Political Opportunity Structure and Social Movement: to what extent political opportunity structure affects the emergence of Indonesia's Islamic movement The Act to Defend Islam

Political Opportunity Structure and Social Movement

To what extent political opportunity structure affects the emergence of Indonesia’s Islamic

movement The Act to Defend Islam

Master Thesis

Crisis and Security Management

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Erysa Poetry

S1897322

First reader: Dr. T. Abbas

Second reader: Dr. A. Bartolucci

Abstract

In 2016, Indonesia witnessed waves of protests called Aksi Bela Islam (The Act to Defend

Islam). The collective action started as a protest in reaction towards an alleged blasphemy case

and evolved into a vast social movement. The intensity, impact, and the success of The Act to

Defend Islam in meeting its demand are worth noting in the study of security management,

specifically national security. Therefore, this research investigates the factors that affect the

emergence of The Act to Defend Islam through the lens of political opportunity structure theory

by using historical content tracing and qualitative content analysis of media coverage during

from 2016 to 2019. The research concludes that political opportunity structure operationalised

into government openness, stable political alignments, presence of elite allies, and state’s

policing strategies affect the emergence of The Act to Defend Islam.

Table of Contents

Abstract

1

Foreword

4

I.

Introduction

5

II. Theoretical Framework

8

2.1 Social Movement

8

2.2 Political Opportunity Structure Theory

9

2.3 Conceptualising Political Opportunity Structure

10

III.

Methodology

14

3.1 Research Approach

14

3.2 Validity, Reliability and Limitation

15

3.3 Case Selection

16

3.4 Operationalisation of Key Variables

17

3.5 Data Collection

18

3.6 Designing Codebook

19

3.7 Data Cleaning Process

20

IV.

Data Analysis

22

4.1 Approach

22

4.2 Case Study Background

22

4.4 Assessing Indonesian Political Alignments

29

4.4.1 Contextualising Political Alignments with Political Opportunity Structure 30

4.5 The Role of Elites Allies

33

4.5.1 Contextualising Allies Support with Political Opportunity Structure

37

4.6 Policing strategy

39

4.6.1 Contextualising Policing Strategy with Political Opportunity Structure

41

V. Discussion

43

VI.

Conclusion

46

VII.

Bibliography

48

Foreword

This thesis is written as partial completion of the Master’s program of Crisis and Security

Management. The research aims to describe the societal and political contour that affects the

emergence of social movement in Indonesia from 2016 to 2019. By using the lens of social

movement theory, specifically the political opportunity structure, this study is expected to

explain the degree of influence of political structure to the emergence of the massive social

movement.

In researching for this topic, I am able to dig deeper into the nodes between the political

opportunity and the likelihood of a social movement to suffice. A point taken from this research

is, despite having a receptive government, the role of allies is more than necessary for a

movement to success. This take away is highly relevant to the current situation, in which

grassroots or institutionalised movements continuously attempt to push the marginalised

agenda. I hope to give insight into the discipline of security management in analysing,

regulating and facilitating movements, that is becoming more common in a democratic setting.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the professors from whom I have learned

during my time at Leiden University. It has been a challenging journey with an abundant of

new insights and perspectives. I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. T. Abbas for his

feedback during the writing process and April Snel for her inputs to this research. Lastly, I

would like to thank my parents for their endless love and support that have made this degree

possible.

The Hague, 5

_{July 2020}

I.

Introduction

In December 2016, thousands of protesters gathered at Indonesia’s National Monument at

the heart of Jakarta. The phenomenon dubbed as The Act to Defend Islam or The 212 (Second

of December) Movement (Quinao, 2016). The mass protest was envisaged as a public platform

to channel Indonesian Muslims' anger towards Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the former Jakarta’s

governor who was accused of blasphemy (Sheany, 2018). The grievances of protesters were

claimed to be generated out of frustration towards the government’s attitude that

underestimated Muslim aspirations (Sheany, 2018). The magnitude, proximity, and the impact

of The Act to Defend Islam ceded had massively impinged both social and political terrain of

Indonesia. The Act to Defend Islam ensues to present day, where 2

_{of December are}

religiously celebrated by the “alumni” of the 2016 demonstration through “reunion act”. The

collective action is still on the rise, with one multi-interpretative goal that is to defend Islam.

To understand the immensity of The Act to Defend Islam as a social movement in the

current setting of Indonesian society, it is imperative to review the history on the role of Islam

in the state’s affairs. Dated back to 1945, the establishment of state’s ideology for the newly

independent Indonesia was not without frictions among different political streams, which

clashed in choosing secularism or an Islamic-based state. Eventually, a middle ground was

adopted through the introduction of Pancasila as the state’s ideology to channel both political

spectrums. Nevertheless, religion still plays a huge importance in the state’s practice such as

through institutionalisation of religion that reasonably still applies in today’s Indonesia.

Moreover, the interpretation of Pancasila, which first clause reads as “Belief in the Almighty

God” that means the necessity for each citizen to believe in one out of six state-acknowledged

religions. This obligation shows the importance of the role religion plays in Indonesia amidst

the breath of democracy and freedom iterated in the ideology.

The complexities of positioning Islam in Indonesian context heightens with the rise of

populism. As populism is “culturally specific in that it must draw inevitably from references

and symbolism that are meaningful” (Anderson, 2009 in Hadiz, 2016, p. 29), Islam facilitates

such needs through its values and symbols as resources to channel grievances (Hadiz, 2016, p.

92). In the context of Indonesia, religion banner allows the protesters in The Act to Defend

Islam to participate in the new populism. This instance can be found in The Act to Defend

Islam as a movement that demanded a bigger merge between Islam and state’s practice. Hence,

the phenomena of The Act to Defend Islam is worth to be investigating since it accounts as an

avenue for an interpolated stream against the dominant establishment. Moreover, The Act to

Defend Islam also serves as a significant point in the ebbs and flows of the perpetual debate on

the role of religion in Indonesia.

The unusual demand by the protesters and the enormity of the movement had captivated

scholars to investigate The Act to Defend Islam further. The past researches on the event relied

on the role of media and the spread of fake news about Basuki since it was assumed to be the

factor of the movement’s success (Carolina, 2017). Yet, the political opportunity structure that

provides a hotbed for the protest remains understudied, even though support from political

elites and the openness of the government towards social movement are theorised to have a

linear effect to the emergence of a social movement (Meyer, 1993 in Meyer & Staggenborg,

1996). Acknowledging the aim to understand the on-going movement by filling the theoretical

gap, the research question reads: To what extent does the political opportunity structure affect

the emergence of The Act to Defend Islam?

Investigating the phenomenon of The Act to Defend Islam is academically relevant as the

study is expected to benefit further assessment of the movement on the potential of

radicalisation that may threaten Indonesia’s domestic security (Wardah, 2019). Since political

opportunity theory is often criticised for conceptualizing all exogenous factors as a measurable

factor (Tarrow, 1996), this research attempts to narrow the definition of political opportunity

structure into a single case study by utilizing conceptualisation. In this vein, the research adds

to the concept of how political opportunity structure can be utilised. Furthermore, the study is

socially relevant as The Act to Defend Islam has been perceived to promote intolerance in

society (Muhtadi, 2018). Therefore, by understanding the formation of the movement, society

may be informed better to reduce societal tension as the result of the on-going protest.

The rest of this research will outline the theoretical framework, the research method,

analysis, and discussion. The theoretical framework section will discuss the academic literature

on political opportunity structure, along with selected definitions and tools by combining

different works of previous scholars (Chapter 2). The third section will cover the choice of

answer the research question (Chapter 4) and wrap with a discussions section in relation to the

findings (Chapter 5) along with a round-up conclusion (Chapter 6).

II.

Theoretical Framework

2.1 Social Movement

In a democratic setting, social movement allows the outsiders of routine politics to signify

their existence (Tilly, 2003, p. 247). It is used as a means to challenge the authority through “a

repeated public display of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments”

(Tilly, 2003, p. 247). Social movements appear by expressing two factors: existence, comprised

by the number of people with the ability to connect and act collectively and claim that

encompassed grievances against certain person or policies (Tilly, 2003, p. 247). Social

movements often immerse with the authority, allies, and even competitors in running its agenda

of repeated political struggle (Tilly, 2003, p. 247).

The definition above comprises both narrow and broad definitions of social movements.

With the former focusing on structured and specific activities such as demonstrations and

public meetings, the latter means collective action against the ruling authorities through the

formation of certain ideologies and dissemination of political doctrines (Tilly, 2003, p. 248).

Despite its lack of legal standing compared to official elections or political parties, a social

movement remains essential on the effects of freedom to iterate one’s opinion in a democratic

setting (Tilly, 2003, p. 248). Challengers of the authorities continuously push forward claims

that are not the interest of election and political parties. Social movements’ main aim towards

the present structure of power is to establish a space for the marginalized grievances. Having

these reasons mentioned, a social movement is chosen as a viable avenue for challengers to

have their opinions heard. Unlike political groups, in expressing its claims, social movements

use collective action explicitly in the open society.

In its approach, social movements take different forms related to their activities as argued

by Tilly (2003, p. 253). Professional, is a type of movement that is conducted by specialized

organizers through funds by activists. Ad hoc, a temporary movement that mobilized a

community to oppose a certain threat. While communitarian, an unspecialized collective act

which performs continuously Tilly (2003, p. 253) . These types of movements are different in

goals. Professional approaches electoral politics, ad hoc movement as a side routine of the

protesters' lives, and communitarian fully devoted to the movement in order to sustain a

In terms of participants, the aggrieved population who enters the movement are rarely the

elites as they are presumed to have more effective methods in reaching goals (Tilly, 2003, p.

251). Conversely, those who are defenceless are similarly inarticulate for their lack of resources

(Tilly, 2003, p. 251). Among the two spectrums, participants take place in the movement on

behalf of the oppressed as a way to channel their lack of capabilities (Tilly, 2003, p. 251).

Nevertheless, the role of the elites is not diminished from the mechanism of a social movement,

as itis salient for the continuity or success rate of a social movement.

2.2

Political Opportunity Structure Theory

A social movement is defined as a form of action to express interest that is highly

institutionalized in a democratic setting (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Participants of social

movements challenge the current power with solidarity by enduring interaction with elites and

authorities (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Social movements were formerly assumed to occur

sporadically. However, it had become an interminable element in a democratic state that

represents a wider range of constituencies (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). In the practice of social

movement, protest is not the only viable mechanism for contention. It may act parallelly with

another form of collective action, such as campaign supported by institutional actors with

similar ideology (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1997 in Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Therefore,

activists in a social movement combine institutional and noninstitutional contention to reach

the group’s collective goal.

In understanding the rise of a social movement, political opportunity structure theory

provides a concept to measure its effect analytically (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Previously,

sociologists in the 1950s, such as Kornhauser (1959), considered social movements as

irrational and the supporters are disconnected from less disruptive mediums to pursue their

grievances (Meyer, 2004). Social movements were assumed to embody political alternatives

rather than common expressions. Nevertheless, this perception changed gradually based on the

fact that social movements also took place in a functioning democracy. Analysts began to view

social protest as a rational choice due to the inability to signify statement through conventional

strategies (Meyer, 2004). Mass mobilisation was linked with the political context and shared

grievances among supporters (Meyer, 2004). In this vein, the political opportunity structure is

considered as an explanatory theory to the emergence of a social movement.

According to Eisinger, the political opportunity structure comprises of static institutional

variables that can facilitate or repress collective action by altering specific strategies (Eisinger,

1973). This means the development of a social movement is highly affected by the political

constellation external to the movement itself (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996), unlike resource

mobilization theory (RMT) that emphasises financial support to motor a protest. Based on this

explanation, scholars design researches on the stable aspects of political structure to explain

the formation of a social movement. The design is aimed for political opportunity structure to

display a set of signs in understanding when contentious movements will appear (Tilly, 1996).

Although the importance has been known since 1970, the political context in shaping the

emergence, development, and the impact of social protest is rather recent (Meyer &

Staggenborg, 1996). The small number of researches that focus on testing political opportunity

structure against other factors produced different conclusions leaves a gap for researchers to

specify variables in testing the hypotheses (Meyer, 2004). These attributes serve as a

contemporary avenue for new research, yet implies the struggle in concluding a solid definition

of the theory (Meyer,2004).

Political opportunity structure theory as a main analytical tool, however, has its limitations.

First, the key concept in applying political opportunity structure is acknowledging that

mobilising protesters and affecting influence is contextual (Meyer, 2004). Hence, factors

outside the movement become important units in this theory, which varies case-by-case.

Second, as the adoption of the term can be broad, the framework is often criticized for

explaining a lot of dimensions within the political sphere that may ultimately explain nothing

at all (McAdam, 1996). There is a risk of overgeneralising factors to be considered as an

opportunity structure. Especially those related to the expansion of cultural opportunities that

extend the likelihood of emerging social movement (McAdam, 1996). Hence, it is necessary

to conceptualise and narrow the meaning of political opportunity structure into working key

features that can be measured analytically. As a first step, changing opportunities and threats

should be identified to conceptualise political opportunity structure.

people to take part in a movement; (2) threats such as repression from the authorities that may

avert contention. The latter is more fluctuating in nature compared to the former, in which

variables are stagnant.

Nevertheless, no single set of formulas can predict the emergence of a

social movement due to different factors depends on the contextual nature of a conflict.

Political opportunity structure becomes a “set of clues” when a collective action will occur

instead of a model that produces a social movement (Tarrow, 1996).

To address this issue, the following section reviews elements necessary to identify political

opportunity structure by borrowing concepts from Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1996) that are

suitable for this research. The concepts are built upon Eisinger’s (1973) theory of open and

closed government. Open government entails the suppression of riots by giving protesters a

conventional political means to address grievances while the closed government has minimum

openings that lead to the eruption of protest (Meyer, 2004).

Adding to Eisinger’s open and closed structure, Tilly identifies key concepts in defining

political opportunity structure: the nature of political systems (open versus closed), the

characteristics of the challengers (categorical, network-based, or combination), and measured

interests of the movement (Tilly, 1978 in Johnston, 2011). Tilly argues that the relationship

between protest and the openness of the political system is curvilinear. An open system that

has an accessible political process with a low repression rate has a smaller chance of witnessing

the emergence of a social movement. On the other spectrum, a repressive system will see a

similar pattern of low protest rate because of the higher cost in initiating a movement (Tilly,

1978 in Johnston, 2011). In between these two spectrums, the protest level differs depending

on the cost and the degree of open-closeness.

Taking a similar stance by departing from Eisinger’s open and close theory, McAdam

(1996) combines four overlapping concepts from Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al., (1992). Rucht

and Tarrow (1994). Through this integration, McAdam (1996) points out four main identifiers

of political opportunity structure, which are: (1) The openness or closedness of the political

system; (2) the stability or instability of elite alignments; (3) the presence or absence of elite

allies; (4) state’s capacity for repression. The fourth variable is inserted by McAdam in line to

some scholars such Della Porta (1995) who view the state’s repression as relational expressions,

hence should be an independent dimension. Insertion was based on significant evidence in the

history of state’s repressions in shaping the dynamics of collective action (McAdam, 1996).

By integrating McAdam’s concepts with Tilly’s curvilinear theory, four main concepts are

formulated:

A

. Government openness

According to Meyer, the ideal condition for a social movement to emerge is relative

openness (Meyer, 1993 in Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In an open condition, the state is

generally stable and political opportunities can emerge in the society. The main idea of this

concept is, when a system is open, it is highly likely for a protest to succeed. On the opposing

spectrum, Meyer also finds a lack of authorities’ receptiveness in allocating controversial

policies to create a condition favourable for activism (Meyer, 1990 in Meyer & Staggenborg,

1996). Conversely, when an issue is “closed” as there is no room left for change, movement is

unlikely to form.

B. Stability of government alignments

The second condition for a social movement to emerge is the state’s structures and capacity.

Movements are likely to emerge in states with a divided governmental authority (Meyer &

Staggenborg, 1996). In a unitary state, the government has a bigger possibility to implement a

policy without a huge challenge from internal opponents. On the contrary, a state divided

among branches have a higher chance for policy advocates to encounter clashes of interest

(Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). The latter setting implies a greater likelihood of the formation

of a social movement.

C. The presence of elite allies

The availability of elite support is one of the important aspects of a favourable political

opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994 in Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Government authorities

may remain uninvolved in response to movement challenges or they may aid or repress a

movement in a more or less unified fashion through the existence of allies at the elite

constellation (Tarrow, 1994 in Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

in 1989, McAdam rests his case that while the political system remained closed, a social

movement was still able to survive due to the lack of state’s repression. Nevertheless, it is

imperative to note that the absence of repression does not have a direct effect on an

institutionalised movement to the political system (McAdam 1996).

From this theoretical framework, a hypothesis is formulated

H: The government openness, stability of political alignments, presence of elite allies, and

policing strategy affect the emergence of social movement

III.

Methodology

3.1

Research Approach

For this research, a single case study or large N observation is chosen instead of

comparative study because it allows the research to “identify and estimate weak causal

relationships” (Toshkov, 2016). By using an in-depth single case study, a general theory can

be developed deductively (Toshkov, 2016 p. 29) through “a pilot case for which the theory is

most likely to hold” (Eckstein 1992 in Toshkov, 2016 p. 29). Since political opportunity

structure relies on the contextual and dynamic structure of government and society, a single

case study approach is able to investigate the effect of political opportunity structure on the

formation of social movement comprehensively.

The research uses qualitative content analysis to test the aforementioned hypothesis with a

prediction of a positive relationship between the independent variable and the dependent

variable. By referring to the political opportunity structure as the main framework, the theory

is encapsulated into a codebook. In the next step, the relationship between variables is analysed

by using deductive reasoning from the existing hypothesis.

In addition to the single case study, content analysis is mainly used in this research to make

a replicable and valid inference from texts (Krippendorff, 2004 p. 16). As a method, content

analysis is not restricted to written material. Other mediums that convey messages and

articulate a certain phenomenon can also be analysed (Krippendorff, 2014 p. 18). Messages

contained in the text is separated from its physical form and later analysed by analysts

conceptually (Krippendorff, 2014 p. 20). The reading of the text juxtaposed against social

context is used as the main tool in the content analysis method. In this way, objectivity and

systematic requirement of content analysis can be assured, not only limited to quantitative

methods but also qualitative such as political analysis (Krippendorff, 2014 p. 42).

Another feature of content analysis is the ability for texts to present information about

distance knowledge, ceased objects, or existing actions through symbols (Krippendorff, 2004

p. 19). Nevertheless, texts may infer various meanings relative to their contexts and purposes

(Krippendorff, 2004 p. 19). Hence, in the early stage of content analysis, a world should be

the researcher to funnel the range of possible interpretations into a specific context. Based on

these features, the content analysis method is assumed to be the most suitable technique for

this research. Content analysis is chosen for its feasibility in assessing text to generate meaning

and justifying reasonable interpretations of the social reality that took place. Referring to

Krippendorf (2004, p. 87), the qualitative content analysis is done in steps, starting from

selecting the relevant text, unitise the text, contextualising the circumstances related to the text,

and preparing an a priori research question. In this vein, a pre-conditioned contextual world is

explained in the case study section before the analysis.

Thee qualitative content analysis uses analytical abductive inferences through the process

of coding. Abductive inferences are chosen because it allows concluding inferences on indirect

observations through available texts (Krippendorff, 2014 p. 36). Conditions related to the

context of the texts are abducted through an analytical construction and systematically applied

in answering the research question. In this research, conditions are the result of the

operationalised theoretical framework mentioned in the previous chapter. The framework is

constructed in a codebook with associated definitions and indicators. Therefore, a reliable

application can be achieved by coding the texts that represent the picture of a phenomenon.

3.2

Validity, Reliability and Limitation

Since the nature of the content analysis is the deficiency of direct observational method,

validation is ex post facto through repeated analytical constructs (Krippendorff, 2014 p. 39).

Therefore, content analysis fits with this research topic as it has happened in the past time to

attain its validity. Moreover, content analysis as an unobtrusive technique will minimise the

errors and bias in data analysis since it distances itself from the phenomena. The use of

available data increases the degree of non-reactiveness which decreases data distortion to

ensure the validity (Krippendorff, 2004 p. 39).

The second step used in this research to measure the reliability is practicing the intra-coder

reliability. This step is done by ensuring the coding process uses a similar and consistent

measurement. Coding process is carried out periodically with similar amount of texts coded in

every session and repeatedly checked. Further, a simple computer search is used to facilitate in

searching certain keywords. In this way, errors by independent coder is minimised.

Moreover, to assure the validity of the study, the causal conclusion is expected with the

exclusion of alternative explanations that is justified by using conditioning (Toshkov, 2016 p.

25). This study conditions political opportunity structure as the main analytical tool and

reasoning to the formation of The Act to Defend Islam. Nevertheless, the research

acknowledges the its limitation, in which other theories of social movement may suffice as an

additional explanation to the formation of social protest instead of confounding variables.

As reliability entails measuring concepts with persistent measurement (Bryman, 2012), the

research uses codebook as the main referral in defining categories and classifications of coded

units. The sources of the coded units are assumed to be reliable since the main source for IV 1

and IV 2 is the government’s official data. For IV 3, only statements from the officials are

counted. In this way, reliability can be assured. Similarly, as Indonesian newspapers were

neutral in reporting The Act to Defend Islam (Prabowo, 2019), data for IV 4 to record the

state’s policing strategy is presumed to be reliable.

Another limitation of this research is access to data. Despite the extensive Indonesian

newspaper archives provided by Leiden University including the regional publications, the

library was not accessible due to physical restrictions imposed during the time this research

was conducted. Hence, this research only makes use of online archives provided by Factiva to

document the available Indonesian newspaper covering The Act to Defend Islam. Nevertheless,

the data is considered to be adequate as Factiva covered eight national newspaper outlet that is

more than satisfactory in picturing the contextual realities.

3.3

Case Selection

The phenomenon of The Act to Defend Islam is related to the Crisis and Management field,

specifically to the sub-section of understanding the rise of social movements. This case study

is chosen because of the knowledge gap in understanding The Act to Defend Islam using social

movement theory. The past publications have focused on dynamic mechanisms that born

internally from the movement, such as framing of grievances and identity as the substructure

to mobilise mass (see: Mujibuddin, 2018; Hadiz, 2018). Whereas, political opportunity

structure as a factor that has similar importance in understanding the social movement remains

unexplored. Hence, this research attempts to funnel the aspect of political opportunity structure

Second, the current political terrain in Indonesia with the political identity of Islam has

risen since 2014, the social movement that is characterized by a strong identity, such as the Act

to Defend Islam will remain relevant (Muhtadi, 2018) with a fear of further radicalization

(Ramadhan, 2018). Thus, it is imperative to understand the movement from a different

approach and look closer on plausible nodes of explanation, shall similar social movement take

place, and needed to be anticipated in the

future.

Investigating Islamic movement with the social movement theory, specifically political

opportunity structure, is essential to the rigorous study of social movements. Although scholars

in the past had attempted to answer the question of how collected opportunities and threats

generate a pre-condition for activism, none arrived at the same agreement (Tilly, 2003). Hence,

leaving the traditional model of social movement is needed to look at various case studies. New

research accrues new understanding of social movement that is highly contextual in nature,

without complying to an existing universality (Tilly, 2003). Departing from this point of view,

this research chooses Indonesia as a new case study, investigated with a different lens to

fruitfully achieve explanations of contemporary social movements.

3.4 Operationalisation of Key Variables

The dependent variable (DV) of this research is the formation and the emergence of the

movement. Scholars argue different operationalisation of social movement, from riots to unruly

activism (Eisinger, 1973; Button, 1978 in Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). This research uses the

approach of nondisruptive and permitted demonstrations under the name of The Act to Defend

Islam.

In regards to the independent variable (IV), three narrowed elements are operationalised by

using combinations of similar measurements by previous scholars. For IV (I), the definition of

government openness borrows the work of Meyer (Meyer, 1993 in Meyer & Staggenborg,

1996) as the laws and legislation related to the regulation of social movements. For IV 2,

operationalisation borrows Meyer and Minkoff (2004) signal model. The variable entails the

number of parliament seats given to the Islamic political party that supports the movement.

The number of seats given to the Islamic political party may indicate the division within

government authority. It also shows structural variables representing political alignment to

overview the stability of the government (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).

For IV 3, operationalisation borrows the signal model that represents the issue-specific

opportunity (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). The model consists of (IV 3) positive and negative

mention of the issue by the incumbent authorities such as president and ministers about the

emergence of The Act to Defend Islam. The variable may indicate the presence of elite allies

within the political structure that can reinforce the movement. Lastly, (IV 4) is the record of

states’ repression that may affect the social movement.

3.5

Data Collection

To collect data for The Act to Defend Islam demonstrations that took place between

2016-2019, Factiva will be mainly used. As the demonstrations were participated by a large number

of participants, each of the demonstrations was covered by the media. This is because the

demonstrations possess all the requirements of phenomena to be valued as news, which are:

the proximity, actuality, magnitude, impact, human interest inherited by the movement, and

the unusualness of the event (McCluskey, 2017, p. 21).

Regarding the independent variables, data was retrieved from the 1945 Constitution of the

Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian Police Archives, and Indonesian President Office to access

existing legislation concerning protest policing for IV 1. For IV 2, the Indonesian Parliament

website and media coverage were used as the main source to look at the political constellation

and assigned seat for parties supporting the movement. For IV 3 and IV 4, data was collected

from media to examine how the government authorities and elite actors perceive the social

movement by using content analysis. Expressions of support were collected from Factiva and

analysed further. To look for this context, several keywords was used for IV 3 and IV 4, both

in English and Indonesian to acquire larger media coverage. The analysis used codebook and

categorization tailored for this research by using the following possible keywords:

Variables

Source

Keywords

Method of

categorization

Constitution of the

Republic of Indonesia

(IV2) Stability

of political

alignments

Indonesian Parliament and

General Elections

Commissions website

-

Election period

in 2014 and

2019

(IV3) Presence

of elite allies

Factiva

Aksi Bela Islam (The

Act to Defend Islam),

Demo 212 (212

Demonstration)

Annually

(2016-2019)

(IV4) Protests

policing

Factiva

Aksi Bela Islam (The

Act to Defend Islam),

Demo 212 (212

Demonstration)

Annually

(2016-2019)

This study uses content analysis mainly for IV 4 and 5. For IV 2 and IV 3, information is

apparent enough to stand on its own without having to be coded. The reason is because for IV

2, information is mainly derived from legal documents while for IV 3, data are extracted from

the parliament website in a form of numbers. Both IV 2 and IV 3 are supplemented with

historical content tracing that is contextual to the reading of the legal document and the number

of parliament seats.

3.6 Designing Codebook

In creating a codebook for IV 3 and IV 4, it is necessary to map the actor who carried out

acts and the tone of their behaviour. For the presence of elites in IV 3, actors recorded are

authorities on the national level and head of districts. These political positions are considered

to be of high rank as they possess the capacity to issue laws and legislations. Further, inherited

characteristics that reflect the stance of authorities and elite are also recorded to map the

standpoints that are necessary for the analysis phase. Lastly, actions carried out by actors in

conveying the characteristics are also considered as important aspects to outline reactions

concerning the theory of political opportunity structure. Actions are classified into four main

activities: attending the demonstration, giving verbal commentaries related to the movement,

delivering a direct speech at the demonstration, and giving suggestions to participate in the

movement. These four actions are assumed to possess strong signals in expressing the stance

taken by the elites.

In regards to IV 4 on protest policing, a codebook is tailored to capture the repression and/or

assistance of government authorities. Unlike IV 3, IV 4 records concrete policing by the

government that is classified into four main acts: support in a form of special aid, instruction

for demonstrators to behave in a certain way, prohibition of a whole or parts of a demonstration,

and detention of protesters. In this vein, the research can outline the features of protest policing

that is necessary for the analysis phase. Further, actors recorded in IV 4 are those who have the

capacity for policing, which is principally police and military body. Nevertheless, several

ministries and the head of districts are also documented for their particular arrangements to the

movement.

3.7 Data Cleaning Process

In collecting data, this research uses Factiva as the largest database on printed and online

media provided by Leiden University. Factiva covers eight Indonesian newspapers as a result

of specific regional and language filter that was used for this study, which are: Antara, Jawa

Pos National Network, Investor Daily, Koran Tempo, Suara Pembaruan, Tempo Magazine,

Tempo.co, and The Jakarta Post. As this research is looking for analytical abductive inferences

from the text, it is not necessary to separate the media based on their political biases or

inclination. Moreover, editorials have also opted from the observation as they mainly consist

of reactionary stances by the newspaper.

In building archives for content analysis, a method of categorisation is used to separate data

periodically. The number of newspapers that has been cleaned and selected for this purpose are

shown below:

Year

Keywords

Newspaper hits

Selected data

Islam), Demo 212

(212 Demonstration)

2017

Aksi Bela Islam

(The Act to Defend

Islam), Demo 212

(212 Demonstration)

222 articles

11 articles

2018

Aksi Bela Islam

(The Act to Defend

Islam), Demo 212

(212 Demonstration)

127 articles

4 articles

2019

Aksi Bela Islam

(The Act to Defend

Islam), Demo 212

(212 Demonstration)

50 articles

5 articles

Firstly, data are cleaned from any duplicated articles between two keywords to avoid

repetition in data recording by using Factiva’s built-in sorting system. Afterwards, selected

articles are read thoroughly to be decided whether it consists of inferences that fit with any

category in the codebook. In this stage, articles that inherit opinions such as editorials,

commentaries, expert analysis, are separated and eliminated. Lastly, archived articles are

meticulously scanned for the second and coded into the code sheet. From these three

conscientious steps, the large number of newspaper articles are able to be reduced into a

feasible amount of data for the analysis phase.

IV.

Data Analysis

4.1 Approach

This research uses a deductive approach to test the hypotheses based on political

opportunity structure theory. For IV 1, the research looks at the existing legislation and laws

concerning social movement to attest government openness. The reading of the laws is

supplemented with historical context to explain further. For IV 2, the research looks at the

number of parliament seat given to the political party supporting the movement. Similar to IV

1, the research supplement historical context. Concerning IV 3 and IV 4, a codebook is

constructed to categorize and code data to ensure systematic reading. Further, data collected

are analysed within the framework of the existing theory. Each independent variable is

investigated separately to demonstrate the applicability of the political opportunity structure

theory in this selected case study. Results are expected to show whether indicators mentioned

in the operationalisation of the theory appear. Furthermore, findings are contextually linked to

the theory that can answer the research question.

4.2 Case Study Background

As mentioned in the methodology section, the research attempts to explain the background

of the case study. This is needed to create a contextual world that is important to the reading

of the variables. Therefore, a brief summary of events leading to the movement is explained

below.

In September 2016, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama replaced the previous governor Joko Widodo

who won the presidential election. During the campaigning season for the next gubernatorial

election, Basuki who also run for his second term, visited Kepulauan Seribu for his routine

inspection. In his visit, Basuki gave a speech that referred to one of the verses in the Qur’an.

His commentaries eventually triggered the Muslim community. He warned his audience “not

to be fooled/lied by those who use Al-Maidah verse 51”, which is about to the verse below:

“Believers! Do not take the Jews and the Christian for your allies. They are allied

with each other. And among you, he who takes them for allies shall be regarded as one

of them. Allah does not guide the wrong-doers.”

The clip of his recorded speech was uploaded to social media, attracting various reactions

from society. As the timeline unfolded, Basuki’s statement was alleged as blasphemy by the

Muslim community, who later demanded Basuki to be prosecuted under the Indonesian Penal

Code number 156a that reads:

“By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished aby person who deliberately

in public gives expression to feelings or commits and act, (a) which principally have the

character of being at enmity with, abusing or staining a religion, adhered to in Indonesia; (b)

with the intention to prevent a person to adhere to any religion based on the belief of the

almighty God.” (Directorate General of Law and Legislation, 1999)

The provocation in reaction to Basuki’s speech enticed a considerable attention partly due

to Basuki’s identity as a Christian with a Chinese descendant (Tempo, 2019), which is a unique

combination in Indonesia as a Muslim majority society. Moreover, there was a previous

coalition among Muslim social organisations such as Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and

National Movement for Guarding the Indonesian Ulama Council (GNFP MUI) concerning the

2017 gubernatorial election. Basuki’s case effortlessly became a headline as the peak of social

and political tension in 2016 (Badrun, 2016).

The incident became a reason for the offended Muslim communities to start a protest and

demand the government to prosecute Basuki under the penal code. Yet, in a broader sense, the

demonstration also expressed grievances on rejecting a leader that is not Muslim based on their

interpretation of the Qur’an verse. Protesters repeatedly used the word “infidel” in addressing

Basuki (Fealy, 2016). The movement was framed as a platform for Muslims who are upset not

only for Basuki’s statement but also for his identity as a non-Muslim. This reasoning makes

The Act to Defend Islam into the category of a new social movement for its religious purpose,

unlike traditional social movements that only focuses on economic and political goals (Badrun,

2016).

In addition to criticisms of Basuki’s identity as a non-Muslim, the protest quickly

transformed into a great social movement because of three additional accumulated reasons.

First, is the high social tension in Jakarta due to the mass eviction done under Basuki’s

administration that was frowned upon by a part of the society (Badrun, 2016). Second, is the

economic tension because of the slow economic growth Therefore the community demanded

the government for their accountability (Badrun, 2016). Lastly, is the tension created from the

communication mistake at Kepulauan Seribu (Badrun, 2016). With these mentioned

circumstances, The Act to Defend Islam was able to pan a lot of protesters who were aggrieved

by the tensions.

After the third demonstration of The Act to Defend Islam, the court released a ruling that

Basuki was indeed at fault, thus imprisoned Basuki and ended his serving time as a Governor

(Lamb, 2016). Although the demand for having Basuki prosecuted had been met, The Act to

Defend Islam that had transformed into a great social movement did not cease. After the

imprisonment of Basuki, the protesters now called “the alumni” planned an annual reunion that

took place on the 2

_{of December. The demonstration changed its name to “212 reunions” and}

had a wider range of demands. Nevertheless, the movement is still related to defending the

existence of Islam and the role of clerics. Apart from the reunion act, the alumnus also held

several protests outside the designated date 2

_{of December, as a reaction of various social and}

political issues in Indonesia related to the life of Muslims in general (CNN, 2019).

4.3 IV 1: Assessing Government Openness Towards Social movement

Government openness is defined as government receptiveness towards the creation of a

social movement. As a democratic country, social movements’ existence to channel aggrieved

voices should be considered as a routine. Yet, it is not accidental that some countries are more

closed in the countenance of such an event. To measure a country’s susceptibility, one can refer

to the existing legislation in amplifying its legal standing. However, it is indispensable to

acknowledge that countries may execute repression towards collective action despite its

legality. Therefore, this research corroborates the state’s restraint as a separate variable, which

will be explained in the IV 4 section.

Under Suharto’s regime from 1967-1988, Indonesia was an authoritarian state. The three

decades era was coined as the New Order government. This nature affected the freedom of

speech in the country, marked by the poor human rights record (Anwar, 2005). On occasions

where the people were demonstrating against the government, protesters were arrested and

jailed (Anwar, 2005). There were several attempts by the opposing politicians to use other

channels in criticizing Suharto through parliament. However, the efforts were outlawed by the

then-president by tightening political control. Activities that had political nature were banned

from university campuses with the implementation of strict media censorship. The policy was

Furthermore, political critics voicing out their opinion were imprisoned and suffered from

social and economic exclusion. The robust policing made Suharto’s regime ‘invincible’

(Anwar, 2005).

In regulating social movements, the New Order regime used legal routes in shaping society

(Boudreau, 1999). Biased laws benefitting the elites and government bodies were established

and topped with the compromised and corrupted judicial system. Indonesian laws forced

independent political parties to merge. Therefore, the state can contain and rule challengers and

rivals effortlessly (Boudreau, 1999). On top of that, the prosecution of activists for voicing

opinions against the government were heavily modulated. Because of these circumstances, a

magnified movement with organizers to coordinate protests was rare. Collective actions were

small in number, isolated, and quickly lost their momentum to reach the movement’s goals

(Boudreau, 1999). Only a few numbers of movements succeeded in gaining immensity with an

expected unfortunate outcome, where challengers were arrested and jailed (Boudreau, 1999).

Nearing the end of Suharto’s regime, the country faced a major recession that encapsulated

the years of repression of social movements. Tensions that produced riots had forced the

Suharto regime to hold an emergency March Special Session of the People’s Consultative

Assembly. Parallelly, opposition leaders were rumoured to mobilize mass in disrupting the

Special Sessions. However, student activists were given indirect permission through a

statement by the Armed Forces General that demonstrations were never banned as long as

carried out in respective places. This statement was translated as a leeway for students to protest,

resulting in a coordinated student protest in demanding Suharto to resign. The unrest led to a

stalemate between students and the state, escalated with the monetary crisis and ethnic tension

in the society. The movement ended with the killing of student protesters with a death toll of

2,244 people and 31 missing (Boudreau, 1999). Due to societal, political, and economic

pressure, Suharto resigned after 31 years. The year 1998 is coined as the revolution year for

ending the decades of the authoritarian regime.

As mentioned previously, Indonesian history on social movement was grimly painted

before 1998 before the revolution year. Despite the right to seek for freedom of aspiring one’s

opinion in public under the 1945 constitution, this independence was repressed under the

authoritarianism regime. It was not until 1998, the newly appointed president Habibi signed

new legislation explicitly directed for the freedom of speech under law number 9 the year 1998

on The Freedom to Deliver Opinion in Public. This document is contently extensive, with rules

on the manner of social movements under the suggestive law, such as procedures, etiquette,

and obligations that need to be upheld. The document also refers to what constitutes as

contentious repertoires and penal justice to its violators. As mentioned in Article 1.3 of the

legislation:

“ Unjuk rasa atau Demonstrasi adalah kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh seseorang atau

lebih untuk mengeluarkan pikiran dengan lisan, tulisan, dan sebagainya secara

demonstratif di muka umum.” (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1998)

“Demonstration is an activity carried out by one person to more to express thoughts

verbally, in writing, and so on in public” (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1998)

A demonstration is a permitted form of repertoire, as a channel to express one’s opinion.

Other types such as pawai (parade) as a way of expressing views with a procession on public

space; rapat bebas (open meeting) held to express opinions with a particular theme;

and mimbar bebas (open forum) as an activity to express views in public freely without a

specific theme are mentioned in the respective article 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 and also considered as

legal. In its disposal, these actions are obliged to follow the written rules, as mentioned in

section IV under the title of Forms and Procedures of Delivering Opinions in Public. In article

6, protesters are responsible for:

a. Menghormati hak-hak dan kebebasan orang lain;

b. Menghormati aturan-aturan moral yang diakui umum;

c. Menaati hukum dan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku;

d. Menjaga dan menghormati keamanan dan ketertiban umum; dan

e. Menjaga keutuhan persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa

a. Respect the rights and freedoms of others;

b. Respect generally accepted moral rules;

e. Maintain the integrity and national unity

The extensive procedures are further elaborated on Article 9.2, limiting protest actions on

several places such as the Presidential area, religious building, military institution, hospital,

ports, stations, and vital national objects. Protesters are also prohibited from carrying objects

that may endanger public safety, as coerced on Article 9.3. Moreover, Article 10 and 11

compels demonstrators to inform the police in a written form along with details on locations,

the number of participants, and the ratio between participants and the responsible officers from

the respected groups or organisations. In response, police must act accordingly to the collective

action requests by preparing coordination with related institutions in securing the public space,

as obligated in Article 13. Shall these provisions violated, the challengers may be subjugated

to penal code, specifically for violation of Article 6, 9.2., 9.3, 10, and 11. Further, those who

are struggling to hinder the process of delivering opinions in public as a part of civil rights can

be penalized as it falls under a criminal act.

In addition to the law number 9 year 1998 on The Freedom to Deliver Opinion in Public,

the legality of conducting collective action is substantiated under The Regulation of The Head

of National Police of Indonesia number 7year 2012 on Procedures for Management of Service,

Security, and Administration of Delivering Opinion in Public. This document is used as the

referral document in managing actions of delivering opinions in an orderly manner and

achieving adequate coordination between the activists and police. Articles mentioned in this

regulation entails detailed practices in managing social movement collective action, ranging

from administrative proceedings, aspecific time allowed for protesters to run their repertoires,

to services required by the police to accommodate the protesters (Kepala Kepolisian Negara

Republik Indonesia, 2012).

4.3.1 Contextualising Laws and Regulations with Political Opportunity Structure

The existence of legislation or regulations is operationalised as the indicator for the State’s

openness towards the collective action of a social movement. In the case of Indonesia, the

government’s stance after the revolution year abruptly changed in regards to voicing opinion

in the public sphere. The government inclines towards providing more space for freedom of

speech, as indicated in the law number 9 year 1998 on The Freedom to Deliver Opinion in

Public and The Regulation of The Head of National Police of Indonesia number 7 year 2012

on Procedures for Management of Service, Security, and Administration of Delivering Opinion

in Public. Compared to before 1998, the legality of comprising freedom of speech was only

incorporated under the 1945 constitution Article 28 that reads

“Kemerdekaan berserikat dan berkumpul, mengeluarkan pikiran dengan lisan dan

tulisan dan sebaginya ditetapkan dengan Undang-undang.” (Republik Indonesia, 1945)

“The liberties of association and assembly, the freedom of thought expressed

verbally or in writing and similar rights are to be determined by law” (Republik

Indonesia, 1945)

The above text was the sole referral to the freedom of expression before the revolution year,

which further elaborated regulations were absent. It is clear to assume that before the revolution

year, laws or permits on collective action were not extensive and somewhat simplified into one

sentence without specific annotation. Having the mentioned article contrasted to the current

provisions for delivering opinions in public, the latter is more receptive by acknowledging

collective action’s extensive procedures.

In addition to the minimum regulations, the banning of political activities, specifically at

university campuses, halted the freedom of expression as fundamental civil rights (Saunders,

1998). In 1978, then Minister of Education and Culture Daoed Joesoef introduced Normalisasi

Kehidupan Kampus/ Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan (Normalisation of Campus Life/

Student Coordination Board) shortened as NKK/BKK as a concept at all universities in

Indonesia. Under this concept, students were prohibited from assembling and establishing any

student body purported to mobilise mass. Through Ministerial decree number 0156/U/1978,

the ministry decided that the primary responsibility of the university is to generate students

with the knowledge needed for the workforce. Hence, being involved in politics is a form of

engaging in political activities that will distort the purpose of the university from its nature.

Nevertheless, the NKK/BKK ceased with later construction and improvement of the concept

and allowed students to be involved in politics and demonstrations. Moreover, the end of the

Suharto regime with the introduction of law number 9, year 1998 on The Freedom to Deliver

Opinion in Public, also opened the possibility to challenge the government through

demonstrations.

Islam, it was clear the movement took place after 1998 with easing legislations underpin the

creation of the demonstration. The Act to Defend Islam organisers were recorded to cooperate

with Police apparatus in fulfilling the regulations stated in law number 9 year 1998 on The

Freedom to Deliver Opinion in Public and Regulation of The Head of National Police of

Indonesia number 7 year 2012. The government’s openness towards The Act to Defend Islam

has influenced the easiness of protesters to assemble and deliver their grievances.

This state of affairs is in line with Tilly’s (1978) curvilinear theory on state’s openness,

which reads the more open a government is the higher chance the society witnesses a formation

of social movements. The government openness, mark by its laws and regulations that are

receptive to social movement collective action can also be considered as what Tarrow (1996)

explained as the first main dimension of political opportunity structure. Laws and regulations

are a set of consistent variables that appeal to protesters to take part in a certain movement, as

it is highly facilitated by the state

4.4 Assessing Indonesian Political Alignments

Political opportunity structures focus on the alignments of support in the political structure

that is operationalised as the number of politicians supporting the Act to Defend Islam.

Although many politicians from various political parties had admitted their presence at the

chain demonstrations, only one political party openly supported the movement through an

official written statement, namely Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), is one of the prominant Islamic parties in Indonesia

established in 1998. The party first admittance to the political contestation in the 1999 election,

although losing to the big parties. Nevertheless, PKS had its breakthrough in 2004, where the

party succeeded in gathering 7.34% of the support that equals 45 parliament seats out of 550

seats (Hilmy, 2010, p. 183). PKS embarked its progress ever since its monumental win for a

newly established political party. PKS as a political party, refers to Islamic sharia as its central

ideology. The party is often coined as the positive development of the new Islamic movement

in Indonesia. Members of PKS are recruited from an early age, mostly college students through

Islamic organisations on the university campus (Rahmat, 2008, p. 28). PKS is also known for

its ability to mobilise mass, despite the small number of parliament seats compared to other

older parties (Rahmat, 2008, p. 57).

During the Suharto era, where social movements were not given space to emanate, Islamic

political movements were also scrutinised. Since Indonesia is a non-theocratic country, any

political group supporting the adaptation of Islamic sharia in the country was frowned upon.

Islamic groups were seen as a threat to the government (Platzdasch, 2009, p. 269) and

stigmatised as the right-wing extremist, which resulted in the limitation of Islamic groups'

movement in public. After the revolution year, Islamic political groups gradually rose to the

surface and attracted society’s attention with the new political freedom. One of the

embodiments of this phenomenon was the creation of PKS. Islamic party was used as a channel

for those who were repressed in expressing their belief on state and Islamism. PKS works the

stream that operated within the system recognises democracy, a Meliorist type that stands

between democracy and Islamism (Hilmy, 2010, p. 244). On another spectrum, the society with

a strong belief in Islamism rejected the conceptualisation of chose to build Islamic

organisations outside the formal political system (Hilmy, 2010, p. 244). Most of these groups

extremely rejected democracy as the main foundation of Indonesia and actively proposed the

whole caliphate and sharia law as the state’s ideology.

Nevertheless, PKS and its ‘middle ground’ ideology is still a recurring issue in how the

party is perceived. PKS elites often struggle in presenting the party image, especially since the

Islamic sharia ideology is seen to be incompatible with the legal concept of the Indonesian

nation-state. Although PKS has successfully entered the democratic election scene, it is very

unlikely for PKS activists to uphold values such as freedom of religion and other civil liberties

internally. PKS politicians and activists possess limited freedom to be against party ideology,

hence to act outside parties’ guidelines will be considered as unfaithful. The centralised

authority of PKS makes members deploy activism as instructed by the party council through

the internal code of conduct (Platzdasch, 2009, p. 266) and inherited culture of tarbiyyah that

puts pressure on collective action (Nurdin, Saputra, & Prayitno, 2018, p. 115). Thus, despite

its struggle in suiting its ideology in a bigger context of Indonesian democracy, PKS can be

forefront in mobilising mass in collective actions. Indeed, this capacity to be engaged in a social

movement is affected by the party’s culture. It is also supplemented by Indonesian Muslims

that resonate with the party’s Islamist ideology, perceived as a supremacist in the society to

those who believe (Platzdasch, 2009, p. 322).

The Act to Defend Islam was founded by the society, specifically Muslims who demanded

the ex-governor of Jakarta to be prosecuted for alleged blasphemy. The mass of protests

organised by Islamic mass organisations attracted not only its members but also Muslim

citizens in general who resonates with the demand of The Act to Defend Islam. In reaction to

the first and second The Act to Defend Islam, PKS responded to the momentum by releasing a

written statement on the party’s stance towards the mass demonstration, released on the 2

_of

December 2016. The statement (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2016) reads five main points, which

concluded as:

1. The party supports the government’s efforts to protect and facilitate The Act to Defend

Islam demonstration according to the existing laws and regulations

2. The party supports that the movement is established to demand the rule of law on any

criminal act, specifically related to defamation of religion for it means ripping apart the

unity and diversity of Indonesia

3. The party reminds the law enforcer not to halt the effort of delivering public opinions

for it is the constitutional right of every citizen, protected under the regulation number

9, year 1998

4. The party reminds law enforcers who have found Basuki Tjahaja Purnama guilty should

be fair and professional. The party also encouraged citizens to guard the law process

5. The party called out all Indonesians, including PKS members to participate in The Act

to Defend Islam, to work hand-in-hand in protecting the unity of the nation

Through this written statement, it can be adjudged that PKS utterly reinforces The Act to

Defend Islam as a legitimate social movement. Further, PKS proposes its member to participate

in the repertoire shows a strong approval of the demonstration. Several PKS activists and

politicians expressed their support and explicit instruction for PKS members to attend and

celebrate the social movement although. Yet, PKS cautioned the supporters not to bring parties’

attributes such as flags and logos (CNN, 2018). PKS support to the movement is critical to the

protester’s endurance, let alone the possibility for the movement to succeed in meeting its

demands as it has a strong back up in the political constellation. This point is fortified with

PKS position in the government, marked by the number of parliament seats given to PKS

during years when The Act to Defend Islam took place. The number is shown below: