Regulating transnational corporations and human rights : towards an international treaty? : a research into the effects of human rights governance by transnational corporations on states’ foreign policy agenda regarding

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Regulating Transnational Corporations & Human Rights:

Towards an International Treaty?

A research into the effects of human rights governance

by transnational corporations on states’ foreign policy agenda regarding

international regulation of Transnational Corporations & Human Rights

Name: Anne Stikkers Student Number: 10641491

Master Thesis: Master of Political Science – International Relations Supervisor: Mr. M.C. Hanegraaff

Second reader: Mr. L.W. Fransen

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List of Tables

Table 1: Sub-questions Table 2: Operationalization

Table 3: Sample Selection Transnational Corporations Table 4: Response rates

Table 5: Conducted Interviews Table 6: Consulted TNC Documents Table 7: Informal Interviews

Table 8: Methods of Data Analysis Table 9: Sub-questions Ecuador Table 10: Self-regulation Ecuador

Table 11: Human Rights Institutionalization by TNCs in Ecuador Table 12: Documents TNCs in Ecuador

Table 13: Enforcement Mechanisms of TNCs in Ecuador

Table 14: Private Authoritative Standards and Certifications of TNCs in Ecuador Table 15: Voluntary Self-Regulation Ecuador

Table 16: Facilitation of Human Rights Ecuador

Table 17: Provision of Common Goods by TNCs in Ecuador

Table 18: Facilitation of Public Enjoyment of Human Rights by TNCs in Ecuador Table 19: Public-Private Partnerships for Human Rights in Ecuador

Table 20: Voluntary Facilitation Ecuador

Table 21: Human Rights Governance by TNCs in Ecuador Table 22: State Knowledge Ecuador

Table 23: State Knowledge of Human Rights Governance by TNCs in Ecuador Table 24: Ecuador’s diplomatic discourse versus conclusions from research Table 25: Sub-questions The Netherlands

Table 26: Self-regulation The Netherlands

Table 27: Human Rights Institutionalization by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 28: Documents TNCs in the Netherlands

Table 29: Local Human Rights Policies by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 30: Enforcement Mechanisms of TNCs in the Netherlands

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5 Table 31: Voluntary Self-Regulation the Netherlands

Table 32: Commitment to OECD and UN by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 33: Common Goods Provision by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 34: Human Rights Governance by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 35: State Knowledge the Netherlands

Table 36: State Knowledge of Human Rights Governance by TNCs in the Netherlands Table 37: The Netherlands’ diplomatic discourse versus conclusions from research Table 38: Human Rights Governance by TNCs in Ecuador

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List of Figures

Figure 1: The creation of foreign policy according to Neoclassical Realism and Neorealism Figure 2: Research Design

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List of Boxes

Box 4.1 – Jaume Corbella, Repsol

Box 4.2 – María Gabriela Troya Rodríguez, Ambassador Box 4.3 – Juan Pablo Cadena, diplomat

Box 4.4 – Karel P. Coors, Honorary Consul-General; Luis Gustavo Espinosa Salas, diplomat; Juan Pablo Cadena, diplomat

Box 4.5 – Juan Pablo Cadena, diplomat

Box 4.6 - Karel P. Coors, Honorary Consul-General; Jorge Elizagary, human rights activist Box 4.7 – Juan Pablo Cadena, diplomat; María Gabriela Troya Rodríguez, Ambassador Box 5.1 – Geanne van Arkel, Interface

Box 5.2 – Heineken, Water Policy

Box 5.3 – Geanne van Arkel, Interface; William van Niekerk, BAM; Saskia Kranendonk, ABN Amro; Jeffrey van Meerkerk, Manpower

Box 5.4 – Rutger Goethart, Heineken

Box 5.5 – Kees van Baar, Human Rights Ambassador; Saskia Böttcher, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Gilles Goethart, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jan van Wijngaarden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Box 5.6 – William van Niekerk, BAM

Box 5.7 – Saskia Böttcher, Ministry of Economic Affairs

Box 5.8 – Kees van Baar, Human Rights Ambassador; Paul Peters, diplomat Box 5.9 - Saskia Böttcher, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Paul Peters, diplomat Box 5.10 – Vincent van Assem, ABN Amro

Box 5.11 – William van Niekerk, BAM Box 5.12 – Paul Peters, diplomat

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List of Abbreviations

AIAG - Automotive Industry Action Group B & HR - Business & Human Rights

CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility

FBHR - United Nations Forum on Business & Human Rights 2014

HR - Human Rights

HRC - Human Rights Council

HRC-26 - 26th session of the Human Rights Council

HRL - Human Rights Law

IHR - International Human Rights

IHRL - International Human Rights Law

ILO - International Labor Organization

IR - International Relations

NAM - Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij

OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PREG - Permanent Mission of the Republic of Ecuador to the United Nations in Geneva

Resolution L.22 - Resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1: ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’

TNC - Transnational Corporation

TNC & HR - Transnational Corporations & Human Rights UDHR - Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN - United Nations

UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UPR - Universal Periodic Review

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List of Appendix Tables

Table A1: Research Design

Table A2: Analysis Sovereign state autonomy

Table A3: Analysis FDI & reduced regulatory capacity

List of Appendix Figures

Figure A1: FDI Inward stock in Ecuador

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1. Introduction

The votes appeared one-by-one on the screen. Months of lobbying and three final weeks of intense negotiations had led up to this moment. Then, the computer projected the final

verdict: 20 votes in favor; 13 abstentions; 14 against.

Cheers of triumph sounded as diplomats from Ecuador let go of their diplomatic reserve. Meanwhile, a Dutch diplomat frowned and sighed: ‘And so it begins...’

1. Background

The scene sketched above took place on the last day of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) meeting in June 2014. This 3-week session was dominated by the negotiations on Business and Human Rights (BHR). Two draft proposals were on the table. One of them reiterated support for earlier adopted voluntary guidelines on BHR; the other one singled out transnational corporations and argued that these firms require a different, legally binding approach. It was this latter one that gave rise to considerable diplomatic struggles and frustrations (Observations HRC-26).

Neither the desire nor the challenges to globally regulate transnational corporations (TNCs) are new. In the 1960s, an international debate commenced on the various impacts and responsibilities of business actors; especially those of TNCs. Several international fora adopted resolutions to regulate the conduct of TNCs in the 1970s1, but the effectiveness of these voluntary policies has been limited (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). Simultaneously, the United Nations (UN) started tough negotiations on an international binding code of conduct for TNCs. Proponents feared neocolonialist and anti-governmental actions by TNCs. These concerns faded in the 1980s, ultimately leaving the negotiations without a result (Litvin 2003; Hummel 2005; Koenig-Archibugi 2004; UNCTAD).

Discussions on regulating TNC conduct resurfaced at the UN in the early 2000s. This time they had a different focus, as poor working conditions and ethical misconduct in global supply chains increasingly gained attention. An attempt at imposing obligations on TNCs under international human rights law failed in 2004. To move beyond the standstill, the UN appointed Harvard Professor John Ruggie as Special Representative on the issue (OHCHR Business and Human Rights).

1_{Most notable examples are the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by the Organization for Economic}

Cooperation and Development and the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by the International Labor Organization.

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11 Professor Ruggie successfully developed a regulatory framework on Business and Human Rights (BHR) that all states could agree to. It emphasizes the legal duty of states to protect their citizens from human rights abuses and the corporate responsibility of all business actors to respect human rights. In 2011, the HRC unanimously endorsed this framework and its operationalizing Guiding Principles and installed an independent Working Group on BHR (OHCHR Business and Human Rights).

When the mandate of this Working Group needed to be renewed in 2014, the consensus on BHR proved to be intact. At the same time however, Ecuador proposed to separately approach TNCs in a legally binding way. This led to considerable diplomatic contention. Ecuador and its supporters were accused of jeopardizing the international consensus. Nonetheless, they persisted and their resolution ultimately passed in an atmosphere of grim disagreement. International negotiations to create an international legally binding instrument on TNC & HR will commence in September 2015 (Observations HRC-26 and FBHR).

These negotiations will surely not benefit from the defensive positions both opponents and proponents have taken up. In order to move the debate beyond disagreement and frustration, a better understanding of each other’s positions might help. Therefore, this thesis aims to explain the variation in states’ foreign policies on the novel and specific policy area of Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (TNC & HR). So far, this variation boils down to being either in favor or against the creation of an international treaty that would focus explicitly and exclusively on TNC & HR (Observations HRC-26 and FBHR).

2. Societal Relevance

The impact of transnational corporations stretches beyond the economic domain. Not only do they affect the lives of their employees, their conduct can affect entire societies. These impacts can be positive, but are often negative. There are countless examples of TNCs

collaborating with corrupt or unjust regimes, or even warlords; of exploitation, child labor and life-threatening labor situations; of environmental destruction; and basically any violation of human rights one can think of (Human Rights Watch 2013). Effective regulation of TNCs is therefore not a luxury; for many people around the world, it is a matter of life and death.

Since TNCs are required to obey the law, they should be held to account when they do not. The Theoretical Framework in Chapter 2 will shed light on several complicating factors regarding this issue. Most certainly, accountability can only be guaranteed if effective

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12 mechanisms are in place; in terms of regulation as well as enforcement. Related to this is the victim’s right to effective remedies. This could take many forms, from financial compensation to restoring damage done to the environment. Here too, effective mechanisms and clear regulations are essential.

As we live in a globalized world, consideration for human rights extends beyond borders. Thanks to the work of many non-governmental organizations and growing media and political attention, people are becoming aware of TNCs’ conduct all over the world.

Consumers in wealthy and human-rights respecting countries increasingly adopt a critical attitude towards the goods they buy. They want to know whether their t-shirt has been made under decent circumstances, and whether the banana they eat has not been picked by an 8-year old girl. The issue of TNC & HR is therefore not only a concern to victims.

Political science has value for society as it enhances the predictability of political developments. If we know what causes certain state behavior, we can give policymakers the tools to make well-informed decisions. The upcoming intergovernmental negotiations on a treaty on TNC & HR would surely benefit from such information. This brings me to the theoretical motivations for this thesis.

3. Theoretical Relevance

This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature in several ways.

As will become clear in the Theoretical Framework, the dominant theories in International Relations (IR) explain events from a highly abstract level and are limited by their ontological and epistemological assumptions. In a response to these shortcomings, scholars have started to develop a new theory, called Neoclassical Realism. This innovative theory incorporates domestic factors as causally relevant for the foreign-policymaking process. So far, the Neoclassical Realist literature has focused on questions of grand strategy and domestic factors like political ideology and leaders’ personalities2

(Rose 1998; Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009). This thesis will broaden its scope by testing the causal relevance of a novel domestic factor, and by expanding the theory’s empirical application to the policy area of human rights.

This research will also contribute to literature on global governance, specifically regarding the role of transnational actors. This concept was introduced by Keohane and Nye

2_{Exceptions like Mark Purdon’s Neoclassical Realist theory of climate change politics show that a wider}

application of the theory is possible. See: Purdon, Mark 2014, ‘Neoclassical Realism and International Climate Change Politics: moral imperative and political constraint in international climate finance’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 17, 301-338.

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13 in 1972 and has broadened the scope of IR beyond a mere focus on states (Keohane & Nye 1972). In the 1990s, scholars started to write about genuine political activity at the global level beyond the state-system (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). This theorization focused on civil society organizations (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Wapner 1995). TNCs on the other hand remained being perceived as embedded in and constrained by state-centric structures (Ruggie 2004).

This research will in fact draw on the notion that TNCs are increasingly showing political behavior and might even become state-like actors (Scherer & Palazzo 2011; Matten & Crane 2005). The political agency of private actors has in recent years gained substantial attention, but has largely remained confined to the Business and Management literature. There are hardly any links yet with Political Science and International Relations Theory (Scherer & Palazzo 2011) and also the global governance literature often overlooks the growing significance of TNCs (Bartle & Vass 2005). This thesis strives to make a link between these adjacent disciplines.

4. Goal of the Research

This thesis acknowledges the need to effectively regulate transnational corporations and their impacts on human rights. The proceedings of HRC-26 have shown that countries are deeply divided on the need or desirability of an international legally binding instrument on TNC & HR. Nevertheless, the negotiations to create such a mechanism will commence within a few months. This process only has chance of succeeding if the states can move beyond mutual disagreement and frustration.

A dialogue based on an understanding of each other’s positions would surely help. Therefore, this thesis draws on original and extensive empirical research in the aim of answering the question: What explains states’ foreign policy agenda regarding international

binding regulation of Transnational Corporations and Human Rights? The thesis’ Conclusion

will explore what policy recommendations can be distilled from the empirical research and analyses.

By empirically testing a yet to be explored causal mechanism in the framework of a novel theory and topic in International Relations, the thesis also aims to contribute to existing literature and enhance its connections to contemporary developments in real world

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5. Thesis Reading Guide

The Thesis will now start with a Theoretical Framework. This chapter will provide the theoretical basis of the research. It will identify a causal mechanism that will be empirically tested in Chapters 4 and 5. To this end, Chapter 2 will also provide a research design with two hypothesis and five sub-questions. Chapter 3 will explain the research strategy and various methods of data collection and analysis. Additionally it will account for the amount of data that has been collected. Chapter 4 will show the empirical results of the first case study, which concerns Ecuador. Chapter 5 will do the same for the Netherlands, which is the second case study. Chapter 6 will close the thesis with an interpretation of the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 and an answer to the research question. It will also provide several predictions and policy recommendations based on this thesis’ findings.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The Introductory chapter has shown that the specific combination of transnational corporations and human rights (TNC & HR) as a policy area in international politics is quite recent. The sudden attention for this topic and the diplomatic disagreement it faces are surprising in the light of the simultaneous consensus on the umbrella issue of Business and Human Rights.

This thesis seeks to explain the variation in states’ foreign policies on TNC & HR. So far, this variation boils down to being either in favor or against the creation of an international treaty that would focus explicitly and exclusively on TNC & HR.

Theories of International Relations (IR) provide the conceptual frameworks to study events and phenomena in world politics. The search for an explanation of the variation in states’ foreign policies on TNC & HR will therefore now start with an examination of traditional IR literature. Then, Paragraph 2 will shed light on a novel IR theory. Paragraphs 3 and 4 will look deeper into the phenomenon of transnational corporations, and finally Paragraphs 5 and 6 will lay down the causal mechanism that will be empirically tested in Chapters 4 and 5.

1. Traditional explanations

Fundamental ontological and epistemic differences lead IR scholars to emphasize different events and actors. Therefore, their analyses can differ significantly (Snyder 2004, Hollis & Smith 1990). A common feature though of the two dominant schools of thought, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, is that they both explain state behavior from a highly abstract level. This enables them to establish broad patterns in world politics, and to make predictions about future state behavior. In order to use these theories, I need to pitch my question at an equally abstract level. I will therefore begin with the question why states pursue, adopt, or resist international cooperation and regulation. Subsequently, I will deduce what explanations Neorealism and Neoliberalism could offer concerning states’ specific foreign policy strategies on Transnational Corporations & Human Rights.

1.1 Neorealism

The dominant school of thought in contemporary IR Theory is Neorealism. Neorealist scholars explain states’ behavior in IR on the basis of structural pressures from the

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16 international system. The lack of an overarching hierarchical power in world politics causes an inherent sense of insecurity for states. They must therefore rely on self-help politics, in which they rationally pursue their self-interest. States will do so in a unitary manner, according to the parameters set by the international distribution of material and military capabilities. Any other factor is of no causal concern to Neorealists (Waltz 1979; Donnelly 2000). When it comes to international institutions, these are seen as tools of powerful states to formalize their dominance. States engage in international cooperation either if it serves their material interests, or if they are forced by a more powerful state (Raustiala 2003).

Neorealists thus focus on states as the only meaningful actors in international politics. States’ foreign policy strategies are led by material, rather than normative interests. TNCs and human rights are not issues that would probe states into international action or cooperation, except when powerful states wish to use international instruments to impose their own human rights norms on the rest of the world (Waltz 1979; Donnelly 2000).

When we turn to states’ actual foreign policy on TNC & HR however, we see that most proponents of new and binding international regulation are in fact relatively weak states (Resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 2014; Observations HRC-26). This is a dynamic that Neorealism cannot explain. What is more, Neorealist strategy could not have predicted that TNC & HR would become an international political issue in the first place. Let us therefore turn to the second leading school of thought in IR academia, and see if that approach can provide more clarity.

1.2 Neoliberalism

Neoliberal theories came up in a response to the incapability of Neorealism to explain actual cooperation between states. Neoliberals share the starting point of an anarchic international system consisting of rational states, but they argue that international cooperation will nonetheless be achieved when there are clear benefits. These gains need not even be equally distributed among states. Where cooperation fails, that is often due to a lack of information. International institutions enhance the chances of cooperation by facilitating information sharing and altering state preferences. Moreover, global cooperation can occur on any policy issue, and agency in international politics is not limited to states. Variation in states’ willingness to cooperate is furthermore explained by diverse characteristics of their domestic political systems. The wider scope of Neoliberalism also takes normative concerns and interests into account (Baldwin 1993).

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17 Neoliberals appreciate international law, non-state actors, and normative motivations. This would lead them to expect inter-state collaboration rather than contention once a topic like TNC & HR arises in international politics. Taking also domestic features into account, states that highly value international human rights law would be expected to be especially willing to consider international cooperation (Moravcsik 1997).

Real world observations however tell us that many of the most outspoken opponents of increased international cooperation on the specific policy area of TNC & HR are in fact liberal democratic countries (Resolution A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 2014; Observations HRC-26). The usual explanation for failed international cooperation, a lack of information, does not seem likely here. The actual established cooperation on the related Business & Human Rights policy area signals the presence of mutual gains and agreement. Moreover, multiple extensive lines of communication and diplomatic interaction already exist. Indeed, the international human rights regime includes a multitude of international institutions for the purposes of information-sharing and negotiating (Observations HRC-26).

1.3 Understanding versus Explaining

Neorealism and Neorealism are not the only influential IR theories. Another set of theories is united under the header Social Constructivism. Social constructivists define structure in ideational rather than in material terms. The structure and state actors mutually affect each other through continuous interpretations and social constructions of reality (Checkel 1998).

Neogramscianism, a strand of Critical Theories, also acknowledges a dynamic to the international structure and the power of ideas. The central concept for Neogramscians is hegemony. Unlike Neorealists, they argue that hegemony cannot merely be based on material and military power. Rather, subordinates need to perceive the current system as legitimate. A loss of legitimacy can lead to systemic change (Cox 1983).

Social Constructivism and Critical Theories offer quite different analyses of international politics than Neorealism and Neoliberalism, because they do not take the structural ‘status quo’ as a given. This can be valuable, particularly when new phenomena need to be theoretically accommodated. However, these theories cannot offer causal explanations of the behavior or strategic policy choices of states. The structure, units of analysis, and the connections between them are assumed to be in constant flux. Such an approach may help to interpret certain developments, but renders it impossible to identify regular connections between observed events and make predictions about future proceedings.

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18 This is generally understood as the difference between positivist and post-positivist approaches. An advantage of positivist theories is that they can be tested and evaluated (Keohane 1989, pp. 173-4). Their identification of causal mechanisms contributes to the predictability of international politics and helps foreign-policymakers in their strategic decisions. For them, the testability of positivist methodologies is a significant benefit (Smith, Booth & Zalewski 1996).

In conclusion, Neorealism and Neoliberalism do not seem to provide a convincing explanation for states’ foreign policies on TNC & HR. Additionally, other IR theories inherently lack the ability to identify causal mechanisms. The review of IR theories has made clear that we need a theory that can accommodate the particularities of the actors and policy area under review, without losing explanatory and predictive abilities. In fact, there is a relatively young IR theory that matches these demands. It is to this theory that I will now turn. First, I will explain its foundations. Then, I will show how the theory can be used for the purpose of this research.

2. Neoclassical Realism

2.1 An innovative theory

With Structural Realism, Kenneth Waltz created a theory that analyzes international politics from a birds-eye view. Consequently, Neorealism can explain everything in general terms. Yet, the downside is that it cannot account for many specific cases. Waltz himself has acknowledged that the theory was indeed not meant to explain every singular event (Waltz 1979, p. 71-72). Neorealism’s highly abstract level is often seen as an oversimplification of what is in fact a complex social and political reality. The subsequent lack of explanatory and predictive power in many specific cases is not appreciated by everyone. Looking for a solution, some scholars have turned to the classic works of Realists and combined this with Neorealist assumptions. By doing so, they developed a new theory that is better suitable to account as a foreign policy theory and explain why states behave the way they do. This body of work, which is still very much in development, has become known as Neoclassical Realism (Interview Freyberg-Inan; Rose 1998).

Like Neorealists, Neoclassical Realists take the structural forces caused by the anarchic international system as the starting point. Yet, the fundamental difference is that Neoclassical Realists see anarchy as a permissive, rather than as the primary causal force (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009). They emphasize that prominent Classical Realists did in

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19 fact recognize multiple influences on state behavior (Morgenthau 1985). In Neoclassical Realism, these two notions are combined by highlighting the potential role of domestic factors (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009).

Neoclassical Realists hold that systemic pressures do not directly result in state behavior. Rather, domestic factors translate these forces to the unit (state) level. However, this translation is often imperfect. Distortions in the conversion can cause foreign-policymakers to prioritize information about certain dynamics, instead of the structural conditions of the international system. In such situations, domestic factors have become intervening variables. Foreign policies will then turn out different from what Neorealists would rationally expect (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009; Interview Freyberg-Inan; Rose 1998). This process is demonstrated by the figure below:

Figure 1: The creation of foreign policy according to Neoclassical Realism and Neorealism (Dependent Variable) Rational Foreign Policy Translation (Independent Variable) System (Dependent Variable) Second-best Foreign Policy (Intervening Variable) Distorted Translation (Independent Variable) System (Dependent Variable) Rational Foreign Policy (Independent Variable) System Neoclassical Realism

Normal Translation Distorted Translation

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20 When this happens, Neoclassical Realists agree that the state’s behavior is sub-optimal. The policy that would benefit the state’s best interest in the long run still relates to the state’s power position in the international arena. Neoclassical Realism identifies the domestic factors that confuse foreign-policymakers. As such, the theory can help policymakers see more clearly which factors they should focus on, and to understand the state’s long term interest (Interview Freyberg-Inan; eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009).

In principle, any domestic factor can constitute such an intervening variable (Interview Freyberg-Inan). This clearly makes theorizing less straightforward than the Neorealist approach. Therefore, some say that the theory has lost predictive power and renders world politics more difficult to understand. Neoclassical Realists on the other hand, maintain that world politics is inherently complicated. Therefore, they say we need a sophisticated theory that is able to identify the mechanisms causing states to pursue irrational foreign policies. As such, they enable policymakers to see the actual parameters of their power position in the international system, and to act accordingly (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009; Interview Freyberg-Inan; Rose 1998). In other words: rather than oversimplify, scholars need to incorporate more factors in their analyses. Without more inclusive studies, policymakers get lost in what is in fact a very complex reality.

2.2 The theory applied

Based on the information above, Neoclassical Realism appears to match well with the topic and purpose of this thesis. The theory shows that appreciation of a complex political world does not necessarily diminish explanatory ambition. Furthermore, Neoclassical Realist research provides valuable tools to explain novel or changing foreign policy preferences, as well as variation among states. It tends to focus on specific cases and problems. Moreover, the concept of the intervening variable allows researchers to investigate the potential causal effects of one particular domestic factor (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998). This is also the method that will be employed in this thesis.

To understand the Neoclassical Realist approach, firstly remember the Neorealist starting point of unitary states. Here, the state is a black box; domestic factors are not causally relevant for their behavior in the international political arena. However, when states seem to behave irrationally in a specific case or versus a particular policy area, Neoclassical Realists open up this black box. They do so by searching for a domestic factor that potentially causes a distortion in the translation of systemic pressures into foreign policy. There is no universal

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21 rule on which national traits to prioritize. Scholars thus choose the potentially intervening variable they will investigate in an ad hoc manner. This is not to say that the selection of the potentially intervening variable under investigation is chosen randomly though. Indeed, Neoclassical Realists have to make a deliberate choice (eds. Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009; Interview Freyberg-Inan).

In the case of states’ foreign policy on TNC & HR, we have already seen that many states appear to behave contrary to what Neorealist rationalism would dictate. If this is caused by a domestic intervening variable, this probably concerns a novel phenomenon. After all, the rise of TNC & HR as a distinctive policy area in international politics happened only recently. Additionally, the stark difference between the worldwide consensus on Business & Human Rights, and the contention on Transnational Corporations & Human Rights, makes one wonder what has recently become so special about TNCs that they would suddenly constitute a policy area of their own.

The remainder of this chapter will therefore investigate TNCs as a domestic factor. Firstly, the traditional conceptualization of TNCs will be discussed. Then, the chapter will address how TNCs are currently challenging this traditional understanding by a transformation of their role in society. Additionally, the chapter will point out the ways in which the very nature of TNCs inherently poses a challenge to states’ regulatory capacities.

The chapter will result in the identification of a causal mechanism in which all these factors are combined. This causal chain will hypothesize that under certain pre-conditions, a transformed societal role of TNCs in a certain country will cause that state to pursue new international binding regulation targeted specifically on Transnational Corporations & Human Rights.

3. Transnational Corporations - a traditional conceptualization

The starting point of the economic theory of the firm is the organization of society into public and private spheres. With the rise of capitalism in the 19th century, the individualism of economic actors became juxtaposed against the state’s public purpose. According to this view, the political actor has the public authority to enforce regulations upon society. The state is supposed to use this power to benefit the common good. Governance thus became understood as the practice by the state to regulate social matters in the common interest, and to provide public goods (Börzel, Hönke & Thauer 2012; Risse 2011). Market-actors on the other hand, strive for economic profit and act in their particular private interest. These

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22 different societal roles are commonly referred to as the public-private division of labor (Horwitz 1982; Weintraub 1997)3.

Private actors do also affect the public sphere of society, but this happens through unintentional side-effects instead of governance activities. Such non-economic impacts of firms’ activities are called externalities and can be both positive and negative. Either way, they fall under the responsibility of the public regulatory authority because of their societal impact. Hence, states are supposed to use their domestic law-making capabilities to regulate firms’ externalities.

Transnational corporations are a specific kind of private actors. While many firms and their activities are not confined to national state borders, not all such international companies are also transnational. The distinctive characteristic of TNCs is that they go further than merely engaging in international trade: ‘Transnational corporations are incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates. A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake’ (UNCTAD n.d.). Even though there is a subtle difference between TNCs and what we call Multinational Corporations (MNCs) (Drucker 1997), legally and politically they are all ‘groups of national corporations subject to the laws of different states’ (Kinley & Tadaki 2004; Vagts 1970, p. 739). Therefore, MNC and TNC can be used interchangeably in this thesis4.

This border-transcending nature has significant consequences for the capability of individual states to regulate TNCs. Since TNCs can relatively5 easily move, and domestic laws differ across countries, TNCs can pick the countries with the most favorable jurisdictions. TNCs are usually seen as beneficial to economic growth because of the foreign direct investments6 that they bring to the host country (Bosworth & Collins 1999; Loungani & Razin 2001; OECD 2002). In their wish to attract these investments, states can be tempted to adjust their regulatory frameworks according to the wishes of TNCs. Competition between

3_{In Governance Theory, the public-private division stems from the difference between ‘objects’ and ‘subjects of}

control’. Then, the term ‘private actors’ refers to both business and civil society organizations (Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan 2007, p.6-7). I however, use the understanding of the private sector as for-profit actors (Buse & Harmer 2007) to show how TNCs and states relate to each other.

4_{This follows practice in international political arenas, as well as academia. As Hartwig Hummel points out:}

‘The OECD term Multinational Enterprise is generally interchangeable with the UN’s Transnational Corporation’ (Hummel 2005, p.10).

5

The word ‘relatively’ here signals that even for TNCs it might be necessary to stay in certain countries, for example when they are dependent on certain natural resources.

6_{‘Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting}

interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor.’ (OECD n.d., p. 7)

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23 states to host TNCs can cause a regulatory downward spiral. This is often referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’, enabled by the lack of an international level playing field in regulation. Where such regulation concerns firms’ externalities, the effects for society can be detrimental (eds Vogel & Kagan 2004; Rudra 2008).

TNCs furthermore affect the regulatory capabilities of states by their role in Globalization processes7. While an increasing amount of issues requires governance on a global scale, the current political and legal world order supposes public governance to take place at the state level. This contradictory situation causes regulatory vacuums, also called global governance gaps. As a solution, states sometimes opt to transcend their authority to an equal global level, for example by creating international law. Importantly though, the international legal framework only has a binding effect on states. As global actors, TNCs therefore constitute a global governance gap of their own. Moreover, as the main drivers of Globalization processes, TNCs also indirectly contribute to other global regulatory vacuums (Held 2007; Scherer & Palazzo 2011). In a more direct fashion, they additionally weaken the regulatory capacities of states by making it impossible for them to exert full control over cross-border movements. This is an ‘empirical fact’ that even sceptics of the novelty and causal significance of Globalization agree with (Krasner 2003).

So by now we have seen that TNCs are economic firms that are supposed to act in their own private interest. They are distinct from other firms because of their border-transcending nature. Additionally, we have seen that this transnational nature has significant impacts on the capacities of states to regulate TNCs and their externalities.

The next paragraph will show how this traditional conceptualization of TNCs is becoming outdated as TNCs start bridging the public-private division of labor. The chapter will then continue with an explanation of why this might not to be appreciated by states, and why it might even lead states to pursue international regulation on transnational corporations and human rights.

4. The Changing Role of Transnational Corporations

Business actors in general, but especially TNCs, have in recent years been crossing the division between the public and private spheres of labor. They voluntarily undertake activities that used to be associated with the state (Scherer & Palazzo 2011; Margolis & Walsh 2003;

7_{Globalization can be defined as ‘a process of intensification of cross-border social interactions due to declining}

costs of connecting distant locations through communication and the transfer of capital, goods, and people’ (Scherer and Palazzo 2011, p.901).

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24 Matten & Crane 2005). TNCs are for example taking initiatives in environmental protection (Hart 2005; Marcus & Fremeth 2009), peace and stability (Fort & Schipani 2004), AIDS and public health (Rosen et al 2003), and human rights (Matten & Crane 2005).

They do so by engaging in self-regulation of their externalities, or even by providing public goods. Since TNCs are global actors, they are thereby increasingly regulating global business and producing global public goods (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Kaul et al (eds) 2003; Vogel 2008). These de facto governance activities have led scholars to talk about the ‘new political role of business’ (Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Some authors even conclude that companies have in fact become political actors (Scherer, Palazzo & Matten 2014; Boddewyn & Lundan 2010; Detomasi 2007).

Scholars are divided on the motivations behind such political agency by private actors. However, most do agree that it is at least enabled by regulatory vacuums (Matten & Crane 2005; Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Regarding global governance gaps, TNCs might indeed offer solutions that individual states cannot, since they are not limited by national borders (Scherer & Palazzo 2011).

A similar reasoning is often applied at the national level. Here, national governance gaps exist when states are either unable or unwilling to regulate social matters in the common interest or to provide public goods. When TNCs use this as an opportunity to step in, they can truly assume state-like roles (Matten & Crane 2005).

This is notably different from situations where states delegate public tasks to private actors, which would be privatization. The crucial difference between the two phenomena is the locus of political agency. It is when TNCs voluntarily take the initiative to engage in governance by regulating social matters in the common interest or by providing public goods, that they become political and state-like actors.

5. A Causal Chain - the political TNC as a domestic intervening variable

TNC & HR is one of the youngest issue areas in international politics. According to a plurality of states, it should also become a category of international law. However, there are also many states opposing this idea. What explains this variation in states’ foreign policy regarding the creation of international, binding regulation in the specific policy area of Transnational Corporations & Human Rights? I argue that in principle, states are against the creation of such international law. Additionally, I argue that states will turn in favor of international binding regulation on TNC & HR if TNCs voluntarily engage in human rights

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25 governance on their national territory. These assertions are based on the following causal chain.

Taking Neorealist rationalism as a starting point, it remains unclear why non-Great Powers would pursue any international legally binding instrument. Moreover, Neorealism cannot account for the rise to political salience of non-state actors and normative issues. According to Neoclassical Realism then, there is probably a domestic factor distorting the translation of structural pressures from the international system into states’ foreign policies.

Given the fact that states do agree on how to approach the more general policy area of Business & Human Rights, the specificities of TNCs are examined. It turns out that the characteristic border-transcending nature of TNCs constitutes particular challenges to the regulatory capacities of individual states. Due to their mobility and economic importance, states will have to coordinate internationally in order to obtain effective regulation. Secondly, TNCs have in recent years begun to voluntarily engage in human rights governance by self-regulating their externalities in the common interest and by facilitating the public enjoyment of human rights.

For this causal mechanism to take effect, certain pre-conditions need to be fulfilled. These are explained in the next and final paragraph.

The rest of the thesis will empirically test whether this causal mechanism can indeed be identified. The investigation is guided by the research design shown in the tables below. The next chapter will provide more detail on how this research is operationalized. It will inter alia elaborate on the chosen cases, identify potential weaknesses, and justify the choices that are made.

6. Research Design

Research question:

What explains states’ foreign policy agenda regarding international binding regulation of Transnational Corporations and Human Rights?

Dependent Variable:

States’ foreign policy agenda regarding international binding regulation of Transnational Corporations and Human Rights

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26 Independent Variable:

Voluntary human rights governance by transnational corporations

Hypotheses:

1. Voluntary human rights governance by transnational corporations will cause states, on whose territory this takes place, to pursue an international legally binding instrument on TNCs and human rights.

2. In the domestic absence of voluntary human rights governance by transnational corporations, states will adopt policy on international regulation of transnational corporations and human rights according to Neorealist logic.

Figure 2: Research Design

Sub-question

Issue

1. Do TNCs engage in self-regulation regarding human rights in the state? Self-regulation 2. Is the self-regulation regarding human rights by TNCs voluntary? Voluntary act 3. Do TNCs facilitate public enjoyment of human rights in the state? Facilitation 4. Do TNCs voluntarily facilitate public enjoyment of human rights? Voluntary act 5. Do foreign-policymakers know about voluntary human rights

governance by TNCs in their country?

State knowledge

Table 1: Sub-questions

Pre-condition 1: Sovereignty maximization

The causal mechanism identified above is stooled on the assumption that states will always seek to maintain or enhance governance autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). In International Relations, the concept of sovereignty grants the nation state the exclusive right to govern within its domestic borders (Sassen 2007; Cutler 2010; Krasner 1999). The use by other actors of governance tools without prior delegation by the state violates the state’s sovereignty.

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27 The theory states that states will not accept such infringements; for example when TNCs voluntarily engage in human rights governance. International legally binding instruments are not the usual solution though, as these shift decision-making powers to the global level and thus constitute sovereignty costs as well (Börzel 2010). Only in exceptional situations does global governance actually enhance states’ sovereignty (Raustiala 2003; Macey & Colombatto 1996). This brings me to the second pre-condition.

Pre-condition 2: An accumulation of sovereignty infringements

In situations where ‘changes in domestic politics (…) have already compromised and changed sovereignty in an irrevocable manner’ (Raustiala 2003, p.843), the only way to preserve sovereign autonomy is by enhancing international cooperation (Macey & Colombatto 1996). In many states the combination of TNC presence, globalization processes and the international human rights regime provides such a context.

As argued above, TNCs and globalization significantly reduce the regulatory capacities of states. Additionally, the international human rights regime is an area of global governance that puts exceptional normative and institutional constraint on state sovereignty (Moravcsik 2000)8. Next to a wide range of legally binding treaties, the regime consists of independent adjudicating bodies. These bodies also empower individual citizens to hold their governments to account. Moreover, to protect the coherency of international jurisprudence, the regime provides no room for exceptions based on local particularities.

Thus, the second pre-condition for the above described causal mechanism is a domestic context of significantly infringed sovereignty and weakened state regulatory capacities due to a desire for foreign direct investments by TNCs, vulnerability to globalization and participation in the international human rights regime.

8_{Neoliberals and Social Constructivists would add that the international human rights regime additionally}

functions as a normative constraint. Some even go as far as to argue that a state’s compliance with international human rights law has become constitutive of its sovereignty. Following (Neo-)Realist thought however, such normative argumentation can be left out of the equation.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter will show how the research design provided by the Theoretical Framework has been operationalized. It will justify the methodological choices that have been made, and provide information about the data collection and analysis.

1. Research Strategy

This research will test a theory-based causal mechanism to explain the variation in foreign policies of states on transnational corporations and human rights. The research strategy draws upon a combination of research techniques to match the Neoclassical Realist School.

1.1 Explanatory Case Study approach

Neoclassical Realist scholars acknowledge the complexity of the social world. They prefer in-depth and holistic research of specific events and variables, rather than abstract explanations of general political currents (Rose 1998). Given the innovate nature of most Neoclassical Realist research, scholars prioritize internal validity; subsequent research can then test for external validity (Interview Freyberg-Inan).

Case studies are well equipped for the examination of complex phenomena, as they focus on one or a very limited number of cases (Baxter & Jack 2008). This thesis uses an explanatory case study. This is an iterative process where the researcher follows a previously outlined logic model, thereby exploring a series of topics. If he or she makes a new discovery in the meantime, he or she revisits the entire outline. The flexibility of this approach thus prevents methodological bias, and enhances the credibility of the results (Harder 2010). Reliability is further enhanced by triangulation; indeed any combination of methods and data is possible in case studies (Yin 2003).

Even though the acquisition of large amounts of data potentially leads to rich and in-depth knowledge, it can be difficult to cohesively integrate all data. By making a structured plan on how to analyze the data, scholars can prevent getting lost in all the gathered data (Harder 2010).

A second drawback of case studies is their low generalizability, especially since generalization is essential for explanatory purposes (Roselle & Spray 2008; Harder 2010). Each case has value however, if it is seen as a unit. Comparable to experiments, multiple case

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29 studies should be conducted as steps towards the general depiction of a causal relationship (Interview Freyberg-Inan; Harder 2010).

1.2 Research techniques

Primary research, where the researcher generates data from the real world, is useful for novel and specific topics. The researcher can collect specific data, tailored to the research at hand. These new data have not been previously interpreted by others. I have used a combination of direct and indirect qualitative methods, mainly interviews and observation. In the analysis, I need to watch out for subjectivity, which is a risk of qualitative research (Hewson 2006, pp. 237-238). To this end I drafted a list of potential biases before starting the analysis.

Besides this, I have conducted desk research to enhance the scope and validity of the research. I mostly analyzed public documents, which are easily accessible and carry a wealth of information. The downside is that it can be time-consuming to distillate the useful information. Additionally, bias remains a risk. The original data have already been interpreted and certain things might have been left out or over-emphasized in order to serve a certain purpose. A critical attitude towards these sources is hence essential (Verschuren & Doorewaard 2007).

Following paragraphs will further discuss the elaboration of these strategies. First, I will turn to the selection of the cases.

2. Case Selection

2.1 Selection on the dependent variable

Researchers tend to select their case(s) based on the independent variable. As such, they can ensure relevance as well as variation on the independent variable without prior determination of the dependent variable (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). In this thesis, an unbiased selection on the independent variable would require extensive knowledge on a complex and novel phenomenon in every country in the world. The amount of research that this would take is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.

Therefore, the case selection is based on the dependent variable. This carries a risk of biasing the conclusions. Since I combine this selection method with a path-dependent argument, a way to reduce this risk would be to examine all countries that possess the identified pre-conditional features (Geddes 1990). However, the scope of this thesis does not allow for that either. These limitations affect the generalizability of my conclusions.

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30 Despite these drawbacks, there are also advantages of selecting on the dependent variable. Geddes for example writes that such research is ‘ideal for digging into the details of how phenomena come about’ (Geddes 1990, p.149). It can contribute to theory-building by elucidating inconsistencies that existing theories cannot explain. They can thus be a good start to the accumulation of knowledge (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane & Verba 1994). This thesis’ critique of existing theories, the novelty of its topic, and the Neoclassical Realist preference for internal validity seem to actually match well with selection on the dependent variable.

2.2 Two country cases

To begin with, I have choses two cases with different outcomes. This enhances the chances of variation on the independent variable, and prevents ‘sampling on theory affirmation’ (Rossman, n.d.). In the search for casual relationships it is useful to select particularly revealing cases (Roselle & Spray 2008). To this end, I first looked for a historically significant event. Here, I chose the 26th session of the UN Human Rights Council because this is where ‘TNCS & Human Rights’ formally became an international political issue9. Secondly, I selected two countries that were exceptionally active and outspoken during HRC-26. Such critical cases have added value, as the formulated hypotheses should particularly hold for them (Roselle & Spray 2008).

Researchers isolate the independent variable under investigation by selecting cases where other potentially influential factors are mutually equal (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). In Neorealism, states are functionally equal units; they behave similarly in equal international political situations, even though their internal attributes might be very different. The only causally relevant factor is the state’s relative power position in the international system. Hence, the positions of my two country cases need to be comparable. Following Waltz, the system is ordered by the number of Great Powers (Waltz 1979). Scholars perceive the current

order either as unipolar, or as moving towards multipolarity (Hincu 2014).My selected cases therefore need to either be challengers of the hegemon, or be too weak to do so. Additionally, the Theoretical Framework pointed out that there are two pre-conditions for the causal mechanism to take effect. These have also been taken into account in the case selection.

This generalized depiction of international hierarchy, as well as the justification for a limited focus on the causal mechanism under investigation, can be perceived as oversimplifications of reality. In fact, many IR scholars do not treat the state as a black box.

9

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31 Neoliberals identify domestic political structure, political culture, and interest group pressures as crucial variables. The validity of research benefits from the incorporation of alternative explanations (Geddes 1990). Therefore, I have included these factors in my interviews with public officials. These answers will be incorporated in the thesis’ Conclusion. This additionally helps to counterbalance the abstract nature of some the research’s assumptions.

Based on the factors above, I first turned to Ecuador. This country indeed shows extraordinary involvement with the topic, being the initiator and tireless promoter of Resolution L.22 to create an international legally binding instrument on TNC & HR. Secondly, the Netherlands caught my attention to be the contrary case. This country spent above-average diplomatic resources during HRC-26 as well, which is especially remarkable because it was not even a voting member at the time.

Neither of these countries is powerful enough to pose challenges to the current hegemon. Several scholars argue that the European Union (EU), which the Netherlands is a member of, does constitute a rising great power. However, I analyze the Netherlands here as a single state. This is firstly because the notion of EU integration as a relevant IR phenomenon is contested among Neorealists (Pilegaard & Kluth 2011, p.7). Secondly, it would only make sense to take the EU as unit of analysis if the Netherlands would be able to dominate the common foreign policy of the EU. However, the Netherlands is not such a regional great power (Pilegaard & Kluth 2011, p.8-9). An elaborate Neorealist assessment of Ecuador’s and the Netherlands’ position in the international system in relation to their policy on TNC & HR is attached to this thesis in the Appendix.

The Appendix also includes research into the application of the pre-conditions for the causal mechanism to take effect. This research is based on extensive empirical research; it draws on interviews, observations and documents. Both pre-conditions turned out to hold up for Ecuador as well as the Netherlands. Firstly, a review of the countries’ legal frameworks and judiciary systems showed that they indeed seek to maintain or enhance governance autonomy. Secondly, both countries turned out to indeed be facing an accumulation of sovereignty infringements. This is caused by their desire for foreign direct investment by TNCs, vulnerability to globalization and participation in the international human rights regime.

Lastly regarding case selection, it can be beneficial for a scholar to have expertise knowledge of a situation, especially in Neoclassical Realist research (Rose 1998, p.166). During HRC-26 I worked for the Dutch Corps Diplomatique. Therefore, in addition to substantial local knowledge in the Dutch case, I will be able to draw upon my observations

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32 during HRC-26. On the other hand, the distant location of Ecuador is a potential limitation. Unfortunately, no country in territorial proximity agrees with Ecuador. Moreover, Ecuador’s relevance is unique because of its role during HRC-26.

3. Operationalization

The factors addressed by the sub-questions need to be turned into factors with observable characteristics. In order to search and find relevant research material, clear definitions are essential. These will be provided first. Then, an overview will be provided of the necessary data and the sources and methods of data collection.

3.1 Definitions

The dependent variable of this research is state’s policy regarding international regulation of transnational corporations and human rights. Countries might not have policy documents on this topic yet since it is so new and specific, but during HRC-26 they did need to take position. Diplomats do so based on instructions from their ministries of foreign affairs. Therefore, I will consider the country’s behavior during this event as a reflection and part of its foreign policy.

For the purpose of this thesis, TNCs will be considered in their legal and political form10 as ‘groups of national corporations subject to the laws of different states’ (Kinley & Tadaki 2004; Vagts 1970, p.739).

The international human rights regime consists of various institutions that are not equally legally binding, nor universally ratified. The concern here is with their impact on states’ regulatory capacities. I will therefore focus on HR instruments that stand out in legally binding powers and universal endorsement: the ten core international human rights instruments, which are legally binding, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation of human rights. In the policy area of Business & Human Rights, states have unanimously agreed to base regulations on the International Bill of Human Rights and the eight core International Labor Organization Conventions11 (Interview Peters; Observations

10_{For the economic definition of TNCs, see Chapter Theoretical Framework, paragraph 3.} 11

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The ILO Conventions contain four categories of rights and principles: Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining; Elimination of Compulsory Labor; Abolition of Child Labor; and Elimination of Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation.

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33 HRC-26). I follow this understanding for the more specific policy connecting TNCs and human rights.

Governance in this thesis refers to the ‘crafting and implementation of collectively binding norms and rules for the provision of common goods or the provision of common goods itself’ (Börzel, Hönke & Thauer 2012, p. 2), traditionally associated with the state (Risse 2011). Human rights are such common goods that ought to be provided by the state (eds Lenzerini & Vrdoljak 2014; United Nations 2014).

TNCs increasingly engage in self-regulation. This refers to situations where ‘those who are subject to the regulation also develop and enforce it’12

(Bartle & Vass 2005, p. 31). Secondly, a growing number of TNCs is providing public goods. Where these activities concern human rights, TNCs are thus engaged in human rights governance.

Moreover, this has a voluntary character when there is no prior delegation by the state on whose territory the governance acts take place and TNCs act autonomously from government. They thereby move from their traditional private role of avoiding human rights violations to actively enabling their enjoyment. This signals TNCs’ de facto transformation into political actors.

Ecuador and the Netherlands are the states under investigation here. Both these countries’ include distant island groups that have their own political and economic dynamics (Interviews Van Schreven; Cadena). By ‘the Netherlands’, I therefore refer only to its European territory; when referring to ‘Ecuador’, I do not include the Galapagos Islands.

By ‘autonomous regulatory capacities of states’, I refer to the state’s prerogative to be autonomous and sovereign in decision-making and –implementing processes regarding public issues. When TNCs voluntarily engage in any stage of the regulatory process, they disregard this prerogative.

3.2 Sources

The table below provides an overview of the different data I needed, and the sources and methods I used to collect the data. Most is gathered from persons and documents. People here serve as experts. They can provide much and diversified information in a small amount of time. Documents on the other hand, tend to be more easily available than people. Furthermore, they cannot be influenced by the researcher. Yet, both data sources come with

12_{NB the ‘collectively binding’ nature of such self-regulation, when applied throughout the TNC as ‘a group of}