From oil kingdom to contemporary developmental state

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Universiteit Leiden

From oil kingdom to contemporary developmental state

A developmental state theory perspective on Saudi Arabia

Master‟s thesis for International Relations Specialisation Global Political Economy

Koen Adriaan de Vries S1370847

Dr. E. Duzgun 11-02-2019

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Introduction

In June 2017, it became clear to the world that Saudi Arabia was changing. Instead of the horizontal succession that has been the norm for over sixty years, the son of the sitting

monarch was appointed as Crown Prince. Following these developments, this thesis will seek to examine the future of the Kingdom. Drawing on theories of the developmental state of the 20th century, this thesis will formulate a contemporary theory dealing with late development of the rentier state. As will be explained in detail through a literature study, the rentier states of the Arabian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia in particular, have been developmentally stagnant in several key aspects. As such, this dissertation will question the remained viability of rentier state theories. This research will ask the question: “What is the most likely path of post-oil development of Saudi Arabia, when examined with a developmental state/dependency theory perspective?” In doing so, it argues for a departure of the focus on rentierism in the analysis of economic and social development of Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, this dissertation will argue for an adapted form of state-managed development according to the theories of developmentalism. As such, its contribution will be two-fold. Firstly, it explains the need to look beyond rentier state theory in Saudi Arabia studies in the discussion of late post-oil development. Secondly, it will argue for an adapted developmental state theory that is more suited for a 21st century state led development project, especially taking into account the increasingly globalised economy and regional structures. Therefore, the contributions of this thesis will go beyond the case study, and find the relevant lessons for any late industrialiser. Even without the aforementioned shifting relations at the top of the Saudi monarchy, there are few states more contentious than Saudi Arabia. It is an important American ally in the

tumultuous Middle East, one of the few states not greatly impacted by the Arab Spring, and one of the handful absolute monarchies left in the world. It is no coincidence that the new Crown Prince‟s reform programme has been set in motion recently, since the Kingdom‟s economy is struggling to provide Saudis with proper employment, and large parts of the population are routinely disenfranchised. Additionally, there are some who advocate a shift away from the monarchical system. Following the international outrage in the case of the disappearance and murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, some experts have called for Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman to step down and for the Kingdom to transform to a constitutional monarchy (see Al-Rasheed, 2018). The monarchical system does, however, hold potential power in other discussions. The extraction of oil still provides the state with a sizable monetary boon, and the lack of accountability of the absolute monarchy makes drastic

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4 state action more likely. As such, this thesis will explore the idea of adapting state-led

development in developmental states to 21st century Saudi Arabia, transforming the authoritarian state one to guide and strengthen development.

The power of the monarchical system as a hub in the country‟s intricate power relations gives it important agency to transform the country‟s economy and help bring down unemployment and, though increasing welfare, open up the country to liberal freedoms one step at a time. Al-Rasheed‟s article rightly puts emphasis on the international aspect of managing the state: the war in Yemen, funding extremist groups and general mistrust of the instatement of the King‟s son to crown prince have all eroded at the international community‟s opinion of Saudi Arabia. This dissertation will not ignore the importance of regional and international actors in its analysis, and choosing a new head of the royal family, as al-Rasheed advocates could be part of that. However, Muhammad bin Salman‟s importance in the current development plans for the country cannot be understated. His influence in the government has sprouted the new development plans in the Saudi Arabia Vision 2030 policy plans. These plans are one of the reasons for this dissertation. Moreover, the shift between monarchs is a time of challenge for any monarchy, and Saudi Arabia is no different in this respect (Stenslie, 2016, 118). During the modern history of the state, the Kingdom has remained in the hands of successive sons of the founding King. While Abdulaziz‟ sons have held power since his death, the age of these sons is steadily increasing, and the shift to a younger generation has to happen soon. This time of uncertainty will inevitably bring new insights to the upper layers of the Saudi Monarchy. As such, this is the first time in decades that it is likely that radical change can come to the stagnant oil kingdom.

The goal for this thesis is, therefore, to explain the situation in Saudi Arabia, and analyse the possibility for reforms to succeed in future-proofing the country. In order to increase the likely applicability to Saudi policy, this dissertation will not attempt to predict radical change to the upper bureaucratic and monarchical status-quo. Instead, it will attempt to prescribe the most viable lessons from the developmental state literature to the case. In doing so, it will combine both case-specific literature and more generic works in order to formulate a contemporary developmental state theory.

As for relevance of the case, in the context of the Middle East after the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia is particularly interesting. Though there have been some sectarian unrests, the country has remained relatively stable. Be it due in part to military crackdowns, this stability

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5 throughout the Arab Spring is quite unique. The monarchies of the Arab Gulf have been designated as the great survivors of the region, given their social stability and the persistence of the monarchical system (See for example Ulrichsen, 2017, 221 or Lacroix, 2011). It is clear that there is a need for change in the political system in Saudi Arabia. The oil rents on which it has been built are declining relative to the population. This dissertation will go over the question whether the country will be able to redesign itself and its economy. This will lead to a more generalised strategy for late development for resource-rich countries, and to a lesser extent other late industrialisers.

The discussion surrounding development has been disputed for as long as economics as a discipline existed. The question what development entails and who can be called „developed‟ does not have a clearly defined answer. As such, the first part of this review will go over the three main authors on which the analysis of this dissertation will be based, and examine what it is that late development entails, how it can come to be and what obstacles to development can be of relevance to the case of Saudi Arabia. As mentioned, three authors will be the main focus in the theoretical framework of this dissertation. These three authors are Peter Evans, a scholar focussing mainly on state-society relations in developmental states, Alice Amsden, a political economist focussing on developmental states as an alternative to market

led-development, and Vivek Chibber, who builds on the theory provided by Evans and extends it to answer the question how class power structures influence the success of developmental state projects. The three authors are all defined as either statist or critical in their views on development, allowing this dissertation to apply this political economic theory on Saudi Arabia to understand the viability of the proposed reform programme in the Saudi Arabia Vision 2030. With the declining oil rents, it is likely the monarchy will have to look into transforming its role in managing economic sectors. As such, it is likely to see a departure from the traditionally „rentier‟ structures, and into state-led capitalist development.

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Chapter 1

Firstly, I will give an introduction to the three scholars‟ views on developmental states. This review will do so in three parts. Firstly it will go over the authors‟ definitions of

developmental states and explain how states can influence economic development. Secondly it will give a more general discussion of achieving economic development through a

developmental state. Finally the pitfalls arising from the frameworks of the developmental state in regards to the case will be given in order to find the strategies to maximise state

effectiveness. Doing so will allow this dissertation to apply the frameworks to Saudi Arabia as a case, and work towards recommending a strategy towards late development in the 21st

century. Using the authors described above outlines the basic discussion of the 20th century developmental state. As such, this review will draw on the cases of the literature, namely Korea, India and Japan, in order to find a general strategy, which will then be made

contemporary in the case study of Saudi Arabia. This dissertation will then use the findings to explain in which ways the ideas from the developmental state are still relevant, and whether or not developmentalism is feasible in a modern global economy.

How to achieve state-led growth

Development can be defined in a multitude of ways. One might for example be tempted to simply look at the per capita production of a country. Viewing development in such simplistic terms hinders the understanding of one of the main policy goals of any state, creating and maintaining sustainable development. In the next part, this review will go over the

development strategies found in the works of the main three authors used. This will lay the foundation of the discussion in this review, and ultimately help formulate a strategy for late development in the 21st century Saudi Arabia. For examples of developmental states of varying levels of success, this part will look principally at Japan, South Korea and India, as these countries have employed different strategies towards creating a developmental state. Peter Evans: autonomy and the importance of political structure

Evans‟ book is the oldest of the three examined works, and offers the most fundamental understanding of what a developmental state entails and what it should endeavour to become. Key in his work is the focus on industrial transformation and capitalism through an

autonomous bureaucracy. In order to understand the ways in which the state can aid or hinder this transformation, one might compare failed „predatory‟ states to (partially) successful

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7 „developmental‟ states. What makes a state constructive or developmental rather than

destructive or predatory can be substantiated. A developmental state should not only be able to extract from or influence the national economy. Rather, it should have the capability to transform the national economy and social structures in the way it deems desirable (Evans, 1995, 45). As a result, one would classify a state like Zaire as predatory rather than

developmental, even though its bureaucracy was very effective in the extraction of funds. This extraction did not, however, result in constructive state management but in personal gains of officials. Rather, Taiwan or South Korea are examples of developmental states, as these boasted a bureaucracy that was in a key position in the pursuit of economic development. Evans holds state autonomy, the ability for state officials and institutions to decide on policy without external influence, as one of the main variables to the effectiveness of state-led economic development. For example he argues that the Zairian state does not possess true autonomy, because it is unable to direct its officeholders to work towards a collective goal rather than pursuing personal goals (Evans, 1995, 47). A successful implementation of the autonomy Evans describes can be found in Japan‟s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and South Korea‟s embedded links to large national business groups, the Chaebols. Embedded autonomy is the term that describes the main link between state and the economic elite described by Evans. This notion is key to creating a developmental state and is defined as an economic situation in which the state is capable to steer industrial decision-making by embedding itself in the process, usually through funding, while remaining

autonomous from industrial elites. Funding could be done either through direct ownership (in Taiwan (Evans, 1995, 55)) or by public funding of industrial endeavours (in Japan (Evans, 1995, 48). The reason the state is required to remain autonomous from industrialists, according to Evans, is that market- and state goals do not usually line up. Be it for strategic reason or as part of a grander developmental plan, states such as the Korean or the Japanese oftentimes found themselves in opposition to the industrial elites‟ interests. Autonomy from these elites, combined with embeddedness in their decision making process allowed states to direct industrial activity. This allowed for example the South Korean state to push for the development of a national information sector (Evans, 1995, 140). All in all, embedded autonomy, in which bureaucrats are capable to constructively direct funds and legislation towards the development of strategic sectors, is the main driver for state-led development in Evans‟ work.

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8 Chibber: The symbiotic relationship between private capital and public management

On the most basic level, Vivek Chibber builds on the theory laid out by Evans in his discussion of developmental states. Embedded autonomy of states led to a shared project between states and industrialists, in which states were able to coordinate industrial development in which both private and public profited and contributed to the end result. Chibber subsequently asks why so many attempts at building developmental states failed (Chibber, 2003, 24). He believes that it is not simply a matter of top-down embeddedness like Evans describes, but a deeper reliance of the state on industrialists that defined the early developmental state building in South Korea. For one, after having seized power, the Park regime arrested leading industrialists, but quickly released them from prison and forgave their crimes. The South Korean state, he argues, is not as much a „leading partner‟ as other authors describe, but was reliant on and constrained by their business partners (Chibber, 2003, 67). The strategy to placate industrialists and to act as a source of finance did not come from an autonomous position, but rather as a result of avoiding overt business opposition.

A key example in proving this thesis comes from India, where the state was never able to become fully embedded in its industry. The main difference in how disciplinary measures were implemented between South Korea and India is in the way the state was embedded. Indian developmental efforts were unsuccessful in implementing any incentive for capitalists to keep to the development plans formulated by the government. These plans were focussed on filling in economic niches in the hopes to substitute imports. The strategy of

import-substituting industrialisation was heavily state-managed. In order to prevent the oversaturation of economic sectors, conglomerates were granted monopolies (Chibber, 2003, 34). The effect of this was that it was rational for the capitalists to support the protection and investment policies by the state, while simultaneously opposing any disciplinary measures aimed at improving international competitiveness. In the end, this led to a situation in which

conglomerates were autonomous from state discipline, while still benefiting from the states generosity (Chibber, 2003, 128). The implication of unconditional aid given to national conglomerates therefore led to a loss of state agency in the furthering of development goals. Conditionality is therewith an important consideration in the creation of developmental structures. Chibber provides another insight in these structures. While Evans argues that state autonomy, and therewith coercive power, is the main driver behind the successful

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9 the defining part of developmental success. Formalised ties between the Chaebols and

government officials were fundamental in carrying out development goals. Drawing in the industrial heads in the decision-making process and integrating their feedback in the

development goals led to a situation in which it was beneficial for them to be in a reciprocal relationship with the government. State actions were therefore not unilateral, but a

cooperative effort between public and private actors. International trade structures that arose in the years following the Second World War allowed the Korean state to involve itself in private decision-making. When along with the Park regime setting up the structures that would define Korean developmentalism, Japanese firms were looking for regional partners for outsourcing export products. Government involvement could therefore focus on decreasing costs for domestic actors, and on providing support for this regional cooperation (Chibber, 2003, 43).

While capitalist action was still carried out by private conglomerates, the decision-making was partially delegated to state actors, because of the mutual benefit this shared development plan offered. What is more, the international dimension of this case plays a pivotal role in the distribution of agency in the relationship between Korean capital and government. The extent of the effects of internationalisation of investment will be discussed in further detail below. The main take-away from the Korean case is that the Chaebols could express their views on the state‟s role just as the state was able to monitor their performances (Chibber, 2003, 169). The reliance on agreements between sectors was superior to the Indian efforts and established a dominance of the state over the industrialists. Korean export-led industrialisation was much more successful than the Indian import-substitution, to a large part due to more potent state management of pre-existing regional relations, filling in the niches left open in the regional economic order.

Amsden: The importance of know-how

In contrast to both Evans and Chibber, the more recent work of Alice Amsden focuses on the importance of capital and knowledge, instead of institutional structures. These structures, she argues, are of decreasing importance with the internationalisation of the global economy. This realisation shifts the focus of her book away from political theory, and more into an economic discussion of research and development, foreign direct investment and the importance of diversification of economic activities. The emphasis Amsden puts on the need for knowledge and skills can is characterised in her introduction where she calls post-war development “pure

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10 learning” (Amsden, 2001, 2). The main take-away from this changed focus is lies in the way this works towards a more generalised theory, that is not fixated on successful examples like Korea and Japan. Rather, Amsden allows for a comparative study of late development,

without the emphasis on institutions. Rather, knowledge and efficient production are the main defining features of a successful late developer. The state, in this theory, comes in where market forces lag behind and enhances the capability of the economic forces to make use of- and create efficiencies.

Amsden claims that following the Second World War there were three general kinds of countries: the West, the Rest and the Remainder. The difference between the Rest and the Remainder is characterised by the difference in success in attracting or mobilising investment funds and in the form of manufacturing experience, while the West is composed solely on the North Atlantic and, until the Second World War, Japan. The distinction between the Rest and the Remainder will be further examined later in this review. First, the path to development for the Rest was unequivocally different from the rebuilding of the West following the Second World War. Even though both Europe and the Rest of the world relied on obsolete capital and the fact that the war had shifted cash from the war-torn European continent to other countries through imports and war-profits, the Rest lacked the guidance Europe did have (Amsden, 2001, 125). This disadvantage of the rest arose in part through the Marshall Plan in Europe, and in part due to a plethora of reasons that can be summed up by looking at the application of know-how and the development of high-tech industries. For one, the textile industries in all non-western countries were inferior to the French and British industrialised productions. Without the import of skills and technology, the best other economies could do was “stumble along” (Amsden, 2001, 50), even though some countries (Amsden mentions Mexico as an example) did already employ protectionist measures. As such, it is clear that industrialisation is only possible through a combination of private investments and public efforts towards the development of know-how.

Before the war, the lack of large firms and prevalence of artisan firms meant that technology transfer was very limited (Amsden, 2001, 98). This is where the distinction between countries with, and without manufacturing experience becomes important. When a country without the national foundation for industry attempts to draw in capital and industrialise, it is far less likely to succeed than when this foundation was already in place. Important distinctions are found in the education/training of individuals, and similarly important, the existence of managerial spirit and experience. Korea for example, which gained its know-how and

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11 schooling during the Second World War by cooperation between Korean elites from both business and politics and their Japanese counterparts (Amsden, 2001, 105). No country was able to start industrialising without any of this kind of experience (Amsden, 2001, 121). Export led industrialisation represented a much more risky strategy than most national corporations were like to pursue. Thus, the point at which the state steps in according to Amsden is similar to what Chibber describes. Filling in the gaps in private investment, and in Chibber‟s case creating a mutual benefit for cooperation are the reason state-led development is so prevalent in the post-war era (Amsden, 2001, 160-161). While import substitution was a main focus in many countries, for an example see India above, export led industrialisation was much more effective. Not only does this help focus on comparative advantages, but the import of know-how was vital for diversifying industries. A fledgling capitalist class is unlikely to expand quickly in risky sectors, even if the development of these sectors would greatly improve the general economic position of the national economy. State protection from the risks associated with developing new sectors is therefore key in setting up export driven industrialisation.

The potential benefits from developing certain national sectors, instead of purchasing

technologies abroad, allows for a more sustainable path to development. The role of national corporations such as Saudi Aramco will be further examined below. Creating a national leader of industry, and fostering domestic R&D will benefit an economy in several ways, most notably in increasing competitiveness. The “make” technology countries identified by Amsden were able to outcompete not only other parts of the „Rest‟, but in some cases even rival the West. This notion is the main take-away in regards to identifying development strategies for late developer in general, and for Saudi Arabia in particular. While Amsden shifts focus away from the institutional public-private links, it is clear that state intervention is still required for late development. Increasing competitiveness of domestic producers is unmistakably important in developmental efforts, and in drawing in and distributing know-how, the state can play a pivotal role.

Late development through developmentalism

In the next part the focus of this review will no longer be based strictly on the work of the three authors. Their theories will be adapted to formulate a general development strategy for late developers. This part will extract the most important aspects of state-led growth from the

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12 literature, and explain the way in which a developmental state might be created. From the previous section, three main strategies have been identified. Amsden‟s focus on accruing know-how, combined with Chibber‟s observations of the origins of the Korean Chaebols underline the importance of international actors. The first part of the next section will analyse the ways in which international corporations and individuals, as well as export partners can be used for the creation and furthering of late development strategies. Secondly, the state

structures explained by Evans and Chibber make it clear that national actors can be instrumental in creating a developmental state, or completely prevent the state from

expressing its autonomy. As such it is clear that state-society relations and the mobilisation of national actors is of similar importance. Finally, the foundational sectors for sustainable development will be identified. In order to create late development it is not only necessary to think of the ways in which the relations between sectors should be formulated, but the effectiveness within them as well. Thusly, this last paragraph will deal more with the development of sectors like education and training, local firms, bureaucracy, labour

organisations, which are all foundational for the establishment of a modern capitalist state and for creating sustainable and equitable development.

International actors and how to employ them

As mentioned before, the international dimension of creating a developmental state is of importance in attracting know-how, in drawing in investments, as well as being a destination for exports. The following paragraph will focus on development strategies involving

international actors. These will be international corporations, international institutions and export partners. No country has been able to create development without foreign experience, though the nature of this involvement did differ in various late developers. International corporations bring in foreign capital and know-how, as has been explored in the previous section, for example in the case of Japanese involvement in Korea. Risky initiatives such as the building of a steel plant while the country lacked both coal and iron ore represents strong state involvement in the economic situation of the country. The Korean state invested billions of dollars in creating an entirely new economic sector, to ensure the international competitive position of the country would improve. In this case, the state is involved in a sector that is of key importance in the further development of the national economy, an action that enabled it to position itself as an autonomous actor in the developmental strategy.

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13 Evans identifies structures between state and societal actors as the main deciding factor on whether or not a state is able to embark on successful economic policy. Korea had a form of embedded autonomy that allowed it to foster or support new and upcoming economic sectors. Though this was only made possible through introducing Japanese war reparations in the form of technical assistance from Nippon Steel, one of the world‟s most efficient producers (Evans, 1995, 74). Moreover, the international structures put in place by the Japanese aided in the formation of an international trading tradition. Japanese trading companies possessed marketing networks in the United States‟ market, and their deals with Korean partners

allowed Korean companies to access this market (Chibber, 2003, 78). International experience was thus used in the Korean case to create a national economy, as well as to participate in international trade. This represents the potential from international and regional links to fully enjoy the potential from new industrialisation, and highlights the need for an „open‟ approach to new industrialisation. In general, the state could positively influence the development of an economic sector by promoting internationalisation through for example mediating between international corporations and local actors, and by offering conditional subsidies on the basis of export performance (see also Thurbon and Weiss, 2016, 640).

Aimed efforts to effective companies and sectors have proven to be much more successful in the promotion of development than a broader policy of protectionism. Protectionism in an aimed form can be a vital measure in increasing the viability of infant industries. As such, it is unlikely that abiding by the rules of international neoliberal institutions is a recommended course of action. In fact, rushing every one of the goals set by neoliberal institutions can be in direct opposition to the smoothest development path (Chang, 2003, 138). Chang‟s book

Kicking down the Ladder introduces the institutional dimension of international cooperation.

He explains that delaying some reforms, or not abiding to all rules and regulations in place in the international economic status quo would be more like the experience by the West, and thus help developing countries (the Rest/Remainder) protect their infant industries or build up an effective bureaucracy (Chang, 2003, 121). It should be clear though, that accession to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund offer many benefits to developing countries as well. Experience in formulating economic policy, as well as lessons to the formation of a national bureaucracy are invaluable in the creation of a national developmental plan. It was because of the prevalence of these institutions that newly industrialising economies (NIEs) were able to grow at a faster speed than the West was in their developing period (Chang, 2003, 132). Chang‟s work therefore further explains that international frameworks have the

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14 potential to increase a national development path, when keeping the main aim in mind: the quick transformation to an advanced capitalist economy.

All in all, mobilising the potential of international actors should be one of the main concerns of a developmental state. The know-how and the potential for new markets is a significant benefit for fledgling industries and established sectors alike. It is clear though that strategising the ways in which to do this is impossible without an strong and embedded bureaucracy. Fostering international companies and institutions requires national actors. As such, while the main driver of development will lie in the international sphere, no late developer can ignore domestic actors.

Mobilising national actors in an overarching development plan

Whereas the previous part emphasised the importance of the international sphere for attracting know-how and for exports, the next part will explain how domestic actors can be drivers and accelerators for these development strategies. This will focus on the integration of national capitalists in the structure of state led development. State-owned enterprises, for one, offer unique opportunities to manage industrial growth, as well as drive the adaptation of foreign technology as well as execute their own research and development programmes (Amsden, 2001, 214 & 279). However, given the internationalisation of the world‟s economy, and the emergence of neoliberal institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, it is clear that import substitution and protectionist measures for infant industries cannot be the only measures taken by states in a path to development. Research and development and regional economic integration will take a greater role in late development of the Remainder than in the developmental states of South- and East Asia (Amsden, 2001, 292). Employing capitalist forces in a state-centred economic model is something the Saudis are quite familiar with. Saudi Aramco, the world‟s largest petrochemical company, is a fully state-owned enterprise. These kinds of corporations are important drivers behind technological advancements, and can be a way for states to take the aforementioned role of foreign corporations in bringing in technologies in their own hands. Whereas many state-owned enterprises are criticised for their ineffectiveness, a company like Saudi Aramco can act as an “apex organization” (Amsden, 2001, 217), and foster a large group of secondary tier companies. Setting up a national company in this way can, in short, integrate a large amount of companies in a state-led economic sector. The national leader can enhance the aforementioned technological advantages for its subsidiary companies.

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15 Another aspect of economic development where large corporations similar to the Korean Chaebols can be of help is in the diversification of economies. Business groups tended to be the driver for diversification in late development since the underdeveloped sectors provided them with new business opportunities. While lack of know-how can diminish potential returns in one of the more developed sectors, it is in the setup of new sectors that these business groups could acquire “generic project execution skills” (Amsden, 2001, 197). These skills include feasibility studies, finance, construction, and importantly setting up research and development. Large corporations or business groups, in short, have been immensely valuable assets to developmental states. In return, states have provided these groups with benefits such as protection from foreign competition, or conditional funding.

In setting up these conditions, it is imperative to avoid losing autonomy to the power of private capital. The result of failing to do so is clear from the Indian example touched upon by Chibber and mentioned in the first section of this review. The Indian state provided a new national capitalist class with unconditional aid first, which was of course supported (Chibber, 2003, 108). When disciplinary measures were announced however, business opposition became so strong that the state had to give in, and instead of being scrutinised to government management, Indian capital was to be self-regulated. This was possible due to the explicit commitment to use public funds for the development of private capital. This led to the situation that private capital could be certain of state assistance, and however strong foreign competition would be, the state would protect national capitalists. In effect, this took away the incentive for corporations to allow the state to urge their improved efficiency, and encouraged a push away from state enforcement. All in all, connecting national actors in order to achieve an overarching development strategy is another key strategy in creating late development. Private capital scrutinised to government control was the main driver for Korean capitalist expansion, while failure to connect state planning with private actors inhibited Indian growth. When combined with the benefits from integrating international actors in state led

development, the groundwork for capitalist expansion is laid out. However, in order for these actors to be able to properly expand national capabilities, several important societal sectors must first be established.

Important foundational sectors for sustainable development.

Whereas the previous paragraphs highlighted the potential for the integration and exploitation of international and domestic actors in national development plans, this part will underline the

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16 importance of a national foundation. It will thus explain the need for developing human resources, creating civil society and working towards bureaucratic reform. Any state that desires to develop late should attempt to increase local competitiveness. Many authors have attempted to prescribe methods by which this can be achieved, and several have been mentioned above.

Simply subsidising industrial endeavours is, insufficient in creating sustainable development. The role of the state is not null, though. Measures such as improving human capital should be among the NIEs main points of focus. A notable point that can be made is that the focus on welfare enhancing sectors such as education and healthcare should go from a utilitarian „means to an end‟, to becoming an end in themselves (Evans, 2014, 86). As such, as

mentioned above, subsidies are insufficient and reforms in for example intellectual property rights are prerequisite for the „new‟ industrialisation Evans talks about. Improving labourers‟ position and education would be another way to work towards this new role. Rather than simply offering monetary advantage or coercing firms to operate in certain ways through shared ownership, the state has to let go of these measures and transform its role from re-distributor, to facilitator for social development. As has been explained above, it is not only necessary to improve the transfer or creation of knowledge in creating competitive markets. Establishing a population with the required skills, managerial, technical and vocational, is of similar importance (see for example Amsden, 2001, 121).

In establishing the institutions needed to achieve the goal of enhancing the capability of the population, civil society can be particularly helpful. As Evans mentions: “civil society constituencies must have the capability to ensure that state actions respond to collective preferences.” (Evans, 2014, 105). However, civil society actors are virtually non-existent in Saudi Arabia because of the clientalist structures. The state dominates organisations such as unions, mosques and environmental groups (Hertog, 2010, 29). Of course, the experience in Saudi Arabia does not compare perfectly to the South and South-East Asian examples, given its large monetary reserves and sizable rent incomes. This monetary advantage is

overshadowed at least in part by power structures and struggles that can be disastrous for state capacity for reform. However, as will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, per capita income from oil rents is dropping, and diversifying economic activities is a serious concern for the survival of the all Gulf states‟ economies. As such, the merits of a facilitating developmental state, working in tandem with national industrialists and regional and

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17 alternative to the rentier structures. Bureaucratic reform and putting an end to the

institutionalised corruption in the corporatists/clientalist structures within the state are

therefore key steps in the formulation of a development plan. Looking back at the experiences in East Asia, it is clear that this bureaucratic reform will include decreasing the willingness at which government jobs are given out. Personal gain cannot be the main concern for

government officials (Evans, 1995, 113 for example), and selection of new recruits should be rigorous (Evans, 1995, 12).

Changing the way in which the state has functioned since the start of oil exploitation is a radical idea, though the decline of oil rents forces reform on the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Until now, employing foreign labourers has demobilised labour movements in the Kingdom. This „spatial fix‟ described by Hanieh once again highlights the importance of moving away from clientalist state involvement. Employing foreign workers as the main source of labour decreases the risk to stability arising from this class, though it also stops the opportunity for civil society actors to increase state capacity in creating broader welfare systems. Moreover, Ulrichsen notes that the clientalist structures by which foreign and domestic private

companies are controlled and endorsed decreases the autonomy of the private sector, and similarly of public policy (Ulrichsen, 2017, 214). A chief way in which the need for labour reform is clear is in the Nitaqat, or Saudisation programme. Set up during the 1980‟s and of renewed importance in the Vision 2030 reforms, this programme aims at coercing Saudi companies to employ more Saudi nationals. While at first glance a logical step in bringing down unemployment in the country, it is important to understand the reasons why Saudi nationals have trouble finding jobs in a job market dominated by foreign labour. These reasons can include wrong schooling (Wiseman et al., 2014, 13), relatively higher wage demands than foreigners (Mellahi, 2007, 90), or even an undesirable labour ethos (Yusuf, 2014, 102). In short, developing the relative competitiveness of Saudi labour should be able to go a long way in having the same effect as the Nitaqat programme, with added economic competitiveness benefits.

Late industrialisation is a challenge to achieve. This part has identified the main development strategies found in the relevant literature. International actors and markets are important vectors for know-how and investment funds. Government intervention in the mobilisation of these international parties can take several forms, and can ultimately lead to the creation of regional networks of trade and cooperation. State involvement can greatly help nudge national actors to work together with international corporations, without drowning out in the

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18 competition. These national actors are particularly helpful in fostering managerial and

vocational skills, and distributing them through aligned companies. In order to provide either international or domestic capitalist actors with the opportunity they require, another new role of the state should be to improve the quality of the conditions for labour. Education and healthcare should be of main concern, as these improve the climate for business. In order to achieve better labour conditions, state structure will have to transform. Civil society and political opposition can be particularly useful in formulating strategies towards improving workers‟ capabilities. What is more, bureaucratic efficiency should be a main concern, and so the selection process for bureaucrats should be strict. The above has explained the ways in which the developmental state of 20th century Asia has created strong economic expansion. This generalised strategy will be made contemporary and case-specific in the next part and chapter. Before going into detail for the case, the next part will go over several potential pitfalls in the strategy explained above when adopted for use in the 21st century and the case study of this thesis.

Strategy made contemporary

A difficulty in creating a new developmental state lies in the foundation on which these states were constructed. The degree of autonomy that characterised the East Asian developmental states did not arise from a vacuum. It appeared as a logical product of certain preconditions such as colonialism and wars, that weakened local capital in such a way that it was possible for states to position themselves at the top of industrial management. As such creating a new developmental state depends on whether or not creating embedded autonomy is still possible, and still relevant.

Evans argues that, once successfully implemented, a developmental state could breed its own opposition. Both workers‟ unions and industrial conglomerates might feel resentment towards the state, even though both would in effect be a product of state management. Moreover, domestic capital has a decreasing importance in local development. As described at length by Hanieh, and discussed in a later chapter, regional capitalists hold superior power in an

increasingly global economy. These regional corporations can benefit in similar ways to the national capitalists described above (see Hanieh, 2011, 174), but are not tied to the state for accountability.

Aside from the internationalisation of capital, all GCC countries, Saudi Arabia included, accessioned to the World Trade Organisation and signed free trade agreements (Hanieh, 2011,

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19 105). This takes away a potent way of protecting fledgling sectors by disallowing

protectionist measures. It is not obvious whether or not these restrictions can be circumvented. Drawing back on the internationalisation of capital, the accession to the WTO helped draw in even more funds to both the state and the international conglomerates (Hanieh, 2011, 106). It is important to remember that, even though there are strong opposing forces to the

autonomous developmental state, it is not clearly an impossibility to build on the lessons gained from it. Both the internal and external tendencies towards diminishing the power of the developmental state do not necessarily tend towards its dismantling (Evans, 1995, 232). Instead, this could very well fit with the observations by Chibber, in that it is required for a developmental state to work with industrialists on a conditional basis for them to retain the advantages provided by protectionism. Even then, Chibber notes that eventually the success of Korean state subordination of private capital failed when the Chaebols were able to source finance themselves (Chibber, 2003, 247). Loss of private reliance on public funding will lead to the destruction of the mutual checks, and to the implosion of the developmental state. A more case-centred pitfall in creating a developmental state is that in this regard to autonomy the Saudi case is made more complex. The institutionalised clientalism and corruption present in the Rentier State structures poses a serious obstacle to creating an independent

bureaucracy. The institutional conglomerate that is the Saudi monarchy manages many

stakeholders in day-to-day economic activity (Hertog, 2005, 115). The stability of this system arises from the bidirectional nature of power in the state-society interactions. Many business elites rely on the state for favours, protection and perks, while the state in turn relies on the same business elites for legitimacy and achieving development strategies. The tribal origins of the way the state organises itself highlights the main weakness of the Saudi State. The

institutionalised corruption found in the clientalist state structure diminish the states

autonomy. This strongly increases the risk outlined by Chibber. States with limited autonomy got, in his words, locked in place. Similar to India, the clientalism in Saudi Arabia lacks strong top-down control or bottom-up accountability. Instead the managing class and

bureaucrats are merged. This represents a form of state capture that, according to Chibber, can reinforce itself. Concessions to private capital led to a retreat of the state from sectors that were designated to be public, and to an even greater reliance on private sector actors (Chibber, 2003, 209). Even without the initial failure of subordinating private corporations, it was the nature of the developmental state to disassemble itself. Loss of state autonomy, combined with increasing autonomy of national actors, led to a decreasing reliance on the

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20 developmental models. This does not mean that a developmental state holds no value to (partially) industrialised economies, it does mean a new developmental state has to involve itself on many more levels in economic planning (Chibber, 2005, 164). In short, in order to create a 21st century developmental state in Saudi Arabia, it is not only necessary to create a way out of the capture of the state by industrial leaders that already exists, but also finding a way to afterwards position the state as a planning organisation above the industrial sector. These difficulties will be further explored in the next part, and along with the reform desires outlined in recent policy plans, the next chapter will explain the ways in which Saudi Arabia can be able to use developmental strategies.

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Chapter 2

In the following chapter this dissertation will go over the case study, and explain in what ways the theory explored in the first chapter can be applied directly, and where existing theory has to be adapted. There are several characteristics of the case that require a more loose

application of the described theory. This chapter will be divided into three parts. Firstly, the case will be described in more detail. Many of the backgrounds of the classic developmental states do not exist anymore, and the internal structure of Saudi Arabia differs greatly from the East Asian examples as well. Having identified and analysed the underlying differences to the theoretical basis, this chapter will prescribe certain reforms arising from the developmental state theory, that will help increase the Saudi state capacity for leading reforms. Lastly, the potential for regional development will be highlighted. While many national reforms might be hard to achieve in the internationalised global economy, a regional approach can open up new paths to development.

20th century developmental state to a 21st century post-oil regional developmental

project

When finding a contemporary theory for state led development, it is important to realise that not only the domestic situation is different from the ones described by developmental state theorists. The international economic relations are also transformed beyond recognition. This paragraph will go over several changes to the international political economic order that are of interest to any country wishing to develop late. The first of these changes was in place when East Asia was attempting to develop, though the prevalence and importance of it has

increased dramatically. The international institutions by which the global economy are governed are increasingly universal. World bank and World Trade Organisation membership is something that is more or less a given in the current global economic system. The

importance of these institutions has been hinted at in the first chapter of this dissertation when dealing with Chang‟s book Kicking away the Ladder, and have since Chang‟s writing not decreased in importance. The benefits from membership are many, though the opportunity for protectionism has decreased accordingly. It is not only the petrochemical industry that

benefits from decreasing barriers to trade through institutions, as the standard of living can increase due to easier imports, and free flow of capital can help draw in more investments for domestic corporations.

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22 On the other hand, in the recent history the importance of global or regional free trade

agreements between groups of nations has diminished. This is exemplified by the United States‟ president Trump‟s denunciation of treaties like TTIP, TPP and NAFTA. The corresponding rise of bilateral trade agreements represents the shift away from global institutions towards a more national or regional focus. This offers opportunities for

developing economies, as negotiations with individual partners can be simpler than complex diplomatic talks about integrating in larger trade blocs. A second kind of international integration of the global political economy is the internationalisation of capital. The fluid nature of international capital offers both opportunities for Saudi Arabia as drawbacks. The important thing to understand is that with the prescriptions of open economies by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, the global economy is more interlinked than ever before. For one, this helped propagate global economic crises such as the one in 2008. However, when companies in the West were no longer seen as mostly risk-free by investors, the international nature of capital meant that this capital was able to flow to the global South (Hanieh, 2011, 168). It must be made clear though that a serious disadvantage arising from the internationalisation of capital arises from the decidedly inexperienced Saudi bureaucracy and government officials on the front of capital management. When oil rents inevitably run lower, the capital supply in the country must be placed under stricter scrutiny. A well

managed financial sector offers opportunities for capital supply in the future. This idea will be further worked out in the final part of this chapter.

Other issues concerning the adaptation of developmentalism to the 21st century Saudi Arabia come from national power structures. Corporatism finds its roots in the tribal past of the Arab region. Before the discovery and exploitation of oil reserves, states in the Gulf region often achieved stability through systems of patronage to merchant families (Valeri, 2013, 19). This tribalist system has been continued through the influx of oil rents, allowing the ruler to ensure loyalty and retain stability (Valeri, 2013, 21). Through this system, the notable families were often directly involved in the extraction of rents, and through those gained significant material wealth. Although often structured hierarchically, the roles of these layers of patronage were not strictly coercive. Ayubi states that the tribal power is rather a hegemonic one. Power is not gained through political force, but through social consensus (1995, 244). The linkages are also not necessarily hierarchical, as they occupy places “around and underneath the ruling family (as the power structure is both circular and pyramidal)” (Ayubi, 1995, 245). These relations have come under stress as the state expanded but did not develop; as oil rents decrease and

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23 state power is decentralised yet strongly depended upon, the loyalty of subjects will be

difficult to maintain (Ayubi, 1995, 253). The structures of government sanctioned economic development also persist. When a ministry or government department, which are usually headed by a member of the royal family, decides to allocate funds to a project, this contract is seen as a favour for the royal family. As such, development projects can provide opportunities for those in public employment to further private positions. What is more, aside from

distributing favours to business elite, the government also employs a majority share of nationals (Beblawi, 1990, 91). The implications of the tribal corporatism still present in the Saudi economic system are far-reaching. For one, there is a distinct lack of a civil society in Saudi Arabia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, civil society actors are often basic drivers behind societal reforms, and as a result these will be difficult to implement.

Moreover, relations between corporate groups are often clientalist. Hertog describes the Saudi state as having strong state-society links, by which the government functions as an

„institutional conglomerate‟ (Hertog, 2010, 115). This means that there are many different, hierarchical as well as parallel stakeholders. Not only does the state reside above the aforementioned corporate groups, it positions itself within the cliental structure of redistribution. One of the key implications of this kind of embeddedness is that both the private and the public (as well as the religious) face of the country‟s elite keep one another in power, as to not lose their own legitimacy. This inherent stability is described by Lacroix in his analysis of the Saudi Arab Spring movements, when religious legitimacy enabled the monarchy to gain overt support from the Grand Mufti. This religious head issued a fatwa against the protest movements. In return, Lacroix states, government officials backed down from the commitment to allow women to vote in the subsequent elections (2011, 55). This exemplifies the Saudi governments disability to reform because of the juggling of powerful stakeholders.

Around the same time, public sector links played a role in the WTO accession debates, in which the fragmented nature of both the administration and the public sector became clear, when neither the public sector, nor government officials were able to produce serious policy actors (Hertog, 2010, 233). While WTO membership has profound influence on the day-to-day business of many private sector companies in the Kingdom, no coherent business opposition/coalition appeared. It is clear then that even after the early reforms of the late 1990‟s and early 2000‟s, the private sector is very much tied in the system of protection, perks and favours. Due to this, it has very little input towards reforms. In fact, the reforms of the

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24 1990‟s and later have cemented the state as a core part of the Saudi nation, with the monarchy at its centre (Lacroix, 2011, 53). Alongside the stability arising from corporatist groups and cliental structures, managing a rentier state provides another part of the social and political stability in the monarchy. Rentier economic management can exist where the accumulation of state means is centred around a small section of the society – in the case of the Gulf this is the oil industry. Due to the limited societal engagement in the creation of state revenue, the rest of society can be engaged in the distribution and utilisation of the wealth created by the minority (Beblawi, 1990, 87). The redistributing nature of the Rentier State then means that the state effectively „buys off‟ the need to hold itself accountable. Democracy and civil society engagement are of decreased importance because of the Rentier state. This disconnect

between the state and the need for democratisation is not only part of the reason why political reform comes slowly in Saudi Arabia, but also provides serious implications to the

developmental state theory described in the previous chapter. Private actors are as much part of creating a developmental state as public sector actors are.

Why developmentalism?

It is because of the stability in the Gulf political economic structures that the relevance of the developmental state theory arises. While the situation from which the Korean or Japanese developmental states were created is radically different from the contemporary Saudi situation, there are key similarities underlying the traditional theory on the case. In the following chapter, both the similarities and differences between the „traditional‟

developmental states and a potential modern iteration of it will be the main focus. This will allow for an in-depth discussion of the viability of developmentalism as an answer to the question what comes after the oil kingdom runs out of oil.

The classic rentier notion of the state providing all nationals with sufficient funds (usually through employment) to buy off their call for representation has been outdated for some time. Unemployment under youths is at a high due to a variety of issues including low

employability of Saudi nationals due to their relative incompatibility with the labour market due to reasons explained above. Since it is no longer possible to maintain the classic

distributing system, it is up to the state to solve these issues and others, and to create an environment for sustainable development. Late development is particularly relevant to the future of Saudi Arabia because of the otherwise strong reliance on a single sector.

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25 short- to medium term development of the Gulf. The era of virtually unlimited oil exploitation has ended, bringing a strong economic and political incentive to expand activities. With the shift from the second generation of Saudi Kings, the political will to transform the economic system has come as well. Making contemporary the developmental state theory will help provide the as of yet capital rich monarchy with tools to take on the challenge of sustainable late development. While political reform will prove to be paramount, this dissertation will not call for the end of the absolute monarchy, as the political nature of state management does not matter greatly. Instead, it will argue for situations as close to the contemporary power

structures as logically possible, to maximise relevance to the case. It will however argue that constitutional freedoms are of key concern to a new monarchical system. The time to change the rentier structures that have ruled the kingdom for decades to a new system has arrived. It is likely not possible for the Saudi State to survive much longer without reformulating the political and economic structures inherent to rentierism (see Ulrichsen, 2017). As a result, exploring alternative solutions to post-oil development has never been more relevant. The next part will go into further detail of how to expand state capacity for reform, in which civil society actors will play an important role.

Expanding state capacity

Distributing opportunities

While the Saudi economy is by no means developmental, it does already achieve several goals identified by developmental state theorists. For one, the primacy of the state-owned enterprise Saudi Aramco is an important tool in the proposed development plan. The administration has realised the promise of this corporation, as they are mentioned in the Vision 2030 plan (Vision 2030, 2016, 14). The idea is to create special economic zones and to revitalise

economic cities with the aid of Aramco. While the realisation that Saudi Aramco has a role to play in the development of economic sectors is naturally important, it seems that the focus is in somewhat the wrong place. Amsden describes the ideal situation, in which an Apex organisation such as Aramco would act as a national leader of technological development (2001, 217). The Vision text only mentions the strategy for including the oil corporation in the context of reviving economic cities, rather than fostering national linkages between sectors. However, in the concluding list of achievements for 2030, the text does mention the role of Saudi Aramco in a Strategic Transformation program (Vision 2030, 2016, 23). Here the text touches on what should be the main goal for the corporation, as it has and should work on a

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26 “sweeping transformative program that will position it as a leader in more than one sector” (2016, 23). Fostering this corporation, and especially those links to subsidiary companies will be one of the more important roles of the state in the spread of know-how in the technological sector (see Amsden, 2001, 197).

Another direct link to the literature mentioned in chapter 1 can be found in the prevalence of corporate groups in the Saudi political economy. While these groups are not autonomous, the comparison to the Korean Chaebols is easily made. Diversification through the protection and funding of different corporate companies would fall into the same general strategy that Korea successfully employed in its developmental strategy. In fact, employing these groups in the same manner could help foster opportunity distribution in the same way Saudi Aramco could. These corporate groups, that will be touched on in more detail later, would take on the role of these national corporations. It is key then, to ensure the autonomy of these groups from the bureaucracy, but to include them in formulating developmental plans. This is where the remaining rentier nature of the state becomes overly clear in the Vision 2030 strategy. The departure from clientalist links with members of the royal family and other aligned business partners is not made explicit in the text, even though these are classified as the main sources of reformative stagnation in the Kingdom (Hertog, 2010, 191). The most important argument for shifting away from the rentier structures towards the management of the state in

accordance to developmental strategies comes in the conditionality of the protectionism. The rentier state of the 20th century was a complex system of unconditional aid given to princes and business elites. All powerful stakeholders would receive funding in order to buy off their political support. Protection from foreign competition and the provision of funding should, in a modern developmental state, only be given to companies that are able to comply with pre-determined export or production goals.

While the rentier state was quite successful in managing a national leader and a State-Owned Enterprise, the decline of oil wealth relative to the size of the economy forces this change on the Saudis. Granting only conditional aid will help companies grow competitive in a global economy, in the way described by Chibber. However, in order to distribute the opportunities gained from increasing economic activity and competitiveness, other reforms are required. These include the equitable distribution of know-how, wealth and labour opportunities. Working towards these goals will be another way to increase the willingness of national capitalists to cooperate with the state, as this will make sure they benefit from the partnership. A more capable labour population is beneficial to employers as well as employees. The next

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27 part will explain how the state should increase its spending on education and other capability enhancing sectors as a main strategy towards development.

Capability enhancement

It is clear that in order to develop into an advanced capitalist society, simple economic figures are insufficiently suited to distinguish success from failure. Creating a contemporary

developmental state should therefore also focus strongly on creating growth that is equitable. One important way to do so is explained by Evans. Enhancing the capability for the

population to fend for themselves should not simply be seen as a means to arrive at economic growth, but should be taken as an economic metric of itself (See Evans‟ Capability enhancing

state, 2014). Moreover, Amsden calls late development “pure learning” (Amsden, 2001, 2). In

case-specific literature, similar calls are made in regards to post-oil economic development. There is still a distinct lack of schooled engineers and scientists, causing national innovation to lag behind other NIEs (Khorsheed, 2015, 150). Building a supply of experienced labour is of key importance according to Amsden (2001, 292). One major advantage the Saudis have in this respect comes from the oil rents it is still drawing in. Large monetary reserves are

however contrasted with a completely lacking civil society. In order for the state to be able to fully exploit its advantage in monetary supply, it is likely that the civil society actors have to be given a chance to express themselves in policy making. While some authors are pessimistic that breaking down the state control over many parts of the population is possible (see

Ulrichsen, 2017, 221 or Hertog, 2010, 191 & 244), it is clear that declining oil prices and the growing population will make a change inevitable (Hertog, 2010, 245). Vocational training and engineering education is more important now that the state‟s capacity for simple

distribution of wealth is faltering. As such, a shift in mentality from oil wealth distribution to the redistribution of tax income is likely necessary. These expenses should go to areas such as healthcare, education and housing, as these lay a better foundation on which economic

development can be made sustainable and equitable.

Provided the Saudis can offer these foundational opportunities to young nationals, the rising productivity in China, India and for example the quickly developing banking sector in Dubai can provide support by which Saudi Arabia‟s companies can increase their own capabilities (Khorsheed, 2015, 151). This mitigates the issue Amsden identifies in her discussion of development by the Remainder, namely the lack of simultaneously industrialising countries to imitate and learn from (Amsden, 2001, 292).

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28 The growth of the non-producing sector, like information and services, represents a key difference from the East-Asian examples of the 20th century. In order to develop new economic sectors in a competitive way, the state has to let go of some control mechanisms, and allow private actors some autonomy. Bureaucratic reforms will be dealt with in more detail in the next paragraph. Allowing for an independent civil society, and thereby increasing the living standards of the population will be another key role of a modern developmental state. As this will inevitably lead to calls for a more democratic, constitutional government, these reforms are likely among the more controversial to implement for the current Saudi leadership. The argument for it however is convincing enough to recommend this strategy. What is more, the Arab spring movements have shown that, even without traditional civil society groups, social media is set to take over their role. Lacroix believes that it was the corporatist system that was able to suppress real reforms during the Arab Spring, just like in the past. It is likely that with the splintering of the upper monarchy during the shift from the second generation Kings to the third, future reform movements might be more successful (2011, 58). Allowing civil society to express concerns with government policy can be an important way to prioritise certain reforms. The effect of failing to do so can be found in the failure of the Indian state to create a successful developmental state, after demobilising the labour movement led to state capture by capitalists. Allowing for unions to emerge in Saudi Arabia could aid the developmental project twofold. Firstly by allowing for an interest group to express concerns with government policy, increasing government accountability. Secondly, dividing the developmental goals between capitalist actors and labour parties mitigates the risk of state capture by an overly powerful class (for an example see India in Chibber, 2003, 44 & 103).

Autonomy

In order to be able to act on the lessons above, bureaucratic reforms will be necessary. While the vulnerability of the Saudi state structure has been the focus of most of the literature dealing with the country, it seems as though the administration is finally set on improving the bureaucratic weakness. Of the “transformative programs” mentioned in the Vision 2030 text, half are concerned with improving bureaucratic efficiency (2006, 22). This determinedness visible from the Council of Economic and Development Affairs signifies the attempted departure from the internal rentier structures in which the Saudi state has been stuck through most of the recent reform efforts. The bureaucratic inefficiency of rentier states is well known, and distributing favours to interest groups was one of the main ways for the state to

From oil kingdom to contemporary developmental state

Universiteit Leiden