The Good, the Bad and the Evil:
A Distinction Between Evil and
Wrongdoing.
Master’s Thesis in Philosophy
By: Frances Gallagher
Supervised by: Dr. Thomas Nys
Word count: 22,136
Defence: 26
thJune 2013
Department of Philosophy,
University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Contents
Introduction...3 Chapter One...6 Chapter Two...28 Chapter Three...61 Chapter Four...76 Conclusion...91 Bibliography...93 2Introduction
The concept of ‘evil’ has received an upsurge of interest from philosophers in recent years. This has not exactly constituted a renewal of considerations of evil because the previous use of the term is different from its current treatment. Perhaps triggered, or at least stimulated, by George Bush’s reference to the ‘evil’ which America was confronted with in the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001,1 that which the term ‘evil’ denotes has somewhat altered in contemporary society. Rather than delineating the opposite of good and therefore all immorality, evil is at present conventionally used to denote an extremity of immorality. The following insight from Daniel Haybron encapsulates this notion:
“"Hitler was a bad person, and what he did was wrong." As is often noted, such tepid language seems terribly inadequate to the moral gravity of this subject matter. Prefix your adjectives with as many "verys" as you like; you still fall short. Only 'evil', it seems, will do.”2
In light of the need for a category of wrongdoing which encompasses the truly extreme, unquestionably abominable cases of wrongdoing the reclassification of ‘evil’ as an expression which denotes the members of this category seems appropriate. This being said, precisely what delineates the instances of evil which constitute the alternative category, from instances of ordinary wrongdoing which do
1
Singer, P. (2004) The President of Good and Evil: Taking George W. Bush Seriously, London: Granta, p. 1.
2
Haybron, D. (2002) ‘Moral Monsters and Saints’, The Monist, Vol. 85, No. 2, p. 260.
3
not invoke the need for the term ‘evil’, remains unresolved. Furthermore, while the reason for this delineation of evil from wrongdoing remains unidentified the very
idea of this distinction is rendered increasingly unconvincing. It is with this in mind
that I propose the aim of this thesis to be the formulation of a sustainable distinction
between evil and wrongdoing.
The first chapter of this thesis will underline the legitimacy of a distinction between evil and wrongdoing. I will elucidate critical doubts regarding the Kantian idea of radical evil which attributes the same basic structure to all wrongdoing and in doing so denies the possibility of a distinction among the group of acts deemed immoral. Thus, in a move towards the delineation of a wrongdoing-evil distinction in the second chapter I will address two completely opposing approaches to the
structure of this distinction: are quantitative or qualitative grounds preferable in discerning evil from ordinary wrongdoing? In other words, is evil simply more
accrued wrongdoing or is it something else entirely? An illustration of the former as
unsustainable will be followed by the affirmation that I will adopt the latter approach and I will subsequently proceed to identify the special quality of evil which
wrongdoing does not possess.
However, after an examination of principal accounts which locate this special quality in the nature of the character of the perpetrator I will conclude that such accounts do not constitute convincing explanations of how evil is best distinguished from wrongdoing. Following a report in the third chapter of evil which is only recognisable if the context of the perpetrator’s actions (as well as the actions
themselves) are understood, the fourth chapter will utilise a third-person perspective (rather than the perspective of a perpetrator) in identifying what I deem to be evil’s special quality.
In purporting that evil is wrongdoing which surprises us on account of the relation of disparity between the wills of the perpetrator and observer of evil acts, and defending this view against initial criticisms, I will form a basis for our intuitive recognition of evil and definitively lay out what I consider to be a sustainable distinction between evil and wrongdoing.
Chapter One
The purpose of this thesis is to construct a convincing distinction between evil and wrongdoing. Yet, before this distinction can be formulated it is important first of all to demonstrate an awareness of the context of this investigation through a consideration of the way in which the term ‘evil’ has been philosophically represented up to this point. An understanding of the most influential origins of evil will provide a sound basis from which an effective and compelling argument in favour of a wrongdoing-evil distinction can be developed; more effective than if principle, pre-existent, widely-regarded conceptions of evil were not acknowledged.
Given these grounds, a position I consider pertinent for examination is a long-standing, predominant account of evil: Immanuel Kant’s construal of ‘radical evil’. Kant’s argument takes the line that every diversion from adherence to the moral law (in other words, all wrongdoing) is rooted in the human propensity for radical evil (this claim will be outlined in full through the course of this chapter).
This view is not only of salience to this discussion because it remains an account of evil which has dominated western philosophical thought. From an explanation of Kantian radical evil it will become clear that approaches to evil have somewhat shifted from an explanation of the source of immorality (Kant’s project) to a differentiation of acts deemed in some way alternatively wrong (contemporary philosophical accounts of evil). Yet, I do not intend to simply show how the use of the word evil has changed over time. Putting names aside, the conceptual feature of Kant’s account which is significant to my project is his attribution of all immoral acts to the same initial motives and subsequent collection of all wrongdoing into the 6
same category and calling this ‘evil’. Kant thereby inextricably binds wrongdoing and evil as one in the same concept, denying any conceptual distinction between the two. Rather than all wrongdoing taking the same basic structure I want to explore the idea that wrongdoing is a heterogeneous group of which ‘evil’ is one element. It therefore seems that if a convincing thesis defence of a distinction between evil and wrongdoing is to be constructed then an initial consideration of Kant’s radical evil is, in more than one sense, requisite.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter will be to demonstrate that a central conjecture of Kant’s radical evil, the notion that all wrongdoing has the same basic structure, is unsatisfactory. I will begin with a brief explanation of Kant’s overall conception of morality and relate this to radical evil. This will be followed by an examination of the location of radical evil in a fundamental disposition and subsequent elucidation of two central features of radical evil: its inescapability and inexplicability. Yet, the elucidation of these features reveals a central dichotomy in the location of radical evil in a disposition. The disposition is a result of both our propensity for evil and our free choice to evil. Thus, radical evil is inescapable because our propensity for radical evil means we cannot avoid it, yet, it is simultaneously inexplicable because its nature as a free choice requires no further justification. This throws Kant’s construal of radical evil as the basic structure for all wrongdoing into doubt.
Furthermore, I will illustrate that even if just one of these aspects (unavoidable propensity or free choice) were taken as the principal feature Kant would still be unable to accommodate all acts which we consider to be wrongdoing. Following an elucidation of Susan Neiman’s argument that the inescapability and inexplicability of radical evil (and by extension its location in a disposition) is 7
essential to the normative pull of Kant’s rationally derived moral law I will argue that Kant cannot relocate radical evil outside a fundamental disposition without reassessing his entire moral project.
Hence, having considered not only a principal, long-standing account of evil, but one which denies any distinction between evil and wrongdoing, and found it lacking, the next chapter will investigate the possibility of a differentiation of
structures of the group of acts which we deem immoral.
Kant’s made-to-measure moral project for humanity.
Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals communicates his moral project. According to Kant, humans are endowed with a rational capacity and it is through this power of reason that we are successful at moral action.3 Of our faculty for reason Kant maintains: “its destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary.”4 Thus, the will is derived purely through reason (something which we have a capacity for just from the fact that we are human) and "it is in [the will] alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found”5 so acting from the will is the only route to moral goodness.
3 For a justification of the inescapability of the moral law for essentially rational beings see: Johnson,
R. (2008) ‘Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in E. N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Section 3.
4
Kant, I. (2008) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by T. K. Abbott, Radford: Wilder Publications, p. 15.
5
Ibid:19.
8
Action from the will is action done purely for the sake of the principle or law (derived through reason) which dictates the will, thus, given that we must act from the good will if we are to act morally, this necessity constitutes a duty to act out of respect for the moral law.6 Action from duty necessarily disregards our personal desires or the actual effects of our actions because such contingencies cannot be relied upon to always procure morally praiseworthy results, whereas Kant’s rationally derived moral law can.7 The rational method used to construct the set of laws which constitute the moral law (which dictate the will from which we have a duty to act if we are to act morally) is Kant’s Categorical Imperative test: if we could not conceive or will a certain maxim to be universal then it is not a categorical moral imperative and not a constituent of the moral law.8
Importantly, Kant argues that acting from the good will is not only the one, exclusive route to morality, but the one, exclusive route to freedom. Yet this freedom is more than just the ability to choose one’s course of action, Peter Dews sums this up succinctly: “Freedom must be construed as autonomy, as the capacity to think and act in accordance with principles whose validity we establish ourselves through insight. And freedom in this sense is the rational core of human subjectivity as
6 Ibid: 18. 7
Card, C. (2002) The Atrocity Paradigm, New York: OUP, p. 73. Kant’s emphasis on what lies within human control (namely our rationality and the rationally-derived principles which guide our action, as opposed to the outcomes of our action) reveals the significant stoic character of his moral project.
8
Ibid: 74-75.
9
such.”9 Hence, if moral action constitutes acting rationally (in accordance with our fundamental human capacity) and freely, what can be said of immoral action?
This question brings to light two further questions. Dews asserts if Kant were to acknowledge immorality in human action then humans would be revealed to be: “incapable of achieving the noblest goals prescribed to them by their own rational nature”.10 So, first of all, given the essentiality of the human capacity for rationality in the moral project, is there any probable chance (in Kant’s construction of morality) that humans could avert from this natural capacity and engage in wrongdoing (action against the rationally-derived moral law)? Second, if it is through moral action that we realize our freedom through rationality, in what way could a human freely choose to act against this rationality (immorally) and thereby be held accountable for their immoral action?11 Dews encapsulates this two-part problem deftly: “[A]n approach to moral theory which established such a strong equation between freedom and moral autonomy was bound to have difficulties in accounting for the imputable, and so presumably free, choice of immoral courses of action.”12
The failure of humanity: the problem of evil and Kant’s solution.
In response to the first question, the patent presence of wrongdoing throughout the history of humankind is not something Kant tries to ignore. Kant admits that historical evidence proves the existence of wrongdoing; regarding the 9
Dews, P. (2013) The Idea of Evil, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, p. 18.
10 Ibid: 21. 11
Grimm, S. R. (2002) ‘Kant’s Argument for Radical Evil’, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 161-2.
12
Dews, 2013: 8.
10
moral goodness of the world he notes: “the history of all times attests far too powerfully against it” (6:20).13 Far from congruity, there exist persistent frictions between what we ought to do (according to Kant’s moral imperatives) and what history and society actually tell us of human behaviour.14 We are in fact torn between faith in the moral law, which brings with it the idea that we are bringing about good, and the overwhelming evidence to the contrary (that wrongdoing persists in spite of any respect for duty) which leaves the aforementioned idea no more than a delusion.15 Given the long-standing prevalence of immorality in our world, if Kant is to sustain his account of morality it seems he is forced to account for how such fundamentally rational beings could not act in accordance with a purely rational set of self-derived imperatives which realize collective human freedom.
In response to the second question, if Kant is to ensure that humans are responsible for their immoral acts then wrongdoing (divergence from an adherence to the moral law) must be contained in more than irrationality. To say that our uncontrollable natural inclinations or features of the empirical world in some way determine our moral imperfections would not only undermine Kant’s argument that rationality is our most fundamental human feature, it would also leave humans unaccountable for their immoral actions (as such actions were not freely chosen as moral actions are).
Kant’s response to this problem is his account of radical evil. Kant himself notes the importance of choice in outlining immorality in order ensure the culpability 13 Kant, I. (1998) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings, Translated and
edited by A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge: CUP, p. 45.
14 Dews, 2013: 28. 15
Ibid: 195-6.
11
of immoral agents: “the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power of choice itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim.” (6:21).16 Thus, given that only action which has as its sole incentive respect for and adherence to the moral law can be good, and all action which fails to do this can never be morally good (despite the consequences), the rule from which Kant considers all morally repugnant action to stem is the subjugation of the moral law in favour of self-interest.17 Rather than taking the moral law as the supreme principle from which all subsequent decisions are made, when an agent adopts her own self-interest as the foundation for her choices her subsequent actions are evil, and radically so, because all are plagued by a shared origin of self-interest.
Kant does not mean to say that moral actions cannot be in congruence with the personal desires of an agent, only that an action cannot be moral if it is done ultimately for the sake of desires, rather than the moral law. Allen Wood sums this up effectively: “The maxim of the good man differs from that of the evil man only in that the former conditions the incentives of inclination by those of duty, whereas the latter reverses the moral order of incentives and makes it a rule to do his duty only on the condition that it be consistent with the pursuit of inclination.”18 Putting self-interest before the moral law is hence a purely intelligible action which precedes subsequent action in the empirical realm; radical evil therefore consists in the nature of the will.19
16 Kant, 1998: 46-47. 17
Card, 2002: 76.
18 Wood, A. W. (1970) Kant’s Moral Religion, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 211. 19
Card, 2002: 76.
12
It is in this way that Kant attributes the same basic structure to all moral wrongdoing: whatever its consequences, an act is morally wrong if the original principal from which it was decided upon is self-interest, rather than the moral law. Furthermore, radical evil is not just a possible fundamental moral grounding, Kant purports that humans are in fact inclined to adopt self-interest over the moral law as the supreme principal, he calls this a “propensity for evil” (6:29) in humans.20
In locating all wrongdoing in a perversion of the will and subjugation of the moral law for personal self-interest as the disposition from which all moral decisions are made Kant also answers the qualm of culpability. An agent remain responsible for her immoral acts because it is her fault that her interests have taken priority over rational, moral considerations.21 The reversal of moral law and self-interest, to give primacy to the latter, is a choice she makes; of personal inclinations Card notes that agents are not determined by them, rather: “We choose to let them determine what we do, just as in acting from duty, we choose to let the moral law be the determiner.”22
So, Kant’s solution to the problem of how essentially rational agents can be accountable for actions done as a result of a diversion from rationality is to say that agents are not controlled by desire but exercise the free power of choice in determining their action in accordance with desire.23 It is in this sense that evil is
20 Kant, 1998: 52-3. 21 Dews, 2013: 21 22 Card, 2002: 77. 23 Dews, 2013: 23. 13
based not in our natural inclinations as such but in our natural state as rational beings with freedom to power of choice.24
Dews argues, in response to Kant’s defence of culpability, that radical evil demonstrates the inner paradox of Kantian freedom: if the freedom of the will is self-derived autonomy rather than the simple possession of freedom of choice, then this autonomy can counteract the freedom of choice with an autonomous decision to be
unfree: to be a slave to self-interest rather than rationality (the latter going hand in
hand with freedom of choice and the former not doing so).25 It seems that in accounting for the empirical patency of wrongdoing Kant must divide rational freedom into the autonomous decision to be free (action done out of respect for the moral law), and the autonomous decision to be unfree (immoral action). It is the recognition of the moral law and yet subsequent free choice to ignore it and not realize our rationally-derived freedom that constitutes the choice to be radically evil.26 This is how Kant answers both of the aforementioned questions.
The fundamental disposition: radical evil’s inescapability and inexplicability.
I will now proceed to scrutinize Kant’s proposed inclination of humans to prefer self-interest (the propensity for radical evil) as the basic structure of all wrongdoing.
Kant maintains his claim that humans are all essentially rational through his justification that we are responsible for all decisions (be they moral or immoral). With a sense of responsibility comes the notion of choice and it is thus the act of
24
Ibid: 26.
25 Ibid: 22. 26
Cole, P. 2006, The Myth of Evil, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 60-61.
14
choosing different courses of action which renders agents accountable for their moral
(or immoral) value. Yet, in being essentially rational, it would not make sense for agents’ choices to be arbitrary, thus it seems there must be a reason behind human decisions, but in order to avoid an infinite regression of reasons justifying actions there must be some fundamental basis from which all these decisions are made.27 Humans can only ever have one fundamental disposition because if it were possible to act according to two different dispositions then neither would be the basis for the choice of all actions, leaving neither fundamental. (6:36).28 One disposition must be supreme if the regression of justificatory reasons for actions is to be avoided.
Whether the moral law or sensuous impulse is subordinated to the other as the fundamental disposition determines whether the agent has a propensity for good or evil: “the human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims.” (6:36).29
Importantly, not only can an agent ever have only one, unchanging fundamental disposition for their entire life, but there are only two options of disposition available: either an agent is good (they have adopted the moral law as the fundamental principal of their original disposition for eternity) or they are evil (they have adopted self-interest as this fundamental principle). Why? Well, given that: “the moral law of compliance with duty in general is a single one and universal”
27 For a comprehensive explanation of this fundamental basis see: Allison, H., (1990) Kant’s Theory
of Freedom, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 136-161. Allison refers to the basic disposition via the German
term Gesinnung and summarizes it as: “the enduring character or disposition of an agent, which underlies and is reflected in particular choices.” (Allison, 1990: 136).
28 Kant, 1998: 59. 29
Ibid: 59.
15
(6:25)30 it follows that to act on an alternative maxim than one determined by the moral law (even on just one occasion) indicates a breach of the aforementioned moral law. Subsequently, such an agent cannot hold the moral law universally supreme, and since the fundamental disposition must be unchanging such an agent
cannot ever be said to hold the moral law as their fundamental disposition. When the
moral law is not the fundamental disposition this indicates that an agent has ultimately subjugated the moral law in favour of self-interest.
Kant strictly emphasises that the responsibility for this subjugation lies solely with the agent: it is our free choice of maxims which dictates our fundamental disposition. It is therefore simply by the fact that a human is not universally good and does not hold the moral law as their supreme maxim (constituting the basic disposition for all action) that an agent is radically evil and culpable for this because: “[H]is disposition as regards the moral law is never indifferent (never neither good nor bad).” (6:24).31
Hence, given that humans have an inclination or a propensity to opt for self-interest as their supreme principal it follows that this disposition for evil is singular, unchanging and eternal for all humans. (6:25).32 Hence, the propensity for radical
evil “cannot be eradicated (for the supreme maxim for that would have to be the maxim of the good, whereas in this propensity the maxim has been assumed to be evil).” (6:31).33 Radical evil is in this sense inescapable.
30 Ibid: 49 (my emphasis). 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid: 50. 33 Ibid: 55. 16
The inexplicability of radical evil is also derived from its location in a fundamental disposition. Kant defines the “propensity for genuine evil” thus: “the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law” (6:29).34 In the sense that it is the ‘subjective ground of possibility’, a propensity is (in part) an original disposition which is universal in its role as the foundation from which all further decisions are made. In addition, propensities are distinguished from predispositions on the grounds that they constitute a ‘subjective ground of possibility’ which is attained or brought about by us, upon ourselves, through the free power of choice. (6:29).35 (This is necessary if agents are to remain culpable for their immoral actions.)
However, as well as attributing responsibility to the decisions which follow the original disposition, the free power of choice (as the genesis for the propensity to evil) just is a capacity which requires no further justification or explanation, according to Kant. Richard Bernstein notes: “To claim that a free choice is inscrutable is not to say that it is mysterious…it is only to insist that the choice is
free.”36 It follows that the free choice to subordinate the moral law for self-interest as our fundamental disposition is as inexplicable as the natural human faculties which we are born with: “we are just as incapable of assigning a further cause for why evil has corrupted the highest maxim in us…as we are for a fundamental property that belongs to our nature.” (6:32).37 It seems therefore that radical evil is explicable only
34
Ibid: 53.
35 Ibid. 36
Bernstein, R. J. (2002) Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation, Massachusetts: Polity Press, p. 25.
37
Kant, 1998: 55.
17
to the point at which we understand it as the corruption of the good will through the adoption of self-interest over the moral law as the supreme maxim; the decision behind this corruption cannot be explained because it is made solely through the free power of choice. In sum, while we can understand how radical evil has come about in humans (the choice to subjugate the moral law for self-interest as the subjective ground for our decisions and actions) this explanation cannot account for why this inclination to choose self-interest as our singular, unchanging, basic disposition exists for all humans.
It is therefore impossible for the choice to adopt self-interest over the moral law as the supreme principle to ever be intelligible because this would constitute an appeal to some higher, more fundamental principle through which the decision could be explained. If an appeal to an explanatory principle were needed then the choice of supreme principle simply would not constitute the basic disposition from which all subsequent decisions are made. Thus, it is by the very nature of radical evil’s location (in a disposition) that we simultaneously cannot explain it or escape it. It also appears that situating radical evil in a fundamental disposition is an essential aspect of Kant’s moral project on account of that fact that the rationally derived moral imperative ‘one must comply with duty’ is universal. It follows that an agent is either universally compliant with all of the moral laws (in which case she has adopted the moral law as her supreme principal) or she is not, in which case she has adopted self-interest as her eternal supreme principal by default of her failure to choose the moral law. The agent’s decision to become radically evil is thus made at the fundamental level.
The fundamental disposition: a central dichotomy.
The illumination of the features of radical evil (its inescapability and inexplicability) which follow its location in a fundamental disposition (as the ultimate basis for all decisions and actions) in fact reveals a problematic dichotomy at the heart of Kant’s construal of radical evil.
Radical evil is inescapable on account of our propensity to adopt self-interest as the basis for all decisions and actions and inexplicable on account of the free
power of choice which we utilise in adopting self-interest as the basis for all
decisions and actions. Thus, Kant appears to advocate that radical evil is inexplicable because it is a free choice which is simultaneously inescapable because we cannot
avoid choosing it. Yet, to what extent can a propensity or inclination to act in a
certain way be autonomously adopted and still be an authentic propensity or inclination?38 In other words, in what sense can the choice of fundamental disposition ever be truly free if we are inclined to choose it? Can we, in a sense,
choose to be unfree as Peter Dews purports?39 It seems inherently paradoxical to purport either of the following:
1. That we could not have done otherwise (on account of our humanity) in making a
free choice (which is possible only through the fact that we are autonomous
humans).
2. That we are responsible for a choice which we were naturally inclined to make.40
Either inescapable or inexplicable: a solution?
38 Bernstein, 2002: 30. 39 Dews, 2013: 22. 40 Bernstein, 2002: 31. 19
If it is problematic to view the adoption of a self-interested fundamental disposition as freely chosen because this undermines any natural propensity for this adoption (and vice versa) would it be possible for Kant to advocate just one of these aspects of radical evil as its principal feature and leave the other as secondary? For instance, if the inescapability of radical evil were emphasised, demonstrating our natural propensity for radical evil as its principal feature, what would be the consequences for Kant’s construal of radical evil as the basic structure for all
wrongdoing?
With regards to the human propensity for radical evil Dews maintains: “we find ourselves engaged, from the first, in an uphill struggle to do the right thing, against a deeply ingrained tendency to prioritize our particular interests over what we know to be morally required.”41 If this elucidation is to be taken as authentic to Kant’s original arguments then Dews communicates the human propensity to radical evil as follows: humans are unable to put the moral law in the supreme position because a condition of the moral law is that it be in that position universally and this is impossible given the human inclination to fulfil personal desires.
I am convinced that Dews is to be believed for two reasons. First, Kant specifically refers to the “frailty of human nature” (6:37)42 in deriving incentives to act from the moral law (as opposed to personal incentives) as the cause for our inability to universally adhere to the moral law and ultimate propensity to radical evil. Second, given Kant’s assertion that the basic disposition is either good or evil
41 Dews, 2013: 20. 42
Kant, 1998: 60.
20
and nothing else besides,43 it follows that the only possible fundamental dispositions are the moral law or self-interest (for Kant) and given that we cannot be universally
good we revert to acting from our default fundamental disposition: self-interest. The
propensity to radical evil therefore seems to exist by default: by default of the fact that we do not have a propensity to moral action.
Yet, I am not convinced that all immorality can be said to result from a frailty to conform to universal laws when this frailty is a consequence of an overwhelming compulsion to fulfil personal inclinations. Certain instances of wrongdoing demonstrate anything but frailty in the wrongdoer’s motives: they indicate Dews’ “uphill struggle” but not to avoid the tempting relapse towards personal desires and do the right thing, rather, to do the wrong thing. A patent example of this is the contribution of SAS officers to the Final Solution in 1940s Nazi Germany. It took Heinrich Himmler a great deal of effort to reverse the personal interests and sympathies of his officers to project pity onto themselves as perpetrators, rather than the victims, in order to make them more efficient in their grossly immoral duties.44
In addition, in his History and Freedom lectures Theodor Adorno asserts that Auschwitz should not be thought of as a blip in the generally progressive movement of human history towards a moral ideal because to see it as an exception to the rule would be “somehow absurd in the light of the scale of the disaster”.45 This particular instance of wrongdoing constitutes something alternative to an action from
self-43
Ibid: 49.
44 Arendt, H (1994a) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, USA: Penguin Books,
p. 106.
45 Adorno, T. W. (2006) History and Freedom (Lectures 1964-1965), Edited by R. Tiedemann,
Translated by R. Livingstone, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 8.
21
interest by default of the human failure to do right and abide universally by the moral law. The Final Solution was not a straightforward violation of the moral law and reversion to action from self-interest, to say so would be an insipid interpretation of the complexity of its atrocity. It principally involved an attempt at an entire reversal of the moral law to bring it in congruence with the totalitarian principles of the Nazi party. Eventually the forbidden fruit was reverted from immoral acts to moral acts: Germans became habituated to standing firm against the temptation to help the victims of Nazi persecution.46
Dews touches on this aspect of the Final Solution in asserting that certain immoral acts transgress our common conception of the straightforward adherence to moral imperatives as constituting right, and the failure to do so constituting wrong.47 In relation to the Holocaust Dews notes: “The invocation of such events reawakens our half-buried sense that moral violation cannot be reduced to the infraction of a rule.”48 Thus, just as the Final Solution is not simply a product of the default fundamental disposition of self-interest for humans it is also not simply an infringement of the universality of our duty to the moral law.
Thus, I believe Kant oversimplifies the category of ‘wrongdoing’ in attributing its underlying structure to the human propensity for radical evil. Kant mistakes the nature of certain immoral acts by attributing their cause to the inconsistency of adherence to the moral law and retreat to self-interest and subsequently purporting that all immoral acts are motivated in this way. This leaves
46 Arendt, 1994a: 150. 47 Dews, 2013: 12. 48 Ibid: 12. 22
the categorization of all wrongdoing as based in our propensity for inescapable radical evil unconvincing.
Alternatively, would radical evil be better equipped to accommodate all
wrongdoing if the free choice of fundamental disposition were taken as the principal
feature of radical evil, thereby emphasising the inexplicability of radical evil? Well, in purporting that the subjugation of the moral law in favour of self-interest (radical evil) is a free choice for which we are completely responsible Kant makes the assumption that the ‘right thing to do’ is always fully known to us and that we are fully capable of performing it. It seems therefore that we consciously and freely (and by extension inexplicably) ignore the right course of action in choosing to be radically evil. Kant’s rigorism in constructing the moral law therefore removes the possibility of sympathy for someone in a state of wrongdoing: on Kant’s view we could always have done the right thing regardless of the contingent circumstances.49
Yet, Adorno argues for the implausibility of Kant’s claim that what we ought to do is necessarily known to us unmistakably and it is in our capacity to perform it regardless of circumstances. Adorno explains that contemporary societies constructs social pressures which actively hinder our ability to see the right course of action, and act according to it.50 For instance, the social pressures of the totalitarian Nazi regime put the opportunity to act morally not only out of reach for most citizens, but also out of mind. As I mentioned previously, the state’s reversal of the moral law distorted the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to the extent to which genocide (in certain circumstances, namely the death camps) was not only legalised, but 49
Ibid: 202.
50 Adorno, T. W. (1973) Negative Dialectics, Translated by E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, p. 243.
23
encouraged on moral grounds. To say that this is a case where “society allows no viable course of action that would be moral”51 in fact comes somewhere close to accommodating the extent of the moral abhorrence which profoundly corrupted this society. The conception of radical evil as a ‘free choice’ is thus defunct for certain instances of wrongdoing: in particular sets of circumstances there may appear no
alternative but to act contrary to the moral law rendering the choice to be radically
evil entirely an entirely unfree choice.
Hence, even if radical evil was seen as principally derived from a propensity (and was therefore inescapable) or from our capacity for free choice (and was therefore inexplicable), despite either conception’s diversion of Kant from a centrally paradoxical conception of radical evil, neither interpretation can account for all wrongdoing. Where does this leave Kant’s conjecture that radical evil constitutes the basic structure for all wrongdoing?
Must the problematic location of radical evil in a fundamental disposition be maintained?
If the location of radical evil in a fundamental disposition (and its subsequent inescapability and inexplicability) is so problematic would it be possible for Kant to do away with this construal in order to reformulate a basic structure for all
wrongdoing? For instance, Paul Guyer argues that the inevitability and
inescapability, rather than just possibility, of radical evil hinders Kant’s overall
51
Dews, 2013: 202.
24
moral project and indicates that he has gone “too far”.52 Yet, this conception is not shared by Susan Neiman. Neiman puts forward an interesting case for the necessity of inescapable and inexplicable radical evil to the entirety of Kant’s moral project.
Neiman highlights that what propels Kant’s instruction for us to act according to principle is the idea that contingent reality ought to in some way justify these actions; for instance, we would not wish for a world in which morally praiseworthy actions were met with physical punishment or where morally abhorrent actions were rewarded.53 This being said, a world which is irrefutably filled with evidence of immorality is proof of a world in which contingent reality and purely rational moral principles are just not systematically related, and it is this evidence which forces Kant to give an account of these circumstances, his account being our propensity for radical evil.54
Now, while this gap between rationally procured moral imperatives and their effects in the natural world may initially appear to have negative effects on our moral behaviour, leaving morally responsible agents disheartened, it is in fact necessary to Kant’s overall moral project.55 Neiman points out: “Where the connections between good behaviour and its reward are obvious, only saints can act without
52
Guyer, P. (1998) ‘Immanuel Kant’ in Craig, E. (ed.) The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online] London: Routledge, Section 11, Available at: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047 [Last accessed: 14th April 2013].
53 Neiman, S. (2002) Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 65-66.
54 Ibid: 60. 55
Ibid: 67.
25
instumentalizing.”56 In other words, if rational agents were to know that their action in accordance with the moral law would result in good consequences, the result would be that no agent would ever act solely out of respect for the moral law, in other words, purely morally. This forms the crux of Kant’s deontological project: given that finite humans simply do not grasp the explanatory gap between reason (how the world ought to be) and nature (how the world is) we can only act morally if we act out of respect for the moral law and ignore the consequences of actions.57
It follows that radical evil, as an account of the indubitable presence of immorality in the world which is indicative of the finitude of humans and their inability to systematically relate their principles with the course of nature, must remain inexplicable: this explanatory gap must never be closed otherwise no action
would be purely moral action. However, it is the very persistent presence of evil in
the empirical realm which indicates that consequences cannot be relied upon as a guide to morality, thus, it is (somewhat paradoxically) the very presence of radical evil which cements our trust in what is truly good, this being action according to the good will which is itself constituted by rationally derived moral imperatives. Hence, if we (as morally responsible agents) have a genuine aim towards a more moral world (on Kant’s conception of what this consists of) then we cannot advocate the comprehensibility or absence of radical evil: radical evil must remain incomprehensible and inescapable.
If the inherently paradoxical notion of inescapable and inexplicable radical evil is a central aspect of the normative pull of Kant’s moral project it seems Kant
56 Ibid. 57
Ibid: 71.
26
cannot simply or quickly replace the basis of radical evil from its location in a fundamental disposition without immediately deprecating his moral law, and then significantly revising its central deontological premise.
In sum, it seems implausible that all wrongdoing can be grouped in the way Kant suggests: as a reversion to action from our default fundamental disposition of self-interest which results from our inability to hold the moral law as our incentive for all decisions and actions. It also appears that Kant cannot resolve this problematic location without potentially undermining the normative strength of his rationally derived moral law. If Kant’s contention that all wrongdoing has the same shared basis is deeply uncertain then I propose that some differentiation between different actions under the overarching term ‘immorality’ is warranted. I will thus proceed in the subsequent chapters to determine the nature of a specific group of immoral acts which are, in contemporary philosophy, deemed ‘evil’.
Chapter Two
Quantitative or Qualitative?
The conclusion that Kant’s attribution of one single structure to all wrongdoing (thereby grouping ordinary wrongdoing along with that which is deemed evil) is unconvincing makes way for an analysis of how a distinction between evil and wrongdoing might be characterised. This chapter will address an overarching dichotomy: whether evil is quantitatively or qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. Advocates of a quantitative difference (such as Claudia Card) purport that the distinction is made according to the amount of suffering which a culpable act brings about (evil acts being those which cause an intolerable level of harm). As Geoffrey Scarre notes: “Card...is drawing attention to the element of gratuitous injury or insult frequently found in those acts we call “evil”.58 Insofar as the level of suffering is located in the experience of the victim Card identifies evil through the victim’s perspective.
The conviction of advocates of a qualitative difference (such as Eve Garrard and Daniel Haybron) is summed up succinctly by Luke Russell: “evil actions differ from ordinary wrongs in virtue of possessing some particular property or properties not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs.”59 The central conjecture here is that evil is a different concept altogether and not simply more wrongdoing. This
58 See: Scarre, G. (2010) ‘Evil’ in. Skorupski, J. (ed.) Routledge Companion to Ethics, Oxon:
Routledge, p. 587.
59 Russell, L. (2007) ‘Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?’ Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 4, p. 661.
28
‘particular property’ of evil is oftentimes located in the nature of the perpetrator and their motivations thereby identifying evil through the perspective of the evildoer. I intend to make two claims regarding these dichotomic positions.
First, with specific reference to Claudia Card the quantitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing will be deemed unsustainable on the grounds that Card treats the concept of culpability with insensitivity, despite its necessity to her argument. I will conclude that evil cannot just be a greater degree of wrongdoing. Second, the possibility that evil possesses a specific quality which ordinary wrongdoing does not possess (constituting a qualitative distinction) will be examined. An initial contention that evil’s specific quality is contained in the character of the perpetrator (as Haybron and Garrard assert, the former deliberately and the latter more inadvertently) will be rebutted on the grounds that such an account necessarily identifies evil by the fact that it is unknown and that this is untenable for a distinction between evil and wrongdoing (for reasons which will be outlined later).
Following these conclusions the final two chapters of this thesis will be concerned with a more explanatory account of evil’s specific quality constituting a move away from an identification of evil in the experience of the victim or the action
of the perpetrator in favour of the perspective of an observer of evil.
The Atrocity Paradigm: a quantitative distinction.
In presenting a theory of evil, Claudia Card makes a case for the following: “[E]vils are foreseeable intolerable harms caused by culpable wrongdoing.”60 For an act to be evil it must cause an intolerable level of suffering for its victims and 60
Card, 2002: 3.
29
someone must be to blame for it.61 Evil acts are also always taken seriously, for Card, unlike mere wrongdoing which can on occasions be seen as trivial.62 The necessary and sufficient qualifications of severity, intolerable harm and culpable wrongdoing, in combination with the theoretical aim of an account of: “the ethically most significant, most serious publicly known evils of my lifetime”63 explains Card’s logical adoption of atrocities as paradigmatic instances of evil. Atrocities are patently and unquestionably evil and fulfill all of Card’s conditions: they are treated with the level of caution and responsibility appropriate to extremely severe acts,64 and they constitute culpable wrongdoing and intolerable harm: “There is no such thing as an atrocity which just happens or an atrocity which hurts no one.”65
The Atrocity Paradigm provides initially convincing substantiations for all
three necessary and sufficient conditions. Card’s elucidation of atrocities performatively justifies the ‘severity’ qualification of evil and simultaneously forges the link between atrocities and evil: the detailed analyses of twentieth century
61 The idea that evil acts are those which constitute extreme harm to victims is similarly advocated by
John Kekes. Kekes purports that if the suffering caused by an act is “grievous, deliberate, and gratuitous” then that act is morally inexcusable, unjustifiable and hence evil. In arguing that acts are evil purely on account of the level of harm caused Kekes argues for a quantitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. I will not examine his argument here, but for more on this formulation of a quantitative distinction see: Kekes, J. (2011) ‘Evil’ in Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [online] London: Routledge. Available at: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L022
[Last Accessed: 5th May 2013].
62 Card, 2002: 7. 63 Ibid: 5 64 Ibid: 9. 65 Ibid. 30
atrocities reveal the extent of their horror and subsequent deserved significance in being explained by Card’s theory of evil.66
In justifying the ‘intolerable harm’ and ‘culpable wrongdoing’ qualifications Card refers to the utilitarian conception that evil is constituted only by suffering (as wrongdoing is, for utilitarians) and highlights the problematic consequence that some evils are justified as long as an overall maximization of good is achieved.67 If evil is just a failure to maximize utility it follows that only the overall balance of harm and good counts: the nature of their distribution is irrelevant.68 Yet, it seems morally unjust to allow some small few to experience intolerable harm for the overall benefit of the majority. Thus, Card’s introduction of the ‘culpable wrongdoing’ clause attributes blame to perpetrators of evil, successfully distinguishing victims from evildoers, where before this distinction was lost in the name of the overall positive balance of utility. Card’s emphasis on the perspective of sufferers of evil is also affirmed in the process: only a concept which combines culpable wrongdoing with intolerable harm can really do sufficient justice to victims of atrocity.
This being said, despite the necessary inclusion of the ‘culpable wrongdoing’ clause Card ultimately bases the distinction of evil from wrongdoing in the level of suffering experienced by the victim. According to Card: “Harm is what is most salient about atrocities...”69 as this is how atrocities are identified as atrocities
66 See: Ibid: Chapters 6, 7 & 10. 67 Ibid: 51. 68 Ibid: 57. 69 Ibid. 31
because it is the “nature and severity of the harms” 70 which single out an act of evil from an act of mere culpable wrongdoing (as opposed to the mindset or motive of the person behind the evil act). 71 Card therefore maintains that culpable wrongdoing (which can induce minor harm) and evil (which necessarily involves intolerable harm) share the same scale. Both moral concepts constitute culpable wrongdoing which results in varying levels of harm: for Card, wrongdoing and evil are simply different intensities of the same concept.
Is ‘intolerable harm’ necessary or sufficient for evil?
In light of the following two examples, however, Card’s ‘intolerable harm’ condition for evil appears neither necessary nor sufficient, leaving her quantitative distinction somewhat implausible. First, Eve Garrard outlines an instance of culpable wrongdoing with a low level of harm (far from intolerable) which she nonetheless considers evil. The family of a “young dissident” in Iraq was billed for the bullet used to execute him and in response Garrard contends: “Clearly the main disvalue produced in this case is the killing of the young man. But it is the charging for the bullet that is more likely to strike us as evil.”72 The level of harm was not conducive to the evilness of this unquestionably evil act, leaving the necessity of an ‘intolerable harm’ qualification for evil doubtful.
Second, Adam Morton compares the case of Harry Truman (American President during the Second World War) who made the decision to attack two 70
Ibid: 4.
71 The severity of the act also identifies it as an atrocity. Card implies that the severity results from the
intolerable level of suffering which is definitive of atrocities, rendering the severity and level of harm inextricable.
72
Garrard, E. (1998) ‘The Nature of Evil’, Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 45.
32
Japanese cities with atomic bombs, resulting in the thousands of civilian deaths, with that of Slobodan Milosevic.73 Milosevic planned and partially executed the racia; persecution and forced withdrawal of non-Serbians from territories which he believed to be Serbian; while this resulted in death and large-scale homelessness a significantly smaller number of people were affected (and less death occurred) in comparison to Truman’s actions.74
Whether Truman’s actions were evil or not remains questionable (Morton argues Truman was not guilty of an evil act but this is not conclusive);75 yet it is
unquestionable that Milosevic’s actions were intuitively more evil, despite resulting
in an overall smaller amount of harm. This particular example contradicts the contention that evil is simply at a higher point of suffering on the same scale as wrongdoing because the culpable wrongdoing which caused comparatively more harm is not that which we deem more evil. A level of intolerable harm (resulting from culpable wrongdoing) does not therefore seem sufficient to warrant the title ‘evil’. Given the insufficiency and lack of necessity of the ‘intolerable harm’ clause the inclined scale of increasing levels of harm which begins at trivial wrongdoing and ends at atrocious evil does not seem as straightforward as Card initially communicates.
This being said, Garrard’s and Morton’s cases are not entirely conclusive. Garrard’s bullet bill counterexample to the necessity of a level of intolerable harm in evil actions can be straightforwardly dismissed when it is conceded that Garrard
73
Morton, A., 2004, On Evil (Thinking in Action), New York: Routledge, p. 16.
74 Ibid: 17. 75
Ibid: 16.
33
treats only physical suffering as a form of harm which can be constitutive of evil.76 To say the most harmful aspect of this action was the murder is only true in terms of physical harm: significant psychological damage undoubtedly resulted from the bullet bill in isolation from the murder.77 There remains an intolerable level of harm in such an act (the trauma of emotional pain) which Garrard simply fails to recognise and the assertion that intolerable harm is an unnecessary qualification for evil is consequently left unsubstantiated.
Morton’s case against the sufficiency of intolerable harm as a qualification of evil can be just as quickly rebutted on these grounds. Once the concept of harm is widened to encompass psychological harm as well as physical harm Morton’s distinction between the level of harm induced by Milosevic and Truman no longer holds. A feature of Milosevic’s acts which is not as apparent in Truman’s is the psychological damage to victims (such as feelings of inferiority and insecurity) resulting from a pro-longed exposure to extreme, racist principles dictating Serbian supremacy.78 Once psychological harm is included the level of harm involved in Milosevic and Truman’s cases looks greater in the former, and this directly correlates with Card’s assertion that the former is more evil on account of the level of suffering caused.
The neglect of culpability.
76 Russell, L. (2007) ‘Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?’ Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 4, p. 672.
77 Ibid. 78
See: Traynor, I. (2006) ‘Obituary: Slobodan Milosevic’, The Guardian [online] 13th March, Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/mar/13/guardianobituaries.warcrimes [Last Accessed: 17th June 2013].
34
Does a broader conception of harm leave a quantitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing, such as Card’s atrocity theory, the most reliable after all? Well, two features of Card’s position lead me to find this unconvincing. First, even if a wider conception of harm were adopted this would not resolve (in fact it might arguably worsen)79 the problematic notion of ‘measuring’ harm which is essential to a quantitative distinction. Through the admission that not all of the factors by which suffering can be measured are potentially quantifiable and the proportion of importance which each should take is unknown Card is forced to concede: “There are no simple correlations among the dimensions along which different evils might be compared.”80
Yet, if The Atrocity Paradigm avoids ranking evils on the grounds that such comparisons cannot be formulated quantitatively, how can a quantitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing further down the scale of the amount of harm caused be justified? The admission that evils cannot be compared leaves the entire basis of Card’s theory of evil (a scale of levels of harm) defunct. However, although this contention is significant it does not rule out the possibility that a method for measuring harm could at some point be developed. Thus, I will elucidate the second objection to Card’s theory in light of a broader conception of harm.
More significantly, even if a wider definition of harm were adopted Card’s quantitative distinction would not be saved from what I deem a problematic relation between her ‘intolerable harm’ and ‘culpable wrongdoing’ clauses. Card explicitly 79 Card would complicate the possibility of measuring harm even further if she allowed more types of
harm to be taken into account in judging harm to be intolerable because these different types maight plausibly require different methods of measurement.
80
Card, 2002: 14.
35
focuses on the harm felt by victims and not the motive of the perpetrator; however, the ‘culpable wrongdoing’ qualification of evil is as essential to a justified concentration on victims as the ‘intolerable harm’ condition.81 Yet, I struggle to see how an agent can be held culpable for an evil act purely on the grounds of the intolerable level of harm which ensues from their act, whatever type of harm this
may be.
Culpability is complex and must be treated with sensitivity in relation to evil acts. Morton characterizes culpability as a sort of ‘stumbling’: a stumble is an instance of blameworthy wrongdoing and the nature of a series of stumbles (stumbling) can determine whether or not an instance of culpable wrongdoing which results in intolerable harm is indeed definitive of evil.82 There exists a differentiation between stumbling which takes a particular pattern (for instance, an agent may ‘stumble’ only in certain contexts of action and not others) and stumbling which is committed across the board of an agent’s action.83 Morton argues that the former indicates motivation, a directed stumbling which could only take this pattern through deliberate intent from the agent, and it is this type of stumbling which is constitutive
81
I made this point earlier in the chapter when discussing the utilitarian conception of evil. In characterizing evil purely in terms of the amount of harm caused and focusing only on the
maximization of utility the utilitarian does not pay due attention to victims of this harm because it is not considered evil for a small number to be severely harmed if it is beneficial to the overall majority. The ‘culpable wrongdoing’ clause removes this oversight of the utilitarians by placing blame with the perpetrators, successfully distinguishing evildoers from victims and preventing the repeated
persecution of a minority to favour a majority.
82 Morton, 2004: 10. 83
Ibid.
36
of evil. The latter (stumbling in all contexts) indicates no deliberate intent to stumble and Morton argues that such cases are unlikely to be indicative of evil acts.84
For Card, on the other hand, as long as blame can be placed for the intolerable harm caused by wrongdoing then it constitutes evil; the direction of blame and justification of this play no direct part in defining the act as evil. On Morton’s more sensitive construal culpability is only sometimes a constitutive part of an evil act: only when the stumbles of culpability take a particular pattern which indicates an intention. Morton’s contention, that whether or not an intolerable amount of harm (be this emotional, physical or psychological) was the fault of a person’s wrongdoing is not enough to differentiate evil, seems plausible.
For instance, agent A is a well-intentioned but hopelessly negligent agent who unquestionably causes an intolerable amount of harm, but given that such negligence prevails in all aspects of his life it does not seem right to label his action ‘evil’(despite causing intolerable harm). Agent A has indeed done wrong and is to blame for the intolerable suffering caused but the fact that no purpose can be attributed to the suffering seems to rule it out as an act of evil. Agent B, conversely, is negligent only in particular areas of his action; for instance he behaves negligently when dealing with females (perhaps due to an underlying misogynist perspective). His culpability in combination with the intolerable level of suffering which it causes would be something closer to, or perhaps constitutive of, an evil act. Morton refers to the difference in the culpability agents such as A and B as “different kinds of condemnation for different kinds of wrong”85.
84 Ibid. 85
Ibid: 18.
37
Such correlative stumbling could be precisely what Morton uses to distinguish between Milosevic’s evil actions and Truman’s only questionably evil actions. All types of harm resulting from Milosevic’s evil war crimes were the result of racially violent acts against non-Serbians. Racist principles invaded Milosevic’s politics in the form of the persecution of non-Serbians (including Albanians, Kosovans, Croats and Bosnians) demonstrating a patent frequency to this culpable wrongdoing. On the other hand, the unquestionably intolerable harm resulting from Truman’s questionably evil act was not the result of a frequency of culpable wrongdoing against the Japanese, or in favour of the devastation which atomic bombs can cause, but a one-off attempt to end a war which had become abominably destructive. No located frequency of immoral stumbling can be found to underlie the harm which Truman undoubtedly caused. Card oversimplifies ‘culpable wrongdoing’ in relation to evil acts and, given that this clause is essential in maintaining a focus on the suffering of the victim, Card thereby deprecates her own aim of doing justice to the experience of victims through a concentration on intolerable harm.
Hence, evil acts do not have a place at the intolerable level on a scale of increasing levels of emotional, psychological or physical harm, partly because harm cannot be reliably measured, but more significantly because even if a way to measure harm were developed, Card’s treatment of culpable wrongdoing is insufficiently complex for a theory which claims to delineate evil. This notion of a shared scale between evil and wrongdoing therefore seems flawed. A straightforward distinction between evil and wrongdoing on quantitative grounds is rendered implausible.
Founding a qualitative distinction: the special quality of evildoers.
The dismissal of the possibility of a quantitative distinction of evil from ordinary wrongdoing leaves open the possibility for this distinction to be made upon
qualitative grounds. Yet, in order to convincingly distinguish evil by its possession
of a specific quality (which wrongdoing does not possess) it is essential that an account of this alternative feature is provided. Thus, I now turn my attention to an examination of the view that the special quality which pertains to evil is contained in the nature of the perpetrators of evil acts (principally their mental make-up such as the emotions, desires, motivations and intentions which constitute their character).86
Daniel Haybron purports that regardless of the actual harm caused by an action, what makes an act evil is the character of the perpetrator from which these acts originate; an agent’s character is determined by the way that agent is disposed to act.87 Haybron expresses dissatisfaction with indirect accounts of evil character which contend that “to have an evil character is to be disposed to do evil on a regular basis”88 because to profess that it is the outcomes of character traits (rather than the traits themselves) which indicate an evil character constitutes a reliance upon consequences to classify the dispositions as evil.89 Haybron endeavours to give an explanatory account of the evilness of the traits themselves, aside from their consequences, in an account of the wrongdoing-evil distinction which appeals purely to the nature of the perpetrator and not to the experience of the victim.
86
See: Scarre, 2010: 588.
87 Haybron, D. M. (1999) ‘Evil Characters’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, p.
131. 88 Ibid: 132. 89 Ibid. 39
Thus, Haybron identifies two qualifications for an evil character. First, the necessary lack of moral conscience: an evil character is one which must be bereft of a disposition to do good and react appropriately to immoral behaviour.90 Second, the necessary possession of at least one of the following three dispositions: antisympathy, malice and malevolence.91 An antisympathetic character is one which is bereft of usual the human sympathies required for social interaction; rather than caring about the welfare of others an antisympathetic character takes pleasure in the pain and suffering of others in an abhorrent inversion of sympathy.92 A malicious character desires misfortune on other persons, but unlike the anytisympathetic quality the production of pain in others is not necessarily pleasurable for a malicious agent, the satisfaction merely comes from the fulfilment of the original desire (misfortune on others) and not necessarily the ensuing consequences of this fulfilment.93 Malevolence as a disposition is the desire for general destruction and badness; according to Haybron the malevolent character is: “full of ill will and bad intentions”.94
Finally, the lack of a moral conscience is deemed necessary by Haybron for a character to be evil because even the presence of antisympathetic, malevolent or malicious dispositions in a character would be insufficient to constitute evil if this character also had a commitment to morality.95 Given that a true obligation to
90 Ibid: 134. 91 Ibid: 137. 92 Ibid: 133. 93 Ibid: 136. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid: 134. 40
morality constitutes a precedence of moral concerns over the personal desires and motivations which come with character traits, Haybron is convinced that a morally conscientious agent (despite their antisympathy, malevolence and malice) could not be evil because “good people often do bad things”.96
The special quality of Haybron’s evildoers: they are unknown.
I believe Haybron’s features deliberately alienate evil characters. This is because the quality of evil which distinguishes it from wrongdoing is that the true nature of evil characters is unknown to us. Before substantiating this point it is essential that I delineate precisely what is meant mean by evil as an ‘unknown’. All I mean to purport is that Haybron, and Garrard (as I will presently demonstrate) construct theories of evil characters such that the true, complete, essential nature of these characters is not comprehended by non-evil beings. Whether this is on account of the fact that evil characters are inherently unintelligible (and evil is thereby
inexplicable) or whether their true nature is simply out of reach of ordinary human
capacities of understanding (rendering evil just unknowable) is superfluous to my argument. As long as Haybron’s and Garrard’s evil characters remain absent from human understanding and hence unknown to ordinary agents my ensuing claims still stand.
Thus, in asserting that Haybron distinguishes evil from wrongdoing on the grounds that the former is unknown to us it is initially important to recognise that Haybron makes use of fictional characters in explicating how his ‘evil dispositions’ are possessed. He refers to the character ‘Claggart’ in Herman Melville’s Billy Bud97
96 Ibid: 135. 97
See: Melville, H. (1924) Billy Budd, New York: Washington Square Press.
41
as being quintessentially antisympathetic, emphasizing that it is his hideous, sadistic character which carries more weight in constituting his evil character than the acts he actually carries out.98 Similarly, when describing malevolence Haybron appeals to Claggart again stating that it is Claggart’s choice to maltreat the “most innocent and virtuous” character which indicates the malevolent disposition within him.99
In justifying a direct account of evil (one which locates evil in character traits themselves and not in the actions which they bring about) Haybron’s principle explanatory source is a character which does not exist in reality. By locating evil in character traits and then justifying this through fictitious characters Haybron pushes an explanation of genuine, real-life evil to the back our minds and alternatively locates evil in fantasy. As a consequence, evil is depicted as an unreal concept and is hence not encompassed by a human understanding of the real world.
This being said, the view that fiction which deals with evil cannot legitimately widen a human understanding of the concept, simply by definition of the fact that its material is unreal, is at absolute odds with the contentions of some principal philosophers of aesthetics. Matthew Kieran, for instance, advocates Cognitive Immoralism: the view that works of fiction (among other forms of art) which demonstrate immoral character in fact have a heightened aesthetic quality on the grounds that they can provide audiences with a significant, profound cognitive understanding and subsequent aesthetic experience.100 Is it plausible, then, that 98
Haybron, 1999: 133.
99 Ibid: 136. 100
For a full exposition of Matthew Kieran’s Cognitive Immoralism see:
Kieran, M. (2006) ‘Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value’, Philosophy Compass. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 129–43.
42
