U
NIVERSITY OF
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MSTERDAM
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raduate
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chool of
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ocial
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ciences
P
olitical
S
cience:
I
nternational
R
elations
T
rack
T
he
F
aces of the
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uropean
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arliament:
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opulism,
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deology and
L
eadership
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easured in fWHR
Nick Geluk
Student number: 10887172 Student email: nickgeluk@live.nl
Lecturers: E. Harteveld & G. Schumacher Second reader: M. Medeiros
Research Project: A global crisis of democracies? Change and continuity in 21st
century politics Date: 22 June 2018 Words: +15000
0. Abstract
Quantitative research methods present evidence that European populists display less dominant and aggressive behavioural tendencies compared to their own party members based on facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR). Whereas, ideology and sex are suggested as the most significant predictors for a politician’s facial width and their accompanied dispositions. Furthermore, populists of both the male and female sex are found to be more masculine in their facial appearance, making them standout as a subgroup in their own European parties. Leaders in the European Parliament show a relative high level of masculinity, comparable to those of populists. The least dominant features appear in European far-left politicians, while right-wing members of the European Parliament have significantly higher fWHRs.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...3
1. Literature Review ...6
1.1. The European Parliament ...6
1.2. Stereotype, subtype and subgroup ...7
1.3. Facial Competence and Attractiveness ...8
1.4. Ideologies and Preferences ...9
1.5. Facial Features ... 11
1.6. Dominance ... 12
1.7. Populism ... 13
1.8. Political Spectra ... 15
2. Research Question & Hypotheses ... 18
3. Methods & Research Design ... 20
4. Results & Discussion ... 24
4.1. General Findings ... 24
4.2. Multiple Regression Analysis ... 27
4.3. Populism Within Parties ... 28
4.4. Social Dominance on the Left-Right Spectrum ... 31
4.5. Female Populists ... 34
4.6. Lack of Leadership ... 35
5. Conclusion... 37
In a democracy, people get the leaders they deserve. - Joseph de Maistre
1. Introduction
The power of visual images is felt ever since the first televised U.S. presidential debate in 1960. The significance of television images made victory for Kennedy possible, as it allowed him to use his superior image over Nixon (Druckman, 2003, p.559). While seemingly unrelated to being of value for successful or effective policy, facial appearance can be a great addition to electorate success. Likewise, facial appearance can prove to be an enormous obstacle to overcome when trying to get elected for certain positions. The political game of getting elected changes dramatically when not only the ideological message is of importance. Image, looks and other features surrounding physical presentation are increasingly crucial to electorate success, especially considering how much politicians are currently appearing in both traditional and social media, foreign and domestic.
Especially in democracies, where the candidates are pitched against one another, the visual aspect in politics becomes a tool to pave the way to elected office. In true democracies, the rule of the people’s majority is a known and given understanding. And while the people in democracies play a substantially larger part than in any other system of government, even democracies are ruled by its leaders. This fact is entirely in line with the iron law of oligarchy, a political theory developed by Robert Michels (2009) in the year 1911. The law states any organization, party or collective will be ruled by an elite or oligarchy due to the sheer technical and organizational need to function properly. So, whether it concerns an ancient Greek democracy or a modern Western democracy, its leaders play a crucial role on the overall functioning of the whole system, despite being technically a rule of the majority.
By the use of elections, the people can generally vote for a representative to construe their desire for specific governance. It is in this process, of electing a representative, a large proportion of democratic rule is established. Why people choose certain representatives to represent them in either a national parliament, local government or as a president is often thought to be an extension of personal preferences on certain ideological implications for government. However, we should not forget the visual presentation of politicians, as much deeper considerations for certain preferences seem to play a role when settling on a representative.
Furthermore, in knowing that facial appearance does matter when getting elected, it is relevant to know which features are important. Beauty is somewhat of an easy feature to imagine, but one cannot argue on personal taste. Individual preferences will differ under any circumstances, making preferences vary from person to person. Differentiating between specific facial features and their general contributions becomes valuable knowledge in political arena. Seeing how people adhere to specific ideologies and have peculiar preferences on appearance, knowing how they mix and match is necessary to understand why people vote for certain politicians (Laustsen, 2017). Knowledge on facial features and the emotions they instigate are therefore a welcome addition to the existing literature on facial features in the political sphere.
Besides the influence of facial appearance in electorate success, there are other features that are considered to have an impact on the overall development of democratic rule. One of these features is considered to be controversial in the democratic process, namely populism. The reason that populism can be seen as a controversial topic is found in the dual nature of democracy. While some see the aggressive nature and tone of populists as a direct threat to the general democratic procession, others emphasize the corrective and fundamental democratic principles that go along with populism (Kaltwasser, 2012, p.184).
As Kaltwasser (2012, p.199) discusses in his article, some people view populism as one of the purest supplements of democracy, since it offers clear and direct influences from the people. Moreover, as democracies are also bound by the aforementioned iron law of oligarchies, elites and other fundamentally undemocratic groups are present in seemingly democratic governments. In order to fight this development, populistic parties and leaders often charismatically display the ruling parties as resentful, while claiming to speak for the people in its entirety. Additionally, homogeneity, unity and patriotism are frequent features in populistic politics (Ionescu & Gellner, 1970).
Fighting elitist power in a democracy by populistic means does not sound wholly evil, but there are some who interpret populism as a danger to the democracy as a whole. As populists claim they represent the people in its entirety, other voices in the political sphere become compromised, silenced and stifled (Ionescu & Gellner, 1970). Furthermore, while populism is found on both sides of the traditional left-right political spectrum, the populist emphasis on national unity and homogeneity in todays globalized world is extremely unpopular by the left. Finally, due to the peculiar candidates that so often seem to guide populistic movements and parties, populist leadership relies on charisma, rather than rational-legal authority. As authority is derived from charisma, rather than rational contemplation, good governance is not guaranteed
as the charismatic leaders might not be the best suited in governing. In short, populism has both positive and negative consequences on democracy, depending who is asked. Similarly, the faces of politicians have a major influence on their final electorate success and thus the outcome of the democratic process.
Democracy is one of the highest values in the Western hemisphere and a concept that is even pushed on other areas of the globe. Therefore, it is rather strange an increasingly more important source of international policy like the European Union, is dealing with a democratic deficit (Müller, 2016, p.83). There is democracy in the EU, but it is limited to the European Parliament (EP) as it is the solely democratic elected body. With the same members as the EU in general, most European nations are represented in the European Parliament. Labelled as both a democratic institution and rich in populism, the European Parliament appears to be an ideal political arena to assess the facial features of its members. To what extent are populists in the European Parliament a subtype of politicians, based on their facial appearance? Based on populism, ideology, sex and leadership, I venture to map the different facial structures of European politicians in order to contribute to the literature on facial features and electorate success.
1. Literature Review
In the literature review, the literary knowledge on facial features and other relevant issues are displayed and discussed. Additionally, gaps in contemporary knowledge on the issue of facial feature and their relation to political success are indicated. However, the main and foremost objective is to display prior research, its contributions and possible flaws or shortcomings. Moreover, the European Parliament and populism as an ideology are discussed in detail.
1.1. The European Parliament
Even for most Europeans, the ordinary day to day execution and internal workings of the European Union remain somewhat of an abstract and vague concept. With institutions like; the European Commission, Council of the European Union, European Council, Council of Ministers, Court of Justice and the European Parliament all working together, yet still having their specific tasks, among other European institutions, maintaining an structured overview can be understandably difficult at times (Karns, Mingst & Stiles, 2015). Moreover, the developing power of the European Union makes that institutions even expand on their original functions, adding difficulty to understand the certain tasks the institutions are burdened with.
The European Parliament (EP) is one of the institutions within the EU that developed drastically as the importance of international cooperation increased. Since the first elections in 1979, the EP is the only directly elected EU body. The 751 members represent the second-largest democratic electorate (after the Indian Parliament) in the world and the second-largest transnational democratic electorate. With universal suffrage, the EP represents over 500 million people (European Parliament, 2018). Every five years elections are being held.
Like most other EU bodies, the EP is seated in both Strasbourg and Brussels. However, the administrative centre is housed in the city of Luxembourg. Together with the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, the Parliament exercises a legislative function. Furthermore, the European Parliament determines together with the Council of the European Union the budget for the EU (European Parliament, 2018). The EP formally does not have the power to initiate legislation, as passing laws with the Council is usually based on proposals of the European Commission. Other than passing laws, legislative acts of the European Parliament include decision-making on international treaties, enlargement and reviewing Commission programs (European Parliament, 2018).
The European Parliament also provides a supervising role for the EU in its entirety. Granting discharges on budget, examining citizen petitions, discussing monetary policy and
foreign election observations are included in the tasks assigned to the EP (European Parliament, 2018). Because the EP carries the democratic scrutiny for the entire EU, the actions of the EP often exude carefully into other features of the EU in order to minimize the democratic deficit that is often ascertained (Vesnic-Alejevic & Nacarino, 2012).
The members are grouped by ideology, instead of nationality. And since all EU countries are represented in the European Parliament, only few European countries are not included. By researching the faces of politicians in the European Parliament, a valid verdict can be made for the entire continent. As a result of the many parties and member states, the EP currently houses practically every kind of ideological direction. Even members that adhere to nazism or communism, albeit small minorities, are present (European Parliament, 2017). How the European parties are ideologically organised themselves is discussed in a subsequent section.
1.2. Stereotype, subtype and subgroup
One of the most valuable articles written on leadership mechanics and electorate success is
Measuring Stereotypes of Female Politicians by Schneider and Bos (2014). In this article, the
collective characteristics of leadership are fundamentally underlined and specific distinctions between groups of people are made. In the article of Schneider and Bos (2014), they display how female leaders are structurally less positively influenced by the stereotype that is maintained on female leaders. Peculiar enough, female politicians do not experience any positive enforcement from their stereotype, while both women and politicians do experience some benefits (Schneider & Bos, 2014, p.245).
Besides the discovery of the negative stereotypical effects on female politicians, Schneider and Bos (2014) tested four other supplementary hypotheses. Primarily, the differential perception of the general sex category and political category is discussed in the research. Their initial thoughts made Schneider and Bos expect different stereotypical characteristics between females and female politicians as well as males and male politicians. In making this very specific distinction, the terms subtype and subgroup are introduced. While a subgroup stereotype shares multiple traits from the derived stereotype, a sub-typical or subtype should be considered as a whole other stereotype. An example of such a subtype classification is best found in the difference between females and female politicians, as their carry their own unique stereotypical qualities (Schneider & Bos, 2014, p.245). The distinction between subgroup and subtype in stereotype literature, can make a valuable addition when researching
the faces of populists, as they could be either a subgroup of existing ideologies or potentially a unique subtype that should be considered as an ideology on its own.
1.3. Facial Competence and Attractiveness
While the literature on stereotypes can offer some interesting insights into the perception of certain political and non-political groups, the overall literature on faces and their traits remains a more significant source for indicating gaps of knowledge in electorate success. A social scientist who has made many relevant contributions to the knowledge on facial features, is the Danish researcher Lasse Laustsen.
There are many clear-cut differences between people and their preferences, as Laustsen (2014, p.777) manages to generalize many specific personal characteristics in leaders and their specific contribution to electorate success. These clear-cut traits of leaders are even further categorized, as not only hair length gets measured, but also colour. The many features result into an elaborate table of features, indicating which are most likely to increase success when running for office. Some of the noteworthy features that positively standout in photographs of candidates are smiling and shaved faces, blond and black hair colours, formal clothing and plain backgrounds. In contrast, full beards, red hair, glasses and sad looking faces are considered negative influences on electorate success (Laustsen, 2014, p.785).
More important is that this test of features is done for both attractiveness and facial competence. After running all the features both for attractiveness and facial competence, Laustsen (2014, p.787) concludes that while attractiveness is a positive and relevant predictor, facial competence is a significantly stronger indicator for electorate success. Attractiveness and facial competence do correlate strongly with one another, as more attractive candidates are often found to have more facial competence (Laustsen, 2014, p.789). Attractiveness is therefore more of a mediating predictor of electorate success than facial competence, as facial competence remains the strongest indicator.
But in order to understand what facial competence exactly is, many questions remain. Although facial competence is roughly described as a comprise of attractiveness, facial maturity and masculinity, the underlying theoretical fundamental explanation between facial competence and electorate success continues to be unclear (Laustsen, 2014, p.790). Moreover, while facial attractiveness is an indicator for both electorate success and facial competence, the overall effect of physical attractiveness is still undeveloped (Laustsen, 2014, p.779). Focusing on faces is therefore only part of the explanation of electorate success, especially in today’s world of ever-present cameras providing full physical display of politicians and leaders.
Other than the elaborate overview of traits that influence the electorate success of candidates and the distinction between attractiveness and facial competence in facial feature literature, Laustsen has made some other interesting discoveries in his academic career.
Laustsen remembers us, that party and candidate preference is highly contextual and largely unresolved. Simple happenings unrelated to politics, like a shark attack or a disappointing performance of a local football club can have negative influence on incumbent politicians (Laustsen, 2014, p.778). However, political ideology is deeply embedded into the psychological orientation of each individual and will differ from person to person. As mentioned in the introduction, conservatives and liberals have different preferences towards their political leaders, which is a result of their varying orientation of the world. In the case of conservatives, they generally view their social environment as threatening and dangerous, resulting in a preference for stronger leaders that shield them from this hazard. Liberals on the other hand, see the world as a safe place noteworthy for its cooperation, ensuing in a preference where warm and kind leaders are required (Lauststen, 2017, p.882). The relation between ideology and facial leadership characteristics preference is therefore established.
1.4. Ideologies and Preferences
However, if populist voters and those adhering to other ideologies have specific preferences springing from their own psychological orientation is unresolved as of yet. Since populists maintain a worldview that is similar to those considered conservative, as threats are perceived and contention is expressed, populist preferences should be inclined towards powerful leaders. This notion is confirmed by the general understanding that populistic parties often rely on charismatic leadership.
In spite of the strong indication that ideology and specific leadership preference are linked, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) do make the nuance of a general preference towards powerful leaders in times of war and strife. Based on this conclusion, the conservative hypothesis was created, but also applies to liberals and other ideologies if war does occur. The shifting preferences underlines the importance of context in leadership preferences. Similarly, as the general preference shifts to more kind-appearing leaders in times of peace, the overall context in elections becomes a mediating factor to account for in research.
Conservatives appreciating more powerful leaders and those adhering to liberalism welcoming warmer personalities is not the only difference that exists between the conservative and liberal voters. Laustsen and Petersen (2016, p.188) discovered that facial dominance is a much-appreciated feature when voters are considered conservative. Contrary, when the
majority of voters are labelled as liberals, facial dominance is a negative quality for electorate success. Therefore, there is an explicit difference in facial dominance and facial competence, as facial competence is considered as an all-round positive contribution to electorate success. As facial competence consists of attractiveness, facial maturity and masculinity, facial dominance sustains mostly other values (Laustsen, 2014, p.790). Primarily, masculinity is to be considered as the most vital aspect of facial dominance. As Schneider and Bos (2014) already described in their article, male features significantly boost leadership traits and the perception of candidates in a positive manner. However, masculinity is not always appreciated. Especially right-wing voters are more appreciative of dominant faces on their leaders, while left-wing voters have less trouble electing feminine and warm-looking candidates (Laustsen & Petersen, 2016, p.207).
An interesting note on the masculine and feminine perception of politicians, is the difference between right-wing and left-wing women. Namely, right-wing female politicians are considered more feminine than their left-wing counterpart (Laustsen & Petersen, 2016, p.207). This difference in perception is most likely due to the relative distant difference between male and female politicians on the right-wing of the political spectrum. As right-wing males are considerably more masculine than their left-wing counterparts, differences between males and females are more noticeable. This more feminine perception of right-wing female politicians could therefore be an explanation on why female politicians have a harder time getting elected than their liberal opposition. Moreover, the perception would also explain why Muslim and Catholic orientated parties have considerably less female politicians (Paxton & Kunovich, 2003, p.91). As conservatism has a stronger link to dominance than liberalism, conservative ideologies are more orientated on male leaders.
As mentioned earlier, conservatives maintain a vastly different perspective of the social world compared to liberals, ruling in different needs when electing a leader (Laustsen, 2017, p.882). Also, preference shifts in times of war and peace, making inclination lined to context. Another ideology-frame breaking nuance to leadership preferences, is found in the specific job at hand. Bound by context once more, leaders are also elected based on the task that needs to be performed in the upcoming term. Older leaders are favoured over their younger counterparts, for more traditional knowledge domains. On the other hand, younger leaders are more popular when new challenges arise (Laustsen, 2017). As age becomes an influential attribute, depending on the task that needs to be performed, context and ideology are both important concepts to take into account when researching facial preferences.
1.5. Facial Features
The facial features that Laustsen and Petersen (2016, p.202) used to make their candidates appear more dominant are most noticeable in the dimensions of the face. A large jawbone or jawline is a clear example of a dominant facial feature, as it increases the overall size of the face and makes it appear more masculine at the same time. In a lesser amount, the chin in dominant faces is wider and straighter at the bottom compared to the warmer feminine faces. A larger distance from the mouth to the chin is also considered to be more masculine.
Next to the jaw as a distinctive feature in the faces of leaders, the eyes have a tremendous influence on the aspect of dominance. Larger eyes are considered far more feminine compared to small eyes. Likewise, as the eyes appear to be closer together, faces are typically considered more masculine. A contrary principle applies to the shape of the mouth. If a mouth is puckered and thus narrower, a more feminine quality is attributed. Contrarily, as the size of the lips increase, the face is optically more feminine. There is some discussion on the forehead and hairline dimensions in relation to dominance. A short forehead combined with a low hairline can be associated as a very masculine trait. But as men age, they often experience a retracting hairline, making the forehead appear larger and noticeably longer than before. Despite the dual nature of a short forehead, a longer forehead is typically associated as a male feature. Additionally, a slight backwards sloping forehead is considerably more masculine than a female forehead, which is more vertical. Also, males boast a stronger brow bone ridge compared to a smooth female brow (Mardirossian, 2008). As not only dimensions are different between men and women, shape can also be of significance.
Not a prime feature, but also not unimportant, is the nose. In dominant faces, the nose is wider, taller and generally larger. The angle of the nose is not found to be of significance, as varying angles occur in both male and female faces. From the side, the bridge of a male nose can have a slight or hefty arch, where women have straight bridges (Mardirossian, 2008).
Female eyebrows are more curved, thinner and sit slightly higher on the face, as male eyebrows are straighter and relative closer to the eyes. Due to the thicker bone ridge above the eyes, male eyes appear to be deeper than female eyes. And since women have considerably more fat in their face than men, female cheekbones show more volume compared to flat and lengthy masculine cheeks. Finally, the distance between the upper lip and the nose is usually shorter for women than for men, making the face appear shorter in general (Mardirossian, 2008). Laustsen and Petersen (2016) display many examples of deviating features applied on the same face, allowing them to test their hypothesis, thus clearly indicating the difference between dominant and, for the lack of a better word, humble faces.
Many deviations of these aforementioned features can occur in faces, thus affecting the perception of the face. These are general guidelines on sexual traits in faces and do not always prove to have their stereotypical effect. In summary, there are many facial features that differ between men and women, and they are appreciated differently varying by ideology and context. Besides underlying worldviews of the ideologies, the reason why some ideologies prefer certain facial traits is not entirely understood.
1.6. Dominance
Another important mediating appurtenance, beyond countenance, is the overall impressions leaders and politicians make in their physical appearance. The overall physical presentation of an individual has similar, if not greater, influence on the befall of the people. Especially when it comes to dominance, a relation between the face and implicit bodily strength appears to be supported. Facial indicators for both strength and dominance are mostly found in brow height, chin length and the width of the nose, mouth, eyes and jaw (Toscano, Schubert & Sell, 2014, p.1). Toscano et al. (2014, p.14) also found evidence which supports the implication that judgements of strength, serve as a cue for dominance.
In today’s western societies, strength might not appear to be a very valid measurement for proper leadership, while from an evolutionary and historical perspective, strength is a crucial indicator for social hierarchies. We see it in primates that are deemed relatively close to man, like chimpanzees and gorilla’s; strength gains greater access to more resources. As mankind evolved from primal societies, to chiefdoms, kingdoms and other modern civilizations, the relationship between strength and dominance proves to be ever present (Toscano et al. 2014, p.1). Due to this lasting relation between strength and dominance, the Russian President Vladimir Putin likes to be photographed in shirtless scenarios. Showing off in physical strength in order to promote an image of dominance is the goal, thus promoting the hierarchical and leadership status of the Russian President (Bershidsky, 2017). Dominance is still a very relevant matter when it comes to leadership, but as western leaders rarely pose bare-chested, their acts promoting dominance are considerably subtler.
When theories of social dominance are applied on the perspective of the individual, the term Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is introduced (Stewart & Pratto, 2015, p.250). Based on ideology, prejudice and socio-political attitudes, SDO determines an individual’s preferences on dominance, equality and inclusion. Preference for a specific leader is therefore hugely influenced by someone’s SDO, as it also encompasses ideology. However, socialization processes, gender, temperament and personality are additional relevant influences on SDO
(Stewart & Pratto, 2015, p.252). Indifference on the presentation of Vladimir Putin’s shirtless photos, and other leaders in general, is hence a matter of SDO.
1.7. Populism
Together with ideology, SDO can also explain to a large extent why certain people prefer some ideologies better than others. The addition of SDO underscores the personal nature of preferences, for leadership and social structures. These social structures are also one of the most important subjects’ populist tend to occupy themselves with. A concise and accurate definition of populism is practically impossible, as populism takes on many forms across several political spectra. Nevertheless, multiple aspects are usually present. Mudde and Kaltwasser define populism as: “a thin ideology that divides society in two homogenous and hostile factions - ‘the
pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ - and deems that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.18). And although this definition is
very defined, some observers’ plea to discard populism as a valid concept, seeing how the huge ideological diversity could make populism empty of meaning (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.35).
The very same diversity makes populism such a difficult concept to research and apply. Populism can be found at both sides of the political spectrum, in conservatives and liberals alike. Right-wing and left-wing politicians can both practice populist methods and tactics while still adhering to vastly different ideologies and policies, independent of a specific political level. Parties, individuals and even societal discourse are among known populistic forces. Religion does not seem to be an exception neither, as religious and secular political actors have both been branded as populistic (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.35).
Despite being very diverse, populism does always need an additional ideology, as populism in itself cannot give a complete or complex answer to the political questions that are presented in modern societies. Besides providing an answer to those political questions, the other ideological elements are indispensable in order to gain votes (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.18). Being a thin ideology, populism has the ability to present itself on practically any direction of the political spectrum.
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, p.22) explain populism has three core features: the people, the elite and the general will. As ‘the people’ remains a fairly vague concept, populists are quite flexible in defining the people in a way that suits them best. In light of the distinction populists make between the people and the ruling elite, three main usages standout; the people as sovereign, the people as regular people and the people as a nation. In all three instances,
populist distance the people from the elite in terms of political power, socio-economic status and nationality. The gap that is created is practically always a mixture of these three dimensions, without any predominating.
Populists play the people against the so-called corrupt elite. But the elite is not always the same in every political arena. Besides the political establishment, the economic, cultural and media elite experiences their share of necessary criticism from populists. The primary difference in all of these dimensions is found in power. The main complaint is that the elite does not use its power to advance the will of the people, but choses to protect itself and remain in power. Due to this claim, some scholars believe populists cannot be in power by definition, as they would become the elite themselves. Nevertheless, we have seen populists in power, reframing the elite as shady powers outside of elected office and thus still posing threats to the will of the people after initial electorate success of populists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.26). Of course, this newly defined elite is still a threat to the general will of the people or the nation as a whole.
The third and final core feature of populism is the will of the people. In line with the work of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, populists discriminate between the general will of the people and the sum of all wills. While the sum of all wills does include all secluded needs and desires of the people, the general will of the people is collective and communal of nature. Harbouring the will of the people would therefore allow the people to form a community and advance accordingly (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.30). Because of the strong link with community, populism has somewhat of a natural relation to direct democracy, where the leaders are close and active with their constituency.
Maybe more than other ideologies, populism seems to be centred around leadership. Moreover, strong and charismatic leadership appears to be typical for populism. These leaders are mostly charismatic and flamboyant leaders that manage to mobilize and direct the masses. In behaviour and language, the leaders also present themselves as a ‘vox populi’ (voice of the people). These populistic leaders are not solely men, as there have been very successful female populist leaders like Eva Péron, Marine Le Pen and Yingluck Shinawatra. Similar to male populist leaders, the female populists usually have some interesting characteristics. Most populist leaders have had some sort of entrepreneurial success in business. The Italian prime minister Berlusconi and Donald Trump are examples of leaders with earlier achieved successes before commencing their political careers. Furthermore, populist leaders have some sort of outsider status that allows them to distance themselves from the political establishment. Yet, the populist leaders do have some sort of insider connection to the existing elite, either by
business or political experience (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). And while not all populist leaders have an ethnical angle to their leadership, this subject is especially popular is Latin America and right-wing Europe. In any case, the populist leaders are mostly very concerned about their image as ‘vox populi’. Oddly enough, populism is a label that is not always appreciated by those that are considered populists.
Populism is such a controversial label and subject in society mainly due to the effects it can have on democracy. Populism can actually increase the democratic value of a society by mobilizing certain groups that were previously unheard, allowing them input in policy. In such a manner, new and previously undiscussed issues can reach the political agenda through the inclusion of groups that were not part of any elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.103). These effects are especially noticeable in societies considered as authoritarian, which became more democratic after populism took hold.
On the contrary, populism can have dreary consequences on existing democracies. Liberal democracies in particular, are exposed to some of the risks populism presents. As populism strongly supports the rule of the majority, a crucial democratic principal can be silenced; the rights of minorities. Similarly, populism can use the idea of sovereignty by the people to hollow out the institutions that were raised to protect constitutional rights. Moreover, by pitching the people versus the elite, populism can create a new political discord that results into unstable political rule complemented by a general lack of concurrence (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.103). Because populism can have these effects on democracy, populist leaders pose as a relevant and interesting subject of research in liberal Western societies.
1.8. Political Spectra
Since populism needs an additional ideology in order to truly become a viable alternative to mainstream and established political movements, the location of populism on the political spectrum becomes yet another point of discussion. While it is obvious populism can occur on both sides of the political spectrum, meaning both conservatives and socialists are capable of using populism to further their goals, some scholars place populism relatively closer to the conservative or ‘right-wing’ side of the spectrum. This move is quite understandable in the European political sphere, where populism is most frequently observed in right-wing politics. Especially parties fighting immigration, European expansion and globalism are known to be called upon their populistic tactics (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.49). However, anti-EU sentiment is not reserved for right-wing parties alone. Indicating that populism lingers on the spectrum as a whole in Europe.
In the US, the Tea-Party movements remain the best contemporary example of populist activity. And while the Tea-Party movement can be described as the right-wing and libertarian daughter faction of the Republican Party, their relation has been far from subtle (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.42). Moreover, populism is also observed in Democratic campaigns, making the populism again independent of the spectrum.
This spectrum overarching capacity is also observed in Latin America, where populism has found its way into multiple countries. Left-wing politics are more concerned with populism than the right-wing in Latin America, despite resulting in mostly neoliberal policies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.45). Inclusion for the people native to America is one of the most present features in Latin American populism. Populism is practically unbound by the spectrum, even though it might lean more towards the left or right, depending on where we look.
When explicating the political spectrum in the European Parliament, the sole subject of this research paper, a number of issues arise. The first obstacle is the position of the parties in the EP. Due to the compounded nature of the European parties, their ideological position is not fixated on one point of the left to right scale. Rather than one point, a European party covers a patch on the left to right scale, as a European party is composite of the multiple ideological positions provided by the national member parties. A clear example of such a position is that of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) group. The GUE-NGL is made up from both communistic movements and parties that adhere to social democracy (GUE/NGL, 2018). A single point on the spectrum would therefore not suffice.
Currently, eight political groups are active in the European Parliament. The European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) represents the left to far-left in the European Parliament. Some parties affiliated to this group are known to make use of populist methods in order to achieve their goals. The GUE-NGL also has a communistic minority, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) is representing the centre-left and is known to be positive toward the EU. Most labour and socialist parties are found within the S&D, making it the second largest in the EP. Regional and environmental issues are mostly served by the Greens - European Free Alliance (G-EFA). The G-EFA is hard to place on the left-right spectrum, as they are not generally concerned with issues relating to the spectrum (Planton, 2014).
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group (ALDE) is pro-EU and liberal in the European sense. Members of the ALDE represent the centre on the left-right spectrum. The European People’s Party (EPP) is the largest party in the EP and represents the centre-right. There are some populist parties within the EPP, and they are generally pro-EU. The
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) are softly Eurosceptic and slightly more right-wing than the EPP is. A relatively new group with the EP is the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD). Populistic means are more the rule than the exception for the EFDD, who are also very Eurosceptic and right-wing orientated. The latest addition to the EP is the Europe of Nations and Freedom group (ENF). This group represents the populist far-right. Even accounts of nazism have been reported within the ranks of the ENF (Planton, 2014).
Last of all, the Non-Attached members form the final group. As the members are extremely diverse in ideology, their ideological positions are scattered over the entire spectrum. Non-Attached members are known to stretch all the way from left-wing communism to right-wing nazism. Placing Non-Attached members on a left-right scale is therefore practically impossible. The European parties and their ideological positions are displayed in figure 1.
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Parties of the European Parliament and their ideological left-right position (Ehrenberg, 2015).
Note that in figure 1, the Greens - European Free Alliance and Non-Attached Members are placed outside of the spectrum, as they are typically single-issue and green politics orientated. A position on the left-right spectrum is not an accurate description for these parties. However, most of the parties that pertain to the G-EFA, are considered to be centre to centre-left on the spectrum. Attached Members are scattered on the spectrum. Therefore, the Non-Attached member can only be place on the left-right spectrum based on their personal party position and not as European group.
2. Research Question & Hypotheses
The main goal of this research paper is to establish whether European populist politicians have a structural different appearance compared to politicians who adhere to more mainstream methods. Of course, politicians that make use of populist methods are most likely to use additional ideologies to strengthen their political message, as described in the literature review. The main focus remains to find evidence supporting populists as a specific subtype of politicians, rather than a subgroup from the certain auxiliary ideologies they use to strengthen their movement. If the faces from populists structurally differ from mainstream politicians is therefore the primary question.
Because populists are known to use additional ideologies (from all directions of the political left-right spectrum) to make their argument more compelling, finding structural different facial features is a difficult task. However, as populism relies heavily on leaders that set themselves apart from the established elite and are mostly considered outsiders, I suspect their appearance will be equally different from mainstream leaders and politicians.
H1: The facial features of populists are structurally different from established politicians
that adhere to mainstream methods.
Moreover, I expect to find a larger difference between populist politicians and established left-wing politicians, than between populist politicians and established right-wing leaders. Since conservative and right-wing voters have a worldview in which the world is more prone to violence and other safety threats, their social orientation is considerably closer to the worldview of populists than progressives and left-wing voters. The cosmopolitan and socially strong worldview of liberal voters is therefore vastly different from the populist prospect. I believe the facial features in their respective representation will indicate these ideological gaps. Thus, populist politicians should show more features relating to social dominance and masculinity compared to the relatively soft features that are expected in left-wing politicians.
H2: Populist facial features are expected to be more orientated towards social
dominance and other right-wing characteristics.
My expectation is that these potential differences apply for both men and women. That would mean left-wing female populists should have facial features that relate closely to social
dominance and even masculinity. The subtyping of populists would be therefore unbound by sex and similar for both men and women. It is important to note that even though female populist politicians are expected to boast features that relate relatively close to social dominance and masculinity, these features are still hard to compare to their male counterparts. In order to guarantee accurate comparison, men are compared to other men and women are compared to other women. Erroneous verdicts on the comparable features between men and women is therefore minimized.
H3: The subtype of the populist is similar for both men and women
Even though politicians can be considered as leaders in general, not all politicians will fit the specific traits of a leader. Moreover, political parties are just like any other institution affected by the iron law of oligarchy, having to deal with hierarchies and a ruling elite by sheer tactical and technical necessity (Michels, 2009). So, even within the European political parties, leaders are expected to distinct themselves from the average politician. The differences that are expected should be orientated towards more dominance and masculinity, as those features are considered to be the primary indicators of leadership.
H4: Political leaders have structurally more dominant and masculine facial features than
politicians in general.
By testing these four hypotheses, new insights into the mechanics of facial features are offered. Additionally, establishing whether populists are indeed a specific ideological subtype can complement the existing literature on populism, facial mechanics and leadership.
3. Methods & Research Design
To answer the research question and test the several hypotheses, quantitative research methods are used. By using quantitative methods, the research question can be answered empirically and objectively. To determine whether populist politicians are more prone to indicate facial features that relate to social dominance, software is used to analyse the facial dimensions of populist and non-populist politicians alike. The software used to analyse the faces of the politicians is called Facial Width-to-Height Ratio (fWHR) Calculator and is distributed by GitHub Incorporated (GitHub, 2018).
The fWHR Calculator analyses the photos of faces based on their relative dimensions, namely the facial width and height (as the name does imply) and calculates the resulting ratio (GitHub, 2018). In taking the facial width-to-height ratio as measurement, an easy and clear indication of general facial proportions can be made. Armed with the resulting ratios, a quick and relatively simple comparison between politicians is offered. The ratio that is calculated, is the result of the width compared to the height of certain facial features. While width is practically always the same measurement, namely from the outer left side of the face to the outer right side of the face, height can vary. Measurements can start from either the chin, lower or upper lip and continue to the upper eyelid, eyebrows or top of the head (GitHub, 2018). Depending on the features that are measured, height can change substantially, thus resulting in different ratios.
In this thesis, I solely make use of the upper lip to upper eyelid measurement for height. Since this distance for facial-height is the shortest, the resulting ratio will be more accurate and telling for the proportions of the face. For this reason, the upper lip to eyelid is the golden standard in fWHR literature (Haselhuhn, Ormiston & Wong, 2015, p.3).
As software is used to make the empirical analysis, assumptions, impressions and subjectivity are omitted. By eliminating chance, randomness and coincidence a higher reliability is maintained, which is in general already relatively high when conducting quantitative research (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, as the fWHR Calculator relies heavily on facial recognition software, the fWHR scores are remarkably reliable when the photographs meet certain standards. As long as the subject in the photograph is facing the camera with a neutral to slightly positive expression, the fWHR score will be identical, independent of the specific photograph, size, surroundings or background.
However, if the subject does not face the camera, has a certain expression or tilts his or her head, the ratio gets warped. Practically all the photographs that are provided by the
European Parliament (2018) do meet the standards that are required for the fWHR Calculator. In only a dozen cases out of the 751 members, alternative photographs had to be selected. Due to the strong public nature of the European Parliament, the alternative photographs that do meet the standards were easily obtained.
Figure 2.
Facial-Width-Height Ratio: 1,81 Facial-Width-Height Ratio: 2,07 Facial-Width-Height Ratio: 2,12
Figure 2: Antonio Tajani; President of the European Parliament subjected to the fWHR Calculator [upper lip - eyelid] (European Parliament, 2018).
In figure 2, three photographs of Antonio Tajani, the current President of the European Parliament, are displayed. The photographs are subjected to the fWHR Calculator and measured from the upper lip to the upper eyelid. Note that the ratios increase when the head turns away from the camera, as the face becomes relatively wider compared to a frontal view. Additionally, the ratios in the second and third photographs becomes increasingly higher as the upper lip is raised, thus decreasing the relative height of the face. To collect reliable information on the Members of European Parliament (MEPs), it is crucial that the MEPs are posing in a similar position. Fortunately, the MEPs are listed in an alphabetical order with very similar photographs, allowing effortless collection and reliable testing (European Parliament, 2018).
The fWHR is remarkably telling on how the proportions of width and height are related to each other. But as two measurements are compared to each other in one ratio, it is vital to have absolute understanding of the ratio results. High fWHR scores are the result of a relatively broad width compared a smaller height. The faces with high fWHR appear broad, but not necessarily small, as the ratio is the result of relative distances and not absolute lengths. Low
fWHR scores indicate faces that are less broad or relatively tall. The overall appearance of faces with low fWHR is therefore narrow and tall. The value of the fWHR does have certain implications.
Hahn et al. (2017) clarify that male high fWHR scores do imply dominant and aggressive behaviour. Moreover, this relation is found in both business, non-profit organisations and NGOs. Even the leaders in the Roman Catholic Church, the popes, display high fWHR scores. While not all men with wide faces achieve a high status through antisocial dominant behaviour or overt use of aggression, the findings suggest a subtle relation between high fWHR, high social rank and dominant orientations. Additionally, Hahn et al. (2017) show that high fWHR of leaders, correlates significantly with charity donations and environmental engagements in the institutions they manage. In the public eye, leaders with high fWHR impress as socially likeable and responsible individuals (Hahn et al., 2017).
Arnocky et al. (2018) establish the link between fWHR and sex drive, as it is a morphological indicator for both male and female intensions. Even significant predictors for masculine infidelity intensions by using their related fWHR were discovered. Earlier, Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett and Penke (2013) found a relation between high fWHR scores and a cluster of behavioural traits in men. Aggression, status-drive and high testosterone are among the features attributed in those with a high fWHR, associating behaviour and face structure. Hodges-Simeon, Hanson Sobraske, Samore, Gurven and Gaulin (2016) nuance that the association between face structure and behaviour as a result of testosterone levels is not found during adolescence. But politicians in adolescence are a rare phenomenon.
Carré, Murphy and Hariri (2013) explain why the wide faces invoke such dispositions and responses: ‘Amygdala reactivity may also represent a plausible pathway through which
fWHR may have evolved to represent an honest indicator of conspecific threat, namely by reflecting the responsiveness of neural circuity mediating aggressive behaviour’ (Carré et al.,
2013, p.224). Through neural mechanisms that are linked to a high fWHR, individual differences in aggressive behaviour can be predicted. An antecedent connection between facial structure and brain function is observed, yet not fully understood (Carré et al, 2013, p.228).
As mentioned, this research paper focusses solely on the European Parliament as political arena. And while both leadership and populism are not contained within this institution, the European Parliament should be an operable institution to reach a verdict on leadership, populism and ideology in relation to facial characteristics. Even though not all countries in Europe are represented in the EP, a vast majority is. Additionally, national parties have serious influence on the EP. By testing the hypotheses for the European Parliament,
national European politics are not neglected. The external validity is therefore guaranteed on the entire European continent.
Nevertheless, populism does occur outside of Europe and does take on different shapes. Likewise, the institutions in which populism might occur outside of Europe are structurally different to the European Parliament. The two-party system in US politics is an example of such a contrasting arena. Similarly, populism is considered much more of a right-wing affair in Europe, compared to the other areas of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.36). So, while external validity is very strong for Europe, limits do appear when reaching out to other areas.
To test the hypotheses, photographs of the members of the European Parliament are collected and subjected to the fWHR Calculator. To correctly measure the difference in facial features in both men and women, the members were coded for their sex. Understandably, men in general have faces that show more features of social dominance and masculinity in contrast to women. This problem is tackled by comparing women to women and men to other men. Comparing the fWHR scores among the sexes should be no issue in this manner.
Party leaders and other relevant commanding positions are taken into account as well. Consequently, leadership an additional variable and not a selection. To extend the test on the differences between leaders and politicians in general, the fWHR for the average European is also collected. By including the fWHR of leaders, politicians and the average population, the relationship between leadership and facial dominance is further explored. Another variable was made for ethnicity. In spite of this addition, the vast majority of the European Parliament can be deemed white or “Caucasian”, making the variable less practical than initially thought.
Each member of the EP is coded for both their European party and their ideological position on the left-right political spectrum. The position on the ideological spectrum is indirectly determined by the position of the member’s national party’s ideological position. Since the European parties are more a collective of national parties, which have diverging positions concerning ideology, national party affiliation is a much more accurate indication for the ideological position of the members.
Multiple statistical tests are used to interpreted the data. Multiple regression analysis is used to determine the predicting power of the variables that have been incorporated. Especially the readout of any statistical significance is a vital addition. Next, a t-test was conducted to ascertain whether populists, leaders and/or politicians differ from ordinary people in their facial ratios. The fWHRs are compared by means mostly, which gives a clear indication of the facial proportions of the MEPs. Alongside the means, standard deviations are always presented.
4. Results & Discussion
Before the multiple regression analysis is displayed or the hypotheses are accepted or rejected, I believe it is important to provide a good description of the overall outcome of measurements. Primarily the outcome of the party variable, the deviations of the fWHRs and the ideology scores seem to be quite telling for the European Parliament when it comes to populism and the ideological differences. Means with standard deviations from multiple subgroups and the EP are presented in table 1 on the next page.
4.1. General Findings
First of all, the fWHR distribution. With a minimum score of 1.70 and a maximum of 2.49 the scale is set. The average fWHR of MEPs is 2.0565 (SD = 0.15293) and makes the ratio appear to be normally distributed, as could be expected. When we take the small standard deviation into account, the normal distribution of the fWHR is established.
Second, the ideological variable is inspected in a similar manner. Ideology was coded from left to right, with 0 = far-left all the way to 9 = far-right. The ideological position of the MEPs (M = 4.65, SD = 2.339) is also normally distributed on the left-right scale. Based upon the existing literature, this distribution seems likely, as Downs already indicated that the median voter is centred and not on the far side of the political left-right spectrum (March & Stoker, 2011, p.45). While the ideological variable does not measure the ideological position of the voters, politicians in a free democracy tend to take up positions that reflect the ideological position of the electorate. The distribution of the ideological variable is therefore a confirmation of Downs perspective (March & Stoker, 2010, p.44).
The sex variable measured the respective sex of the MEPs and shows that there are more men (64%) than women (36%) in the European Parliament. While the division is not equal, the European Parliament does display a far greater presence from women than most other parliaments. Globally, nearly a quarter (23%) of all national parliamentarians are women, making the European Parliament scores far above average (UN Women, 2017).
Although the European Parliament scores relatively better on female inclusion than the global average, ethnic diversity remains low. Out of the 751 members, only 3 members are from African descent and 9 from Middle-Eastern origins. With the majority (98%) being white, the EP is almost completely represented by white people of “Caucasian” descent. In spite of being small minorities in the European Parliament, descendants from Middle-Eastern and African origins do show a fairly high fWHR average (M = 2.1113, SD = 0.18111).
Table 1.
Table 2: Multiple subsections of MEP groups with their related average ratio and group size. Note: means with the standard deviations in parentheses.
Variable Group Ratio Mean N
Total MEPs 2.0565 (0.15293) 751 Sex Men 2.0476 (0.15282) 479 Women 2.0721 (0.15293) 272 Populism Populists 2.0585 (0.17323) 165 Mainstream Politicians 2.0559 (0.14687) 586 Female Populists 2.0657 (0.15215) 59 Female Mainstream Politicians 2.0739
(0.15370) 213 Leadership Leader 2.0256 (0.18924) 12 Non-Leader Politician 2.0570 (0.15238) 739 Male Leaders 1.9959 (0.19462) 10 Male Non-Leader Politicians 2.0487
(0.15187) 469 Female Leaders 2.1743
(0.00498) 2 Female Non-Leader Politicians 2.0714
(0.15246) 272 Party GUE-NGL 2.0220 (0.16666) 51 S&D 2.0524 (0.15336) 189 Greens-EFA 2.0660 (0.15438) 52 ALDE 2.0572 (0.14589) 68 EPP 2.0443 (0.13817) 219 ECR 2.0782 (0.15697) 71 EFDD 2.1117 (0.17817) 45 ENF 2.0544 (0.17675) 35 NA 2.0911 (0.14936) 21
But as there are only a few of these non-Caucasian MEPs, their fWHR scores are not a valid indicator for higher fWHR scores over their entire ethnicity, as it is uncertain whether these scores are attributed by some outstanding individuals or do represented the general ethnicity.
After carefully coding the MEPs national party besides their European affiliation, I was able to determine whether the members are adherent of populist means. From the 751 members, a fair share of populists did emerge, as one fifth (22%) is classified as a populist. Although the populists are present in both the left-wing and right-wing parties, the European Parliament is far richer in right-wing populists (81%) than left-wing populists (19%). But just like the literature on populism suggests, populists are found almost in all the ideological orientations. Only the Greens-EFA seems to avoid the use of populist methods entirely. The Eurosceptic parties seems to be the main supplier of politicians with populistic tendencies in the EP (75%).
Leaders were not that common in the European Parliament. With only seven parties and few non-attached members, twelve politicians did qualify as leader figures. The President of the Parliament, chairmen and several other politicians known for their leadership capabilities are included in this variable. Still, the overall number of leaders remains low (2%).
All the MEPs are categorized by their European party, allowing a good overview of the European Parliament based on ideology. While the measurement of ideology based on European parties is less accurate than the measurement of ideology based on the national parties, the European parties remain the leading form of organization in the European Parliament. Currently the EP is compiled in the following order:
Party Members
European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) 51 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 189
Greens - European Free Alliance (G-EFA) 52 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group (ALDE) 68 European People’s Party (EPP) 219 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 71 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 45 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 35 Non-attached members (NA) 21 Total 751 The composition of the current European Parliament is by all means not any new finding. Nevertheless, the composition does give valuable insight into the present distribution of seats and therefore the ideological direction of the European Parliament.
4.2. Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to see the effects of the multiple variables on the fWHR of the MEPs, I conduct a multiple regression analysis. To see the effect of each independent variable, one variable is added in each consecutive model. In doing so, analysis of the individual contribution to the overall explanation on the total variance is possible. Through the inclusion of several individual variables, multiple models are created. The models are displayed in table 2.
Table 2.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6
Sex 0.025* (0.012) 0.024* (0.012) 0.025* (0.012) 0.025* (0.012) 0.028* (0.012) Leader -0.027 (0.044) -0.031 (0.045) -0.032 (0.045) -0.033 (0.012) Ethnicity 0.030 (0.025) 0.030 (0.025) 0.032 (0.025) Populism 0.005 (0.014) -0.008 (0.015) Ideology 0.006* (0.003) Constant 2.048*** (0.007) 2.048*** (0.007) 2.047*** (0.007) 2.046*** (0.008) 2.022*** (0.014) R² 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.014 N 751 751 751 751 751
Dependent Variable: facial width-to-height [upper lip - eyelid] ratio of European Parliament Members Note: unstandardized regression coefficients with the standard error in parentheses
p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001***
The multiple linear regression that is calculated predicts the facial width-to-height of MEPs based on their sex, leadership status, populism classification and ideological position. An insignificant regression equation was found (F(5,745) = 2.195, p > 0.05), with an R² of 0.015. The low R² is an indication for a relatively weak explanation on the variance, meaning that the variables adopted into the model offer little insight on the overall explanation of the fWHR scores that are observed in the European Parliament. In spite of the low R², both sex (b = 0.025, p <0.05) and ideology (b = 0.006, p <0.05) are found as significant predictor of fWHR scores in the European Parliament. Due to a problematic level of multicollinearity with the ‘Ideology’ variable, the variable concerning the European party affiliation of the MEPs is
omitted in the regression analysis. As party affiliation and ideological position are closely related to each other, either one suffices for the regression analysis.
According to the model, women have significantly higher ratios on average. As sex is measured by a dummy variable, where sex is coded as 0 = male, 1 = female, women have higher fWHR scores than men. That women have higher fWHR has some interesting implications, on which I elaborate in a subsequent section. Similarly, the variable measuring ideology indicates a significant effect on the fWHR scores. As the independent variable of ideology increases with 1, indicating politicians are maintaining a relatively more right-wing persuasion, the unstandardized coefficient illustrates the ratios increase 0.006 point. Although this might seem like a trivial difference, the fWHRs are a relatively close together (M= 2.0565, SD = 0.15293). Especially when we consider the normal distribution of the fWHR scores, ideological differences on both sides of the political spectrum prove to be a significant predictor. The specific meaning of a higher ratio for right-wing politicians is discussed in the section dedicated to the ideological relations in the European Parliament.
As the R² remains low throughout all consecutive models, alongside little changes in the unstandardized coordinates, the multiple regression is not very helpful in determining whether populists have strikingly different appearances. That sex and ideology does predict fWHR scores are interesting discoveries and confirms the existing literature.
4.3. Populism Within Parties
The multiple regression analysis displayed in table 2 did not suggest populism is a significant predictor for large differences in fWHR scores. Therefore, it would seem that populists do not structurally differ from their non-populist colleagues. But there are more methods which can be used to research the results from the EP. A pretty straight forward solution is to simply compare fWHR scores of politicians in the European Parliament who use populism to those who do not. However, yet again no specific difference is observed. The fWHRs of populists in general compared to politicians that abstain from populist methods are actually so close, the difference can be entirely neglected. As can be observed in Table 1, mainstream politicians (M =2.0559, SD = 0,14687) and populists (M= 2.0585, SD = 0.17323) scores do not indicate different facial proportions at all.
Yet, there is still a very important distinction to be made. Due to the strong relationship between populism and ideology, the populists have to be researched in their own respective ideological direction. So, when the populists are compared within their own European party, a new light is shed on the facial proportions of populists.
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Comparison of facial ratios means between populists and non-populists within the same European party.
In figure 2, it becomes clear populists do differ in fWHR scores from their non-populist party members. While in two instances the ratios do increase, populists seem to display lower fWHR scores in general. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats group are standing out with an exceptionally high score of their populists. In spite of this high fWHR score, the frequency of populists among the S&D party is incredibly low. Only mere individuals from the French Radical Left are among the populists from the centre-left Pro-EU party. Therefore, the score from the S&D should be considered as an outlier. Just like the S&D populists, the Non-Attached members show higher ratios for populist politicians compared their own mainstream politicians. However, whether this increase in ratios is caused by a higher presence of left-wing politicians in the Non-Inscrits remains unclear.
In two parties, the difference between populists and non-populist could not be measured. The Greens-EFA party does not display an average ratio for populists, as none of the national affiliated parties use populist methods. On the contrary, the ENF group shows no members of parliament that use mainstream methods, as all members belong to national parties that are known for using right-wing populism to advance their messages.
With the exceptions of S&D as a single outlier, Greens-EFA and ENF both missing reference groups and the Non-Attached members as a particular extraordinary group, a general trend becomes apparent. Five out of nine European parties in parliament show that the populists
