Communicating Civil Society : assessing the Success of Civil Society Organisations Entering the Public Sphere

Communicating Civil Society

Assessing the Success of Civil Society Organisations

Entering the Public Sphere

By

Master’s Thesis

Graduate School of Communication Master’s Programme Communication Science

Track Political Communication

Supervisor dr. Katjana Gattermann

Abstract

The participation of civil society organisations, which represent diverse interests in the democratic decision-making process, is encouraged by the European Commission and normative desirable for a democracy. However, to be perceived as a relevant and legitimate actor by decision-makers and their constituency, civil society organisations need visibility within the public sphere. Setting different communication strategies to work, they try not only to leverage their opinion and expertise with political actors, but also to set the public agenda. Amongst these strategic tools is the press release; sent out to inform about activities and events, as well as bring their opinions and expertise forward to a general public. But how successful are civil society actors to get media coverage in doing so. To be perceived as newsworthy and to pass the gates of the journalistic selection process, organisations’ communication professionals make use of news values in the press releases. Using a

quantitative content analysis, press releases of different organisations from Germany and the UK are analysed regarding the application of news values with regard to the follow-up in newspapers in the days following the publication of the press release. The study is conducted within the context of the Europeanisation of public debates. As more and more decisions are made in Brussels, but affect citizens in all member states, the advocates of interests are worthwhile considering. Though overall organisations apply news values, and though follow-up is found, results suggest that the voice of CSOs is rather quite in the public debate.

Key words. Civil Society actors, European public communication, Europeanised public sphere, news values, gatekeeping, agenda-setting, press release, content analysis,

1 Since the White Paper on European Governance in 2001, the inclusion of civil society

interests into the European Union’s (EU) decision-making process has been emphasized (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; European Commission, 2002). Civil society organisations (CSOs) are perceived as “the facilitators of broad policy dialogue” (European Commission, 2002, p. 5): Giving citizens a voice as “a good platform to change policy orientation and society […and] a structured channel for feedback, criticism and

protest” (European Commission, 2002, p. 6). Nevertheless, citizens increasingly are frustrated with the political processes: Trust in political institutions has shrunk enormously, and more than half of Europeans do not think their voices count (European Commission, 2016). CSOs claim to represent people’s interests by enabling political participation outside of, and in addition to, traditional forms such as voting and party membership (European Commission, 2002). The question is how publicly accessible their various opinions and actions are for citizens, particularly regarding the European policy-making process.

CSOs, as manifestation of active citizenry, enable citizen participation in the public debate by representing their interests (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010) and European institutions depend on CSOs’ input, as they provide resources and expertise lacking in the institutions themselves (Bouwen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011). Overall, active CSOs are desirable for democratic participation and interest intermediation (Finke, 2007). Hence, the involvement of and interaction with CSOs exerts a legitimization and control function in the democratic decision-making process (Bouwen, 2007; Finke, 2007). According to the European Commission, “a range of organisations” is included: “labour-market players […] (“the social partners”); organisations representing social and economic players […]; NGOs […] which bring people together in a common cause […]; CBOs (community-based organisations), i.e.

organisations set up within society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives […]; and religious communities” (European Commission, 2002, p. 6). Generally, there exists a vast network of different organisations at EU and national level which all claim

2 to represent legitimately an interest of their constituency (Kohler-Koch, 2009, 2011). Smaller, grass-root organisations like the newly founded Open Britain, campaigning for Britain to stay in the Single Market after the Brexit vote, gained popularity recently (Open Britain, n.d.). Aiming to enter the public debate on Europe, these organisations need to reach out, on the one hand, to their own stakeholders and, on the other, to the general public; inevitably, to be accepted as a legitimate actor and influencer in the political arena. Their claims are brought to the attention of the general public, and indirectly to decision-makers, by the media. Thus, the media’s role is decisive in determining failure and success of CSOs (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Koopmans, 2004). Here, this paper will address the question: How successful are civil society organisations in setting the agenda for the public debate?

Since the mid-1980s attention towards interest group research has been on the rise: Research concentrates mostly on institutional settings supporting or constraining access to institutions, and the state-society relations (Finke, 2007), on strategies of different actors, their access to (Beyers, 2004) and the reaction of their inclusion in the EU’s multi-level governance system (Beyers, 2004; Finke, 2007). Additionally, their ability to mobilize (Vliegenthart, Oegema, & Klandermans, 2005) as well as the Europeanisation of interests (Dür & Mateo, 2014) are explored. Next to the access to the EU institutions, obtaining broader societal acceptance and legitimization is central. CSOs have to be willing to disseminate their standpoints for a general audience, which are intermediated via the mass media (Koopmans, 2004). In the US, CSOs are seen as particularly successful in getting their views into the media (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010). Regardless, the research focus is often single issue-specific like women’s rights (Banaszak & Ondercin, 2016; Barakso & Schaffner, 2006) or environmental activism (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Schmid-Petri, Häussler, & Adam, 2016; Vliegenthart, Oegema, & Klandermans, 2005). As often in political communication research, the geographical focus is on a single country (e.g. Binderkrantz, Christiansen, & Pedersen, 2015; Schmid-Petri et al., 2016; Vliegenthart et al., 2005). Few research so far has focused on

3 the communicative efforts and success of CSOs on an European level (Altides, 2013).

Particularly in the context of a Europeanised debate there is a need for cross-country comparison of CSOs’ communication. Research in corporate communication shows how successful corporate interests make it into the media (Schafraad, van Zoonen, & Verhoeven, 2016).

This paper takes an actor-centred approach and aims to enrich the perspective on European CSOs’ communication, especially considering the Europeanisation of public

debates. The theoretical framework outlines the importance of including CSOs’ voice into the public sphere and their use of news values. Following, a quantitative content analysis of the communicative actions of CSOs and the resonance is conducted to assess these actions, similar to Schafraad et al.’s analysis (2016).

Theory

European(ised) Communicationi

The inclusion of CSOs is normatively desirable for democracy, especially within the EU, as a “democratic communicative space transcending national borders [to] serve as transmission belts linking EU institutions to the people” (Kohler-Koch, 2011, p. 70).ii With the deepening European integration and new policy competences on the supranational level, the number of interest groups and the competition for policy-makers’ attention grew in the multi-level governance system (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010; Bouwen, 2007). Regardless, the European system of interest representation does not differ notably from national systems (Berkhout, Hanegraaff, & Braun, 2017): There are signs for diversification and balance between non-business and corporate interests. Furthermore, the EU-level of interest representation is not more biased than the national one (Berkhout et al., 2017; Berkhout & Lowery, 2010). Interest groups which own an issue in a policy area of high EU-competence, are more Europeanised than others (Dür & Mateo, 2014). Scrutinizing multiple CSOs’ public

4 interest representation allows to monitor this communicative space as well as the linkages drawn between society and policy-makers. As CSOs are “those who have no institutionalized access to political power” (Schmid-Petri et al., 2016, p. 402), they need a different way to get their message across to decision-makers: via the media into the public arena (Koopmans, 2004). Due to the limited carrying capacity of the public sphere, political alternatives, and actors representing the same interest and same goals compete (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Thereby, rendering it another contested space for interest representation. However, not only political actors such as governments and politicians compete. Non-governmental actors increasingly seek routine access to represent interests, thereby setting the public agenda (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Besides augmenting an organisation’s visibility within the broader public and legitimating the claim, media attention imparts an agenda, draws on attention from policy-makers (Vliegenthart et al., 2005), and influences attentiveness by political officials as well as vice versa (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Koopmans, 2004, 2007; Vliegenthart et al., 2005). The media is a vital part in the interest intermediation: Media transfer messages between different actors as well as to third parties who observe and interact with each other (Koopmans, 2004; Figure 1).

In absence of a single pan-European public sphere, national public spheres are the space for “'European political communication' [as] any form of communication which refers

to European governance in the wide sense, expressing consensus or dissent with regard to particular issues”(de Vreese, 2007, p. 6) – they are Europeanised.iii Hereby, among others, the legitimacy of different opinions and policies, participation of different actors, orientation and transparency for public opinion formation are ensured (de Vreese, 2007; Koopmans, 2007; Table 1). Broader and diffuse interests such as those of citizen groups have improved their representation strength (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010; Bouwen, 2007) and their access to the media (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010). Nevertheless, CSOs have been found to be less visible in the public sphere compared to politicians (Koopmans, 2007; Walter, 2015). Conclusively,

5 media attention heavily influences success and failure of CSOs’ actions (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Finke, 2007) and their ability to set the agenda. Less visibility results in less resonance and in less legitimisation of interest representation. Thus, the herein addressed research question is set in the context of Europeanisation of national public debates.

Communication Strategies

Several characteristics shape the CSOs’ communication: 1) the interested represented; 2) the degree of professionalization; and 3) different communication strategies. Here, one distinguishes between diffuse and specific interests. The former are “socioeconomic” or “producer” interests; their constituencies are clearly demarked and linked to their members’ “professional, economic, social and commercial interests” (Beyers, 2004, p. 216). The latter are “linked to broad and general segments of society such as consumers” (Beyers, 2004, p.

216) and lack a clearly demarked constituency (Beyers, 2004).Yet, they only differ slightly in their strategies to approach decision-makers and to get public attention (Beyers, 2004). Likewise, when distinguishing between elite, established groups and diffuse interests, none seems more dominant than the other (Chalmers, 2011). Contrary, the level of

professionalization matters: Professionalized actors have more resources and routinized media work than semi-professionalized groups with organized, but less routinized media work, or non-organized interests (Schmid-Petri et al., 2016). Therefore, CSOs’ communication

strategies are bound to their resources and degree of establishment in the political system. As CSOs might hold various levels of direct access to policy-makers, public strategies are combined with inside lobbying (formal or informal networks of exchange with decision-makers) (Beyers, 2004). Public strategies intend to reach decision-makers indirectly, by appealing to a wide audience, outside formal institutional settings (information politics), or stage events to get attention (protest politics). Specific interests are more publicly active than previously assumed whereas diffuse interests, which are generally more difficult to mobilize

6 due to highly fragmented constituencies, are more successful in gaining access to institutions when utilizing public strategies (Beyers, 2004). As these groups are found to be more present in the public arena, there are hopes of spill-over effects, though access to the public arena is not necessarily the same as access to the institutional arena (Binderkrantz et al., 2015). Overall, media attention is crucial as it enlarges visibility, and public awareness for the organisation, as well as relevance for decision-makers. Accordingly, active media work is essential. Typically, CSOs distribute their positions via their websites, newsletters or member-platforms to spark discourse (Altides, 2013). To indirectly transmit their information to policy-makers via the public arena, they need to carefully select and set up their information (Beyers, 2004; Chalmers, 2011). CSOs often bridge to decision-makers outside the political arena, at strategically chosen points in time (Beyers, 2004). For instance, CSOs issue press releases. They “are part and parcel of agenda building strategies of organisations” (Schafraad et al., 2016, p. 451). As a “constructed representation of an event” (Schafraad et al., 2016, p. 457) organisations’ press releases aim for positive media attention (Schafraad et al., 2016). Finally, press releases provide sources for journalists’ news stories (Boumans, Vliegenthart, & Boomgaarden, 2016; Carlson, 2009; Manning, 2001; Reich, 2010, 2011). Divided in self-promotion and issue-self-promotion, this constitutes CSOs’ media work: Firstly, CSOs aim to get their organisation in the media by promoting their activities and goals (self-promotion). Secondly, they want to influence a political issue by publishing their standpoint (issue-promotion) (Schafraad et al., 2016). Consequently, I assume CSOs are more likely to receive media attention by publishing the latter via their press releases:

H1. Issue-press releases are more often published than self-promotion releases by the

7

News value theory

The frequency of publication per se is not the only decisive factor to assess whether different actors gain visibility. In the public arena, only a small portion makes the news

(Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). Journalists are the gatekeepers: selection depends on their routines and practices. One of the selection tools are news values (e.g. O’Neill & Harcup, 2009). The landmark study by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and subsequent actualizations introduce a variety of such selection criteria, among others: references to an elite or personalities, proximity, negativity/conflict, positive news, magnitude, relevance for audience, or follow-up on subjects already news.iv News values are in part found to be consistent and independent of journalistic characteristics such as experience and political orientation (Helfer & Van Aelst, 2016) and in the context of Western democracies (O’Neill & Harcup, 2009). Yet, different news sources are differently assessed by journalists in their newsworthiness, determining their access to the public, hence their participation in the public debate (Helfer & Van Aelst, 2016; Manning, 2001). Organisations are aware of these selection mechanisms and anticipate them (Koopmans, 2004; Manning, 2001). This suggests that organisations apply news values in their communication to 1) reach their target groups as news values draw public attention, 2) to select different issue frames or specific issue-aspects. Consequently, press releases are used to pass the gatekeepers (Helfer & Van Aelst, 2016; Schafraad et al., 2016). As the application of news values does not differ between professionalized and non-professionalized CSOs

(Schmid-Petri et al., 2016), I assume about news values use:

H2. News values are applied in all press releases by CSOs, no matter the type of

organisation.

H3. The more news values are used simultaneously, the more likely the press release is

8 Newsworthiness of a source is not only affected by applying news value per se. Some news values prove more successful in certain contexts than others (Helfer & Van Aelst, 2016; Schafraad et al., 2016). Especially, applying values such as conflict/controversy, negativity, relevance or being an elite organisations increase chance of being followed up (Schafraad et al., 2016). For journalists it matters whether it is timely, as in being recent or referring to a recent event (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Golding & Elliot, 1979). As this paper focuses on an Europeanised debate, and CSOs publish their communication at strategic moments, this is an EU-related event. I assume:

H4. Press releases referring to a current event on the public agenda are more often

followed-up.

Research found, that negative news are considered more newsworthy (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001) as negativity can also stand for conflict and

controversy, like protest and debate (Schulz, 1982). Hence, characterizing the EU as an arena of conflicting interests, I assume:

H5. Press releases stating conflict are more likely to be followed up than those

without.

H6. Press releases using the news value of negativity are more likely to be followed up

than those without.

As media access can further depend on geographical and cultural proximity to be relevant for the audience (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; Schmid-Petri et al., 2016) and

Europeanised public debates are still dominated by national perspectives on EU affairs (de Vreese, 2007; Machill, Beiler, & Fischer, 2006), I expect:

H7. Press releases stating a national perspective are more likely to be followed up than

9 Though the national perspective is assumed to be dominant, the question arises which policy fields are most often commented on with regard to EU power structures. Hence, it will be explored whether CSOs comment more often on policy fields in which the EU has power of decision-making or on those in which member states do.

Walter (2015), supporting Koopmans' (2007) findings, suggest that CSOs are notably less presented in the mediated discourse. However, they make themselves heard, even if not directly named, by their personnel. So, as people have the need for identification, news which include an element of personalisation are considered more newsworthy (Caple, H., Bednarek, 2013). As quotes further increase newsworthiness (Schafraad et al., 2016), personalisation can be achieved through it. Consequently, I assume:

H8. The use of a personalized quote in the press release makes it more likely to be

followed up.

Lastly, CSOs act on national level to best connect to their constituencies (Altides, 2013). As countries differ with respect to their political, media and interest representation system (Brüggemann, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, & Castro, 2014), different news values, though universally applied, might be more effective in some countries than others based on these distinctions. Hence, I assume:

H9. There is a difference between countries with different systems of interest

representation and media system.

Method and Data

To assess the communicative success of the CSOs, their press releases and the follow-up in newspapers are analysed in a quantitative content analysis. Text analysis is an

acknowledged tool to analyse influence of interest groups and their lobbying success, as has been shown by Klüver (2009, 2015) and by Klüver and Mahoney (2015). As the analysis of

10 party press releases has been done successfully following Klüver (2015), I argue that a

quantitative content analysis of CSOs’ press releases is feasible to answer the main research question of this paper. The codebook is based on the stated hypotheses. Further information explain the variables and coding instructions are found within it in detail (Appendix 2).

Country selection

For comparative reasons, Germany and the UK were selected for analysis. This constitutes a most-different cases design (Table 2). Both countries differ according to 1) their level of conflict on EU integration (European Commission, 2016; Guinaudeau & Palau, 2016); 2) their media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004); and 3) their political interest representation system (Berkhout et al., 2017). In regard to the Europeanisation of public spheres, the UK is considered to be less Europeanised than Germany (de Vreese, 2007; Machill et al., 2006). However, in both countries civil society is less visible than other political actors in the public sphere (Koopmans, 2007; Walter, 2016). Due to the assumed universality of news values, the hypotheses were posed in a general manner. Per country two daily quality newspapers, distributed nationally, and of opposite political affiliation were chosen. Based on their circulation numbers, these newspapers are considered to be opinion-leading in the countries.v Furthermore, national broadsheets report more political news particularly on European affairs, and make European actors more visible than tabloids (e.g. Brüggemann & Kleinen-von-Königslöw, 2009; Trenz, 2004). Online media, especially social networks, often merely reach an exclusive group of people – their own members or target groups - instead of a broader general audience. Traditional mass media allow to reach the latter, and hence, increase CSOs’ visibility (Koopmans, 2004). Regarding the Europeanisation of public sphere print media are studied most often (Machill et al., 2006), and most Europeans still get their information on political matters from newspapers (European Commission, 2012; Guinaudeau & Palau, 2016).

11

Selection of CSOs

As there is no cohesive registry of European interest groups (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010), sampling was a challenge for this analysis. Previous studies mostly relied on “single temporal snapshots of the EU system of umbrella organisations” (Berkhout & Lowery, 2010, p. 448). As Altides (2013) argues, national organisations gain easier access to their members and as the national media, in the absence of European mass media, inform people on the European debate, I consequently focused on national CSOs.

Taking the definition by the European Commission, I included two organisation of each kind based on systematic selection. Selected were those, which 1) take part in a European policy discourse (e.g. are part of a European umbrella organisation) and/or are registered in the European Transparency Register), 2) are the biggest by members in their respective fields, and 3) have press releases are available and accessible online for at least 3 months of 2016. The chosen organisations represent a variety of organisations types,

organisational cultures, and structures which might influence an organisation’s

communication practice (Altides, 2013; Table 3). For Germany, eight organisations based on their membership in the German branch of the European Movement International were selected (Europäische Bewegung Deutschland, 2017). Seven British organisations were chosen when listed in the European Transparency Register and similar in their concern to the German CSOs (“European Transparency Register,” n.d.). The NGOs included one

representing diffuse interests (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband and Which?) and one clearly pro-European (Europa Union Deutschland, Open Britain). Furthermore, for CBI, CSAN and Open Britain press releases were not available for the whole of 2016. CBI was accessible starting from June 2016, CSAN and Open Britain from September 2016. For the latter, this might be due to its foundation at the end of August 2016 (Open Britain, n.d.). As the main role of CSOs is the representation of citizen’s voice, following a governance approach, as propagated by the European Commission, the organisations considered are

12 categorized as such (Kohler-Koch's & Quittkat, 2009).Hence, I did not include political organisations political foundations, local authorities, and academia. The final sample size was 315 press releases. Consequently, the sample does not pose a complete picture of reality (Table 4). To control for the continuous flow of CSO communication which mirrors the constant demand of holding governments accountable (Altides, 2013), I selected the press releases for the previous year 2016.

Units of analysis

The main units of analysis were CSOs’ press releases with any reference to the EU/Europe using these terms as search terms. As a source for journalists (e.g. Reich, 2011), analysing their characteristics helps to explain success or failure of CSOs to pass the

journalistic gatekeeping and set the public agenda. In this respect, they are suitable for the analysis from an actor perspective. Of those organisations which released more than 100 press releases with a reference to European affairs, a random sample of 25 press releases was included in the analysis as for the most of the organisations roughly a quarter of their press releases related to Europe. Moreover, the analysis included the newspapers articles in the six days after publication of each press release in 2016. Articles were accessed via LexisNexis (Die Welt, The Guardian and The Times) and Datenbank-Informationssystem (DBIS; Süddeutsche Zeitung). Search terms included the full name of the organisation as well as its abbreviation.

Independent variables

The news values timeliness, negativity and positivity, quote, proximity, and conflict were dichotomous variables, (present = 1; not present = 0), following previous studies (Schafraad et al., 2016; Schmid-Petri et al., 2016). Timeliness was measured as any reference to an official EU-event, any national election or referendum, and introduction or

13 e.g. whether there were any direct consequences or impacts mentioned for the CSOs’ home country (Country_Proximity), and for the EU (EU_Proximity). Conflict was measured on two levels (Schmid-Petri et al., 2016): whether there is any actor criticism present (Actor

Criticism) and whether or not the position presented is controversial (Controversy). Quote

was measured based on the presence or absence of a direct quote by an official of the CSO. The news values were computed into a continuous variable NewsValues_total to measure how many news values were used per press release. In addition, the event referenced, the actor criticised and the people quoted were coded. The variable Policy_Field was coded to record the context of the press release. Further, the variables Country (Germany = 1; UK = 0) and Organisation_Type were recoded based on the organisations’ names and the definition of the

European Commission.

Dependent variable

To assess the success of the organisation to get into the news, the number of newspaper articles in which the press release was followed up, was counted and combined into a continuous variable FollowUp_total. Furthermore, the follow up was counted by country as the two newspaper variables, one for Germany and one for the UK, were summed up (FollowUp_Germany, FollowUp_UK).

Inter-coder reliability

Coder training was provided and 10% of the sample, randomly selected, was coded by one additional coder (n = 32; Table 5). To assess inter-coder reliability, Krippendorff’s α was used. Values above α = .67 were acceptable as it is tested with a conservative measure (de Swert, 2012; Krippendorff, 2004). For all of the main variables acceptable to good values were found. For Positivity (α = .23) the reliability test failed. For EU_Proximity (α = .63), Actor_Criticised (α = .51) and Policy_Field (α = .65) the threshold was marginally missed,

14

Policy_Field and Actor_Criticised most probably did not provide categories sufficiently

exclusive as they were too large, e.g. social policy including employment and health policy (Krippendorff, 2004). For the analysis, Policy_Field was recoded according to power of decision-making, and categories appearing to be not exclusive enough, fell in a broader category; as did actors criticised. Dichotomous variables are extreme cases for reliability analysis as they are highly susceptible and little variance can produce values not meeting the defined threshold (Krippendorff, 2004). So, results need to be interpreted tentatively. Further, difficulties might be due to the required language skills in a cross-national sample with coders only native speakers of one language. To solve this problem, more detailed coder training could have been provided and the codebook been adapted as otherwise coding turned out acceptable.

Findings

Three hundred fifteen press releases were analysed. Roughly a quarter of the

organisation’s total press releases issued in 2016 were related to the European debate (Table 4). Tests were conducted on a 95% significance level and assumptions tested.

Descriptives

On average a press releases contained 415 words (M = 415.41; SD = 316.95). Considering the different organisations types, the press releases were distributed as follows: Social partners published the most with 158 (50.2% of total), followed by NGOs with 122 (38.7%); social players and religious communities followed suit with 14 press releases each. The lowest amount of press release relating to European affairs was published by social players (7). Neither the Sozialverband VdK Deutschland nor AGE UK participated in the Europeanised public debate, diminishing the total amount of press release of the group (Table 4). Despite reducing the number of press releases if there were more than 100, NGOs and social partners released by far the most in 2016 (Figure 2).

15 Testing which kind of press releases were published more often (H1), 39 of the 315 press releases analysed were considered an organisation’s self-promotion, while the majority of 276 was issue-specific. Distinguishing between organisation types, NGOs published the most self-promoting releases (Table 6). Hence, CSOs more often try to set the agenda by publishing their opinion on specific issues or presenting their expertise. Consequently, H1 was supported. In the following analyses, only issue-specific press release were considered (N = 276). In general, 23% of press releases were found to be followed up by the newspapers (M = .30; SD = .67). A majority of them was followed up once (n = 53). To explore whether there was a difference between the types of organisations, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. No significant difference was found, F (4, 271) = 1.80, p = .129. The type of organisation does not make a difference for follow-up. However, the groups were not equal in size and equal variance was not assumed (Figure 3). In a second step, the three biggest groups social

partners, social players and NGOs were compared in a one-way ANOVA. The groups differed significantly in the amount of follow ups, F (2; 250) = 3.03, p = .050. Equal variance cannot be assumed. The post-hoc test indicated that social partners differed marginally from NGOs

(Mdifference = .19, p = .093). No significant difference between social partners and social

players or social players and NGOs was found.

News Value Use

Turning to the use per organisation type (H2), in total eight news values could be used per press release. On average, four news values were used (M = 4.24; SD = 1.03, min = 1, max = 7; Table 7). To compare the use of news values between different organisations types, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There was no significance difference between the groups, F (4, 271) = 1.48, p = .208. Thus, H2 was supported as news values were applied in all press

16 Whether the use of more news values simultaneously predicts the follow-up (H3), was tested in an OLS regression with total follow-up as dependent variable and the number of news values used as predictor. The regression analysis was not significant, F (1, 274) = .03, p = .874 (Table 8a). Additionally, to predict whether the follow-up is dependent on the news values used, an OLS regression with the single news values as predictor variables was

conducted. The regression analysis was not significant, F (8, 267) = 1.46, p = .174 (Table 8b). So, H3 that the more news values used, the more likely is follow-up, was not supported. Therefore, news values were analysed separately with regard to the follow-up. A series of independent samples t-test was conducted to test H4 to H8, including tests for assumptions. Testing whether the reference to any event which was already considered newsworthy was followed up (H4), no significance difference was found, t (274) = .06, p = .952, 95% CI [-.180, .191]. H4 was not supported: Press releases with a reference to any, in an Europeanised debate as newsworthy considered event, are not more often followed up than those without such a reference (Table 9). A majority of press releases either referenced a referendum or the introduction of a new law (Figure 4).

Whether the presence of conflict is more likely to be followed up (H5) was tested based on two sub-categories: actor criticism and controversy. CSOs criticised different actors, most often national institutions or the European Commission (Figure 5a). Considering the actor-level, national actors were in total more often criticised (Figure 5b). An additional independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the criticised actor on the national versus the EU-level and whether it matters for the follow-up. There is a significant difference between criticising EU-level actors (M = .08, SD = .39) and criticising national level actors (M = .36, SD = .53), t (63.90) = -2.49, p = .015, 95% CI [-.51, -.06]. Equal variance could not be assumed. Criticising national level actors is more often followed up. Actor criticism in press releases is on average not more often followed up than if not present, t (274) = .34, p = .733, 95% CI [-.14, .19] (Table 9). However, the absence of controversy is on average more

17 often followed up, t (257) = 7.19, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .39] (Table 9). Equal variance was not assumed though. Consequently, H5 cannot be supported for conflict as controversy, as those without controversy were more often followed up controversial to what was expected. For conflict as actor criticism H5 was not supported.

Testing whether negativity is more often followed up (H6), no significant difference was found between the follow-up of those press releases including negativity and those not including it, t (274) = -.26, p = .793, 95% CI [-.19, .14] (Table 9). H6 was not supported. When negativity as a news value is present, press releases are not more likely to be followed up. Positive news can also be considered newsworthy. Due to the low inter-coder reliability of the value positivity, analysis is not reported here.

Testing the geographical proximity for the country (H7), the follow-up when there was a national perspective was significantly higher compared to when it was not present, t (80.58) = -2.01, p = .048, 95% CI [-.33, -.001] (Table 9). Equal variance cannot be assumed.

Concerning the EU-proximity, there was a significant difference between the value present and followed-up, and not present, t (273.63) = 2.38, p = .018, 95% CI [.03, .32]. Equal variance cannot be assumed. On average follow-up was higher when EU-proximity was not present compared to when present (Table 9). vi Hence, H7 was supported; a national

perspective was more often followed up than when not present.

Moreover, the inclusion of quotes by officials of the CSOs was tested (H8). Probing the people who were quoted, leading figures of the organisations as the director, as well as experts, were quoted most often (Figure 6). There was a significant difference in follow-up when a quote was given, t (50.78) = -2.89, p = .006, 95% CI [-.41, -.07] (Table 9). Equal variance cannot be assumed. H8 was supported as press releases including a quote were more often followed up.

18

Country Compariosn

The difference between the total follow-up, and the difference between the total numbers of news values used were tested using independent samples t-tests to compare the UK (n = 174) and Germany (n = 141). Furthermore, it was explored how the countries differed with regard to the use of the proximity news value. Firstly, there was a significant difference between the follow-up of press releases in Germany (M = .18, SD = .45) and the UK (M = .36, SD = .78), t (268.5) = 2.45, p =.014, 95% CI [.04, .33]. Equal variance is not assumed. UK press releases were on average more often followed up. Secondly, there was a significant difference in the use of news values. German CSOs (M = 4.60, SD = 1.20) used on average more news values than British CSOs (M = 4.08, SD = .88), t (187.79) = -2.82, p = .005, 95% CI [-.64, -.11]. Equal variance cannot be assumed. The news values of geographic proximity and actor criticism were tested in a cross-tabulation. In a majority of 81% of UK press releases the EU-proximity was not present compared to 34% within the German press releases. Furthermore, in a majority of 162 press releases consequences and impacts for the UK itself were referenced, while within the German releases two thirds (74) included a national reference. A further cross-tabulation showed the UK organisations criticised to 96.9% national actors while the German organisations more often criticised EU-level actors (69.4%).Hence, H9 was supported; there is a difference between Germany and the UK regarding the use of news values and the follow-up of press releases in newspapers.

Policy fields

Most press releases were either related to economic and financial or to social policy. Consumer protection as well as EU-UK relations came second (overview Figure 7). Policy fields were recoded according to decision-making power in either: decision-making power of the EU (n = 61), joint power of decision-making of the EU and member states (n = 193), or decision making power of the member states (n = 5).vii The distribution between Germany and

19 UK differed slightly, though both published a majority in the second category. A minority of press releases was issued in policy fields with exclusive decision-making power of the member states (Table 10). However, there was no difference between the policy field and their follow-up as tested by an one-way ANOVA, F (2, 256) = .13, p = .874.

Discussion

The aim of this paper was to investigate how successful CSOs from Germany and the UK are in setting the agenda for the public debate. To that end, their press releases on topics of EU affairs of 2016, and thus their contribution to a Europeanised debate, were analysed. In total, around 20% of the press releases were followed up. Though comparable data for an equal selection of organisations is missing, power of agenda setting seems limited. However, related to the 25% of follow-up found for corporate press releases (Schafraad et al., 2016), and considering claims about interest groups not accessing the media successfully (Waisbord, 2011), CSOs indeed make the news - sometimes. Acknowledging, that reporting on European affairs did not differ over time (e.g. de Vreese, 2007; Machill et al., 2006), 20% follow-up can be interpreted as an success of CSOs’ participation. However, recognizing that the number of organisations making the news is much smaller than the actual population (Andrews & Caren, 2010), other results imply that CSOs’ role in European news coverage might actually be quite small (Altides, 2013; Koopmans, 2007). These interpretations further reinstates de Wilde (2013), Koopmans (2004), and Walther (2016): All showed that civil society is the least visible actor in the public sphere; even in times of elections when it is necessary to enable people to make the most informed decisions, vital voices are excluded.

By analysing the use of news values in press releases, explanatory value can be added to how CSOs pass the journalistic selection process. The news values geographic proximity to the country, personalisation, and the absence of controversy can explain follow-up. Similar results were found in previous studies which focused on corporate press releases (Schafraad et

20 al., 2016) or specific organisations (Schmid-Petri et al., 2016). The news values were adapted to fit CSOs and in a Europeanised debate. Nevertheless, the results show that a geographic proximity, e.g. mentioning consequences for the country the CSO is from - matters more than a European perspective to be followed up by journalists. Reporting on EU affairs still occurs from a national focus (de Vreese, 2007), this is underlined by the finding that criticism of national actors is more often followed up, even in policy areas of joint decision-making power. With regard to the Europeanisation of the debate, it has to be noted that results imply the British CSOs might be less Europeanised compared to German CSOs: They focus more often on national actors, policy implementation or consequences and impacts on the UK rather than the EU. In relation to the absence of controversy, it can be assumed press releases providing a distinct opinion of CSOs are more newsworthy. Hence, distinct opinions set the public agenda, especially in a contested space like a Europeanised debate. Furthermore, it was observed that supporters of the organisation Open Britain who were quoted, held political office or were former political officials. In this respect, I speculate that a young organisation such as Open Britain (Open Britain, n.d.), takes advantage of having these elite political actors speaking for them, as they have leverage and are interesting for journalists per se (Caple, H., Bednarek, 2013; Helfer & Van Aelst, 2016). These findings shed some more light on the level of Europeanisation in the UK, not only in the newspaper but also within

organisations’ communication. The UK’s public sphere has been characterised before as little Europeanised, and the EU is most often used as a scapegoat (Brüggemann & Klein-von-Königslöw, 2009; de Vreese, 2007; Machill et al., 2006). As indicated elsewhere (Altides, 2013; Koopmans, 2007), reporting on CSOs might depend on their perceived political relevance in the Europeanised debate. Here, social partners seem to be perceived as most relevant as suggested by their higher follow-up numbers.

21

Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research

In contrast to other studies, this study includes a variety of different organisation accounting for variance in types and continuous communication throughout a year, from two countries characterised by different systems. Hence, some generalizability is possible

regarding CSOs. However, generalizability falls short as press releases were not available for the entire period for all CSOs and due to the rather small sample size and unequal group sizes, many of the tests were not significant and results are interpreted tentatively. Furthermore, the newspapers included depict only a fragmented, rather elitist and hence, not representative part of the media landscape and respective audiences (Gattermann, 2013). The biggest challenge was the sample of the organisations, as research agrees to disagree on the definition of CSOs (e.g. Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2009; Ruzza, 2006). Hence, the inclusion of actors like the social partners can be contested. Furthermore, small and medium sized organisations, which contribute to the debate on a more regional or local level, might be underestimated (Beyers, 2004) as the study focuses on nationally operating actors. Conducting a quantitative content analysis proved useful to gain further insights into CSOs’ communication on Europe. In doing so, the findings support the argument that CSOs apply news values despite their different organisational structures and level of professionalization (Schmid-Petri et al., 2016) or the type of organisation, adding validity to previous findings. The measurement of news values seems appropriate based on studies by Schafraad et al. (2016) and Schmid-Petri et al. (2016) but limits due to their dichotomous nature are acknowledged and a bigger sample might be desirable to increase the probability to find significant effects. Nevertheless, content analysis is not a tool to provide insights into effects of CSO communication (Macnamara, 2005). A step for future research is to analysis additionally the news values found in the newspaper articles in which the CSO is mentioned. To assess CSOs’ success, a quantitative analysis of the salience of press release in the follow-up needs to be analysed. Together, this enables us to understand journalistic selection processes better. Additionally, future research should include

22 a broader variety of organisation on national and/or local level, while following another approach towards CSOs. Though Schmid-Petri et al. (2016) argue online communication is more easily accessible for research and a day-to-day tool of communication, this research focus largely on the follow-up based on press releases – a traditional tool of communication practice. Future research might explore how the application of online communication tools supplements traditional tools in relation to media coverage and agenda-setting power.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the voice of CSOs, which claim to represent citizens and on whose participation in the legislation process is emphasized by the European Commission, is heard in the public sphere - though quietly. Hence, it can be questioned whether the intended role as “facilitators of broad policy dialogue” (European Commission, 2002, p. 5), linking citizens to

the political institutions, is adequately fillable when intermediated by the media. But who is to blame? Considering the visibility of political actors in the public sphere (e.g. de Vreese, 2007; Koopmans, 2007; Walter, 2016), the first question is how inclusive, transparent and

participatory such a public sphere is regarding the normative expectations and functions for democracy, particularly in Europeanised national public spheres. Second question is, whether journalists as gatekeepers actually amplify as many different civil voices as possible within the public sphere. However, it might also be the public’s general perception of CSO which influences their power to set the public agenda and mirrored by journalistic selection. Finally, it is up to the organisations, to more actively shape the linkage and take part in the debate in a transparent and accessible way, even beyond traditional media and their constituencies, instead of focusing on backdoor-lobbyism. Though press releases of CSOs proof to be a source of journalists, it is the questions how established they are as sources. A combination of more public communication tools, and the right mix of online and offline tools can be a

23 starting point. Civil society actors need to become more publicly relevant in order to possibly turn into a regular go-to-source for journalists in Europeanised debates and set the agenda.

i

In short, Europeanisation is understood as becoming more European and adapting to influences due to a nations EU membership (Ladrech, 2010). Radaelli defined Europeanisation as: “Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30). For an account of different conceptualizations see e.g. Featherstone (2003). A concrete example of Europeanisation of interest representation provide Fairbrass and Jordan (2002).

ii

For further reading on how CSOs exert a democratising effect within the EU see e.g. Fairbrass and Jordan (2002), Goehring (2002), and Ruzza (2006).

iii

This paper does not discuss the Europeanisation of public spheres and the (non-)existence of a single European public sphere in further detail. See for mostly normative discussions e.g. de Vreese (2007), Gerhards (1993), Neidhardt, Koopmans, and Pfetsch (2000), Risse (2000), Semetko, de Vreese, & Peter (2000), or Trenz and Eder (2004). Empirical research is provided by the Europub project (Koopmans, n.d.).

iv

An overview of noteworthy actualizations, e.g. Allern (2002); Golding and Elliot (1979); Harcup and O’Neill (2001, 2016); Palmer (1998); Schulz (1982).

v

The respective Sunday editions of the newspapers are included into the analyses: The Observer (The Guardian); The Sunday Times (The Times) and Die Welt am Sonntag (Die Welt). The Guardian circulation 153,163 (daily readership: 829,000) (newsworks, 2017a); The Times circulation 456,925 (daily readership 1,014,000) (newsworks, 2017b); Süddeutsche Zeitung 365,938; Die Welt 170,53 (Statista, 2017).

vi

Interestingly, an additional regression analysis with the total number of follow-up as dependent and the EU-proximity as predictor is significant, F (1, 274) = 4.49, p = .035, though the strength to predict the follow up is rather weak: only 2% of variance in follow-up can be predicted on basis of the news value EU-proximity. (R2 = .02). When the reference is present, the press release is .18 less likely to be followed up, b* = -.13, t = -2.12, p = .035. Hence, a European perspective can make the press releases less likely to be followed up.

vii

Policy fields were recoded according to: EU-UK relations, Trade policy, Monetary Union, Customs Union, Internal Market - power of decision-making by EU; Foreign Policy, Development and Humanitarian Aid Policy, Security and Defence Policy, Environment policy, Social Policy, Infrastructure and Transport Policy,

Digitalisation and Cybersecurity, Agricultural Policy, Consumer Protection, Energy Policy and Research & Development Policy- joint decision-making power; Education Policy and Cultural Policy - only member state decision-making. Those categorized as more than one policy field mentioned or general press release, were not included. Classification was made based on the Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

24 References

Allern, S. (2002). Journalistic and Commercial News Values News Organizations as Patrons of an Institution and Market Actors. Nordicom Review, 23, 137–152.

Altides, C. (2013). Information Strategies of Organized Civil Society: Does Anyone Listen ?

In B. Kohler-Koch & C. Quittkat (Eds.), De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU-Governance and Civil Society (pp. 149–172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Andrews, K. T., & Caren, N. (2010). Making the News. American Journal of Sociology Review, 75(6), 841–866. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410386689

Banaszak, L. A., & Ondercin, H. L. (2016). Public Opinion as a Movement Outcome: The Case of the U.S. Women’s Movement. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 21(3), 361–378. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-21-3-361

Barakso, M., & Schaffner, B. F. (2006). Winning Coverage News Media Portrayals of the Women’s Movement, 1969–2004. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11(4), 22–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X06293069

Berkhout, J., Hanegraaff, M., & Braun, C. (2017). Is the EU Different? Comparing the Diversity of National and EU-level Systems of Interest Organisations. West European Politics, 40(5), 1109–1131. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1308695

Berkhout, J., & Lowery, D. (2010). The Changing Demography of the EU Interest System since 1990. European Union Politics, 11(3), 447–461.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510369264

Beyers, J. (2004). Voice and Access Political Practices of European Interest Associations. European Union Politics, 5(2), 211–240. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116504042442

Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015). Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media. Governance, 28(1), 95–112.

https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12089

25 News: A Comparison of Source, News Agency and Newspaper Content about Nuclear Energy over Time. European Journal of Communication, 31(3), 260–282.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323116629879

Bouwen, P. (2007). Competing for Consultation: Civil Society and Conflict between the European Commission and the European Parliament. West European Politics, 30(2), 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380701239715

Brüggemann, M., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Humprecht, E., & Castro, L. (2014). Hallin and Mancini Revisited: Four Empirical Types of Western Media Systems. Journal of Communication, 64(6), 1037–1065. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12127

Brüggemann, M., & Klein-von-Königslöw, K. (2009). “Let's Talk about Europe ": Why Europeanization Shows a Different Face in Different Newspapers. European Journal of Communication, 24(1), 27–48.

Caple, H., Bednarek, M. (2013). Delving into the Discourse : Approaches to News Values in Journalism Studies and Beyond. Retrieved from

https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Delving into the Discourse_0.pdf

Carlson, M. (2009). Dueling, Dancing or dominating? Journalists and their Sources. Sociology Compass, 3(4), 526–542.

Chalmers, A. (2011). Interests, Influence and Information: Comparing the Influence of Interest Groups in the European Union. Journal of European Integration, 33(4), 471– 486. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.579751

Commission of the European Communities. (2001). European Governacne - A Whitepaper, COM(2001) § (2001). Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm

de Swert, K. (2012). Calculating inter-coder reliability in media content analysis using Krippendorff ’ s Alpha, 1–15. Retrieved from

http://www.polcomm.org/amsterdam-26 content-analysis-lab/manuals/

de Vreese, C. H. (2007). The EU as a Public Sphere. Living Reviews in European Governance, 2(3), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.12942/lreg-2007-3

de Wilde, P. (2013). Representative Claims Analysis: Theory Meets Method. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(2), 278–294. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.746128

Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2014). The Europeanization of Interest Groups: Group Type, Resources and Policy Area. European Union Politics, 15(4), 572–594.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116514532556

Europäische Bewegung Deutschland. (2017). Mitgliedsorganisation | Netzwerk EBD [Member Organisations |Network EBD]. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from

https://www.netzwerk-ebd.de/mitglieder/

European Commission. (2002). Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the

Commission. Communication form the Commission (Vol. COM(2002)7).

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004

European Commission. (2012). Media Use in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 76 (Vol. 76). Retrieved from

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_media_en.pdf%5Cnpapers2:// publication/uuid/A7FCC2E7-27A1-40E9-9090-BD6CB28A07B8

European Commission. (2016). Standard Eurobarometer 86 Autumn 2016 First results Public Opinion in the European Union. Retrieved from

http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail /instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130

European Movement UK. (2017). European Movement UK. Retrieved June 16, 2017, from http://www.europeanmovement.co.uk/

27 http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false&locale=en Fairbrass, J., & Jordan, A. (2002). The Europeanization of Interest Representation: The Case

of United Kingdom Environment Policy. In A. Warleigh & J. Fairbrass (Eds.), Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy (pp.

138–159). London, UK: Europa Publications.

Featherstone, K. (2003). Introduction: In the Name of “Europe.” In K. Featherstone & C.

Radaelli (Eds.), The Europeanization of Politics (pp. 3–26). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Finke, B. (2007). Civil Society Participation in EU Governance. Living Reviews in European Governance, 2(2), 1–31. Retrieved from http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-2

Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers. Journal of Peace Research, 2(1), 64–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200104

Gattermann, K. (2013). News about the European Parliament: Patterns and External Drivers of Broadsheet Coverage. European Union Politics, 14(3), 436–457.

Gerhards, J. (1993). Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeit der Entstehung einer europäuischen Öffentlichkeit [Western European Integration and the Difficulties in the Emergence of an EUropean Public Sphere]. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie, 22(2), 96–110. https://doi.org/Heft 2

Goehring, R. (2002). Interest Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union: The New Quest for Civil Society Formatin. In A. Warleigh & J. Fairbrass (Eds.), Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy (pp.

118–137). London, UK: Europa Publications.

Golding, P., & Elliot, P. (1979). Making the News. London, UK: Longman.

Guinaudeau, I., & Palau, A. M. (2016). A Matter of Conflict: How Events and Parties shape the News Coverage of EU Affairs. European Union Politics, 17(4), 593–615.

28 https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116516662716

Hallin, D., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Harcup, T., & O’Neill, D. (2001). What Is News? Galtung and Ruge revisited. Journalism Studies, 2(2), 261–280. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700120042114

Harcup, T., & O’Neill, D. (2016). What is News? News Values revisited (again). Journalism

Studies, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1150193

Helfer, L., & Van Aelst, P. (2016). What Makes Party Messages Fit for Reporting? An Experimental Study of Journalistic News Selection. Political Communication, 33(1), 59– 77. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.969464

Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Social Problems : A Public Arenas Model. American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53–78.

Klüver, H. (2009). Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis. European Union Politics, 10(4), 535–549. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116509346782

Klüver, H. (2015). The Promises of Quantitative Text Analysis in Interest Group Research: A Reply to Bunea and Ibenskas. European Union Politics, 16(3), 456–466.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116515581669

Klüver, H., & Mahoney, C. (2015). Measuring Interest Group Framing Strategies in Public Policy Debates. Journal of Public Policy, 35(2), 223–244.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X14000294

Kohler-Koch, B. (2009). The Three Worlds of European Civil Society: What Role for Civil Society for what kind of Europe? Policy and Society, 28(1), 47–57.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.02.005

Kohler-Koch, B. (2011). The Three Worlds of “European Civil Society”: Different Images of Europe and Different Roles for Civil Society. In U. Liebert & H.-J. Trenz (Eds.), The New Politics of European Civil Society (pp. 57–72). Abingdon: Routledge.

29 Kohler-Koch, B., & Quittkat, C. (2009). What is Civil Society and Who Represents Civil

Society in the EU? Policy and Society, 28(1), 11–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.02.002

Koopmans, R. (n.d.). EUROPUB.COM. Retrieved June 23, 2017, from https://europub.wzb.eu/

Koopmans, R. (2004). Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Sphere. Theory and Society, 33(3/4.), 367–391.

https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000038603.34963.de

Koopmans, R. (2007). Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debates. European Journal of Political Research, 46(2), 183–210. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00691.x

Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (1999). Political Claims Analysis. Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse Approaches. Mobilzation, 4(2), 203–221.

Krippendorff, K. (2004) Reliability in Content Analysis. Some Common Misconceptions and Recommendations. Human Communication Research, 30(3), 411-433.

Ladrech, R. (2010). Europeanization and National Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from

https://books.google.com/books?hl=de&lr=&id=oQkdBQAAQBAJ&pgis=1

Machill, M., Beiler, M., & Fischer, C. (2006). Europe-Topics in Europe ’s Media, 21(1), 57– 88.

Macnamara, J. R. (2005). Media Content Analysis: It’s Uses, Benefits and Best Practice Methodology. Asia-Pacific Public Relations Journal, 6(1), 1–34.

Manning, P. (2001). News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction. London, UK: Sage. Retrieved from

https://books.google.nl/books?id=Jl0a3so5fSUC&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source=g bs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

30 Neidhardt, F., Koopmans, R., & Pfetsch, B. (2000). Konstitutionsbedingungen politischer

Öffentlichkeit: Der Fall Europa [Constitutive Conditions for a Political Public Sphere: The Case Europe]. In H.-D. Klingemann & F. Neidhardt (Eds.), Zur Zukunft der Demokratie: Herausforderungen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Berlin: Rainer Bohn

Verlag.

newsworks. (2017a). The Guardian: Readership, Circulation, Rate Card and Facts. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from http://www.newsworks.org.uk/the-guardian

newsworks. (2017b). The Times: Readership, Circulation, Rate Card and Facts. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from http://www.newsworks.org.uk/the-times

O’Neill, D., & Harcup, T. (2009). News Values and Selectivity. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), The Handbook of Journalism Studies (pp. 161–174). New York: Routledge.

Open Britain. (n.d.). About. Retrieved June 17, 2017, from http://www.open-britain.co.uk/about

Palmer, J. (1998). News Production, News Values. In A. Briggs & P. Cobley (Eds.), The Media: An Introduction (pp. 377–391). Harlow: Longman.

Radaelli, C. (2003). The Europeanization of Public Policy. In K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli (Eds.). The Politics of Europeanization (pp. 27–56). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Reich, Z. (2010). Measuring the Impact of PR on Published News in Increasingly Fragmented News Environments. Journalism Studies, 11(6), 799–816.

Reich, Z. (2011). Different Practices, Similar Logic: Comparing News Reporting across Political, Financial, and Territorial Beats. International Journal of Press-Politics, 17(1), 76–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161211420868

Risse, T. (2000). Zur Debatte um die (Nicht-) Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit [To the Debate on the (Non)Existence of an European Public Sphere]. Berliner Debatte

31

Initial, 13(5/6), 15–23.

Ruzza, C. (2006). European Institutions and the Policy Discourse of Organised Civil Society. In S. Smismans (Ed.), Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (pp. 169– 195). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Schafraad, P., van Zoonen, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2016). The News Value of Dutch Corporate Press Releases as a Predictor of Corporate Agenda Building Power. Public Relations Review, 42(3), 451–458. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2015.11.014

Schmid-Petri, H., Häussler, T., & Adam, S. (2016). Different Actors, Different Factors? A Comparison of the News Factor Orientation between Newspaper Journalists and Civil-Society Actors. Communications, 41(4), 399–419. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2016-0023

Schulz, W. F. (1982). News Structure and People’s Awarness of Political Events. International Communication Gazette, 30, 139–153.

Semetko, H. A., De Vreese, C. H., & Peter, J. (2000). Europeanised Politics – Europeanised Media? European Integration and Political Communication. West European Politics, 23(4), 121–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380008425403

Statista. (2017). Überregionale Tageszeitungen in Deutschland nach verkaufter Auflagenzahl im 1. Quartal 2017 [Nationawide Daily Newspapers in Germany according to

Circulation number 1st Quater 2017]. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from

https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/73448/umfrage/auflage-der-ueberregionalen-tageszeitungen/

Trenz, H.-J. (2004). Media Coverage on European Governance. European Journal of Communication, 19(3), 291–319. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323104045257

Trenz, H.-J., & Eder, K. (2004). The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism. European Journal of Social Theory, 7(1), 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431004040016

32 Vliegenthart, R., Oegema, D., & Klandermans, B. (2005). Media Coverage and

Organizational Support in The Dutch Environmental Movement. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 10(3), 365–381.

https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.3.pw25225470l850xn

Waisbord, S. (2011). Can NGOs Change the News? International Journal of Communication, 5, 142–165. https://doi.org/1932–8036/20110142

Walter, S. (2015). Three Models of the European Public Sphere. Journalism Studies, 0(0), 1– 22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2015.1087815

Walter, S. (2016). Explaining the Visibility of EU Citizens: A Multi-Level Analysis of European Union News. European Political Science Review, 1–21.

33

Tables

Table 1.

Functions of the Europeanised Public Spheres

Function Description

Transparency Enabling visibility of all social groups and opinions

Validation Voice, debate and revise opinions by presenting different ones

Orientation Possibility to voice and be confronted with a set of different opinions, enable opinion formation of the public

Legitimation Display opinions and policies to gain (or not) public resonance and thereby legitimacy; legitimate European actors and their issues Responsiveness Enable policy makers to get information about

opinions of citizens and other actors

Accountability Hold decision makers accountable by publicly scrutinizing them; enable public to build their opinion on decision makers and actors on all levels

Participation Encourage contributions from a range of different actors (inclusiveness); enable citizens to

participate and the European policy process Note. This table represents an adapted summary of the functions explained by de Vreese (2007) and Koopmans

34 Table 2.

The Selection of Countries represents a Most-different Cases Design.

Country Level of conflict on EU integration Media system Representation system Selected Newspaper (affiliation)

Germany Low Democratic

corporatist

Corporatism Süddeutsche Zeitung (centre-left)

Die Welt (centre-right)

UK High Liberal Pluralism The Guardian

(centre-left)

35 Table 3.

Selected Civil Society Organisations

Country Name of Organisation Type of organisation

Estimated number of members

Germany Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)* Social Partner (labour market player) > 6 Mio Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA)* Social Partner (labour market player) 1 Mio

Zentralkomitee der deutschen Katholiken (ZdK) Religious communities 230

Sozialverband VdK Deutschland Social player 1,8 Mio

Diakonie Deutschland Social Player 1,1 Mio

Europa Union Deutschland NGO n.a.

Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. (vzbv)* NGO > 20 Mio

Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e.V. (TGD) Community based organisation 60000

UK Confederation of British Industry (CBI)* Social Partner (labour market player) 190 000

Trades Union Congress (TUC)* Social Partner (labour market player) 5,6 Mio

AGE UK Social player n.a.

Caritas Social Action Network (CSAN) Social player n.a.

Open Britain NGO n.a.

Which?* NGO > 1 Mio

Open Rights Group Grass root organisation 3000

Note. Organisations characterised by * were also used in an analysis by Altides (2013) on the publication of their contribution to the European Commission’s consultation