Parliamentary discourse on national identity : debates over immigration in the Russian State Duma as a milieu for the construction of national identity and otherness

(1)

Parliamentary Discourse on National Identity:

Debates over Immigration in the Russian State Duma as a milieu for

the construction of national identity and otherness

Armen Grigoryan Student ID Number: 961418

Joint European Master in International Migration and Social Cohesion May 2015

Supervisors:

Dr. Andreas Pott, University of Osnabrück, Germany Dr. Sarah L. de Lange, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

(2)

2

Foreword

During these two years I was able to learn many things not only about migration, but also about other countries and cultures. I am really grateful to have such an opportunity to constantly migrate and at the same time to study and attempt to write about migration. It could be a great case with participant observation already done, if I was going to write about that. Maybe it can be a good idea for a paper to work on in future.

I acknowledge the support given by the people who were important for making this work to become a reality.

I would like to acknowledge the ideas and remarks of all my supervisors to my research project. All the feedback I received helped me to develop the final thesis and even if many things can be still elaborated, I think it is a good start.

I would like to thank all my MISOCO friends for constant support they gave and the ideas which were an outcome of brainstorming taking place even in pubs and bars. Especially I would like to thank Marisa Raditsch for proof-reading my thesis and sharing ideas. Her fresh look helped me to rephrase and elaborate the ambiguous parts in this work as sometimes it is difficult to properly express for non-native speaker ideas in English academic language.

My gratitude also goes to Petra, Emilie and Nieves for their help to overcome administrative and technical challenges I faced during this time.

(3)

3

Abstract

This research focuses on the way the national identity construct is created in the Russian parliamentarian debates on immigration. The topic is contextualized in regards to the broader theoretical literature on national identity, which discusses what the national identity is, how different theories try to explain that phenomenon, the Russian identity discourse development. The State Duma, being lower house of the Russian Parliament and the political body where debates take place and constructs are created, is the focus of this work, as the parliamentarians constantly create discourses on Selves (Russians) and Others (foreigners). The analysis of the transcripts on debates on Federal Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation (from 1996 to 2015) showed that Selves are perceived as law-abiding, “civilized” members of the state, whereas migrants are considered as the ones being used to live in basements, sheds and tents, prone to criminality and so on. However, the idea of shared past with migrants coming from the post-Soviet space was uttered several times by parliamentarians to show some general identification traits between Russians and those migrants.

Keywords: Russian national identity, migration, othering, identity construction,

(4)

4

According to the UN Global Statistics on Migration, the Russian Federation hosts approximately 11 million immigrants and occupies second place in the world with the highest number of immigrants residing in its territory, after the United States (UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs Population Division, 2013). The Russian Federation is the main destination country for immigrants of post-Soviet countries, which is facilitated by the visa-free regime between Russia and some of those states1. Having a shared history of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire before that, those countries have developed many cultural commonalities. Therefore it is not surprising that the Russian Federation is the first destination for immigrants from those states looking for jobs – not only because of the visa-free regime, but also because of a shared history and cultural ties, including at least some level of knowledge of the Russian language. As the Russian market requires a labor force to be employed in its business initiatives, it is reasonable to recruit this labor from the countries whose citizens do not require a visa to enter the Russian Federation. Aside from the visa-free regime and the shortage of local workers, Russian employers prefer to employ workers whom they can pay less than locals2_{. Therefore, a majority of these immigrants have been and are}

mainly involved in low-skilled and low-paid jobs in such fields as construction, street cleaning, retail trade, public transportation and so on. Companies usually do not register migrants – not only to avoid taxes, but also because the Russian state has had a quota system for a long period of time which limited the number of labor migrants: in 2013, for instance,

1_{Among post-Soviet states, Russia has a visa-free regime with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova,}

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

2_{Some initiatives were taken in Moscow to change foreign workers (or “Gastarbeiters”, as it is usually}

written in media and used in public speeches) to local or regional workers (www.mk.ru, 2013). Such kind of actions were overtaken in other Russian cities, so far unsuccessful (www.ria.ru, 2013).

(6)

6

the quota level was 1.6 million (rg.ru, 2013), which means that that was the number of potential migrants who could receive a work permit for a certain period of time. In 2014 the patent system3 was introduced, which changed the way of getting work permits in the Russian Federation4; it is an outcome of the hundreds of changes that have been made to the laws regulating migrants’ situation in the Russian Federation since the 1990s. One of the main laws regulating the migrant’s situation in the state is the Federal Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation. To get a patent, the potential migrant worker must pass exams on the Russian language, history of Russia and basics of legislation. Moreover, he or she is required to have medical insurance to be able to get a patent (Federal Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, 2015).

This number of immigrants residing “legally” and “illegally” in the Russian state prompted manifold attitudes in the Russian society towards them. For instance, in 2013, according to the Levada Center5 (www.levada.ru, 2013), the most disturbing problem (55 per cent) for residents of Moscow was the high number of migrants coming from post-Soviet southern republics and Northern Caucasus. Other surveys conducted later by the same center show that on the whole societal scale, 38 per cent of respondents would like to see immigrants from the Caucasus be deported, and 33 per cent is in favor of deporting immigrants coming from Central Asian countries (www.levada.ru, 2014). In general, even from these surveys it

3_{According to this system foreign citizens can receive work permits if they present all the required}

documents. From one side, this system helps to overcome the restriction of number put annually in accordance with the quota system, but from the other side it demands many requirements, such as medical insurance, passage of exams on knowledge of Russian language, history and legislature and so on, that it is difficult to say if it is a liberalization of migration policy or its reinforcement.

4_{Even though a patent system was introduced, the quota system has not been abolished. The quota system}

will still continue to exist; however, for 2015 the quote was established at 275,856 (The Government of the Russian Federation, 2014). In comparison, the 2014 quota was 1,631,586 (The Government of the Russian Federation, 2013)

5_{Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) is a Russian non-governmental research organization which}

(7)

7

is evident that there do exist some dividing lines within the citizens of the Russian state as the same Russian citizens from the Northern Caucasus are grouped with migrants coming from Central Asian countries. According to numerous surveys conducted, societal attitude is negative towards immigrants (especially from certain post-Soviet regions, as seen above). Nevertheless, the negative stance towards immigrants changes according to the political situation in the state. Recent developments in Russian policy towards the Ukraine6_and,

accordingly, the sanctions imposed on the Russian state have changed society's main concerns. However, the immigration “issue” continues to be one of the hot topics and many discourses are constantly being created throughout the Russian society. And in those discourses, the lines separating citizens (or natives)7 and foreigners are also created. The debates construct different identities, which can be divided into two groups: national identity and immigrant identity. Even if both of them are very blurred by their nature, the language and the arguments made by politicians can be constructers of some unifying traits. Discourses are created by different actors and to have a more complex whole picture it would be necessary to see all the points in this net of constructs spreading from Actor A to receptors and so on. But due to numerous limitations, the identification of one of the actors and analyzing the discourses this actor creates can be of an important contribution to the research field.

6_{After the change of government in the Ukraine in 2014 on the basis of protests to join the Eurasian}

Economic Union (EEU) initiated by Russia resulted in the incorporation of Crimea in the Russian Federation and military conflict between the Ukrainian central government and some of its eastern regions. Not only did this trigger sanctions against the Russian Federation from the EU and the USA because of Russia’s support to the Ukraine and inclusion of Crimea within the Russian Federation, but it also resulted in waves of refugees migrating from Ukraine to Russia. According to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, since 2014, more than 440,000 Ukrainians applied for temporary accommodation (www.rbc.ru, 2015).

7_{Here it is crucial to note that the civil and ethnic perceptions can be important in the words of debaters who}

(8)

8

The Research Problem

In our case the Russian parliament as a certain discourse creator is of relevance. Deliberation is an everyday practice which takes place in parliament. The parliamentarian debates use deliberation which leads to decision making, based on the Aristotelian idea that political action is based on the result coming from deliberation (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), therefore argumentation is the way to lead to some kind of final solution. Even if a political party holds a majority of seats in the parliament, the argumentation is going to be used to pass a law8.

The Russian State Duma is the main body of the Parliament where the laws are discussed, debated and adopted or rejected, therefore the legislative action process is taking place in the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia. The upper house or the Federation Council of Russia is the more formal body, focusing mainly on completing the adopted laws coming from the lower house, usually without debates and discussions. The upper house is composed of the federal subjects of the Russian Federation and its members are not directly elected but are chosen by territorial politicians, and each subject has two representatives. Therefore the debates, including the ones focused on immigration, take place in the lower house, the State Duma, and from those debates it is possible to track the development of construction of identities by different actors. As the critical race theory in its beginnings was focused on the revealing of racism in its not so evident manifestations, as in laws (Delgado and Stefancic, 2001) in their different displays, it is clear that laws are one of

8_{Why deliberation continues to be present in the states with low level of democratic governance is another}

issue, but the fact that it takes place is in major cases undeniable (informal and formal institutions can be another explanation, but that is not going to be included in this research).

(9)

9

the important indicators of power, marking lines and therefore creating constructs of, for instance, national identity, and thus possibly spreading them into the society as legitimate legal constructs. In the same vain the parliament is the place where the discussions over a certain law take place, and during these discussions various constructs are created. As Wodak (2002, p. 145) noted, “Narratives of identity are proposed by politicians, in speeches and other documents” and the Parliament is one of the spaces where propositions of such narratives takes place. As the debates over immigration are discussed in the State Duma, those discussions involve construction of different aspects of national identity. According to Moscovici (cited in Hopf, 2002), identities make everything simple and similar according to the Self’s identity through turning unfamiliar to familiar. Individuals want to understand the world surrounding them, make it predictable and certain (Hopf, 2002). The knowledge is socially distributed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 28), and the face to face meeting can make someone perceive who the other is in real life, as he is, actually, real. In this vain, the social construction of reality takes place, and in this construction language occupies an important place as knowledge is distributed through it. In our case, the agora for construction of others and Selves takes place in the State Duma, which also has its particularities, like representation of different power groups (parties, factions, thus ideologies, techniques and so on).

Positioning must not be excluded from our sight, as the Parliament is a place where different political parties are represented due to results in elections. In general, the ruling

(10)

10

party and the opposition factions can occupy different positions not only because of different ideological and political reasons, but also because of the position being occupied9.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has been trying to develop its immigration policy, which has undergone several changes. From early 1990s until present times, many laws have been adopted and amended with the aim to regulate migration. As the laws concerning migration are debated in the State Duma from time to time and changes are made, during these discussions many arguments are circulated therefore drawing lines between immigrants (them) and citizens (us) or eliminating these boundaries. Hence, it is evident that one of the main actors in producing discourses over national identity and otherness is the legislative body of the country.

Therefore, I plan to reveal the line of the construction of the national identity when parliamentarian debates over immigration take place in the Russian State Duma.

The Research question

The research aims to reveal the national identity construction when debates over migration take place in the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The research will try to answer the following question:

- What components does the construct of national identity during parliamentary debates over the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation bear?

9_{Here E. Goffman’s work (Goffman, 1959) can be of relevance as showing the way this or that legislator}

(11)

11

Answering this question will also propose the responding to the following related questions:

- What kind of otherness of immigrants is created during parliamentarian debates over the same law?

- Is there any differentiation between different immigrants in their relationship to the national identity bearers (i.e. locals)?

- How does the discourses about national identity and immigrants change over historical development of the debates around the mentioned law?

- Which actors in the State Duma are involved in the process of creation of discourses over immigration and constructs about national identity?

Methodology

This qualitative study focuses on journal articles, books and other materials in English and Russian languages. The specialized corpus to be analyzed in this study are the parliamentarian debates on a specific law: the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation. The debates over the draft of this law and the changes after it was adopted would be the actual data to be analyzed to reveal discourse patterns being circulated by different Russian parliamentarian forces. All transcripts of the debates in the State Duma of the Russian Federation can be found in Russian on the following website: http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/. Another website http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/ (Automated System of Provision of Legislative Activity of the State Duma of the Russian Federation), was used to track the full legislative process to determine all the changes a certain law has gone through. Finally, another website helped me to use the identification numbers of files

(12)

12

to find specific transcripts of debates in the transcript database of the State Duma (http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/). The corpus will present a dynamic picture of the immigrant and national identity discourse in the debates occurred in the lower house of the Russian Federation during a certain period of time (from 1996 until the present; i.e. the beginning of 2015). The number of transcripts reviewed and used is almost 80; these texts are analyzed through discourse analysis.

Hypothesis

During parliamentary debates over the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, parliamentarians create strong differentiation not only between immigrants and locals, but even between locals.

During debates over the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, the parliamentarians produce negative image of immigrants coming from post-Soviet states, mainly the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus.

Limitations and exclusions

To see what kind of discourses are initiated by the parliament and how they find their reception in the other segments of society, it would have be helpful to establish a more general idea upon which to define Russian national identity. However, due to limitations of time and space, this task will not be undertaken, thereby excluding a large block of possible researchable space from my work.

(13)

13

The next limitation is the absence of the video-taping of the parliamentarian debates used for the analysis. This means that the spoken language, which has several differences from written one, having more contextual signs, including intonation as a specification of illocutionary power of speech (Jahandarie, 1999), can put emphasis on or reduce importance of some parts of a given speech or make unimportant some parts of a given speech.. Although these important factors are lacking to some degree, the large body of material analyzed has been deemed sufficient to provide certain lines in debates, revealing the picture of discourses created.

Thesis Structure

The research has been developed in this manner:

A) In the theoretical section, theories about national identity are reviewed and the interrelation between national identity and migration is examined.

B) In the next chapter, the Russian context is reviewed, including theories on national identity actively propagated and used during, before and after the Soviet times. C) The historical overview and the way of functioning of the Russian Parliament is

shown. The Russian parliament’s role in the production of identity discourse is reviewed, using the particular example of debates on the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation.

(14)

14

1. Theoretical Background

How do the debates about immigration in Parliament construct the national identity of Russians? This question can be answered in many ways, but first of all it is important to understand what national identity is, how it interacts with the phenomenon of migration, and, taking into consideration the context of my research, the interrelation/interaction of national identity and migration. In the theoretical review and the analysis, it will be important to determine how to define national identity and what it encompasses (which will later be applied to our particular case), to then dive into the role of the institution of citizenship in the construction of national identity, as well as to shed some light on transnational identity.

Here it is important to develop a step-by-step theoretical insight into issues of national identity, the interrelation of institution of citizenship and national identity, of national identity and immigration, especially postcolonial national identity and immigration, and, of course, transnational identity.

1.1 National Identity

National identity is extensively ambiguous term, which is very difficult to explain with one clear definition. In his seminal work, Ernst Gellner (1983) showed an emergence of nations and nationalism along with industrialization. Dividing societal development into two different periods (agrarian or agroliterate) and industrial (modern societies), he showed that in agroliterate society, culture was divided horizontally (literate power holders and illiterate peasantry) and vertically (different agricultural producers have different peoples with their local cultures). Therefore, this division into two spaces, which met at some points but were

(15)

15

mainly kept different in reality, shows the absence of converging unifying points. In the age of industrialism, a homogeneous culture was in need to serve the requirements of economic growth, which, according to Gellner, was served through a common education which created a framed society sharing many common traits. Nations share the same “high culture”, which is achieved through centralized, standardized education10. Nations are not dormant entities which can be brought to life by different impetuses; their existence is only possible in the age of nationalism. Therefore, they are modern inventions.

Anthony D. Smith (1998) argues that there are some moments overlooked by Gellner. Even if Gellner talks about modernist view of past through the prism of present necessities and circumstances, he does not go into detail on how the marking of shared destiny from the past takes place and from what kind of similar basis it occurs. And it is not simply the needs of current generations and particular elites, according to Smith, that influence the formation of nations (1998, p. 43).

Here it is important to mention the particular view and the role of Russian politicians in shaping particular past events in their usage for modern needs. In other words, the political intelligentsia of the Russian Federation creates a unifying identity based on specific shared past that is Soviet Union. However, it occupies only one of the parts of this broad construct, as will later be discussed.

According to Benedict Anderson (1983), the age of nationalism developed along with capitalism, mainly through the emergence of print capitalism. A member of a given nation can perceive someone to be in the same nation through reading a newspaper or book and

10_{During Soviet times, standardized education was introduced in local languages; however, the higher status}

(16)

16

realizing that there are others who can read and understand the same, thus creating a bounded community, which is imagined, as he or she has never met all the members of his or her nation.

According to Rogers Brubaker’s (2004) term “groupism”, when bounded groups are taken for granted, it is done to simplify the understanding and representation of that bounded group, however an important element is framed out, as it usually does not represent the real picture as being bounded in this simple and primitive way. However, even if the construction of such a groupism is an opportunity for politicians to gain political benefit, it is at the same time not so precise what the certain group constitutes in reality.

For instance, in his book “National identity” (1993), Anthony D. Smith attempts to reveal some components of the emergence of nations, such as shared history (sometimes mythologized) as well as an ethnic component (ethnie as an entity) as incentives for developing national identity. Not being primordialist, he, in line with Barth (1969), tries to focus on myths and other symbols important for gathering that society under the term “nation”. At the same time, it is important to note that Barth argued that the ethnic traits are not bounded systems free of social interaction and acceptance, but can often be built on them. As Brubaker shows through his work on citizenship and nationhood in Germany and France, there are two types of nationalism which were developed through the institution of citizenship, one of which is ethno-cultural (Germany), and another is civil nationalism (France). Later, in his work “Ethnicity without groups” (2004, pp. 131-146) he discusses the difficulties in making world state divisions into ethnic and civic nations, as in reality the polities are not so simply divided, where many analytical and normative ambiguities occur. Clearly, such division is usually not very useful, as national identity is constructed from both

(17)

17

civic and ethno-cultural components, but these different traits can nevertheless be useful for identification during parliamentary debates, which is how the parliamentarians actually frame the Self and Other.

As Laitin (1988) argues, language standardization is the state’s rationalization strategy, from that moment the administration can efficiently reach the population. With the coming of socialist power to all the future republics of the Soviet Union, the center (Moscow) made a language standardization (of local languages) in all those states. The standardization of Russian took place gradually and by the time of the collapse of the USSR, Russian occupied an important place in all the republics. Borderless nature of the Soviet Union within its territory helped the language policies be implemented without many difficulties.

Even if the borders were open for all the citizens of the Soviet Union, the institution of

propiska made the process of migration and stay in any other than the place someone was

registered a difficult thing11. However, the internal absence of borders within the Soviet state created possibilities of labor migration from one region to another, which gradually changed the demographic representation by nationalities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these changes brought an increase of the number of Russians in places outside of the actual territory of the Russian Federation. All these Soviet citizens could easily apply for Russian citizenship and receive it, and thus change their status from stateless to state subjects. To reach its former citizens (as the Russian Federation is the legal successor of the Soviet Union its successor

11_{“Propiska” was an institution of governmental control of people on their territories where they were}

registered (propisany). Thus to reside in another place required from a potential internal migrant having propiska (this system is similar to hukou system in China) (More about the propiska system can be found in “Housing the New Russia” of Jane R. Zaviska (2012), Chapter 1.)

(18)

18

status also applied to the case of stateless people), the state created this two-fold identity with a cultural core on the one side, and a legal (citizenship) core on the other.

How do people construct their identity? The Other can be a trigger to construct the Self’s identity. As Hopf (2002) theorizes, there is an important relation between the Self and the Other, but that is not the main point, as identity can have other components too, such as another idea, history or place. Hopf (2002) concentrates on customary and everyday aspects of the Self, at the same time rejecting Ernst Goffman’s work and focus on intentionality. When discussing human beings’ choice of identity, therefore representing themselves as they would like others to see them, we must keep in mind that national identity and citizenship will not concur (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2010).

Individuals who have many identities derived from their participation in manifold discursive formations, as well as their daily social practices, are in need to understand the world surrounding them, make it predictable, certain and ordered (Hopf, 2002). This supports people’s need to generate identities. It is understandable, then, that Hopf uses identities “as cognitive devices or heuristics” (Hopf, 2002, p. 4). Identities make everything simple and similar in accordance with the Self’s identity by turning unfamiliar to familiar (Moscovici, cited Hopf, 2002, p. 6). The role of language in creating discourses and thus producing identities is undebatable. “Language is a product of the human drive to create order in the society” (Taylor, cited in Hopf, 2002, p. 6). As the cognitive perspective of human beings to order the world is usually promoted through language, language is a powerful toolkit to be reviewed. People are prone to identify themselves and others to make their life predictable and perceivable. The logic of mutual need of Self and Other is important to make identification (Hopf, 2002). The identification can be understood relationally, as it is difficult

(19)

19

to know what X is without relating it to Y (Hopf, 2002). According to Hopf (2002), to understand what can be constituted for myself in the Other is a question of great importance and can be revealed through researching how states understand the self through “domestic other” (Hopf, 2002, p 10). In this vein, this research focuses on understanding how a legislative body and its members tries to understand its own self by way of understanding others. But, unlike Hopf (2002), I will try to focus on what is said and expressed, argued, used to show what are the lines marked by those utterances. However, habitual practices can become clear in the evident absence of in the presence of absence of active parliamentarian debate, when certain actors are obligated to at least express their role and power, (which can be matter of habit, already unthought), however even in the expression of those roles and powers the construction takes place through deliberation.

1.2 Citizenship and National identity

As mentioned before, the classification of national identity between civic and ethnic categories has changed over time and makes evident that it is difficult to make a precise division when researching case X. Even if the state’s attitude towards others through its institution of citizenship was considered to be ethno-cultural (like in the case of Germany), it has changed over time; e.g., the law on granting citizenship can be transformed due to amendments to the law (once again, this is exemplified by the German case). Usually identity constructs incorporate complex traits, both civic and ethnic (cultural) components. Also, civic identity cannot always be generalizable as citizenship regimes differs from one another (Writh, 2011). Migration can be another challenge when developing a citizenship institution,

(20)

20

it defines lines of “us” and “them” and how easily this line can be eliminated will actually show the difference between states’ concepts of national identity.

The institution of citizenship tries to develop the concept of national identity, which is understood as a pillar of sovereignty of the state (Brubaker, 1992). The work of Brubaker (1992) attempts to show how the institution of citizenship could show the different constructs of national identity in two different states: Germany and France. While the French case proposed state-centered and assimilationist model, the German one was focused on an ethnic center and differentialist model. For instance, the French assimilationist attitude easily turned the second-generation immigrants into French citizens. At the same time, the German ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship created many obstacles for immigrants, – even in the second-generation – to become members of German community. This was mainly changed from late 1990’s showing how precise was Brubaker in his attempt to show what was before those changes, i.e. which type of national identity institution of citizenship and thus national identity was constructed.

What kind of identification can provide citizenship? The subjective sense of being a citizen is considered a psychological citizenship, when the resonance on identification created through the institution of citizenship shows their identification with some state (Sindic, 2011). As other types of social identification, psychological citizenship does not survive in isolation, as the contacts with other members of the same group are important (Sindic, 2011). The institution of citizenship creates horizontally equal membership in a given society, beginning from Greek and later Roman times and continued also in the modern times, especially commencing from the French revolution (Sindic, 2011). National identity

(21)

21

as a form of identification includes both a psychological component of citizenship and a common psychological reality.

The institution of citizenship will not be reviewed in this research, but during debates the constructs will show how the idea of kin-members of community is constructed for different parliamentarians, whether it is based on ethno-cultural or civic identification.

1.3 National identity and migration

Migrations from one region to another raise many questions in people's minds, not only of the receiving states, but the migrants as well. But one important element that has been challenged through the influx of foreigners is the construct of national identity. Here we have to keep in mind that national identity is not a fixed phenomenon, so it can be reconstructed because of different developments taking place in different societies. So the differences between “we” and “they” can be revealed when people immigrate from a different cultural milieu, bearing other religions, languages and so on. The way indigenous people react depends not only on the differences, but also on the behavior of politicians.

Therefore, the difficulties on the way to be integrated in the receiving society can be manifold, from accepting the state’s policies to cultural differences. It is also difficult to be a member of a group with a certain national identity. Sometimes, a claim for a certain national identity in case of rejection can lead to social exclusion (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2010). Perception of national identity is not necessarily dependent on a recipient's desire to be a bearer of that identity, and here the receiving society’s some groups can be important in making the claim legitimate. According to McCrone and Bechhofer (2010), national identity

(22)

22

is created and chosen by people and it does not coincide significantly with citizenship. Chosen identities are “implicit and taken-for-granted” (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2010, p. 923) and can become noticeable in the time of problematic situations. Such problematic situations may be economic crises, political instability and other developments, which can be an impulse for the political leadership to act differently, and the Parliament can act as one of the bold bodies creating or changing laws concerning these others.

As a statement by the Transnational Council on Migration (Papademetriou, 2012) shows, there are five drivers of anxiety concerning migration and the accepting society’s stance. Anxiety can occur because of the fear of loss of identity and culture of newcomers, which can be challenged and even changed because of migrants. Also, there is cause for anxiety due to a rapid pace of social change appearing in cities, towns and other neighborhoods, as a large amount of migrants can be a reason for such changes. Another reason can be the economic situation and inequality. This cause is one of the usual drivers for finding scapegoats when economic hardship appears. Low confidence in the political leadership often results in the possibility to turn to the public when the immigration “issues” are becoming a hot topic, giving citizens a sense of the inability of the leaders to control it. Inability to have full control is another possible source of anxiety as social well-being and stability can become fragile. This can also be prompted by discourses from right-wing political forces, who express the incapacity of government to control the “illegal” migrants from coming12, rather than utilizing the term "undocumented".

12_{The notion of “illegal migrants” is already predetermined and considered as being out of control and}

(23)

23

The control of the representation of immigrants by the state is initiated to promote the adoption of society’s rules and the incorporation of traditions into the newcomers' way of life. The aspirations of states to control arranged marriages in the UK, Netherlands and Denmark are an example of their ability to control the family formation of migrants (Kofman, 2005).

The other explanation of social-psychological feelings of immigrants when meeting the reality of being the Other in the accepting society can be reached through Mead's (1934) argument. According to Mead, (1934) “I” and “me” are the ways to see two-sides of the self which socializes in the accepting society (”me”) and curbs its “I” by trying to keep it within the rules and norms which “me” respects. A migrant’s perception of themself and others in the interplay between these two makes him/her a person who occupies their social niche. The accepting state is the one who puts the rules and norms for foreigners to react, therefore showing its hierarchically higher level/point in comparison to immigrants. At the same time, we can see the discourses prompted by politicians as a way to defend themselves, which in a way shows the reflexive nature of identity when it fluctuates from peaceful to aggressive and so on. Moreover, the works by Philogène (2007) and Augoustinos and Riggs (2007, cited in Andreouli and Howarth, 2012) restate the point explaining how otherness can have an outcome on the construction of different identities. It is not strange that the “illegality” by which immigrants without documents are marked brings into existence many constructs and therefore perceptions of them by both themselves and the accepting society. This in-between situation causes people to occupy an odd niche of liminal legality (Menjivar, 2006). The role of political institutions is important here not only because they institutionalize the way the

(24)

24

individual occupies the place determined for him or her, but also the statesmen who can push even bolder discourses which can lead to a de facto appearance of this otherness.

Unlike its European empires, who could colonialize many territories beyond the seas, the Russian colonization was mainly directed to the Eurasian heartland and Far East and its dissolution brought an “end” to Russian colonialism, and not decolonization like in case of the UK and France (Svirsky & Bignall, 2012). People and people differentiation in Agamben’s (Agamben, 2000) understanding can also be put into the dichotomy of postcolonial metropoly-nation and migrants, as the converging point between these two is always restated in a different manner by power holders. At the same time, we have to bear in mind the different paths that the postcolonial states had from the post-soviet states, which had a different stance in the USSR, in which both the republics and their citizens were at least equal to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and its citizens (Blakely, 2012). Furthermore, after Tsarist Russia, a new identity was developed which was based on the ideas of patriotism, collectivism and internationalism (Shamina, 2014). Even if the general Soviet identity lost its space after the collapse of the Soviet state, it continues to exist. Now the space is divided into several independent states, and this identity continues to exist for some groups of people living in those different states. Thus this identity has adopted a transnational nature. It is also transnational because immigrants coming to the Russian Federation have several shared identifying factors not only with locals, but also with citizens of other post-Soviet space.

(25)

25

1.4 Transnationalism

As the term “transnationalism” focuses on people and groups and the possibility of being a factor of social order change (Ben Rafael & Sternberg, 2009), the Soviet identity has changed and even now changes the nature of social order in the Soviet Union, as well as in current post-Soviet states. Some scholars argue that the modern state has moved away from the idea of a nationalist view and entered a new, postnational stage (Soysal, 1994; Earnest, 2008). The age of globalization proposed a situation in which the new communities of transmigrants would be closer to global citizens (Martinello, 2006). Transnationalism changed the relation of migrants to space through the emergence of transnational “social fields” which are multi-layered and multi-sited constructs (Levitt & Schiller, 2004). As Munch (2001) argues, nation-state identity transforms into transnational identity in the example of the European states and the EU, which, surely, brings some problems, but occurs due to harmonization in many fields being implemented in the EU framework. The case of Munch can be operationalizable in Soviet context, which, however, had many differences. But the Soviet identity is similar to European Union’s one in one thing: the unifying identity being formed/in formation. Thus, in a way, transnational identity with a huge share of main state’s (Russia’s) identity components like language, could become transnational by its nature after the collapse of the state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union many changes occurred and local nationalisms were activated being based on previous ethno-national policies of the USSR and the modern nationalist movements in member republics developed their specific local identifications. However that does not mean the Soviet identity ceased to exist even after collapse of the state. As Suny (2012) argues, “the Soviet citizens often experienced identification both with the ethnicity or nation to which they were officially

(26)

26

ascribed and, in different ways, with the Soviet Union as motherland or fatherland, and acceptance of the values and norms of Soviet life” (Suny, 2012, pp. 22-23). After the collapse, some points of identification continued to exist in the Russian Federation and the post-soviet republics. As Suny (2012) shows, the acceptance of the Soviet national anthem as Russia’s modern-day anthem with other lyrics has revived some nostalgia in the society. However, in my work, these kinds of activities (e.g., the national anthem) in line with other changes (e.g., the law about compatriots, as well as parliamentary debates) will show that the modern Russian identification patterns include many traits of the Soviet identity. The modern Russian state and the constructs developed by members of one of the official bodies of the state (the State Duma) are attempting to nationalize Soviet identity, which has become a transnational construct. ,

(27)

27

2. The National Identity in Russian Context

When talking about Russia, it is important to consider its history. Today’s Russian Federation emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is considered its legal successor. Formed on the basis of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union existed for 70 years and was made up of 15 republics, of which the RSFSR (The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) held the main role. The actual focus of this research is on modern Russia and its emergence after the end of the Soviet Empire. However, the historical excursus is required to understand how the modern situation emerged. Therefore I will make a short review of national identity construct during the Romanov Empire, followed by a review of Soviet times and the modern day situation.

2.1 The Russian Empire

In the Russian Empire there were many concepts used to explain and describe the who-ness of Russians, as well as what-who-ness of the Russian land.

The name “Russian land” comes into circulation from the Primary Chronicle or Tale of Bygone Years13_{(1113). The Primary Chronicle was used a lot to justify this or that concept}

with corresponding interpretation.

One of the concepts describing the origin of the Russians is the Norman theory of the Russian state. According to the protagonists of the Norman theory, the Vikings, who came to Russia in the mid-ninth century, influenced Russian culture, in the areas of law, political structure, religion and traditions and others (Riasanovsky 1947). The antagonists of the

(28)

28

theory, anti-Normanists (for instance, the famous Russian scientist, Mikhail Lomonosov), refuted the theory basing themselves on the Slavic basis (coming from the Southern Rus’ or from western side, referring to Baltic Rus’) of the Russian state, the founding basis of the Russian state during the mass migration of peoples.

Later, several other concepts about Russian identity came into existence. They were generally developed during the existence of the Russian Empire (mainly during the governance of Romanov dynasty).

One of the main concepts about Russian identity is the concept of the Pan-Russian or All-Russian nation. The basis for this idea comes from the Russian priest Zakharia Kopi’stenskii (Bishop Makariy 2013), who proposed the idea of the triune Russian nation, which was divided into Great Russians (velikorossy, in Russian: великороссы), Little Russians (malorossy, in Russian: малороссы) and White Russians (belorusy, in Russian: белорусы). The Great Russians are Russians of the modern day, the Little Russians are the modern Ukrainians, and the White Russians are Belarusians. As noted by Miller (2008), during the Russian Empire the Ukrainians and Belarusians (or in their old terms Little Russians and White Russians) were never considered foreigners in the Russian empire. In his book, "The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research" (2008), Miller shows that even in the 18th century, the eastern parts of Empire, such as Yakutia and Sakhalin, were not considered part of the Russian empire in the minds of that time intelligentsia (for instance, in his book “Island Sakhalin”, the famous Russian author, Anton Chekhov, talking about culture and territories of Siberia, regards them as different to Russia).

(29)

29

During the Romanov Empire, the dominant ideological doctrine, proposed by Russian minister of Education. Sergey Uvarov in 1834, was “Official Nationality”. According to “Official Nationality”, the basics for Russian state are Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality (Riasanovsky 1959), which was used to educate new generations until the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917. Developed from the Western doctrine of Enlightenment and Idealism, the concept was a shifting moment in the history of the Russian empire as a mark of passage into the era of modernism, in which an attempt was made to develop the role of the nation-state.

The development of the ideology of Slavyanophilia led to the emergence of the Russian state (Moscow) as “the third Rome”, when the idea of religious originality of the Russian state with the development of orthodoxy from the 10th_{century, followed. The idea of}

“Moscow as the third Rome” resurged from the letter of Russian monk Filofei of Pskov, who proposed the idea of Christian representativeness of Moscow after two Romes were gone (Rome and Constantinople) (Laats 2009).

The Slavyanophils influenced the development of the Russian culture and language, a process that continued during Soviet times.

2.2 Soviet Times

In Soviet times, ideology was developed on a totally different basis, resulting in a different type of identification. But one of the main traits for identification was the Russian language. There are several works going into the language policy of the Soviet Union, and how the language inclusion actually took place in all the Soviet republics.

(30)

30

During Soviet times, the huge territory, – which with the Russian Empire’s legacy with the territories where gradual dissemination of Russian occurred, – was a space where the Russian language became the lingua franca. The importance of the Russian language was reasoned not only because of the huge possibilities to foster career development, but also by the policies of the state center towards these different parts of the state. During the times of the Russian Empire, russification was taking place in different ways, but these developments were not limited to language alone. As Pavlenko (2013) demonstrates, russification could be seen in four different aspects: administrative russification, or usage of Russian in legal and other practices; religious russification, or conversion to Russian Orthodox Christianity; linguistic russification, or the spread of Russian language as a second language as means of administrative, educative and military communication; and, finally, integration on the voluntary basis or obrusenie14 (Pavlenko 2013, pp. 655-656). Therefore, during the Russian Empire, russification was implemented in all the regions of the Empire, in some places actively, in others, passively, and also with different attitudes during different time periods. As mentioned previously, the introduction of the “orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality” concept during the reign of Nikolai I influenced an active russification policy in the imperial internal policy agenda.

After the establishment of the Bolshevik state, which became the USSR in 1936, the policy towards language was developed in different ways in respective periods of time. Therefore, as Pavlenko discusses, language management in the Soviet Union can be divided to four periods:

14_{Obrusenie can be translated as russification, when other ethnic groups assimilate taking Russian traits such}

(31)

31

a. Nativization (1918-1938);

b.Introduction of Russian as the second language (1938-1958); c. Bilingual education (1958-1928);

d.Russification (1978-1988) (Pavlova 2013, p. 657).

With the establishment of the Soviet socialistic republic, nativization of the native languages took place. As Suny (1993, p. 102) argues, the consolidation of nationality took place in three ways, firstly, by promoting national language secondly, through the creation of national intelligentsias and political elites and, thirdly, by institutionalizing in formal way ethnicity in state apparatus. Language standardization was one of the first ways to develop national identities in the republics. Due to the united nature of the state, however, in which all governance was subordinated from the center (Moscow), it was not unusual for the populations in different republics to develop bilingual acquisition.

Actually, it was a two-directional process. From one side, it was a requirement to study Russian language since 1938 (Decree of 1938 "On the Obligatory Study of Russian Language in National Republic and Regional Schools").It is important to remember that the choice to study in native language schools was left to the language bearers, which meant that there was education in 70 languages in the Soviet state (Pavlenko, 2013), but at the same time, the long legacy of the Russian empire’s existence the Russian influence was already spread through all imperial territory (including the migration of Russians in all the territory).From the other side, the migration of population from one region to another, which presupposed the existence of a large number of Russian speaking groups or people using the Russian language as a means of communication (as the non-Russians coming to different locus could not speak

(32)

32

a local language and were able to use Russian as the lingua franca). Therefore, the Russian language gradually began to play the role of one of the identity markers in the Soviet Union. As Brubaker (1996) argues, the case of the Soviet Union can be seen as an institutionalized multinationality, as that country was not only heterogeneous, but it also institutionalized these different groups into territorial nationhoods or put them in ascribed nationalities. As discussed above, this was achieved through such policies as korenizatsia (nativisation) on the initial level.

Thus, the establishment of many ethno-national polities led to the further development of local identities, and the collapse of the state prompted its subjects struggle for independence15.

2.3 The Russian Federation

With the independence of the Russian Federation, intelligentsia, state officials, civil organizations and movements and other actors in this large regime as have attempted to explain the identity of the newly-formed nation. The first in line was an attempt to explain the difference between “Russian” (Russkii, русский) and “Rossiianin” (россиянин)16_{. To}

refrain from creating ambiguities, it is necessary to consider naming, a very important part of language discourse, needs when looking into post-Soviet and Russian cases. There are even examples of using “Rossiia” instead of “Russia”, which can be more precise in the

15_{The Chechen case would be important to mention here, but it has its particularities, as conflict with}

Chechen highlanders also existed during Romanov imperial times.

16_{In this work the words “rossiianin” and “russkii” are supplementary used in brackets the way the}

parliamentarians used them in their speeches to make it transparent if they put this or that meaning. As noted Tishkov

(33)

33

modern state (Tishkov, 1997)17_{. The English language does not provide dividing lines}

between these two identity markers, as in English there is only one marker for both ethnic and civil understandings of the term called “Russians”. But in this emphasized divergence of understanding, if “Russian” marks ethno-cultural identity and the group of people identifying themselves as such, “Rossiyanin” is a modern state identity, which has no ethnic component. The Rossiyanin construct was actively put into usage by the first president, Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), who used the welcoming phrase “Dear rossiiane” (дорогие россияне) in almost all his speeches. At the same time, the active development of the ultra-nationalistic movement in the Russian Federation has taken place with slogans like “Russia for the Russians (Russkii)”, the activities of the Skinhead movement (mainly from the 2000s onward) and so on.

Several concepts about Russian identity were introduced after independence. One of the active protagonists of Russian uniqueness is Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin proposed the idea of Neoeurasianism, after a long period of time in which he was a proponent of national-bolshevism in modern Russia. National-national-bolshevism was proposed earlier by the Russian emigrant, Ustryalov, but its modern understanding was developed mainly by Dugin, who attempts to show the leftist ideology in conjunction with Russian nationalism. According to Dugin (arcto.ru 2014), national-bolshevism was a purely Russian ideology. Neoeurasianism is a new vision of Eurasianism understanding, which is based on the ideas proposed by Lev Gumilev from 1960s till 1990s in his passionar theory on ethnogenesis. Gumilev (1974) argues that there is a biological stimulus for development of every ethnicity which comes to an end over time, but he also proposed the idea of “superethnicity”, which is a collectivity of

(34)

34

ethnicities and is a making of geographic-social object. This later term was used a lot by the students of Eurasianism, because it was interpreted as civilizational referring to Russian civilization. Eurasianism proposed the Russian special identity having Eurasian core, not only European or Asian. According to Dugin (2003), Russia is considered as Eurasia, and therefore, it is the center of the world as it is the center (in geopolitical terms) of the most important continental space of the world18_{. Basing his concept on the special spatial reality}

of the Russian Federation, he proposes the uniqueness of the Russian nation, and with his Fourth political theory (Dugin, 2009), he adds that there is a fourth ideology which is in opposition to the three traditional ideologies: Liberalism, Communism and Fascism. From his point of view, this understanding can be used to explain the Russian context.

In the book "National Idea of Russia" (Yakunin et al. 2012), the authors try to place Russian identity in the civil, as living in the same place, thus country, but also in the historical perspective. They argue that non-ethnic Russians also have the same national core as ethnic Russians, through the shared historical path that creates that kind of general identity (the Soviet Union also created such shared history). At the same time, however, the civilizational character of Russian development is important in this line, which means the mainly Russian core during these several centuries fostered some general traits, like language, history, customs, traditions and natural conditions. According to the authors (2012, p. 393), for instance, one of the national identity traits is collectivism, which came into existence because of harsh natural conditions. At the same time, the civilizational question of difference

18_{That is why the geopolitical theories like the Heartland theory proposed by Mackinder found their active}

dissemination in Russian political and academic circles to state the specificity of Russian states. (Even during my studies at the Russian-Armenian University within subjects like Geopolitics, Russian Foreign Policy, and International Relations, these concepts were specifically lectured and discussed with actual focus on the Russian state).

(35)

35

between Russians and others is raised. On one hand, it can be traced back to the shared history and respective traits described before, and on the other, it is focused on Russian orthodoxy and also geographical space it occupies.

(36)

36

3. Parliament as a locus of discourse production

According to the social constructionist view of discourse, what we say and speak influences the construction of a particular understanding of social reality (Paltridge, 2008). Therefore, this can also be referred to political institutions, which are sometimes in the core of constructing understanding of the social reality around. The national parliament is one of the core players in this construction work.

When discussing language pragmatics, it can be useful to explain what people actually mean when they say something, rather than just focusing on the meaning of a sentence in the grammatical and semantic way, but in contextual understanding. In parliamentarian debate the context is very important as the power vended upon parliamentarians gives a certain position from which the discussion of manifold subjects can be interpreted, taking into account those contextual surroundings.

It is important to take into consideration the cultural and language differences when doing discourse analysis (Paltridge, 2008). Different situations require different social languages (Ger, cited in Paltridge, 2008) to be used in a specific surroundings. If the debate takes place in the Parliament, therefore, the language being used and the way people interact differs from other spaces. Our social identity is formed in the use of language (Paltridge, 2008, p. 12) in our everyday life.

Discourse community, according to Paltridge (2008, p. 24) is a group of people with a shared practice and specific way of communication. The focus on Parliament assumes a set of rules, the way the debate is organized in everyday practice. All the markers of this discourse community (i.e. Parliament) or community of practice (Wengen 1998, Banton and Tusty 2005, cited in Paltridge 2008) share the same rules of the game, have the same general goals, but at the same time they have their sub-discourse communities (for example,

(37)

37

factions), which, in their turn, can be divided into other discourse communities, such as political parties and independent parliamentarians. A community of practice interacts in a way which shows their group identity (Paldridge 2008), therefore Parliamentarians share an identity which derives from their position and their everyday practice as holders of this position.

Identity is constructed in a specific way through the use of discourse, it is not fixed and permanently / constantly constructed and reconstructed when people have connections/relations with each other (Paldridge 2008, p. 38). In their everyday interaction and talks about different topics, Parliamentarians are constructing some identity. Parliamentarian debates have their specific genre which occurs in the mentioned political law-making setting. However, deviations from this genre can occur, when a text is atypical to this genre, or when a debate is being transferred to a violent fight between parliamentarians, which was not uncommon in the Russian State Duma in the 90s, in the Ukrainian Rada, and others. When developing an analysis of a genre of text, according to Paltridge (2008), one of the methods is to take into account a background situation, such as social, cultural and other attributes which can influence the formation of a specific text. It is exceptionally important when doing a parliamentarian debate to try to reveal the reasons why a particular debate and set of texts developed. In my study, I am trying to find which reasons brought outbursts of debates on the immigration issues, therefore, it is necessary to be familiar with the reasons which put a particular draft of a law into circulation in that debate that is being analyzed.

Much like the role of language in the construction of social reality, the role language plays in identity construction can be very noticeable in the case of Parliamentarian debates. As the study attempts to determine how the identity construct of “Russian” can be revealed

(38)

38

from the debates over immigration, it will give us an outcome of having two constructs: an immigrant construct and a local one.

As G. S. Jones pointed “We cannot . . . decode political language to reach a primal and material expression of interest since it is the discursive structure of political language which conceives and defines interest in the first place. What we must therefore do is to study the production of interest, identification, grievance and aspiration within political languages themselves.” (Jones G.S., cited in Brubaker, 1992, p. 16) Jones’ perception can be taken into account for doing my analysis, but as I have shown before, Russian identity construction has its particular historical development which we cannot exclude from our analysis.

As the central locus of our research is focused on the State Duma and the specific debates taking place within it, it is important to show the legal power hierarchy of the modern Russian state with the main emphasis into the composition of Parliament and the main changes that have occurred from the mid-90’s. The rationale to understand the way the Russian Parliament works will help us to see its possible impact on society. The time and space requirements of this thesis limits the proposed research, therefore this work shall concentrate on the Parliamentarian locus to see how certain discourses coming out from the lower chamber of the legislative power is received by different segments of society.

3.1 The State Duma

In researching modern Russia’s emergence, we must consider policy changes that took place in the state since 1991. First of all, there is a turning point in Russian internal and

(39)

39

foreign politics due to the1999 leadership change in the state. Vladimir Putin was appointed head of state in 1999 by Boris Yeltsin, who decided to resign.

The era of reforms started by Yeltsin and received negatively by large segments of the population, also brought about a negative reception of the democratic transition which was accompanied with more problems than actual solutions. At the same time, several powerful figures emerged who were able to get benefits from that transition. They could create their wealth (also through illegal means) and obtain comfortable positions in the political ruling arena, and were oligarchs in the circle of the first president. Furthermore, the 1998 Asian Economic crisis – with its extensive negative consequences in the Russian Federation – was another reason for the protagonists of the Soviet times and system to point out the bad aftereffects of ‘democracy’ and ‘free market economy’.

The situation was sincerely changed with Putin’s rise to power. Putin’s focus was on “stabilization, restoration and state efficiency” (Laurelle, 2009, p. 19) with two main slogans: “vertical of power” (vertikal’ vlasti) and “the dictatorship of law” (diktatura zakona).

Unlike Boris Yeltsin, Putin developed proactive policy towards post-Soviet states, as well as with countries such as China, Iran, Turkey and so on (Laurelle, 2009) through investments and the development of diplomatic relations. The recent establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is another way of creating closer ties with countries on post-soviet space.

According to surveys conducted by the Levada Center, the extreme increase of the number of people who consent to with the slogan “Russia for Russians” (Rossiia dlia

russkikh) resulted also in the increase fast ethnicization of the term “Russian” (Russkiĭ). For

(40)

40

minorities, while for others it makes reference to the citizen (as opposed to migrants) (Laurelle, 2009).

Crisis and problematic situations can result in the search of scapegoats in the face of migrants (Castles, 2000); this was the case in the economic crisis of 1998 when the negative attitude towards immigrants increased. The Chechen wars and terroristic acts increased the xenophobia against the people from the Northern Caucasus, especially against Chechens, which resulted in other phobias, such as Caucasophobia (kavkazofobia) including Dagestanis, Balkars, Azeris, Armenians and Georgians (Laurelle, 2009). This also led to racialization of the people of the region, as they are referred to in a derogatory manner solely because of the difference in their appearance.

Although they are citizens of the state, people from the Northern Caucasus are perceived as foreigners (Laurelle, 2009). Additionally, the discourse on negative Islamic fundamentalism was applied to Muslims in general (Laurelle, 2009). However, it is important to note that the religious communities were not visible during Soviet times, which is why many people who lived side by side did not present their religious differences, but mainly ethnic ones (also through the politics on nationalities during the Soviet period), therefore not establishing religion as a component of differentiation.

Many discourses were employed in media and public speeches to differentiate between “Selves” and “Others” between the indigenous population (korennoe naselenie) and behavior (povedenie) of migrants, as well as a notion of master of house or host (khoziain) and guests (gost’) with the goodwill of master of the house “to decide cultural and social rules” (Laurelle, 2009, p. 43).

Parliamentary discourse on national identity : debates over immigration in the Russian State Duma as a milieu for the construction of national identity and otherness