“You’ll be a marine, a higher form of life”
Identity and boundary work in a fragile military
organisation
Nina van Douwen
10011579
Thesis Research Master Social Sciences
Amsterdam, 18 August 2017
Supervisor
Dr. C.M. Roggeband
2
ndReader
Dr. E. Grassiani
3 Abstract
While military scholars have claimed that militaries in Western countries enjoy a special, often high status in society, this study illustrates that this is not necessarily the case in the Netherlands. Soldiers often feel disregarded by the public and the military has a rather negative image in Dutch society. How do soldiers navigate this position in society? In this article, I look specifically at the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has an ambivalent and paradoxical position: it is an elite unit but part of an organisation with an overall low status. According to marines, their status threatens to be further undermined by political pressure to integrate women in the corps. Using data collected through extensive fieldwork, I show the ways in which marines use identity and boundary work to navigate the ambivalent status of their occupation and organisation. Identity work and boundary work have both been used to analyse identity constructing processes; combining these concepts yields new insights. Through identity work, marines create a high-status identity for themselves and fight back against the stigma of Dutch society. Performing boundary work, marines differentiate themselves from civilian society, other parts of the Dutch military, and women. While this allows marines to reinforce their high-status identity, this study suggests it may also create the opportunity for exclusionary practices against those who do not meet the qualities of marines’ collective identity.
5 Introduction
On January 1st, 2017, one of the last men-only work organisations in the Netherlands was officially
opened to women. Established in 1665 as the first part of the Dutch military, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (Dutch: Korps Mariniers) had always been a male bastion – women were not allowed to apply. Now the Dutch parliament forced them to open their ranks. What does such an external push imply for an organisation that has been exclusively male since its foundation? Military organisations, and particularly elite combat units such as the Marine Corps, are widely assumed to have a special and high status in society (Basham, 2009; DeGroot, 2001; Leal, 2005; Winslow & Dunn, 2002). This is considered necessary, as the high status is the reward combat soldiers receive for the sacrifices their job entails. The case of the Netherlands, however, shows that this is not always true. Dutch society generally does not see the need for a military and, more importantly, the Dutch population has a rather negative image of its armed forces (Algra, Elands & Schoeman, 2007; Sion, 2006). This creates a paradoxical situation for the Marine Corps and its soldiers; the corps is an elite unit but part of an organisation with an overall low status. Moreover, it is widely noted (Pease, 2011; Pollit & Oldfield, 2017; Sasson-Levy, 2011) that the feminising of an occupation may further threaten its status. Research in a variety of countries has indicated that female dominated occupations tend to have a lower status in society than those that are dominated by men (Basten, 1997; Madaran & Catterall, 2000). Additionally, the more an occupation is feminised, the more likely it is to be poorly paid (Drudy, 2008; O’Connor, 1998). The threat the integration of women poses to an occupation’s status is even more prevalent in the military, as masculinity is an inherent aspect of the military’s culture (Barrett, 1996; Kovitz, 2003; Rimalt, 2007). The integration of women in combat roles therefore also threatens the image of the soldiers as male warriors (Kümmel, 2002; Russo, 1994). Dutch marines are
consequently employed by an organisation with an ambivalent status: the Marine Corps is labelled as an elite unit within the military, but is also struggling with a negative public image and a reduced status due to the planned integration of women marines. What are the experiences of soldiers being part of an elite corps within a low status organisation? How do Dutch marines navigate their
organisation’s ambivalent and contested status?
Through in-depth qualitative interviews with employees of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, this study looks at the ways Dutch marines construct their identity and perform boundary work to negotiate the ambivalent status of their occupation. Identity work is known to be used to fight back against the stigma of a dominant group (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). In this case, marines fight back against the stigma of Dutch society. Boundary work, additionally, is performed to further police this collective identity. Through boundary work groups define their identity in opposition to that of others, indicating who is similar to and who is different from them (Lamont, 1992, 2000). Lamont (1992, 2000) finds that boundary work is an essential medium through which people acquire status and construct a sense of self-worth. With this article, I do not just aim to add to the extensive body of literature on status and the military, but I also intent to further the knowledge of identity work, boundary work, and boundaries in the social sciences. The theoretical concepts of identity and boundary work have rarely been applied to the military (for an exception, see Persson, 2010),
however, the military is an excellent case to further our understanding of such processes, particularly because of the special status the military generally enjoys and its separation from civilian society. While identity work and boundary work have both been used to analyse identity constructing processes; combining these separate concepts yields new insights. This study shows how a
combination of both concepts deepens our knowledge of group identity processes and its possible consequences. Furthermore, it demonstrates that identity construction and maintenance take place
6 both as an in-group process and in relation to external ‘others’, and that both processes are not necessarily neatly separable but are ingrained in each other.
Status, identity work, and boundary work in the military
In order to study the status and position of the military and the Marine Corps in Dutch society, it is pertinent to understand the relation between the military and civilian society in general. Much has been written about how civilian society and the military relate to each other; this will be the starting point of this theoretical framework. Additionally, I will theoretically explain in what sense the Dutch military differs from militaries in other Western countries to understand why the Dutch military has an atypical relation to the Dutch population. Subsequently, I will introduce the concepts of identity work and boundary work, and describe how they may be combined to yield new insights.
The relation between civilian society and the military has been discussed by various scholars (Ben-Ari, 1998; Moskos, 1976; Winslow, 1997). Historically, in Western countries, civilian society and the military have been perceived as strictly separate spheres. Because of the military’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the waging of war, the organisation is required to isolate itself from civilian society (Basham, 2009; Higate, 2003; Winslow & Dunn, 2002). However, some scholars (Burke, 2004; Cohn, 2000) state that the military also uses its separation from civilian society to argue that it should have the right to set its own standards, distinct from those in civilian society. Consequently, in democratic societies there exists a tension between society’s political and legal institutions, and the military’s mandate and eagerness to function as a separate entity (Kovitz, 2003). Over the past decades, there has been a push towards the civilianisation of the military (Basham, 2009; Winslow, 1997). Slowly, Western militaries have been required to adhere to society’s norms, especially when it comes to the integration of ethnic minorities, non-heterosexual people, and women. It has also been argued (Burke, 2004; Kovitz, 2003) that the integration of women symbolises the civilianisation of the military. One of the reasons women’s presence in the military is contentious is that women are thought to represent civilian society. Simultaneously, men’s military masculinity is considered to represent the military’s segregation from said society (Burke, 2004; Kovitz, 2003). Militaries’ close relation to governments and their dependency on tax-payer money have made it increasingly important for militaries to respond to civilian society’s call for diversity and equality, in order to maintain its social legitimacy (Basham, 2009; Bosman, Richardson & Soeters, 2007; Harries-Jenkins, 2006). Nonetheless, military scholars (Basham, 2009; DeGroot, 2001; Leal, 2005; Winslow & Dunn, 2002) agree that it is vital for militaries, and especially for combat units, to have a special status in society. This special status is based on the military’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and may serve as a kind of reward for the sacrifices military personnel is required to make for their occupation. Without this special status, Basham argues that soldiers might wonder why only they are asked to put their lives on the line for their country.
The need for the military to have a special and high status, as reward for a soldier’s sacrifices, is related to another classical debate in military sociology, namely that of citizenship (DeGroot, 2001; Enloe, 1994; Iskra, 2007; Jeffreys, 2007; Klein, 2003; Rimalt, 2007; Sasson-Levy, 2003, 2007; Snyder, 2003; Tilly, 1996). Most studies on the link between citizenship and the military focus on either Israel or the United States. Nonetheless, scholars (Giddens, 1985, as cited in Sasson-Levy, 2003; Tilly, 1996) do argue that all Western societies have made military service central to the definition of citizenship. In the West, citizenship emerged during the revolutionary wars, most notably the French revolution of 1789 (Tilly, 1996). Citizenship grants rights to the citizens of a certain country, but with it came certain duties, such as military service. Tilly (1996: 231) claims that while variation in citizenship rights and
7 duties existed, “nevertheless, some version of the causal chain from military activity to citizenship prevailed”. As Rimalt (2007:1103) writes: “Military service became not only a fundamental expression of the individual’s commitments to the state but also an essential proof of the willingness to make a personal sacrifice for the sake of one’s country”. Especially in Israel, the soldier has come to represent the ideal citizen. Military service is seen as a “rite of citizenship” (Sasson-Levy, 2007:485). While this may partly be because of Israel’s universal military conscription, scholars (DeGroot, 2001; Enloe, 1994; Iskra, 2007; Jeffreys, 2007; Snyder, 2003) argue that the same can be said about the link between military service and citizenship in the United States. As DeGroot (2001:29) states: “War provides a unique opportunity for the active demonstration of one’s love of country”. Consequently, serving in the military can be seen as not only a citizen’s right, but also a citizenship responsibility (Iskra, 2007). Through military service, a citizen will receive the rights and liberties associated with living in a free society (Snyder, 2003). Furthermore, in Israel, the top positions in the military, politics, and civilian businesses and industry are generally reserved for those who have served in prestigious combat positions. Serving in the military may thus function as a gateway to a successful military or civilian career (Rimalt, 2007). The same can be said about the United States, where combat veterans generally have enormous advantages when running for political positions (DeGroot, 2001).
Academics have consequently concluded that the military has a high and special status in society. However, the case of the Netherlands shows that this is not true in all Western societies. Sion (2006: 456) argues that the Netherlands is a so-called “warless society”. Historically, the Dutch were known for their neutral and pacifist attitude, and Dudink (2002, as cited in Sion, 2006) argues that, because of this, the Dutch view themselves as unheroic or nonmartial. In the Netherlands, the probability of war is low, especially of war on Dutch soil, and consequently the Dutch population feels far removed from international conflicts and combat (Sion, 2006). Furthermore, in recent years, the Dutch military has become increasingly focused on peacekeeping missions. As Algra, et al. (2007: 400) argue, “generally speaking, peacekeeping operations do not produce heroes. There are no hard-won victories, and apparently, no immediate national interests are visibly served by peacekeeping
operations”. Because of the ‘warlessness’ of Dutch society and the nature of recent missions, the military is seen as rather unimportant within Dutch society (Sion, 2006). Yet, simultaneously, the Dutch population has a fairly low trust in and a rather negative perception of their military (Algra, et al., 2007; Sion, 2006). Sion argues that this is at least in part due to past military missions gone wrong. In recent history, several of the conflicts in which the Dutch military participated have had negative consequences for the image of the military in society. Immediately after the Second World War, the war of decolonisation in Indonesia started, but the Dutch had to give up the colony after four years. Approximately twenty years after the war ended, discussion arose on the so-called “Dutch Vietnam” (Algra, et al., 2007: 398) and possible criminal conducts. This greatly impacted the image of Dutch veterans, who were seen as perpetrators of war crimes. Yet, Dutch society and consequently the Dutch military were most impacted by the peacekeeping mission in Srebrenica in 19951, when Dutch
peacekeeping soldiers failed to protect the enclave they were assigned to (Algra, et al., 2007; Sion, 2006). The aftermath of this mission lasts until the present2. Although official reports (Moens, 2003)
established that the Dutch soldiers carried little responsibility for the final outcome in Srebrenica, Algra, et al. (2007: 404) find that in Dutch news articles written about Srebrenica “the fall of the enclave was listed with a string of Dutch military defeats” from the Second World War to the colonial wars and peace missions. While this is incorrect from a historical perspective, Algra et al. (2007: 404) argue that it does show how the media views the Dutch armed forces, which they paraphrase as: “Be unafraid. We always yield”. “We are the losers””. This negative publicity has caused Dutch veterans to
8 be weary of the way the Dutch media covers them. Veterans generally share the impression that the Dutch media is focused on military failures or misconducts. They have the feeling that the media rarely covers the sacrifices made by those who have served in the Dutch military (Algra, et al., 2007). The combination of disinterest in the armed forces and the simultaneous negative image of Dutch soldiers, leaves the Dutch military in an ambivalent position. Furthermore, because of this negative image, the link between citizenship and military service is not as clearly established in the Netherlands as it appears to be in other Western societies. As I will show later in this article, military service in the Netherlands generally does not serve as a gateway to a successful civilian or political career. One may ask, if the Dutch military does not have a special, high status in society, how do Dutch soldiers make their service worthwhile? How do they justify the sacrifices they are required to make to themselves and to others?
In this article, I will show in what ways soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps perform identity work and boundary work to navigate the ambivalent position of their occupation and carve out a high-status identity for themselves. The topic of status is closely connected to questions of self- and group identity. Group identities can be used to create a sense of self-worth and dignity, a feeling of personal significance, and a sense of belonging (Jewkes, 2005; Higate, 2012; Lamont, 2000; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Identity work and boundary work have been individually used to explain the
processes of identity making, however, in this study I aim to prove that a combination of these concepts can lead to a better understanding of these processes. First, I will theoretically review identity work and boundary work, and subsequently I will show how these concepts can be related to each other.
Snow and Anderson (1987: 1348) introduced the concept of identity work in their study on homeless people. They conceptualise identity work as the “range of activities individuals engage in to create, present and sustain personal identities” that are consistent with and supportive of the way they see themselves. This definition conceptualises identity work as an individual process, however, Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996) argue that identity work can also entail group processes. They define identity work as “anything people do, individually or collectively, to give meaning to themselves or others” (p. 115). In their conceptualisation, identity work is used to uncover how groups construct identities, thus on the process of identity making, and less on the content of said identities. This is also the reason scholars call it identity work, as it involves an active process. Talk as a process to establish identities has been the main focus in the study of identity work (Snow & Anderson, 1987; Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). This study’s main attention also lies on the construction of identities through talk, but I will additionally show some alternative measures marines employ. Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock split the process of identity work into four parts that they argue must all take place, although not necessarily in a specific order. The first part is defining, which is the creation of a shared idea about the existence of a type of people. Identity work thus begins with the making of a symbol or name that represents, according to more than one person, a group of people. Defining also includes adding meaning to this identity; this is the only part of identity work that specifically includes the identity’s content. Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock argue that groups who aim to create a high-status identity may have to do extra work to resist the reactions of other groups. One of the strategies a group can use is what they call essentialising. Essentialising is the process in which a group claims that certain traits are natural in all those who share this specific identity, for example “promoting the notions that superior capacities for reason, organisation, and control are among the natural
endowments of males” (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996: 124). The second part of identity work is
9 knowledge about how to show that you belong to a certain group or have specific abilities. This can include learning how to dress, talk, and act so that an individual is seen as belonging to this group. The third part of identity work is affirming. Groups create opportunities for their members to enact or validate their claim to an identity. According to Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock this may in some cases include initiation rites. The fourth and last part of identity work is policing, which is the work carried out to protect an identity. This is mostly done by specifying who can claim an identity and who cannot (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). This part of the identity work relates closest to what Lamont (1992) calls boundary work.
Lamont (1992: 233) defines boundary work as “the process by which individuals define their identity in opposition to that of others”. Boundary work is performed; people and groups use boundary work to construct similarities and differences between themselves and others. Lamont (1992, 2000) argues that boundary work is an essential medium through which people acquire status. In her study on working men, Lamont (2000) finds that they use boundary work to construct a sense of self-worth. Instead of focusing on economic definitions of success, working men use moral standards to define their identities. They use the characteristics of hard work, personal integrity, and traditional morality to put themselves above others and compensate for their low socioeconomic status.
Moreover, they downplay status criteria that are generally used by the upper middle class. Working men thus empower themselves by using standards that disassociate worth and respect from socioeconomic status.
In short: boundary work is a process by which people differentiate themselves from others, and through this differentiation create their own identities. Hence, one of the difference between identity work and boundary work lies in the question of how identities are created. Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996) specifically distinguish between what they call the work done to create an identity, which mostly lies in the defining and coding parts of identity work, and the work done to preserve an identity, which to them is the policing part of identity work. They see defining and coding as an in-group process: groups define their identity by focusing on the qualities important to
themselves and decide on their own identity codes, without specifically comparing or distinguishing themselves from other groups. Lamont (1992, 2000), on the other hand, argues that identities are created by drawing strict boundaries against perceived ‘others’. By focusing on identity work and boundary work, we can understand how identities are created both as an in-group process and in relation to external groups. Using identity work, we can apprehend how marines create their identity through an internal process, without actively distancing themselves from others. Taking boundary work into account gives analytical space to understand that identities are also constructed in relation to others, e.g. it creates the opportunity to show that protecting and constructing are reciprocally related. As the concepts of identity and boundary work stem from two different theoretical debates, they have been separated in this study. However, as we will see, the processes are also very much ingrained in each other and are generally not as neatly separable. Combining the two concepts allows us to see the full picture of the strategies marines employ to construct and protect their collective identity and status.
Furthermore, the concept of boundary work focuses extensively on the (re)production of hierarchies and power differences (Lamont, 1992, 2000; Lamont & Molnár, 2002), a topic left undiscussed by Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996), but extremely relevant in the context of the military. Lamont (1992) argues that the making of communities, of group identities, presupposes the exclusion of the people who do not belong to this specific community. Boundary work and boundaries produce power differences and inequality. In discussing the (re)production of inequality through
10 boundary work, it is important to understand the differences between symbolic and social boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are “tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002: 168). Furthermore, symbolic boundaries are used to separate people into groups, and therefore these boundaries can create feelings of similarity and group membership. Using symbolic boundaries to differentiate themselves from others, people and groups can acquire status and superiority. When performing boundary work, people generally draw symbolic boundaries (Lamont, 1992). Social boundaries, on the other hand, are “objectified form of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources and social opportunities” (Lamont & Molnár, 2002: 168). Consequently, while symbolic boundaries are drawn in the process of identity making and may result in the creation of hierarchies, social boundaries are the boundaries that effectively cause inequality. Symbolic boundaries do not automatically turn into social boundaries. Lamont and Molnár argue that only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon, it is possible for them to develop into social boundaries. Additionally, they believe that symbolic
boundaries are more likely to be transformed into social boundaries when these boundaries are drawn contrasting only one group instead of multiple. Lamont and Molnár do state that there is a need to explore the possibility of multiplex identity framing, in which a group defines its identity in relation to multiple ‘others’. In this study, I aim to show how the Dutch Marine Corps, as a means to navigate their ambivalent status in society, employs identity work and boundary work to contrast themselves to multiple groups. Furthermore, I will argue that these symbolic boundaries may indeed turn into social boundaries that exclude all groups and individuals who do not conform to the marines’ group identity.
Methodology
This study is based on extensive fieldwork within the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. From February until May 2017, the Marine Corps provided me with access to their bases and their employees, which allowed me to immerse myself into their organisational culture. For the purposes of this study, I conducted 23 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Respondents included marines of various ranks (ten soldiers, four non-commissioned officers, and two officers), three male and three female Navy soldiers working in support roles for the Marine Corps, and a diversity officer of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. A list of respondents and their rank within the organisation can be found in appendix 1. All interviews with Marine Corps employees took place at one of the Marine Corps bases. Additionally, I conducted field observations while I was at the Marine Corps base, and was present during a full-day discussion of Navy and Marine Corps officers on diversity and inclusion within their ranks. Lastly, I discussed my research topic with the commanders of the two main Marine Corps military bases, and spoke informally with several other Marine Corps employees. Notes of these meetings and
conversations are also included in the data used for this study. Transcriptions of the interviews and field notes were analysed through grounded theory (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2011). The original aim of the study was to understand how marines perceive the planned integration of women in their organisation. However, when discussing this topic with respondents, it became clear that while talking about women, marines were actually saying a great deal about how they view themselves and their organisation. Consequently, instead of focusing on the integration of women per se, I decided to use the topic of women’s integration as a lens through which we can better understand marines’ self-perception and how they relate themselves to others.
Next to the methods of research and analysis, it is pertinent to discuss my own position as a researcher in the Marine Corps. Being a young, high-educated female interviewer resulted in having
11 the perspective of studying up while also studying down (Nader, 1972). Compared to most
respondents, in particular those lower in rank, I was highly educated. This slightly intimidated some of the interviewees, especially if they were of the same age as I am. Simultaneously, being a female researcher in an all-men organisation has no doubt influenced the constructed knowledge. While I do not feel my respondents have been dishonest with me, or withheld any information on purpose, it is highly likely that they would have behaved and responded differently had I been a man. Moreover, by being a female interviewer, who is also within the age range to apply for the Marine Corps, I could experience and observe the identity work and boundary work performed by marines first hand. In a sense, respondents used me as a prototypical female to illustrate why they believe women are not suited for the Marine Corps. Consequently, my educational background caused feelings of studying down while respondents used my gender to establish a superior position, which resulted in the perspective of studying up. Furthermore, as has been argued by Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport (2003), being a female interviewer in a male organisation can also be an asset. The fact that respondents were interviewed by a woman, who was not related to the Dutch military in any way, encouraged
interviewees to give more detailed descriptions about their work and organisation to introduce me to their world, and to explain their taken-for-granted assumptions. Lastly, my outsider position may also have caused them to be more open about certain sensitive topics, as they felt their remarks would not have consequences for them or their career.
In the following parts of the article, I will first briefly introduce the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and explain its ambivalent status in Dutch society. Subsequently, I will show how marines use identity work to create a collective, exclusively male identity for themselves, and I will indicate how they code, affirm, and police this identity. Lastly, I will show the ways in which marines perform boundary work to further establish their identity and elevate their status.
A brief introduction to the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and its status in Dutch society
The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps was founded in 1665 and is the oldest unit of the Dutch military3.
It is one of three elite units within the Dutch armed forces and works in close cooperation with the Dutch Navy. The Marine Corps is a light infantry corps that carries out amphibious and special operations. Recent missions have included anti-piracy missions on the coast of Somalia, and deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq4. While some marines temporarily carry out administrative or
logistic tasks, their main occupation is infantry. All marines are trained as combat soldiers and they officially remain combat soldiers during their entire service. As an elite unit, the Marine Corps uses strict selection criteria to decide who gets into basic training. Most men who are interested in
becoming a marine fail the physical, medical, and psychological entry tests. Of those who are selected to start with the Marine Corps basic training, the commander of the Marine Corps Training Centre indicated that on average less than fifty percent manages to complete training. The same can be said of those who start the officers’ training of the Marine Corps (De Vries, 2016).
Similar to most military organisations, the Marine Corps employees can be broadly divided into three groups: marines, non-commissioned officers, and officers. In short, marines can be seen as the foot soldiers of the Marine Corps, while non-commissioned officers generally are the supervisors of a small group of marines. Officers, depending on the specific rank within this category, supervise a larger unit of marines and are responsible for most of the strategic decisions. Importantly, the physical burden differs greatly between the ranks. Adjutant Groen said:
12 Well, with the officers you see… They hardly have to walk with a rucksack for more than eight years. But especially non-commissioned officers, they start out as young marine and then it could be that, through the ranks, you’ll walk with that rucksack daily, until you’re 47, 48.
The expression of ‘walking with a rucksack’ is the marine’s way of referring to the physical exercises they must complete, often while indeed carrying a rucksack, and the overall physical strength necessary for the occupation. Interviewees indicated that there were large differences between the physical burden of a non-commissioned officer and an officer. This is important especially because while the division between marine, non-commissioned officer, and officer is normal enough for military organisations, in the Marine Corps it also encompasses a class division. Generally, recruits who start out as marine, the lowest rank, are low educated. Anyone with a high school diploma, no matter which level5, can enter basic training for marines. Yet, the Marine Corps officers’ basic training is seen
as an (applied sciences) university degree, and consequently only accessible for people who have finished a higher level of secondary education6. This class division is reinforced by the lack of career
opportunities for recruits who start at the lowest level. Men who start out as marine, as mere soldier, rarely climb up to the rank of officer. First lieutenant Van Oudewater, who started out as marine but did manage to become an officer, said:
Three years ago, I became an officer. OEXS, they call that, Officer Ex-Sailor [marine]. When you come into service you’re either a sailor or an officer. And later, I became an officer, but then they call it OEXS. And yeah, generally, as OEXS you can’t get any further than the rank of captain.
Van Oudewater indicates that his position is special, the organisation uses a specific abbreviation for those who start as marine and manage to rise to the rank of officer. The existence of the abbreviation shows how rare it is that marines become officers; this group of officers has to be highlighted as the majority of men who enrol as marine never rise above the rank of non-commissioned officer. It could be argued that the distinction between ‘regular’ officers and officers ex-sailors also relegates the latter to a lower position in military ranking. Furthermore, Van Oudewater reveals that it is largely
impossible for officers who started as marines to rise above the rank of captain, which leaves the seven highest officers’ ranks (from major to general) unattainable for anyone who did not start as officer, or in other words, who did not complete a higher level of secondary education. Consequently, it is rather difficult if not nearly impossible for the young, low educated men who start as marine to make career within the Marine Corps. Leaving the military and aiming for a career in civilian society, however, is also not easy. Contrary to most other units within the Dutch military, the Marine Corps trains its recruits only as combat soldiers. This means that they hardly learn any skills that are valuable outside of the military. Marine Becht said: “As a soldier, you can’t do anything outside of the armed forces. You’re standing still, on a professional level”. This lack of professional development is worse for those who start out as marine, as they are already generally lower educated than those who
immediately become officers. Furthermore, this suggests that in the Netherlands military service is indeed not a gateway to a successful civilian career, as it is in other countries (DeGroot, 2001; Rimalt, 2007).
The difficulty of finding a career outside of the Marine Corps is reinforced by the ambivalent status of the organisation in Dutch society. Regardless of the fact that the Marine Corps is an elite unit, the status of the Dutch military in general is relatively low, which has an impact on all who serve in the organisation, including marines. As discussed above, this low status is two-fold. First, because the
13 Netherlands can be seen as a warless society (Sion, 2006) the Dutch population does not necessarily see the need for a military. Interviewees were clearly aware of this. Corporal Feenstra said:
Many people also wonder: “What good does the military even do?” […] But if it truly... If something happens and something must be done, look at the MH177, then suddenly, it’s: “Why don’t we have a
military anymore?” Then people start asking questions. But if nothing happens, and things only happen outside of your country, yeah then why would you spend money on the armed forces?
This excerpt shows that corporal Feenstra not only knows how the Dutch population sees the military, but that it also frustrates him. Society does not see or appreciate the work the military and the Marine Corps do. Because of this, he speculates that people doubt the need to spend money on the military. This is a topic that interviewees often referred to. In recent years, the budget of the Dutch military has been cut repeatedly and marines notice this lack of money in their day-to-day work. For them, it is a sign that the Dutch population does not appreciate or notice the work that they do. In a sense, marines feel as if their organisation is somewhat invisible. This is also true in the literal sense of the word. Dutch military bases are often located in remote areas, as far away from civilian society as possible. While this reinforces the desired separation between civilian society and the military (Basham, 2009; Moskos, 1976), it also means that the Dutch population is less acutely aware of the existence of their military. This separation has been reinforced by the suspension of the draft. Since 1997, the Dutch military no longer actively conscripts civilians8 and has converted to an all-volunteer
force. The commander of the main Marine Corps base stated that the relation between civilians and the Marine Corps has deteriorated since then, especially because this has further increased the Marine Corps’ invisibility in society. In recent years, this invisibility has been strengthened by the fact that Dutch soldiers are no longer allowed to wear their uniforms in public outside working hours9.
Consequently, the Dutch population rarely sees soldiers during their daily lives.
Next to the invisibility of the Dutch military, I have argued above that the Dutch population has a rather negative image of its armed forces. This is mostly based on past missions gone wrong (Algra, et al., 2007; Sion, 2006), but is reinforced by frequent negative publications about the military in the Dutch media. While the Dutch military has a fairly invisible role in society, when the organisation does break through its invisibility it is more often than not because of negative publicity. These kinds of publications also extend to the Marine Corps. For example, in March 2017, while I was conducting my fieldwork, articles were published about a Marine Corps’ training in the Himalaya being too expensive10 and about alcohol abuse, group fights, and sexual escapades after a Marine Corps’ winter
training in Norway11. Interviewees were very aware of the negative publicity. Marine Van Dongen said:
“I do feel connected to the Corps but I am not going to talk about it during birthday parties”. This sentiment was shared by many respondents, who felt that because of the negative image they could not talk about their occupation with their civilian friends or acquaintances. Some told me about hurtful occurrences when they had been perceived negatively because of their occupation. Sergeant Köster said:
I had just returned from Iraq when my girlfriend introduced me to her parents. Back then, the story of the ex-marine who chased after his parents-in-law with a gun had just been in the news12. So yeah, they
referred to that like: “Is that really a wise thing to do, to take a guy like that into our home?” Yeah, I find that… that saddens you. It does something… Luckily, everything turned out fine. [Laughs].
14 In these cases, being associated with an organisation with a low status comes with a price. Despite this, the Marine Corps remains an elite organisation. Marines are required to work extremely hard, first to get into the organisation but also because the occupation is exceptionally demanding. The Marine Corps’ elite position sharply contrasts the near invisibility of and the often-negative news publications about the Dutch military. Moreover, contrary to other Western countries (DeGroot, 2001; Sasson-Levy, 2003; Tilly, 1996) citizenship rights are not connected to the military in Dutch society, especially since the suspension of the draft. This creates a certain paradox, wherein marines’ hard work and sacrifices do not pay off. As argued above, a reward in the form of status is essential for combat soldiers (Basham, 2009). Consequently, the question remains how marines navigate the ambivalent status of their organisation. I will show the ways in which marines use identity work and boundary work to carve out a collective high-status identity. They use this identity to overcome the ambivalent status of the Marine Corps and to compensate for the lack of appreciation from Dutch society.
Identity work: military masculinity with a twist
Marines feel a sense of pride for their organisation and occupation. This topic came up in many interviews, and the following quote from the interview with sergeant-major Van de Pol exemplifies how many respondents feel: “I am extremely proud that I’m a marine. I still am. It’s simply in my heart and in my soul”. This raises the question: if the Dutch military has such an ambivalent status in Dutch society, then on what is the marines’ pride and self-worth based? This research shows that marines base their pride on a collective identity they actively create and perform through identity work and boundary work. First, I will discuss the process of identity making with use of the concept of identity work. Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996) define four parts in the process of identity making: defining, coding, affirming, and policing. Not every aspect of identity work is of equal importance to marines, thus, while I will address all four parts, I will emphasise some more than others.
The first part of identity work, defining, relates to the creation of an image for a certain group (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). The image, or identity, marines have created for themselves is that of a mentally strong, dedicated, and loyal man. The fact that this identity revolves around the image of a man, and not a person, is partly because there are currently no female marines. However, it is mostly related to the masculine nature of marines’ identity and their boundary work, which I will discuss later. Furthermore, marines construct this identity mostly as an internal, in-group process, by emphasising the qualities they find important. The first quality, mental strength, includes emotional control, the ability to withstand hardship, and perseverance. Marine Visser said: “You should simply keep going until you think you’ll fall down, and then you’ll be able to go even further”. Interviewees felt that mental strength was extremely important, as this quality allowed marines to continue to carry out their job no matter the circumstances. While the second quality, dedication, might appear to be somewhat similar to the characteristics mentioned in relation to mental strength, in the case of the Dutch Marine Corps dedication refers to marines’ willingness to put the organisation first. Marines are expected to work full-time and are frequently away from home for extended periods of time. Adjutant Groen said: “Of the 36 years I have been a marine, I spent 23 years and nine months abroad”. Because of this, many marines have trouble maintaining relationships outside of the organisation. Interviewees indicated that they were divorced or that they did not have a strong bond with their children. Making friends outside of the Marine Corps often proves difficult, hence marines stated that the majority of their friends and acquaintances were from within the organisation. Loyalty, the third quality of marines’ collective identity, is an important factor in this. Sergeant Köster said: “If something would
15 happen to me right now, and I’d call a colleague, he’d simply say: “I’m on my way, where are you?”. […] Yes, we can trust each other blindly”. Most interviewees echoed this sentiment; they feel a deep sense of trust and loyalty amongst the people employed by the Marine Corps. The quality of loyalty is not only limited to trust. Marines argue that they are connected to one another in a sense that transcends the regular bond between colleagues. Marine Van Dongen said:
Even when you meet marines who are eighty years old, you’re still a marine. […] Yes, if you’re a marine, you’re a marine. I think that’s the best part, the sense of brotherhood, even with people you may have never seen before.
This sense of brotherhood further increases the likelihood and importance of making friends within the Marine Corps, while, simultaneously, having these kinds of relationships reinforces marines’ feelings of connectedness. Marines clearly feel closely connected to the organisation and its members, and they frequently expressed that once you are a marine, you will always be a marine. Consequently, their sense of loyalty is not limited to their everyday colleagues but includes everyone who has once been a part of the Marine Corps.
These findings reflect the literature on military culture, but with a twist. Mental strength, dedication, and loyalty are frequently mentioned in the literature as characteristics of military masculinity (Barrett, 1996; Ben-Ari, 1998; Burke, 2004; Hockey, 2003; Woodward, 2003). Military culture is inherently masculine, as militaries were traditionally male-only organisations (Burke, 2004; Sasson-Levy, 2011) and war and combat were historically perceived as man’s natural role (Herbert, 1998; Klein, 2003). Qualities such as mental strength, dedication, and loyalty are seen as important features of many soldiers’ masculine identities. By stressing the importance of mental strength, dedication, and loyalty, marines create not just a collective identity, but a masculine collective
identity. However, this is a masculine identity with a twist. Physical strength is generally also seen as a central characteristic of military masculinity (Barrett, 1996; Burke, 2004; Hockey, 2003; Woodward, 2003), and it is one of the most important qualities tested during entry tests and basic training. Yet, interviewees downplayed the importance of physical strength as component of their collective identity. Consider marine Van Dongen’s thoughts on what a ‘real marine’ looks like: “He must be strong between the ears. You can look like superman, but if you are not mentally strong, you will break at a certain moment”. Van Dongen argues that being physically fit, or looking “like superman”, is not as necessary as having a certain mental strength. Sergeant Köster even said: “Whether someone is physically very strong or not, it’s more important that he’ll keep trying”. This is in direct contrast with the physical requirements the occupation entails. I argue that marines downplay the importance of physical strength and instead emphasise mental strength, dedication, and loyalty because this allows them to distinguish themselves from the stereotypical image of soldiers present in Dutch society. Physical strength is generally a central characteristic of military masculinity; thus, soldiers are strongly associated with it (Barrett, 1996; Cohn, 2000; Kovitz, 2003; Woodward, 2003). By highlighting the qualities of mental strength, dedication, and loyalty instead, marines distance themselves from being mere soldiers and place themselves above other soldiers in an imaginary hierarchy. This is in line with Lamont’s (2000) finding that working men find worth in their own lives by downplaying the status criteria that are dominant in society, such as socioeconomic success, and instead stress moral criteria of success. The qualities that make up marines’ collective identity could furthermore be seen as the creation of a moral identity. Similar to Lamont’s working men, marines find their self-worth in
16 loyalty to their fellow marines. We will see that they use this masculine and moral identity to perform boundary work, and through this carve out a high-status position for themselves. Furthermore, this shows that identity work and boundary work are indeed reciprocally related. Marines formulate their identity partly in relation to how society views them, and then use this identity as a boundary to further distance themselves from society.
The second part of identity work is coding (Schwalbe & Mason Schrock, 1996). The question to answer here is: how do you show that you are a marine? The most significant way for a marine to signal that he does in fact belong to the Marine Corps is through his uniform. When a soldier is wearing a uniform, there is no chance of mistaking him for a civilian (Burke, 2004). As military
uniforms in the Netherlands are very similar for all branches of the military, there is one particular part of the uniform that is of vital symbolic importance to marines: their beret. The Marine Corps’ beret is dark blue with an anchor on the side, placed on a red square. The combination of dark blue and red is unique within the Dutch military, which makes marines easily identifiable. Marines virtually always wear their berets when they are wearing their uniforms, they only take it off when they are seated. Corporal Feenstra said: “If you have received your beret, you’re a marine”, thereby equating this specific part of the uniform to the Marine Corps’ identity. However, because of the above-mentioned prohibition for military personnel to wear their uniforms in public outside working hours, it has become more difficult for marines to signal their identity to the civilian population. This may not be much of a problem, as we have seen above, because the ambivalent status of the Marine Corps has resulted in marines being cautious in who they signal their identity to. Consequently, marines use their beret mostly as an in-group code to show to other marines that they belong to the organisation.
The affirming of an identity, the third part of the identity work process, may involve elaborate initiation rites (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996). The most important aspect of the affirmation of a marine’s identity is the Marine Corps’ basic training. Military basic training is generally seen as a rite de passage: it turns civilians into soldiers and boys into men (Herbert, 1998; Hockey, 2003; Winslow, 1999). During basic training, recruits have the chance to prove that they do in fact possess the qualities that make up the identity of a marine. If they do, they will transition from civilian to marine. Discussing this, first lieutenant Beernink said: “At the end of basic training you’ve either deserved your beret or you haven’t”. Here, we again see the importance of the beret to signal the marine’s identity. As the Marine Corps is an elite unit within the Dutch military, its basic training is one of the most difficult military trainings in the Netherlands. Consequently, recruits have to work hard both to get in and to finish. This enhances the importance of this affirmatory moment. Marine Jonker said: “You get a sense of pride because you’ve made it. Because it’s a tough training, and many lads drop out. There are a lot of guys who dream about it, but only a few can make it”. In line with downplaying physical strength as part of the marines’ collective identity, most interviewees argued that not the physical but the mental part of basic training was the most difficult.
Lastly, the main policing strategy I want to mention adds to the definition of policing put forth by Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock (1996). In their definition, they perceive policing as a process meant to maintain an identity by deciding who can and cannot be part of a certain group. I argue, however, that policing may also include strategies that are meant to ensure that those who are already part of the group continue to adhere to the same identity. In military organisations, uniformisation (Burke, 2004) is such a strategy. Uniformisation starts during basic training. Its main goal is for recruits to supress their individual differences and through that to become the exact soldier the organisation wants them to be (Herbert, 1998). Because of this, marines are very cautious to prevent, as marine Schipper put it, being “special, different”. The prevalence of uniformisation is underlined by a recent
17 study into the Dutch military that found that the organisation in general has a so-called assimilation culture (Andriessen, Van den Berghe, Sterckx, Van Lisdonk & Merens, 2017). Employees are expected to strictly confirm to the dominant culture and to weaken their individuality. Uniformisation helps maintaining marines’ collective identity by requiring them to suppress their differences and emphasise their similarities, which are rooted in this identity. This part of identity work shows how marines maintain their identity by using an in-group process. However, this process may also have exclusionary consequences. Corporal Feenstra said: “if you never truly fit, you’ll leave”. Some marines referred to this part of their organisational culture as a “wolf-pack mentality”. They argued that marines’ loyalty to their organisation combined with the effort to uniformise its members may lead to the exclusion of those who are unwilling or unable to conform to the marines’ collective identity.
Summarising, marines have created a shared masculine identity, based on mental strength, dedication, and loyalty. They have constructed this identity mostly through an in-group process, although distancing themselves from the stereotypical soldier also plays a part in the creation of marines’ collective identity. This shows the close connection between identity and boundary work. Marines further perform more explicit boundary work to distinguish themselves from other groups in society. I will turn to this in the next section.
Boundary work: Maintaining marines’ identity through symbolic boundaries
Through identity work, marines have created a collective identity, but after an identity has been created, a group must make an effort to maintain it. Here, I will turn to the concept of boundary work to show how marines’ collective identity is further constructed and maintained in relation to external groups (Lamont, 1992, 2000). I will use Lamont’s boundary work to analyse the process through which marines perform the similarities and differences between themselves and other groups, to keep their collective identity in check. Boundary work is also used to reinforce the high status of the marines’ collective identity. This is evidenced by the following quote from marine Martens: “During basic training I was told: “Soon you’ll be a marine, and then you will be a higher form of life. The rest, that’s all down below””. Here, Martens clearly indicates that being part of the Marine Corps is the highest identity one could possibly claim. He does not draw boundaries against a specific group, instead he draws a very clear boundary against anyone who is not a marine. Besides this attempt to set the marines’ identity apart from every other group, I have identified three groups of “others” against whom marines frequently draw boundaries: civilian society, other parts of the Dutch military, and women. Boundary work against these three groups was performed rather explicitly in the interviews I conducted within the Marine Corps. However, the marines’ collective identity implies other
boundaries. The Marine Corps is rather homogenous when it comes to ethnicity and sexuality. While discussing this topic with the only non-white respondent, sergeant-major Van de Pol, I asked him if it is true that most marines are white. He said: “Everyone who differs from the image of the stereotypical marine that you just described, you can be certain that those guys have had to work really hard to prove themselves”. Consequently, it appears to be implied in the organisation that white,
heterosexual men best meet the qualities of the marines’ collective identity. However, boundary work against homosexual and non-white men was rarely performed, which may also have to do with the set-up of the study, as it focused specifically on the integration of women and not on other minority groups. Notwithstanding that the exclusion of other minority groups may play a role in the identity work and boundary work of Dutch marines, in this article I will focus on the three groups of others mentioned above: civilian society, other parts of the Dutch military, and women. I will not only show
18 how marines use boundary work to elevate their own status, but also why they draw boundaries against these specific groups.
“In civilian society, someone will simply stab you in the back”: Marines versus civilian society
The military and civilian society are, and should be, two distinct spheres according to various scholars (Basham, 2009; Moskos, 1976). During the interviews, marines actively tried to convince me of the differences between the military and civilian society, clearly performing boundary work. When discussing diversity policy within the Dutch military, marine De Graaf said:
She [the Minister of Defence] is busy renewing the armed forces: We must have more women, we must have more gays, we must have more immigrants. […] That’s something for civilians working at an office, and if you want to change things about your personnel there, you should do it, but not with us. As discussed above, it is implied that white, heterosexual men best meet the marines’ qualities. Everyone who does not fit these characteristics will have a more difficult time being considered a ‘real marine’. De Graaf was one of the few interviewees who openly performed boundary work against homosexual men and ethnic minorities. Simultaneously, he draws a clear boundary against civilian society, and most importantly civilian work organisations, as he considers diversity policy something for these organisations and not an issue the military should focus on. He clearly perceives diversity policies negatively and appears to look down upon organisations who do care about this. Other performances of boundary work against civilian society also appear to be based on a kind of superior morality. When talking about the most important thing he learned during the Marine Corps’ basic training, marine Jonker said: “That I’ve grown up. Because if I compare it to my civilian friends, who are all still studying… Yes, it’s all fun and games, and they don’t give a shit. No responsibility or anything”. Jonker draws a boundary against his civilian friends based on their attitude. He considers marines more responsible and mature, and thus morally superior to his civilian friends. Similar to how marines’ collective identity is partly based on morality, respondents almost always based their
boundary work against the Dutch civilian society on moral distinctions. Especially the attitudes of civilians and soldiers were considered to be different. Additionally, marines argued that their bond is a unique quality that cannot be found in civilian society. Marine Visser said: “So, here your colleague is your buddy, and he stands beside you. In the civilian [society] someone will simply stab you in the back if you don’t watch out”. Visser argues that the bond between marines, based on trust and loyalty, is unique and thus is not found in civilian society. This boundary is also based on a moral distinction, as he implies that the marines’ attitude and loyalty are better than that of civilians.
Overall, performing boundary work against civilian society reinforces the necessary distinction between civilian society and the military (Basham, 2009; Moskos, 1976). Additionally, in the case of the Dutch Marine Corps and its ambivalent status in Dutch society, the performance of boundary work helps marines to navigate the status of their occupation. Both the Dutch population’s disregard for the military’s sacrifices and the military’s negative public image (Algra, et al., 2007; Sion, 2006) make it necessary for marines to further distance themselves from civilian society. By claiming a superior attitude and morality compared to civilians, marines place themselves above the civilian society. This not only allows them to reinforce their high-status identity, it also helps marines to disregard the way civilian society perceives them.
19
“We are the oldest”: Marines versus other parts of the Dutch military
The Marine Corps is an elite unit within the Dutch military, which grants the organisation the
ambivalent status of being elite within an organisation with a generally low status in society. Marines frequently perform boundary work to distinguish themselves from other parts of the Dutch military. Navy soldier Molenaar, who had to drop out of basic training for the Marine Corps three weeks before the end because of an injury, noticed how marines sometimes acted towards him:
They [marines] are of course officially the elite. And those fellas think like, okay, even though you do your job well, […] and physically you are much stronger than some of the guys here, you know…. Nonetheless, it’s still an issue. Like today, I had to go to this interview, so I said to my supervisor, “well, major, I have to go to the interview, I’ll see you later”. Immediately someone said: “why would they want to interview you, you’re not even a marine?!”
Marines use this language of differentiation to set themselves apart from other parts of the Dutch military, and in particular to emphasise their own status. Marines especially perform boundary work against other elite units. Within the Dutch military there are three elite units: the Marine Corps, the Airmobile Brigade and the Commando Corps. Marine De Graaf said: “We are the oldest part of the Dutch military. There’s nothing older, as old as we are. Look at the Airmobile Brigade, it’s maybe twenty years old… maybe forty, maximum, I think. We are 351 years old”. This emphasis on being the oldest part of the Dutch military was mentioned during several interviews, as marines clearly perceive this as a reason to be proud of belonging to their organisation. Not only age was used to draw
boundaries between units, marines also used the integration of women to do so. First lieutenant Van Oudewater said: “Of course it’s cool to say, “hey, we are the sole men-only unit”. Yes. England is already on board, marines. With the American marines, there have been women for years. And the Commando Corps also must accept them”. Based on the integration of women, Van Oudewater does not only draw boundaries between the Marine Corps and other Dutch elite units such as the
Commando Corps, but even between the Dutch Marine Corps and those of other countries. Marines draw these boundaries between their own organisation and other parts of the military based on various arguments and claims. By drawing these boundaries, they distance
themselves from the rest of the Dutch military and consequently from its overall low status in society. This disassociation allows them to downplay their connection to the Dutch military, emphasise their position as an elite unit and thus reinforce their own status. The wide range of boundaries marines draw against other units furthermore show that marines perform this type of boundary work solely to highlight their own status; they do not add to the content of their collective identity. We have already seen the importance of masculinity and the rejection of women at various points of the analysis, now I will turn to the boundaries marines draw between themselves and women specifically.
“A marine must simply be a man”: Marines versus women
Most frequently, marines drew boundaries against women. This is of course partly caused by the set-up of the study, as many interview questions revolved around the subject of the planned integration of women in the Marine Corps. However, the nature of marines’ collective identity also plays an important role. As argued above, marines’ identity revolves around concepts of military masculinity and they have concretised this identity by focusing on the qualities of mental strength, dedication, and loyalty. Furthermore, as we have seen above, the fact that the Marine Corps used to be a men-only unit was a source of pride and status for marines. Yet, various scholars (Barrett, 1996; Burke, 2004; Herbert, 1998; Kovitz, 2003; Mechling, 2009) have argued that masculinity is primarily defined as a
20 negative. Masculinity is generally seen as what a man is not, or as that which is not feminine. Drawing boundaries between marines and women is therefore similar to drawing boundaries between
masculinity and femininity. Some interviewees drew rather simple boundaries between themselves and women. For example, when discussing what a marine should look like, marine Van Dongen said: “A marine must simply be a man”. While many interviewees similarly felt that women are not suited for the Marine Corps, they felt this exclusion should not be extended to other parts of the Dutch military. Marine Schipper said:
The infantry is a men’s world. But of course, the entire organisation surrounding it… that can be done by women as well. Because you have the logistic part, organisational structures, HR, and all that shit, that’s pretty much the same as a normal company.
In this short excerpt, Schipper manages to draw three boundaries simultaneously, against all three groups of ‘others’ that have been previously identified. First, he draws a boundary against women, because he does not think they should be part of the infantry. In the same breath, he subsequently draws boundaries against the Dutch Navy, “the entire organisation surrounding [the Marine Corps]”, and civilian society by talking about “normal” companies. While he considers women unqualified for the infantry, he does think they are capable of working in the Dutch military in general or in civilian companies. Schipper also places these groups lower in hierarchy than the Marine Corps by arguing that those unqualified for the Marine Corps are sufficiently qualified for other parts of the military or civilian companies. The distinction between soldiers’ opposition to women serving in the military in general or in the infantry has been noted in various studies (Herbert, 1998; Hockey, 2003; Klein, 2003; Kovitz, 2003; Sebesta, 1994). Authors (Russo, 1994; Kovitz, 1994) have argued that this is at least partly due to the fact that while men are perceived as warriors, women are generally seen as creators of life, which is supposedly incompatible with serving in the infantry and thus in combat roles.
Furthermore, women are thought to negatively influence soldiers’ mutual bond (Burke, 2004; Kovitz, 2003; Sebesta, 1994). Marine Van Eck said: “I’ve noticed during deployments, if we had a female nurse with us, people started to behave differently. […] If there aren’t any women, you’ve gotten rid of the cause”. Interviewees indicated that they thought that the integration of women would undermine marines’ loyalty towards each other, as they were afraid marines would be willing to do more for a woman than they would for a man.
Many respondents considered women to be inherently different from men, which would make them uniquely unequipped for any role in the Marine Corps. Sergeant-major Van de Pol argued: “At a certain moment, you’ll need a man’s ingenuity to get through a situation. Also, if I look at our ability to improvise, there’s a big difference between men and women. And probably, that’s
genetically determined”. A somewhat comparable statement was made by corporal Feenstra. When questioning whether women belong in combat positions, he said: “I don’t know if the female instinct is built for that”. By drawing these boundaries against women, marines not only express their resistance against women marines, they also essentialise (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, 1996) their own
capabilities. They emphasise that women are biologically different from men and argue that the capacities necessary to be a marine are inherent in men but not in women. Through this, marines reinforce men’s unique claim to the marines’ identity.
Most of the respondents’ boundary work against women revolved around physical strength. Marines frequently argued that women were less capable of becoming a marine because they were not as strong. When talking about the planned integration of women, lieutenant Beernink said: “But I
21 know that eventually it won’t work. Because they [women] won’t have the necessary physical
strength”. Marine Van Dongen went even further. Discussing women’s physical strength, he said: “I don’t believe a woman can train for that, because then she would nearly be a man. [Laughs]. Then there’ll be so much testosterone in her body that she has almost become half a man”. This shows how marines also use essentialising statements when talking about women’s physical strength. Van
Dongen appears to argue that a woman could never become strong enough to be a marine, because being that strong would make her “nearly a man”. Marines argue that the strength necessary for becoming a marine is inherent in men but impossible to attain for women. Because of this, nearly all interviewees stated that they considered it highly unlikely for a woman to be able to complete, or even get into, Marine Corps’ basic training. Marines boundary work against women thus centres on women’s perceived capacities. They argue that women are biologically different than men, making claims about genes, instinct, hormones, muscular strength, and bodily abilities. By emphasising their belief in the biological differences between men and women, respondents use boundary work to assert that being a marine requires a male body.
The focus on women’s (lack of) physical strength in marines’ boundary work is interesting and important for another reason. As we have seen, in the process of defining their collective identity, marines try to downplay the importance of physical strength to do away with the stereotypical image of a soldier as merely a strong man. Yet, in marines’ boundary work against women, physical strength becomes the most important quality to use, which according to Lamont (1992, 2000) would make it a vital part of their identity. I argue that this is not the case. Instead, in line with (Cohn, 2000), I claim that marines most frequently draw boundaries based on physical strength because this is a socially acceptable way of expressing a variety of negative feelings about women in the military. While marines do also draw boundaries based on other qualities, for example by claiming that the female instinct is not suited for combat positions, making these type of distinctions is less acceptable in society. Drawing boundaries based on physical strength consequently does not necessarily mean that marines see this quality as highly important.
Contrary to their boundary work against civilian society, marines’ boundary work against women does not revolve around claims of superior morality but is based on essentialising statements. They claim that women are naturally unsuited for the occupation because of supposed biological differences between men and women. Through this, marines are capable of maintaining an inherently masculine identity. These essentialising claims make it virtually impossible for women to attain
marines’ collective identity, as they are viewed as fundamentally unsuited for the occupation. Marines use their boundary work against women to affirm that being a marine requires a male body.
Furthermore, essentialising strengthens marines’ status, as it shows that they are the only ones capable of successfully carrying out this job. Because marines believe that the occupation requires a male body to be performed adequately, women are considered incapable of doing the job and should thus be excluded. However, the planned integration of women denies marines’ claim that only men have the necessary qualities to be a marine. By requiring the Marine Corps to open their ranks for women, civilian society assumes that women are just as capable. This creates an external threat to the Marine Corps’ exclusive identity. Marines boundary work against women thus serves two goals simultaneously: it asserts men’s unique claim to the marines’ collective identity while also protecting their identity and status from the external threat posed by the planned integration of women.
