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Counter Framing and the impact on

attitude towards Mass Surveillance

Wessel de Vries

Student number: 11890150 Master’s Thesis

Graduate School of Communication Political Communication Science

Supervisor: Alyt Damstra Date: 31-01-2019

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2 Abstract

This study examines the effect of framing on the formation of opinion regarding mass

surveillance. Moreover, this research observes whether the threat a person perceives and their personality will moderate this framing effect. This experimental study had a 2x2 design with two frames constructed and a neutral condition; the liberty frame, opposing the bill and pointing out the erosion of civil liberties, and the security frame, supporting the bill and pointing out the improvement of security. The idea behind these two frames come from counter framing literature and the trade-offs between civil liberties and security. The second factor incorporated in the design was the moderating variable level of threat of terrorism in Europe. Third, participants were tested on the moderating variable personality. The

personalities used in this research are Authoritarian and Civil Libertarian as these have different values and opinions regarding government policy. The results show that framing effect takes place for both frames. Furthermore, that personalities have an effect on attitude but that this does not moderate the strength of the framing effect. Threat in these framing conditions had no moderating impact on attitude towards mass surveillance.

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3 Introduction

“Mass Surveillance laws are a fundamental threat to human rights and a violation of privacy enshrined in European Law” – Council of Europe

This quote stems from a report of the Council of Europe (2015) after researching mass surveillance and the UK’s and NSA’s national spying programs. The Council states that it is “deeply concerned” while pointing to the breach of civil liberties (The Guardian, 2015). Nevertheless, various nations have passed mass surveillance programs in order of national security. Domestic surveillance policies increased after 9/11 and the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Most mass surveillance bills are adopted after crisis situations such as terrorist attacks (Kossowska, 2011; Waddington, 2006). The USA implemented the Patriot Act just one month after the World Trade Center attacks. France approved the French Intelligence Act (FIA) three days after Charlie Hebdo. These mass surveillance bills were approved with public support, not much criticism and attention of the media, and with overwhelming support of the

government. The Patriot Act was supported with Senate’s favor of 98 to 1 and the House with 357 to 66 (Abdolian & Takooshin, 2003). France implemented their counterterrorism

legislation, the French Intelligence Act (FIA) with a favor of 438 seats to 86 (BBC, 2015). In 2017, the Dutch government also implemented a domestic mass surveillance bill nicknamed ‘Sleepwet’. Sleepwet resembles the Dutch word Sleepnet, this is a large fishing net that scoops up everything regardless the species. Parliament adopted the policy with an approval of 11 parties and just 6 parties against. The Dutch advisory organ, Raad van State, wrote a critical report on the powers granted to the AIVD, the Dutch secret intelligence agency (Bof, 2017; Raad van State, 2016). Finally, the mass surveillance bill came to the attention of the media due to students at the University of Amsterdam. They started a petition in order to revise the policy. The petition was signed by more than the bar of 300.000 and was backed by multiple human rights organization which eventually led to a referendum on the

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4 new bill on the 21st of March 2018. The outcome of the referendum was a close call with 49.5% opposing and 46,5% supporting the new Sleepwet (AD, 2018).

While mass surveillance laws have been accused of being inconsistent with human rights, and causing an erosion of civil liberties they are still adopted. This can be attributed to a phenomenon called the ‘rally around the flag effect’ (Norman, 2013; Chowanietz, 2010). This implies that in the wake of a traumatic event, such as a terrorist attack, the media become uncritical towards new government policies, even if these policies may have a great impact on people’s privacy (Abdolian & Takooshian, 2003). The media have a profound impact on public opinion (Boynton & Richardson, 2016; Brinson & Stohl, 2012; Chong & Druckman, 2007), for example by presenting information in certain frames. A frame highlights certain parts of an issue and influences how people think about an issue (Hurtikova, 2013; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; De Vreese, 2005). Also, the use of certain frames may direct the way people think about such counter terrorism policies. In contrast to the USA, France or the UK, the Netherlands did not suffer a terrorist attack. Therefore, the Netherlands have not experienced this ‘rally around the flag effect’. Instead, the media have been presenting different frames discussing mass surveillance measures. A dominant (security) frame and a so-called counter frame (liberty) (Anderson, 2018; Brewer & Gross, 2005; Sander & Theriault, 2004).

Another factor that may have an impact on public attitudes towards mass surveillance is personality. One’s personality influences a persons’ world view and is part of the cognitive schema a person uses when making a political decision (Caprara & Zimbardo, 1999; Brewer & Gross, 2005). As a consequence a persons’ personality affects the manner in which a frame is deconstructed (Hurtikova, 2013).

Finally, when observing attitudes on counterterrorism measures the threat an individual perceives is an important factor to integrate as well. Threat perception has a

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5 significant effect on how people evaluate these mass surveillance matters because it is a psychological experience which can even lead to behavioral adaptations (Greenberg et al, 2005). Fear is necessary for survival and is a very strong emotion which creates a feeling of risk avoidance and the desire to attack the threat (Lupton & Tulloch, 1999). Terrorist attacks cause fear among the public and cause citizens to allow questionable legislation and a tendency to trade liberty for security (Finkelstein et al, 2017; Davis & Silver, 2003). This study seeks to explain attitudes on mass surveillance measures by examining framing effects together with the moderating impact of personality and threats. When framing effects occur for both frames the legitimacy of current mass surveillance policies is

questionable as most were adopted in times of one dominant frame. In addition, most research has studied the effects of one dominant frame on attitudes towards counterterrorism and has not examined the effects of a counter-frame in combination with the moderating impact of perceived threat and personality (Davis & Silver, 2004; Howie, 2005; Haider-Markel, Joslyn & Al-Baghal, 2006; Wolfendale, 2007; Brinson & Stohl, 2012; Garcia & Geva, 2016). It is crucial to investigate the opinion creation process on mass surveillance because of the great impact these laws may have on human rights and society in the future.

Taken together, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: Does the framing of mass surveillance laws by the media actually change people’s opinion on mass surveillance and to what extend is the strength of this effect moderated by other factors such as perceived levels of threat and personality traits?

The fact that in the Netherlands– so far – no terrorist attack has happened makes this country a suitable case to study framing effects. People are not ‘primed’ on the issue by the shock of attacks or by a history of one-sided media coverage (Norman, 2013).

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6 Theoretical Framework

Media Influence

Policy is the result of a complex bargaining process that can be understood as the interaction between agendas. In the field of political communication three agendas are distinguished; the political agenda, the media agenda, and the public agenda. All, to a certain extent, can

influence each other (Vliegenthart et al, 2016; Boynton & Richardson jr, 2015; Hurtikova, 2013; Habel, 2012). Public opinion is mostly moved by the media as this is the main provider of information (Hurtikova, 2003; Naveh, 2002). There are different ways by which these media effects may occur: Agenda-setting and Framing. Agenda-setting is closely linked to framing due to the fact that agenda-setting establishes the level of attention an issue gets therefore making it a dominant theme in society which generates public discussion. In this case mass surveillance policies. Therefore, agenda-setting creates the ‘what to think about’ (Scheufele, 2000; Hurtikova, 2013). However, this research focuses on framing due to its insights into the process of opinion formation.

Framing research investigates the way an issue is portrayed by the media. “Framing is the method for stressing the significance of different aspects of a theme” (De Vreese, 2004). News media construct frames to help the audience grasp important aspects of and important viewpoints on relevant issues. Therefore, frames create the ‘how to think about’ an issue (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Hurtikova, 2013; Scheufele, 2000).

Framing and Public Opinion

According to Entmann (1993) framing means “to select certain aspects from a perceived reality and render them more significant in the communicated information than others, and in such a manner so there is an intended interpretation of the communication, moral evaluation or recommendation for evaluating the provided information” (p.52). The second part argues

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7 that framing has the possibility influence an opinion and therefore differs from agenda-setting as it not solely is about the appearance of information in the news. De Vreese (2005) argues that framing has societal as well as individual level effects. The societal effect of framing over time can shape society wide public opinion and has the ability to instigate collective action. The latter was the case in the Netherlands which ultimately led the government to revise their policy. However, before the societal impact of framing can take place, the opinion of

individuals needs to be altered.

A frame has three effects on the individual; information processing, attitudinal effects, and behavioral effects (De Vreese, 2005, Chong & Druckmann, 2007, Scheufele, 2009, Hurtikova, 2013). Information processing precedes the other two effects, as attitudes as well as decisions are based on the information presented (Kahneman, 2011). Through this

information an opinion is formed which leads to a decision. In this case to be in favor or against the new implemented counterterrorism policy. A framing effect has taken place when individuals arrive at different positions after being exposed to a frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

Issue specific frame and counter-framing

The focus of this paper is on one specific issue; mass surveillance. The frames I investigate are issue-specific (De Vreese, 2005). Different frames can appear due to the diverse goals of politicians, interest groups, the media or others who try to steer citizens’ opinions. Sniderman and Theriault (2004) reasoned that framing studies usually overlook the fact that most frames can be counter argued. There are three cornerstone elements of what they call a counter-frame. First, they usually appear at a later stage. Second, the new frame is contradicting the first original frame. Third, the first frame has already created an environment in which people have developed an interpretation of the issue, therefore the counter-frame is generally

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8 can destabilize previous attitudes and refers to a study of Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997). They have shown the influence of a frame on a specific issue, the rally. They portrayed two sides of a story. In an experiment Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) showed the difference of opinion after participants where shown a newspaper article about a KKK rally. Two counter frames where created on a conflict of civil liberties. One frame defended the right of free speech and the contrasting frame the city’s safety. Participants likewise adapted their opinion whether the rally should be tolerated. Furthermore, their arguments in favor or against where constructed in line with the frames.

Also in the case of the introduction of mass surveillance measures, one can distinguish a frame that has been dominant. Altheide (2006) argues that since 9/11 all mass media

contributed to a scary portrayal of terrorism and the need for security. Norman (2013)

explains that in the early stages after a terrorist attack the media become very patriotic which was certainly the case in the US as almost no reports after 9/11 were negative towards the measures imposed. This only occurred months later. The US’ media blamed themselves of failing to do their job as watchdogs as public opinion, years after the implementation, has been changing about the Patriot Act and the debate has become very polarized (Abdolian & Takooshian, 2003; Edwards, 2018).

Recent developments on the abuse of these new mass surveillance policies have sparked outrage and raised voices of concern. Snowden revealed that the NSA was using its new abilities for more than combatting terrorism (van Vleet, 2017). The Council of Europe wrote a blog where they showcase the misuse within a number of nations such as the UK, France, Turkey, and Spain (Council of Europe, 2018). All of these developments contribute to the appearance of a strong counter-frame (Anderson, 2018). This is the emergence of the liberty frame as contradicting the security frame. The two frames display the trade-offs between national security and civil liberties in the context of battling terrorism (Finkelstein et

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9 al, 2016; Garcia & Geva, 2016; Davis & Silver, 2003). Based on the above considerations, I expect the security frame to have a positive impact on support for mass surveillance and the liberty frame to have a negative effect. Formalized into the first hypothesis;

H1: “The Liberty frame will create a more negative attitude towards the mass surveillance bill, in contrast to the Security frame that will create a more positive attitude towards the new mass surveillance bill”

Personality and framing effect

As framing is a cognitive process, a person’s personality may have an influence on the strength of a framing effect (Scheufele, 2000). Personality influence how people dissect and understand a frame and are therefore part of the information processing effect (Hurtikova, 2013; Brewer & Gross, 2005). People have ideological believes that help shape their opinion on political issues (Altemeyer, 1998). The influence of one’s personality and the strength of framing effects is increasingly uncovered with the rise of micro targeting research. This form of advertisement targets people based on their personality (Moon, 2002; Hirsh, Kang & Bodenhausen, 2012; Matz et al, 2017). This is also known as psychological persuasion. Matz et al (2017) conducted an experiment through Facebook advertisements and created messages that fit peoples’ personalities. Their results show that people tend to click and purchase more products when the message is congruent with their personality traits. Hirsch et al (2012) showed similar results with an advertising experiment. They tailored messages and it was noticeably effective.

Civil libertarian and Authoritarian

There are two contrasting personalities that could be linked to counterterrorism policy. These are the Authoritarian (RWA) and the Civil Libertarian (CL) personality. The

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10 Levinson, and Stanford, 1950). Individuals who score high on RWA tend to support military responses, and strategies to reduce terrorist threats. Furthermore, they tend to be less

supportive of social welfare and foster more conservative values. In addition, they are more likely to support restrictions of human rights and civil liberties (Crowson, 2009; Crowson & DeBacker, 2008; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). People with RWA personalities value security highly and do not mind granting a government the power to protect their security. They credit power to the legal authority and view criticism as destructive to the social order (Saunder and Ngo, 2017). It is also closely linked to the previous variable of threat. When a threat is perceived as high authoritarian beliefs tend to increase in society (Kossowska et al, 2011). This is due to the fact that Authoritarians’ psychological motives are largely based on fear, uncertainty and threat (Kossowska et al, 2011; 247). This value system is relatively stable throughout adulthood (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003re; Konty and Dunham, 1997). Many scholars examined the effect of RWA to predict attitudes on the war on terror (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; McFarland, 2005; Kossowksa et al, 2011).On the opposing side are the Civil Libertarians, people that score low on the authoritarian personality scales. These types of personalities are often critical towards the government, they tend to support left-wing economic policies, protect civil liberties, and are in favor of diplomacy rather than military action (Dun et al, 2017). Based on research, I expect that an individual’s personality moderates the effect of a message, which I formalized into the following hypotheses; H2a: “The positive effect of the security frame on support for the bill will be stronger when people have an Authoritarian personality”

H2b: “The negative effect of the liberty frame on support for the bill will be stronger when people have a Civil Libertarian personality”

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11 Perception of Threat

Whereas one could conceptualize personality as an internal moderator of framing effects, the level of terrorist threat could be seen as an external moderator Threat is an important factor when considering attitudes towards mass surveillance, as threat incites negative emotions such as anxiety and anger (Vasilopous, Marcus & Foucault, 2017). Therefore, perceived threat is a psychological phenomenon. In the field of political science many studies have shown that people who perceive a situation as threatening shift from liberal to more

authoritarian attitudes (Bonanno & Jost, 2006). People who experience threat are also more inclined to support punitive measures against fellow citizens and accept more authoritarian behavior of the government (Garcia & Geva, 2014). Garcia and Geva (2014) observe that when citizens experience threat from terrorism they are willing to trade off civil liberties for security. The finding is supported by a Gallup poll showing that 74% of US citizens agreed that “it was necessary to give up some freedoms in order to make the country safe from terrorist attacks” (p.32). In the Netherlands fear of terrorism is similar compared to other nations; in the US 43% perceive terrorism as a great threat, in France 42% worry about terrorism which is close to the 40% in the Netherlands (PewResearch, 2013; Ipsos, 2017; CBS, 2017). Gadarian (2010) conducted an experiment that exposed participants to news about terrorism which contained either a high or a low level of threat. People exposed to the high threat condition were more willing to support foreign military interventions. Zimmerman et al (2014) expose frames with a high or low threat on the use and distribution of marihuana. Individuals who were exposed to the high threat frame agreed with more punitive measures and granted more power to the police to arrest dealers. Based on all this, I expect that people become more susceptible to the security frame in a high threat context because this is related to negative emotions and the need for protection. Similarly, I expect that it will weaken the

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12 effect of the liberty frame on support for the bill. These expectations are formalized into the third and fourth hypothesis which read;

H3a: “The positive effect of the Security Frame will be stronger when people perceive the threat level as high”

H3b: “The negative effect of the Liberty Frame will be weaker wen people perceive the threat level as high”

Method and data Design

In order to test the hypotheses an online survey experiment was conducted. The aim is to test the immediate effect of the information displayed to the participants and an experiment is a good way to analyze this (Potter, 2012). As I want to examine framing effects in a context of high as well as low threat, I adopt a 2 (Frame: Security vs Liberty) x 2 (Threat: High vs Low) design with a neutral control condition. Therefore, five stimulus conditions were created. The neutral condition was created to control for personality and its effect apart from the impact of the other variables. The participants first answered a 15-item questionnaire regarding their personality. Second, they were exposed to one of the manipulated news articles which were randomly assigned. Finally, they filled in a short questionnaire about the article that they just read. In order to test Hypothesis 1 a one way analysis of variance was conducted. To test Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothesis 3b a two way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. To test the differences in personality of Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b a two way ANOVA was employed.

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13 Sample

The sample consisted of 166 participants of which 15 were excluded because they did not finish the experiment. I relied on convenience sampling, as the link to the survey was spread on social media and WhatsApp. Of the remaining 151 participants 90 were male and 61 were female. The average age was 28 (M=28, SD=8.49). Most of my participants were Dutch (n=107) and only a few come from non-European nations (n=8) mostly South-American. The participants were also quite educated as 110 had a bachelor’s degree or higher.

Frames

The stimuli were presented as online articles from the BBC. The article first introduced the new terrorism policy by the EU commission’s DG on terrorism. In order not to prime participants as this could affect their opinion a new mass surveillance bill from the EU was chosen. In the articles it illustrates that Europol would be granted new powers in order to combat terrorism on European soil. This was followed by a report of the Council of Europe. This is the EU’s highest advisory organ. The report was either in favor (security frame) or against (liberty frame) or unbiased (neutral frame) on the new implemented counter-terrorism bill. The titles of the articles portray already the direction of the report;

Against the new mass surveillance bill:

“Report of EU Council on new EU surveillance strategy – major breach civil liberties”

In favor of the mass surveillance bill:

“Report of EU Council on new EU surveillance strategy – major improvement civil security”

The neutral condition:

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14 The supportive articles describe how the new bill increases the security of the EU and how this is in line with their policy:

“ The Council stresses that article two of the Treaty of the EU obligates the Union to protect its citizens. With these counterterrorism measures Europol is able to prevent terrorist attacks and contribute to the EU’s pursuit of safety and stability (…) it provides Europol with extra tools for monitoring potential terrorists. If proven efficient it could be a powerful tool in the war on terror.”

In addition, these articles put emphasis on how the war on terror is different from normal warfare and how not imposing the new bill could pose a danger:

“We are used to thinking of war as a form of conflict among states, however over the past decade or so warfare has begun to slip out of the control of states. The Council expresses that weak states could pose a danger to human freedom”

On the other hand, the opposing reports stress that the new measure is harmful to citizens’ civil liberties and could, as a result, also harm democracy. In addition, the protection of civil liberties is also written in article two of the Treaty of the European Union and in line with their policy:

“The Council stresses that article two of the Treaty of the EU obligates the Union to protect citizens’ human rights. With these counterterrorism measures Europol breaches the right of privacy and this does not contribute to the EU’s pursuit of human rights and democracy.”

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15 “…we are used to thinking of privacy as a given right and protected by the state, however over the past decade or so liberties have begun to be slip out of the control of the people. The Council expresses that authoritarian states could use it to control critics, and combat critical press.”

Both the conditions were as similar as possible throughout the article for consistency. In the neutral condition the Council of Europe stated both the concerns about and reasons to be in favor of the bill:

“The Council published a report which underlines both concerns and support voiced within the EU’s institutions. The report states that the new bill should be a balance on article two of the Treaty of the EU which emphasizes both the obligations to protect citizens from harm and to protect citizens’ human rights (…) Critics argue that the new bill is creating a police state and deteriorates civil liberties. Supporters on the other hand argue the war on terror is a new type of warfare that requires new strategies.”

Threat

Threat is the second independent variable incorporated into the articles. Each BBC news article included a description of the current threat level. It is mentioned twice.:

“The new regulation is said to be necessary, because (despite the fact that) the current threat level is high (low).”

“The EU’s terrorism watch has several levels of threat which are based on the chances of an attack happening. Previous year the level of threat has increased (decreased) from limited (critical) to critical (limited).”

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16 The level of perceived threat among the participants was measured by means of the following question: ‘I perceive the current terrorism threat in Europe as’ on a 5 point Likert-scale ranging from 1 low to 5 high.

Personality

To measure Authoritarian and Civil Libertarian personalities, 15 items were adopted from two different research studies. The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. First, 5 items were used from the RWA scale constructed by Altemeyer (1981). However, this is mostly based on an American sample. Due to the convenience sample most of the participants were from European nations. Therefore, other items were used from Evan (1996) whose items were applied to investigate authoritarianism in the United Kingdom. All items were constructed with the same guidelines as the Political Compass. This is an official website that uses analyses to put people on a cross spectrum ranging from political left to right on the

horizontal axis and Authoritarian and Civil Libertarian on the vertical axis. One item was left out ‘human rights are the most important for a functioning democracy’. The item was taken from Altemeyer’s (1981) survey but, as already expected, only 6 people from the sample argued that it was not important. The 14 items together were reliable α=0.79.

Attitude

Participants were asked about their attitudes towards the bill by means of the item ‘I believe the new mass surveillance bill implemented is’ on which they could answer from extremely bad (1) to extremely good (5). Next to this general attitude, I included two other items which are ‘the mass surveillance bill is a necessary improvement in the war on terror’ and ‘the mass surveillance bill is an unnecessary violation of human rights’ again, the answer categories run from definitely true (1) to definitely false (5). These last two dependent variables (DV) were added to broaden the concept of attitude and to measure people’s evaluation of the new mass

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17 surveillance bill based on different factors. (Brinson & Stohl, 2012; Hewitt, 2014; Cayford & Pieters, 2016; Council of Europe, 2018)

Manipulation Check

In order to check if the manipulation had taken place the participants were asked the following question ‘The report of the EU Council was’ on which they could answer on a 5 point Likert-scale from very positive (1) to very negative (5). In addition, whether the participants perceived the threat levels ‘I perceive the current terrorism threat as’ as high (5) or low (1) indicate if the manipulation of perceived levels of threat have taken place correctly. The Liberty Frame should contain the more negative tone compared to the tone of the report of the Council in the Security Frame.

Table 1 Means of threat perceived and report of Council per condition

Condition (N) Frame Threat Threat perceived

(M, SD) Tone of EU Council (M,SD) 1 (N = 32) Liberty High 3.44 (0.98) 3.69(1.09) 2 (N = 29) Security High 3.90 (0.86) 2.41(0.98) 3 (N = 30) Liberty Low 2.90 (0.96) 3.67(1.06) 4 (N = 31) Security Low 3.12 (1.09) 2.39(0.68) 5 (N = 29) Neutral None 3.41 (1.02) 2.79(1.13)

The variable of the report of the EU Council was recoded so that the higher the average the more negative the perception is. As predicted, the variations in the report of the council where effective, F(4,146)=13.31, p<0.001 as the participants in the Liberty Frame indeed

experienced the tone of the Report of the Council as more negative compared to the participants in the Security Frame. Second, Table 1 shows that the threat was perceived correctly in the conditions. The high threat conditions perceived the threat indeed higher in both frames, compared to the low threat conditions and was significant, F(4,150)=5.541, p<0.001.

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18 Results

Construction of Variables

In order to test the hypotheses the independent variable (IV) Condition was created which contained the different stimuli: High threat x Liberty Frame (1), High threat x Security Frame (2), Low Threat x Liberty Frame (3), Low Threat x Security Frame (4), and neutral (5). The other IV ‘I perceive the current threat in Europe as’ is reverse coded into low (1) to high (5) for more easy interpretation. In addition, two groups were created and put together in a high threat group and low threat group to be able to test the moderation of the level of threat. The dependent variables (DV) ‘The new terrorism bill is a necessary improvement on the war on terror’ and ‘The new terrorism bill is an unnecessary violation of human rights’ were similarly reverse coded into definitely false (1) and definitely true (5), as higher scores reflect higher levels of agreement. Also the manipulation variable ‘The report of the EU Council was’ has been reverse coded to negative (1) to positive (5).

The moderating variable of personality consisted of 14 items. Some items needed reverse coding this meant that the items went from most Civil Libertarian (1) to most

Authoritarian (7). A principle component factor analysis was performed on all fourteen items, this resulted in a KMO=.84 therefore the scale is acceptable p<.001. The Eigenvalue criteria of EV>1 show three components. The component represent 54.9% of the variances explained. Furthermore, as stated before it was reliable (α=0.79). The three components separately do not explain separate conditions, furthermore they overlap on all components in the PCA. This could be a consequence of the separate sources they were taken from and therefore will be treated as one. To create the two personalities ‘Civil Libertarian’ and ‘Authoritarian’ a split at the median was conducted (Mdn=3.29, SD=0.86). This created the Civil Libertarian group (n=77) and the Authoritarian group (n=74).

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19 Randomization check

A randomization check if gender distribution across the conditions using cross-tabulation and controlling for chi-square showed no statistically difference, X2 (4, N=151)=2.87, p=0.579. Another randomization check of age distribution across the conditions using a one-way ANOVA proved insignificant, F(4,146)=0.86, p=0.492. These randomization analysis show that both age and gender were distributed fairly across conditions.

Framing effect

In order to test the claim that the Liberty frame will create more negative stance on mass surveillance compared to the Security frame an one-way ANOVA was conducted on all dependent variables that show the attitude of the participants.

Table 2 Means of attitude towards mass surveillance bill per condition

Condition (N) Frame Threat

General attitude bill (M, SD) Improvement War on Terror (M, SD) Violation of Human Rights (M, SD) 1 (N = 32) Liberty High 2.28 (0.95) 2.41 (1.19) 3.84 (0.92) 2 (N = 29) Security High 3.44 (0.82) 3.38 (0.90) 2.93 (0.92) 3 (N = 30) Liberty Low 2.46 (1.07) 2.67 (1.14) 3.73 (0.91) 4 (N = 31) Security Low 3.39 (0.92) 3.61 (1.14) 3.14 (1.06) 5 (N = 29) Neutral None 3.03 (0.94) 3.14 (1.30) 3.14 (1.16)

Table 3 Means of attitude within each frame

Frame General attitude bill (M, SD) Improvement War on Terror (M, SD) Violation of Human Rights (M, SD) Liberty (n=62) 2.38(1.01) 2.53(1.11) 3.79(0.91) Security (n=60) 3.42 (0.87) 3.50(1.03) 2.97(1.00) Neutral (n=29) 3.03 (0.94) 3.14 (1.30) 3.14 (1.05)

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20 Table 2 shows the overall results of all dependent variables of the liberty frames (condition 1 and condition 3) and the security frames (condition 2 and condition 4) and the neutral

condition (condition 5) in combination with the threat variable. This table is added to provide an insight in the overall averages. However, in order to test Hypothesis 1 and to focus on the framing effect of the liberty frame (n=62) and security frame (n=60) the groups were split. Table 3 shows the results between the two groups exposed to the frames. First, the ANOVA on ‘I believe the new mass surveillance bill is’ came out significant F(2,148)=18.98,

p<0.001. It passed the Levene’s test p=.435. The liberty frame groups viewed the bill implemented as worse, compared to the security frame groups. In addition, a post hoc Bonferroni showed that the differences between the security frame and liberty frame were significant p=<0.001 but the differences between the security frame and neutral frame were also significant p=0.006. Second, the ANOVA on whether it is an improvement on war on terror came out significant F(2,148)=11.536.11, p<0.001 however did not pass the Levene’s test p=0.041 therefore equality of variances may not be assumed. A post hoc Bonferroni showed that the differences between the liberty frame and security frame were significant p=<0.001 but the differences between the security frame and neutral frame were also significant p=0.053. The participants in the liberty conditions scored lower on trueness and the participants in the security conditions scored higher and neutral condition again stands in the middle. Last, on unnecessary violation of human rights which also came out significant F(2,148)=11.245.62, p<0.001, it only failed the Levene’s test p=0.012 therefore equality of variances cannot be assumed. A post hoc Bonferroni test showed that the differences between the liberty frame and security frame were significant p=<0.001 but the differences between the security frame and the neutral frame were also significant p=0.012 The participants in the liberty conditions viewed the new bill as more violating compared to the participants in the security conditions. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be confirmed.

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21 Moderating impact of Personality

To test the moderation of personality on the framing effect an univariate analysis was performed on the personality variable and the all three DV’s;

Table 4 Results two factor ANOVA on General Attitude with Personality

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 34,69 2 17.34 24.53 <0.001 0.253 Personality 29.20 1 29.20 41.29 <0.001 0.222 Frame * Personality 2.02 2 1.01 1.43 0.243 0.019 Error 102.54 145 0.71 Total 1448.00 151

Table 5 Results two factor ANOVA on Improvement War on Terror with Personality

Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 28.98 2 29.98 13.85 <0.001 0.160 Personality 29.12 1 14.50 27.84 <0.001 0.161 Frame * Personality 2.92 2 2.92 1.40 0.251 0.019 Error 151.69 145 1.05 Total 1604.00 151

Table 6 Results two factor ANOVA on Violation of Human Rights with Personality

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 22.23 2 11.12 14.27 <0.001 0.164 Personality 32.06 1 16.03 41.15 <0.001 0.221 Frame * Personality 1.49 2 0.74 0.96 0.387 0.013 Error 112.95 145 0.78 Total 167.68 151

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22 Tables 7, 8, and 9 show that personality on itself was significant for all DVs; general attitude, improvement war on terror, and violation of human rights with small effect sizes. However, for all DVs the interaction between the exposure of the frame and personality was not significant for all DVs.

Graph 1 above showing averages of general attitude for each frame

Graph 2 above showing averages on improvement war on terror for each frame

2 3,1 2,25 2,77 3,82 3,59 0 1 2 3 4 5

Liberty Frame Security Frame Neutral

BA D (1 ) - G OO D (5 )

General Attitude

Civil Libertarian Authoritarian

1,97 3,24 2,5 3,13 3,82 3,59 0 1 2 3 4 5

Liberty Frame Security Frame Neutral

F A L S E (1 ) - T RUE (5 )

Improvement War on Terror

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23

Graph 3 above showing averages on violation of human rights for each frame

As graph 1, 2, and 3 show both personalities are equally affected by the frames in their support for and attitudes towards mass surveillance. This can be concluded from the total averages for each personality and their fluctuation in all conditions. Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b cannot be confirmed. The goal was to control for the effect of the Civil

Libertarian and the Authoritarian personalities. In the control conditions are quite large for all DVs compared to the framed conditions; on general attitude (Mdiff=1.34),opinion on

necessary improvement war on terror (Mdiff=1.10) violation of human rights (Mdiff=1.33). However, on interesting result for the DV questioning the whether the bill was necessary improvement for war on terror the liberty frame (Mdiff=1.16) had a larger effect on the Civil Libertarians compared to the Authoritarian personalities who remained relatively stable because in security frame the difference was less (Mdiff=0.58).

4,19 3,33 3,92 3,37 2,52 2,59 0 1 2 3 4 5

Liberty Frame Security Frame Neutral

F A L S E (1 ) -T RUE (5 )

Violation of Human Rights

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24 Moderation of Threat

Table 7 Results two factor ANOVA on general attitude with threat

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 33.18 1 33.18 36.86 <0.001 0.202 Threat 0.118 1 0.12 0.131 0.718 0.001 Frame * Threat 0.463 1 0.46 0.514 0.474 0.004 Error 131.43 146 0.90 Total 1448.00 151

Table 8 Results two factor ANOVA on Improvement War on Terror with threat

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 28.05 1 28.05 22.26 <0.001 0.132 Threat 1.86 1 1.86 1.47 0.227 0.010 Frame * Threat 0.01 1 0.01 0.00 0.948 0.000 Error 184.02 146 1.26 Total 1604.00 151

Table 9 Results two factor ANOVA on Violation of Human Rights with threat

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p Ƞ2 Frame 20.63 1 20.63 20.72 <0.001 0.124 Threat 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.909 0.000 Frame * Threat 0.25 1 0.25 0.25 0.621 0.002 Error 145.40 146 1.00 Total 1850.00 151

To test Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b and examine whether threat had a moderating role on all three DVs a two way ANOVA was conducted. As a consequence of the significant manipulations test it is allowed to test the moderation of threat levels through the threat incorporated in the conditions. The results in tables 4, 5, and 6 show that frame have a significant weak effect on all DVs. In addition, the results indicate that threat has no

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25 between exposure to a frame and different levels of threat. Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b can therefore not be confirmed.

Discussion

The main aim of the study was to examine the effect of frames in the media on individuals’ attitudes towards mass surveillance as counterterrorism policy. In addition, I also looked into the moderating role of perceived levels of threat and personality. The results suggest that attitudes on mass surveillance are influenced by the frames people are exposed to.

Before addressing framing effect further we examine the moderating role of threat. The results show that threat does not moderate attitude formation within the framed

conditions. This was unexpected. Moreover, people in the security frame experienced threat at higher levels than people in the liberty frame. This implies that the frame is stronger than the threat that a person is exposed to and perceives. This is not in line with previous research that show that the level of threat perceived by an individual also affects his/her attitude towards the mass surveillance bill (Gadarian, 2010; Garcia & Geva, 2014). Norris (2013) investigated threat as moderating variable and did find significant results. Moreover, what is extraordinary is the fact that their was no real statistical difference between the people in the security frame and in the neural frame. As a consequence it strengthens the idea of Snider and Theriault (2004) that there is indeed a dominant frame. Furthermore, the result constructs on my expectation that the media is portraying terrorism in security frame, the currently dominating one, where it terrorism is portrayed as acute threat (Gadarian, 2010). The fact that previous research has not intensively investigated threat as moderator in the liberty frame could explain the different results. In addition, the security frame already had a threat inducing effect

therefore it could have become obsolete in the evaluation of the mass surveillance bill. Even though, the manipulation results argue that the threat perceived by participants was influenced by the design. Moreover, some research found that threat influences personality. However,

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26 personality was merged in this study and could also be the cause (Bonnano & Jost, 2006; Vasipoulous, Marcus & Foucault, 2017).

This study wanted to examine whether framing effects are similar for people with different personalities but the level of positive attitude towards the new bill did eventually differ. Even though the hypothesis are not confirmed as personality had no moderating effect, there are observable variances in individual attitude plus personality was a significant factor according to the results. Authoritarians had a more positive view of the bill in general, in regard to it being an improvement, and were less skeptical if it violated human rights. This more optimistic view towards the bill did not change when exposed to the liberty frame however the frame did cause them to adapt their opinion. The same results were there for the Civil Libertarians. Civil Libertarians were to a lesser extent positive about the mass

surveillance bill regarding whether it was good or bad, whether the bill is an improvement, and whether it violates human rights. Nevertheless they too were affected by the frame to which they were exposed. In particular, the Civil Libertarians showed the largest differences with Authoritarians when exposed to the message asked if the new terrorism bill was a necessary improvement to combat terrorism. This could be attributed to the fact that Authoritarian personalities in general are against aggressive government policies and Civil Libertarians are skeptical of the government (Dun et al, 2017). In the neutral condition the differences between the two personality types were the largest. This is in line with the previous studies which demonstrated personalities and their attitudes on terrorism policies (Dun et al, 2017; Crowson, 2009; Crowson & DeBacker, 2008; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). These findings do suggest that this value system is still in place when framing effect occur.

Furthermore, this study aimed to broaden the understanding of framing effects by also examining the impact of a contrasting frame which has the capability to alter the dominant

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27 frame (Sander & Theriault, 2004; Anderson, 2018). Most previous research has examined the effect of the dominant security frame on restrictions of civil liberties. Similarly to these

studies the emphasis was put on the ability framing has to change and shape public opinion. In order to investigate whether the counter-frame holds the same capabilities in regard to mass surveillance this researched introduced the liberty frame. The concept of attitude was

broadened by not solely focusing on the general opinion but also on two other evaluations that are important in light of mass surveillance. As stated before these derive from the general trade-offs between security and liberty. The first is whether these measures are viewed as an improvement and necessity to combat terrorism. Second, the recent debate added the attitudes of people regarding the intrusiveness of mass surveillance on their civil liberties. These three factors embody in my opinion the most important points raised on both sides. The results suggest that depending on which frame a person is exposed to attitudes will change

accordingly. As is shown, it affected all three attitudes that were tested for; their general view, whether the bill is an improvement, and whether the bill is a violation of human rights. In the introduction it was emphasized that this makes the decision making capability of citizens on such issues questionable. The media frames might have the power to affect a persons’ vote. In addition, the current mass surveillance measures that are adopted by most Western nations were all adopted under the reign of the dominant security frame and a high sense of terrorist threat.

When a nation constitutes a referendum an individual is invited to make a decision regarding policy. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate the framing effects of different

messages. The personalities, which are build up through one’s lifetime, have a smaller effect on the frame than expected which were assumed to guide the dissection of the message (Hurtikova, 2013). This research has shown even though people’s personality do not have a moderating role when exposed to a frame people’s personality will determine to what extent

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28 they favor mass surveillance. Moreover, I take some comfort out of the fact that when

individuals are exposed to unbiased information this value system takes over. In a decade of domestic surveillance measures with heightened attention to terrorism the importance of a counter frame cannot be overestimated. The media and politicians in other nations should follow the Dutch citizens’ initiative and re-evaluate their current mass surveillance policies. A counter frame can contribute to individual attitude change and therefore to societal debate. Next to the frame the media should not underestimate their role in the creation of fear by portraying the dominant frame. The frame they portray also influences the amount of fear a person experiences. Even though, this may not be significant it is important to note that the security frames heightens a threatened emotional state which was just as high as the neutral condition. Ultimately, it is clear that framing has an influence on opinion formation when evaluating mass surveillance policy. Changing the frame will change the debate.

Democratically elected politicians are representatives of the people, when public opinion changes chances are that policy will adapt as well.

Limitations and Future Research

This research has some limitations that should be kept in mind. Due to time and scope constraints, the data of this thesis are the result of convenience sampling. The number of participants is one of the aspects that could be improved when replicating this study. The fact that fear did not moderate the effect of the frames was unexpected. Even though, when all conditions are viewed it does show minimal differences. The effect the security and liberty frame alone have on threat perception could be interesting for future research. Another reason for the threat not being part of the evaluation of the mass surveillance is perhaps terrorism fatigue which is an interesting topic to research. In addition, it could be attributed to the shift of the debate and recent discoveries by Snowden and the EU Council on the abuse of powers by various intelligence agencies. Moreover, due to the current experimental design there is no

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29 observation in opinion formation of participants when they are exposed to contrasting frame afterwards. Perhaps the two frames cancel each other out which would make personality more important than the actual framing effect. Moreover, as terrorist attacks are likely to occur in the foreseeable future on European soil there is no way of telling whether this recently appeared counter-frame will hold in the future. Just recently terrorist suspects have been arrested in the Netherlands plotting to shoot and kill people at a festival (NU, 2018). Even though they were arrested through traditional counter terrorism strategies the feeling of insecurity could also change the public opinion in the Netherlands.

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Appendix A

The 15 item questionnaire to test for Authoritarianism:

1. If economic globalisation is inevitable, it should primarily serve humanity rather than the interests of trans-national corporations

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36 2. The rich are too highly taxed

3. I’d always support my country, whether it was right or wrong

4. There are no savage and civilised peoples; there are only different cultures 5. Human rights are the most important for a functioning democracy

6. Sometimes rights may be restricted for the sake of national security

7. It is regrettable that many personal fortunes are made by people who simply manipulate money

8. Those who are able to work, and refuse the opportunity, should not expect society’s support 9. First-generation immigrants can never be fully integrated within their new country

10. For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. 11. Military action that defies international law is sometimes justified 12. All authority should be questioned

13. A significant advantage of a one-party state is that it avoids all the arguments that delay progress in a democratic political system

14. The government is right most of the time and the critics are just ‘loud-mouths’

15. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people

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