University of Amsterdam
Could the Irish Citizens’ Assembly be replicated in Poland?
Nadia Terpiłowska
Supervisor: Dr Afsoun Afsahi Second Reader: Dr Enzo Rossi June, 2019
Master Thesis Political Science
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether or not the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland. Given that the focus of the literature on deliberative democratic theory remains limited to deliberation in authoritarian regimes, a unique contribution of this thesis is to examine the replicability of deliberative mini-publics onto illiberal democracies. In this respect, this thesis finds that the Irish Citizens’ Assembly cannot be replicated in Poland as the democratic advantages of the Assembly would have been lost in the process of replication. For replication to work, the government of the borrowing country must be committed to
Introduction 3
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 6
Deliberative Democratic Theory 6
Deliberation in Divided Societies 7
Deliberative Mini-Publics 8
Replicability of Deliberative Designs 10
Deliberation in Illiberal Democracies 13
Chapter 2: Methodology 15
Case Selection 15
Data Collection 16
Chapter 3: The Irish Citizens’ Assembly 18
The Irish Citizens’ Assembly 18
Chapter 4: Conditions Conducive to Replication 20
Conditions Conducive to Replication 20
Commitment to Deliberative Values 22
Chapter 5: Replicating Deliberation in Poland 24
Micro-Deliberative Impact 24
Macro-Deliberative Impact 27
Discussion 30
Conclusion 33
Practical Implications 35
Further Research Recommendations 37
Appendices 39
Appendix 1 39
Introduction
Citizens, scholars, and policy makers have recently become enthusiastic about the idea of deliberative mini-publics, which place citizens at the heart of political decision-making. The growing interest and demand for deliberative mini-publics—and for citizens’ assemblies in particular—is best illustrated by news headlines like “Citizens’ Assemblies and the next
democratic revolution” (Henning, 2019) and “How could citizens’ assemblies be used to tackle climate change?” (Kaminski, 2019). Among the recently established deliberative mini-publics, the Irish Citizens’ Assembly is by far the most extraordinary.
The Irish government decided to establish the Citizens’ Assembly following a major political deadlock on the issue of abortion. The Citizens’ Assembly, composed of 99 randomly selected participants, was tasked with deliberation on several topics—including abortion. In the last session the majority of the participants voted to lift the ban on abortion and recommended to the granting of unrestricted access to abortion services (Suiter, 2018, p. 31). Reflecting the decision of the Citizens’ Assembly, 66% of Irish citizens voted in the national referendum to repeal the Eight Amendment which imposed a total ban on abortion (Pottorff, 2018). Overall, the experience of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly was groundbreaking compared to its two predecessors organized in Canada whose recommendations were defeated by the citizens voting en mass (Chambers, 2009, p. 331).
While the abortion law was loosened in Ireland, abortion continues to be the subject of an ongoing battle between pro-life and pro-choice movements in Poland (Hinshaw and Rocca, 2018). Public pressure for legislative change of the abortion law—that for now allows for pregnancy termination only in cases of rape, incest and fetal abnormalities—has been
mounting upon Polish policy makers for years. More recently, citizen voices have started to emerge, calling for national deliberation on the issue of abortion (Gerwin, 2018; Kapela, 2018). Since deliberative mini-publics are mostly associated with solving policy problems in liberal democracies (Dryzek and Sass, 2014, p. 4), establishing a deliberative mini-public in an illiberal democracy like Poland could be an interesting topic for examination. In light of the recent events surrounding abortion, the political situation in Poland, and the success of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in tackling the abortion conflict, the following question arises:
Could the Irish Citizens’ Assembly be replicated in Poland?
The topic of replicating deliberative designs onto other political cultures has been largely overlooked by scholars of deliberative democratic theory. The focus of scholarly literature remains limited to deliberation in authoritarian regimes and the issue of the
replicability of deliberative mini-publics onto illiberal democracies has not been addressed yet. Therefore, a unique contribution of this thesis is to extend the research on transferability of deliberation to illiberal democracies and further problematize the theory and practice of democratic deliberation around the world. With the growing number of liberal democracies taking an illiberal turn (Krastev, 2018) an understanding of whether and under what
circumstances deliberative experiments can be transferred from one country to another could offer helpful guidelines to practitioners of deliberative democracy.
Dryzek and Sass (2014) and He and Wagenaar (2018) are some of the few scholars that address the issue of replicating deliberative designs around the world. The scholars argue that deliberation is a universal practice that can be replicated in any political culture, even in
authoritarian China (Dryzek and Sass, 2014, p. 3; He and Wagenaar, 2018, p. 622). However, the claims advanced by Dryzek and Sass (2014) and He and Wagenaar (2018) are seriously flawed as the deliberative experiments they describe have lost normative force of democratic
deliberation in the process of replication. Hence, in my thesis I reject the argument promoted by the scholars that deliberation can be transferred to any political culture. While examining the possibility of replicating deliberative practices to an illiberal democracy, I argue that for a deliberative mini-public to maintain its micro- and macro-advantages, the government of the borrowing country must be committed to deliberative values.
This thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter outlines the theoretical framework used in this thesis. I begin by describing the main normative assumptions of deliberative democratic theory and then move on to identify the gaps in the literature. This is followed by a section on methodology which introduces the methods of data collection and justifies case selection. With the groundwork thus set, the third chapter positions the establishment of the Irish Citizens’ Assemblies within a broader context. To understand whether the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland, chapter four analyzes conditions which are necessary for successful replication of deliberative practices. The next chapter examines the presence of these conditions in Poland and their implication on the replication of the Irish Citizens’
Assembly. In the last section of this chapter the findings of this thesis are discussed.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework used in this thesis. I begin by describing deliberative democratic theory and its main normative assumptions. This is followed by criticism of deliberation in deeply divided societies and a description of mini-publics, that is, institutions that put the normative assumptions of deliberative democratic theory into practice.
In the last sections I identify gaps in the existing literature.
1.1.Deliberative Democratic Theory
Although the roots of deliberative democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece, its recent revival is connected to a growing dissatisfaction with Western liberal democracy and its inability to meet citizens’ needs (Elster, 1998, p. 1; Kapoor, 2002, p. 459). Jürgen Habermas is one of the most prominent scholars in this field who proposes to improve these democratic processes by placing citizens’ at the heart of public policy (Habermas, 1996).
Citizens become an active part of public problem solving by engaging in the deliberative process of community decision making. In an ideal deliberative situation, all participants are equally involved in an inclusive dialogue where all voices are heard and the discussion is based on the mutual respect of participants (Dembinska and Montambeault, 2015, pp. 3). Within this process, participants should reason reciprocally—that is, appeal to reasons that are shared or could be shared by their fellow citizens (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 14). Interests and preferences are not fixed: participants are open to conversion and may change their minds as they listen to and consider opposing views. This transformative dialogue is not driven by the use of coercive power but by the power of reason and arguments, which eventually leads
participants towards a compromise or even a consensus (Dembinska and Montambeault, 2015, pp. 3-4).
1.2.Deliberation in Divided Societies
Following the initial phase of enthusiasm, critical evaluations of deliberative democratic theory have started to emerge. One of the most prominent criticisms addresses the inability of deliberation to handle deep disagreements and deeply divided societies. Since this thesis is concerned with deliberation on the issue of abortion -- often considered a deeply divisive topic -- it is necessary to discuss this criticism.
For Young (2001), deliberation in deeply divided societies is hard due to structural inequalities and the existing power dynamics between powerful elites and minorities. The elites exert their power by managing deliberative settings and, as a result, the deliberative processes become biased in favor of those holding greater power and greater resources (Young, 2001, p. 677). Young (2001) further argues that—even if deliberative settings represent all those
affected by the issue of concern—free deliberation is not possible due to hegemonic discourses that make it difficult for participants “to think critically about aspects of their social relations or alternative possibilities of institutionalization and action” (p. 686). She concludes that
deliberations and agreements contaminated by structural inequalities are not legitimate (p. 680).
Similarly to Young (2001), Dryzek (2005) perceives deliberations on deeply divisive issues as illegitimate when state authorities are instruments of one group only, suppress engagement in the public sphere, or are engaged in projects aimed at bolstering their own support (p. 232). To counteract the interest of powerful groups in divided societies Dryzek
(2005) proposes placing deliberations in “cold” deliberative settings However, the idea of “cold” deliberations where participants are not partisans and the forum is unofficial (Dryzek, 2005, p. 229) is criticized by Fung (2003) who argues that “hot” deliberations are more sustainable as “the results of deliberation are more likely to be forcefully supported and implemented” (p. 345).
Overall, it is clear that various barriers to democratic deliberation on deeply divisive issues exist. The Irish Citizens’ Assembly was closely coupled with the state and therefore, when examining the possibility of replicating the deliberative mini-public in Poland attention should be paid to the power dynamics between the political elite and the citizens.
1.3.Deliberative Mini-Publics
Deliberative mini-publics are forums that put the normative assumptions of deliberative democratic theory into practice. The most standardized forms of mini-publics include citizens’ assemblies, which are of particular interest to this thesis.
Citizens’ assemblies are meant to promote civic virtues, dialogue, consensus, opinion change, and mutual respect between participants. The aforementioned micro-deliberative impacts that deliberation can have on participants are stimulated by a “set of incentive
structures” that promote certain attitudes over others amongst participants (Setälä and Smith, 2018, p. 7). These incentive structures include the use of balanced information, expert advice, and moderators who encourage participants to reflect on their views. Deliberation rules and sampling techniques ensure a mutually respectful deliberation characterized by diversity of opinions (Grönlund et al., 2015, p. 996). Following the process of deliberation, participants craft
a collective recommendation or vote on statements that are later presented to the broader public as well as the decision-makers (Jacquet, 2018, p. 3; Smith and Setälä, 2018, p. 5).
However, the value of a mini-public should not be judged solely on the basis of its micro-deliberative impact on participants, but also in terms of the macro-political impact that it can have on the public and on political decision-making in general (Dryzek, 2009, p. 1382). This approach to examining deliberative mini-publics is supported by Chambers (2009) who argues that “unless we have a good grasp of how the broader democratic context can be shaped to complement [...] deliberative experiments, then many of the democratic advantages of mini-publics will be lost” (p. 331). Chambers (2009) makes an important point here by emphasizing that for mini-publics to maintain their normative force the broader democratic context must be conducive to deliberation (p. 333).
On a similar note, Smith and Owen (2015) argue that scholars of deliberative democracy should refuse to recognize non-deliberative communication acts as means for deliberative experiments to achieve micro- and macro-impact. In their view, scholars that defend the value of non-deliberative acts for the sake of achieving an overall deliberative system risk legitimizing rhetoric that reproduces marginalization or oppression of vulnerable groups (Smith and Owen, 2015, p. 222). This does not mean that deliberative experiments to maintain their advantages must be facilitated by mass deliberation in the public sphere but that the broader discursive system should enable citizens to take a “deliberative stance” on the issue under deliberation (p. 228). The notion of a “deliberative stance” implies the democratic context should create
mutual exchange of reasons oriented as if to reaching a shared practical judgment” (Owen and Smith, 2015, p. 228).
The reviewed scholarly literature has two implications for my own research. First, from the perspective of deliberative democracy, a mini-public to maintain its value should be able exert micro-impact on participants and macro-impact on the public sphere and political
decision-making. Second, for mini-publics to maintain their value the broader context should be conducive to deliberation.
1.4.Replicability of Deliberative Designs
Although the growing popularity of the mini-public has led policy makers around the world to become interested in adopting these deliberative practices in their own countries, the scholarly literature on this topic remains scarce and seriously flawed. First of all, scholars of deliberative democracy address the transferability of mini-publics to authoritarian regimes only. Second of all, this literature is flawed as it acknowledges that replication of deliberative practices to other political cultures is possible even though the replicated experiments described by the scholars are clearly non-deliberative.
Dryzek and Sass (2014) are some of the few scholars who examine the topic of replicating deliberative practices around the world. The scholars argue that deliberation is a universal practice and can therefore be replicated in any political culture. To illustrate their argument, Dryzek and Sass (2014) examine deliberation under the Islamic revival in Egypt. Even though the replicated practices are exclusive and involve non-deliberative acts the scholars argue that those practices are still significant (pp. 4-8). In their view, deliberation can vary across time and space and therefore, the key to the success of deliberative transfer lies in
adjusting the deliberative practice to the political culture of a country (Dryzek and Sass, 2014, pp. 3-4). However, from the perspective of a deliberative democrat, ‘deliberation’ that is exclusive and involves non-deliberative acts has no ‘deliberative’ value. Clearly, deliberation is not a universal practices that can be transferred to any political culture. One may therefore wonder if there is a point in calling non-deliberative practices deliberative?
He and Wagenaar (2018) support the view of Dryzek and Sass (2014) and argue that deliberation could be replicated even in authoritarian countries. Taking China as an example, the scholars illustrate how, in the process of replication, the deliberative practices became adjusted to the authoritarian context. According to He and Wagenaar (2018), “authoritarian deliberation” in China has several key features: it uses controlled forms of representation, public reason is constrained by coercive techniques, and deliberation in the broader public is not allowed. Furthermore, deliberative mini-publics are strategically deployed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for its own political gain, where the recommendations from the mini-publics are only taken into consideration if they could further strengthen the rule of the CCP (He and Wagenaar, 2018, pp. 624-625).
Again, I argue that the replication of deliberative practices in an authoritarian countries is pointless, simply because the authoritarian deliberation described by He and Wagenaar (2018) is non-deliberative. First of all, the use of coercion and exclusion of certain perspectives automatically renders such a forum non-deliberative. Second of all, the idea of deliberation is based on an openness to changing views and values, and thus excludes the purely strategic behavior(Dryzek, 2005, p. 220) that is openly deployed by the CCP. Third of all, the fact that authoritarian deliberation precludes broader citizen deliberation (He and Wagenaar, 2018, p.
625) is problematic, as mini-publics require an impact on the broader public sphere in order to uphold their deliberative integrity. The CCP does not enable a deliberative stance on the part of citizens, which means that the broader discursive context in China hinders the democratic and deliberative advantages that mini-publics usually exert. Clearly, the deep inequalities present in authoritarian China contaminate the deliberation and skew the process in favour of the elite. It could thus be concluded that, in the process of replication, the deliberative and democratic values entrenched in mini-publics have been lost.
The replications proposed by He and Wagenaar (2018) and Dryzek and Sass (2014) could be classified as ‘transfer failures’ as the transfers remain incomplete and inappropriate. It is an incomplete transfer as “although transfer has occurred, crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 17); in this case elements that make deliberation ‘deliberative’ have not been transferred. It is also an inappropriate transfer as insufficient attention has been paid to the differences between the political and ideological context when transferring the institutional structure to the borrowing country (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, p. 17). Here, the scholars did not pay sufficient attention to the authoritarian structures that make deliberation impossible in this political culture.
Clearly, the claims made by He and Wagenaar (2018), and Dryzek and Sass (2014)—that deliberative practices are universal and thereby could be replicated in any political culture—do not correspond to real world experiences. The practices which the scholars call a ‘deliberation’ have actually lost their micro and macro-qualities in the process of replication making the deliberative forums ‘non-deliberative’. Therefore, to determine whether deliberative practices
can be replicated in other political cultures more research is therefore necessary. Furthermore, the current scholarly literature focuses on deliberation in authoritarian regimes only. One may therefore wonder if deliberative practices could be replicated somewhere in a state that exists between a full democracy and a full authoritarianism?
1.5.Deliberation in Illiberal Democracies
In recent years many have argued that democracy is in decline, namely due to the ‘populist apocalypse’ looming over Europe. The surge of populism in Europe has triggered democratic backsliding, which is visible when looking at countries such as Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia that have each lost their liberal democratic status and are now categorized as what scholars call ‘illiberal democracies’ (Freedom House, 2018a). Despite the growing number of liberal democracies taking an illiberal turn, the scholars of deliberative democracy have not yet examined whether deliberative practices could be replicated in this context.
While a liberal democracy maintains a balance between a majority rule and minority and individual rights (Plattner, 2010, p. 87), an illiberal democracy is a democratically elected regime that routinely deprives its citizens of basic rights and freedoms, and ignores
constitutional limits on power (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22). In Europe especially, these ‘illiberal democracies’ are governed by populist leaders who weaken the protection of individual and minority rights (Plattner, 2010, p. 87), and at the same time promise to end the political exclusion of the masses (Rhodes-Purdy, 2015, pp. 415-417).
All these features create a tension that can yield much in analysis. The fact that illiberal democracies deprive citizens of basic rights and freedoms (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22) would suggest
that the replication of deliberative practices in this context is impossible (as in the case of authoritarian regimes), and that any attempt to replicate them would lead to a transfer failure: the components necessary for deliberation (such as inclusion, non-coercion, equality, and freedom of speech) could not be transferred. Such an outcome would confirm that democratic deliberation is inherent only to liberal democracies and thus scholars should not aim to
replicate deliberative practices in different political cultures.
However, the context of illiberal democracies is more ambiguous than that of
authoritarian regimes. Since illiberal democracies fall somewhere in between a full democracy and full authoritarianism, citizens still hold some rights and freedoms, and the
democratically-elected populist leaders must be responsive to the population (Richards, 2018, p. 1). Even more interesting for this study is the fact that populist leaders often vow to promote popular inclusion and the empowerment of the masses (Rhodes-Purdy, 2015, pp. 415-417). These claims resonate closely with the normative assumptions regarding the
deliberative-democratic participation of lay people in political decision-making. Perhaps then, the elements that make deliberation so successful in liberal democracies could be transferred to an illiberal democracy?
Exploring whether democratic deliberation is possible in illiberal regimes could further problematize the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in different political contexts. Given the recent rise of illiberal regimes this could be a much needed contribution to the scholarly literature on deliberative democracy.
Chapter 2: Methodology
In this chapter, the methodology of this thesis is described. First, I justify case selection and then I move on to describe methods of data collection.
2.1.Case Selection
The choice to examine whether the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland is motivated by the fact that the two countries share one crucial difference: the political culture. In 2015 the populist and authoritarian Law and Justice Party (PiS) rose to power in Poland by winning both parliamentary and presidential elections, and Poland has since been categorized by scholars as an illiberal democracy (Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016, p. 58). Ireland, on the other hand, remains a liberal democracy with a minority government led by
liberal-conservative party Fine Gael (McElroy, 2019). In fact, it is one of the few countries where no right-wing populist parties have appeared (McCarthy, 2019).
However, the countries also share several similarities. Prior to the Irish abortion referendum in 2018, Poland and Ireland were among the five European countries with the strictest abortion laws in Europe, and the topic of abortion was on top of political agendas in both countries. The abortion dispute is partially related to the fact that both Ireland and Poland are among Europe’s most Catholic countries (Pope, 2016). Although Ireland’s experience with nation-wide democratic deliberative experiments is extensive, Polish citizens have also expressed interest in conducting national deliberation on the issue of abortion (see Gerwin, 2018; Kapela, 2018).
2.2.Data Collection
In answering the research question central to this thesis, the qualitative approach was found to be the most appropriate, as it places an emphasis on the examination of specific cases and their cultural meanings (Neuman, 2014, p. 167). In order to obtain meaningful and accurate findings I consider a range of different data sources. While primary sources used in this thesis consist of news articles and speeches, secondary sources involve academic books and articles. In order to illuminate different facets of the subject, I have also conducted interviews with five practitioners of deliberative democracy in either Poland or Ireland.
Two of the interviewees are scholars of deliberative democratic theory who were actively engaged in the organization and research of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. The other two participants work for “Stocznia” a Polish NGO that deals with the organization of civic
participation programs in Poland. The interviewed participants were directly involved in the organization of a local citizens’ assembly in Lublin, Poland. One of the last interviews was conducted with a specialist in deliberative democracy, and an organizer of local citizens’ assemblies in Lublin and Gdańsk, Poland. Overall, the interview sample is characterized by a diversity of relevant experiences in both the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect quality data from the participants. This method of data collection was found appropriate, as it facilitates the adequate answering of complex issues, and allows for responses that are rich in detail (Neuman, 2014, p. 333). The interview involved questions about the Irish Citizens’ Assembly, deliberative practices in
Poland, and transferability of deliberative designs. To enhance the quality of interview findings I have used probes to reduce misunderstandings, and spontaneous follow-up questions to obtain
complete and relevant responses (Neuman, 2014, p. 353). To gather an international and varied sample of respondents, Skype was used as a method of data collection. Video recording
ensured that attention was paid to visual and verbal gestures. This way the online interviews maintained the advantages of face-to-face interactions (Deakin and Wakefield, 2013, p. 605). Prior to the start of the interview, interviewees were assured of the anonymity and
confidentiality of the interviews. With the permission of the participants, the answers were recorded using a mobile phone and were then manually transcribed. Some of the interviews were translated from Polish to English.
Chapter 3: The Irish Citizens’ Assembly
This chapter positions the establishment of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly within the broader context and then moves on to compare the situation surrounding the abortion conflict in
Ireland to the abortion crisis in Poland.
3.1.The Irish Citizens’ Assembly
The success of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in resolving the issue of abortion that had dogged Irish politics for years has led many to suggest that the mini-public could be an example for other countries to follow. This is best illustrated with news headlines such as “Citizens’ Assembly is an example to the world” (McGreevy, 2018) or “I took part in a citizens' assembly – it could help break the Brexit deadlock” (Caldwell, 2019). When considering replication of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in another country one could wonder what has led to the establishment of the Assembly in Ireland.
According to the interviewees, the major crisis on the issue of abortion was one of the crucial factors that led to the establishment of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. In regards to this, one of the interviewees stated that “[the] major crisis focused the minds of politicians on [the fact that] we need to do something here, we have a major crisis, there is a lot of anger, we need to try and [...] come up with something that would help reduce the anger” (Interview I 2019, personal communication, 29 April). The significance of crisis in establishing deliberative forums is also recognized by Fung (2005) who argues that political mobilization often provides the pressure necessary to encourage the government to engage in deliberation (Fung, 2005, p. 416).
Indeed, the pressure on the Irish government to deliberate on the issue of abortion had been mounting since 2012 in particular, when Savita Halappanavar died after being denied an abortion despite pregnancy complications (Field, 2018, pp. 612-613). The government was also facing international demands for action on its abortion legislation, particularly from the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Farrell et al., 2019, p.114). The international pressure only amplified polarization within the public sphere, with annual abortion rallies becoming more and more violent (Leahy, 2016). At that point, calls from citizens and politicians to establish a
deliberative forum on the issue of abortion could no longer be ignored, and the Irish
government was forced to act (Farrell et al., 2019, p. 114). Facing a major political deadlock, the Irish Prime Minister, Leo Varadkar, decided to show his commitment to deliberation by
advocating the establishment of a forum that would “facilitate a respectful and rational debate on these highly sensitive, and often, very emotive issues” (Fine Gael, 2016, p. 72).
The situation in Poland resembles the abortion crisis that forced the Irish government to establish the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. The populist Polish government has been under intense pressure to liberalize abortion laws, ever since the notorious 2014 case of doctor Bogdan Chazan who—on the grounds of faith—refused to perform the abortion of a severely damaged fetus (Żuk and Żuk, 2017, p. 694). This has triggered a cascade of events, including widespread protests, calls from the international community for legislative change, and proposals put forward by both pro-choice and anti-choice sides that would further liberalize or restrict abortion laws (Szelewa, 2016; Król and Pustułka, 2018). Amid all this chaos, voices advocating the national deliberation on the issue of abortion have also intensified (see Gerwin, 2018; Kapela, 2018;).
Clearly, both the Irish and the Polish government have encountered a political deadlock on abortion which in the case of Ireland has led to the establishment of the Citizens’ Assembly. However, is the similar context surrounding the issue of abortion in both countries enough to determine whether the replication of deliberative practices in an illiberal democracy like Poland would be successful?
Chapter 4: Conditions Conducive to Replication
To understand whether the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland, this chapter analyzes interviews conducted with practitioners of deliberative democracy and outlines conditions which are necessary for successful replication of deliberative practices. The last section examines whether these conditions are present in Poland.
4.1. Conditions Conducive to Replication
Although political mobilization often provides the impetus to establish deliberative institutions (Fung, 2005, p. 416), the interviews conducted for the purpose of this thesis reveal that, in order for the process of replication to work well, the political leadership of the
borrowing country must meet one important condition: a commitment to deliberative values. At first the interviews revealed a lack of consensus on whether deliberation could be replicated in a political culture other than the liberal one. In this context one of the
interviewees stated: “I think it [the Irish Citizens’ Assembly] is replicable across all sorts of contexts, you don’t need an advanced democracy to be able to have a citizens’ assembly” (Interview II, personal communication, April 30). On the other hand, another
interviewee—when asked about the possibility of replication of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in Poland —admitted that “We would need a change of government, the government would have to be comprised of parties that are actually democratic” (Interview III, personal communication, May 22). These claims neither entirely support nor refute the argument of Sass and Dryzek (2014), that deliberation could be replicated in any political culture.
However, there was a general agreement between the interviewees that for replication to work the government of the borrowing country must be “open”, must be willing “to consider different views”, must “respect the voice of citizens”, and “can’t be biased”. The borrowing country should also have “a political leadership that is open to dialogue and citizen
participation” (Interview IV, personal communication, May 24). In this respect, I argue that the attributes of this ideal political leadership mentioned by the interviewees correspond closely with the values of inclusion, openness, and respect promoted by the theory of deliberative democracy.
According to the interviewees, there were several reasons why this ‘deliberative attitude’ on the part of the political leadership is necessary for the successful replication of deliberative practices in the borrowing country. A recurring claim made by all interviewees was that this open approach of the government officials would ensure that the micro- and
macro-advantages of the mini-public are not lost in the process of replication. In this context, one of the interviewees emphasized that the commitment to deliberative values will ensure that the “input”, “throughput” and “output” legitimacy of the mini-public is preserved in the process of replication (Interview II, personal communication, April 30). These findings enhance the claims made by Smith and Owen (2015) and Chambers (2009)—that all components of the
system must be deliberative in order to bring about the advantages of deliberative experiments (p. 331).
For other interviewees the “willingness to consider different views” was necessary for the replication to succeed, as this was the “ingredient that made the Irish Citizens’ Assembly so successful” and ensured its micro- and macro-political impact (Interview I, personal
communication, April 29). Indeed, prior to deliberation the Irish government actively displayed its commitment to deliberative values of openness, consensus, and mutual respect. For
instance, the Irish Prime Minister despite his pro-life stance acknowledged that “this is an issue that requires compassion and empathy, and not unshakeable certainty” and that the solution to the issue of abortion "is not to create further moral and legal confusion but rather to try to come together to find a consensus” (Sheahan, 2014). With these words the Irish Prime Minister showed the commitment of the government to deliberative ideals of consensus, being open to conversion and listening to the views of others with an open mind.
Overall, the interviews reveal that for the replication of deliberative practices to work, the government of the borrowing country must be respectful of diversity and open to consider different views and values. These claims resonate closely with normative assumptions of deliberative democracy and thus, it could be argued that for replication to work the political leadership must be committed to deliberative values. These findings therefore suggest that deliberation cannot be replicated in just any political culture—as claimed by Dryzek and Sass (2014)—but only in one that maintains a commitment to deliberation.
4.2. Commitment to Deliberative Values
To determine whether the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland it is necessary to establish whether the political leadership is committed to values of deliberation. At first one could assume that deliberative values are familiar to the Polish government as the ruling party won both parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland by vowing “to end the political exclusion of the masses” (Rhodes-Purdy, 2015, p. 416). But, if anything, the rhetoric promoted by the government amid the abortion crisis has been of exclusion rather than inclusion. In an illiberal democracy like Poland the commitment to the deliberative values of inclusion, respect for diversity, and openness to conversion is therefore hard to find.
The non-deliberative approach of the government is best illustrated by the polarizing framing used by government officials. In official speeches, pro-choice groups are depicted as supporting the “culture of death”, while the anti-choice groups endorse the “civilization of life” (Żuk and Żuk, 2017, p. 696-697). Not to mention that—despite opinion polls showing that 69% of voters support the legal termination of pregnancy up to 12 weeks (Chrzczonowicz,
2018)—government officials are unwilling to consider different views on the issue. Instead, the leader of the ruling party, Jarosław Kaczyński, pledged that the government will “do
everything—even in cases of very difficult pregnancies, when a child cannot survive or is very deformed—to ensure that these pregnancies still result in childbirth, so that the child can be baptised, buried, and have a name” (TVN24, 2016).
The wider discursive context shaped by the Polish government is far from displaying any commitment to deliberative values of openness, inclusion, or respect. In fact, the polarizing rhetoric aims to further marginalize the pro-choice supporters and amplify the conflict rather
than seek to achieve mutual agreement. The government also does not refrain from the use of coercive practices towards groups which openly express their opposition to the hegemonic discourse. Several feminist organizations involved in the fight for women’s reproductive rights were recently denied public funding and their headquarters were searched by police who paralyzed their work and confiscated their computers (Król and Pustułka, 2018, p. 377). The use of oppressive tactics is strictly against the deliberative assumptions of non-coercion and mutual respect.
Deliberative values of inclusion, openness, respect, and diversity are clearly not familiar to the Polish political leadership. This is in sharp contrast to the deliberative attitude of the Irish government which according to some of the interviewees determined the success of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. What implications, then, may the non-deliberative approach have on the replication of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in Poland?
Chapter 5: Replicating Deliberation in Poland
The value of deliberative mini-publics lies in their impact on participants and on the public and political debates. This chapter therefore, examines the implications that the non-deliberative attitude of the Polish government could have on replicating the micro- and macro-impact of the
Irish Citizens’ Assembly in Poland. The last section discusses the findings of this thesis.
5.1. Micro-Deliberative Impact
The value of a deliberative mini-public lies in the micro-deliberative impact that it exerts on participants engaged in deliberation. In the Irish case, the Citizens’ Assembly successfully
facilitated opinion change, mutual respect and agreement among participants (Farrell et al., 2019, p. 118). According to the interviewees, the ‘incentive structures’ that stimulated the micro-deliberative impact on participants of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly remained “impartial, objective, and balanced” thanks to the “openness” and “willingness to consider different views among the leadership of all the parties” (Interview I 2019, personal communication, April 29). How then could the non-deliberative attitude affect the replication of the Assembly in Poland?
In this respect, the interviewees shared the concerns expressed by Young (2001) that in deeply divided societies the powerful elite may contaminate the deliberation by exerting power over the deliberative settings (p. 677). In their view, the hot deliberative settings of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly—managed by civil servants—would give the ruling party the opportunity to indirectly exert their power on the deliberative structures. As one of the interviewees put it: “in more authoritarian countries like Poland you don’t want civil servants in charge [...] civil
servants as I see this are there to support the interests of the government. They are servants of their political masters and so they will do everything to make sure that their political masters are not in anyway upset or there is no embarrassment or there is nothing that is going to cause difficulties and that’s the wrong attitude” (Interview I 2019, personal communication, April 29). A similar view was expressed by another interviewee who said that “a Citizens’ Assembly is a form of democracy that should be left reasonably free and I think for the ruling party it will only serve as a mechanism to exert power and manage everything” (Interview III 2019, personal communication, May 22).
The interviewees were particularly concerned that the lack of deliberative commitment on the part of the government will diminish the “input legitimacy” of the replicated mini-public.
This refers to whether or not the participants “are representative [...] of the society [...] and randomly selected” and the “throughput legitimacy”, which concerns such issues as “what are the participants talking about, who are the experts[...], who is the chair, what is the facilitation like, what is the quality of deliberation” (Interview II 2019, personal communication, 30 April).
In this context, one of the interviewees said that since “the ruling party strongly supports only one side of the conflict [...] they would not be ready to put forward experts that would have different opinions” (Interview V 2019, personal communication, May 24). Indeed, for the ruling party—which acts as a tool of the anti-choice group—the ‘neutral experts’ are the Catholic hierarchs. This is best illustrated with the words of the former Prime Minister of
Poland, Beata Szydło, who said that in order to resolve the conflict “we need [...] a wise voice of the episcopate [...] I believe that it is important for these moral authorities to share their opinion [on the issue of abortion]” (Rutynowska, 2016).
Another interviewee suggested that the internal quality of the mini-public could be compromised by the choice of the “chair of deliberation” (Interview II 2019, personal
communication, 30 April). This concern was voiced with good reason. The legitimacy of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly was partially based on the fact that the deliberation was headed by the Supreme Court Judge who, according to the interviewee, was regarded as “impartial” by both sides of the conflict (Interview II 2019, personal communication, 30 April). Selecting an
‘impartial’ judge to lead the deliberation in Poland could be problematic, given that the ruling party took control of the judiciary and dominated the system with pro-government judges (Freedom House, 2018b).
It thus appears that the replication of the Citizens’ Assembly in Poland would lead to establishment of exclusionary practices that cannot be called deliberative. The settings managed by the biased political leadership that acts as a tool of the anti-choice group would lead to a very homogenous ‘deliberation’—with the chair, experts, and most participants supporting the anti-choice side of the conflict. A high social homogeneity is damaging to good deliberation, as it pushes groups to move into more extreme directions than indicated prior to deliberation, and could thereby strengthen polarization between the conflicting groups
(Sustein, 2002, p. 177). Furthermore, according to Dryzek (2005) deliberations when the state acts as an instrument of one group only cannot be considered as legitimate (p. 232). It could be thus argued that as a result, the micro-deliberative advantages of the Irish Citizens’
Assembly—such as opinion change or consensus—could be lost when the mini-public is transferred to Poland.
Overall, the interview findings suggest that the incentive structures that facilitate the micro-deliberative impact of the mini-public on participants could be compromised as a result of the one sided attitude of the political leadership. In this respect, the findings enhance the claims made by Chambers (2009) that the broader deliberative context must be conducive to deliberation for the mini-publics to maintain their advantages (p. 331).
5.2. Macro-Deliberative Impact
The macro-political impact of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly was exceptional. Many pro-life Irish politicians—including the Prime Minister—changed their positions on abortion as a result of the conclusions drawn by the Citizens’ Assembly (Lanigan, 2018). Furthermore, the proposal
put forward by the Assembly won in the referendum vote, and the exit polls conducted after the Irish referendum revealed that 66% of voters were aware of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly and its recommendations (Appendix I). For the interviewees the commitment to deliberative values in the borrowing country, was again essential for preserving the macro-political success of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in the process of replication.
There was a general agreement between the interviewees that this factor will ensure that the recommendations put forward by the Assembly will be respected and reviewed—even if those are not in line with the personal views of the politicians. One of the interviewees explained that, in the Irish case, the “openness of the political class to consider different views and values” determined that “they [the politicians] were going to accept the advice of the assembly” and later in the process this led to “a very engaged discussion by our representative institutions on this deliberative process” (Interview I 2019, personal communication, April 29). The interviewees also emphasized the need for the wider context to be deliberative, by referring to the two Citizens’ Assemblies in Canadian provinces of Ontario and British Columbia, whose proposals on electoral reform were defeated in the public vote. In this respect one of the interviewees stated that the Canadian politicians “always liked the status quo… So there were very few of them who were open to change and who were open to debate [...] this is the reason why they didn’t affect change” (Interview II 2019, personal communication, April 30). Indeed, the lack of willingness of the Canadian local governments to consider any changes to the electoral system led to the lack of public and political debates on the recommendations put forward by the Assembly. This then deprived the Citizens’ assembly of its potential to exert macro-political impact (Chambers, 2009, p. 331).
The interviews therefore suggest that the macro-political impact of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be difficult to achieve in Poland. The non-deliberative approach of the government may lead to the rejection of the recommendations of the Assembly if those recommendations are not in line with the values promoted by the government. As one of the interviewees put it: “Since the current government is basically a tool of the anti-choice
movement [...] I don’t think they would agree to recommendations that go against the ideology they believe in” (Interview IV 2019, personal communication, May 24). In this respect, the replicated mini-public could repeat the failure of the Citizens’ Assemblies in Canada.
Nevertheless, the interviews also revealed that the government of the borrowing country should be dedicated to upholding deliberative values, not only to preserve the impact of deliberation on political decision making, but also to preserve its influence on the debate in the public sphere. One of the interviewees illustrated this point by describing how, thanks to the fact that “they [the Irish politicians] treated it a lot more like [...] trying to come to an agreement [...] this communication effect had gotten out and depoliticized the debate in the public sphere” and even led to a “more reasoned debate in the media”. As a result, “they [the public] were very aware of the specifics and that had some impact on the yes vote. So you clearly need to have that sort of thing in Poland also for it to work” (Interview II 2019, personal communication, 30 April). These claims extend the theory of Smith and Owen (2015) and suggest that, if the broader context enables citizens to take a deliberative stance on the issue, then this may enhance the influence of the mini-public on the results of the referendum. The lack of deliberative attitude on the part of the Polish government may thus suggest that the
Polish citizens will be unable to take a deliberative stance on the issue of abortion, making it more likely for the proposal put forward by the Assembly to be defeated in the referendum.
Overall, the findings suggest that the government’s non-deliberative approach, and in particular its lack of respect towards different views and opinions, makes the possibility of replicating the macro-deliberative impact of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in Poland highly unlikely. Since the value of a mini-public is judged based on its influence on public and political debates, the lack of macro-political impact in the Polish case renders the mini-public
non-deliberative. These findings once again suggest that the whole system must be deliberative in order for mini-publics to maintain their advantages, and thus reinforce the claims made by Chambers (2009).
5.3. Discussion
Despite the fact that both Poland and Ireland have encountered a major political deadlock on the issue of abortion, the Irish Citizens’ Assembly cannot be replicated in Poland. This is mainly due to the fact that the crucial element that has made the Irish Citizens’ Assembly successful -- that is, the deliberative approach of the Irish government -- cannot be found in Poland. As a result, the interview findings suggest that the deliberation on the issue of abortion in Poland would be contaminated by pre-existing power relations making the process
exclusionary, one-sided, and prone to conflict. Since the idea of deliberation is based on
inclusion, consensus and openness to changing views and values, the deliberation that could be replicated in Poland would have put the micro-deliberative impact of the Assembly in danger. The macro-advantages of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly would have also been lost in the process
of replication as the influence of the Assembly on the public vote and on the political
decision-making would have diminished significantly. A potential transfer of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly to Poland would thus not meet the requirements set by deliberative democratic theory.
These findings thus reject the claims advanced by Dryzek and Sass (2014) that
deliberation is a universal practice, and therefore can be replicated in any political culture. The success of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly clearly cannot be replicated in an illiberal democracy like Poland as in the process of replication the normative force of the Assembly would have been lost, therefore, making the mini-public non-deliberative. For replication of deliberative practices to work, I argue that the political leadership in the borrowing country must be committed to deliberative values of inclusion, respect for diversity, and openness to conversion.
In this context, the research findings suggest that this commitment will ensure the preservation of the incentive structures which bring about the mini-public’s micro-deliberative impacts on participants. In this way, the presence of structural inequalities—which according to Young (2001) often contaminate hot deliberations on deeply divisive issues like abortion—will be prevented. The political leadership’s receptiveness to deliberation may also ensure that the macro-political impact of the mini-public will be replicated in the borrowing country. This attitude may enhance the public and the political debate, making it more likely that the
recommendations of the Assembly will be accepted. The commitment to deliberative values on the part of the political leadership will therefore ensure that the broader context is conducive to deliberation and in this way complement the argument made by Chambers (2009) that the democratic advantages of the mini-public must be actively nurtured for them to remain
significant. This approach to replication will also allow deliberative democrats to avoid the risk of legitimizing non-deliberative practices.
This is in sharp contrast to the approaches advanced by Dryzek and Sass (2014) He and Wagenaar (2018) which in fact serve as a way to legitimize non-deliberative practices. One could, for instance, follow the example of He and Wagenaar (2018) and claim that the
non-deliberative practices replicated in Poland are in fact a form of ‘illiberal deliberation’ that is only significant from the point of view of illiberal democracy. Or one could like Dryzek and Sass (2014) argue that non-deliberative acts can be deliberative in effect (p. 8) and by doing so legitimize the use of marginalizing, sexist, and harmful rhetoric of the Polish
government—disguising it as a suitable tool for initiating deliberative practices that are based on the notion of equality, inclusion and respect. The commitment to deliberative values is thus clearly necessary to prevent legitimization of non-deliberative practices and to ensure that the normative forces of deliberation are preserved in the process of replication.
In this context, deliberative democrats instead of looking for deliberation where it cannot be found —as it is done by Dryzek and Sass (2014) and He and Wagenaar (2018)-- could channel their efforts into promoting deliberative practices and values around the world. For instance, scholars of deliberative democracy could focus on promoting the idea of deliberation in the media, among the citizens, and to opposition politicians. This could lay the groundwork for future deliberations when the wider discursive context is more conducive to deliberation. Alternatively, scholars of deliberative democracy could spread deliberation by promoting liberal ideals in universities around the world (Tampio, 2014, p. 116).
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether or not the Irish Citizens’ Assembly could be replicated in Poland. To answer the research question the theory of deliberative democracy is employed. However, since deliberative democratic theory is mostly associated with Western liberal democracies, the topic of replicability of deliberative designs to other political cultures has been largely overlooked by deliberative democrats. In fact, the literature on this topic has focused on deliberation in authoritarian regimes only. Therefore, the key contribution of this thesis is to address the topic of replication of deliberative practices in illiberal democracies. By examining transferability of deliberative practices to an illiberal democracy this thesis has intended to further problematize the theory and practice of deliberative democracy in different political contexts.
This thesis finds that the Irish Citizens’ Assembly cannot be replicated in an illiberal democracy like Poland. The interview findings suggest that the fact that both Ireland and Poland have faced a major political crisis on the issue of abortion is not enough to replicate the Assembly in the borrowing country. For replication to work, the political leadership of the borrowing country must be committed to deliberative values of inclusion, openness to conversion, and respect for diversity. A deliberative attitude on the part of the borrowing government will ensure that the micro- and macro- advantages of the mini-public are not lost in the process of replication. As a result, the forum will remain deliberative and valuable from the perspective of deliberative democrats.
The biased stance of the Polish government is far from displaying deliberative values which are necessary for successful replication of deliberative practices and which have made
the Irish Citizens’ Assembly so successful. The transfer of the deliberative forum to Poland may thus put at risk the micro- and macro-advantages of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. To be more precise, as a result of the non-deliberative attitude of the Polish government the deep
structural inequalities may contaminate the deliberation obstructing the forum from exerting micro-deliberative impact on participants. The recommendations put forward by the Assembly may be ignored if not those are not in line with the ideology promoted by the government or could be used strategically to further strengthen the position of the ruling party. Furthermore, the macro-political impact of the Assembly on the public vote is unlikely given that the wider discursive context promoted by the government does not allow citizens to take a deliberative stance on the issue of abortion. It could be thus argued that the replication of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly in Poland is pointless as the normative force of deliberation would have been lost in this replication. As a result, the replicated mini-public would be neither deliberative nor democratic.
These findings reject the argument advanced by Dryzek and Sass (2014) that
deliberation can be replicated in any political culture (p. 4) as it clearly cannot be replicated in an illiberal democracy like Poland. The approach promoted by Dryzek and Sass (2014) and He and Wagenaar (2018) runs the risk of labelling non-deliberative practices as deliberative and it can also serve as a tool to legitimize harmful communication acts. By arguing that deliberation can be replicated only in a political culture committed to values of deliberation I aim to prevent legitimization of non-deliberative practices. This condition will ensure that the normative forces of deliberation are preserved in the process of replication and that the transferred mini-public
remains deliberative. In this way, this thesis adds a helpful criterion for deliberative democrats to determine whether or not deliberations can be replicated in another political culture.
6.1. Practical Implications
A major goal of this research was to reconnect the theory of deliberative democracy with its practice and thereby allow organizers of deliberations around the world to draw several practical implications from this study.
First of all, important practical implications can be drawn from the failure to transfer the Irish Citizens’ Assembly to Poland. Prior to replication, practitioners of deliberative democratic theory should closely examine the wider discursive context, the governmental attitude towards deliberation, and the political differences between the countries. Ensuring that the broader context of the borrowing country is conducive to deliberation could help practitioners to avoid the risk of transfer failure and guarantee that the advantages of deliberative mini-publics will be preserved. It may also increase the chance of successfully replicating the deliberative forum in the borrowing country. Overall, this approach will ensure that the transferred practices remain deliberative.
Second of all, the findings of this thesis suggest that deliberation in illiberal democracies may be hard to achieve. In this situation, practitioners of deliberative democracy, instead of attempting to replicate deliberative forums, could focus on promoting the idea of deliberation and citizens’ assemblies in particular among the broader public. This approach could prepare the ground for deliberations in the future when the discursive context facilitates the committed to deliberative values.
Finally, another practical implication originating from the findings is that deliberation in illiberal democracies could be contaminated by pre-existing power relations. This creates an opportunity for the practitioners of deliberative democracy to explore different mechanisms that could prevent structural inequalities from contaminating deliberative practices. This might involve exploring different ways to combine deliberation with state authorities.
6.2. Study Limitations
Although this study provides a unique contribution to the practice and theory of
deliberative democracy around the world, the limitations of the adopted approach should also be acknowledged.
The first limitation concerns the hypothetical nature of this study. Since the Irish Citizens’ Assembly has not actually been replicated in Poland the conclusions drawn from this study may have limitations in regards to credibility. However, to lend more credibility to the findings I used triangulation, and relied on data collected from various sources including interviews, theories, and other written and spoken statements. Furthermore, to gain a more accurate and complete understanding of the subject matter the interviews were conducted in a neutral environment.
Another limitation is the single qualitative research. This type of research may pose a threat to the external validity of the study as the findings of this thesis may be difficult to apply generally to other cases of deliberation in illiberal democracies. The external validity could be increased by employing the large-N approach that allows the collection of data from a larger set of cases.
It is also important to acknowledge that personal biases (such as political preferences) of the interviewees could have influenced the answers and may hence pose a threat to the internal validity of the research results. The internal validity of the results was however ensured by the use of neutral questions and the avoidance of leading questions that could cause the interviewees to provide biased answers.
The last limitation of this study concerns the use of Skype to conduct the interviews for the purpose of this thesis. According to Iacono et al. (2016), building rapport between
interviewer and participant over Skype interviews is challenging in comparison to face-to-face interactions (n.p.). However, to build trust and encourage rapport I have exchanged a series of emails with each participant prior to the interview. Furthermore, reading non-verbal cues which are important for the richness of the qualitative data can be challenging even in Skype video calls. To mitigate this challenge I was carefully listening and observing participants during the interviews (Lo Iacono et al., 2016, n.p.).
6.3. Further Research Recommendations
The replicability of deliberative practices around the world is a topic often overlooked by the scholars of deliberative democratic theory. Therefore, a number of gaps in our
knowledge could be addressed in future research.
First, future research should focus on improving the credibility of this study. To strengthen this research aspect, scholars could examine cases of completed replications of deliberative democratic practices in illiberal democracies. Doing so may yield more accurate
results and contribute to a richer understanding of the theory and practice of deliberative democracy around the world.
Second, in terms of the focus of the study, attention should be also dedicated to examining the replicability of deliberative forums discussing issues less divisive than abortion. Scholars could also explore the potential of replicating deliberation on a local level. These new research areas could bring a more nuanced view of the replicability of deliberative practices.
Third, to increase the generalizability of the findings future studies could extend the topic of replicating deliberative practices to other illiberal democracies. Countries which have recently experienced an illiberal turn and which could be examined by scholars of deliberative democracy involve: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovenia (Freedom House, 2018a).
The last recommendation involves strengthening the external validity of this study. In this respect, in order to examine the issue of replicability of deliberative practices in illiberal democracies, scholars of deliberative democratic theory could employ the large-N approach. This way the researchers would gather more robust information and enhance the
Appendices Appendix 1
Awareness of Citizens’ Assembly Among all Referendum Voters
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