethics, both on an individual and a newsroom level (Hájek et al., 2015). As Hájek et al. argue, fragile media climates and commercial interests thus stress the importance for journalists to monitor and scrutinize businesses, strengthening a collective feeling of newsroom autonomy. In this way, momentum is created for journalists to reaffirm the importance of performing a critical role in society (2015).

Role perception and performance: are journalists truly autonomous?

The previous section discussed autonomy as a concept and studied how perceived autonomy can vary between different levels, such as the organizational, the political or individual level. Furthermore, overall, journalists highly value autonomy and independence in their work and in fact consider it one of the main prerequisites for legitimate and valuable journalism (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; McDevitt, 2003). In Eastern European countries, political and commercial interests sometimes threaten journalistic autonomy, but journalists often succeed in finding agency in new ways, for example by moving an outlet to an online platform (Stetka and Örnebring, 2013; Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2008).

Although this presents hope for developing media climates such as Hungary, some scholars have warned perceived autonomy amongst journalists is higher than the level of autonomy in practice (Hanitzsch et al., 2019; Reich & Hanitzsch, 2012; Szábo & Kiss, 2012). These scholars argue journalists perform cognitive dissonance to make themselves believe they are very independent, as they highly value autonomy in their profession. In reality, however, journalists might suffer from severe political, industrial or economic restrictions in their work (Hanitzsch et al., 2019). According to Hanitzsch (2011), the emotional value journalists attach to being free and independent creates a distinction between the role perception and role performance of the practitioners. In other words, journalists might highly value autonomy from a normative standpoint; yet, looking at it from a day-to day perspective, their autonomy might actually be more limited than they desire (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). To understand this, the authors emphasize the relatively little importance of political factors journalists attribute to their autonomy, described earlier in this framework

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(p. 11). Quite emphatically, they state there is ‘no doubt’ the political realm strongly

influences the process of news production. Also, economic influences such as advertisement and ownership to a large extent form journalistic cultures throughout the world (Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2012). Still, Hanitzsch and Mellado conclude, almost surprised, journalists are mostly unaware of these influences in everyday work, as journalists in general state these factors have little influence on their day-to-day work. As a response, Hanitzsch & Mellado wonder: “If journalists are not aware of these political influences, how could they develop an adequate response?” Harrison (2000, p. 130) explains this process by describing it as a completion of professional and organizational socialization, claiming journalists might think they are autonomous, “when in fact they have simply begun to subscribe to the corporate view” (Harrison 2000, p. 130).

Both Hanitzsch & Mellado’s as well as Harrison’s worries can be recognized as well in the earlier discussed concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990a). When pressure is

perfectioned, journalists have integrated the newsroom’s doxas in their daily routine. Especially for more experienced journalists, journalists perceive censorship as editorial revisions. This can make it harder to recognize if pressure takes place. Journalists start creating routines to augment their freedoms within the systems, whilst the system at itself might be very restricting (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020a). Lastly, it shows how

powerholders can integrate external pressure into internal beliefs, (Bunn, 2015; Zeveleva, 2020).

In short, this framework shows censorship and self-censorship are interdependent and can exist simultaneously. As Schimpfössl and Yablokov show, this paradox is

recognizable in many post-socialist countries, who are dominated by government-loyal media (2020a). As populism in liberal democracies is growing in other Western countries as well, deepening the understanding on how economic influences and adekvatnost influence media could be useful outside Eastern Europe too, as this might provide insights on future developments in other media climates as well.

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3. Context: Media ownership and party politics

In Hungary, the current state of media cannot be fully understood without discussing the country’s past (Bajomi, 2010). Therefore, I will give a short - and rudimentary - overview of the country’s media history here. Then, I explore ownership structures of Hungarian journalism, to give an overview of the country’s past and current media sector. This section will have a less theoretical and real-life focus than the past chapters.

Hungary’s recent media history

Hungary’s communist rule ended in 1989 (Lánczi & O’Neil, 1996). Before that period, media freedom was mainly used to spread state propaganda. Yet the country’s pragmatic so-called 'goulash communism' expressed greater concern for public opinion and the well-being of citizens than most other communist regimes. This created a less controlled media climate than elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe (Lánczi & O’Neil, 1996). This resulted in a somewhat broader scope for debate than in neighbouring countries, albeit still limited.

The end of the communist rule resulted in a political void. In the end, the political transition of the 1990s resulted in a strong political divide, existing of two political poles: the ex-communist pole on one side and the right-wing opposition on the other (Lánczi &

O’Neil, 1996; Enyedi, 2007). In journalism, too, a ‘media war’ was fought between parties, resulting in high levels of media polarization (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). This sharp ideological power play arguably still resonates in stereotypes and commonplace views of each other (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013).

After 1996, all parties but one agreed to collectively launch private broadcasters. As a result, the media gradually consolidated its media freedom, resulting in a mainly left-leaning media (Enyedi, 2007). Still, the media climate was fragile and covering issues such as

corruption or illegitimate government were considered taboo at the time (Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). Both left-liberal governments and right-conservative governments increasingly challenged media freedom, hindering the development of the Hungarian media (Bajomi-Lazar, 2013).

Arguably, the election of Orbán’s Fidesz party in 2010 has been the biggest shift in Hungary’s recent media history. After many years of socialist government, Orbán’s

government directly imposed stricter media laws on journalism, allowing more government regulation and ending the relative plurality of the media system of that time (Bajomi-Lázár,

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2017). The imposed Multimedia Act allowed regulation of all media platforms: print, television, radio and internet (NMHH, 2011). In effect, multi-party media control gave way to one-party control (Bajomi-Lázár, 2017).

Media ownership

Although communism accordingly has put a mark on Hungary’s media climate, the influence of media ownership, oligarchic influences and new authorianism on Hungary’s media climate are just as compelling (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020). After the 2008 financial crisis, many international investors withdrew from Hungarian media, legal media regulations became stricter (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014) and the media landscape became increasingly dominated by oligarch-state ownership and wealthy friends of the ruling party (Freedom House, 2017). The result: precarious working conditions, a tight job market and increasingly severe constraints on newsrooms (Schimpfössl & Yablokov, 2020; Stetka, 2016).

To understand the Hungarian media climate, one should learn about its financial structures. Money shapes the profession and the power of media, scholars stress (Altschull, 1997; McDevitt, 2003). To control the media, governments can for example advertise products and services by the companies they own only in specific media outlets, prioritizing those who favour government policies. State advertising, state subsidies or

market-disruption measures are other means for governments to control the media sector through funding (Dragomir, 2018). Of these four, Dragomir considers state advertising “probably the most insidious form of government funding” in the media (Dragomir, 2018, p. 1133), a tactic that is employed in Hungary as well. But the other three categories can be recognized in Hungary too, such as market-disruption measures: for example, in 2013 the government introduced an advertisement tax specifically targeted at the Germany-owned RTL Klub, in this way financially stripping the tv station (Dragomir, 2018). This is arguably worrisome, as private ownership related to the government or direct government ownership are

associated with less press freedom and fewer political rights (Djankov et al., 2003). During my previous research in Rwanda, I noticed how financing can be a powerful form of censorship, since only pro-government channels receive the financial means to proceed (Ter Rele, 2019). Critical outlets, on the other hand, receive no or few income from advertisement. As these outlets tend to be weaker already, such measures can lead to extinction (Ter Rele, 2019). This tactic encourages media outlets to censor negative

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Recent developments in Hungarian media ownership

In the past ten years, multiple Hungarian media outlets have been closed off, or have been taken over by owners with political ties to the government (Griffen, 2020). In 2013, the largest commercial television broadcaster, TV2, was sold to a close friend of Orbán’s. In 2014, the centre-left daily Népszabadság was sold to Orbán-allied investors (Griffen, 2020) and the newspaper was closed in 2016. The centre-right daily Magyar Nemzet was closed in 2018, although the outlet continued as an online portal. On top of this, in November 2018, 467 outlets became part of KESMA, Central European Press and Media Foundation, owned by a small group of Fidesz-supporters. The event created an immediate extreme

centralization of the Hungarian ownership, controlling the large majority of radio, TV and print media in Hungary (Griffen, 2020).

Mid-2020, possibly the most well-known example of a Hungarian media takeover became world news. More than 70 senior editors of Index, Hungary’s largest independent news outlet at that time, resigned after pro-government businessman Miklos Vaszily dismissed the editor-in chief Szabolcs Dull (Kafkadesk, 2020). After the event, Index continued to exist, however with an almost completely different group of staff (Kafkadesk, 2020). One day for publication of this thesis, Klubrádió, one of the last critical radio stations lost its license to air. The large majority of media companies is now owned by

Fidesz-loyalists and friends of Orbán, with estimates going as far as 80 to 90 percent.

As of now, critical investigative journalism almost fully relies on online-only news portals (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013). Yet, the journalistic market in Hungary is tight and there are severe budget constraints on newsrooms, especially those who do not adhere to government narratives on domestic politics (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013). As these

organizations have significantly less resources than legacy media competitors and tv broadcasters, investigative journalists describe their work and research as “precarious’. Some journalists speak of working essentially a “hobby” basis, as they need to be engaged in other jobs in order to finance their journalism work (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013). As

Schimpfössl and Yablokov (2020a) highlight, such a climate forms an ideal ground for self-censorship, explored earlier in this framework. Aware of the financial risks of speaking out, Hungarian journalists censor themselves to avoid conflict with private advertisement, whereas the number of media showing overt support to authorities is rapidly growing (Dragomir, 2018).

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Hunter (2015) explores the concept of crowdfunding as a potential solution to this, as it puts audiences in a position of power. Although this might provide a new kind of autonomy for journalists, it brings practitioners in a fragile position: on the one hand, journalists who highly value autonomy tend to prefer crowdfunding as a financing method (Hunter, 2015). On the other hand, by doing so they create another kind of dependency: that of the audience. Journalists feel a responsibility towards funders and want to engage them in the work (Hunter, 2015). On other hand, journalists express pursuing a distance towards the readers at the same time. It is a precarious balance that might hinder the journalistic norm of objectivity (Hunter, 2015). According to McDevitt (2003) such ‘public journalism’, as he calls journalism spurred by audiences’ needs, fails to appreciate the complexity of professional autonomy and challenges journalists to adequately protect their independence. Szabò and Kiss describe the growing ‘dramatization’ of media, arguably spurred by audience demands, as a potential threat for Hungarian media (2012). At the same time, a growing number of investigative outlets in Hungary has preferred this type of funding, such as Direkt36 and Atlatszo. Exploring how these journalists maintain a balance between independence and creating a constructive relation with the audience, turned out to be an interesting question of this research.

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4. Methodology

In this section, I discuss the qualitative research approach used for this research, with semi-structured interviewing as a method. I explore the strengths and weaknesses of the method and how I have approached biases. The goal of this research is to answer the following main question:

How do Hungarian journalists balance between working autonomously and accepting a level of self-censorship in the Hungarian media climate?

To answer this question, I interviewed 16 Hungarian journalists about their perception of autonomy and self-censorship in their work as a journalist in Hungary. The goal of the research was to deepen existing knowledge on autonomy and self-censorship in the Hungarian media climate. Here, I focus on three levels: the institutional, organizational and individual, as defined by Ettema et al. (1987), as discussed in the previous chapter. By

focusing on how journalists value professional autonomy, both as individuals and as part of a newsroom, the research sheds new light on how journalists balance autonomy and self-censorship in the current Hungarian media climate.

Research method

To achieve this goal, a qualitative design was considered most appropriate. The method allows for creative answers and the development of new knowledge, as well as deepening existing knowledge. As a starting point, Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis (TA) was used to systematically identify and organize patterns across a data set (2008). Also, sensitizing concepts as described by Blumer (1954) were used as building blocks for understanding of the social world. For my research, the concepts of self-censorship and autonomy were most important: I studied how they should be redefined in the context of Hungarian media, in this way testing and improving the understanding of these concepts. Whilst preset themes were used to structure interviews and data, interviewees were requested to integrate personal themes and insights into the conversations.

The research question of this thesis focuses on how journalists balance self-censorship and autonomy; such a balance is contingent, personal and also adaptable to change (Balaton, 2004). A qualitative approach was considered most fitting, since it can give insight into alternative assumptions of the social world (Qu and Dumay, 2011), uncovering

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the interviewee’s “private and sometimes incommunicable social world” ( p. 255). Steger (2004) emphasizes how words and ideas might look similar in dictionary terms, yet are connected and understood differently when coming from different historical and societal backgrounds. For my case, this especially applies to topics like autonomy and

self-censorship. For example, some interviewed journalists expressed to be working

autonomously, however still admitted to self-censor in their work, as they considered these two topics to be reconcilable, contrary to my expectations. Also, some journalists defined autonomy as being free from interference from political parties (both the government and opposition parties), rather than autonomy from commercial forces, as suggested by Bourdieu (2005) and Marchetti (2005). As these answers are personal and present

alternative assumptions to what is expected of Hungarian journalism (Qu & Dumay, 2011), through quantitative research such insights would have been much more difficult to achieve.

At the same time, qualitative interviewing in a cross-cultural setting makes the role of the researcher more complex than in quantitative research. Since qualitative research is based on social interactions, the researcher becomes part of the research context itself. This complicates the knowledge such research produces (Qu & Dumay, 2011). As Fontana and Frey describe it, “We cannot lift the results of interviewing out of the contexts in which they were gathered and claim them as objective data with no strings attached” (Fontana and Frey, 1998, p. 663).

It can be difficult for foreigners from a Western background to fully understand the complex media history of post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe (Steger, 2004).

Especially in transforming societies of post-socialist Europe, the researcher’s identity and behaviour strongly influence qualitative research (2004). Without having grown up in the transitional historical-political context of Eastern Europe, understanding the political context of the media landscape is difficult. At the same time, Lang and Steger (2002) stress some distance from this context can create new insights as well (2002).

My position as a researcher

The more complex a research setting becomes, the more attention researchers should dedicate to their behaviour and place in the social context, Steger emphasizes (2004). It is thus important to reflect on my position as a researcher and how this position affects my results, which I will do here.

Between Political Pressure and Personal Agency: Attitudes of Journalists on Autonomy and Self-Censorship in Hungary’s Media Landscape