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When do authoritarian oppositions coalesce? A study of the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad in 2011-2013

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Nienke Dek-1548298

nienkedek@hotmail.com

Supervisor: Eelco van der Maat

Word Count - 14995

MA Thesis International

Relations Leiden University

When do authoritarian oppositions coalesce? A study of the

Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad in 2011-2013

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the potential reasons for the failure of a Syrian opposition coalition formation between the Syrian National Council and the National Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change during the first years of the Arab Spring (2011-2013). Literature on opposition coalition formation often argues that oppositions are likely to coalesce in times of regime weakness, but the case of Syria provides a puzzling situation: whereas Syrian opposition parties have coalesced in the past during the Damascus Spring, they failed to successfully coalesce at the start of the Arab Spring. This thesis therefore analyses two alternative

explanations for this failure: inter- and intra-opposition rivalry. By discussing both opposition coalition formation during the Damascus Spring and the start of the Arab Spring, as well as the extent to which elements of inter- and intra-opposition rivalry could be witnessed during the Arab Spring, the thesis attempts to provide an answer to the above mentioned puzzle. It finds that none of these theories can explain the failure of opposition coalition formation in Syria (2011-2013) on their own, as the failure can be explained by elements linked to both inter- and intra-opposition rivalry which fuelled each other. This interlinkage in the end made a successful opposition coalition formation highly difficult.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all who have helped me create this thesis, all the way from the

brainstorming sessions to the final product. First, I want to thank my supervisor Eelco van der Maat for the great and often extensive feedback and helping me to truly develop a solid idea. However, the final product would not be here without the thorough proof-reading of my friends and family: especially Jasmijn, Mirthe and my father. Thank you for keeping me to the word limit, removing my personal stopgaps and for taking the time to provide me with your suggestions. Lastly, I want to thank everyone who supported me through the process in their own personal ways.

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Table of Contents

Introduction ... 5 Literature review ... 7 Regime weakness ... 8 Alternative explanations ... 9 Inter-opposition rivalry ... 9 Intra-opposition rivalry ... 10 Design ... 11

Puzzle and case selection ... 11

Observable implications ... 12

Inter-opposition rivalry ... 12

Intra-opposition rivalry ... 13

Timeframe and events ... 13

Case study ... 14

Damascus Spring and its aftermath ... 15

Damascus Spring (2000) ... 15

Damascus Declaration (2005) ... 16

Damascus Declaration disputes ... 18

Arab Spring (2011-2013) ... 18

Establishment of the National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCB) ... 19

Establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) ... 20

Inability of opposition coalition formation in 2011-2013 ... 22

Elements of inter-opposition rivalry ... 23

Systemic versus non-systemic opposition ... 23

Foreign intervention, support for armed opposition and dialogue with regime ... 25

Support bases ... 27

Elements of intra-opposition rivalry ... 29

The SNC: Ghalioun, support for the armed opposition and influence of the MB ... 30

Discussion ... 35

Conclusion ... 37

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List of Abbreviations

DD Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change FSA Free Syrian Army

MB Muslim Brotherhood

NCB National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change NDA National Democratic Assembly

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Introduction

In the beginning of 2011, it became clear that the Arab Spring had arrived in Syria (Yassin-Kassab & Al Shami, 2016). The revolution did however not truly catalyze until fifteen young schoolboys were arrested for painting “it is your turn, Doctor Bashar al-Assad” on the walls of their school. Syria, however, took another turn than states like Egypt or Libya. Seven years after the catalyzation of the revolution, Bashar Al-Assad remains in power and the country has

spiraled into a civil war with more than 10.000 civilians killed (I am Syria, n.d.) and over 5.6 million refugees having fled the country since 2011 (UNHCR, n.d.). Those numbers do not even account for the 6.6 million internally displaced persons within Syria, and the 13.1 million people in Syria that are in need of help (UNHCR, n.d.). Although the civil war continues, many have started to look back and question whether the civil war could have been avoided (van Dam, 2017).

While others have answered these questions by focusing on the international response to the conflict (van Dam, 2017), or the way in which Assad highlighted the importance of ethnicity in the Syrian struggle (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 45), this thesis will focus on another important element: the failure of unification among the Syrian opposition in the first years of the Arab Spring. Increased popular discontent is thought to facilitate popular mobilization and pressing for political demands (Lust-Okar, 2004), increasing the chance of regime change.

Logically, one would thus argue that opposition parties would take such an opportunity to create a coalition in order to provide a forceful and unified political alternative to push the weakened incumbent out (Draege, 2016, p.,190).

Such a coalition occurred in 2000, during the ‘Damascus Spring’: a period of increased opposition activity right after the death of Hafez al-Assad and inauguration of his son Bashar. The reformist and moderate Islamist opposition camps differed in ideology but recognized that unified they could create the most significant political change (Draege, 2016, p. 189). Together, they released multiple statements and signed various declarations on opposition cooperation (Wikas, 2007). However, the strong opposition coherence soon became too threatening for the newly appointed president Bashar Al-Assad, resulting in a crack-down mid-February 2001 and the beginning of the ‘Damascus Winter’ (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Although opposition activity remained low during the following years, the two camps kept responding to periods of regime weakness. The suspected role of Syrian officials in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, former prime minister of Lebanon, provided for such a weakened situation in 2005 (Wikas, 2007; Draege, 2016). As a result, the reformist and moderate Islamists built an even greater unified platform, this time with the cooperation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and published

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7 the ‘Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change’ (DD) that asked for pluralism, nonviolence, unity and democratic change (Draege, 2016, p.195). This declaration remained the largest coalition of Syrian opposition parties for the years to come (Draege, 2016, p.196). When the revolution started in early 2011, various attempts of opposition unification between the then-established Syrian National Council (SNC) and the National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCB) failed. The opposition split into a ‘radical’ and a ‘reformist’ or ‘secular’ camp that increasingly started to disagree on how to deal with the regime,

international support and religion : right at the time an opposition coalition was most likely to result in regime change (Draege, 2016; Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). This thesis deals with exactly this puzzle:

Why did the Syrian opposition fail to coalesce at the time when a coalition was most likely to result in regime change?

How is it possible that different opposition groups to the Syrian regime were able to form an opposition coalition despite their differences in 2000, and were not able to do so in 2011? There were signs of regime weakness in both periods, increasing chances of contributing to regime change, thus why did an opposition coalition occur in one but not the other case?

By examining this puzzle, this thesis will answer a more fundamental question often raised in academic literature:

Under what conditions are opposition parties to an authoritarian regime likely to coalesce?

This question is important because it not only explains the Syrian puzzle mentioned above, but also increases our understanding of the political mechanisms in authoritarian regimes in times of weakness and, most importantly, the mechanisms of political opposition groups in times of regime weakness. When the Arab Spring arrived in Syria and demonstrations broke out, the Syrian opposition received an unparalleled amount of attention from the international community asking them to unite (Draege, 2016, p.200). However, as will be argued, this unification was far more complex than it appeared at first sight.

Literature review

Opposition cohesion is often described as an essential element for successful regime change (van de Walle, 2006, p.77). After all, an incumbent can ensure his hold on power by keeping the opposition divided (van de Walle, 2006, p.77) thus unification of the opposition would logically decrease the likelihood of staying in power, resulting in more chances for regime change. The question remains: under which conditions are different opposition parties likely to coalesce?

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Regime weakness

Existing academic literature focuses on one condition for the likelihood of an opposition coalition: regime weakness. Regime weakness contributes to regime change, because challenging the incumbent becomes easier. Or, is perceived to be easier. In addition, regime weakness often occurs alongside increased popular discontent, making it easier for political opponents to mobilize and use the discontent to press for political demands (Lust-Okar, 2004). Howard and Roessler (2006) underline the cruciality of public mobilization and argue how protests weaken the legitimacy of the incumbent. In light of the Arab Spring, one would argue that this argument has been proven right in many states of the Middle East North Africa region: for example in Libya, where protests eventually led to the fall of the Gadhafi regime.

Opposition parties do realize, however, that this chance of contribution to regime change is only there if the opposition proves effective (Draege, 2016, p.190). As Howard and Roessler (2006, p.371) argue, divided opposition parties are more likely to be manipulated, cooptated or repressed by the government. Van de Walle (2006, p.77) reinforces this argument, by stating that a divided opposition often explains the ability of the incumbent to stay in power. Thus, the most important step for opposition parties in a situation of regime weakness, is to form a strategic coalition (Howard & Roessler, 2006, p.371; Draege, 2016, p.190).

Indeed, according to van de Walle (2006), opposition parties are more likely to coalesce if they perceive that the tenure of the incumbent is likely to end soon (van de Walle, 2006). Whereas a divided opposition would create an ability for the incumbent to stay in power, the unification of opposition parties is thus often seen as the ‘watershed’ in ousting the incumbent’ (van de Walle, 2006, p.77).

Regime weakness should thus logically results in opposition coalition formation: after all, the (perceived) chances of contributing to regime change have never been better and opposition coalition formation is necessary for the opposition effectively challenge the regime. The Syrian situation, however, problematizes this explanation and provides a puzzle and research gap: whereas the Assad regime was weak due to increased popular discontent and mobilization in the context of the Arab Spring, the two opposition parties failed to coalesce. The failure of opposition coalition formation in Syria is clearly more nuanced than the sole explanation of regime weakness. This leads to questioning which other theories might explain the Syrian situation.

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Alternative explanations

Inter-opposition rivalry

One potential alternative explanation for the failure of opposition coalition formation, is linked to rivalry between different opposition parties. Increased rivalry logically leads to less incentive for cooperation, decreasing the chances of the formation of an opposition coalition. Rivalry between the different opposition parties can be divided into two sections: content-based differences, and structural- based differences.

First, inter-opposition rivalry can occur because of content-based differences: issues on which the standpoints of the opposition parties differ. For example, opposition parties could differ in their views on the necessity of actual regime change, the importance of religion or the use of foreign assistance in their struggle (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Cases in which content-based differences affected the likelihood of opposition coalition formation exist. In Kenya the different opposition parties to the Kenya African National Union had difficulty with coalescing through the “differential reading which they had, and held rigidly to, of challenges ahead of them” (Olukushi, 1998, p.63). Similarly in Uganda, coalition formation was problematized by increased rivalry amongst opposition leaders (Oluka, 2010).

The effect of content-based differences on the likelihood of opposition coalition formation, however, is not only determined by the views of the party members: it is also determined by their support base. After all, they are the ones the opposition is –or should be—representing. Going against one’s own support group(s) can be highly inefficient: often most financial support comes from these groups, and going against them may equal self-destruction. Thus, an

opposition coalition formation becomes less likely if not backed by the support bases of both opposition groups (Draege, 2016).

Support bases can explain increased inter-opposition rivalry in two ways. To begin with, increased inter-opposition rivalry could be caused by a change of the support base(s): if previous support bases were more supportive of opposition coalition formation than current support bases. Furthermore, increased inter-opposition rivalry could be caused by a change

within support bases: if members of a support group increasingly care for certain values that

might not have been threatened in the past but are threatened now, or were never relevant up until the current situation.

Second, inter-opposition rivalry can occur because of structure-based differences: in this case, differences in the relationship with the government. Lust-Okar (2004) explains how the

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10 willing to mobilize (Lust-Okar, 2004). The difference lies in the establishment of a divided or undivided political environment: the former means the regime allows participation of some opposition parties in the political system while excluding other parties, the latter means that no opposition parties can operate in the political system (Lust-Okar, 2004, p.16).

A divided environment creates a loyalist and illegal opposition (Lust-Okar, 2004). Loyalists challenge the regime, but in return help to maintain the current system. They will pay a high prize if the system destabilizes, but their costs of mobilization are relatively low (Lust-Okar, 2004). Radicals, however, have high costs related to mobilization but pay no prize for

destabilizing the regime (Lust-Okar, 2004). As popular unrest becomes more apparent, radicals will increase their strength and will join demonstrations (Lust-Okar, 2004). This frightens the loyalist opposition because the radical opposition is expected to use the increased popular unrest to demand more radical reforms (Lust-Okar, 2004). As a result, loyalists choose not to mobilize, as they know radicals are less willing to initiate mobilization (Lust-Okar, 2004). This theory of Lust-Okar (2014) could also be a potential explanation for the lack of opposition coalition formation in Syria. In a divided political environment, the likelihood of coalition formation would be much higher for the ‘radical’ party than for the ‘loyalist’ party who will fear implementation of more radical reforms that will destabilize the regime. It is a good example of the difficulty of coalitions between a systemic and a non-systemic opposition, which until now has been linked almost solely to the political situation in Russia (Ross, 2015),

In conclusion, inter-opposition rivalry could explain the failure of opposition coalition formation in Syria in two ways. The first explanation would be content-based differences: issues on which the standpoints of the opposition parties differ. Increased inter-opposition rivalry, following a period of opposition coalition formation, might be explained by change of or change within the support base(s) of the opposition groups. The second explanation would be structure-based differences: in this case, differences in relationship with the government. In a divided environment, the loyalist (or non-systemic) party would have less incentive for opposition coalition formation than the radical (or systemic) party.

Intra-opposition rivalry

In contrast to focusing on rivalry between different opposition parties, the failure of opposition coalition formation could also be explained by rivalry within the opposition parties: intra-opposition rivalry.

Intra-opposition rivalry is known: Olukushi (2000) describes how in Kenya, Kenya African National Union had many intra-elite rivalries causing factionalism and fragmentation within the party (p.63). Elitism, she argues, is the most important argument for the decline of opposition

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11 party politics (Olukushi, 2000, p.66). Some leaders decide to build personality cults or “have simply reduced their parties to instruments for advancing their personal cause or the interest of their ethnic group” (Olukushi, 2000, p.66). How does this intra-opposition rivalry however affect the likelihood of opposition coalition formation?

First, leadership dynamics might affect the willingness of opposition party leaders to form coalitions. Little academic literature discusses this effect. A logical mechanism to analyze, based on existing research on intra-elite rivalry (Svolik, 2009; Sudduth, 2017), would be the effect of coalition building on the position and role of opposition leaders. After all, they will be less inclined to form an opposition coalition if this would mean a loss of their position within the party.

Second, it is important to take a closer look at those right below the leader: the ‘number two’ or ‘number three’ of the party. What would it mean for them if an opposition coalition would establish itself? Would it put them higher on the ‘ladder of power’ and sway the balance of power in their direction, or would a coalition negatively affect their power? It is important not to underestimate the importance of these ‘number two’s ’ and ‘number three’s’. As supporters — and potential successors— of the leader, they often influence decisions made: including those on potential coalition building. Should a coalition increase their power, they would logically be more inclined to support it.

Third, intra-opposition rivalry fuels internal discontinuity, which in turn affects the chances of an opposition coalition. As Cunningham (2015) argues, lack of a clear and uncontested leader makes commitment to future behavior of the opposition party difficult. Rivalry between

opposition elite creates such an absence. This often results in a lack of general opposition party legitimacy (Cunningham, 2015), decreasing the chances for a coalition. After all, intra-opposition rivalry creates a situation in which the other party does no longer know whether its potential partner will adhere to agreements in the future, whether their leader remains in power, or whether (in case of a coup) the coalition remains in place. The potential costs of coalescing with an internally divided opposition party thus often outweigh the benefits. Thus, intra-opposition rivalry decreases the likelihood of opposition coalition formation by creating a lack of a clear and uncontested leadership.

Design

Puzzle and case selection

This thesis will provide an answer to the following puzzle: Why did the Syrian opposition fail to coalesce right at the time when a coalition was most likely to result in regime change? Hereby, it

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12 will provide an answer to the bigger question: Under what conditions are opposition parties to an authoritarian regime likely to coalesce?

Syria during the Arab Spring is of particular interest because it provides an interesting puzzle: in a previous situation of regime weakness (the Damascus Spring) the opposition parties had been able to form a coalition, but at the beginning of the Arab Spring the SNC and the NCB failed to coalesce. The focus is on the SNC and the NCB because they are recognized as the to most important opposition parties, and most (inter)national funding for the political opposition was ascribed to these two parties (Lund, 2012).

To study the puzzle, the process of theory testing is carried out through a combination of process tracing and congruence analysis, as this allows for the analysis of the flow of events (sequential analysis), observable implications as well as the intervening mechanisms in testing the theories (Mahoney, 2015, p.205).

Observable implications

Now this thesis has constructed the theories that could explain the failure of opposition coalition formation, it is important to determine the evidence expected if the potential explanations are correct or false. In addition, each of these potential theoretical explanations provide a dependent variable. Inter-opposition rivalry determines ‘the failure of opposition coalition due to rivalry between the different opposition parties’ as the dependent variable. Intra-opposition rivalry determines ‘the failure of opposition coalition formation due to rivalry within the opposition parties’ as the dependent variable.

Inter-opposition rivalry

To begin with, it is important to introduce the (non)-observable implications of the first theory: inter-opposition rivalry. Clearly, we must observe forms of rivalry between the opposition elite of different opposition parties: in this case between the SNC and the NCB.

First, inter-opposition rivalry could affect opposition coalition formation through structure-based differences: in this case, differences in the relationship with the government (Lust-Okar, 2004). More specifically, in a situation where one opposition party can participate in the political system (the loyal/systemic), and another cannot (the radical/non-systemic). This could be witnessed by the possibility of participation in the political system by only some (or one) of the coalition parties trying to form a coalition, followed by an expressed unwillingness to cooperate by the elite of each opposition party. Without this expressed unwillingness to cooperate, the causal mechanism would not exist. In addition, a division might be witnessed by regime

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13 some opposition parties operate in exile. Often, such a division is highly interlinked with the regime’s recognition of one but not another opposition party.

Second, inter-opposition rivalry could affect opposition coalition formation through content-based differences: issues on which the standpoints of the opposition parties differ. For the mechanism to work, one would potentially witness the invocation of these content-based differences as the reason for failure of opposition coalition formation, either in public (during conferences or more specifically, unification meetings) or in private . In this case, it is possible to witness a systemic/systemic rivalry, a systemic/systemic rivalry and a systemic/ non-systemic rivalry.

Intra-opposition rivalry

In addition, it is important to introduce the (non)-observable implications and causal

mechanisms for the theory of intra-opposition rivalry. Clearly, we must observe forms of rivalry between members of the same opposition party.

As introduced earlier, power struggles are a clear element of intra-opposition rivalry affecting chances of coalition building. Thus, all mechanisms carried out by oppositional ‘elite’ linked to battling other oppositional elite can account for intra-opposition rivalry. In addition, defections of important members of either the NCB or the SNC that occurred because of the leadership of the party can show ongoing power struggles within the opposition parties. As long as defections do not occur, statements of oppositional elites on their disagreements with the leader of the opposition party and his workings may also show ongoing power struggles.

For the causal mechanism between intra-opposition rivalry and failure of opposition coalition formation to exist, one must see a clear link between the elements of intra-elite rivalry and a failure of opposition coalition formation. Key moments in which this mechanism might come to the surface include unification meetings between the SNC and the NCB in which a cohesive opposition party would have led to a successful coalition, but a current incohesive opposition party eventually leads to the failure of such a coalition. In such a situation, it is clear that intra-opposition rivalry (or the resulting incohesive political intra-opposition party) played a key role in the failure of opposition coalition formation.

Timeframe and events

The timeframe of this thesis is set to 2011-2013. The puzzle of this thesis can be divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the successful opposition coalition formation in a time of regime weakness, the Damascus Spring. The second part analyzes the inability of the Syrian opposition to do so during another time of regime weakness, the Arab Spring. Logically, therefore, the first section of the case study provides an analysis of the opposition coalition

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14 formation during the Damascus Spring and its aftermath. The second section of the case study provides an analysis of the opposition coalition formation during the beginning of the Arab Spring.

The decision to exclude the word ‘aftermath’ in the section on the Arab Spring (and thus focus on 2011-2013) has a reason. As will be shown, the aftermath of the Damascus Spring included a period of regime weakness after the assassination of Lebanese president Rafiq Hariri. In that period, the opposition established new platforms for coalitions: most importantly, the DD. The aftermath of the Damascus Spring is thus highly relevant for discussing the puzzle because it shows that in previous times regime weakness led to opposition coalition formation. In the case of the Arab Spring, however, the aftermath has been excluded because regime weakness is difficult to demonstrate after 2013: after the chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta in August 2013, it became clear that the United States would not adhere to its ‘red line-pledge’ which argued for US military intervention if chemical weapons were used in Syria (Jaffe, 2016). In addition, the prior three years (2011-2013) had shown Syria would not follow the same path as Libya and Egypt concerning quick regime change: after two years of heavy protests, Assad was still ruler of Syria. The focus thus lays on 2011-2013.

Case study

Why did the Syrian opposition fail to coalesce right at the time when a coalition was most likely to result in regime change? The following sections will attempt to provide an answer to this puzzle. A key factor in the puzzle is the difference between the success of Syrian opposition coalition formation during the Damascus Spring and its aftermath, and the Arab Spring. Therefore, the first section of the case study will provide an analysis of the Syrian opposition coalition formation during the Damascus Spring in 2000 and its aftermath including the DD in 2005, in order to compare the situation concerning opposition coalition formation in the Arab Spring with the situation in the Damascus Spring. What fueled the success of opposition coalition during the Damascus Spring? And to what extent did certain issues and mechanisms relate to the failure of opposition coalition during the Arab Spring? The second section will provide an

analysis of the Syrian opposition coalition formation during the Arab Spring and most

importantly in the period 2011-2013 when opposition coalition formation was most likely to occur due to regime weakness. By discussing the extent to which intra-opposition rivalry and inter-opposition rivalry played a role in the failure of the Syrian opposition parties to

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15 to the above-mentioned puzzle by analyzing the mechanisms of the theories of inter- and intra-opposition rivalry present during the Arab Spring.

Damascus Spring and its aftermath

Analyzing the opposition coalition formation during the Damascus Spring and its aftermath is part of building the answer to the puzzle of this thesis: after all, in order to know why the opposition was able to successfully coalesce during the Damascus Spring but was not able to do so during the Arab Spring, it is important to first analyze the success of opposition coalition formation during the Damascus Spring before going into the failure of coalition formation in the Arab Spring.

As will be shown, the Damascus Spring and its aftermath showed clear signs of relatively strong coherence amongst the opposition. In addition, the evidence below further reinforces the general argument on the link between regime weakness and successful opposition coalition formation. What will also become apparent, however, are the minor cracks which came to the surface at the end of this period (2007). As will be argued throughout this section and the next section on the Arab Spring, these cracks eventually affected the likelihood of successful

opposition coalition formation in the beginning of the Arab Spring.

Damascus Spring (2000)

On 10 June 2000, Hafez al-Assad died after ruling Syria with an iron fist for three decades (Macfarquhar, 2000). Under his rule, Syria was a police state: citizens had no access to tools undermining the regime (such as internet), they were spied upon, and no opposition was possible. The massacre in Hama, 1982, showed the true characterization of the regime at the time: around 20.000 Syrians were slaughtered to crush a Sunni rebellion (Rodrigues, 2011). The massacre is considered one of the bloodiest assaults of an Arab ruler ever carried out in modern times, and it still plays an important role in Syria nowadays (Rodrigues, 2011).

When Bashar al-Assad took over, with a referendum providing him with 98% of the votes, everything seemed to change (AP& Reuters, 2000). In his inauguration speech, Bashar disassociated himself from this father (Andersen, 2011). He spoke of democracy as an instrument to a better life, and on state bureaucracy as an important obstacle for further development of Syria (Andersen, 2011; Draege, 2016). Political reform was not necessary, as Syria should not become a blueprint of the Western democracies, but the country should try to find its own democratic experience (Al Bab, n.d.). His speech was followed by minor political liberalization: amongst others, hundreds of political prisoners were released (Andersen, 2011, Amnesty International, 2001).

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16 Although the acts of liberalization were only minor, they were important for those Syrians repressed for years under his father’s rule. Bashar’s acts sparked new optimism around

opposition activists and the months that followed were characterized by groups of intellectuals openly discussing subjects that had long been major taboos: free elections, the right to form political parties and abolishment of the emergency law (Andersen, 2011). This period of

increased opposition activity right after the start of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency became known as the ‘Damascus Spring’ (Draege, 2016; Andersen, 2011) and was characterized by several joint agreements and statements of opposition activists.

The first of these joint statements was the ‘Statement of 99 intellectuals’, published in al-Hayat, a London-based pan-Arab daily newspaper on September 27, 2000 (Kerr & Larkin, 2015, p.161). Signed by intellectuals, artists and professionals, it demanded “an end to the state of emergency that had been in effect since 1963, a public pardon for all political detainees and exiles and the establishment of a state of law that would recognize political and intellectual pluralism” (Kerr & Larkin, 2015, p.161). Key signatories were: Michel Kilo, a leftist journalist who had set up a discussion forum named ‘Committees for the Revival of Civil Society’ ; and Riyad Sayf, a business man and parliamentarian who also created his own National Dialogue Forum (Draege, 2016, p.192; Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012a). The Assad regime appeared to be quite tolerant to the initiative: it did not arrest any of the signatories (Draege, 2016, p.192).

The statement of 99 was quickly followed by another statement in January 2001: The Statement of 1000, drafted by the Committees of the Revival of Civil Society of Michel Kilo. Whereas the Statement of 99 had spoken of general reforms, the Statement of 1000 proposed more radical reform including the establishment of a multi-party political system (Kerr & Larkin, 2015, p.161; Draege, 2016). Most importantly, it also questioned the role of the Ba’ath party within the Syrian government (Kerr & Larkin, 2015, p.161).

The statement of 1000, however, was a step too far for the Assad regime. Almost right after the release of the Statement of 1000, the regime publicly criticized the themes of the ‘Damascus Spring’ (Atassi, 2018, p.358). In the pan-Arab daily ‘Asharq al-Awsat’, Assad called the activists of the Damascus Spring ‘enemy agents’ and dismissed the complete opposition movement (Atassi, 2018, p.359; Al Bab, n.d.). The regime started to close all discussion forums and their holders were arrested (Atassi, 2018; Draege, 2016). The Damascus Spring had turned into a Damascus Winter.

Damascus Declaration (2005)

Although the Damascus Spring was followed by a period of little opposition activity, things changed in 2005 with the assassination of former Lebanese president Rafiq Hariri and the

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17 supposed involvement of top Syrian officials (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p.26). As a result, Syria had to withdraw its forces from Lebanon (Draege, 2016): now, Assad’s focus lay on

countering accusation and international pressure (Wikas, 2007, p.8) and almost no attention was given to the Syrian opposition.

The Syrian opposition groups took advantage of the state’s weakness. Unification meetings were organized on an even bigger scale than those during the Damascus Spring (Draege, 2016). Now the Syrian MB, in exile since it was rooted out by Hafez al-Assad after the Hama massacre (Lund, 2012, p. 62), had announced its support for a political framework focused on democracy and human rights (Draege, 2016, p.195). Michel Kilo, drafter of the statement of 1000, flew to Morocco to meet with the leaders of the MB (Draege, 2016, p.195) and soon afterwards the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change (DD) was published on the 18th of

October 2005.

The DD was a joint statement signed by various Syrian opposition groups asking for a multi-party democracy (Landis, 2005). The declaration put forward four main principles: pluralism, nonviolence, unity and democratic change (Landis & Pace, 2007, p.55). As Draege (2016) argues, “It was the first time under the Ba’ath regimes that such a broad coalition of internal and exiled opposition parties had combined forces against the government” (p.195). The more than 250 signatories to the declaration included: the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), a

coalition of Arab nationalist and leftist parties that is primarily secular; the exiled MB; some Kurdish and Assyrian parties; and amongst others Michel Kilo and Riyad Sayf (O’Bagy, 2012; Lund, 2012). According to a Syrian activists, “only with the DD could we speak about a Syrian opposition” (as cited in Landis & Pace, 2007, p. 55). The regime response was another

crackdown on all forums and communication channels of the opposition. The number of arrests was one unseen since the Damascus Winter (Landis & Pace, 2007).

Another interesting event took place in the aftermath of the DD: former vice-president Abdelhalim Khaddam defected from the regime, and the MB (signatory to the DD) decided to join Khaddam in his belief that the Assad regime was about to fall (Lund, 2012). They created the National Salvation Front (NSF), which took a more radical stance towards the regime than the DD (Landis & Pace, 2007). Whereas the DD and previous statements had only shown the unity of the Syrian opposition and not the effect they could have on society per se, Khaddam represented such a personal capital in terms of money, connections and inside knowledge on the workings of the regime that he was posing a significant threat (Landis & Pace, 2007, p. 58).

Khaddam’s defection and alliance with the MB did not only affect the regime: it also brought the united opposition in a difficult situation. First, the hardline regime stance of NSF was impossible

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18 to follow for activists inside Syria: supporting these statement could result in instant arrests (Draege, 2016). Second, Khaddam’s former role in the Assad regime did not make him very popular amongst the opposition activists either (Draege, 2016).

Damascus Declaration disputes

At the end of 2006, Michel Kilo was arrested (Varulkar, 2006). Riad Sayf was released in January 2006. At the end of 2007, the DD wanted a national council, for which it needed to elect a new leadership. Interestingly, the increasing divides within the ‘united’ opposition became clear. From 2005 until 2007, when both DDs were issued, a conflict between two strands within the DD had been growing (The Syrian Observer, 2012). One strand was led by the liberal politicians and Islamist opposition activists of the Damascus Spring-era, amongst who Riyad Sayf (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012b; The Syrian Observer, 2012). The other strand was led by the

traditional and nationalist-leftist opposition groups, under NDA leader Hassan Abdulazim and Haytham Mannaa (Lund, 2012). Eventually, the liberal strand under Sayf won the elections, and Sayf became President of the Secretariat General of the DD coalition (Draege, 2016). Abdulazim, however, was not elected as a member of the council. As a result, his party (the NDA) withdrew from the declaration (The Syrian Observer, 2012) and later most leftist signatories followed. This meant that around 2007, the DD “represented a coalition of conservatives, Islamists and liberals who largely favored radical opposition to the regime” (Draege, 2016, p.196). The situation remained that way until the uprisings in 2011, when the Arab Spring had arrived in Syria.

Although the above statements and declarations showed both the strong coherence of the opposition as well as the general link between regime weakness and opposition coalition formation, the DD disputes of 2007 thus showed cracks in this ‘unified group’. The next section will analyze how these cracks developed by focusing on the first years of the Arab Spring and the creation of two opposition blocs. As will become apparent, some of the main figures of the Damascus Spring and its aftermath played an important role during the first years of the Arab Spring as well.

Arab Spring (2011-2013)

The Arab Spring arrived in Syria in early 2011. Resembling Tunisia and Egypt, exceptional levels of protests erupted in Syria: the protest in Dara’a was the first, and the brutal response of the regime increased protests even more (Draege, 2016, p.196). Meanwhile, the Damascus Spring opposition activists presented themselves as the future democratic leaderships of Syria, and as representatives of the masses on the Syrian streets: in other words, as leaders of the new opposition (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2017, p.183; Draege, 2016, p.197).

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19 Such representation of an opposition was necessary in the eyes of Syrians, but most importantly the international community. After all, “every conceivable path away from sectarian conflict requires a functioning opposition leadership” (Lund, 2012, p. 4). In case of a foreign

intervention, government collapse or topple of the regime through armed struggle, there is a need for a legitimate civilian political opposition to fill the vacuum (Lund, 2012, p.4). In response to this need, as well as the increased chances for contributing to regime change, the opposition activists and parties that had been somewhat quiet since the Damascus Spring and its aftermath started to emerge again. Eventually, this resulted in the establishment of two main Syrian opposition parties in 2011: The National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCB) and the Syrian National Council (SNC).

Establishment of the National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCB)

The establishment of the National Coordination Bureau for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCB) was a response to two needs. First, it was a logical outcome of the many attempts to unify the leftist-nationalist strand of the opposition groups (Lund, 2012; Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012c). Second, it was important for these leftist-nationalist activists and politicians that a coalition of Syrian opposition parties within their strand of ideology would counter the soon-to-be coalition of the SNC who were in exile and strongly pro-interventionist (Kamrava, 2014; Lund, 2012).

The process of establishment of the NCB started at a conference in the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus on the 27th of June 2011. The conference was organized, amongst others, by Michel

Kilo and Mondher Khaddam: important actors in the Damascus Spring and its aftermath (Landis, 2011) and only independent dissidents were invited. Interestingly, the regime allowed the meeting to take place and even sent Syrian television to interview participants: clearly, it wanted to allow the moderate and anti-interventionist opposition activists some space, most likely because it preferred an opposition inside Syria over one outside Syria where the security forces could be of no help (Lund, 2012, p.47). The conference resulted in a strong statement against the regime and the attendants refrained from statements on foreign intervention and armed

violence (Shadid, 2011).

The NCB was established three days later, outside Damascus. Here, the participants and views clearly overlapped with those at the Semiramis conference : they focused on the moderate and secularist part of the Syrian opposition (Lund, 2012, p.48). The newly established NCB included: most parties of the NDA (which withdrew from the DD after the disputes in 2007) except for the SDPP which stayed with the DD and eventually joined the SNC; the Democratic Union Party, a PKK front group which highly influenced Syrian-Kurdish politics; the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria; Marxist Left Assembly; Democratic Islamist Current; Harakat Maan; the April 17th Youth

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20 movement and many individual dissidents (Lund, 2012, p.48). Hassan Abdelazim (O’Bagy, 2012), who lead the NDA during the Damascus Spring, became leader. He had eventually withdrawn from the DD after the disputes between him and the winning leadership of Riad-al Turks and Riyad Sayf’s liberal Syrian opposition. Michel Kilo and Mondher Khaddam both joined the NCB as well, but while Khaddam became a member of the NCB Executive Board, Kilo

eventually refused his position in the NCB Executive Council. He wanted unity, he stated, instead of a deepened division between opposition groups (Lund, 2012, p.49; Hinnebusch & Imady, 2018). Other dissidents did join the NCB, such as Aref Dalila, Faye Sara and Ahmed Faiz al-Fawwaz.

The NCB generally favored a negotiated settlement and dialogue with the Assad regime and asked for political reform through that strategy (O’Bagy, 2012). The Syrian regime must eventually be replaced by a democratic government, so it argued, but in this process all parties should adhere to the three no’s : la unf, la taifiya, la tadakhul: ‘no violence’, ‘no sectarianism’, ‘no intervention’ (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012c; Hinnebusch & Imady, 2018; Lund, 2012). This made sure that the NCB was strongly supported by the secularists and leftist-Arab

nationalists. However, it also led to a lack of support by Sunni Islamists and liberals (Lund, 2012, p.48).

The NCB had a Central Council which elected the Executive Council. This executive council was re-elected three times between June 2011 and March 2012 (Lund, 2012). In March 2012, the Executive Council counted 23 members, of which nine had been part of the council since its temporary council in June 2011 (Lund, 2012). An important change in March 2012, as will be further discussed, was the appointment of Heitham Mannaa as the Deputy Coordinator for the Diaspora (Lund, 2012, p.49).

Establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC)

Around the time the NCB established itself, the remaining parties of the Syrian opposition also organized meetings on the creation of a unified political platform which eventually lead to the establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2013). It started in April and May 2011, when the remaining factions of the DD (ever since the 2007 Damascus Declaration disputes) organized meetings in Turkey focused on the ideology of the DD and the MB. They concluded that the Assad regime should be overthrown, and no compromise or reform solutions should be provided (Lund, 2012, p. 21&23). It were these meetings that pointed the soon-to-be NCB on the necessity to form a countering coalition at that time.

In addition to these meetings in Turkey in April and May, the biggest factor leading towards the eventual establishment of the SNC was the support for opposition unity coming from

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21 independent dissidents (Lund, 2012). They had already created exile groups such as: the

‘National Action Group for Syria, who were Islamist/nationalist, allied to the MB and led by Ahmed Ramadan; and the Democratic Coordination Meeting, including around 25 independent dissidents such as Basma Qodmani, Abdulbaser Sieda, and Adib al-Shishakli (the grandson Adib al-Shishakli, Syria’s military ruler between 1949-1954) (Kamrava, 2018, p.412; Lund, 2012, p.23). They joined forces with each other and the Independent Islamic Current, and became known as the ‘Istanbul Group’ (Kamrava, 2014). On the 23rd of August 2011, this Istanbul Group

called for the formation of a ‘Syrian National Council’ and a congress in Istanbul was planned for early September (AFP, 2011).

In the meantime, the Istanbul Group received invitation to the ‘Doha opposition Conference’ (Kamrava, 2014). The conference was held in Doha, Qatar’s capital, and organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, a Qatari think-tank (Lund, 2012, p.24). 25

representatives from the major Syrian opposition factions were invited to the Qatari capital, which made for representation of the NCB, the DD, the Istanbul Group and some independents (Lund, 2012, p. 24; Hinnebusch & Imady, 2018). The MB was not present, but was kept up to date (Lund, 2012, p.24).

During the conference, however, the Arab League started their own (Qatari-backed) initiative on a solution for the Syrian crisis: Assad would serve out his term until 2014 and then step down (Lund, 2012, p. 24). Logically this angered many parties present: were they supposed to comply with the leadership of the NCB and forget about instantaneous regime change (Lund, 2012, p.24)? The Istanbul Group, until then most radical in its stance towards the regime, eventually decided to pull out. Although the remaining groups (DD, MB and NCB) formed a deal, it failed to unfold as the SDPP (a part of the DDs not present at the conference) did not agree to cooperate with the NCB, and a faction within the MB (the Aleppo faction) wanted to wait until the Istanbul Group had created its National Council (Lund, 2012, p.24; Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012b). Concluding, it becomes apparent that the disputes of the DD in 2007 still influenced the

willingness of Syrian opposition parties to cooperate and unify.

One week after the Doha Conference, the Istanbul Conference was held. The MB and the DD were both present, and the SNC was established (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2013). The DD and the MB were present at the conference, but it was only at the second unification conference on the 29th of September 2011 in Istanbul that they truly joined the SNC together with the Assyrian

Christian Assyrian Democratic Organization and some youth groups (Lund, 2012, p.25). The stance of the SNC was clear and rigid: overthrow the regime, and the head of the regime (Lund, 2012, p.25). At its first press conference on October 2, 2011, which received much media

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22 attention, it seemed as if the SNC had finally been able to unify all Syrian political opposition parties: its new leader Burhan Ghalioun was surrounded by Mohammed Riad al-Shafqa (MB), Basma Qodmani (an independent liberal), Abdulbaset Sieda (an independent Kurdish leftist), Ahmed Ramadan (supporter of the MB and Islamist), Abdelahad Steifo (from Assyrian

Democratic Organization) and Smir Nashar (DD, liberal) (Lund, 2012, p. 25). However, there was still another big opposition party that did not join the SNC: the NCB. This meant the Syrian political opposition was still divided between these two most important parties.

After the establishment of both parties, there were serious attempts at unification. Why did all these attempts at coalition formation fail right at a time a coalition was most likely to result in political change? As discussed in this section, the Doha opposition conference already showed the effect of the cracks that had developed during the 2007 DD disputes on the willingness of parties to the soon-to-be SNC to cooperate with the NCB. In addition, the standpoints of the SNC and the NCB appeared to differ on important issues: foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition and dialogue with the regime. To what extent did these elements influence the likelihood of opposition coalition formation? Were there other elements that affected the formation of an opposition coalition, and how do all elements link to the potential explanations of inter- and intra-opposition rivalry?

Inability of opposition coalition formation in 2011-2013

From the start of the Arab Spring protests in 2011, there was continuous pressure for opposition coalition formation from both foreign and national actors. Halfway through 2011, the US, European Union and Gulf states began arguing that unity would become a precondition for material support (Lund, 2012, p.29). In addition, important national actors within the opposition expressed the need for cooperation between the two different Syrian political opposition

parties. “The biggest issue for the opposition is unity” (Lund, 2012, p.29) said Burhan Ghalioun, leader of the SNC, in October 2011. In an opening speech to a congress in Sweden, Ghalioun explained this further by stating that:

At first, there was a feeling that this was certainly important, but only with time did it become apparent how important it is that the revolution acquires a single address, where you can go to discuss with it […] We must stop these splits, this talk of a national and un-national opposition, an internal and an external opposition. That is the only way we can show the world that a new Syria has already been born (as cited in Lund, 2012, p.30). His argument on the need for ‘one single address of the opposition’ had been used by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2011. Clinton ushered the need for a united Syrian

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23 both the people who were doing the outreach diplomatically and the fighters. We could actually meet with them. We could eyeball them. We could ask them tough questions” (as cited in O’Bagy, 2012, p. 34&35).

In sum, there was a general consensus on the need for the two major opposition factions, the SNC and the NCB, to coalesce. However, this coalition was never established in the early years of the Arab Spring (2011-2013). Although the media often talked about ‘The Syrian Opposition’: there was no such thing as a recognized group that presented all Syrians who opposed the regime (Lund, 2012, p. 12). The next sub-sections will focus on explaining the inability of the SNC and NCB to coalesce by focusing on elements related to inter- and intra-opposition rivalry.

Elements of inter-opposition rivalry

Relevant elements of inter-opposition rivalry include: the potential systemic/ non-systemic division between the NCB and the SNC; as well as the issues of foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition (mainly the Free Syrian Army (FSA)) and continued dialogue with the regime. Thus, both content- and structure-based differences will be brought to light.

Systemic versus non-systemic opposition

One of the major differences between the SNC and the NCB was the place from which they operated. From its establishment onwards, the SNC had been operating in exile, with its

headquarters based in Istanbul and all of its meetings and conferences organized abroad as well. In this aspect it resembled the National Transitional Council in Libya, which had also tried to form an opposition government in exile (O’Bagy, 2012, p. 9). In contrast, the NCB operated from its headquarters in Damascus (O’Bagy, 2012, p. 19) and was in its essence created as a counter-opposition party to the SNC which was at the time thought to be building a government in exile that would ask for foreign intervention, just as the in-exile National Transition Council in Libya had done a few months before (Lund, 2012, p. 47).

The eventual internal-external division created many problems for potential opposition coalition formation in the Syrian case. Although Lund (2012, p.15) calls it a somewhat

stereotypical perception, the idea that external opposition parties seem to have a much more hardline political view than those on the inside did prove right in the case of the division between the NCB and the SNC in Syria. First, the parties differed in their support for the armed opposition and dialogue with the regime: the ‘internal’ NCB chose the less radical political line and primarily argued for dialogue, whereas the SNC followed a completely different view. In addition to the content-based differences that were reinforced due to the internal-external divide between the NCB and the SNC , this divide fueled another major obstacle for opposition coalition formation: the perception that the NCB was working as a puppet of the regime. In other

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24 words, there seemed to be a divide between a systemic Syrian political opposition – the NCB— and a non-systemic Syrian political opposition – the SNC.

As a result of its somewhat moderate approach to the Assad regime, the Syrian government had recognized the NCB as a political opposition group, which it had never done with the exiled SNC (O’Bagy, 2012, p.19). Therefore, the NCB was the only political opposition group that could carry out activities and conferences within Syria, although to a limited extent (O’Bagy, 2012, p. 19). Most likely, the regime wanted to show that those who played by the book and refrained from having too many foreign ties (as will be shown in the next section in more detail, the NCB checked both boxes), could express themselves without restriction (Lund, 2012, p.52). In contrast to those of the SNC, who would be immediately arrested at the border, Executive Council members of the NCB could travel abroad and return without problems (Lund, 2012, p.52). One might question the lenience of the Assad regime: why not crush any form of political opposition? In its essence, the NCB represented an asset to the regime: it was the rival of the SNC, making it very difficult for the latter to declare it represented the entire opposition (Lund, 2012, p. 52). As Malik al-Abdeh, part of the Movement for Justice and Development (which formed the DD block within the SNC) said in an interview over the phone in May 2012:

These guys are in Syria, but they’re not being arrested, they can travel and go to Russia, and so on’. ‘The regime is obviously happy to have them, it needs an opposition like the NCB. It can coopt the NCB. It can’t do that with the SNC, because it calls for intervention and supports the FSA—things which are beyond the pale, as far as the regime is

concerned (as cited in Lund, 2012, p. 51).

In theory, the position of the NCB inside Syria (in contrast to the exile position of the SNC) would make it easier for the NCB to be in contact with Syrians on the ground (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 185). In reality, however, their situation inside Syria only made it easier for the regime to monitor all their activities and control its members (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p.185). For example, when the regime allowed the NCB to organize a conference in Damascus in September 2012, one of its most important members AbdelAziz al-Khayyer, was arrested (Baczko, Dorronsoro & Quesnay, 2018, p.88). In addition, some claimed that the NCB leader, Hassan AbdelAzim, cooperated with the Assad regime to protect his role within the opposition (Lund, 2012, p.50).

Although rumours of the NCB cooperating with the Assad regime were clearly present at the time, the NCB did everything it could to counter these accusations. When the Assad regime suggested the party should join the official political system: the NCB did not respond (Lund, 2012, p. 52). In addition, “the NCB parties refuse to apply for legal recognition under Syria’s new

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25 party law” (Lund, 2012, p. 52). It is therefore not completely fair, as Lund (2012) further argues, to characterize the NCB as working on behalf of the regime. The leadership of the NCB is full of activists, some of which were highly important during the Damascus Spring as well, and most of which have been imprisoned for at least 10 years of their life. In addition, he argues, once attacked politically by the NCB, the Assad regime responds the same to the NCB as it does to any other political opposition group (such as the SNC) (Lund, 2012, p. 52).

Whereas the NCB should thus possibly not be discussed as a true systemic opposition, the effect that the divide between the SNC and NCB had on the possibility of opposition coalition formation mostly relied on the perception of the NCB as a systemic opposition and a ‘puppet of the regime’, not necessarily on the reality of this structure-based difference. The perception of the NCB as a puppet of the regime by both the SNC and its support base remained during the early years of the revolution. In addition, this perception was reinforced and maybe injected with some elements of truth, by the NCB’s stance on foreign intervention, support of the armed opposition and dialogue with the regime: strategies they were unlikely to abandon. After all, as Lust-Okar (2004) argued, a systemic/non-systemic division might also be characterized by a loyalist opposition that may challenge the regime but at the same time helps to maintain the current system since destabilization of the system disadvantages them. This seems to fit very well with the strategy and workings of the NCB at the time.

Foreign intervention, support for armed opposition and dialogue with regime

The issues of foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition and continued dialogue with the regime were among the most important content-based differences between the SNC and the NCB. Whereas the SNC refused dialogue with the regime, openly called for the help of foreign powers in terms of a military intervention and generally favored the support for the armed opposition, the NCB was highly against all three situations and favored a continued dialogue with the regime. As mentioned earlier, ‘intervention’ and ‘violence’ were even part of the NCB’s three no’s that together formed their basic principles in the opposition against Assad (no violence, no sectarianism, no intervention) (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012c; Hinnebusch & Imady, 2018; Lund, 2012).

In early 2011, the SNC recognized that the Syrian revolution had become a proxy-war in which regional as well as international powers would fight their battles (Lund, 2012, p.26). It chose to align itself with one side of that proxy-war, namely the side of the West, Turkey and the Gulf Arab States (Lund, 2012, p.26). This explains why the SNC headquarters are based in Turkey, and why many of the opposition’s conferences have been held in cities like Istanbul and Antalya. An important aspect in the SNC’s decision, was that it expected a foreign military intervention to occur based on the Libyan precedent, as Malik al-Abdeh (part of the DD within the SNC)

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26 explains: “Everyone expected that when the SNC formed, we’d have a similar dynamic as in Libya. When the National Transitional Council [in Libya, also government in exile] formed, before you knew it, you had NATO coming in” (as cited in Lund, 2012, p.26).

The NCB, however, opposed foreign intervention and strongly criticized the influence of the West, the Gulf States and Turkey on the Syrian situation (Lund, 2012, p.26) which still creates anger and disbelief among Syrians on the ground (Lund, 2012, p.29). The party feared that foreign intervention and support for the Syrian armed opposition would eventually lead to a civil war (Lund, 2012). However, one could argue that by the time the SNC was calling for foreign intervention, Syria had already spiraled into such a violent conflict that civil war would occur with or without foreign intervention (Lund, 2012, p.54).

This raises the question as to what other explanations there could be for the NCB’s stubborn stance on non-intervention. One explanation for the behavior of the NCB relates to its position as the (somewhat) ‘systemic opposition’: their position on foreign intervention fitted the regime’s stance on non-intervention (Lund, 2012, p.52). In that way, being stubborn on non-intervention made sure the NCB could still function. If they would abandon their strategy of non-intervention, they would lose their protected status (O’Bagy, 2012, p. 20).

Besides potential protection of the Assad regime, some argue that the NCB chose its stance on non-intervention because it simply did not believe that the supposed-interveners the SNC talked so highly of, would actually have the stomach for a real military intervention (Lund, 2012, p. 53&54). Such an intervention, the NCB however believed, would be the only way in which the Assad regime could actually be removed from office: as this would not occur without an

intervention, the NCB chose the way of dialogue with the regime and press for long-term reform (Lund, 2012, p.53 &54).

The promise or threat of foreign military intervention remained one of the most persistent red herrings of the Syrian conflict (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 188). Whereas the NCB remained stubborn on non-intervention, the SNC “put almost all its eggs in the basket of a foreign military intervention which was never going to happen” (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p.188). Basel al-Junaidi explains how this lack of foreign intervention in the end highly delegitimized the need for the SNC:

Its function was only to bring support—humanitarian or military—from abroad. This is why the people recognized it. It certainly wasn’t meant to negotiate with the regime on our behalf. Perhaps when it became clear that there’d be no intervention, we needed political representation, but the Coalition couldn’t do it. They didn’t control the ground; they had no militia (as cited in Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 188)

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27 All in all, this dynamic made an opposition coalition of the NCB and the SNC increasingly difficult. During several unification meetings of the NCB and the SNC the issue of foreign intervention became one of the biggest obstacles. In other cases, such as the Friends of Syria meeting in February 2012, the NCB even declined invitations in the first place because it feared meetings would eventually result in foreign intervention or supporting the armed opposition (Lund, 2012, p. 31).

Interestingly, the issues of foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition and continued dialogue with the regime did not only cause inter-opposition rivalries: the support for the armed opposition was also one of the main factors for internal rivalry within the SNC, as will be

discussed in the attributed sub-section. First, however, it is important to discuss the effect of support bases on the likelihood of opposition coalition formation during the Arab Spring.

Support bases

Another important element for the likelihood of opposition coalition formation, are the

(changing) support bases of the SNC and the NCB. After all: often the support groups are either the ones which the political opposition represents, or the ones it owes its existence to (through funding). The argument on heavy reliance on support groups was reinforced by statements of both the NCB and the SNC on each other’s support groups. The NCB argued that the SNC would completely fall apart if international media such as the BBC and Al-Jazeera stopped reporting (Lund, 2012, p. 34). SNC leader Abdulbaset Sieda touched upon the weakness of the NCB, as it only relied on some support from old guards of the Arab League (as cited in Lund, 2012, p.34). Although there lies some truth in these arguments, the importance of the support groups for the SNC and the NCB went deeper than the arguments above make it seem and certainly had an effect on the likelihood of opposition coalition formation in the early years of the Arab Spring in Syria.

The support-bases of the SNC consisted of numerous groups, which all supported the SNC for their own reasons. From its establishment onwards the SNC was supported by many actors in the West and the Arab region, which eventually set up the ‘Friends of Syria’-group in February 2012: an initiative by the then-president Nicolas Sarkozy as a response to the Russian and Chinese veto on a draft United Nations Security Council resolution. This draft resolution proposed the extension of the UN Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic and

threatened to impose sanctions if the Assad regime did not end the downward spiral of violence (UN, 2012). The ‘Friends of Syria’ included around 70 states, including some that had already been supporting the SNC (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France etc) (Lund, 2012, p.31).

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28 The group’s main goal was to increase the international legitimacy of the SNC and provide it with support (Lund, 2012). After all, the SNC’s main goal from its establishment had been to become the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people’: a scenario that would highly affect the functional ability of the Assad regime and increase chances of regime change. It

received this status from some states: the Gulf Cooperation Council, France, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom all recognized the SNC as the sole representative of the Syrian people (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012; Black, 2012, November 20). Others were more hesitant, such as the European Union, who declared the SNC to be a legitimate representative, but left out the world ‘sole’ (Black, 2012, November 20): mainly because the SNC had shown clear signs of internal-rivalry.

The support from the Friends of Syria most certainly helped the SNC get international

recognition, but the international support the SNC seemed to receive on paper did not always translate into actual support in practice. Often, the support for the SNC and the FSA coming from Friends of Syria member states was described as “the tap being turned on and then off again as soon as any progress was made”(Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 192). This policy

“fundamentally misunderstood the nature of both regime and revolution” (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016, p. 192) and showed that the aim of the Friends of Syria support base was not ending the Assad regime but only bringing them to the negotiating table.

The SNC had been hesitant on coalescing with the NCB, amongst other things based on its belief that foreign intervention and support for the armed opposition would eventually take place: if its own support base would have been more clear on their inability or unwillingness to truly intervene or support the FSA, the SNC would have potentially made other choices in its

willingness to cooperate with the NCB. The idea that they had a support base they could rely on had now made them less inclined to work together.

Another way in which the support bases of the SNC and the NCB affected the likelihood of opposition coalition formation, was through support for the SNC by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. With the NCB’s main allies being Russia, Iran and China, and its stances towards foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition and dialogue with the regime, the NCB had no true cordial relationship with the Gulf states (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012c). However, this was not the only reason for the lack of a cordial relationship between the NCB and the Gulf states. In the early days of the Arab Spring, the NCB had two main leaders: the first was Hassan AbdelAzim, president of the NCB (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2013). As it became increasingly difficult for the NCB to organize events inside Syria, the international deputy of the NCB based in Paris, Haitham Mannaa, took on a more important role (Lund, 2012, p.50). As a result, Mannaa was often incorrectly described in the media as the leader of the NCB (Lund, 2012). Mannaa

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29 decreased the likelihood of opposition coalition formation between the NCB and the SNC by publicly criticizing the support base of the SNC: the Gulf countries. Often, he attacked his

ideological opponents publicly, and according to Lund (2012) he seemed to “be involved in a few running vendettas at any given time”(p.51). Although this behaviour led to praise from hard-line supporters of the NCB, it also increased accusations of Mannaa being an “agent-provocateur for the regime”(Lund, 2012, p.51), decreasing the likelihood that the SNC, which was heavily backed by—and thus heavily reliant on—the Gulf countries, would want to coalesce with the NCB. In addition to Mannaa publicly denouncing the Gulf countries, the NCB still argued it did not want to cooperate with the Gulf-backed SNC because both Qatar and Saudi Arabia were involved in the Syrian proxy-war, and their support (together with that of the other countries of the Friends of Syria) made the NCB argue that:

the SNC was dominated by an alliance of Gulf- and Western backed liberals and Islamists [who] strive to push the conflict towards armed confrontation and foreign intervention, and have no interest in cooperating with the NCB, since a merger would dilute their own influence and make it more difficult to adopt a pro-intervention line (Lund, 2012, p. 31). According to Philips (2017), the NCB might have been somewhat right here: Qatar and Saudi Arabia continuously prioritized their own short-term interests over a possibility for opposition coalition formation (p.39). Especially the support for the SNC coming from Qatar highly affected the NCB’s willingness to cooperate with the SNC: Qatar had been funding the MB within the SNC and there was a fear amongst NCB members that the Islamists controlled the SNC (Black, 2012, July 26). As Khalaf Dawood, an NCB member, said: “We don’t want to end up swapping one corrupt dictatorship for another” (Black, 2012, July 26). However, the funding for the MB also created internal problems for the SNC, mainly due to the SNC’s supporter Saudi Arabia: who wanted to support anyone but the MB.

In conclusion, this section has shown that intra-opposition rivalry decreased the likelihood of opposition coalition formation in Syria through both content- and structure-based differences: the (supposed) division between the systemic and non-systemic opposition, the different stances on foreign intervention, support for the armed opposition and dialogue with the regime, and how these differences were fuelled by the support bases of both the NCB and the SNC.

Elements of intra-opposition rivalry

Although ideological and political differences played a role in the failure to establish an

opposition coalition of the SNC and the NCB, these differences were not the sole reason for this failure. Internal disputes and differences based on power struggles and leadership dynamics, the

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Whereas the non-violent Islamist movement is typically a student movement, only eighteen of the listed members had a higher education and only ten of these had acquired a

This growth of the state apparatus had a number of différent dimensions and conséquences: it greatly enhanced the ability of central government to structure social and

Building on the ‘rally around the flag’ literature, our main expectation is that as the pandemic develops, and the nature of the crisis changes from mostly an acute public health

Particularly interesting from the perspective of consensus democracy are the small Christian parties SGP and the CU, which focus more on policy-making than scrutiny tools, as

Fluidization regime of the amine sorbent, minimum fluidization velocity, reproducibility of fixed bed experi- ments, full column pro files (concentration, temperature, and tray