Framing EU enlargement in a competitive environment: the case of Albania’s accession

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MA Erasmus Mundus Master

Journalism, Media and Globalisation

Framing EU enlargement in a competitive environment: The

case of Albania’s accession

by

Muhammad Omer Hayat

Student ID: 11896620

Master’s Thesis

Graduate School of Communication

Master’s programme Communication Science

Supervisor/Examiner: Rachid Azrout

Date of completion: 01 June 2018

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Abstract: The primary aim of this study was to investigate the effects of competitive framing, i.e.

simultaneous exposure to opposing frames, on support for EU enlargement and integration. For this purpose an experiment was conducted with six conditions, including a control, to gauge the impact of framing in both, one-sided conditions and competitive frame conditions. Opposing frames of risk and opportunity were identified for the purpose of the study. The stimulus material was a fictitious news article on the possible accession of Albania to the EU. The study found no direct effect of framing on support for EU enlargement in both competitive and one-sided exposures. However, the study found that political knowledge moderated framing effects in the one-sided risk condition, with those having low political knowledge showing susceptibility to the frame and scoring low on the scale for EU enlargement support. Anti-immigration views were also found to moderate framing effects in the one-sided risk condition with strong

anti-immigration views resulting in lower support for enlargement. The same moderator also

predicted behaviour in one competitive condition, in which both the risk and opportunity frames were deployed equally. However in this case, having strong anti-immigration views actually resulted in an increase in support for EU enlargement. This move away from the direction propagated by one frame despite strong antecedent attitudes predicting the opposite behaviour depicts how balanced competitive framing can actually result in changing opinions, even for those holding extreme views.

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Introduction

If there is one important lesson that can be learnt from Brexit, it is that the future of European integration hinges on public support. With an unprecedented influx of migrants and right-wing politics gaining popularity in many EU member states (Kettle, 2018), the political relevance of public opinion on European integration is expected to be paramount. As many scholars have noted, more and more leading politicians across different EU member states want to have referenda in their respective countries on matters of EU enlargement (Maier and Rittberger, 2008).

A significant majority of European citizens cite mass news media as their preferred source of information about European integration. In fact, for a majority of citizens, the entire process of European integration is “abstract” and “complex” which means that information from mass media will likely play a key role in helping them form their opinion (Boomgarden and de Vreese, 2006). As Maier and Rittberger put it: “It is obvious that the vast majority of citizens have no first-hand experience of politics, whether domestic, European or international. Consequently citizens rely on mass media to obtain information about political issues” (2008; p. 247). But how does the media go about changing or impacting public opinion on the issue?

Media framing and EU integration

There have been many studies that have looked at how media influences public opinion on European integration and to what extent. In this regard, there are two kinds of studies that have been carried out. The first kind look at respondents’ media exposure in a natural setting by creating an assessed information environment based on their self-reported media exposure. Such studies will conduct a content analysis of major media outlets to see whether their coverage on

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European integration has a directional bias, and how much time individuals spend consuming content from those outlets, to come up with a media effect (see for instance: De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Azrout et al., 2012). Other studies have carried out framing experiments to see whether media influences public opinion. In these experimental studies on EU public

support, exposure to specific news frames is used to explain support for general enlargement (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006), or support for accession of specific countries (De Vreese, 2004; De Vreese et al., 2011; Lecheler and De Vreese, 2010; Maier and Rittberger, 2008). All these studies conclude that those participants who were exposed to frames that negatively portrayed EU integration and/or enlargement showed lower support for either enlargement or accession.

Schuck and de Vreese (2006), for instance, first conducted a content analysis of major German newspapers and found that in their coverage of the EU they were using two opposing frames – which the researchers label as ‘risk’ and ‘opportunity’ frames. The ‘risk’ frame emphasises the costs and disadvantages of EU enlargement while the ‘opportunity’ frame highlights the advantages, whether economic or cultural, from EU enlargement.

Having identified these two frames, they then went on to conduct an experiment to gauge whether these frames had an impact on support for EU enlargement. When EU enlargement was presented as a risk, support was generally lower as opposed to when it was presented as an opportunity (Schuck and de Vreese, 2006). However, while there are innate problems with the experiment approach which will be discussed later, one major problem with these framing experiment designs is that they are one-sided asymmetrical i.e. the respondents are exposed to just one frame – either the one portraying the positive side of enlargement or the negative one.

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Whereas in real life, much like most issues in politics, that of EU integration is competitive: i.e. political parties, stakeholders and opinion leaders debate the issue and frame it in opposing terms. As Chong and Druckman point out: “Virtually all public debates involve competition between contending parties to establish the meaning and interpretation of issues. When citizens engage an issue —be it social security, foreign aid, a hate-group rally, affirmative action, or the use of public funds for art — they must grapple with opposing frames that are intended by opinion leaders to influence public preferences” (2007; p. 100).

Many studies, including those discussed above, have shown that news frames can affect the “evaluative direction of thoughts, interpretations or perceptions of an issue”. As for their role in forming public opinion, news frames thus have to be seen as important tools in shaping public debate and citizens’ understanding of political issues. And by extension, news frames can potentially have an impact on real policy decisions if we assume public opinion to be influential in affecting those decisions (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006; p. 6).

However, quite interestingly, as Chong and Druckman (2007) point out, a large chunk of previous work on the impact of news frames on public opinion investigates asymmetric one-sided designs using either strong or weak frames. This is to say that experiments to study the impact of news frames on public opinion have been designed such that participants are exposed to only one frame – or one side of the debate. Chong and Druckman (2007) identify only one study, by Sniderman and Theriault (2004), in which participants were exposed to both frames (in equal quantities). This dearth of two-sided designs in research is problematic because in reality individuals are exposed to multiple frames with varying frequencies. Like all other political issues, the matter of European Union enlargement and integration, is also typically competitive, with contending camps framing the matter in opposing terms. However most of past research on

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EU framing and public opinion, as noted above, is marred by the same problem Chong and Druckman (2007) identify: they employ one-sided designs. Designs with simultaneous exposure to opposing frames are completely missing from framing research on the subject of EU

integration.

With this background, this study will look into the effect of news framing on support for EU integration. The principal aim of the study is to answer the following question:

RQ: How does exposure to competing frames influence citizens’ stance on European integration?

Framing Effect

Framing refers to how media presents complex information relating to an event or an object, specifically by highlighting or emphasising some aspects of that event or object and ignoring or neglecting others (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; p1). News frames thus can be defined as coherent packages of information that contain “a central organizing idea or story line that provides

meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; p143). These news frames are then presented in the media and are consumed by the citizens, whose cognitive responses to such exposure can potentially determine their attitudes on the matter.

Several scholars and researchers have tried to determine how and when a frame impacts the receiver. Chong and Druckman (2007), for instance, theorise that for a frame to have an effect, it must impact certain considerations and make them seem more important in the mind of the receiver. They begin with the argument that individuals base their opinions or attitudes on a few dimensions concerning the issue at hand, not on the entire available dimensions related to the

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issue. So to reach a conclusion, individuals use considerations that are available, accessible and applicable or appropriate (Chong and Druckman, 2007; p108).

Available considerations are those that have been stored in a person’s memory and can be recalled for use while making an attitudinal decision. For instance, an individual needs to understand how the accession of a new country to the EU could be a risk to them or their country, or alternatively how it could translate into economic advantages for them or for their country or the European Union as a whole, if these considerations are to play a part in their stance on enlargement. But a consideration need not just be available, it needs to be accessible as well, which is to say that there is a high probability that this available consideration will be “activated for use in an evaluation” (Chong and Druckman, 2007; p108). The more a consideration is used in evaluations, the more accessible it becomes.

However, sometimes accessible considerations can be set aside by individuals if there are other more critical accessible considerations that are deemed more salient to the issue at hand. Lastly, these considerations should also be applicable to the issue at hand which is to say that an

individual must deem them relevant to use in the evaluation. For instance, as Chong and

Druckman explain, “the concern that a demonstration will tie up traffic may be an available and accessible consideration, but it may be judged irrelevant and given no weight in determining one’s attitude toward allowing the rally” (2007; p. 109). How much deliberation an individual puts into deciding the applicability or appropriateness of a consideration will vary from person to person and on the context.

So for a frame to have an effect, or be termed a strong frame, it should bring to the mind’s fore available considerations because a frame based on unavailable considerations will have no effect on the receiver. And it should make those considerations seem more important and relevant

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compared to others. The other important factor for a frame to have an effect is its “judged persuasiveness” which essentially depends on the nature of the individual receiving the message (knowledge and motivation) and the context of the message (combination of frames) (Chong and Druckman, 2007).

Competitive framing happens when competing sides promote and propagate alternative interpretations of an issue. Chong and Druckman (2007) hypothesise that in competitive

environments, i.e., when opposing frames are presented together, all individuals are affected by strong frames rather than weak frames. But how the effect works depends on their level of motivation and knowledge. They also hypothesise a situation in which “opposing frames of sharply contrasting strength may give rise to a counter-effect” which means that the weak frame may cause the individual to move away from the position it is propagating and into the opposite direction. Such a situation can only happen when frames are presented together and the

individuals receiving the message are highly motivated or knowledgeable (p111).

To conclude the discussion, frames have an effect only if they are able to change the weight of certain considerations in the mind of individuals. Additionally, certain prior-held beliefs, level of knowledge and motivation of individuals can attenuate the effect of framing (Chong and

Druckman, 2007). This will hold more so in competitive environments as frames simultaneously make available and accessible opposing considerations in the minds of individuals. In such situations, the ability of the recipients and their antecedent attitudes will play a major role in determining their susceptibility to the framing. Other scholars, such as Scheufele (2000), also point out that framing studies should look at particular orientations and attitudes of individuals before they are exposed to media content.

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Individuals with high political knowledge, for instance, “think more, and more deeply, about political issues. In addition, more politically aware individuals are more likely to be exposed to frames and to be able to comprehend and integrate the frames in their (re)formation of opinion” (De Vreese et al., 2011; p. 184).

Given this line of argument, framing would not work on those with low political knowledge because they would not be exposed to the frame due to unavailable considerations. While those with moderate political knowledge will be most responsive to frames because of available considerations: “they pay enough attention to be exposed to the content, but lack the resources to resist the persuasive message” (Zaller, 1992; p19). But for those with high levels of political knowledge, two things could happen. They could either go with the frame if it is tapping into existing beliefs and conclusions or they could counter-argue the frame due to alternative considerations that are being brought to the forefront and thus face no frame effect (Wenzel, 2015; p156). But this line of argument applies only to one-sided frame exposure. Even then, there is no consistent direction of the moderating effect of political knowledge in framing studies, with some researchers finding that low political knowledge results in higher

susceptibility to news frames while other studies have found the exact opposite (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006 ; p7). Recent studies in the context of support for EU integration show that

individuals with low levels of political knowledge were more affected by the news frames and more susceptible to risk framing (Inglehart et al., 1991; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006) because they are unable to reject or counter-argue the message being passed on to them.

Following this discussion, it becomes apparent that individual response to framing will vary in one-sided and competitive framing environment. Therefore this study hypothesises:

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H1a: Individuals with moderate political knowledge are most affected by the news frame in

one-sided frame exposures.

This follows from the discussion above that those with enough knowledge to understand the message but not enough to have alternative considerations available at their behest will not be able to resist the effect of the framing message. They are the most susceptible to framing effect.

H1b: Individuals with low or high levels of political knowledge are not affected by the news frame in one-sided or competitive frame exposures.

This also follows from the discussion above that states the frame effect will not be present for individuals who are unable to understand the message (those with low knowledge) or for those who are able to counter-argue it (with high knowledge).

Views on immigration

Public support for European integration has been explained using two major perspectives. First, the utilitarian perspective argues that individuals’ support for European Union integration is determined by whether or not they perceive it as benefitting them economically (Anderson and Reichert, 1996). Pitted against this ‘utility’ theory is the ‘identity’ perspective, which argues that individuals’ stance on EU integration is determined by whether or not they perceive enlargement or integration as a threat to the social group they identify with. According to this theory,

individuals with a high sense of national identity or other antecedent attitudes (such as anti-immigration) are likely to see the world in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ – and have a negative

perception of ‘them’ (Azrout et al., 2012). Thus when it comes to EU enlargement, if the citizens of the country applying for membership are seen as part of the ‘out-group’, support will be low.

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This fear or hostility towards other cultures is what primarily determines public support on integration, according to this perspective (De Vreese and Boomgarden, 2005).

As a result, among antecedent factors that shape public opinion on EU enlargement, a lot of significance has been given to ‘identity’ related factors, of which attitude towards immigrants has been treated as critical (Azrout et al., 2012). These scholars argue that individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants reveal whether they perceive the world in terms of the in-group/out-group dichotomy. It has been argued in several studies (Azrout et al, 2012; De Vreese and

Boomgaarden, 2005) that individuals with strong anti-immigrant attitudes are in fact looking at the world in terms of “us” and “them” and thus by measuring anti-immigrant attitudes, we are in fact measuring “the degree to which a person identifies with an group and contrasts the in-group with out-in-groups” (Azrout et al., 2012; p695).

And so individuals who have strong anti-immigrant attitudes, can either opt for out-group

rejection, as seen in the case of potential Turkish accession to the EU when Turks were discussed largely as an out-group (Azrout et al., 2011), or in-group protection as Brewer (1999) argues. Individuals with strong anti-immigrant attitudes identify strongly with the in-group and need to protect their in-group, especially when enlargement is portrayed negatively in the news media. From this, we can hypothesise that the stronger an individual’s anti-immigrant attitudes, the more susceptible they will be to framing that portrays enlargement or integration negatively, particularly due to threats from out-groups . Thus individuals in whom this antecedent attitude features strongly should always be susceptible to such kind of framing, whether in competitive or uncompetitive environments. From this discussion, we hypothesise:

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H2: Individuals with strong anti-immigrant attitudes will be susceptible to framing that portrays EU enlargement and /or integration as having negative consequences in both one-sided and competitive exposure.

Methodology

A survey-experiment was conducted with six conditions, including the control condition, to answer the primary research question. Two of these conditions were one-sided frame exposures that portrayed EU enlargement as either advantageous or disadvantageous. The other three conditions portrayed the issue in competitive terms with opposing frames used simultaneously in varying frequencies. Competing frames can be defined as narratives on a political issue

propagated by contending political factions and replicated in media, which debate and

communicate an issue in opposing terms (Chong and Druckman, 2007). For the purpose of this study on EU integration, I have identified competing frames of ‘risk’ and ‘opportunity’ from literature.

“The ‘risk’ frame raises concerns and emphasizes potentially negative consequences of the enlargement process such as high costs, increase of crime and instability and threats of other cultures. The ‘opportunity’ frame raises hope and confidence and emphasizes potentially positive consequences of the inclusion of new countries into the EU, such as the spread of democracy, freedom and human rights or economic growth and cultural diversity (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006).

Additionally, the six conditions will include a control group that is, following the standard set out in Chong and Druckman (2007), not exposed to any “persuasive communication” on EU

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enlargement. The other five conditions, shown in the table below, will include one-sided frame exposure and dual-frame exposure, in both equal and unequal quantities.

Condition 1 ‘Risk’ frame only

Condition 2 ‘Opportunity’ frame only

Condition 3 Both frames in equal quantities

Condition 4 Both frames but ‘risk’ is in higher quantity

Condition 5 Both frames but ‘opportunity’ is in higher quantity

Condition 6 No persuasive communication on EU integration (control group)

The stimulus material is a fictitious news article that was created just for the purpose of this research. I used my own experience of working as a journalist coupled with the stimulus material created for Schuck and De Vreese (2006) to create a news article on the likely accession of Albania to the EU and the debate surrounding the matter across the political divide. Albania was chosen because it is one of the contenders waiting in line to become members of the EU (BBC, 2014). It also presents an interesting case to test framing on EU integration because the country has a large Muslim population and represents an ideal case to check for the moderating effect of in-group/out-group classification on framing effects, as discussed above.

Following from previous research, conditions 1 and 2 are one-sided single frames that portray the inclusion of Albania in terms of either risk or opportunity alone. Deviating from previous framing studies on the subject, conditions 3, 4 and 5 discuss the potential accession of Albania in terms of both risk and opportunity in varying frequencies. Condition 3 uses both frames in equal frequencies, Condition 4 uses both frames but risk is in higher frequency, while Condition 5 uses both frames with opportunity in higher frequency. Condition 6 is a short news article on football

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and is not related to European integration or enlargement at all. All these stimuli are attached in the appendix.

Participants who were at least 18 years old and citizens of one of the member states of the EU were invited to take part in the survey through online channels. For this purpose online websites such as www.surveycircle.com and mturk.amazon.com were used. The survey was also shared on Facebook and other social media websites among friends and colleagues. Eventually, over a period of four weeks, the required number of respondents were collected.

The structure of the survey was such that participants first had to answer eight questions to measure their level of knowledge on European politics. These questions were developed using help from past studies that have operationalized political knowledge in context of the EU (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006; De Vreese et al., 2011). These questions are attached in the appendix.

The responses to these questions were coded as either 0 (incorrect) or 1 (correct) and in the case of one question on the location of the EU Parliament, respondents who chose one correct

location (from either Brussels or Strasbourg) were coded as 0.5. A final score was calculated for each respondent with the minimum possible score being 0 and the maximum possible score of 8. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was α = 0.677 (M = 4.4, SD = 1.71).

Participants were then asked to state the extent to which they agreed or disagreed (5-point Likert scale) with nine statements to measure their views on immigration. These statements, also adapted from past studies (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; McConahay, 1982), measured views on immigration in terms of economics and culture. Statements taken from McConahay (1982), also referred to as the modern racism scale, have been adapted to use the word “immigrant” instead of “black”.

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The responses to these questions were coded into new variables with values of 1 = Agree, 2 = Somewhat agree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Somewhat disagree and 5 = Disagree. Three of the statements were reverse coded to ensure that the scale being constructed is reliable.

Additionally, a principal component factor analysis with Varimax rotation on the 9 statements confirmed a loading on two distinct factors (eigenvalue factor 1 = 5.07, eigenvalue factor 2 = 1.26) explaining 70.3% of variance. Since the statements were either economic or cultural in nature, a loading onto two factors is ideal. Finally, a 5-point index is created based on the responses to these statements, with 1 being the lowest possible score and representing the least favourable views on immigrants, and 5 being the highest possible score and representing the most favourable views on immigrants. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is α = 0.901 (M = 3.83, SD = 0.87).

Following that, respondents were randomly exposed to one of the six stimulus conditions (described above, attached in appendix) that have been created for this experiment. Participants were told at this point that they will be shown a news article which they should spend a few minutes to read carefully.

If the respondents were exposed to any condition other than the control condition (condition 6), they had to state the extent to which they agreed with the statement (5-point Likert scale, Agree= 1, Disagree = 5): “The article you read was supportive of Albania’s accession to the EU”. This statement served as the manipulation check, with correct answers for each condition as follows: Condition 1 = 4 or 5, Condition 2 = 1 or 2, Condition 3 = 2 or 3 or 4, Condition 4 = 2 or 3 or 4, Condition 5 = 2 or 3 or 4.

After that, participants were finally asked for their views on European Union enlargement via responses on four statements concerning the consequences of EU enlargement and/or integration

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to measure their views on the matter. These statements, attached in the appendix, were adapted from previous literature (De Vreese et al., 2011; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006). All responses to statements were recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree Likert scale. The responses to these statements were then coded into new variables with values of 1 = Agree, 2 = Somewhat agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Somewhat disagree and 5 = Disagree (Three of the statements were reverse coded). Then a 5-point scale was constructed to measure support for EU

enlargement with 1 being the least favourable position and 5 being the most favourable position on the matter. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale (EUFinal) is α = 0.826 (M = 3.23, SD = 0.92).

Results

A total of 247 respondents completed the survey, of which 27 failed the manipulation check. Thus eventually 220 individuals participated in the survey (N = 220). Of these, 44 were assigned to the control condition, 33 to condition 1 (Risk only), 20 to condition 2 (Opportunity only), 51 to condition 3 (Both frames equal), 31 to condition 4 (Both frames but risk is higher) and 41 to condition 5 (Both frames but opportunity is higher).

To test the effect of the various frame conditions on individual support for EU enlargement, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. But before that, a new variable ‘S’ (Stimulus) was created which had values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 – with 0 representing the control condition, 1 = Risk only frame, 2 = Opportunity only, 3 = Both frames in equal quantity, 4 = Both frames but risk is higher, 5 = Both frames but opportunity is higher. Then both variables (S and EUFinal) were checked for outliers using boxplots. Any data points that are more than 1.5 box-lengths from the edge of their (blue) box are classified by SPSS Statistics as outliers and are illustrated as circular dots. In this case, 10 data points were identified as outliers, which were not included in the analysis (see appendix).

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Then, a Shapiro-Wilk test of normality was conducted to check if final scores on EU enlargement (EUFinal) were normally distributed across the various frame conditions. As the table in the appendix shows, the scores across two conditions – the control group

(condition 0) (p = 0.037) and the ‘Both frames but risk is higher’ (condition 4) (p = 0.008) – are not normally distributed.

Lastly, before proceeding on to conduct the one-way ANOVA, a test was conducted to check for the homogeneity of variances of the dependent variable across each condition. This is because the one-way ANOVA assumes that the population variances of the dependent variable are equal for all groups of the independent variable. In this case, the homogeneity of variances assumption was violated, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p < 0.05).

Since the homogeneity of variances assumptions has been violated, results of a Welch ANOVA have been used to check for significance of mean differences across the conditions. There were no statistically significant differences in EUFinal score between the different stimulus groups, Welch’s F(5, 80.84) = 1.198, p = .318.

Final results of one-way ANOVA

A one-way Welch ANOVA was conducted to determine if final score for the variable “views on EU enlargement” (EUFinal) was significantly different for groups exposed to different frame conditions. Participants were classified into six groups: control group (n = 40), Risk only (n = 33), Opportunity only (n = 20), Both frames equal (n = 50), Both frames but risk is higher (n = 26) and Both frames but opportunity is higher (n = 41). Before that 10 outliers were identified, as assessed by boxplot, which were removed from the analysis; data was not normally distributed

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for each group, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk test; and there was heterogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances (p < .05).

The differences in mean final scores on EU enlargement (EUFinal) between the frame conditions were not statistically significant, F(5, 80.84) = 1.198, p = .318.

Moderation effects

To test for the effect of moderators, political knowledge and views on immigration, two separate regression models were run. Before that, the stimulus conditions were recoded into 5 dummy variables (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) representing each of the frame conditions (excluding the control condition). The regressions were run on SPSS extension PROCESS, model 1. For each model, five regression combinations were run with each dependent variable taking its turn as the main predictor while the others were used as covariates.

Political Knowledge

Political knowledge was not a significant moderator for any of the frame conditions and therefore H1a and H1b both are rejected. However, there is one interesting reading when the regression model is run for the one-sided ‘Risk only’ frame condition (X1) and its interaction with political knowledge. Even though the overall model for X1 is not significant F (7,202) = 2.02, p = 0.054, R2=0.066, it does trend towards significance and so does the interaction coefficient (b = 0.16, t (202) = 1.67, p = 0.096).

A further probe into the effect of the moderator reveals that at low and moderate scores of political knowledge, the effect of the ‘Risk only’ frame on support for EU enlargement is negative and significant. Specifically, individuals who scored one standard deviation below the mean on the political knowledge scale, and were exposed to the Risk only frame, scored lowest

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on the support for EU enlargement scale by 0.73 (b = -0.73, t(202) = -3.01, p = 0.0029). Those who scored mean on the political knowledge scale also scored lower on support for EU

enlargement but the effect was not as strong (b = -0.46, t (212) = -2.37, p = 0.019). However, the results are not significant for higher levels of score on political knowledge. In this regard, H1a is rejected because individuals with low political knowledge are seen as the most susceptible to the one-sided frame, followed by those with moderate political knowledge. H1b is rejected because political knowledge was not a significant moderator for any of the competitive frame conditions.

Views on immigration

The second regression model was run with views on immigration as the moderator variable. The interaction was significant for X1, the ‘Risk only’ condition, and trending towards significance for X3, ‘Both frames in equal quantity’ condition.

For X1, the overall model was significant F (7,202) = 11.37, p < 0.005, R2=0.283. The

interaction coefficient was also significant (b =0.35, t (202) = 2.51, p = 0.013). A further probe into the effect of the moderator reveals that at low and moderate scores of ‘views on

immigration’ scale, the effect of the ‘Risk only’ frame on support for EU enlargement is negative and significant. Specifically, the effect is the strongest for individuals scoring one standard deviation below the mean on the immigration views scale (b = -0.71, t(202) = -3.46, p = 0.007), whereas those who scored mean on the immigration views scale also scored low on the EU enlargement scale, although the effect was not as strong (b = -0.41, t(202) = -2.44, p = 0.016). For individuals scoring higher than mean on the immigration views scale, the results were not significant.

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For X3, the overall model was significant F (7,202) = 10. 79, p < 0.005, R2=0.272 whereas the interaction coefficient was trending towards significance (b = -0.277, t (202) = -1.82, p = 0.07). A further probe into the effect of the moderator reveals that at extremely low scores on the ‘views on immigration’ scale, the effect of the ‘Both frames in equal quantity’ (X3) condition on support for EU enlargement is positive and trending towards significance. Specifically, when the immigration views score is 1 (lowest possible), those exposed to condition X3 see a positive impact on their support for EU enlargement (b = 0.8, t(202) = 1.68, p = 0.095), whereas those who scored 1.2 on the immigration views scale also scored more on the support for EU

enlargement scale, although the effect was not as strong (b = 0.74, t(202) = 1.66, p = 0.098). For individuals scoring higher than 1.2 on the immigration views scale, the results were not

significant.

H2 is partially accepted on grounds that strong-anti immigration views did have a significant negative effect on support for EU enlargement for those exposed to the one-sided ‘Risk only’ frame. Such an effect was not expected for the other one-sided frame, ‘Opportunity only’ because it does not portray enlargement or integration negatively at all. However, while there was no significant moderation effect of anti-immigration views in any of the three competitive frame conditions, the trend towards significance seen in X3 condition (Both frames equal), is in the opposite direction than that hypothesised. Those exposed to Condition 3 and having the strongest anti-immigration views are in fact showing a positive increase in the scale measuring support for EU enlargement and these data points are trending towards significance as reported above. Thus instead of being susceptible to the risk frames in the ‘Both frames equal’ condition, it appears that the opportunity frames in the article are having an effect on these individuals. Discussion

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This paper set out to investigate what happens to individuals’ stance on European integration when they are exposed to competing frames on the issue. It set out to achieve this end through an experiment that exposed respondents to both one-sided and competing frames on the issue. On the whole, the experiment found that framing, whether one sided or competitive, had no effect on support for EU enlargement as the one-way ANOVA produced insignificant results. Therefore the principal research question of this study remains unanswered. However, when these frame conditions were tested alongside the moderators – political knowledge and anti-immigration views – there were a few significant readings that need to be discussed more.

Firstly, the results show that political knowledge plays a role in the one-sided ‘Risk only’ frame, i.e. when participants are exposed to EU integration portrayed as disadvantageous and negative. And more importantly, that individuals with low political knowledge are more susceptible to this frame. As noted above in the literature review, this finding is consistent with several other

studies on the subject of EU integration that have found individuals with low political knowledge to be more susceptible to risk framing (Schuck and De Vreese, 2006). Although we had

hypothesised that low and high knowledgeable individuals will not be effected by frames, whether one-sided or competitive, our results found that for one-sided frame exposure that is not the case. An explanation for this result could be that in today’s day and age certain

considerations, particularly those associated with the risk frame on EU enlargement, have become universal and the level of political knowledge does not determine whether they become available to certain individuals and not to others.

As for exposure to competitive frames, this study found no moderation effect of political

knowledge. However, anti-immigration views did show some trend towards significance for one competitive frame in which both the risk and opportunity frame were presented equally. And

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surprisingly, instead of strong views against immigrants causing participants to fall prey to the risk frame in the competitive condition, results show that participants with such views were actually supportive of enlargement. This is not just a simple rejection of H2, it is a move towards the opposite direction to that hypothesised. Individuals who had strong anti-immigrant views and who were exposed to Condition 3 (Opposing frames in equal quantity) actually chose to respond to the opportunity frame. Theoretically, there can be several explanations for this.

Firstly, it could be that the risk frame is a weak frame and the opportunity frame a strong frame, as defined in Chong and Druckman (2007). Thus the situation hypothesised by them where these frames are contrasting and causing individuals with extreme antecedent attitudes to move away from the weak frame and into the opposite direction (p. 111) is happening in this case. To confirm this, further investigation needs to be done on whether the frames used in this study can be categorised as strong or weak.

Secondly, having strong anti-immigrant views is akin to having high motivation with respect to classifying people into groups. As Chong and Druckman (2007) argue, competition can cause individuals to review the appropriateness of available and accessible considerations. Since those with strong anti-immigration attitudes are individuals already motivated in one respect, it is likely that this motivation could take on other manifestations such as the need for cognition or accuracy, as has been as discussed in the theoretical framework of Chong and Druckman (2007). Therefore when presented with an equally competitive frame on the risks and opportunity of Albania joining the EU, individuals with strong anti-immigrant views were pushed to reassess the weights given to prior considerations and as a result gave more weight to new considerations propagated in the competitive condition’s opportunity frame.

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Lastly, this study also found, similar to other studies, that strong anti-immigration views will cause individuals to be more susceptible to the risk frame in one-sided exposures. Naturally, as discussed earlier, this is because such exposures highlight considerations that are available in the minds of the individuals but also offer no alternatives through which recipients can resist the message (Wenzel, 2015).

Conclusion

This study found that framing alone, whether in competitive or uncompetitive environments, has no effect on support for EU enlargement. However, when tested in conjunction with moderators – political knowledge and views on immigration – there are instances when framing, both in competitive and one-sided conditions – has an effect on support for EU enlargement.

Specifically, the effect of political knowledge is seen only for individuals with low political knowledge exposed to the one-sided risk condition. These individuals are susceptible to the frame and therefore score significantly lower on their support for EU enlargement.

Additionally, this study also finds that strong anti-immigration views moderate certain frame conditions. Specifically, individuals with strong anti-immigration views were seen to be more susceptible to the one-sided risk frame, showing lower support for EU enlargement. But surprisingly, for participants in the perfectly competitive frame condition, strong

anti-immigration views were seen to have a positive impact on support for EU enlargement. Rather than falling prey to the risk frame in the article, those with the strongest anti-immigration views in fact show support for enlargement. This move away from the direction propagated by one frame despite strong antecedent attitudes predicting the opposite behaviour depicts how balanced competitive framing can actually result in changing opinions, even for those holding extreme views. This finding is the closest this study came to answering the research question it set out to

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investigate, which was to gauge the effect of exposure to competing frames on support for EU enlargement.

Limitation of study

A major limitation or problem with this study and other experimental research of this kind is its “limited ecological validity” (Azrout et al., 2012; p693), which is to say that participants’ views on the issue of enlargement or integration will not be influenced by this single exposure to media content. There is no way of finding out whether the effects produced from this exposure will hold for a longer time period and such a design is not feasible. Moreover, even though the stimulus material has been adapted using past studies that combined an experiment with a media content analysis, the use of Albania as a potential member in 2020 is fictitious and is therefore not representative of what is found in actual news media.

Moreover, participants know from the beginning that they are taking part in an experiment and so it can be argued that this knowledge will have an impact on their responses. Therefore, it raises the question of whether the findings from these experiments can be generalized (Azrout et al., 2012; p693).

Additionally, as noted above, there are problems with the data which could cause most of the results to be insignificant. The dependent variable was not normally distributed across the six conditions as shown by the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality. Additionally, the dependant variable also violated the assumption of homogeneity of variances across the frame conditions. If more work is done on the data to get rid of these problems, there are chances that significance may be achieved for direct effects of conditions.

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Moreover, the sample size across conditions was not equal and varied highly. A higher sample, with more or less equal participants in each frame condition, and a better and careful selection of respondents rather than reliance on online social media channels could also have improved the quality of the data and resulted in much better and significant results.

Works Cited

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-Azrout, R., van Spanje, J. & de Vreese, C. H. (2012). When news matters: Media effects on public support for EU enlargement in 21 countries. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, 691-708

-BBC, EU enlargement: The next seven. (2014, September 02). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616

-Brewer, M.B. (1999) ‘The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?’ Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 429–44.

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-De Vreese, C.H. (2004) ‘The Effects of Frames in Political Television News on Issue

Interpretation and Frame Salience’. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 81, No.1, pp. 36–52.

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-De Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2003) ‘Valenced News Frames and Public Support for the EU’. Communications, Vol. 28, pp. 361–81.

-De Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2006) ‘Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union’. JCMS, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 419–36.

-De Vreese, C.H. and Boomgaarden, H.G. (2005) ‘Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of

Immigration and Support for European Integration’. European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 59–82.

-De Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Semetko, H. A. (2011). (In)direct Framing Effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union. Communication Research, 38(2), 179-205.

-Gamson, W.A. and A. Modigliani (1987) ‘The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action’, pp. 137–77 in R.G. Braungart and M.M. Braungart (eds) Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 3. Greenwitch, CT: JAI Press.

-Inglehart, R. (1970) ‘Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity’. Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 45–70.

-Inglehart, R., J. Rabier and K. Reif (1991) ‘The Evolution of Public Attitudes towards European Integration 1970–86’, pp. 111–31 in K. Reif and R. Inglehart (eds) Eurobarometer: The

Dynamics of European Public Opinion. London: Macmillan.

-Lecheler, S. and De Vreese, C.H. (2010) ‘Framing Serbia: The Effects of News Framing on Public Support for EU Enlargement’. European Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 73– 93.

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-Maier, J. & Rittberger, B. (2008). Shifting Europe’s Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU. European Union Politics, 9(2), 243–267

-Kettle, M. (2018, May 31). Threatened by Italy and Brexit, the EU must turn the tide | Martin Kettle. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/31/italy-brexit-eu -McConahay, J. B. (1982). Self-Interest versus Racial Attitudes as Correlates of Anti-Busing Attitudes in Louisville: Is it The Buses or the Blacks? The Journal of Politics, 44(3), 692-720. -Schuck, A.R.T. and De Vreese, C.H. (2006) ‘Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and Its Effects on Public Support for EU Enlargement’. European Journal of Communication, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 5–32.

-Scheufele, D. (2000) ‘Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication’, Mass Communication and Society 3(2–3): 297– 316.

-Sniderman, Paul M., and Sean M. Theriault. 2004. "The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing." In Studies in Public Opinion, eds. Willem E. Saris, and Paul M.

Sniderman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 133- 165

-Wenzel, M. (2015). Media Effects on Support for European Integration in Old and New EU Member States. Polish Sociological Review, 2, 153-169.

-Zaller, J. R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix

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1. Who is the Chancellor of Germany? Martin Schulz Andrea Nahles Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer Theresa May Angela Merkel Don't know

2. Which country is set to exit the EU next year? France Austria United Kingdom Ireland Denmark Don't know

3. How many states are members of the EU? 19

24 25

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27 28

Don't know

4. In which of these cities is the EU Parliament located in? Vienna Strasbourg Madrid Brussels Paris Don't know

5. How long is the mandate period of the European Parliament? 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years Don't know

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Angela Merkel Emmanuel Macron Jean-Claude Juncker José Manuel Barroso Mark Rutte

Don't know

Q7. What is the number of commissioners in the European Commission? 24 28 27 26 25 Don't know

8. Which country currently holds the Presidency of the EU? Bulgaria

Germany Netherlands Belgium

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Estonia Don't know

Questions to measure Anti-immigration views:

Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements (Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree) -Immigration is good for the labour market

-Immigrants enrich our culture

-Members of immigration groups misuse our social welfare -Immigrants' children cause problems in the schools they attend

-Over the past few years immigrants have gotten more economically than they deserve -Immigrants and refugees are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights -Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to immigrants than they deserve

-Immigration boosts the economy

-Immigrants' religion is a threat to our way of living Questions to measure stance on EU enlargement:

Please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements (Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree) -Enlargement of the EU is a good thing.

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-Europe will get stronger due to the enlargement of EU. -The integration of Europe will cause many troubles.

- Enlargement will bring more advantages than disadvantages to my country and the EU Stimulus conditions:

Condition 1 – Risk only

EUROPE MAY GROW TO THE SOUTHEAST

Entry of Albania to the European Union a highly likely outcome

By Pete Anderson

BRUSSELS, 12. APRIL: As the European Union is set to lose the United Kingdom, it may well end up gaining another member, Albania, to keep its tally at 28. This was discussed yesterday in the stoa of the Attalo, a former columned hall and now museum beneath the Acropolis in Athens. There was no shortage of important words said: “EU enlargement is a great opportunity for Europe,” Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, told his colleagues.

After decades of division, the near integration of Albania into the European community is moving fast towards a reality, with a few steps left in the process. On the first of May 2020, the enlargement of the European Union will be voted on by the Council.

But the split on the country's accession was visible as politicians debated the pros and cons. For several attendees, if successful, the expansion of Europe could fulfill the hope of a transfer of the successful EU model with its values – democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and

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minorities – to Albania. "Freedom and political stability will be permanently guaranteed," echoed Frans Timmermans, EU Commissioner from the Netherlands.

Many in the meeting pointed that it was the right time to take a look back and forward. From the point of view of the prospective member country, one must remember the long time of

occupation and oppression. “Still, one should be aware that the entry does not mean an end to the countries’ own efforts but the taking over of new responsibility,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in a speech to his nation earlier this year. “With the enlargement, the artificial division of Europe will now be overcome,” he said.

And Historians such as Dr Green Jonh of the University of Southampton agree. If successful in its bid for EU membership, Albania will take back its appropriate position as a core country in a common historic and cultural Europe, he argues. “The whole of Europe will have an advantage as Albania's rich culture and peoples are allowed to freely integrate in the union,” he claims. On the economic front, analysts have good expectations from the possible entrant with experts arguing that the tough economic environment in the past decade means many countries have had to quickly realize and accept that Brussels’ funds for whitewashing economic structural deficits can no longer be endlessly increased. “And there should be no problems because Albania has a strong economic potential – adding growing markets to the EU,” says Piet Dijkgraaf, an analyst for European Investment and Trade Fund. “Its performance on the GDP-per-capita front and labour market expansion has been worth noting in the past five years,” he added.

Given its strong economic status and deep cultural and historic ties to Europe, if Albania does make it to the EU in the coming years, the road to integration appears to be a smooth process.

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Condition 2 – Opportunity frame only

By Pete Anderson

BRUSSELS, 12. APRIL: As the European Union is set to lose the United Kingdom, it may well end up gaining another member, Albania, to keep its tally at 28. This was discussed yesterday in the stoa of the Attalo, a former columned hall and now museum beneath the Acropolis in Athens. There was no shortage of important words said: “EU enlargement is a great opportunity for Europe,” Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, told his colleagues.

But the split on the country's accession was visible as politicians debated the pros and cons. For several attendees, if successful, the expansion of Europe could fulfill the hope of a transfer of the successful EU model with its values – democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and minorities – to Albania. "Freedom and political stability will be permanently guaranteed,"

echoed Frans Timmermans, EU Commissioner from the Netherlands.

occupation and oppression. “Still, one should be aware that the entry does not mean an end to the countries’ own efforts but the taking over of new responsibility,” said Albanian Prime Minister

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Edi Rama in a speech to his nation earlier this year. “With the enlargement, the artificial division of Europe will now be overcome,” he said.

And Historians such as Dr Green Jonh of the University of Southampton agree. If successful in its bid for EU membership, Albania will take back its appropriate position as a core country in a common historic and cultural Europe, he argues. “The whole of Europe will have an advantage as Albania's rich culture and peoples are allowed to freely integrate in the union,” he claims. On the economic front, analysts have good expectations from the possible entrant with experts arguing that the tough economic environment in the past decade means many countries have had to quickly realize and accept that Brussels’ funds for whitewashing economic structural deficits can no longer be endlessly increased. “And there should be no problems because Albania has a strong economic potential – adding growing markets to the EU,” says Piet Dijkgraaf, an analyst for European Investment and Trade Fund. “Its performance on the GDP-per-capita front and labour market expansion has been worth noting in the past five years,” he added.

Given its strong economic status and deep cultural and historic ties to Europe, if Albania does make it to the EU in the coming years, the road to integration appears to be a smooth process.

Condition 3 – Both frames equal

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By Pete Anderson

BRUSSELS, 12. APRIL: As the European Union is set to lose the United Kingdom, it may well end up gaining another member, Albania, to keep its tally at 28. This was discussed yesterday in the stoa of the Attalo, a former columned hall and now museum beneath the Acropolis in Athens. There was no shortage of important words said: “EU enlargement is a great opportunity for Europe but at the same time it could be a great risk,” Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, told his colleagues.

But the split on the country's accession was visible as politicians debated the pros and cons. For some, if successful, the expansion of Europe could fulfill the hope of a transfer of the successful EU model with its values – democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights and minorities – to Albania. "Freedom and political stability will be permanently guaranteed," echoed Frans Timmermans, EU Commissioner from the Netherlands.

But others attending the meeting were not so optimistic, with several pointing to concerns such as an import of problems – crime and corruption, discrimination of minorities and disregard for human rights, and an influx of Muslim immigrants since Albania has a large Muslim population – from the South to the Centre of Europe. "The risk of extreme Islamism and the political and social instability arising from this move cannot be ignored," said Marcel de Graaf, a vocal member of the European Parliament from the Netherlands.

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occupation and oppression. “Still, one should be aware that the entry does not mean an end to the countries’ own efforts but the taking over of new responsibility,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in a speech to his nation earlier this year. “With the enlargement, the artificial division of Europe will now be overcome,” he said.

And Historians such as Dr Green Jonh of the University of Southampton agree. If successful in its bid for EU membership, Albania will take back its appropriate position as a core country in a common historic and cultural Europe, he argues. “The whole of Europe will have an advantage as Albania's rich culture and peoples are allowed to freely integrate into the Union,” he claims. Yet other scholars in the field, such as Dr Gotz Bracher of the University of Mannheim, argue that “with the enlargement, something comes together that does not really belong together”. This school of thought claims that Southeastern European countries are for a long time now not core countries of a common historic and cultural Europe. “Europe will be confronted with the

consequences of open borders in the Southeast. The whole of Europe will be at risk as it becomes more accessible to outsiders,” he said in an interview with the Guardian.

On the economic front, analysts have mixed expectations from the possible entrant. “A major problem is that Albania is still dependent on agriculture which can be linked to high

transformation costs and pose disadvantages for global competition,” says Alan Roberts, Chief Economist with JP Morgan Investments. Thus some analysts, who see extra pressure on the EU kitty in the coming years, argue that the economic potential of the joining countries is low – and the expected growth rates will be limited for a long time.

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But others say the tough economic environment in the past decade means many countries have had to quickly realize and accept that Brussels’ funds for whitewashing economic structural deficits can no longer be endlessly increased. “And there should be no problems because Albania has a strong economic potential – adding growing markets to the EU,” says Piet Dijkgraaf, an analyst for European Investment and Trade Fund. “Its performance on the GDP-per-capita front and labour market expansion has been worth noting in the past five years,” he added.

If Albania does make it to the EU in the coming years, the road to integration will be sometimes smooth, sometimes rocky it appears.

Condition 4- Both frames but risk is higher in quantity EUROPE MAY GROW TO THE SOUTHEAST

By Pete Anderson

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But others attending the meeting were not so optimistic, with several pointing to concerns such as an import of problems – crime and corruption, discrimination of minorities and disregard for human rights, an influx of Muslim immigrants since Albania has a large Muslim population – from the South to the Centre of Europe. "The risk of extreme Islamism and the political and social instability arising from this move cannot be ignored," said Marcel de Graaf, a vocal member of the European Parliament from the Netherlands.

Many in the meeting pointed that it is the right time to take a look back and forward. From the point of view of the prospective member country one must remember the long time of

occupation and oppression. “Still, one should be aware that the entry does not mean an end to the countries’ own efforts but the taking over of new responsibility,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in a speech to his nation earlier this year. “With the enlargement, the artificial division of Europe will now be overcome,” he said. And historians such as Dr Green Jonh of the

University of Southampton argue that if successful in its bid for EU membership, Albania takes back its appropriate position as one of the core countries in a common historic and cultural

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Europe. “The whole of Europe will have an advantage as Albania's rich culture and peoples are allowed to freely integrate into the Union,” he claims.

Yet other scholars in the field, such as Dr Gotz Bracher of the University of Mannheim, argue quite the opposite. “With the enlargement, something comes together that does not really belong together”. This school of thought claims that the Southeastern European countries are for a long time now not core countries of a common historic and cultural Europe. “Europe will be

confronted with the consequences of open borders in the Southeast. The whole of Europe will be at risk as it becomes even more accessible to outsiders,” he said in an interview with the

Guardian.

On the economic front, analysts have low expectations from Albania. “A major problem is that Albania is still dependent on agriculture which can be linked to high transformation costs and pose disadvantages for global competition,” says Alan Roberts, Chief Economist with JP Morgan Investments. Thus some analysts, who see extra pressure on the EU kitty in the coming years, argue that the economic potential of the joining country is low – and the expected growth rates will be limited for a long time.

If Albania's bid for membership to the EU does succeed, the road to integration will be a mixed bag with perhaps more risks than opportunities.

Condition 5 – Both frames but opportunity is in higher quantity EUROPE MAY GROW TO THE SOUTHEAST

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By Pete Anderson

But others attending the meeting were not so optimistic, with several pointing to concerns such as an import of problems – crime and corruption, an influx of Muslim immigrants since Albania has a large Muslim population – from the South to the Centre of Europe. "The risk of extreme Islamism and the political and social instability arising from this move cannot be ignored," said Marcel de Graaf, a vocal member of the European Parliament from the Netherlands.

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Many in the meeting pointed that it is the right time to take a look back and forward. From the point of view of the prospective member country one must remember the long time of

occupation and oppression. “Still, one should be aware that the entry does not mean an end to the countries’ own efforts but the taking over of new responsibility,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in a speech to his nation earlier this year. “With the enlargement, the artificial division of Europe will now be overcome,” he said. And historians such as Dr Green Jonh of the

University of Southampton agree. If successful in its bid for EU membership, Albania takes back its appropriate position as one of the core countries in a common historic and cultural Europe, he says. “The whole of Europe will have an advantage as Albania's rich culture and peoples are allowed to freely integrate into the Union,” he claims.

Yet other scholars in the field, such as Dr Gotz Bracher of the University of Mannheim, argue quite the opposite. “With the enlargement, something comes together that does not really belong together”. This school of thought claims that the Southeastern European countries are for a long time now not core countries of a common historic and cultural Europe. “Europe will be

confronted with the consequences of open borders in the Southeast. The whole of Europe will be at risk as it becomes even more accessible to outsiders,” he said in an interview with the

Guardian.

On the economic front, analysts have good expectations from Albania. The tough economic environment in the past decade means these Southeastern countries have had to quickly realize and accept that Brussels’ funds for whitewashing economic structural deficits can no longer be endlessly increased. “And there should be no problems because Albania has a strong economic potential – adding growing markets to the EU,” says Piet Dijkgraaf, an analyst for European

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Investment and Trade Fund. “Their performance on the GDP-per-capita front and labour market expansion has been worth noting in the past five years,” he added.

If Albania's bid for membership to the EU does succeed, the road to integration will be a mixed bag with perhaps more opportunities than risks.

Condition 6 – Control condition- No persuasive communication Is European football facing a crisis?

By Aaron McKinsey

MADRID, May 10: It has been a busy, and often turbulent, time for football. Several FIFA officials were arrested in Switzerland; FIFA announced a raft of new reforms aimed at changing the organisation’s system of governance; Chinese investors made their first foray into the English Premier League, acquiring a 13% stake in Manchester City; and now the draw for the 2016 UEFA European Championship in France has taken place.

As football grapples with its sense of purpose and identity, the Euro 2016 draw brings a welcome focus on the game itself rather than on the intrigue of its boardrooms. The prospect of an

England-Wales group game, in particular, will have many fans excited. Even so, Euro 2016 speaks volumes about the politics and commerce at the heart of what is supposedly the people’s game.

Next year’s tournament will mark a first and, potentially, a last. For the first time, the tournament will be played between 24 competing teams, up from the 16 that normally take part. The

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tournament could also be the last in its current format as the Euros switch to a multi-venue format. In 2020, it will be played in 13 host cities, stretching from Dublin in the west to Baku in the east.

UEFA’s President, Michel Platini, has been responsible for both these developments. His view is that an increase in the number of competitors at the Euros is important because there are now more European countries than there were 20 years ago. Moreover, Platini has a long-held belief that European football should be more democratic and not just a fiefdom dominated by the likes of England, Germany and Spain. However, many commentators counter Platini’s views

believing that what UEFA has instead created is a bloated, cumbersome Euro competition that will ultimately be very boring.

The organisation of 2020 is unusual, although Platini has said that it was a romantic decision to mark the tournament’s 60th anniversary. Platini, though, faced a difficult choice at the time that host country bidding was taking place; Europe was in the grips of a post-recessionary chill. Indeed, many people have noted that he had little alternative as there were so few countries interested in hosting the Euros. Still, the concept has its supporters, many of whom believe that it is one way of off-setting the huge cost burden it is for one country alone to host such sporting mega-events.

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