Migration as an instrument to save
lives: The duty to prevent starvation
through migration
Title: “Migration as an instrument to save lives: The duty to prevent starvation through migration.” Name: Sam van Noort
Student number: 10211098
E-mail address: samvannoort91@gmail.com Course: bachelor Political Science, UvA
Direction: International Relations & Political Theory and Behavior First reader: Luara Leite Ferracioli
Second reader: Enzo Rossi Date: June 24, 2014
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Table of contents
Introduction ... 3
The problem and causes of underdevelopment ... 5
The supremacy of institutions ... 5
Why aid is not going to do the job ... 9
Migration as an instrument to fight starvation ...10
The moral grounds of this claim ...13
The objections to this claim ...22
Conclusion ...25
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Introduction
Immigration has been an extremely salient topic within public debates in nearly all affluent countries around the world. It seems that, although fully reliable data is lacking, the result of these controversies has generally been to close down state borders further and further over time (UNDP, 2009, p. 2). This is especially the case for low-skilled migrants from developing countries (Pritchett, 2006, p. 1). In this thesis the focus will be on the normative question: “should international borders be open?” In other words, do states have the right to control their borders and, as a result of that, limit the freedom of movement at the global level? My main argument will be that it is morally required for countries with stable domestic institutions which can provide the minimum conditions for a reasonable decent life for their own population and would-be immigrants to provide transportation and permanent residency for vulnerable people that are in direct treat of starvation and cannot be helped differently.1
Some authors argue that giving foreign aid and transforming international institutions is enough or will be more effective to help the most vulnerable in this world.2 This claim is highly
doubtful, however. First of all, a large literature within development studies shows convincingly that these extreme problems (mostly related to poverty) are above all the result of domestic
institutions (sometimes in interaction with geographical factors). These institutions are unlikely
to change quickly. Rather, they seem to be extremely stable over periods of decades or even centuries. Since: (i) migration could sometimes be the only effective solution to prevent starvation and because (ii) well-institutionalized countries have stringent obligations towards persons in (preventable) life threatening situations, especially when they have contributed and benefitted of the cause of this situation, it is morally required for governments of
well-institutionalized countries to help these persons now by evacuating them to countries that can provide the conditions for a minimal descent life.
This thesis will contribute to the debate on the ethics of migration, which is a still
ongoing debate within political philosophy around the question whether states have the right to control their borders. While staying agnostic about the question of whether borders should be
completely open, I claim that borders should at least be open to a certain threshold (that is for
the most vulnerable in this world that face a direct threat of starvation and cannot effectively be helped differently).3 Open borders are here considered as an instrument to solve the great
1 In this thesis I will refer to countries that are able to guarantee the fulfillment of basic human rights (as food and
shelter) for all inhabitants (civilians and migrants alike) as “well-institutionalized countries”. I deliberately avoid speaking of “wealthy countries”, since many countries cannot generally be categorized as “rich” or “wealthy” (at least in comparison to some European and Anglo-Saxon countries) but are undeniably able to guarantee the basic human rights of their (future) inhabitants.
2 See for example: Pogge (2003; 2006) and Lister (2013).
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development problems of our time.4 This is an important qualification, which makes my claim
morally less demanding in two ways. First, it lowers the costs (fiscally and politically) for well-institutionalized countries. Second, my approach appeals only to widely recognized human rights (subsistence rights), instead of more controversial rights were proponents of full open borders are dependent upon (like the freedom of international movement) (Wilcox, 2009, p. 7). This work also contributes to the lively public- and policy debate around underdevelopment: its causes, possible solutions and the responsibility of the international community.
Although it is at least unclear if states are, in an ideal world, legitimate actors in themselves to coerce individuals in one way or the other, we proceed simply by leaving this discussion aside and assuming that states are legitimate (or at least real-world entities that we have to deal with). The question now becomes: ‘given that states exist, do they also have a right to control their borders?’
The focus will here be on the right to migrate as a result of the implications of underdevelopment. That is, especially, the treats to basic human rights in the form of lack of nutrition. I have chosen to limit the scope of the argument to these cases of human right violations since I believe that other, not particular more or less important, violations of human rights come (predominantly) in the form of arbitrary prosecution or lack of law enforcement by states which are already dealt with (at least in paper) by the Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967) Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 2010, p. 5).5
First, I will outline the problem of underdevelopment. This is a mere empirical
discription of the problem of underdevelopment itself, the size of the problem and what seem to be its causes. Second, I will set forth my argument of migration as an appropriate method (in terms of morality, justice and effectivity) to face this problem when it comes to the group that is worst of and cannot be helped differently. This section will be built up of three parts: (1) why foreign aid will not be effective enough, (2) why migration will, and (3) why
well-institutionalized countries should take on the costs that are associated with the migration of the world most vulnerable. Last, I will deal with the main objections to this claim.
4 See for other authors that have considered opening-up borders as an instrument instead of a general moral duty:
Whelan (1988) and Wilcox (2007). Others have recognized migration as an option of last resort but have generally underlighted how much people should actually be helped this way and have failed to make explicit what the obligations of recipient countries are exactly and for what reasons. My account goes further than past research, by making the effects for both sending and recipient countries more concrete and by explicitly focusing on the grounds on which this obligation on the account of well-institutionalized countries is based.
5 To be sure, I acknowledge that when it comes to the actual dealing with refugees worldwide it is very hard to argue
that refugees are threatened according to what international law or morality would require (UN Regufee Agency, 2013: 29; Vluchtelingenwerk, 2013: 27). In addition, Ferracioli (2014, p. 124) argues that the Refugee Convention should actually be widened to include cases of economic insufficiently. Thereby thus claiming that it is wrong to treat claims to migrate as a result of prosecution or -economic insufficiently as two separate things.
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The problem and causes of underdevelopment
Infant mortality (that is death of children under the age of 5), which is generally considered to be a valid measure of economic development, is steadily declining since 1990 (Unicef, 2013, p. 14). The percentage of people living in developing regions that have to live on less than $1.25 a day fell from 47 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2010, as a result about 700 million people have got out of extreme poverty conditions (United Nations, 2013, p. 5).6
The problem is, these results are mostly caused by the development of China, India and some other successful developing countries and overlook the fact that there is a large group of mostly small countries that have seen their economy stagnate or decline in the last decades (and that is without considering demographic growth).7
It is important to acknowledge that this “stagnate group” is the minority of developing countries and consists of countries which are following distinctively different developing paths (read: no development) than most other nations (ibid. p. x). Although most are located in sub-Saharan Africa it has, as we will see later, not much to do with the geography itself. The
problems these countries face are distinctively different than that of other developing countries and as I will argue are institutional problems, often in combination with other structural factors, which are unlikely to change anytime soon.
The supremacy of institutions
Generally speaking there are three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, schools of thought evident in the literature when it comes to explaining development and underdevelopment. First, there is the “geography school”. Second, the “international trade school”. And third, the
“institutions school” (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003, p. 31).
The geography school highlights the role of climate, natural resource endowments,
disease burden and transport costs in economic development (ibid.).8 There are a few problems
with this explanatory model, however. First, although many poor countries happen to be located in tropical areas while rich are mostly located in temperate latitudes, there is no clear, simple and enduring link between climate and economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 49-50). For instance, it is not true that the tropics have always been poorer then places with
6 Nonetheless, there is still a lot to be done. Everyday 18.000 children die on preventable causes (that is 6.6 million a
year!) and it is now almost certain that the Millennium Development Goals for 2015 will not be achieved (United Nations, 2013, p. 9).
7 Paul Collier (2008: 7) calls these countries “the bottom billion” (see attachment 1). These countries’ growth rates
have been negative in relative terms (and often also in absolute terms). Life expectancy is fifty years, whereas in the other developing countries this is sixty-seven years (ibid. p. 11). The infant mortality rate in these countries is 14 per cent in comparison to 4 per cent in all other developing countries and the proportion of children with symptoms of long-term malnutrition is 36 per cent against 20 per cent (ibid. p. 8).
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a more temperate climate. In addition, there are examples to be named of countries that are developing in all continents and climates (ibid. p. 51).
Second, although the “natural resource curse” seems to be at work in a lot of poor countries, it is also true that not all countries will oil, minerals or other natural resources have experienced this curse to the same extent. 9 In contrast, some countries (as for example Norway
or Kuwait) seem to highly benefit of natural resource extraction. It therefore seems to matter much more how you deal (institutionally) with the finding and exploitation of natural resources, instead of the mere fact that a country has natural resources or not (Yom, 2011, p. 217).
Third, although the disease burden as a result of malaria and other illnesses is real in a lot of (especially sub-Saharan) developing countries, it is not true that this on its own can account for significant differences in development between countries. Again, some countries seem to overcome this problem. More importantly, however, empirical results suggest strongly that disease is largely a consequence (instead of a cause) of poverty and of government
institutions that are unable or unwilling to undertake necessary measures to eradicate them (ibid. p. 51). Empirical research from Amartya Sen, for example, indicates persuasively that a famine has never occurred in countries with democratic institutions regardless of the wealth and economic situation of the particular country in question (1994, p. 36).
But, being landlocked (as most of the countries that we are considering are) can raise transport costs substantially.10 This can make inclusion in the world market, which could lead to
increased productivity, economies of scale and economic growth, fairly difficult or even impossible. Indeed, these countries are mostly not at all connected (through export or import) to the world market (Collier, 2008, p. 55).
The international trade school emphasizes the role of integration in the world economy
as the driver of productivity change (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003, p. 31).11 Although much of
the (political-)economics profession would agree that integration in the world market, if certain institutional pre-requisites have been fulfilled, could have positive effects in terms of
specialization, larger markets and innovation through competition, this view argues that this is the prime source that distinguishes rich from poor countries (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004, p. 132). There are at least three problems with this view. First, some countries that are to
9 The “natural resource curse” is an umbrella concept of theories which claim that the exploitation of natural
resources leads to negative economic- and political effects (see Collier (2008) and Ross (2001) for mechanisms).
10 An astonishing fact is that while in the developing world, excluding Africa, only 1 percent of the population lives in
countries that are landlocked and resource-scare. In Africa around 30 percent of the population lives in such regions. According to Collier (2008: 57) “A reasonable case be made that such places never should have become countries.” As we all know, Africa’s borders were drawn by colonial powers, mostly on the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.
11 The most prominent scholars in this school are: Frankel and Romer (1999), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Dollar
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a far extent integrated in the world market are also poor.12 Second, the benefits of freeing trade
(after also considering the costs in the form of volatility and job displacement) seem to be much smaller than is often presumed (Krugman, 1995, p. 31; Graham, 2000, p. 135). Third, empirical research does not find rebust support for the integration view after institutions are controlled for. “[Similarly,] once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the “wrong” (i.e., negative) sign.” (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004, p. 131).
The institutions school argues that what ultimately matters is ‘the rules of the game’ in a
society.13 Institutions are commonly defined as: the prevailing explicit and implicit behavioral
norms and their capacity to create appropriate incentives for desirable economic behavior (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003, p. 31). Usually the role of property rights and rule of law is highlighted but the real influence of institutions is broader than that.14 Secure private property
rights are essential since only then citizens will be willing to invest and increase productivity, but good institutions also need to provide secure economic opportunities for all citizens and not just the elite; this is the only way to start technology and educational levels to rise (Ocemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 75 + 77).
There is political conflict surrounding institutions because every institutional system is beneficial to one or certain groups in society at the expense of others (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 79; Fukuyama, 2011, p. 517). The sitting elites have an interest in defending the status
quo, even if this is highly damaging for the vast majority of citizens (Fukuyama, 2001: 517). Creative destruction—that is the destroyment of old production methods by new more efficient
and innovative ways of producing—is highly threatening for the sitting elites since they are the ones profiting of the current way the economy is structured (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 84).
The problem is that in the least-developing country their exists a strong synergy between political and economic power. Extractive political institutions—not sufficiently centralized and pluralistic—enable the political elites to choose and sustain economic institutions with few constraints or opposing forces. They will therefore set up extractive economic institutions which enrich the same elites, not by innovation (as a result of creative
12 The opposite does not seems to be true, however. There are no examples of countries that are rich but totally not
integrated, through import and exports, in the world market (Underhill, 2014, p. 8). This provides at least some indirect evidence for the international trade school.
13 This tradition began with the work of Douglass North (1990) and was further proceeded by Hall and Jones (1999)
and Acemoglu et. al. (2001).
14 It also includes the provision of public services that provide a level playing field in which people can exchange and
contract, as well as providing opportunities for new businesses to arise and people to choose their careers as they would like to (Ocemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 75).
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destruction) but through exploitation of their citizens and/or natural resources (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012, p. 81).15 These extractive economic institutions, in turn, enrich the same elites
which makes it easier for them to stay in political power. Creating a devastating feedback-loop which is very difficult, although not impossible, to break through (ibid.).
Institutional change, has to come from a struggle between new and old interest
coalitions within society. The success depends on the extent to which political interest that try to sustain the status quo can be overwon (Fukuyama, 2011: 518).
It turns out that substantial institutional change comes very slowly and is highly depend on historical processes that reach over decades or even centuries (Ocemoglu & Robinson, 2012: 402; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003, p. 34). That’s why it is no coincidence that if you: “Go back one hundred years, or a hundred and fifty, [and] you’d find nearly the same countries in the same [development, SvN] group.” (Ocemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 45-46). It is estimated that the probability of a sustained turnaround starting in any given year is about 1.6 percent in all developing countries (thus, including countries that are actually developing in the first place) (Collier, 2008, p. 71).
But then the question arises: ‘why are these bottom billion countries so different from all the rest?’ After all, some of the (relatively) developed countries in this world are notorious for their bad institutions (like: Algeria, Argentina and Egypt), while some of the poor places (e.g. Costa Rica and Tanzania) have had relatively honest governments for long periods of time (Diamond, 2012, p. 5). First, the institutional problems in these countries are much worse and systematic than that of other developing countries. More than 75 percent of the population of “bottom billion” countries have been living in what has been a failed state at some time in the last half a century (Collier, 2008, p. 69).16 Also here, it turns out that a particular institutional
inheritage is highly rigid: “[…] the mathematical expectation, which is the average length of time it takes to get out of being a failing state. [It] comes out as fifty-nine years.” (ibid. p. 71).
In addition, and that is what makes these countries really distinctive, is that these malfunctioning institutions are combined with four specific “development traps” which are also very rigid in nature. “Seventy-three percent of them have been through civil war, 29 percent of them are in countries dominated by the politics of natural resource revenues, 30 percent are landlocked, resource-scarce, and in a bad neighborhood, and 76 percent have been through a prolonged period of bad governance and poor economic policies.” (Collier, 2008, p. 79). Chances for any substantive and positive change in these countries are thus extremely low.
15 Not surprisingly, the leaders of many of the poorest countries in the world are themselves among the global
superrich (Collier, 2008, p. 66).
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Why aid is not going to do the job
If institutions, possibly in combination with geography, are the cause of the starvation of millions of people in these countries; what can we do about it? And why turn to such drastic means as migration, instead of the traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA)? Although both ODA and the removal of trade barriers (especially for agricultural products) is probably part of the solution it will not be fast enough; people are starving today rather than tomorrow.17
Secondly, both will be highly ineffective in dealing with the real problem, that is: a structural institutional deficit.
It is a misunderstanding, according to Collier (2008, p. 100), to claim that aid has totally no (positive) effect on the development of the poorest countries.18 Aid does speed up the
process of economic growth, which in the end is the main thing that is necessary to feed the population. Its effect are, however, far too small to really change the bottom billion countries around. “A reasonable estimate is that over the last thirty years it has added around one percentage point to the annual growth rate of the bottom billion.” (Collier, 2008, p. 100). Since the growth rate of these economies has often been in negative terms this is a serious
achievement. It is however, as everyone will acknowledge, never enough to lift the most vulnerable in this world out of poverty (to put things in perspective: the population growth of Africa between 1990-2010 was around 55%).19
But maybe that will just mean that we have to increase ODA drastically. Unfortunately it is not that simple. Aid, just as every other investment, is subject to what economists call
“diminishing returns”; doubling the aid budget will not have the effect of doubling growth (ibid.). “A recent study by the Center for Global Development, came up with an estimate of diminishing returns implying that when aid reaches 16 percent of GDP it more or less ceases to be effective. Africa wasn’t far off that level even before Gleneagles [the G8 summit in 2005 were the G8 committed itself to doubling aid to Africa, SvN].” (ibid. p. 101)
17 Although the current international trading system is clearly unbeneficial for poorly developed countries it is
unlikely, for reasons described above, to really make a big difference for the problems in the badly-institutionalized countries. For that reason, I will not consider this option any further.
18 It is important to acknowledge, however, that a considerable number of rigorous empirical research actually finds a
negative correlation between foreign aid and economic growth (see for example: Easterly (2006)). The strategy that I have chosen here, to be safe of critics, is to argue that even if foreign aid does have a positive effect, it will be very far from being enough to turn the situation around.
19 It is important to realize here that even if Collier underestimates the positive effects of ODA with a factor of ten, it
would still be not even close to being enough. Besides that, it is also true that this 1% growth is not evenly spread out over the population. In contrast, it is probably highly unlikely that the most vulnerable has benefitted even close to equal from it.
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In addition, institutions also seem to play a crucial role in the case of aid effectiveness. Most of the positive results have been reached in countries were governance and policies are already reasonable (ibid. p. 102). Unfortunately, technical assistance in a badly-institutionalized state also has little effect on the chance of a turnaround actually occurring (ibid. p. 116).
Others would suggest that if it is ineffective to develop persons in direct threat of starvation out of extreme poverty conditions, we could implement a permanent food supply (a sort of permanent emergency aid) instead of migration to help them. If possible, this could also be an option to seriously consider. There are good reasons to expect, however, that due to bad infrastructure, political instability and the remote and difficult to reach places large portions of these group life that this cannot be done structurally against reasonable costs and without risking deaths as a result of logistical problems.
Besides that, it would have much more negative effects for the society in need themselves; incentives for efficient and sustainable production within these societies
themselves will be cut off almost entirely in the presence of free/cheap supply of products. This would thus probably lead to a vicious-circle leaving these societies more and more dependent, instead of autonomous, over time.
Migration as an instrument to fight starvation
Although, migration will also not deal with the cause of the problem directly. It will deal with the outcome of the problem directly, by structurally saving the citizens that are directly threatened by economic insufficiency (Whelan, 1988, p. 12). Bringing these people within territory with stable and relatively inclusive institutions will not only take the direct threat away (at least when temporally support of the recipient state is institutionalized), but will also increase the chances of leading a descent, autonomous and relatively independent life for these people in the future substantially. It will thus, in contrast to (emergency) aid, be a permanent solution.
The purpose of this thesis has not been to provide a final and exclusive scheme of migration for the most vulnerable. This will probably need more philosophical and empirical backing. Nonetheless, it is important to take in consideration the feasibility of what I am proposing here, as well as sketching some broad focus points for implementation.
The first question that arises seems to be: ‘about how large a group are we talking about?’ Well, although this is difficult to define exactly we do know that about 25.000 people are
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starving on a daily basis.20 This means that yearly approximately 9.125.000 persons are unable
to survive domestically and will receive the right to migrate into save territory directly (if no ‘better’ option is available). Just above this group is an enormous group (of about 842 million people) that is undernourished (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2013, p. 8). Fortunately, this number has fallen by about 17 per cent since 1990 due to success in other developing countries, but this group is still extremely vulnerable to even the smallest set-back (ibid. p. 15).
We can reasonably assume, however, that part of this group just above those in direct threat of starvation, consists of people that are in threat of starvation in the medium to long run and which cannot, in the absence of substantial domestic changes, effectively be helped
structurally through ODA. Since we are unsure about the size of this group, and we are also unsure if it is even possible to save everyone against acceptable costs we will need a principle for selection.
When considering which people should get the right to migrate (first), two principles seem to be valid. First, the need for help. Since we are ultimately aiming at saving as much people from starvation as possible, it seems logical to move from the ground up; first the people most at risk need to migrate. Second, the prospects for a better future are of relevance. It seems reasonable to argue that when a trade-off needs to be made between two people equally in need for help, the person that lives in a country with less prospects for development in the future should receive the right to migrate first. After all the chances of surviving in a better
institutional surrounding are significantly larger. In addition, because of this better institutional surrounding he/she is probably, centris paribus, better able to influence the future of his/her own life and thus bears more individual responsibility.
Of course the question of ‘what is equal burden sharing?’ between recipient states then arises. Three criteria in a pure organizational sense could be useful: (1) population density, (2) economic prosperity, and (3) the need for relatively unskilled workers in the near future.21 The
first, because it seems obvious that countries which are already overpopulated have less capacity (resource wise but also in terms of the quality of living which is partly depend on free space to live) to include migrants. The second, since countries which are richer (in terms of per capita income) can be expected to be better able to make a larger part of their income available for the assistance of migrants before they will drop to a level were costs are unacceptable. The need for relatively unskilled workers could also be of relevance because: (i) it can reasonably be
20 Note that an even larger group is dying on ‘preventable causes’ (which includes easy to cure sicknesses). If part of
this group can also only be helped through migration, my argument counts for them as well.
21 As we will see later, other criteria (related to contribution and benefitting) are also of relevance to determine how
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expected that most if not all of these migrants from badly-institutionalized countries are (at least relatively to the recipient country’s population) low skilled and (ii) since the capacity of including a significant proportion of these migrants into the labor force lowers the costs for recipient countries while it also provides an extra opportunity to build up a meaningful live through job participation for would-be immigrants.
Another important consideration at the implementation level is the so-called “brain drain” problem. Currently the borders of well-institutionalized countries are already open to some extent for the skilled citizens of badly-institutionalized countries (UN-DESA & OECD , 2013, p. 4; Wilcox, 2007, p. 274). This leads to a problematic situation for at least three reasons. First, it leaves the ‘middle group’ (which under this scheme do not receive the right to migrate) with a country with much less economic- and development potential (Collier, 2008, p. 94). Second, it could quite plausibly be argued that this group that is now “leaking away” (the relatively skilled and well educated) should actually take the lead in changing the country’s political-economic institutions from the inside (Ferracioli, forthcoming, p. 8). Third, part of this group that is leaking away posses skills that are of vital importance for the guarantee of basic human rights in their home country. The most prominent current example in this regard is the migration of large numbers of doctors from developing countries which are themselves short on medical staff (ibid. pp. 7-8).
This implicates that at least in the cases of migration of citizens with skills that are essential for the direct protection of basic human rights in resource-deprived countries and which cannot be compensated for by other means, that well-institutionalized countries also have a moral obligation to exclude certain citizens from bottom billion countries (ibid. p. 7).
Regarding ‘the middle group’ one could argue that my proposal is not providing sufficient justice to their situation. This group is probably also (very) poor and also lacks the resources to pursue ones live plans in a substantial way. It is important to acknowledge, however, that since resources are scarce and societal costs for well-institutionalized countries are substantial we have to make hard choices about who will receive the right to be included in a society of a well-institutionalized country. It then seems obvious that we work from the ground up. Letting people die while they could be saved is just not an option.
Second, even though the largest reason for their poverty is probably the ineffective use of economic resources in the first place. Letting the poorest group leave will still result in a substantial economic relieve of the group just above there. Undernourishment is mostly caused by underproduction per m2 in comparison to population size. Three-quarters of all hungry
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their survival (Website World Food Program). More land per capita will substantially raise there quality of life (that is, if demographic growth stays within reasonable limits over time).
Last, it is important to acknowledge that just opening up border for this group of people will not be enough. As is evident now; not the most needy (try to) immigrate but the people that are actually in a position to risk and finance the crossing of borders do (Ferracioli, 2011, p. 15). This implicates that the most vulnerable need to be helped actively to migrate into safe territory. This means well-institutionalized countries should take on transport costs. Second, it is also important to prevent these people to become second-class citizens in their new country of settlement.22 This means institutionalizing: (1) an opportunity to receive full citizenship within
a reasonable time period and (2) a substantial policy to integrate these people in society as fellow citizens with equal social-, political- and economic opportunities.
To conclude I would like to note that recipient countries are not expected to take on unlimited costs. Rather a balance should be found in practice between the costs and benefits citizens to sending and recipient countries (Ypi, 2008, p. 391). After all, well-institutionalized countries also have obligations towards their own citizens to maintain public institutions, a social minimum and the opportunity of self-determination (Ferracioli, 2011, p. 41).
The moral grounds of this claim
Assuming that it is at least to a certain point possible to use migration as a tool to prevent direct starvation, it is important to reason why well-institutionalized countries should help these people in the first place. In addition, what grounds taking up such high costs as opening-up ones (political) community? I will argue that well-institutionalized bear this positive duty based on three grounds: (1) the duty to assist people in need, (2) the duty not to contribute to injustice, and (3) the duty not to benefit from injustice.
Assistance-based duties are those duties that moral agents have because they can help
someone else who is in need of assistance. The most important proponent of this view has been Peter Singer (1972) in his article Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Singer starts off with two assumptions: (1) suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad and (2) if it is in ones power to prevent something bad from happening against reasonable cost (that is, without sacrificing something comparably important), we ought, morally to do it (Singer, 1972, p. 231).
22 As Walzer (1983: 61) argues: “No democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizen
and foreigner (though there can be stages in the transition from one of these political identities to the other). Men and women are either subject to the state’s authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what authority does.”
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Make sure to note that this principle takes no account of proximity or distance. It thus does not matter if one can save a life on the corner of the street or if one can safe someone in another country (ibid. p, 232). It also makes no distinction between cases in which the moral agent is the only person who could possibly do something about the situation and cases in which one is just one among many in the same position (ibid.).23
The question than arises: what is a reasonable cost? In general their seems to be a ceiling in terms of what we can ask of moral agents when it comes to assisting others in need (Øverland, 2005, p. 308). This is so since in the liberal tradition the life plans of individuals are also of importance, and have to be taken in consideration. As Schmidtz (2000, p. 705) puts it: “[Second] we have to recognize that even if being in situation X were unjust, that does not mean any particular agent is obligated to dedicate his or her life to helping people escape from
situation X.” In addition, there is the question of the cost in the form of other resources than time: “On the more moderate principle, it may not follow that we ought to reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might hold that to reduce oneself and one’s family to this level is to cause something significantly bad to happen.” (Singer, 1972, p. 241)
Under the more stringent principle (people have an obligation to help others if they do not need to sacrifice something that is morally just as important) it is undeniably the case that letting the most vulnerable migrate is morally required. Think about it, citizens of
well-institutionalized countries can save them directly and will suffer in the worst-case scenario a combination of: job displacement, economic turndown, cultural turmoil and political turmoil. Although, all very serious indeed, does this even comes close of weighting up to saving millions of lives?
On the more moderate view, costs seem to be highly dependent on how it is
institutionalized on the international level and how ‘moderate costs’ are defined. Although I will further go into the economic costs in the next section, it at least seems to be possible to deal with a substantial part of the problem through migration against bearable costs. Let’s make a simple and blunt calculation: if only the 34 member countries of the OECD would contribute 0,5% of their GDP to a fund for helping these migrants this would count up to around
$225.000.000.000,- (OECD database). This means that in a year were 20 million people would
23 As Singer argues: “[…] I admit that there is a psychological difference between the cases […] Yet this can make no
real difference to our moral obligations. Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also notices the child but are doing nothing?” (ibid. p. 232-233)
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receive the right to migrate, $11.250,- per person would be available for transportation, shelter and (short-term) welfare benefits.24
But besides these quite practical arguments one might have more theoretical
challenging objections. First, one might argue that even in well-institutionalized countries there are people that are also seriously suffering (maybe from addiction, poor living conditions or poverty). Why not help them first? Although it is undeniably true that some people in well-institutionalized countries are also in need, this claim has two serious flaws.
First, it does not seem to account for the fact that our intuition is telling us that proximity and distance do not matter when it comes to saving other human beings (recall the child in the pond metaphor of Singer). One could then argue that he/she has a larger
commitment to ones countrymen relative to foreigners. Although national identity can in some cases be of moral importance it does not seem to be obvious that this is true in this case. Would it be a morally valid reason if one could only safe one out of two people in the pond to prefer a fellow citizen over another? Or should that decision be made on other considerations? I would argue this decision needs to be made on considerations of severity and urgency (what if your fellow countrymen could swim, while the other person could not?). Although it is definitely also of importance to help your fellow countryman in need, it obvious that citizens in bottom billion countries are cetris paribus in much more severe and urgent need than deprived citizens of well-institutionalized countries.
In addition, one could argue that it is also of importance to take into account the
responsibility of the people themselves (Øverland, 2005, p. 305). In that case, however, it could be argued that citizens that happen, by the lottery of birth, to get born in a country with failing state institutions and no economic infrastructure at all have probably much less responsibility to bear for their severe situation than fellow countrymen in well-institutionalized countries that are in need. This is so since, citizens that happen to be born in bottom billion countries probably have had far less chances to influence the crucial political decisions that determines one’s life conditions, simply because inclusive political institutions are fully absent (Pogge, 2003, p. 2). At last, one could use the argument of information asymmetry to argue for not helping the bottom billion citizens through migration. This argument is often used in the discussion about the effectiveness of foreign aid and proclaims that because of imperfect information one is not sure if he/she is doing good by giving aid, and therefore should withhold from acting or is unable to act justly (Schmidtz, 2000, pp. 686-687). Although this argument is maybe justified
24 Note that this is about the purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita of a country as South-Africa (World Economic
16
when it comes to ODA it is not justified when it comes to migration as an instrument. It seems simply highly unlikely that the (short-term) live chances of someone who is starving in badly-institutionalized countries will not be improved when he/she is evacuated to a place with safe, inclusive and well-organized institutions that are committed to his/her survival.
Although I think that, given the obvious effectiveness and bearable costs, a duty on the principle of assistance could already be enough to back my account. I will also argue below, that citizens and governments of well-institutionalized countries have the duty to help persons in direct treat of starvation through migration on the basis of contribution to and benefit of the problems of the deprived societies were they are coming from.
Contributing to an injustice is widely considered to give more stringent moral duties to moral agents than the mere duty of assistance (Barry, 2005, p. 210; Øverland, 2005, p. 304; Pogge, 2003, p. 19). If one played a causal role in bringing about an injustice he/she is in common moral reasoning seen to be obligated to compensate the victim(s) more by taking on higher costs (Øverland, 2005, p. 304). In addition, according to Pogge (2003, p. 20), these moral obligations are even less sensitive to variation in community and distance.
It is a misunderstanding to think that because domestic institutions are by far the strongest factor in determining a country’s development that other countries in the
international sphere are therefore morally “off the hook”. In contrast, a significant proportion of
the now well-institutionalized countries have played a causal role in establishing these extractive political- and economic institutions in the first place. In addition, all
well-institutionalized countries of today are contributing to the sustainment of these institutions in badly-institutionalized countries.25
Colonialism, which began in the early fifteenth century and massively intensified after 1492, has had a determining effect on the institutional system in all colonized countries
(Acemoglu et. al. 2005, p. 407). It is important to acknowledge, however, that there has not been ‘one colonialism’ and thus also not ‘one effect’ on previous subjected countries. Rather, there were different types of colonization policies which created very different institutional structures in the former colonized countries:
“At one extreme, European powers set up “extractive states”, exemplified by the Belgian colonization of the Congo. These institutions did not introduce much protection for private property, nor did they provide checks and balances against government
25 This in contrast to Patten (2005, p. 12) who argues that the obligations that affluent countries have towards
developing countries are both fairly weak and minimal because the affluent are not, individually or collectively, harming the world’s poor by causing their poverty.
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expropropriation. In fact, the main purpose of the extractice state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer, with the minimum amount of investment possible.
At the other extreme, many Europeans went and settled in a number of colonies, creating what historian Alfred Crosby (1986) calls “Neo-Europes”. The settler tried to replicate European institutions, with great emphasis on private property, and checks against government power. Primary examples of this include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.” (Acemoglu et. al. 2001, p. 2)
The question of settlement (which was the prime determinant of which policy was chosen by the colonizers) was mostly determined by the disease environment in a candidate colony (ibid. p. 8). There existed extremely large differences in European mortality rates between potential colonies, and the European were well aware of that. This was mostly due to tropical diseases as malaria and yellow fewer (which were incurable at the time). The historical creation of
political- and economic institutions were thus highly entangled with geographic factors, but the actual effect on development was the result of choice instead of the geographic situation itself.
The effect of this dynamic until today should not be underestimated. We are able to explain approximately three-quarters (!) of all cross-country income differences in previous colonized countries today using mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors in the colonies between the 17th and the 19th century (ibid. pp. 2-3).26 These estimates change remarkedly
little when controlling for other factors as: the distance from the equator (latitude), an Africa-dummy, controls for climate, geography, religion, legal origin, main colonizer, natural
resources, and soil quality. As well as using different operationalizations of the quality of institutions (ibid. p. 3-4).
The enormous influence of colonialism is examplified even further by the fact that there has been an undeniable “return of furtune” in many countries as a result of colonialism (Acemoglu et. al., 2002, p. 1231). That is, if you compare the situation just before colonization and some time after that moment you will find very distinctive differences which last until today and can only be accounted for by the colonization process itself.27
26 This multiple regression analysis was largely done on the basis of historic data from Philip Curtin.
27 As Acemoglu et. al. (2002, p. 1232) have shown convincingly that there exists a negative association between
economic prosperity in 1500 and today, within previously colonialized countries. “[…] those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor.” (ibid. p. 1231).
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“[…] the relatively densely settled and highly urbanized colonies ended up with worse (or 'extractive') institutions, while sparsely settled and non-urbanized areas received an influx of European migrants and developed institutions protecting the property rights of a broad cross-section of society. European colonialism therefore led to an institutional reversal, in the sense that the previously richer and more-densely settled places ended up with worse institutions.” (Acemoglu et. al., 2005, p. 414)
Besides the fact that at least some well-institutionalized countries are responsible for the establishment of highly extractive institutions in bottom billion countries that still exist until today, all well-institutionalized countries actually contribute to the sustainment of these extractive institutions.28
As is well known, it has been regularly the case that foreign governments are only able to stay in power thanks to foreign- instead of popular support (Pogge, 2003, p. 11). It does not seem to matter, in practice, how a government got into power to be included (and thereby legitimized) on the international stage. This is even the case when an elected government is overthrown (ibid.).
This also means that the international community (with only well-institutionalized countries as serious power blocks) is accepting the group of people that now forms the
government of a badly-institutionalized country to act on behalf of the people it rules. Thereby conferring upon them privileges to freely dispose the country’s natural resources and to borrow in the country’s name (ibid.). This, in turn, has two effects. First, it strengthens the power
position of the elites in comparison to its citizens considerably. Making institutional change (overcoming the interests in the status quo) even more difficult and unlikely. Second, it shifts large costs towards the current citizens and/or future generations of the state in question.
Although it is clear that all well-institutionalized countries contribute to some extent to the situation in badly-institutionalized countries, it is unclear (as my critics will argue) to what extent they did/do this.29 In addition, since it is clear that also domestic politics plays a
substantial role in the process of underdevelopment it seems that contribution duties on behalf of other countries (the international surrounding) can never fully account for the obligation to bring everyone above a sufficiency threshold (Patten, 2005, pp. 23-24). In other words: even if
28 Recall here again that it is not only the institutions, but also the borders that were drawn by colonial powers which
have had a determining effect on most bottom billion countries (in terms of ethnic tensions and transportation costs).
29 See Patten (2005, p. 21) and Butt (2007, pp. 146-147) for a discussion about the concepts of “harm” and “cause”,
and the difficulties of establishing a causal relationship in these (non-counterfactual) historical processes. Here I will comply by arguing that these choices by well-institutionalized countries were clearly harmful for bottom billion countries and that it is more than reasonable to assume that a more just institutional order was/is possible (a so-called “substantive baseline”) (Patten, 2005, p. 25).
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colonialism did not happen and the international system would be so that governments of badly-institutionalized countries could not stay in power without popular support, it would most probably still be the case that some people in badly-institutionalized countries would still be starving although we are not sure of it (ibid. p. 24).30
Without being able to go into much detail here, my reaction to this claim would be twofold. First, although it is unclear how much underdevelopment is exactly caused by (historic) international effects it is beyond a doubt that this influence was substantial and lasting. Second, since well-institutionalized countries also bear duties based on assistance and
benefitting, and since the costs seem acceptable compared to the stakes, I think it is reasonable
to say that well-institutionalized countries are obligated ‘enough’ to help persons in badly-institutionalized countries in direct treat of starvation through migration (or at least to a far extent).
Secondly, there is the problem of how the costs for well-institutionalized countries should be distributed. It is obvious that some well-institutionalized countries have contributed more than others. After all, most did not participate in colonialism at all or even worse, were colonized themselves. In addition, some tend(ed) to support despotic regimes more than others. Although this aspect of my claim probably needs more thought in pure implementation sense, it does not weaken my claim that well-institutionalized countries have a serious obligation to help the badly-institutionalized countries through migration (also if this has to be done against higher costs than assistance based duties would require).31
Another important distinction in this context is that since I regard the right to migrate purely as an instrument to prevent basic human rights being violated, the would-be migrants can be distributed equally/fairly (however that is defined) over the well-institutionalized countries. They thus do not (necessarily need to) have a choice regarding to which safe and well-institutionalized country they may be helped to migrate. This makes my proposal much easier to institutionalize fairly on the international level.
This also, of course, has large consequences for the individual autonomy of these persons. I think, however, that this is permissible because if the choice is left to the individuals in question this can lead to very unequal burden sharing between states as a result of large groups of migrants all choosing to go to one or a small set of countries. Although financial
30 As Patten (2005, pp. 23-24) argues: “[But] we know from the domestic politics of the developed countries that even
fairly democratic countries, operating under an international set of rules that have been shaped for their own advantage, can routinely fail to enact policies designed to help their poorest and most marginalized citizens.”
31 Butt (2007, p. 133) argues that: “[…] in cases where more than one party is relevantly connected to the suffering
agent we must use our moral intuitions to determine either which party bears the primary responsibility, or how the costs should be shared among different parties.”
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compensation between countries could fix this problem to some extent, it cannot (at least in theory) institutionalize equal burden sharing fully since there is simply a limit to how much extra citizens a country can integrate within a certain period of time.
In practice however, I think, that the demands of the migrants can often be fulfilled if international cooperation is successful. In the end, the most desired destinations for individual migrants are probably much more differentiated as a result of affiliation with a particular well-institutionalized country (for example through language, culture and contacts). This will provide more room for the international community to maneuver migrants according to the capacity of states and the wishes of migrants.
Last, I would like to point out that in determining who contributed and to what extent (which will of course always will be a messy exercise in these cases) we should be willing to error in favor of the actually deprived subjects that are demanding help in contrast to the agent that maybe contributed. In the real world it is often difficult to determine with full confidence whether and to what extent a moral agent has contributed to acute deprivations of others (Barry, 2005, p. 211). Since we have this uncertainty, one of the two societies in our case needs to bear the costs of a possible misjudgment.32 Given that the costs for citizens of bottom billion
societies if a well-institutionalized country is falsely acquitted from stringent obligations to help (a type 2 error) are so much larger, than the costs for well-institutionalized countries being falsely convicted to stringent obligations to help, we should be willing to error in favor of the acutely deprived subjects (type 1 errors) (Barry, 2005, p. 210).33 That means that in cases of
reasonable doubt about the guiltiness of well-institutionalized countries they should be
obligated to make the larger costs that are associated with contributing to injustice. After all the possible contributor is not, like the possible victim, in a situation to risk losing the most
precious thing in this world itself: human life.
The last argument that grounds a stringent positive duty to help the most vulnerable in this world is that of benefitting (consciously or unconsciously) from the injustice of badly-institutionalized countries. It is commonly understood that being a moral agent implies that one should be committed to the idea that justice should prevail in this world; this means that if one is voluntary or involuntary benefitting of an unjust situation one should compensate the victim(s) as a result of our regret about the unjust situation and because we want to make the situation right (Butt, 2007, p. 143). It is important to notice, however, that benefitting from an
32 In this case there are two possible misjudgments possible: so called “type 1 errors” (to claim falsely that someone
has contributed) and so called “type 2 errors” (to claim falsely that someone has not contributed) (Barry, 2005, pp.
216-217).
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injustice is not always wrong (Anwander, 2005, p. 40).34 It actually seems to be important what
kind of benefitting it is that we are talking about, and then it seems that at least empirically it is
often difficult to distinguish between benefitting and contributing within particular cases (ibid. p. 45).35
In the case of benefitting of the injustices in the bottom billion countries I think the story is actually much less clear than in the first two cases. On the one hand, the citizens and
governments of well-institutionalized countries are clearly benefitting of the situation. For example, in the form of cheap and reliable natural resource supply and by benefitting of a stronger position in international (financial) institutions (Vreeland, 2004, pp. 3-4; Barro & Lee, 2005, p. 1245). On the other hand, the situation also has serious costs for well-institutionalized countries. These costs come in the form of expenditure on ODA.36 But most importantly come in
the form of instability; which in some circumstances could lead to the need for humanitarian intervention and threats of terrorism among other possible cost factors.
Although I think it is not difficult to see that the economic benefits are probably multiple times larger than the cost, I agree that this is a difficult cost-benefit analysis to make. What is much more important, and which tips the balance in favor of a strong duty to help, is that well-institutionalized countries have (got) undeniably the intension to benefit of the weak position of the bottom billion.37 In the case of colonialism this is, in the light of the above, an obvious claim
to make but also in the current international system it is clear that countries that are
economically- and politically stronger are using their position to pursue their self-interest even if this leads to serious and uncompensated harm in badly-institutionalized countries.38
One might then ask ‘what if well-institutionalized countries intended to benefit but did not really benefit in the end?’, would this still tip the balance? My answer to that question would be yes. Given that this world is full of uncertainty when it comes to causal claims (you never know exactly what your behavior is going to cause), the only compass we can really trust is that of philosophical principles for the initial behavior itself. Besides that, it seems unjust that some states can try to benefit from injustice while going unpunished if they turned out to not really
34 Consider for example the fact that some academics benefit in some way or another of the injustices that are done in
this world (what would they otherwise write about?!).
35 Anwander (2006, pp. 42-43) distinguishes three principal ways in which we may contribute to injustice while
benefitting from it: (1) “perpetuating injustice”, (2) “enabling injustice” and (3) “benefitting at others’ expense”.
36 Which consisted of only 0.29 percent of gross national income of donor countries in 2012 (United Nations, 2013, p.
52).
37 Intension seems to give more stringent duties to moral agents since it undermines the idea that moral agents
should be determined to behave in such a way that justice prevails (Butt, 2007, p. 145).
38 Examples include: trade barriers on agricultural products, tax regimes facilitating tax evasion and many other
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have benefitted in the end. This will not, at least according to my view, bring about a more just world.
The objections to this claim
An obvious criticism on my account would be that it is simply too costly and therefore
unrealizable. As van Gunsteren (1988, p. 740) argues, for example: “The problem is here one of numbers. Admitting all […] would endanger the continued reproduction of citizenship for those who are already in. For instance, this could make demands on welfare state provisions for citizens too heavy (the total pie is too small to give each the piece that he has a right to as a citizen).”
If it is even possible to evacuate the most vulnerable to well-institutionalized countries in terms of financial and societal costs seems ultimately to depend on where one draws the line with regard to who receives the right to migrate. After all, a staggering amount of people need help in this world while resources are scarce. So let’s not be naïve: although exact figures are difficult to give, it seems clear that costs of transportation and integration will be high for receiving countries. These costs come in the form of financial costs but also in the form of a decreased capacity for self-determination which in turn could lead to political and social
tensions. What I hope to show here, however, is that these costs are acceptable in the light of the strong obligation that well-institutionalized countries have towards the most vulnerable living in badly-institutionalized countries in this world.
There are multiple reasons to expect that at least an important part of the group that is daily threatened by starvation (about 10 million directly and a much larger group that is vulnerable to starvation in times of crises) should be able to be evacuated. After all, a lot of people (which were much less in need) have migrated in recent years without unacceptable costs in terms of fiscal or political functioning of recipient states. In addition, most are located in just a few countries, which indicates that if they would be spread out better in an international mechanism of equal burden sharing a lot more potential is there.39
The financial costs will depend quite heavily on how it is being organized on the
international level. When we look at refugees, the group that is most similar to the group we are considering here in terms of vulnerability, the fact that migration is “unchosen” and that they both cannot be helped within their own country, we see that the international burden sharing is highly unequal. In 2013, the total number of refugees was estimated to be 15,7 million, whereby nearly nine of every ten refugees had found asylum in developing regions (UN-DESA & OECD ,
39 About half of all international migrants reside in just ten countries. The United States alone hosted 20% of the
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2013, p. 2). It seems thus that quite a lot of (developed) countries have an even larger obligation to do something in favor of the needy in this world.
As described above a relatively small group of countries (the 34 OECD countries) can already account for a significant proportion of the expected costs. If you add to this that at least some part of the group that is migrating will contribute economically through labor and tax paying, these costs look even less unreasonable.40
It could be argued that this portion will be very small but that does not seem to be obvious (Pritchett, 2006, p. xiii). If we look at Europe (perhaps the region with the most capacity and moral duty to take up future migrants), we see that due to the large aging problem these migrants are, if well absorbed by society, able to fill in a large gap of workers that will arise in the future.41 In 2007, 235 million people were employed in Europe. In 2060 this will be 50
million less or even 110 million workers less if migration flows are restricted further. This, in combination with large-scale aging, will lead to an enormous shortage of workers in the future (Website Europa). The same applies for the whole OECD-region. Even if the number of migrants in the OECD-countries increased by a factor of ten from current levels, they still would only be able to meet half of the employment shortfall (Goldin, 2013, p. 38).
Although unreasonable economic costs for recipient countries can always be reduced by lowering the barrier of who receives the right to migrate, one can also have a more challenging objection to my account; the loss of self-determination for recipient societies.42
The self-determination argument ultimately rests on three premises: (1) legitimate states have the right of political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an essential part of self-determination, and (3) the freedom of association entitles one to refuse to associate with others. In addition, it is often argued that delineation of groups of people is needed for a legitimate political system to work in the first place (Whelan, 1988, p. 28).43 This would be the
40 To be sure, it is also clear that some in the domestic economy of well-institutionalized countries will be negatively
affected (typically the unskilled workers that now have to compete with more persons). In general, however, the economy as a whole often benefits of an influx of migrants, as (1) firms are able to hire cheaper labor (and pass along correspondingly lower prices to consumers), and (2) there is an increased demand for various goods and services. More generally, there exists a large consensus within the economic literature that the global economy as a whole would highly benefit from fewer restrictions on who can work where (the effect is estimated to be around 100 times larger than freeing trade) (Pritchett, 2006, p. 33).
41 Of course I am aware that this is probably the worst group when it comes to adapting to the European labor
market, it remains a fact, however, that an enormous pool of low-skilled workers will be demanded in the coming decades.
42 I will here only deal with the problem of self-determination in relation to the proper political functioning of a
legitimate state. This, while there are also accounts focusing specifically on the sustainment of national culture. See Ferracioli (2011, pp. 56-61) for problems with this ‘culture argument’.
43 This seems especially be the case with liberal welfare states, since states of this kind are only able to function as the
do because of the enormous political sacrifices their population is willing to make to sustain a vibrant democracy and equitable welfare state (Website Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
24
case since the ‘self’ that supports a certain government should overlap with the ‘self’ that is bounded by the results of that government’s policy. The collective right to self-determination comes from the general right of persons to have authority over their self-regarding affairs (Wellman, 2008, p. 110). In the end political communities exist and want to have at least some control over the circumstances that determine their lives. And it is also clear that, collective political decision making is affected by membership arrangements (who is allowed to have influence?) (Ferracioli, 2001, p. 69).
Although, I acknowledge that political self-determination is an important value which can be damaged by large streams of migration I think my account survives this criticism for two reasons. First, I think that in the case were only the most severe cases receive the right to immigrate (around 10 million per year) the cost for self-determination will be easily bearable for well-institutionalized countries if the burden is shared among all. After all, about 15,7 million refugees (and more than 200 million migrants), often with different political ideas, behavior and traditions, have move beyond international borders and settled in other political communities without apparent unreasonable costs in terms of political functioning. In the future one should also consider that the group of refugees and migrants as a result of economic insufficiency could most probably be overlapping to a large extent since a lot of economic insufficiency is caused by war, violence and general political oppression in the first place. In sum, I think it is highly unlikely that at least under the most restricted proposal it is the case that well-institutionalized countries will be unable to maintain public institutions that provide basic goods and services while also securing a meaningful opportunity for self-determination for their citizens. Note in this context, that every international arrangement limits domestic self-determination to some extent. The real question is to what extent and is this morally
acceptable?
Second, and more importantly, I think that in the case of an inherent tension between the right to control the border of ones community on the one hand and severe threat to basic human rights that cannot be solved differently than through migration on the other hand, the balance tips over towards inclusion of these individuals (especially in the light of the stringent obligations that well-institutionalized countries have towards the societies of
badly-institutionalized states).44 In the end collective self-determination is no ultimate end on it is
own. It needs to be weighed against other values and the rights of others.
