The European experience in Ukraine : a neorealist examination of the European Action Service intervention to the crisis in Ukraine from 2012 to 2015

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The European Experience in

Ukraine

A Neorealist examination of the European External Action

Service intervention in response to the crisis in Ukraine from

2012 to 2015

6/23/2017

Student ID: 11266031

Student Name: Nicholas Richebacher Supervisor: Dr. Rocco Bellanova Second Reader: Prof. Abbey Steele

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Abstract

The European External Action Service established in 2011 is the prominent diplomatic and security organization representing the EU on the world stage. Its purpose is to further EU interests based on fundamental principles of democracy, as well as lead diplomatic and military operations. This research focuses on one such effort: the 2014 intervention in Ukraine by the EU.

This mission originated as a strictly cooperative effort between the EU and Ukraine with the objective to foster deeper relationships between the two countries. While a variety of reasons initially motivated the desire to establish closer ties, a development that dramatically accelerated and shaped the relationship was the conflict with Russia during which the Russian Federation annexed parts of Ukraine.

Through a Neorealist interpretation, this research seeks to explain the adaptation of EU security policy in an ever-expanding field of security threats. Through close examination and contextualization of EEAS activities in Ukraine, a greater understanding of the evolving field of security can be examined. This adaptation to new security threats is at the forefront of the desire to develop preemptive measures against conflict escalation and continuation.

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Table of Figures

Figure 1 – EEAS Organization ...8

Figure 2 – Eastern Partnership ...9

Figure 3 – CSDP Hierarchy ... 10

Figure 4 – CSDP Map ... 11

Figure 5 – Crisis Response Curve ... 16

Figure 6 – High Representative Chain of Command ... 21

Figure 7 – Assistance Type by Security Sector... 29

Figure 8 – Assistance Type by Security Sector with timeline ... 31

Figure 9 – Ukraine Oil Map ... 41

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This study examines the security assistance provided by the EU to Ukraine and the relationship between the two countries. It explores and analyzes the services offered and provided to the Ukrainian government by the EEAS and through its subsidiary organizations, such as the EUAM Ukraine, from 2012-2015. Thus, the central research question is:‘How has the European External Action Service supported security efforts in Ukraine from 2012-2015’?

This inquiry leads to the supplementary puzzle of this research. Does the identification of the EEAS strategy to combat a hostile nation state’s attempt to overthrow a government through

unconventional methods provide insight into methods to fight hybrid wars? This question is relevant, as an examination of the measures taken by the EEAS provides visibility into how its assistance to Ukraine has not only helped the Ukrainian state progress towards a stable democratic system, but simultaneously furthered EU interests through the creation of a diplomatic buffer between Russia and Ukraine.

While nobody has declared war in Ukraine in a conventional sense of the word, another kind of conflict is waged – a hybrid war. This type of conflict presents proxies and destabilization efforts that are indistinguishable in their narratives of aggression (Axe, 2013, pg. 9). These narratives of antagonism, pursued by the Kremlin, are in direct violation of not only international law, but present hostile acts and intentions not seen on the European continent since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting destabilizing effects in the Bosnian War in 1992 (UCDP,2017,1989-2017). For Russia, aggressive behavior is not a new development, but rather mirrors an antagonism of other conflicts in the region during recent decades. Grigas, (2016) sums up the position of current and previous examples of Russian reimperialization as follows:

“Perhaps the most significant commonality shared by Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine is the clarity with which their recent histories reveal the trajectory of Russian reimperialization. Equally striking is the similarity with which Russian policies (particularly passportization, information warfare, and calls for protection) have been enacted in these three states at different time periods.” (Grigas, 2016, pg. 95)

Grigas explains ‘reimperialization’ as Russia’s newfound interest in the Baltics; an interest that is not so recent. After all, Russia aggressively perused destabilization efforts within multiple former Soviet satellite states, for example in neighboring Georgia, which the Russian Federation invaded in 2008 (Grigas, 2016, pg., 95-86). Ukraine just happens to be the most recent incident in which Russia has aggressively influenced or directly intervened with military force,

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6 | P a g e What characterizes these wars is that they are not conventional, nor are they meant to be conceived as such. In the current international system, wars have become far more complex than their earlier counterparts, or as Davidovic, (2015) explains when speaking of the ‘changing faces of war’: “The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war.” (Davidovic, 2015, pg. 603-604). Whetham (2016) writes based on works done by Russell Glyn.

“Russell Glyn has suggested that the hybrid threat can be characterized as when “an adversary... simultaneously and adaptively employs (1) political, military, economic, social, and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/criminal warfare methods.” This could involve a combination of state and nonstate actors in the process.” (Whetham, 2016, pg.56-57- [Referencing Glyn, 2009]

War is no longer based in the kinetic realm, but has instead, reshaped itself into something far more complex and resilient. Entire countries can be brought to their knees without a single shot being fired Whetham, (2016). The interdependence of nation states in areas such as communication networks, social media, cell phones, drones, has allowed for the perversion of these technologies. No longer is war something occurring in a remote country or a foreign narrative shared by a few; now ideas can spread through the click of a mouse and observed through the lenses of a drone. The damages of war are no longer used strictly for prevention, but for encouragement, as ISIS does in its propaganda wars by turning footage of war, into means of recruitment for the organization Whetham (2016). Counter-terrorism, military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring, Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Baltic unrest, and cyber-attacks have one thing in common, they do not conform to the traditional perspective on conflict (Whetham 2016). Instead of states moving armies and tanks against each other in the defined oppositional configuration we now have powerful, violent non-state actors representing international organizations Whetham (2016). However, the change did not stop with the actors, rather the actors brought change to the methods of conflict, the environments in which they occur and the context in which they evolve.

To study the effect of these changes I chose the Ukraine / Russia conflict. The conflict in Ukraine is classified as a Hybrid war for this thesis, because of its similarity to the components of such as war outlined by Glyn (2009) and referenced by Whetham (2016).

This research paper explores how the EU chose to address the highly ambiguous situation in Ukraine, which includes propaganda manipulation, boots on the ground, lack of distinction between

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7 | P a g e civilians and combatants, historical alliances, and civil war elements. Of interest is that these conflict features are shared at various levels across the globe under different circumstances, while in contrast, the EU’s response is not broadly shared because unlike other conflict partakers it perceives security through a non-traditional perspective that views security through a comprehensive lens that includes multi-faceted internal and external considerations.

The benefit of this research is that it helps to further the development of additional insight into the EU’s security stratagem in Eastern Europe and thereby expands the discourse surrounding emerging security concerns around the world.

1.1- EUROPEAN UNION:

The European Union (EU) plays a significant role in international affairs through diplomacy, trade, development aid and management of global relationships. While the EU is often perceived as an organization primarily focused on economic and political issues its reach goes further, as it is also actively involved in the development of security policies. (Dijkstra, 2013, pg. 46-49) In fact, the idea of a common defense policy for Europe dates to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels. (Dijkstra, 2013, pg.47-49) A mutual defense clause in this treaty created the underpinnings for the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), which in conjunction with NATO remained the primary medium for security and defense dialogue until 1990 (EEAS, 2016)

After the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the development of Balkan conflicts in EU neighboring countries, it became apparent that the EU needed to assume a more proactive stance regarding crisis management and conflict prevention. A flurry of agreements and treaties culminated in 2003 with the creation of a taskforce led by EU High Representative Javier Solana with the objective to develop a Security Strategy for Europe (SSE) – (EEAS, 2016). The resulting document (A Secure Europe in a

Better World) comprehensively analyzed key EU security challenges and their implications (EEAS, 2016).

In 2008, a revision of the paper became the foundation for the Lisbon Treaty. (EEAS, 2016)

The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 and was the cornerstone of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and includes a mutual assistance and solidarity clause. It enabled the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Combining multiple organizations and two distinct functions into one new position created the ability to

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8 | P a g e bring all necessary EU assets together and design comprehensive EU crisis management solutions. (EEAS, 2016).

Since 2011 the European External Action Service (EEAS) has become the European Union's diplomatic service. It has its headquarters in Brussels and 141 delegations and offices around the world. It ensures that the voice of the European Union and its member states are heard in the world (EEAS, 2016). The organization separates its services into distinct support areas. Among the most critical are: material assistance, policy reform, as well as social and security programs (European Action Service, 2016). The EEAS and its direct predecessors have sponsored nine civilian missions and six military operations since 20041 (EEAS,2016). The chart below shows the organization's overall structure (EEAS, 2016).

Figure 1 – EEAS Organization (EEAS, 2016)

1.2 - EEAS structure:

The EEAS divides mission responsibilities into five geographic macro regions, which are: 1) Africa, 2) Americas, 3) Asia and Pacific, 4) Europe and Central Asia, 5) the Middle East and North Africa. Macroregions are further divided into sub-regions, and the operational requirements of a given region determine the respective policies and agenda.

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9 | P a g e EEAS security efforts are defined as actions or other support provided to Ukraine to preserve and combat external or internal threats to the state. The Neorealist theoretical framework divides security activities into four categories, they are Economic & Financial, Law Enforcement, Military Assistance & External Security, and Diplomatic & Social Programs.

Eastern Partnership (EP): The sub-region relevant for this research is the EP, which falls under the

“Europe and Central Asia” umbrella. The EP consists of six countries, they are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EP's purpose is to share the common values among these six nations and the EU. Under the guidance of the EEAS, the EP partnership supports a range of advisory activities related to financials, advisory-, and security actions with the objective to develop, strengthen and ensure healthy democracies.

The EP states its goals as:

“…based on a commitment to the principles of international law and fundamental values -

democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also encompasses support for a market economy, sustainable development and good governance.” (EEAS, 2016)

EP activities are divided into country-specific organizations and missions. This research focuses on two organizations most closely tied to Ukrainian actions, which are: 1) European Union Advisory Mission, 2) Common Security and Defense Policy Organization.

1.3 - European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM):

The EUAM was established in December 2014 at the direct request of the Ukraine with the sole focus to support and assist the Ukrainian government (EUAM, 2015). The EUAM’s mission is:

“To assist relevant Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights.” (EUAM, 2015)

Along with this mission, the EUAM outlined in 2016 further developments and priorities while upholding the reforms started in 2014 (EUAM, 2015).

Figure 2 – Eastern Partnership (EEAS, 2016)

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10 | P a g e EUAM Priorities (EUAM, 2015) are:

1. Strategic advice on civilian security sector reform and the need to develop civilian security strategies

(EUAM, 2015)

2. Support for the implementation of reforms, through the delivery of hands-on advice, training and other projects

(EUAM, 2015)

3. Cooperation and coordination, to ensure that reform efforts are coordinated with Ukrainian and international actors

(EUAM, 2015)

1.4 - Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

The CSDP is named after its namesake policy, the ‘Common Security and Defense Policy’ (CSDP). In contrast to the EUAM, the CSDP focuses on matters related to military operations and the training of domestic security and defense forces in supported countries. The idea of a common defense policy for Europe dates as far back as 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels (CSDP, 2017). More recently, to enable the European Union to assume its responsibilities fully for crisis management, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish a permanent security and military structure outside the authority of individual countries. Figure 4 shows the organization chart of the CSDP policy. Figure 3 shows a map with a list of countries in which the CSDP or its direct predecessor have operated.

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11 | P a g e The CDPS’s mission is:

“The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.” (CSDP, 2017).

1.5 - Modern Ukraine

Ukraine descended into a state of disarray

when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. Many in the West hoped for the rise of a Ukrainian democracy and the embrace of democratic institutions. However, this scenario did not transpire. The void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting process towards self-government was stymied by the inability to evolve from the deep-seated roots of the previous Soviet rule, which had established a monopoly on a power reserved for the Communist Party (Subtelny, 2000). By mid-1991, as finally, the grip of the Communist-dominated political sphere started to loosen the resulting vacuum not unexpectedly led to internal division and conflict.

By 1993, Ukrainian society had splintered into a multitude of parties and interest groups, all advocating for radically different directions in governance. While the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 is often associated with the splintering of the political system starting in the early 90s, its roots can be traced to other contributing factors based on its long historical relationship with Russia. One prominent group, under the leadership of Petro Symonenko located in the Donetsk, rallied those who still believed in the Communist cause. As many regions of Ukraine were negatively affected by the fall of the Soviet Union his base grew, especially in the Donetsk and Crimea regions (Subtelny, 2000). In contrast, a right-wing splinter faction, in the western part of Ukraine, which was dominated by the National Democrats advocated for integration with Western Europe. (Subtelny, 2000).

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1.6 - What Caused the 2014 Crisis?

The 2014 crisis, as explained in the previous paragraph, grew out of deep-seated cultural tensions and clashes of political ideologies. These pressures became evident with the rejection of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU directed by President Victor Yanukovych. (Satter, 2014, pg. 6-9) The denunciation consequently led to a strong constituent backlash against the decision, which gave rise to a protest movement around the country which soon became the point of contention for an East versus West polarization. Sotiriou (2015) “Street revolts immediately erupted with a vigor that would later transform them into an intractable conflict between the pro-EU and the pro-Russian parts of the country.” (Sotiriou, 2015, pg. 52-54). The uprising was the direct result of the corruption surrounding the Yanukovych administration, as well as the deep divide between the pro-EU western section of the country those that with deep-rooted cultural ties to the Russian Federation in the East. The prominence of this cultural legacy is explained by Sotiriou (2015) when he writes how multifaceted circumstances expressed themselves in a complex conflict motivated by factors far more complicated than the actions of a single corrupt president.

“So it happened. The 2013–2015 crisis brought to the fore the regional political preferences of the early post-soviet period in an absolute circular course. In the case of Crimea, the data showed that the population started gradually to lose all the more its trust in Ukraine’s state institutions, first by calling, albeit divided, for more rights and powers within the then current status of autonomy as a part of Ukraine.”

(Sotiriou, 2015, pg. 64)

In other words, the Ukrainian crisis developed through a combination of colliding issues that due to their perceived irreconcilability led to the referendum and separation of the Crimea. Whether legitimate or not, the situation showed that the Crimean people had lost faith in the ability of the Ukrainian government. This lack of trust by the disenfranchised members of the Crimea enable the Russian Federation to coerce the population into holding a referendum which would lead to the separation of the Crimean Peninsula, as recognized by the Russian Federation (Sotiriou, 2015, pg. 64).

Thus, Ukraine finds itself sandwiched between two contrasting forces. On one side is the West represented by the EU and US, while on the other is a resurgent Russia absorbed in the historical significance of the Crimea and Donetsk regions to its interests. With both sides claiming the other as the

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13 | P a g e provocateur the relationship between the West and East severely degraded after February-March 2014, when the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine (Kuzio, 2016, pg. 103). The invasion and the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation led to the establishment of the Donetsk Republic known as the ‘separatists’ by the Ukrainian’s and supported by the Russians through legitimization and support of military equipment (Kuzio, 2016).

Chapter 2: State of The Art

Due to the recency of the Ukrainian crisis, literature about the EEAS / Ukraine relationship is very limited; the academic literature that does exist analysis the conflict resulting from the annexation by the Russian Federation in 2014. The material focuses primarily on unique facets of the EEAS/Ukraine relationship, instead of exploring the diverse interrelated set of essential characteristics surrounding this conflict. Nonetheless, despite the limited discourse material five distinct conceptualizations could be identified and combined to create a unified discourse around the research question:

Discourse I: EEAS Organization & Agenda-Setting

Examines the organizational development and governing rules of agenda-setting by the EEAS and EUAM. This topic is important because it provides insight into policy formation, promotion and implementation. Implementation can then be used as diagnostic tools to detect associations between security events and the agenda adaptation.

Discourse II: Theoretical Reasoning

Explores the reasons for the EEAS interventions in Ukraine, as well as the overall EEAS / Ukraine relationship based on the reasoning from the neorealism school.

Discourse III: Military & Defense

Addresses topic of military force and lethal aid within the EEAS through the CSDP. Discourse IV: EEAS & NATO

Discusses differences between EEAS and NATO capabilities and the reasons for them. Discourse V: Explaining The EEAS & Ukraine

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2.1 - Discourse 1: EEAS Organization & Agenda-Setting

“Agenda Setting is the first and indispensable phase in any policy-making process.” (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, pg. 1319-1320).

Agendas and agenda-setting are critical functions within every organization. They provide insight into purpose, priority, and urgency of specific topics or tasks, as well as offer historical accountability as they reflect insight into discussions and possibly decisions. In the context of this research topic, the relevance of agenda analysis is that it reveals the fundamental approach applied to the Ukraine. It reveals whether the EU approached the conflict with a preconceived notion of a solution based on fixed/traditional thinking or through a dynamic approach enabling dynamic response to the changing nature of the struggle. In the context of this thesis, EEAS agenda changes from 2012 – 2015 are derived from changes in topics, priorities, and actions based on documents published directly by the relevant organizations; they shed light on the nature of modern security discourse. Deviations between the agenda preceding and following the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation identify observable links between before and after policies and deviations from the original agenda-setting is evidence of a relationship between the EEAS, and the discussion surrounding counterbalancing.

Agenda-setting also highlights EEAS restrictions in its ability to conduct operations. Through a

complex set of ‘check & balances,2’ these limitations were deliberately designed to conform with the underlying the EU governmental framework. After all, at the heart of the EEAS strategy in Ukraine the goal is to prevent the escalation of the conflict (EEAS, 2016). Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (2013) about the original four stages set out by Prince (2011) developed their classification contained within the EEAS agenda-setting process to show how the EEAS intervention was developed.

Mobilizing Support:

Per Vanhoonacker & Pomorska (2013; Prince, 2011) promoting Ukraine’s situation through the European Union’s hierarchy was the first step. A step that is accomplished using vertical or horizontal ties and depends on the organization's position and prominence within the larger EU framework. Two developments had to occur for the EEAS to create effective Ukraine support.

2_{Checks & Balances is an American bureaucratic system to prevent one body of government from becoming too} powerful.

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15 | P a g e The first was a consolidation of power through the acceptance of the Lisbon Treaty. “The Lisbon Treaty aimed to address the continuity and leadership problems by installing a longer-term chair both at the level of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The latter is the dual-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who besides chairing the FAC is also Vice-President of the European Commission. She is assisted by her foreign policy administration, the EEAS. Like the member states, the HR has the right to put forward foreign policy proposals.” (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, pg. 1319). The main High Representative (HR) during the Crimea annexation was Federica Mogherini (EEAS, 2016) who consequently spearheaded the original EEAS missions in Ukraine. As such, missions undertaken by the EEAS, are in direct correlation with the HR’s agenda in the region. The second development was the official assignment of Ukraine’s mission to the EEAS, which created an organizational assignment and consequently responsibility, as well as accountability. This move was supported by the HR Federica Mogherini who was already focused on combatting Russian aggression in 2014 (Federica Mogherini at EP Plenary, 2015). The vast powers associated with the position of High Representative enables Federica Mogherini to shape and direct support through the channels of the EEAS. As such, she is a powerful actor who has a profound influence on the decision-making process within the organization.

Arousing Interest:

The second step is arousing interest and refers to the ability to create support Vanhoonacker & Pomorska (2013). The EEAS, which prides itself on its soft touch and ability to provide humanitarian assistance, security reform, democratic reforms and a host of other sectors (EEAS, 2016) surprised the Western world when it proclaimed that Ukraine situation had escalated to a crisis and constituted a breach of the International Law (EEAS, 2016). Vanhoonacker & Pomroska (2013) explain:

“The success in mobilizing supporters often depends on the way a problem is defined and framed…interest in the issue can be aroused either by using ‘big words’ or by a small step approach. In the first case, agenda-setters may try to link a foreign issue to a big moral cause or the EU’s long tradition as a soft power, strong in the promotion of human rights and multilateral solutions.” (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, pg. 1319)

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16 | P a g e The EU publicly and repeatedly condemned the annexation as a breach of international law and the EEAS depicted the annexation as a criminal act (EEAS, 2016).

Building Capacity:

This stage identifies the organizations that need to be created or engaged when a project moves from concept to execution. The EEAS, which was created as a diplomatic arm of the EU with the explicit objective to promote ‘soft-power’ and engage with nation-states experiencing security issues became the default choice for the design and execution of Ukraine’s intervention (EEAS, 2016). It had the authority to create the EAUM, an entirely new organization designed specifically to address the Ukraine circumstances. This selection solidifies the theory that the EEAS was selected to soft balance the EU against Russia (Novaky, 2015).

The EU took this approach to avoid classical forms of counter-balance that rely on military force or threatening coercion to achieve goals. While this method can be effective in specific circumstances, the Ukraine, and in a broader sense Eastern Europe, are not a classical example of such a security situation. The EEAS, realizing the fruitless nature of addressing such complex circumstances in a confrontational, direct way opted for the strengthening of institutions, law enforcement, and the integration of Ukraine into Western Europe. Previously vulnerable Ukrainian institutions now had the solidity to disrupt and halt Russia attempts at destabilization.

Claiming Authority:

This stage associates an issue with an organization's capability. The EEAS created for diplomacy and the extension of ‘soft-power' was the best organizational choice to lead operations in Ukraine. “Building credibility may involve framing an issue in EU terms, i.e., justifying why it should be dealt with at the EU level.” (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, pg. 1319). This justification can range in its presentation from moral obligations or political reasons, to direct military confrontation (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska)

Figure 5 – Crisis Response Curve (Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013, pg. 1319)

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17 | P a g e In line with the UN-focused conflict resolution strategy, the EEAS employs a crisis management style focused on the ‘Crisis Cycle’ illustrated in Figure 5 (Tercovich, 2014, pg. 153). The crisis cycle consists of various stages within a given conflict. The most important is the beginning stage of ‘Conflict

Prevention,' the middle stage of ‘Crisis outbreak’ and the ending stage of ‘Post-crisis monitoring’

(Tercovich, 2014). Understanding these dynamics helps explain the progression and adaptation of policy objectives in Ukraine and provides potential proactive insight into the policies that should emerge depending on the escalation or de-escalation of a conflict.

2.2 - Discourse 2: Theoretical Reasoning

Diplomatic & Social Assistance

The second area of discussion drawn from the literature explores how the EEAS uses civilian support strategies, such as education and reforms, as counterbalancing measures to prevent the vast circulation of misinformation and the exploitation of tensions.

Novaky explores in his scientific article the reasons for creating the EUAM and explains why the EU has not augmented its strictly ‘civilian’ operations in Ukraine with additional military activities through the CSDP (Novaky, 2015, pg.244). Per Novaky (2015), the formation of the EUAM, through the eyes of a realist, is a counterbalancing move to address Russian aggression in Ukraine (Novaky, 2015, pg. 245-246) and a deliberate move to avoid direct military involvement (Novaky, 2015, pg. 244-245). Due to the reasoning of the agenda-setting presented by the EEAS, the type of power projection being used, namely, soft-power, coincides with the support provided to Ukraine. This support is comprised of non-lethal material assistance and civilian missions and is strongly preferred over the often antiquated hard-power approach, in which the classical example of hard-power projection is accomplished by force of arms. As Novaky explains “The EUAM’s aim is to help Ukraine stabilize herself by advising and mentoring the country’s civilian security services on SSR” (Novaky, 2015, pg., 244).

What can be observed is that the goals of the EEAS organization are still rooted in the act of counterbalancing Russian encroachment, but this counterbalance diverges from the traditional classical approach of hard-power counterbalance. In this scientific journal Novaky (2015, pg. 244) further, elaborates on this relationship in the following excerpt:

“On 1 December 2014, the European Union (EU) launched a civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in the framework of its Common Security and Defense Policy(CSDP) to mentor and advise Ukrainian officials

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18 | P a g e on Civilian Security Sector Reform (SSR). The mission aims to improve the accountability of Ukraine’s security services and restore public confidence in them following their use of violence against the Ukrainian people during the Euromaidan protests, which culminated in the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014”.

(Novaky, 2015, pg. 244-245)

As with the theoretical foundation of this study, Novaky (2015, pg., 244) assumes a realist perspective when explaining the European Union’s actions in the region Novaky (2015, pg. 245). Novaky considers the realist idea of counterbalancing to be the primary motive for EU activities in Ukraine, but coins a modified expression, which is ‘Soft Balancing3_{.' This concept is a variation of soft-power}

projection and based on the premise that soft-power can be used as a counterbalancing element (Novaky, 2015, pg. 244).

From a realist perspective, Ukraine’s mission is motivated by broad geopolitical policies comprised of soft-balancing approaches focused on civilian reforms (Novaky, 2015, pg. 245-246). The basic premise behind this ‘soft’ strategy is that civilian missions play a crucial role in the development and execution of large security stratagems. Civilian missions designed to enhance stability and increase the effectiveness of local security entities offset the purposeful disruptive activities created by aggressive nation-states, such as the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 (Novaky, 2015). The importance of this discourse and article is that the security concept is evolving into a comprehensive approach which recognizes that security is not solely a matter of force and military engagement. The reason for that development is that security issues have evolved from events to processes, in response to the somewhat unstructured and intangible way conflicts are created and waged. Conflicts whose aim is destabilization and the exploiting of regional tensions to allow for the advancement of influence, and therefore, power is harder to address than a fight for a geographic border.

2.3 - Discourse 3: Military & Defense

This discourse explores the use of military force and lethal aid by the CSDP. It recognizes that the EEAS is adaptive in its security stratagem of counterbalance. While hard-power projection associated with the classical realist school is still an essential element of its framework, it is not the sole approach. It

3_{‘Soft Balancing’ is very much like the counterbalancing assumption; the difference lies in the severity of the} counterbalancing measures. (Novaky, 2015, pg. 246-247).

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19 | P a g e examines the military material balance within Europe should the EEAS require a hard power approach (The Military Balance, 2015) and articulates and explores how and what leads to military intervention.

The discourse affirms that realist assumptions of counterbalance are the main motivational force behind the EU’s interest in Ukraine. This conclusion is best understood through the exploration of the types of security operations performed by the EEAS. By investigating instances of hard-power one can conclude that the EEAS is adapting to specific security situations, but maintains the traditional interpretation of counterbalance as its foundational motivation. This means that behind the façade of claiming to be just a diplomatic corps, the EEAS is essentially still a security provider focused on representing Western interests involved in counterbalancing activities against those states deemed a threat, be it with soft- or hard-power. (EEAS, 2016).

The EEAS has realized that the classical security approaches do not work in sensitive security situations. This experience grew out of peacekeeping missions conducted by the earlier ‘European Union

Force, RCA’ (EUFOR RCA) in the Central African Republic.

“However, while the EU was a crucial economic and diplomatic actor during the Ukraine crisis, its security and defense policy was, in common with recent years, influenced by and developed outside Europe, in places such as Africa, where the EU launched further military missions.” (The Military Balance, 2015, pg. 57)

Accordingly, EUAM operations in Ukraine focus on creating stability, reliability and calm through the design of a comprehensive, inclusionary security approach based on developing domestic security, anti-corruption training, and economic support. This method is not altogether altruistic because the reason for such an intervention is rather pragmatic and still based on the EU’s desire to preserve influence and counter Russian expansionist aims, which is captured in the following excerpt:

“…EU slowly increased both pressure on Moscow and support for Kiev, agreeing on limited sanctions against Russian and signing an Association Agreement with Ukraine in June. Maintaining a united front was no small political feat given the varied levels of economic and energy interests that tie many governments to Russia. On 22 July, the EU established a civilian advisory mission for security-sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) with a two-year mandate. The European Council also repeatedly called on Russia to end any support to the actors in the conflict and refrain from activities that might further destabilize the region.” (The Military Balance, 2015, pg. 57).

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2.4 - Discourse 4: EEAS & NATO, The Difference Between Actors

Shepherd (2015) writes:

“What many of these conceptualizations have in common is that the EU is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as focusing more on “milieu goals” rather than “possession goals” with generally more (although not entirely) benign motivation. More recently the EU distinctiveness as an international security provider has been more pragmatically couched in the language of the “Comprehensive Approach”, whereby the EU seeks to address security challenges holistically; something NATO cannot do, being primarily a military organization, and other international organizations, such as the United Nations are struggling with.” (Shepherd, 2015, pg. 156-157)

Vital in this excerpt from Shepherd (2015) is the discussion revolving around the EU/EEAS being adaptive security actors. Instead of solely focusing on classical ideas of security discourse related to military deployment and force, they embrace a policy of ‘soft power’ through missions that focus less on military goals and more on the strengthening of local institutions. (Shepherd, 2015, pg. 164). This strengthening of establishments, in turn, is a strong counter to that of intentional disruption by aggressive nation states (Shepherd, 2015, pg. 158-159).

External and internal security are not mutually exclusive, they are the same, and per Shepherd (2015) the EEAS was created to bridge the gap between the internal and external aspects of security. “Nevertheless, the EEAS has the potential to enhance the EU’s ability to address the blurring of internal and external security and rearticulate its distinctiveness as a security provider.” (Shepherd, 2015, pg. 164-165). Critical to this fundamental understanding of security is the adaptive nature of organizations such as the EEAS, as it creates the flexibility and ability for an organization to form the best-suited stratagem in combatting a much wider range of security threats than previous organizations. Shepherd (2015) states in reference to the ‘2010 Internal Security Strategy’ and the ‘Commission’s ISS in Action’: “…identify and ever expanding range of challenges: terrorism, cybercrime, cybersecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal migration, energy security, organized crime, state failure, environmental change, regional conflict, natural and man-made disasters and border security.” (Shepherd, 2015, pg. 158-159).

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2.5 - Discourse 5: Explaining the EEAS & Ukraine

The final discourse is based on a publication frequently cited by scholars ‘Policy-Making in EU

Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective’ by Hylke Dijkstra. With an excellent exploratory and

conceptual examination of the EEAS, Dijkstra has produced the most comprehensive EEAS research and review. Her views as an institutionalist, coincide with the underlining Neorealist perspective that underpins this research study. Of special interest in this book is the discourse surrounding the EEAS and the CSDP and the power dynamics between member states and the individual organizations.

The CSDP is included in this thesis because it executes a vast majority of the missions conducted by the EEAS and other EU organizations. This role has created a debate revolving around the function of the member states in regards to missions being undertaken by the EEAS. Dijkstra explains through an institutionalist perspective how the original authorization of missions has shifted from a member state decision to one in which the EU conducts missions without the consent of the member states themselves. She examines how the EU is evolving into one of the most powerful supraorganizations ever conceived. Understanding this development is imperative in understanding the power and importance of particular positions to agenda-setting within the EEAS. To illustrate this point, I have included a graph from Dijkstra (2013).

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22 | P a g e This illustration is important because it shows the power distribution in the EEAS and thereby highlights implications on the policy agenda of the EEAS. Figure 6 illustrates the shift of power from member states to the EU through the location of the ‘Foreign Policy Instruments’. These instruments which include the EEAS shows how a shifting of power from the member states themselves has taken place. Instead of member states having dominant control over organization such as the EEAS, power is distributed in such a way that quick reaction are achieved with little bureaucratic influence. This speed and efficiency is extremely useful when security situations are fluid in their pacing. “The CMPD, EUMS, CPCC, INTCEN, and EEAS are now household names for people working in Brussels on issues of security and defense (Dijkstra, 2013, pg. 202).

The fascinating aspect of this discourse is the revolutionary development of professional organizations created to address security concerns, largely free of independent member state influence. The trust that has been placed in these agencies is paramount in understanding how powerful the EU has become. Experts from around the world are gathered into organizational niches that can address a wide variety of issues. This not only explains the adaptability of EU security policy but enforces that the allocation of a specific organization to meet specific security discourses is strategic from the beginning.

In the context of this research, it shows why the EU / HR decided that the EEAS be the most suitable organization for the Ukrainian mission. The EEAS, as a diplomatic arm with ties to security, specifically those of civilian lead security missions, was strategically picked to combat the methods of interference being conducted by the Russian Federation. This was a calculated counterbalance decision.

The prominence of the shifting nature of power from the member states to EU organizations signifies a new era in EU security policy. The EU, an actor that is largely free from the confines of specific nation-states and their ideas and interpretations of security, can instead rely on organizations to design its solutions through expertise that is free from the bias associated with individual state-sponsored security programs. This creates an independence that permits quick decision-making and fast, coordinated action as discordance between members will not stop the process.

2.6 - Conclusion

As mentioned previously, the originality of this subject is evident in the lack of direct discourse relating to the topic of the EEAS in Ukraine. As such, this compilation of literature and discourse covers the major conceptualizations I have encountered during this research. Instead of directly exploring the research question, these examples of discourse help lay the foundations for understanding the complexity

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23 | P a g e of the decision-making process behind such a multifaceted organization as the EEAS, and emphasize the adaptive nature of EU security discourse.

Chapter 3: Theory & Methods

Chapter 3 has three sections. Section 3.1 explains the theoretical framework of the Neorealist school, by breaking it into core values and assumptions. Section 3.2 examines Neorealism as it pertains to historical examples of the theory in action. The last section, 3.3, concludes with an exploration of this study’s variable in conjunction with the Neorealist theoretical framework.

3.1 – Neorealism: A Structural Interpretation

The Neorealist interpretation used in this thesis is based on Waltz’s interpretation of Neorealism outlined in his book Theory of International Politics (Waltz, 1979), which later become known as

‘Structural Realism’ (Waltz, 1979). This framework is very applicable to Ukraine as it includes a

comprehensive counterbalance viewpoint that also includes financial and social dimensions.

Structural Realism is based on four core assumptions,

1. Anarchy - the international system is in a state of anarchy, or the notion that the

international system lacks a unifying force, such as a ‘world government’ (Wendt, 1995 pg. 71-72) [Referencing Mearsheimer, five principles of ‘realism’].

2. Competition – as a symptom of anarchy, competition is the underlying principle that

nation-states act based on the desire of continued survival and self-interest over all else. (Wendt 1995, pg. 72-73)

3. Counterbalance - a realist term similar to the ‘Security Dilemma’ concept. It states that

when a nation causes concern in a rival that rival nation-state seeks parity to counterbalance the rise of a competing nation state (Dyson and Konstadinides, 2013 pg. 137-138; Mearsheimer, 2001 pg. 102-103)

4. Institutions – this assumption is taken directly from Waltz on how institutions tie into Structural Realism. The main difference between Classical Realism and Structural realism

is the addition of the institutional dimension. (Waltz, 2000 pg. 26-28)

The fundamental difference between Structural Realism and Classical Realism is the understanding that structures are an integral part of the contemporary international power. Waltz explains

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24 | P a g e that the Realist school, founded shortly after the Cold War, recognized that: “The Institutional Approach starts with a structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of institutions, and unsurprisingly ends with realist conclusions.” (Waltz, 2000, pg. 25-26). Waltz is stating that large institutions are another facet of the nation-state, however, instead of being founded in cooperation, they are a product of realist assumptions. They are grounded in the ‘international system’ which is dominated by specific ‘units’ or nation states (Mearsheimer, 2001, pg. 97-101). Mearsheimer (2001), an ‘Offensive Realist,' explains how Waltz (1989) considers the international realm to resemble a pool table. In this metaphor, nation states are equivalent to individual units (pool balls), but those units can have dissimilar sizes, which means that some units have a greater sphere of influence as measured by their respective military and economic power. As the international realm is anarchic in nature, these larger units can push smaller units in a direction that serve their interests when they see fit. Alternatively, smaller units can conglomerate to enhance the size and power of the individual unit. Examples of this dynamic are NATO or the European Union (Mearsheimer, 2001, pg.100-101)

3.2 - Neorealism in practice

During a time when the international power structure had only two state actors - the Soviet Union and the United States the Neorealist theoretical framework was developed (Waltz, 2000 pg. 6-8). Since then, with power alignments shifting dynamically based on the strengths and weaknesses of individual countries and regions, the world order has changed and continues to do so.

Waltz (1979, pg. 97) describes this process and interplay of changing dynamics through the historical developments leading to World War II. He explains that Germany and Japan threatened the existing international power balance dominated by Britain and France and that it was their challenge that leads to World War II. Ultimately, the destructiveness of the war led to Germany, Japan, France and the United Kingdom losing their status as world powers and the vacuum created by their absence resulted in the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States - A power structure which also turned out be temporary, as the never-ending shifts in international dynamics continue to evolve.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 which brought an end to the USSR / US bipolar system and caused the shift to a unipolar system with a single hegemonic force - the United States (Waltz, 2000 pg. 23-24). However, is is apparent that this position which the United States holds is diminishing and as its hegemonic dominance wanes, the resulting void gives way, once again, to a system structure whose balance of power shifts towards an equilibrium maintained by multiple actors. Russia, China and the

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25 | P a g e multinational conglomerate of the EU are all seeking to fill this growing vacuum (Mearsheimer, 2001, pg. 104-105).

Through the creation of the EEAS and the commitment to develop the organization, the EU demonstrated that it is willing to assume a role in this competition. The EEAS addresses challenges to the existing status quo, such as Russian aggression in Ukraine through the EUAM. The response has not been military; the focus has been on internal security as there is no interest in a direct military confrontation with Russia (EUAM, 2015). An examination of the assistance provided to strengthen Ukraine’s internal security sphere through the structural realist framework, suggests that these steps are performed to diminish Russian influence in the region.

3.3 Security Sectors through the Neorealist Lens

The underpinnings of Neorealism are grounded in the assumption that the autonomous ‘unit’ is separate from that of the overall international structure, which helps break down the macro-level system.

Neorealism breaks explanations into specific international realms, which create the flexibility to “zoom

in” on just the security situation between the EEAS and Ukraine using realist assumptions (Waltz, 1990, pg. 29-30).

The importance of understanding this theoretical aspect is that it is vital in understanding the independent variables of this research. In other words, all these sectors will be explored as they pertain to the hypotheses being examined. As each of these sectors acts as independent ‘units’ within this research, they directly affect the (DV). Therefore, the impact of each sector must be examined independently to explore where support is concentrated.

Chapter 4: Variables & Methodology

This research is based on two well-established methods that fall under the qualitative research umbrella, Document Analysis, and Content Analysis. Bowens (2009) describes them in his article,

‘Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method.' They are particularly appropriate for research

that examines content variations over time. Most of the material is based on primary sources directly obtained from the various EEAS websites which publishe a variety of reports and periodicals that contain time series data, as well as ‘discourse’ by officials of the organization. Bowen (2009), referencing Labuschangne (2003), explains the uses of document analysis as follows:

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26 | P a g e “The analytic procedure entails finding, selecting, appraising (making sense of), and synthesizing data contained in documents. Document analysis yields data—excerpts, quotations, or entire passages—that are then organized into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis” (Bowen, 2009, pg.28; Labuschagne, 2003)

The data is collected based on the principles of Content Analysis which require that it be analyzed and applied within the literature context to form an empirical example. Below is a list of sources sorted by year.

4.1 - Data Sources & Summary of Sources

Publication of the regular Progress Report Ukraine 2012 – This source examines the progress made in

Ukraine since 2012. Much in line with expectations, this document focuses heavily on smaller levels of support aimed at furthering and enhancing the financial integration with the EU.

Summits & Conferences

Third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (2013)– This is a key document that sets the baseline for

my analysis to determine security adaptions over time. It provides a history of the relationship between the EU-sponsored EEAS with the Eastern Partnership. It contains detailed statements directly from the EU on activities that correspond with the previously discussed security sectors

16th EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint Statement (2013) - Although this is a short statement it is highly significant

as it acknowledges the admittance of Ukraine into participating in CSDP operations. The importance of this recognition through an official channel speaks volumes about the intentions of the EEAS towards Ukraine (Joint Statement, 2013)

The EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was updated: at the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (2013) - This

document examines the cooperation and coordination between the EU and Ukraine. It provides details on specific programs and missions, as well as the implementing organization, such as the EEAS, EUAM. If also provides further information on CSDP policies and committees. (EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, 2013).

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EU-UKRAINE Relations Factsheet (20174_{) - This fact sheet is important as its language and emphasis}

exhibits a sharp rebuke to Russian aggression in the region. Since the annexation of Ukraine, the EEAS has promoted a zero-tolerance policy towards the violation of Ukrainian borders. Although many of the activities covered in this fact sheet were developed after the 2014 annexation, they are presented as being within the 2014 timeframe, as they were a direct response to this event. The fact sheet lists comprehensively activities of the EEAS policy response to the immediate crisis, as well response to the escalations after the annexation.

The European Council of 20 March 2014 strongly condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation- EU leaders underlined that there is no place for the use of force and coercion to

change borders in Europe in the 21st century. The EU does not and will not recognize the illegal annexation. The EU has adopted a strict non-recognition policy about the illegal annexation. This policy has led to substantive sanctions, set out in the annex below. The sanctions have been extended several times since then and are still in place.” (EEAS, 2017)

Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit – Much like the established association agreement

this document focuses on the partnership after the annexation of the Crimea. It contains valuable data because of content that shows the shift from a purely diplomatic agenda to one focused increasingly on security-related concerns.

Video Statements by the EEAS about Ukraine

Extracts from the statement on Ukraine by Catherine ASHTON on 11 February 2014, in Brussels -

Catherine Ashton speaking about the EU’s support to Ukraine in response to the Russian Annexation of the Crimea. (Ashton, 2014)

Opening statement by Federica Mogherini at EP Plenary (2015) – Federica Mogherini, address the

European Parliament on the situation facing Ukraine.

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4.2 - Data Structure

Changes in the relationship between Ukraine and the EEAS between 2012- 2016 are the subject of this analysis. Accordingly, the analysis is separated into a dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (IV) where the independent data is arranged along a timeline.

Dependent Variable: (DV)

The dependent/outcome variable is: ‘The European Union through the EEAS, is strengthening its

position in Ukraine to counterbalance Russia.’ The DV is separated into two factors. The first factor is

the relationship between the EU and Ukraine before the Russian invasion and the second factor is the relationship after the Russian invasion.

Independent Variables: (IV)

Influence or explanatory power on the outcome variable is represented by independent variables/features and for this research are derived from four activity sectors that are derived from Glyn’s (2009) components of a hybrid war to reflect EEAS measures:

1. Economic/financial – Neorealist Theory links financial support closely to security development. Identifying EEAS financial support to Ukraine from before and after the invasion enables identification of factors that increased stability and were designed as either as cooperative or counterbalancing activities to mitigate Russian influence.

2. Law Enforcement – Activities related to training missions with local law enforcement entities fall into this category. Increases indicate the further development of security objectives, as the strengthening of law enforcement is an effective way of combating negative foreign influence in a contested region.

3. Military Assistance – Although explained in Chapter 1 - Introduction that the EEAS has not been directly involved in military operations in Ukraine (EEAS, 2016), military sector support can encompass information technologies related to military operations, material support, logistical support, weapon design and sale of weapon.

4. Diplomacy & Social Programs – The reason for developing and strengthening the relationships between EP countries and of which Ukraine is a member is based on the goal to help cement functioning democratic system in Ukraine. (EEAS, 2016) The security aspect of which is to ensure a beachhead within the Ukrainian state to prevent further influence by the Russian Federation.

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4.3 - Operationalizing the Data

Data Coding

This section explains how the data was collected and coded and this research’s limitations and the conventions used to address them.

Security sectors based on the document- and content-analysis are defined and assigned using a neorealist theoretical approach to hybrid wars. One exception is the inclusion of a General Assistance sector, which is comprised of measures unrelated to the other sectors. Security sector assignments are mutually exclusive; this means that a specific activity is assigned to only one security sector. The security sector activity assignments are then coded by activity type, through counterbalance or cooperation indicators. Counterbalance activities are those that can be directly linked to a security issue, or target a specific area of a hybrid war. Cooperation is assigned when assistance is given for no other purpose than to further diplomatic ties, missions of mercy, or simply encompass helpful institutional reforms.

Activities within a security sector can belong to either activity type depending on the nature of the activity, as the data below shows:

Figure 7 – Assistance Type by Security Sector

Assistance Type Security Sectors (group)

1/12 - 3/12 4/12 - 8/12 9/12 - 2/13 3/13 - 8/13 9/13 - 2/14 3/14 - 9/14 10/14 - 3/15 4/15 - 9/15 Grand Total

cooperation Diplomacy & Social Programs 3 2 10 5 8 5 33

cooperation Economic & Financial 2 1 4 2 2 5 16

cooperation General Assistance 1 1 1 1 4

cooperation Law Enforcement 1 1 1 6 1 10

cooperation Military & External Security 2 2

counter balance Diplomacy & Social Programs 2 2 6 10

counter balance Economic & Financial 2 10 12

counter balance Law Enforcement 1 1

counter balance Military & External Security 1 4 13 2 14 2 13 49

Grand Total Total 7 8 19 29 17 14 2 41 137

In the event sources, did not publish exact event dates the convention applied was to use the publication date as the timestamp. This approach seemed appropriate because the publications used for this research are regularly republished and accordingly focus on specific time periods.

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30 | P a g e Coding rules for a guideline of the security sector and activity type are as follows:

General Assistance – includes all EEAS non-security activities that don’t fit into the scope of the other security sectors.

Law Enforcement - includes all support/programs aimed at local Law Enforcement & National Law Enforcement entities. The range of activities encompasses, but is not limited to material assistance and training of domestic security forces. This category does not include military aid.

Diplomacy & Social Programs – consists of diplomatic acts, as well as support for social or governmental activities, such as municipal projects or education reforms are assigned this security sector.

Economic and Financial – this is the most prominent security sectors and includes large donations and market reform support.

Military & External Security – The most classical of security sectors, Military & External Security

includes everything related to military support, such as training of security forces and material support with the intention of military use, such as medical or logistical equipment or backing.

Counterbalance & Cooperation – to tie this data back to the theoretical concept of Neorealism all activities are assigned either to a counterbalancing or cooperation category. The distinguishing feature between the two is the intent behind the policy. For example, a financial measure directed at strengthening surveillance that coincides with a particular security situation is categorized as a counterbalancing measure, while funding for an environmental cause falls into the cooperation category because it is unrelated to a security issue.

Chapter 5: Case Analysis

This chapter explores the data collected regarding the type of support provided to Ukraine. In the context of this analysis, support is defined as activities, written & oral statements, as well as policies implemented by the EEAS in the Ukraine. Individual source documents used for data collection are discussed and findings of implications presented. The chapter culminates with a comprehensive discussion that gives conclusion related to the central research question.

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31 | P a g e Document Interpretation and Findings

Figure 8 below shows the data collected by source and security sector This section focus on the five primary source documents and examines individually the data gathered from them.

Figure 8 – Assistance Type by Security Sector with timeline

Document 1: Publication of the regular Progress Report Ukraine - 2012

This document is a progress report highlighting the advances in the EU-Ukraine relationship about the year of 2012. The beginning of the relationship between the EU & Ukraine can be traced back to two strong measures. The first is known as the ‘Association Agreement’ and was a diplomatic understanding in which the relationship between the EEAS and Ukraine was announced on the world stage in 2012. This announcement was the first time the EU internationally announced that it had taken an interest in Ukraine. The second measure came in the form of a mutually beneficial financial package revolving around institutional reform and progress towards a more stable, fair, democracy (Progress Report Ukraine, 2012, pg. 1).

This document provides insight into the original EEAS agenda and steps taken to implement it. It provides data on 33 EU activities in assistance of Ukraine. The breakdown of this activities by security sectors is as follows: 14 initiatives in ‘Diplomacy & Social Programs,’ 4 measures within ‘Economic &

Financial,’ 3 in ‘Law Enforcement,’ and lastly, 5 actions in General Assistance. Following is an

exploration of the key aspects of this data.

This financial package and trade agreement which became known as the ‘DCFTA’ or ‘Deep

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32 | P a g e the EU and Ukraine and is an example of key measures. Key measures are those whose mention persists throughout the timeline of this research. They are highly relevant because they set the agenda and create the foundation for the direction of the EU-Ukraine relationship. The implementation of these measures, however, as stated in this progress report, is dependent upon the speed at which Ukraine deploys its agreements through the Association Agreement. Although not considered a counterbalancing measure, key events set the foundation for the tone and structure of the EU/Ukraine relationship

“There was a common understanding that Ukraine’s performance, notably in relation to respect for common values and the rule of law, will be of crucial importance for the speed of its political association and economic integration with the EU, including in the context of conclusion of the Association Agreement and its subsequent implementation” (Progress Report Ukraine, 2012, pg. 1).

Insight can also be gained from the wording and tone of the content. For example, the text is lacking mention of any discourse surrounding external security issues. Only domestic security matters are addressed and it focuses on local law enforcement through the ‘Second Additional Protocol to the

European Security Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’ (Progress Report Ukraine, 2012, pg. 15).This initiative focused on the review and reform of the Ukrainian judiciary to promote impartiality and stability is consistently mentioned through the research timeline.

The most exciting development in the Military & External security sector was the inclusion of discourse surrounding the ‘CFSDP.' The report mentions that “In 2012 Ukraine aligned with 23 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations” (Progress Report Ukraine, 2012, pg. 8). In addition to these mentions of the CFSDP, Ukraine also agreed to participate within the CSDP with military support “The Ukraine-Poland-Lithuania Brigade should become fully operational in 2013 and available for future CSDP missions” (Progress Report Ukraine, 2012, pg. 8). This development is fascinating, as the agreement to cooperate and join forces with the CSDP can be interpreted as the first counterbalancing steps and defining the moment of the nature of the relationship between the EU & Ukraine.

Concluding Thoughts

This document provided real insight into the beginnings of the intensification of support to Ukraine. This support came mostly in the form of measures focused on creating stability, impartiality of justice, and reform of stagnated governmental organizations. The stagnation outlined in this report was

The European experience in Ukraine : a neorealist examination of the European Action Service intervention to the crisis in Ukraine from 2012 to 2015