Turkish Government’s “15 July Virtual Reality Project”: Creating A New ‘Reality’

(1)

Turkish Government’s “15 July Virtual Reality Project”:

Creating A New ‘Reality’

University of Amsterdam Faculty of Humanities MA Comparative Cultural Analysis

2017-2018

İlayda Üstel

MA Thesis Comparative Cultural Analysis Supervisor: Dr. Aylin Kuryel

(2)

“We had the experience but missed the meaning, And approach to the meaning restores the experience In a different form”

(3)

Introduction

On 15 July 2016, a failed coup attempt took place in Turkey. A small portion of the Turkish Armed Forces, allegedly organized by Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization [FETÖ], under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen, a businessman, and an influential religious figure, blocked the Bosphorus Bridge and several key places in both Istanbul and the capital, Ankara, marking the start of a coup d’état. Despite the lack of information on the subject, according to officially accepted narrative, in the end, this attempt failed due to a portion of citizens’ perseverance as a response to Erdoğan’s call for the people to take to the streets in order to “give the necessary answer” to these traitors. After this day, in honor of this victory of people and democracy, large scaled celebrations and commemorations took place. The Bosphorus Bridge, which is seen as a key figure in 15 July “victory”, was renamed as the 15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü [15 July Martyrs Bridge], just as a number of other public

institutions and public spaces (parks, squares, streets etc.) all over Turkey. This event that is framed as a victory created a foundation for new discourses that are reiterated with the monuments, commemoration ceremonies, photo exhibitions, documentaries, martyrs memorials, an upcoming museum, books, among others, most of which are organized and funded by the government.

“15 July Virtual Reality Project” (15 July VRP) was one of these government-based commemoration projects, one that makes use of a rather contemporary tool; virtual reality and 360° video technologies. The project was carried out by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in collaboration with Bahçeşehir University and Tatu Creative Studios. According to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s website, for this project, they made use of "[a] bluebox studio over 6,000 sqm specially designed for VR shoots,” “[a] casting

(6)

team of 420 and a production team of 150,” “one of the world’s best custom made, virtual reality and 3D shoot cinematic VR cameras,” “3D stereoscopic video technology used together with virtual reality,” “[s]caled 15 July Martyrs Bridge décor,” etc. (“Zapatero: ‘I Experienced July 15th Coup Attempt Here in Turkey”). Judging from the Municipality’s claim that this is “the word’s biggest virtual reality project,” and the list of project’s “prominent details” some of which were mentioned above, a significant amount of money, time and labor was devoted to the making of it (“Zapatero: ‘I Experienced July 15th Coup Attempt Here in Turkey”). Therefore, it can be concluded that this is one of the government’s biggest post-15 July projects along with the monuments, memorials, exhibitions and

celebration campaigns, and it stands out amongst others because of its uncommon medium. Due to this medium, the distribution of the VR film also required some novel

solutions. One solution was provided by the municipalities, through the idea of “360° Karanlık Gece” [360° Dark Night] trucks that contained VR goggles set up for the viewers. These trucks visited various cities and attracted viewers throughout 2017. Another more convenient and sustainable way of distribution was through YouTube; even when the trucks are not in circulation, the viewers can view the film at the comfort of their own homes whether with or without VR goggles (by using the arrow keys instead of head movements to change one’s point of view).

The content of the project is a narrative based on the 15 July coup attempt that took place on 15 July 2016. The framework of the narrative that this medium conveys can be summed up as two clashing sides: the people and the soldiers. The point of origin for the clash is soldiers attempting a coup d’état. People rise against them in order to prevent the coup. In the end, soldiers give in, and the coup attempt fails thanks to the people who stand up against it on the 15 July Martyrs Bridge. Prior to the production of this VR project, during and after the actual event the project seeks to narrate, it has been strongly implied within the

(7)

political and cultural context of Turkey that a patriot must and would take the side of the people instead of the “traitors that are members of Fethullah Terror Organization”, as protectors of democracy (“15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ile İlgili Meydanlara Yaptıkları

Konuşma”). While there is this predetermined side assigned to the participants through the actual event and the 15 July discourse beforehand, in the virtual world, the participants are not assigned a side or a fixed subject position. Points of view of the shots interchangeably go back and forth between one side (people’s side) to the other (soldiers’ side), and sometimes situates the viewer in between the two, and let the users experience all three points of view. Instead of providing the viewer with an interactive experience, or allowing them to wander within the scene, the project is made as a (360° VR) film, with directed shots and transitions between scenes, a determined running time, and a voiceover that guides the viewer through the narrative. The only liberty that is given to the viewer is the ability to look around (360°).

Throughout this thesis, I will analyze 15 July VRP with the aim of exploring the question, how is the government shaping and framing the public opinion through re-purposed concepts, mediated narratives and memories of 15 July coup attempt? One of my reasons for choosing this object of analysis is the fact that VR and 360° video technologies are intriguing and novel governmental tools for propaganda, and this video, as its narrative is mostly built around some key 15 July symbols and discourses, works as a representative of the

government’s post-15 July propaganda tactics. It is theoretically and politically significant and urgent to research this particular object because of its implications as to the government’s use of 15 July as a way of registering the break in the national narrative of Turkey while preserving the illusion of national continuity at the same time, and the medium-specificity of this process provides insights as to the medium of VR’s use as an alternative propaganda tool and space to physical public spaces.

(8)

In order to situate the project within the ideological and political context of post-2002 Turkey, to understand the government’s objectives and towards which direction it steers the public’s ideology and opinion, in the first chapter, I will investigate some of the 15-July-related discourses and symbols in conjunction with the theories of nation-creation, and the break in the national narrative that is concealed through the illusion of national continuity. I will focus on this changing national narrative in the AKP-era and how it shaped the post-15 July discourse, through which a new perception of the Turkish nation is being created. Specifically, I will make use of Anderson and Balibar’s theories on “imagined communities” and nation-creation, Bhabha’s idea of nations as narratives, Hobsbawm’s concept of

“invented traditions”, and Anderson’s theory of the national Dead and the Unborn to get a grasp of the ideological and political frame of my object, 15 July VRP, and consequently, the transmitted contents of this tool of propaganda. My analyses of the government’s discourses and symbols will hinge on the concept of re-purposing, as I claim that post-15 July symbols are re-purposed and re-appropriated by the government to both explain and exploit 15 July.

In the second chapter, with the objective of getting a sense of the government’s positioning of the public in the political sphere and the extent of political autonomy given to the public, I will move onto the medium of VR and 360° video technologies, and review the project’s properties to infer the intended experience for, and influence on the viewers. My main goal will be to investigate the contributions and limitations of the medium to the

distribution of the ideological and political framework discussed in the first chapter. As a way of comprehending 15 July VRP’s possibilities and limitations, I will look into Shields’ ideas on the term “virtual reality” and his theory of “presentism”, Yoh’s theories regarding the sense of reality and immersion in virtual reality, Sherman and Craig’s ideas on the experience of VR, and lastly, Steyerl’s concept of “bubble vision”.

(9)

Lastly, in the third chapter, following through the implications of the medium of VR with regard to the public’s position, after experience creation, I will also explore 15 July VRP’s ability to shape and create memories. I will look into the government’s tactics for creating a memory of 15 July in the minds of both the participants and the non-participants of the actual event with the help of Jan and Aleida Assmann’s concept of “cultural memory”, Erll’s ideas on cultural memory and theory of “travelling memory”, Van Dijck’s ideas on mediated memories, Rigney’s ideas on remembering, and Sever’s analyses of 15 July monuments and memorials. I will mostly focus on the role of mediation in the transmission and creation of memory in the post-15 July process, and ask and how are the memories shaped and created in relation to the political and ideological framework of the event explored in the first chapter, and how this project is different from the other government-based means of memory transmission in relation to the properties of the medium of VR explored in the second chapter.

(10)

(11)

Situating 15 July Coup Attempt within the National Narratives of the “New Turkey”

15 July VRP was a project of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, which is run by AKP (Justice and Development Party), Turkey’s governing political party since 2002. Therefore, the project can be thought of as a product of the government ideology, and a tool of political propaganda. In this chapter, through the concept of “re-purposing”, I will investigate the national narrative of Turkey and the recent break in the narrative, which is trying to be established by the government, while simultaneously kept silent and done by the “re-purposing” of the former symbols and discourses for the sake of the illusion of national continuity, and giving new meanings to them within the context of 15 July. Such an analysis of the government ideology is crucial for the analysis of the channels of conveying ideology the government uses, such as 15 July VRP, and to understand 15 July’s part in the narrative of the “New Turkey” and the significance of glorifying it. Once how this re-purposing works is established, this chapter is going to provide an ideological and political background for the further analysis of my object, 15 July VRP, in the following chapters, as well. In order to infer how the government wishes to present the 15 July coup attempt, and in connection to this, to investigate how the government attempts to represent and construct the nation, I will analyze some properties of 15 July VRP along with other government-produced discourses and means of propaganda. I will focus on the changing national narrative of Turkey in the AKP-era that established the ground for 15 July coup attempt, and shaped the post-15 July discourse. In my analyses, I will make use of Anderson concepts of “imagined communities” and “the Dead and the Unborn”, Balibar’s theories on nation-creation, and Bhabha’s idea of nations as “continuous narratives of national progress”, and Hobsbawm’s concept of

(12)

“invented traditions” (1). My objects of analysis will be “destan,” the Battle of Manzikert, selâ, and “martyrs of democracy”, all of which are the post-15 July symbols and discourses produced and distributed by the government. Aside from the public’s association of these symbols and discourses to 15 July and their hyper-visibility resulting from the government’s frequent use of them in relation to 15 July, I chose these objects because they all go through a “re-purposing” process and mark a change in the definition of “Turkishness” and the

“Turkish nation”, but at the same time they provide a sense of continuity in the national narrative. Thereby, my goal is to follow these objects to get a sense of how the nation is portrayed, and consequently, to understand the ideological and political framing of 15 July.

Nation as Narration

15 July coup attempt is being referred to as “15 Temmuz Destanı” (“15 July Saga/Epic”) in the posters published on the “15 Temmuz” website under auspices of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, and “15 Temmuz Destanı” has been established as the campaign slogan in the “Kurumsal Kimlik Kılavuzu” (“Corporate Identity Manual”) on the same website.1 Thus, the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey put forward the word “destan” in their slogan, for it to describe and encapsulate the nature of 15 July coup attempt. The word “destan” here has several connotations that are being tied to the event through this slogan, all of which contribute to the ways this event is and will be perceived. By referring to 15 July as a “destan”, first and foremost, national importance of the event is highlighted; both because of the chosen word’s use as a genre of Turkish folk literature, and its general function of narrating the greatness of a nation. By the analysis of the use of “destan”, I will address the government’s attempt at creating a continuous narrative by linking the pre-Islamic Turkish

(13)

societies to today’s Turkey, and pointing at an unchanging glorified “Turkishness”. The question I will try to answer with this analysis is, how does the re-appropriation of an old literary genre that used to constitute a national narrative itself shapes the narrative of 15 July?

To begin with, the word “destan” obscures the historical reliability of the story that is told, and foregrounds the narrative quality of these accounts. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, a Turkic historian and a Turkologist, these old national epics (milli destanlar) “reflect peoples’ high national feelings, and demonstrate an ideal world that is completely or partially based upon history, rather than depicting historical occurrences” (4). In other words, their purpose is to evoke national pride and a sense belonging, and not to depict a historical event as it is. This is why, calling 15 July a “destan” is placing 15 July narratives within the realm of literature, rather than history. It implies that the main objective of creating and recreating these 15 July narratives is not to depict the historical event as accurately and as impartially as possible, instead, to demonstrate what the “heroic Turkish people” are capable of, and

evoking national pride. Thus, this reference, as a deliberate choice made by the government imply that they are epic stories based on a real event, retold for transmitting stories about heroic Turks to future generations. It can also be argued that there might be some alterations and omissions in these narratives, for the purposes of demonstrating an ideal world and evoking national feelings. Therefore, as there is no claim to truth on the part of the

government, instead of questioning the accuracy and impartiality of 15 July narratives created by the government, what should be looked into is what the elements that are chosen and used imply about the government’s way of seeing the event, and what kind of a perception of the Turkish nation is being created through them.

The definition of “destan” according to Yakup Karasoy is that, destans are “gests depicting peoples’ religion, virtue, and national valor in verse” (37). Thus, they inherently have a national quality, and are generally heroic stories attempting to aggrandize a nation and

(14)

transmit its victories to future generations. The word “destan” in the context of Turkey goes back to the oral stories about how the people called “Turks “came into being (as told in the Epic of Ergenekon, for example), regarded as part of Turkey’s national history. Etienne Balibar argues, “The history of nations, beginning with our own, is always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject” (86). Every nation takes on a form of a “national personality” with its “personal” history of events that lead to its development and its “today”. These histories are always reiterated in forms of nationalistic narratives (“destans” are one of them), both by the governments and by the public, in order to maintain an idea of the nation as a continuing entity that “appears as the fulfillment of a 'project' stretching over centuries” (Balibar 86). Carrying on the tradition of “destan”, and expanding the nationalistic narrative, creates a connection between the pre-Islamic Turkish societies and today’s Turkey. But this tradition is at the same time cut off from its past because of a strong presence of Islam in this narrative that is called “destan” as well. Therefore, while this connection seems to help create a progressing image of the nation with roots going back a long way, it is actually re-appropriating a literary tradition that belongs to pre-Islamic societies. However, the assumption that there is a common

unchanging element in these societies that constitutes the link between old and new is still present in this usage, and this is what the government makes use of to establish a continuation in the narrative. Balibar explains this assumption as one of the illusions constituted by nations as narratives, and describes it as “believing that the generations which succeed one another over centuries on a reasonably stable territory, under a reasonably univocal designation, have handed down to each other an invariant substance” (86).

This invariant substance, as it appears to be taken for granted in the aftermath of 15 July, is an imagined essential quality of the events and the people that are found to be worthy of being narrated in destans both old and new. Presenting the new narrative of 15 July

(15)

through an old Turkish genre places it within a long-established cultural history through the established continuity between the pre-Islamic Turks and the “New Turkey” (AKP-era Turkey), which in turn, brings forth a feeling of sameness, a sense of a timeless essence that was, is, and will be possessed by Turkish people. This unchanging “national essence” is a long-standing concept of “Turkishness” that is marked by certain characteristics, such as bravery, in both the old and new destans. It is imagined as the essence shared by a group of people across time, and it needs to be repeated and reminded to the people through

comparisons of old and new national occurrences in order to maintain the illusion of its existence. Believing in an unchanging, ever-present “Turkishness” constitutes the basis of the continuity in the narrative.

This “essence” is reiterated in an effort to present a single, progressive narrative of the Turkish nation, but what it refers to actually changes with every reiteration and every context. What we get when we think of the term “Turkishness” used to convey a national narrative retrospectively is a combination of multiple narratives, at times complementary and other times conflicting. The idea of a “Turkish nation” itself takes form through the coherent sequencing of retrospectively selected aspects of the past, and therefore the idea of “Turkish nation” can be modified and re-defined according to the ideologies of the governments. Consequently, as a national narrative is not as continuous as it is presented to the public and “Turkishness” is not an ever-changing essence, in order to get a sense of how the “Turkish nation” is constituted during the aftermath of 15 July coup attempt, the changes in the national narrative that took place during the AKP-era need to be reviewed first.

AKP presented itself as a conservative party that identifies with the Ottoman past and values of Islamic traditions. Therefore the election of AKP partially symbolized a break from Turkey’s Kemalist past that has been established with Atatürk’s foundation of the republic in an effort to separate the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman past, and that valued

(16)

Westernization and secularism, and this stance got more visible and stronger in the last period of the AKP regime. With the start of the AKP-era, not only the ideology of the state, but also the concept of “Turkishness” began to change. While “Turkishness” was defined “not by consanguinity, but by a common land and a common culture,” nowadays it is defined by a common nationality history and a religion (Yıldırım and Alpman, 29). This difference in defining the people of Turkey is also reflected by the choice of words. While “the people of Turkey” is named as “ulus” (a word which has its origins in the pre-Islamic Turkish era and Mongolian, also means “country”) by the Kemalists, the conservative right wing prefers to name it “millet” (a word that meant “a religious community” in Arabic). As it can be inferred from the choice of words, during the AKP era, the cultural essence of “Turkishness” came to be specified by nationalism and religion.

Although AKP aimed at and symbolized a separation from Turkey’s Kemalist past, as the Dutch Turkologist Erik J. Zürcher suggests, “The changing cultural climate did not immediately signal the end of the Atatürk cult. Veneration for the founder of the republic was too closely intertwined with Turkish nationalism and national cohesion was too important a factor for that to happen, but there was certainly a reorientation towards the Ottoman past” (350). This failure to completely eradicate the signs and structures of Kemalism was mainly due to the fact that “Kemalism succeeded at constituting a comprehensive hegemony” that could “attain very different segments of society in a very short time” (Yıldırım and Alpman 29). And this is also why instead of being able to completely abandon the Kemalist past, AKP’s break in the narrative of Turkish nation is mostly constituted by replacements and re-purposing of Kemalist discourses and structures, such as the replacement of the word “ulus” with “millet”. This replacing and re-purposing perceptibly shows itself through architecture. In today’s Turkey, the public structures of the early days of the republic “that were built in a way that disregards and excludes the Ottoman influence,” are now being replaced and

(17)

transformed, and new symbolisms are being created from these transformations for AKP (Burulday 103). As an example, the construction of new mosques can be seen as “a cultural means of representation of the government’s political power,” in accordance with a neo-Ottomanist world-view (Burulday 98). As a result of this politicization of mosques, they are re-purposed as symbols of the conservative Islamist and neo-Ottomanist ideology, as well as of the power of the government.

This break in the Turkish national narrative is also marked by a new name for the AKP era: “Yeni Türkiye” (“The New Turkey”). This expression was adopted by AKP around 2010, and then presented as a project by Erdoğan during his election campaign in 2014 with the slogan “On the Way to New Turkey” (Bora 11). According to Tanıl Bora, The New Turkey is more or less The New Ottoman,” because of the common policies such as making use of “symbols of power, self-reliance and ‘reconciliation,’ making peace with the past and reclamation of the Ottoman Empire by ‘modernizing’ it” (13). In accordance with AKP’s neo-Ottomanist goals, The New Turkey stands for a restorationist and conservatist way of thinking about Turkey. As a way of realizing these goals, AKP tries to establish a bond and a continuation with the Ottoman era, through organizing Ottoman Turkish courses, reviving Ottoman architecture, subsidizing Ottoman-era related researches and documentaries, etc. In accord with AKP’s neo-Ottomanist goals, “destan” that is borrowed from the pre-Islamic Turkish societies is re-interpreted and used as both a Turkic, and an Islamic narrative style for 15 July, encompassing both the ethnic and the religious past.

Homi K. Bhabha, a significant critical theorist especially in the field of post-colonial studies, states, “The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor. Metaphor, as the etymology of the word suggests, transfers the meaning of home and belonging … across those [geographic] distances, and cultural differences, that span the imagined community of nation-people”

(18)

(200). The nation is formed, as a new way of holding people together in the place of kinship and religion, and is supposed to provide people with a “home” that they feel a belonging to regardless of their cultural differences and physical distance. Bhabha uses the notion “imagined community” by Benedict Anderson to point out that the nation is filling in for religious communities or kinships only through a metaphor precisely because of these differences and distance between its members. In the case of the narrative of “New Turkey”, “Turkishness” corresponds to this metaphor. “Turkishness”, although it doesn’t account for the implied condition of being a Muslim and having the same ideology as AKP, and only points at an ethnic identity that is not a criterion for citizenship, is used as an

all-encompassing term for the Turkish society. Anderson explains his use of the word imagined as, “[Imagined community] is imagined because the members of the even smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Imagined Communities 6; emphasis in

original). Keeping this imagined quality of nations in mind, Bhabha goes on to claim that rather than being an “empirical sociological category or a holistic cultural entity” as historicism suggests, the nation is a “narrative strategy” (201). Nation forms a community where cultural differences and physical distances among its members are overlooked thanks to the metaphors and narrative elements. The narrative picks and chooses, or even invents pieces of a “common past” to form a coherent narration of the nation according to the present. These elements bring about a new understanding of the “people”, which have to be thought in double-time; because historical elements with their origins in the “shared” past positions the “people” as historical objects, while those elements’ traces in the present require them to be subjects that constantly reiterate and perform these elements of a “national

culture”. In Bhabha’s words, “In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious,

(19)

recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation” (209; emphasis in original). The word “destan” that is used to define a recent event here both alludes to the nation’s continuity through providing a historical background and basis, and at the same time, becomes part of a reproductive process that writes the nation in the present through its reiteration and re-purposing.

Invented Traditions

This reiteration and nation-writing process can be followed further in another element that has surfaced recently in political discourse, and has been used by the government in comparison with 15 July; the Battle of Manzikert.2 While being a recently re-purposed and re-appropriated past event, just like the word “destan”, the Battle of Manzikert is also used as a replacement for the Kemalist-era’s Turkish War of Independence, and thus, introduces a new national milestone along with a new tradition. Dated approximately a week after the coup attempt, in his 15 July speech published on the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, President Erdoğan states that “In this coup attempt, our people manifested their determination to embrace this land as a homeland, in just the same way as they did a

thousand years ago in Manzikert [referring to the Battle of Manzikert]”.3 Through a historical milestone for the nation, which in this case refers to very similar qualities such as determination,

2_{Battle of Manzikert was fought on 26 August 1071 between the Byzantine Empire and the}

Seljuk Empire (a Sunni Muslim Turko-Persian empire), and resulted in the defeat of the Byzantine army, and the capture of the Byzantine Emperor, Romanos IV Diogenes. It was a pivotal victory for the Turks, as the Byzantine authority in Anatolia was undermined and consequently, the gradual Turkification of Anatolia began.

3_{Original Turkish quote: “Bu darbe girişiminde milletimiz tıpı bin yıl önce Malazgirt’te}

olduğu gibi, bu coğrafyaya [sic] vatan olarak sahiplenme konusundaki kararlılığını ortaya koymuştur” (“15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ile İlgili Meydanlara Yaptıkları Konuşma”). (All translations from Turkish to English in this paper are by the author unless stated otherwise.)

(20)

bravery and devotion to one’s nation, he introduces a consistent Muslim-Turkish identity. As Balibar writes, “the imaginary singularity of national formations is constructed daily, by moving back from the present into the past” (87). By referring back to historical national events, such as the Battle of Manzikert, the past is also brought into the future, to construct a consistent national identity. Thus, methodical remembrances of the past are scenes for nation-writing. And in addition to this, this reference also signals the break in the Turkish national narrative. The Battle of Manzikert becomes the “New Turkey” version of the Turkish War of Independence that symbolizes the break from Turkey’s Ottoman past for the Kemalist view. Bringing this past event back into the narrative also contributes to the writing of the changing national narrative, and to the construction of a new national identity.

One example to these scenes is the revival of the yearly celebrations of the Battle of Manzikert. According to Tanıl Bora, one year after the coup attempt, during the celebrations of the 946th anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert, “President Erdoğan said that, today they also are fighting with whomever Sultan Alparslan [of the Seljuk Empire] fought with back then” (207).4 Later on in this chapter, I will get back to this quote and what it implies. But for now, it demonstrates the identification Erdoğan forms with Alparslan, leading to a paralleling of Turkish people now and Turkish people a thousand years ago. The introduction of

Manzikert into the context of 15 July, just like the word “destan”, creates a connection and continuity between 1071 and today, Seljuk Turks and Turkish citizens.

Bora points out that 26 August, the 946th anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert was celebrated with “a new kind of splendor” one year later after the coup attempt (2017), and writes: “It was announced that this anniversary will be celebrated much more ostentatiously next year” (207). Celebrating this historical national victory became a much-valued tradition

4_{Tanıl Bora, in his book Zamanın Kelimeleri: Yeni Türkiye’nin Siyasi Dili (Words of Our}

Times: Political Discourse of the New Turkey), identifies the word “Manzikert” as one of the

(21)

in the process that followed 15 July. Eric J. Hobsbawm argues, “both nations and nationalism are products of ‘social engineering’. What deserves particular attention in this process is the case of ‘invented traditions’ (…) which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’” (Özkırımlı 94). Much like Bhabha’s notion of nation as narration, Hobsbawm claims that continuity and repetition are key in the production of a nation, which are primarily achieved through

“invented traditions”. These sites of “invented traditions” encapsulates Bhabha’s “double-time”; Turkish citizens who attend to a Battle of Manzikert anniversary celebration are both

objects of a continuing national history, and subjects of their reiteration and the writing of the

nation. The timely resurrection of this victory and its traditionalized celebration is not a coincidence according to Hobsbawm. For him, “invented traditions are ‘responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations’” (Özkırımlı 94). That is to say that, the discourse of Manzikert surfaced as a response to 15 July. Although the references to a battle between determined Muslim-Turks and the enemy, and the conclusive victory appear to be just an homage and the indicator of a coherent national identity, it actually provides an insight as to how 15 July can be perceived in the post-15 July environment.

Some specific attributes of the historical event chosen for the “invented tradition” make this choice intriguing, and its reiteration at this point of time allows for a space for performativity (writing the nation). Firstly, due to the importance of the Battle of Manzikert as a “pivotal victory” that changed everything and granted Turks Anatolia, their homeland, the government’s association of 15 July with Manzikert might be a sign of its pivotal importance in the eyes of the government, whose reasons I will analyze in more detail later. Secondly, The Battle of Manzikert is retrospectively seen by the nationalist-conservatives as a sign of “the promise of Anatolia to Turks, [and] Turks being the precursors of Islam and

(22)

carriers of a world-historical sovereignty mission” (Bora 208).5 That is to say, for nationalist-conservatives (which can be said to be the prevalent government policy, more visibly so since 15 July6), the Seljuk era is a template for Turkish-Islamist sovereignty primarily over

Anatolia, and a historical justification for the claim of Muslim-Turks being the

representatives of Islam. Specifically in the case of Manzikert, due to the fact that the enemy is the Christian state of Byzantine Empire, which was eventually overcome by Muslim-Turks, this battle takes on the status of being a battle of religions as much as a battle of nations. Thus, when President Erdoğan says “today they also are fighting with whomever Sultan Alparslan fought with back then,” the concept of ‘the enemy’ bears more definition then ‘other nations’ or “non-Turks” if thought of in this context; it implies “non-Muslims”, too (207). Introducing Manzikert into the discourse and inventing a new tradition of its celebration is not a self-contained act; it affects how recent events are perceived and is used as a tool for “inculcat[ing] certain values” (Özkırımlı 94). The nation, how it is defined and the uniting factors of its people, is written through the reiteration of history in order to use it “as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion,” and shaping perceptions in a post-15 July environment with invented traditions (Özkırımlı 94). This re-introduction the Battle of Manzikert gives a sense of continuity in the national narrative by referring back to a former “national” victory and drawing parallels to a current event, similar to the re-introduction of “destan”, and at the same time, becomes a new tradition with new and

context-bound implications. These two mechanisms work together to preserve the illusion of continuity and a deep-rooted national history while covertly changing the existing

5_{Original Turkish quote: “Anadolu’nun Türklere vaat edilmişliği, Türklerin İslam’ın öncüsü}

ve dünya-tarihsel bir egemenlik misyonunun taşıyıcısı oldukları.”

6_{Serkan Demirtaş writes in his article for Hürriyet Daily News almost 4 months after the}

coup-attempt, “[A]t the point we have arrived after 15 years, it can be argued that the AKP’s [Justice and Development Party] political line has shifted to a rather ‘nationalist

conservative’ stance at the expense of ignoring its promises to upgrade the level of the Turkish democracy.”

(23)

connotations of the words, and to shape the ideological framing of the post-15 July discourses and political climate.

A Religious Victory

During the process of 15 July coup attempt and afterwards, the AKP government re-purposed another religious symbol besides mosques: selâs. Selâ is a prayer usually read from mosques’ minarets to announce someone’s passing away, and on Fridays as a reminder for the Friday prayer. During the night of 15 July and the following day, consecutive selâs were heard all over Turkey. Selâ is seen as such an integral part of 15 July that it is included in 15 July

Martyrs’ Memorial, broadcasted constantly through loudspeakers, and in the “15 Temmuz”

website by a built-in sound player, through which the user can also download the audio file.7 It also constitutes a significant part of “15 Temmuz Şehitler Köprüsü Sanal Gerçeklik Filmi” [15 July Martyrs Bridge Virtual Reality Film] that was released to the public within the scope of 15 July VRP on the first anniversary of 15 July (a government-produced narrative of 15 July). This film was made by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in an effort to produce a virtual version of the actual 15 July coup attempt experience on the bridge. Therefore, as it is an Islamic object, the role of selâ in the film is important in relation to the aforementioned conservatism of the AKP government, and just as the re-purposing of “destan” and Manzikert that shapes the political climate, the new meanings and functions “selâ” gains in the context of 15 July will indicate religion’s newly appointed position in politics by the government.

Starting with the depiction of the scene that involves selâ, while the soldiers and the people are facing each other on the bridge, and the viewer is situated in between the two groups (with a visual field of 360-degrees), one unarmed man from the people’s side starts to

(24)

approach the soldiers. After he takes several steps, the sound of selâ is heard (00:03:35). Moments later, the shooting begins, and the unarmed man is shot dead by the soldiers as selâ continues (00:03:43). After a brief blackout, the viewer’s position changes (now situated among the people), and the gunfire continues as the viewer witnesses a number of people falling and being carried to the sides by the others. The image of civilians, who in this case are Muslim Turkish citizens, being killed by the enemy during a prayer that is known to evoke sadness in the listeners both because of its lament-like tone, and its association with death, dramatizes the scene. Moreover, presence of selâ in this film alludes to the actual 15 July night, throughout which selâs and ezans (call to prayer) were heard all over the country.

There are three possible reasons why selâ has an important role in the 15 July events, and all three contribute to the VR film’s content and message. First reason might be selâ’s now rarely used function of announcing significant victories or events in old times. The fact that announcements repeating Erdoğan’s call to the people to take to the streets to “give the appropriate response” to these soldiers (the audio of which is included in the film) followed these selâs supports this reasoning (00:02:49-00:02:56). They were an efficient way of mass communication; thanks to selâs, people were more easily and quickly mobilized, and the coup attempt was successfully stonewalled. What is also important here is that, during a coup, mass communication and media are taken over by the military (although the military failed to seize control this time, and Erdoğan was able to appear on television through a FaceTime video call), but the mosques were a reliable way of mass communication.

Therefore, aside from their practical contribution, this idea of mosques as the safe spaces that will never be conquered gave people confidence. The second possible reason is the moral support they provide. Before important wars or military expeditions during and after the Ottoman period, such as the Turkish War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı), selâs were read in order for the people to feel spiritually stronger, because of the strong religious feelings and

(25)

faith in God it evokes. This repetition of a tradition, again, provides a continuous narration by linking the Ottoman-era and the early republican period to today. Selâs read on the day of 15 July also worked as a morale builder, and emboldened the people. When their function of announcing Erdoğan’s call to the streets is considered in conjunction with their function of boosting morale for the battle, it can be concluded that they actually took on the role of a call to resistance/battle. Therefore, the sound of selâ that is heard in the VR film might be

indicative of the beginning of the resistance/battle, which is also marked by the simultaneous first killing that takes place in the VR film, as well as a tribute to the important mobilizing effect of it on the day of 15 July.

The third possible reason for the importance attributed to selâ is related to the political history more explicitly. Since the establishment of the republic, military has always been the Kemalist, secularist institution that interferes with politics when “necessary”, with the

justification of “guard[ing] and defend[ing] the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish republic”, as explained in the army’s Internal Service Law (İç Hizmet Kanunu) (Zürcher 346). These interferences generally targeted the Islamist practices, with the fear of “Islamist agenda might infiltrate and gradually take over the state” (Zürcher 324). For instance, on 28 February 1997, “Task Force West” (Batı Çalışma Grubu) formed by the military to “collect evidence about fundamentalist threats to the state” presented their “advices” to the cabinet, which were “aimed at curbing the influence of the Islamists in the economy, in education, and inside the state apparatus” (Zürcher 324). This process came to be known as the “28 February post-modern coup d’état”. At the time, Necmettin Erbakan from Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) was the prime minister, and he was known as the founder of the religio-political movement “National Vision”, which inspired a number of Islamist parties, including AKP. With a history full of similar interventions, as from AKP came to power, their most important

(26)

were taken to achieve this goal such as making changes in the role of the National Security Council (MGK), and the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials (Zürcher 344). From AKP’s point of view, on the day of 15 July 2016, AKP’s fears came true. For the Islamists and/or anti-secularists, this interference meant that their “national will” (milli irade) was being restricted once again, as well as their religious practices, since AKP was elected by the public and must be representative of the “majority”. But this time, democracy was defended and the coup attempt failed, thanks to Erdoğan’s mobilization of the people. Considering that this is how the events progressed for AKP, it can be argued that this victory is seen as a pivotal victory by AKP as the Manzikert discourse suggests, since, unlike their precedents, they were able to repress the military factor and make way for a more Islamist politics. As Berat Albayrak, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, stated, “Nothing will ever be the same after 15 July” (Oktay). In this sense, selâ in the VR film represents Islam’s involvement in politics by playing an important role in the political struggle to overcoming the military’s intervention in politics. Also, being used as a counterattack to resist the restriction of religious freedom, and the Islamist practices brought about by the majority’s will, selâ is re-purposed as the symbol of democracy, and symbolizes the “national will” in “15 July Martyrs Bridge Virtual Reality Film” [15 July VR Film].

In the context of the AKP era, the concept of democracy goes hand in hand with the Islamist influence on the governance, and takes the form of “national will” in the political discourse, which has been a frequently used term in politics throughout the AKP years. “National will” is generally put forward as the justification for the government’s actions with the subtext of democracy, and used as an answer to the secularist Turks’ discontent about the government’s Islamist and Ottomanist practices. Zürcher explains AKP’s tendency to rely on the term too much as, “The AKP felt entitled to steer the country in a different cultural direction because it saw itself as a representative of the ‘national will’ in clear disregard of

(27)

the fact that a majority of Turkey’s citizens had not voted for the party” (350). Therefore, it is necessary to re-evaluate the meaning of “nation” in “national will” that AKP uses. According to Bora, Erdoğan chooses a specific “nation” or “people” for himself, which does not exactly correspond to the whole Turkish nation (41).8 Bora gives the example of the Gezi Park protests; he reminds that in his rallies, Erdoğan said, “If the ones in Taksim Gezi Park are the people of this nation [millet], what are the people here [referring to the people at his rally]?” (41). Bora concludes, “The real people [millet] are the ones that gathered there” (41). By portraying the protesters at the Gezi Park as “‘vandals’ (çapulcular) and unbelievers who had no respect for the ‘national will’,” and “as puppets in the hands of mysterious international financial interests aiming to undermine Turkey’s economy,” Erdoğan rejects their status as members of this nation, and claims that even if they are, their judgments cannot be trusted as they can easily be manipulated by the evil external forces (Zürcher 356). Therefore, “the nation” that constitutes the “national will” refers to the conservative Muslim-Turkish AKP voters. And the rest of the members who fall outside of this category should “recognize the dominion of the majority, and get along under the auspices and tolerance of them,” and if they do not, they are no different than the enemies of the nation in the eyes of the government (Bora 41).9

The reason for AKP’s dismissive attitude for any other ideology or voice stems from their belief that they constitute and represent the essence of the Turkish nation. As Yıldırım and Alpman puts it, “As nationalism, conservatism and Islamism that undertake the Turkish right’s ideological representation, present themselves as the Turkish society’s culture,

national idea, and the only form of societal entity; they are ready to define all the other social,

8_{Original Turkish quote: “Şu aralar Türkiye’nin Başbakanı, kendine bir millet, bir halk}

seçiyor.”

9_{“Çoğunluk milletin egemenliğini tanıyarak, onun hoşgörüsü ve himayesi altında yaşayıp}

(28)

cultural, political demands, inclinations, discourses, and even the aims of coming to power, as ‘gayri-milli’ (non-national)” (25). In other words, the nationalist, conservatist and Islamist government is believed to be the true representatives of the nation and the culture, and this belief and trust is so strong that, any other alternative appears to be wrong. Hence, the strict classification of ‘milli’ (national) and ‘gayri-milli’ (non-national) by those in power creates a polarization amongst Turkish citizens, and immediately labels the alternatives as sinister.

At the root of this binary labeling system lies the world-view of the Turkish nation: and that is “us” against “others”. Erdoğan’s “milli” and “gayri-milli” classifications are a reflection of “‘our’ constant fight against the ‘external forces’ that aspire to harm the Turkish nation” discourse inside the nation. ‘Non-nationals’ within the nation are always tied to the bigger picture, and believed to be manipulated by an external source, a foreign mastermind that plots the nation’s downfall. Even though the name of this external source that is always blamed for any unrest in the nation constantly changes (faiz lobisi [the interest rate lobby], Batılı güçler [Western powers], terrorist organizations, üst akıl [superior mind], etc.), the specific group of people it refers to generally stays ambiguous, and assume the role of an invisible enemy that cannot be fought. Therefore, with the help of this ambiguity, and the government’s strategy of re-purposing, “gayri-milli” can be into “milli” and vice versa, in the ways that will benefit the current ideology and discourse.

According to Zürcher, during his 2014 election campaigns, “[w]ith aggressive and self-confident speeches, (…) [Erdoğan] portrayed himself as the national will incarnate and the only one to defend Turkey against the conspiracies of its enemies” (359). As Erdoğan claims to be the only one who can fight these external forces, he should be the only one that has both the ability and therefore the authority to identify them and whom they manipulate, as well. As mentioned in the Gezi Park protests example, even though it was a considerable portion of the Turkish nation that protested the government’s practices, Erdoğan claimed that

(29)

the protestors were manipulated by international evil forces that do not belong to this nation. In a similar way, in the context of 15 July coup attempt, the group of Turkish soldiers who claim to interfere with the democracy for the nation’s good were also excluded from the nation under the label of “traitors” who were manipulated by an external force (FETÖ) as soon as Erdoğan called this attempt “an invasion” and invited “his people” to the streets.10 Therefore, regardless of these two groups’ status as citizens, they can be pronounced “non-national”.

Interestingly, in the VR film, the soldiers are also denied their soldiership. The narrator says, “15 July was a day on which the shock caused by a treason gang posing as the nation’s own soldiers spraying bullets without blinking an eye, was turned into a will to fight, a common spirit of comradeship and unity” (00:04:30). In this description, the coup group is not defined as a group of Turkish soldiers who betrayed their nations, but as traitors who

pretend to be Turkish soldiers. There is an underlying assumption in this choice of words to

describe the soldiers, and in the statement that the people were shocked to see their soldiers betray them, and that is a nation’s soldier would never betray their nations. The only way of explaining the situation without conflicting that assumption and breaking people’s trust in their army is to deny their soldiership, along with their nationality. Therefore, their previous title as Turkish soldiers is being revoked, and in doing so, they are pronounced impostors that betray the nation. As soon as a group of citizens betray their nation (in the eyes of the

government), their nationality is immediately invalidated, they are excluded from the nation, and they become part of ‘them’ in the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse. This exclusion process works to reinforce the binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and once again points to the fact that it is

10_{A quote from Erdoğan’s speech over the FaceTime video call at the night of the coup}

attempt, calling the attempt “invasion”: “Yapmış oldukları işgali de çok kısa sürede ortadan kaldıracağımıza inanıyorum” [I believe that we will annihilate their invasion in less than no time] (“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Ben de Cumhurbaşkanı olarak meydana geliyorum”).

(30)

Erdoğan who decides who is in and who is out, and thus, that the concept of “the nation” and/or “us” is used selectively in the government-based or -related discourses.

This narration of “us” against “the evil others” that constitutes the structure of the 15 July VRP is mainly based on religious codes and discourses. Proceeding with the analysis of the second religious cue in the 15 July VR Film (first one being the selâ), it will become even more clear that one significant criterion for this divide of “us” and “them” is religion. After the selâ scene, people retreat and take cover as the shooting continues (00:04:01-00:04:39). Seconds after the shooting stops, people start shouting “Tekbir…Allahuekber” and “Ya Allah, Bismillah, Allahuekber” (commonly used as “Oh dear God, I commence everything with/in your name, you are [the] greatest”), as the viewer is still positioned on their side (00:05:01). Saying “Allahuekber” (also known as Tekbir/Takbir) is commonly used as an Islamic battle cry. Just as selâ, this religious cue also marks the beginning of a religious battle between Muslims and “infidels”. Several seconds later, the viewer’s point of view changes, and they are positioned at the soldiers’ side, facing the people (when the viewer turn their head, soldiers and military vehicles can be seen on their right and behind them). Moments later, as the battle cry continues, the tank gun is fired, and the fire hits a short distance away from the civilians (00:05:28). The fact that the second religious cue is also followed by a shooting reinforces the idea that one of the most important tensions this battle hinges on is about religion. These two scenes suggest some form of an intolerance or disrespect towards Islam on the soldiers’ part. Soldiers are depicted as using disproportionate force in the VR film, as they respond to verbal Islamic battle cries by firing their weapons into the unarmed crowd. Indications of the soldiers’ unprovoked anger and hate towards the people, triggered at the moments of their displays of faith, put the soldiers in the position of “infidels”/non-Muslims, and even Muslim-haters. The clash between the soldiers and the people is portrayed as a religious battle, a “holy war”. When seen from this black-and-white frame of Muslim

(31)

Turks against Muslim-haters that is being established throughout the VR film, in line with the Manzikert comparison, 15 July becomes the symbol of a modern-day religious victory. Therefore, since the religious practice of selâ is re-purposed as a political communication tool, and the notion of democracy is re-defined as the “national will”; the fight for

“democracy” becomes the fight for Islam.

Nation as Religion

The associations of democracy with Islamic practices stem from the concept of “national will” in the political discourse, as previously mentioned, and this association necessitates Islam’s involvement in a fight for democracy, namely, in 15 July coup attempt. And as discussed, this re-definition of democracy and the involvement of religion in politics stem from the rupture of the national narrative with the AKP era, and constitute a transformation of the narrative. In addition to this, in line with the ideology of “New Turkey”, 15 July is portrayed as about religion as much as it is about nationalism, because of the current

dominant view that religion is a cultural essence of the Turkish nation. This view is implied through the new definition of the word “national” as used by Turkish Islamists, which according to Zürcher is “an ‘authentic’ conservative Muslim Turkishness” (xii). The nation and the national cannot be thought independently of Islam, which constitutes a crucial portion of the Turkish identity and the Turkish culture, according to this view. This intermingling and codependency can be observed through the borrowings of political discourse from Islamic discourse, which are appropriated in a way that nationalism assigns new meanings to the religious language and the nation itself, in a way, nation takes on the role of religion.

(32)

martyrdom. The civilians who died on 15 July for the sake of standing up against the soldiers

that tried to seize power and eliminate democracy, were given “martyr” status, just as any other person who dies for their country. “Şehitlik” (martyrdom) primarily means sacrificing one’s life for one’s religion. But today, the word’s meaning is extended to include those who sacrifice their lives for their nations, as well. According to Anderson, “for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless. Just for that reason, it can ask for sacrifices” (Imagined Communities 144). Because of the “disinterested love and solidarity” the nation offers to its members, dying for it becomes a “moral

grandeur”. (Imagined Communities 144). This kind of death turns into something to be proud of, something to be desired, because of the promised “honorary rank” after death. Nation, with its disinterested position and its task of uniting and caring for its members, borrows from religion, and substitutes for it.

But what is different about the use of “martyrdom” in the 15 July process from the general concept of “martyrdom” as is used in Turkey, is the word “democracy” that precedes it. 15 July martyrs are the only martyrs that are called “the martyrs of democracy”. While “şehitlik”, borrowed from Islam, implies a higher status both in the national discourse, and in the religious discourse, the specification of “democracy” draws it closer to the political sphere. In the end, the distinction between sacrificing one’s life for one’s nation, for one’s right to choose their representatives to govern them, and for one’s religion becomes blurred. Bora claims, “In the modern times, the primary heir of the martyrdom culture is nationalism. Martyrdom culture constitutes the backbone of the articulation of nationalism with religion, and even the nation’s becoming a religion itself ” (185).11 According to him, the nation becomes the new religion, the new “higher cause” for self-sacrifice, filling in the existing

11_{Original Turkish quote: “Ama tabii modern zamanlarda şehitlik kültürünün baş varisi,}

milliyetçilik. Milliyetçiliğin dinle eklemlenmesine hatta bizzat bir din haline gelmesine kan verir şehitlik kültürü.”

(33)

religious discourse with new meanings and nationalist ideals. But when the notion of “democracy” is attached to it, the association of democracy with “national will”, therefore with the freedom to exercise one’s Islamic practices in the context of the AKP era, leads the way back to the “higher cause” being one’s religion. AKP that exercises democracy and allows for “its nation” (Muslim Turks) to practice their religion becomes the link between democracy and Islam. Accordingly, instead of the existing religious discourse being filled with new nationalist meanings, in this case, the religious concepts that were filled with nationalist meanings regain their religious meanings through the mediation of politics.

“Şehitler ölmez” (“martyrs don’t die”) is a frequently used saying/slogan in Turkey, generally followed by the sentence “vatan bölünmez” (“homeland cannot be divided”). Their pairing suggests an inherent immortality and continuity both for the ones that lost their lives for the nation, and for the nation itself. Anderson compares nation’s denial of fatality and finiteness to religion: “[I]n different ways, religious thought also responds to obscure intimations of immortality, generally by transforming fatality into continuity … In this way, it concerns itself with the links between the dead and the yet unborn, the mystery of re-generation” (Imagined Communities 11). Through the discourse of immortality of the dead, in this case the martyrs, the immortality of the nation is secured.

As Anderson suggests, there is a link between this discourse and the yet unborn members of the nation. The deaths of the martyrs are given a cause, and that cause is the (religious) freedom and democracy for the future generations. Before the closing scene of 15 July VR Film, the narrator says “For the ones who sacrificed their today for our tomorrow,”12 and the photos and names of the martyrs appear on the screen, surrounding the viewer in every angle (00:06:38). Because of the overwhelming visual encircling of these faces and names, first of all, the viewer feels like they are one of the martyrs, sharing the same cause.

(34)

But at the same time, as the viewer is forced to get more intimate with these martyrs by seeing their faces and reading their names, and realizing that they are not only numbers or characters in a VR game, they feel a sense of indebtedness and obligation (both to honor the martyrs’ memory and to honor the nation).

In a news article published on the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey only 9 days after the coup attempt, it is stated that President Erdoğan said, “Undoubtedly, our martyrs will continue to occupy their pre-eminent place in our hearts. Moreover, every year on 15 July Martyr Remembrance Day, we will particularly remember them, and pass down their memory to future generations” (“Türkiye, 15 Temmuz Gecesi Tüm Farklılılarını Geride Bırakarak Birleşti”).13 Once again, the national dead is being linked to the national Unborn, and the traditions are also invented for the Unborn. Every act of remembrance is aimed for the future generations, which are referred to as “our tomorrow” in the VR film. The future of the nation is symbolized by the Unborn, and it is a good future regardless of all the wrongs of the nation today. This hope for a Good Nation is based on the Goodness of the Unborn. Just like the national dead, the Unborn do not have identities; as Anderson writes, “They have no social lineaments at all, except for their [Turkishness]” (“The Goodness of Nations” 362). In the same line as martyrs, their purity brings about an assumed goodness, both for them and for the nation’s future. It is through this hopeful discourse of the Unborn that the living members of the nation today accept to “work hard, pay [their] taxes, and make other substantial sacrifices–in order to preserve heritages, reduce national debts, protect

environments, [and] defend frontiers” (“The Goodness of Nations” 362). Most importantly, it is also for the Unborn and the promise of a good nation that the living members accept to give their lives.

13_{Original Turkish quote: “Hiç şüphesiz şehitlerimiz kalplerimizdeki mümtaz yerlerini daima}

muhafaza edeceklerdir. Bununla birlikte artık her yıl 15 Temmuz Şehitlerimizi Anma Günü’nde kendilerini hassaten yâd edecek, hatıralarını gelecek nesillere aktaracağız.”

(35)

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality recognizes this interplay between the Dead and the Unborn, and states the main goal of the 15 July VRP as: “[T]o never to forget what happened on the night of 15 July, and to pass it on to future generations” on the

Municipality’s website (“İBB'den 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi Sanal Gerçeklik Projesi”).14 Essentially, it can be said that the project is meant to be a conveyer of the past to the future, with the goal of reminding the Dead, and through it, guaranteeing the future generations’ Goodness. The assumption behind this goal is that what happened on the night of 15 July and the martyrs are Good, and the future of the nation will also be Good thanks to them and thanks to the assumed potential Goodness of the future generations. But the third group in the picture, the Living, also should not be forgotten. While the project’s official goal is

exclusively concerned with the Dead and the Unborn, it also transmits to the Living the assumptions it is based on, and its promise of getting involved in the process as a conveyer. Therefore, for the Living, the project functions as both a promisor and a guarantor of national continuity and national Goodness.

This “unintended” message is given to the Living through two mechanisms. First, the hope for a better Turkish nation inherited by the future good members of the nation is kept alive through a self-fulfilling prophecy: As today’s members sacrificed themselves in the hope of a Good nation, they made it possible for this hope to be realized by securing democracy and eliminating the enemies of the nation on 15 July. Second, the assumed Goodness of the Dead and the Unborn serves as an assurance for the Living: They “mirror each other, and provide the best sureties of the ineradicable Goodness of the nation” (“The Goodness of Nations” 364). In other words, they provide a trust in the essentialness of the Goodness of the Turkish nation both in the form of a historical proof, and in the form of an

14_{“İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Bilgi İşlem Daire Başkanlığı tarafından ... hayata geçirilen}

projeyle 15 Temmuz gecesinde yaşananların unutulmaması ve gelecek nesillere aktarılması amaçlanıyor.”

(36)

eventual reality in the future. Thanks to the reiterations of the Dead and the Unborn, the living is obliged to serve the nation and realize the hope of national Goodness. And the two mechanisms that are included in the project operate as a reiteration of this dual discourse that keep the living believing in and contributing to the nation, which is rendered more emphatic through the medium of the VR, which I will analyze in more detail in the next chapter. From these two mechanisms it can be understood that, through the discourses of the past and the future, today’s assumptions, hopes and motives are produced. And in the process of their realization, the nation is being written. The “continuous” narratives of the past, present and the future are built on, and thence, the idea of a national “invariant substance” is based upon these mechanisms.

Conclusion

Although the national narrative of Turkey is presented as single, coherent, and progressive; due to the ruptures and reinterpretations in the narrative,, it is actually a mix of multiple narratives that most of the time are in conflict with one another. While national continuity seems to be constructed through references to the past and revival of old concepts, such as “destan”and the Battle of Manzikert as I have analyzed, when looked closely, all the references are re-purposed and re-appropriated to mean something else in accord with the political atmosphere of the day. In spite of these shifts in the meaning, the illusion of a continuous and unchanging national identity, “Turkishness”, is still kept alive to create an “inherent” bond between the citizens and give them a sense of belonging. This bond and belonging is mostly constructed through the discourses of the dead and the unborn, and promises a good nation, for which the members are willing to give their lives. In the process of 15 July and during its aftermath, these efforts of portraying the Turkish nation as a

(37)

deep-rooted, progressive, and homogenized single unit gained intensity with the aim of uniting the people against the “common enemy,” and of explaining what 15 July signified to the public.

The strategy that keeps recurring for creating an image and a perception of 15 July and the “New Turkey” appears to be re-purposing. All of the key symbols and discourses that were chosen as objects in this chapter were re-purposed by the AKP-government within the context of 15 July, as a way of attributing a meaning to 15 July within the scope of the government ideology, as well as using 15 July to promote the government ideology. Now in order to see how these re-purposed symbols and discourses in connection with 15 July are conveyed to the public, I will move onto the way they are conveyed, namely, to the medium of one of the government’s main tools for 15 July propaganda.

(38)

(39)

The Use of Virtual Reality in “15 July Virtual Reality Project”: A New Way of Transmitting Experience

15 July Turkish coup attempt was a hyper-mediatized event. Erdoğan’s call for his people to go out onto the streets that shaped the event itself along with the country’s future was made through a FaceTime15 video connection, and broadcasted on every TV channel in the form of an image of him addressing the people from the mobile phone of the TV presenter. As he could not be in the studio, he made use of this app that allowed him to virtually teleport there, and address the public in real-time. This use of a contemporary technology became a turning point for the whole nation, together with the help of social media that allowed for the public to communicate and inform each other.

In the aftermath of this coup attempt, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) announced their “15 July Virtual Reality Project”, in line with the use of new technologies throughout the event. In this project, Virtual Reality and the 360° video technologies are used by the government for the first time. The motivation behind this project is stated as, “[T]o never to forget what happened on the night of 15 July, and to pass it on to future generations” by İBB (“İBB'den 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi Sanal Gerçeklik Projesi”). The medium is very different from the other media that have been used (such as memorials, documentaries,

statues etc.) in order to remind and teach about an event of national importance. As VR is used to create virtual worlds for the viewers to experience in a way that is close to the actual, I think it would be best to approach it as a means of creating an experience. Once that is established, the main question that will be handled remains as, why was specifically this medium chosen?

Turkish Government’s “15 July Virtual Reality Project”: Creating A New ‘Reality’