Bachelor thesis Political Science
Politics of Identity June 2019 Supervisor: dr. M. (Mike) Medeiros Second reader: dr. J. (Jana) Krause
What do the Supporters Think?
Right-Wing Populism and Gender in the
Netherlands
By Melisa Can
10988785Table of Contents
Introduction 2
Theoretical Framework 5
Right-Wing Populism 5
Gender and Nationalism 6
Right-Wing Populist Parties and their Attitudes towards Gender 7
The Dutch Context 10
Data & Methods 14
Results 15 Descriptive analysis 15 OLS analysis 18 Conclusion 22 Discussion 23 References 24
Abstract
Gender plays a central role in politics of nationalism. Therefore, when studying the populist right, an ideology that is identified by its nationalist dimension, it is crucial to take into account gender. In this thesis, results of descriptives as well as OLS statistics shine light on the dynamic between the positions considering gender relations of the Dutch right-wing political elite on the one hand, and the views of their supporters on the other. This is particularly relevant given the populist premise of voicing the wants and needs of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. Moreover, as the Dutch self-identify with being a gender-equal nation, it is interesting to see whether this national identification resonates in nationalist parties as well as their supporters. The results show that this national self-identification is in line with the right-wing populist supporters’ attitudes towards gender relations. However, an asymmetry is found between elite-level stances and mass-level views.
Introduction
Gender and nationalism are closely connected. Not only are women the symbolic bearers of a national identity (Yuval-Davis 1997: 45), they also, quite literally, by means of their wombs, reproduce a nation’s ‘genetic pool’ (idem: 22). It is thus not a coincidence that Thierry Baudet, the political leader of the Dutch right-wing nationalist party Forum for Democracy (FvD) recently published an essay in which he connects the preservation of a national identity with women’s ‘traditional’ gender role – e.g. “building a family” and “supporting a husband” (Baudet 2019). To Baudet, women’s 'liberated’ position “and the feminist ideology that underpins it” is a direct threat to the “powerful” nation state (ibid). This is just an example, but it is emblematic for the role gender plays in nationalist rhetoric – as I will show later.
Although gender and nationalism can be viewed as two sides of the same coin, many theorizations about nationalism have not paid attention to gender (Yuval-Davis 1997: 1). Particularly, research on right-wing populism, which is an ideology closely connected to nationalism (Mudde 2007: 16), rarely shines light on its relationship with the meaning society gives to the sexes (Spierings et al. 2015: 3; Mudde 2007: 90). This is surprising, given (1) the aforementioned genderedness of nationalist rhetoric that is central in right-wing populism; (2) the fact that there is a ‘gender gap’, that is, generally, more men than women vote for right-wing populist parties (Spierings et al. 2015: 3; Mudde 2007: 111) and (3) that women’s emancipation is often ‘used’ by the radical right to put forward an islamophobic message (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 63; Akkerman 2015: 56; Wekker 2016: 110).
In their 2015 study, Spierings et al. (2015) did an attempt at closing this knowledge gap. They examined the link between right-wing populist parties and gender, and looked at the demand as well as the supply side of the political spectrum – mostly in Western Europe, “where
[right-wing populist] parties have gained most ground, are most firmly represented in parliament and have taken on government responsibility" (Spierings et al. 2015: 6). The studies on the supply side focused on the ideologies of various right-wing populist parties regarding gender, found in party manifestos (De Lange & Mügge 2015) and party documents (Akkerman 2015). When it comes to the demand side, Spierings et al. (2015) focused on the right-wing populist male and female voters’ attitudes towards (a) ‘classical’ right-wing populist themes such as nativism, authoritarianism and political discontent (Harteveld et al. 2015) and (b) gender and sexuality (Spierings & Zaslove 2015). However, these studies’ main aim was to explain why it is that, generally, more men than women vote for radical right-wing parties. Still, only little is known about the supporters of right-wing nationalist parties and their attitudes towards gender issues.
This thesis aims to close that gap. Using data from the European Values Study (2017), I examine the attitudes of Dutch right-wing populist supporters towards gender relations. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Netherlands, given that the Dutch identify with having achieved women’s emancipation, and that this has “become the litmus test… who qualifies as belonging to the nation” (Wekker 2016: 110). In other words, women’s emancipation has become a central element to the Dutch national sense of self (idem: 113). Hence, one can expect that this resonates in the attitudes of the supporters of the nationalist right. However, little is known about this dynamic. Moreover, when the above mentioned studies on right-wing populist parties and gender were conducted, Baudet’s FvD did not yet exist. Since its founding in 2016, the party has gained substantial electoral support – most notably since the 2019 provincial elections, when FvD acquired the most votes and provincial MPs (KiesRaad 2019). So it is apt to explore what supporters of this relatively new player in the field think about the position of women in society. Especially considering that, when it comes to matters of national identity, “there is a potential disconnect between, the narrative used at the elite/macro-level and those at the members/micro-level” (Van der Zwet 2016: 1243). As other research has found that what the elite proclaims and what the mass voice (e.g. the electorate) wants differs when it comes to national identity (ibid), when focusing on issues related to national identity, it is relevant to see if the supporters of the populist right share the parties’ ideological stances on gender issues. This is particularly important for populist parties that proclaim to express the will of the people (Mudde 2004: 543).
The thesis is structured as follows. First, I dive into the theoretical framework, and explore the main theoretical concepts, e.g. populism and its right-wing dimension. Moreover, by building on the theory of gender and nation developed by Yuval-Davis (1997), I examine
right-wing populist parties’ stances on gender issues. Thirdly, I elaborate on the Dutch political landscape regarding right-wing populist parties and their positions on women’s (and, by the same token, men’s) position in society, as to provide the reader with a context in which to place this thesis. As many of the 2019 FvD voters previously voted for the Party for the Freedom (PVV) (Ipsos 2019), and both parties can be approached as right-wing populist (Rooduijn 2019b), I focus on (the support for) the latter party as well. In the Data & Methods section, I explain what data I use and how. By means of descriptives, I assess whether the attitudes of supporters of right-wing populist parties resonate the elite-level stances on gender issues. Additionally, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) statistics, I analyze the relationship between support for the populist right and these attitudes. Finally, in my conclusion, I answer the central question of this thesis, that is: what are the Dutch right-wing nationalist supporters’ attitudes towards the position of women?
Theoretical Framework
Below, I dive into the theoretical basis of my research. I start by elaborating on right-wing populism and its key features, most notably nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism. Next, I explain why gender plays such a central role in nationalism. Building on that, and based on previous research, I set out the main stances of right-wing populist parties with regard to gender issues. The chapter ends by seeing what the position of the Dutch right-wing populist parties, respectively FvD and the PVV, is on these issues.
Right-Wing Populism
Broadly, populism can be understood as an ideology that separates society “into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde 2004: 543). This elite is seen as corrupt, because, according to the populists, it does not know what the people want (Rooduijn 2018). Hence, the populist premise is that they do, in fact, know what the people want, i.e. express the general will of ‘the pure people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). Accordingly, populists generally embrace democratic institutions, such as the referendum, while being critical towards the political establishment (De Lange & Mügge: 64).
In this definition, populism is approached as a thin-centered ideology, which means that it must be accompanied by a “host” ideology (Rooduijn 2018; Mudde 2017: 6; Spierings et al. 2015: 8). Although populism in Europe is generally associated with nationalism, it can also be combined with neoliberalism or socialism (Mudde 2017: 11). Such accompanying ideologies are not mutually exclusive, but rather, they can work together. For example, a populist party can be nationalist as well as socialist, or neoliberal as well as conservative.
Who ‘the pure people’ populists refer to are, depends on the ideology populism is combined with (Mudde 2017: 6-7). For example, when this “host” ideology is socialism, ‘the people’ has a dimension of class to it (ibid). When populism is combined with nationalism, which is “a political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state” (Mudde 2007: 16) ‘the pure people’ refers to the persons who belong to a nation (Mudde 2017: 6-7) – according to the populists, I should add. Nationalism is characterized by internal homogenization as well as external exclusiveness (Mudde 2007: 17). This is closely connected to the nativist element of right-wing populism (ibid). Nativism is “an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (idem: 19) (note here how this connects back to the way in which populism approaches ‘the people’ as a homogeneous group). In this nativist rhetoric, a
distinction is made between ‘the nation’ and ‘dangerous others’ (Rooduijn 2019a: 365). This notion of the ‘dangerous other’ is what fuels xenophobic sentiments, which is another element that is indicative of right-wing populism (Mudde 2007: 21). When authoritarianism, i.e. “a willingness to submit to authority, to adhere to and enforce in-group conventions and a tendency to aggress against those who challenge established authorities or in group conventions” (Kemmelmeier 2015) is added to that, a populist party can be approached as right-wing (Spierings et al. 2015: 8; Mudde 2007: 21).
To sum up, at the most basic level, populism is about the dynamic (or tension) between ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. Like a chameleon, populism can change its colours, depending on the ideology it is combined with. In this thesis, the focus is on the populist ideology combined with the above mentioned ideologies of nationalism (and its closely connected dimension of nativism) and authoritarianism, or, in other words, the ideologies that add the right-wing dimension to populism.
Gender and Nationalism
This part of the theoretical framework focuses on the connectedness of gender and nationalism. The feminist scholar Yuval-Davis has examined the dynamic between gender and nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). She approaches the idea of the nation state as a fiction (Yuval-(Yuval-Davis 1997: 11) and describes nations as “the mythical unity of national ‘imagined communities’ which divides the world between ‘us’ and ‘them’”” (idem: 23). Accordingly, norms and conventions create these ‘fictions’ that determine who ‘belongs’ to a national identity, and who does not (ibid).
What role does gender play in that fiction? According to Yuval-Davis’ theory, gender relations constitute the ‘essence’ of cultures (idem: 43). Or, to put it in another way, women’s (perceived) position in a national society is emblematic for that society’s national identity. For example, notions of femininity, and the related collective norms surrounding the organization of family life, determine who belong to the nation-state, and who does not (Bonjour & De Hart 2013: 62). Hence, the private sphere – e.g. childcare and household responsibilities – “play a crucial role in the construction of ethnic and national identities” (idem: 63). In this sense, in national collectivities, women carry the “burden of representation” (Yuval Davis 1997: 45).
How does this dynamic between gender and the construction of national identities work out in the Dutch case? The Dutch self-identify with having achieved women’s emancipation (Wekker 2016: 113). This emancipated position of women has become “the litmus test” in determining who ‘belongs’ to the Dutch nation, and who does not (ibid). By the same token, it is believed by some that this Dutch achievement is in need of protection against ‘misogynist’
immigrants (Bracke 2012: 239 - 241). Thus, gender relations in the Netherlands are placed vis-à-vis ‘other’ (i.e. immigrant) communities. It is not hard to see nativist resonances here. ‘Non-native’ elements, e.g. misogyny, is regarded as threatening to the Dutch-nation state. In this sense, women embody the borders between ‘imagined communities’, e.g. their nation state, and ‘other’, non-native communities.
There is another element to this somewhat more symbolic notion of the role that gender plays in nationalist ideologies, that is, the fact that women give birth to children. In this sense, women, quite literally, reproduce a national collectivity. Population policies, such as access to abortion or contraceptive pills, should therefore not only be understood as women’s policies, but also as ways to ensure the reproduction of “‘the genetic pool’ of the nation” (Yuval-Davis 1997: 22). This explains why nationalism and ‘population policies’ (ibid) are so closely connected. Indeed, “nationalist agendas tend to emphasize nation-building and reproduction as a means of strengthening a country, and are at odds with postmaterial values that might threaten the concept of the traditional family and reproduction, such as support for abortion and same-sex marriage” (Spierings and Zaslove 2015: 143). This relationship between nationalism and women’s reproductive capabilities becomes particularly clear when taking in mind the current political landscape in which right-wing populist movements attempt to revoke (or, at least, limit) women’s legal access to abortion. For example, under the Trump-administration, which has a strong nationalist element to it (‘make America great again’), countless of measures have been taken to limit abortion services – such as defunding Planned Parenthood or the dozens of anti-abortions laws that have been implemented in the country (Rottenberg 2019). In the Netherlands, the leader of the right-wing nationalist FvD has, as was mentioned in the introduction, openly criticized women having fewer children, as this would foster “the demographic decline of Europe” (Baudet 2019), as I will touch back upon later in this thesis.
To sum up, gender and nationalism are closely connected. On the one hand, gender relations have become emblematic for a nation’s national identity. On the other hand, women, biologically, carry the burden of reproducing a national collectivity. In the next section, I examine in what ways this dynamic between nationalism and gender plays out in right-wing populist party’s attitudes towards gender.
Right-Wing Populist Parties and their Attitudes towards Gender
Over time, gender has increasingly been an element in the ideology of right-wing populist parties (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 79). However, the ways in which gender has been incorporated into the populist rhetoric differs per time, place and political party (Akkerman
2015). Based on the literature (De Lange & Mügge 2015; Mudde 2007; Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Spierings & Zaslove 2017), I make a distinction between five ideological variations: (1) the neo-traditional; (2) the modern-traditional; (3) the modernist; (4) the anti-immigration and (5) the anti-feminist view. Although I label these views as separate from each other, it is important to note that the views do, in practice, overlap.
Before I dive into these views, I wish to note that, in this thesis, ‘gender’ refers to the meaning society gives to the sexes, resulting in “the accepted, expected and rewarded behaviour and preferences based on social structures, norms and institutions” (Spierings et al. 2015: 10). Although challenged, most notably by feminists whose main aim is to create equality between the sexes (Lorber 2005), the social construction of gender has, for some time now, meant that women’s expected place in society is in the private sphere, i.e. as mothers and housewives (idem: 5), and men’s place is in the public sphere, i.e. as breadwinners (ibid). Although gender is thus about women’s as well as men’s place in society, it is women who are usually disadvantaged in these social constructions (ibid). Therefore, when I use the term ‘gender’, I mainly refer to women(‘s positions). The ‘traditional’ gender role of women is underscored or challenged by the different positions described below.
The neo-traditional view is a conservative one. According to this view, women’s main focus should be on family planning and taking on caring responsibilities. By the same token, neo-traditionalists’ aim is to encourage a society in which women’s main goal is to become mothers and housewives (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 71). Accordingly, the private sphere, i.e. the household, is approached as the female space, and through policies, such as laws that restrict access to abortion, entering the public sphere (e.g. the workforce) is made difficult for women (ibid). Note how this relates to the ‘population policies’ mentioned in the section above, and women’s burden to reproduce a nation’s collectivity. Moreover, emphasizing women’s ‘traditional’ role in society relates back to the authoritarian element of right-wing populism, as it is about the adherence to in-group conventions regarding gender relations (Spierings and Zaslove 2015: 142).
Modern-traditionalists combine the neo-traditional view “with modern elements such as promoting a combination of work and raising children, and advocating equal pay for equal work” (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 71). In other words, modern-traditionalists underscore traditional gender roles that assign women with the responsibilities of the household, but at the same time, they accept women’s participation in public life, i.e. the labour market (Akkerman 2015: 38). Thus, there is a little opening for women to enter the public sphere, as long as the private sphere stays their main domain.
Modernists encourage women entering the public sphere, and, accordingly, support policies such as equal pay and labour market participation (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 71). The difference with modern-traditionalists is that modernists hardly mention issues related to family life or women’s ‘responsibilities’ in the household (ibid). Therefore, modernists break with the adherence to traditional gender roles, and instead aim to create a climate in which women can equally participate in society.
This modernist view towards gender relations is often combined with an anti-immigration rhetoric. As Islam is targeted as a religion that oppresses women (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 76; Akkerman 2015: 56), populist right-wing parties place their ‘liberated’ view towards gender relations vis-à-vis the Islamic and/or immigrant ‘other’ (Akkerman 2015: 38). Hence, the premise of the anti-immigration rhetoric on gender relations is that women’s emancipation, which is seen to be achieved in the West, should be defended against ‘misogynist’ Muslims or immigrants from other ‘non-Western’ countries, whose ‘non-native’ elements are threatening to the nation state (Bracke 2012). Note how this relates back to nativism and the notion of the ‘dangerous other’. In this view, gender issues have become instrumental in putting forward a xenophobic, anti-Islam rhetoric (idem: 58; Spierings & Zaslove 2015: 143).
Lastly, right-wing populist parties can adhere to what some label as an ‘anti-feminist’ attitude (Spierings & Zaslove 2017: 823; Keskinen 2013). Basically, this anti-feminist view refers to the notion of men feeling disempowered because of “social and economic changes posing challenges to male power” (Keskinen 2013: 226). These social and economic changes refer to women’s changed role in society. Consequently, anti-feminists feel as if their dominant position is under attack by, indeed, feminists (ibid). Therefore, one could also understand this last view as a way of holding on to traditional positions on gender relations (e.g. the gendered private/public divide), which, again, connects back to the authoritarian element of right-wing populism. By the same token, this view is closely connected to the neo-traditional one, combined with an anti-feminist sentiment.
To sum up, generally, right-wing populist parties are quite conservative when it comes to family values and traditional gender roles, which makes sense considering the authoritarian element of this party family, e.g. the adherence to in-group conventions (resonating in the adherence to traditional gender roles). The feeling that these traditional gender relations are under threat can, additionally, result in an anti-feminist attitude. Alternatively, right-wing populist parties can embrace a somewhat more modernist view, putting less emphasis on women’s (traditional) role in family life and household responsibilities, and emphasizing the need to defend their (emancipated) position against muslims and ‘other’ ‘non-western’ groups.
In the next section, I dive into the right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, and determine on what position in this gendered ideological spectrum they fit.
The Dutch Context
The Party for the Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy can be approached as the Dutch members of the right-wing populist party family (Rooduijn 2019b). Both are characterized by nativism, populism, and Euro- and climate skepticism (ibid). The main difference between the parties, is that PVV is more explicit in its anti-Islam position (ibid). Next to their shared ideology, research into the demand side of these right-wing populist parties shows that 31 percent of the people that voted for FvD in the recent 2019 provincial elections, voted for PVV in the 2017 Dutch municipal elections (Ipsos 2019). In other words: one-third of the current FvD electorate was formerly part of the electorate of the PVV. Considering this, in my analysis, I will focus on the attitudes of the supporters of both FvD and the PVV.
So, what are the attitudes towards gender relations of respectively FvD and the PVV? Although, as I have argued above, gender plays such a pivotal role in right-wing populism and national identity, FvD and PVV do not have an official party line set out with regards to gender. Therefore, below, I dive into what is known about the parties’ stances on gender relations, and see how this fits in the five ideological variations within the family of right-wing populist parties. Research finds that the PVV mentions gender almost exclusively in relation to immigration and Islam (De Lange & Mügge 2015: 80). The party is in favor of equality between the sexes and, accordingly, women and men are entitled to equal positions in society (idem: 70). However, these values considering gender relations should, according to the PVV, be defended against immigrants and/or Muslims “who allegedly do not share the same values” (ibid). In other words, the PVV adheres to this notion of equality between the sexes – which resonates the Dutch sense of self considering gender relations (Wekker 2016:113) – but only in the context of ‘defending’ this against ‘immigrants’ and ‘Muslims’, which fits within the right-wing populist dimension of nativism and the context of the ‘dangerous other’. Thus, when looking back at the ideological variations, the PVV fits best in the ‘anti-immigration’ view, given its quite modernist stance on the equal position of men and women in society, which is, moreover, placed in opposition to the Islamic or immigrant ‘other’ with regards to gender relations. As modernists break with the adherence to traditional gender roles that right-wing populist parties generally embrace, my first hypothesis goes as follows:
H1a: PVV supporters have more supportive attitudes towards gender equality than FvD supporters.
When it comes to FvD, no systematic study has been conducted yet with regards to its position on gender issues. However, based on recent statements made by the party leader, Thierry Baudet (Baudet 2019), I will do an attempt at placing FvD in the spectrum of right-wing populist parties’ ideological variations with regards to gender issues.
As was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, Thierry Baudet quite recently published an essay in which he gives some insight into his stances on women’s position in society (Baudet 2019). In this essay, Baudet reviews the latest work of French writer Michel Houellebecq in order to put forward a political message of his own. In interpreting Houellebecq's work, Baudet criticizes individualism, which, according to him, resulted in women’s changing position in society and the associated downfall of the nation state (ibid). Consider, in light of this, the quote below:
“Consider the emancipation of women and the feminist ideology that underpins it (...). The “liberated” status of women is usually celebrated as one of the great triumphs of late-liberal society. Today women, from an early age, are encouraged to pursue a career and be financially independent. They are expected to reject the traditional role of supporting a husband and strive instead for an “equal” relationship in which “gender roles” are interchangeable.
But how has this really been working out for them? What hap-pens when they hit thirty? If they continue to work full hours, building a family becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is why women in the Western world increasingly tend to have fewer children—if they even have them at all. Work and children then often limit the time available for the maintenance of a committed relationship, and rare are the lovers that both work full hours, rear children, and invest sufficiently in each other for the marriage to remain healthy over time. An inevitable result of all this is the demographic decline of Europe.” (Baudet 2019).
Instead of celebrating women’s “liberated” position – as PVV’s Wilders might have done – it seems that Baudet, rather, condones it. He criticizes women entering the labour market, i.e. the public sphere (because that makes “building a family extremely difficult”) and, by the same token, views women’s traditional place in society to be as housewives and mothers, i.e. in the private sphere. In this sense, Baudet adheres to the traditional gender roles assigned to the sexes. Note how the essay seems to point at an anti-feminist view, as Baudet explicitly states that it is the “feminist ideology” that underpins women’s emancipated position in society (ibid).
Moreover, because women are now entering the labour market, Baudet states that it has become “extremely difficult” to build a family and this all “inevitably” results in “the demographic decline of Europe” (ibid). In other words, because women are entering the public sphere they cannot build families and therefore, Europe is, demographically speaking, declining.
This last point connects to another statement Baudet makes in his essay:
“All … institutions that the individual requires to fully actualize a meaningful existence – such as a family and a connection to generations past and future, a nation, a tradition, perhaps a church – will weaken and disappear. Today, even new life (in the womb) may be extinguished to avoid disturbing the individual’s freedom” (Baudet 2019).
Although Baudet does not necessarily state that he wants restrictive abortion policies, he does, connect the weakening and disappearing of “a nation” and “a tradition” to women’s access to abortion (“new life (in the womb) may be extinguished”) (ibid). This relates to the ‘population policies’ emphasized by Yuval-Davis (1997) and nationalist rhetoric considering women’s biological function in the reproduction of a nation’s collectivity.
To sum up, Badet’s essay seems to point in the direction of a neo-traditional stance on the position of women in society, with an anti-feminist dimension. Not only does Baudet reject women’s changed gender role, e.g. the fact that they entered the labour market (“work full hours”, “pursue a career”, “be financially independent”, see first quote), he also emphasizes women’s role in reproducing a nation – symbolically as well as biologically. Also, the authoritarian element of the neo-traditionalist view, i.e. the adherence to traditional in-group conventions, that women are now “expected to reject” (Baudet 2019), resonates in Baudet’s essay. Although this stance is in line with the view on gender relations within the right-wing populist party family, Baudet, in his nationalist message, rejects the Dutch national identity when it comes to women’s position in society (the notion that, in the Netherlands, gender equality is central in the national sense of self) (Wekker 2016: 113). In other words, ironically, in his nationalist essay, Baudet’s neo-traditional stance on gender issues does not resonate the Dutch national identity.
Hence, I conclude that the position of FvD’s party leader on gender issues fits within the neo-traditionalist view with an anti-feminist dimension. However, it should be noted that this analysis is based on just one personal essay of FvD’s party leader, and not an official party document. Moreover, given that FvD is relatively new, it is likely that the party is still evolving with regards to gender as well as other issues (for more on this, see discussion). Hence, it is hard to say where the party stands, exactly, with respect to gender relations. The above is therefore
just an attempt at giving some insight into the party’s ideological stance towards gender relations, as to propose the hypothesis outlined below:
H1b: FvD supporters encourage more traditional gender roles than PVV supporters.
However, as gender equality is so central to the Dutch national sense of self, I propose an alternative hypothesis about the position of FvD as well as PVV supporters, resonating the Dutch self-identification:
H2: Dutch supporters of right-wing populist parties support a gender equal society.
The above considers the right-wing populist parties’ attitudes towards gender relations, and provides the theoretical ground for my research. Below, in the empirical part of my thesis, I focus on the supporters of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands and their attitudes towards gender. Does what the elite proclaims represent the mass voice?
Data & Methods
To answer my research question, that is, what the Dutch right-wing nationalist supporters’ attitudes towards gender relations are, I make use of the European Values Study (EVS 2018). This is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal research program conducted in 16 countries in Europe (n = 22313), measuring values in European societies. The data of the EVS was gathered through surveys, with a target population consisting of individuals aged 18 or older (ibid). As the aim of this thesis is to explore right-wing populist supporters’ attitudes towards gender in the Netherlands, I focus on the Dutch sample (n = 686), and, more specifically, on supporters of the PVV (n1 = 46) and FvD (n2 = 26). Of the PVV supporters, 26 respondents are male, and 20 are female, which means that the sexes in this sample are relatively equally distributed. When looking at the supporters of FvD, 23 respondents are male, and only 3 female. This skewness in the distribution of the sexes among FvD supporters should be taken into consideration when analysing the data. Moreover, it should be noted that the EVS (2018) was conducted at a time when FvD had just been founded (in 2016). Since then, the party and its supporter-base has changed, and is still changing (for more on this matter, see discussion).
For the dependent variable, i.e. attitudes towards gender relations, I look at Q25 (Q25A-Q25G) (EVS 2018). Q25 measures these attitudes by means of questions directly connected to women’s position in society in relation to the private sphere, e.g. their responsibility considering family life, and women’s access to the public sphere, most notably the labour market, but also the political sphere (i.e. if women can function as political leaders) and higher education. The respondents were asked to determine whether they strongly agreed (1) or strongly disagreed (4) with a statement, or did not know what to answer. As the Q25 set of variables are related to each other, I use factor analysis to reduce Q25 into two multi-item dependent variables, as to make them suitable for OLS statistics.
For the main independent variable, i.e. partisanship, I look at Q48, that is, the party that appeals to a person the most (EVS 2018). In the Netherlands, a respondent could choose between all the parties that, at this moment, have seats in parliament (ZA7500 Questionnaire Netherlands). In this research, I mainly focus on respondents that feel most appealed to right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, i.e. FvD and the PVV. Therefore, after running an independent-samples t-test, I created a dummy variable measuring ‘partisanship’ in a dichotomous manner, i.e. support for the PVV and FvD recoded into 1 and support for the other parties as 0. In order to test the relationship between this independent variable and the two multi-item dependent variables (Y1, Y2) measuring gender attitudes, I make use of OLS statistics.
Results
In this chapter, I start by briefly providing a descriptive overview of the Dutch right-wing supporters’ attitudes towards gender relations. Next, after reporting the factor analysis and the independent-samples t-test, I analyze the results of the OLS, and see if there is a relationship between support for the populist right and these attitudes.
Descriptive analysis: neo-traditional or modernist?
Tabel 1 reports both the PVV and FvD supporters’ responses to questions about women’s (and, to some extent, men’s) position in society. In the EVS 2017 questionnaire, respondents had to assess whether they agreed strongly (1), agreed (2), disagreed (3) or disagreed strongly (4) with one of the statements outlined in Table 1.
The responses of respectively PVV and FvD supporters are quite similar. When looking at women’s ‘traditional’ responsibility considering family life (Q25A-Q25D), the majority of respondents disagree or disagree strongly with the statement that a “child suffers with working mother” (n = 47, 67,14 percent) and that “women really want home and children” (n = 49, 69,01 percent). When the statement is that “family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”, most respondents do agree. However, this majority is quite small (n = 31, 43,66 percent), as almost as many respondents disagree with the statement (n = 25, 35,21 percent). Hence, it seems that most supporters of both the PVV and FvD reject the view that women’s main place in society is in the private sphere, i.e. as mothers and housewives. This rejection is underscored by the fact that 88,89 percent (n = 64) of the respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement that a “man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after home and family”. In other words, traditional gender roles are rejected by most Dutch supporters of the populist right. This confirms H2: Dutch supporters of right-wing populist parties support a gender equal society. Moreover, as H2 is confirmed, this means that Baudet’s neo-traditional position does not resonate the attitudes of his supporters. This finding has broad implications, given that populists claim to express the general will of the people, as, according to the populists, ‘the corrupt elite’ does not know what the people want (Mudde 2004: 543). As Baudet’s view on gender roles differs from what most of his supporters think, this means that there is an asymmetry between his elite-level views and the mass-level attitudes. This observation confirms what earlier research has found when comparing the views of the (political) elite vis-à-vis the mass (e.g. voters, members or supporters) with regards to issues related to national identity (Van der Zwet 2016).
Tabel 1. Questions measuring gender attitudes supporters of PVV and FvD (Q25)
PVV n FvD n Total (%)
Child suffers with working mother (Q25A) 1 2 3 4 Tota l 1 15 23 6 45 1 2 3 4 3 4 14 4 25 4 19 37 10 70 5,71% 27,14% 52,86% 14,29% 100%
Women really want home and children (Q25B) 1 2 3 4 Tota l 4 12 22 8 46 1 2 3 4 0 6 17 2 25 4 18 39 10 71 5,63% 25,35% 54,93% 14,08% 100%
Family life suffers when woman has full-time job (Q25C) 1 2 3 4 4 19 17 6 46 1 2 3 4 2 12 8 3 25 6 31 25 9 71 8,45% 43,66% 35,71% 12,68% 100% Man’s job is to earn
money; woman’s job is to look after home and family (Q25D) 1 2 3 4 2 6 23 15 46 1 2 3 4 0 0 15 11 26 2 6 38 26 72 2,78% 8,33% 52,78% 36,11% 100% Men make better
political leaders than women (Q25E)
1 2 3 4 1 6 21 15 43 1 2 3 4 1 3 14 8 26 2 9 35 23 69 2,9% 13,04% 50,72% 33,33% 100% University education more important for a boy than for a girl (Q25F) 1 2 3 4 0 4 21 21 46 1 2 3 4 0 0 14 12 26 0 4 35 33 72 0% 5,55% 48,61% 45,83% 100% Men make better
business executives than women (Q25G) 1 2 3 4 1 4 26 14 45 1 2 3 4 1 5 13 7 26 2 9 39 21 71 2,82% 12,68% 54,93% 29,58% 100% 1 = agree strongly, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = disagree strongly
Graph 1. Distribution of scores measuring gender attitudes supporters of PVV and FvD (Q25)
The second part of the questions (Q25E, Q25F, Q25G) is about women’s and men’s position in the top of the public sphere, i.e. as political and business leaders, as well as their access to higher education. Again, the responses of both the PVV and FvD are quite similar. A considerable majority of the respondents disagree or disagree strongly with the statement that men make better political leaders (n = 58, 84,06 percent) or business executives (n = 60, 84,51 percent). This is in line with the modernist stance that encourages women acquiring equal positions in the (top of the) public sphere, a stance that is underscored by the fact that 68 respondents (94,44 percent) disagree or disagree strongly with the statement that “university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”. The boxplots in graph 1, in which the distribution of the scores are represented, visualize this support for the modernist view (graph 1).
To sum up this descriptive section, the supporters of the Dutch right-wing populist parties, generally, accept women entering the (top of) the public sphere, thereby rejecting their traditional position in society (i.e. in the private sphere, as mothers and housewives) and supporting an emancipated one (in which women can hold positions in the top of business, politics and education, i.e. the public sphere). This is in line with the Dutch national self-identification with regards to gender relations, and confirms H2.
OLS analysis: the relation between support for the populist right and gender attitudes In order to explore the relationship between partisanship and gender attitudes, the 7 items of Q25 were subjected to factor analysis. Prior to performing this, the appropriateness of the data was checked: the correlation matrix showed a majority of correlation coefficients above .3, and the Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin value was above the recommended value of .6 (KMO = .814, Barlett’s test’s p < .001). The Pattern Matrix (below) shows three items loading on component 1 above .7 (alpha .690) and three items loading on component 2 above .6 (alpha .746). Although an alpha of above .7 is recommended, .690 for the first component is acceptable (Bélanger & Nadeau 2009). From this, I conclude that I can create two multi-item dependent variables measuring attitudes towards gender. The first set is composed of variables Q25E, Q25F and Q25G, which I interpret as being about the public sphere, and whether or not women can behold positions in (the top of) that. The second set is composed of Q25A, Q25B and Q25C, which I interpret as representing women’s role in society, e.g. as mothers or as workers. As Q25D has the lowest scores in the pattern matrix, I decide to disregard this variable in the remaining of my analyses. The two multi-item variables that, based on the factor analysis, are my main dependent variables, are thus labelled ‘PositionWoman’ (Q25A, Q25B, Q25C) and ‘TopPublic’ (Q25E, Q25F, Q25g), and become the two main dependent variables (Y1 and Y2) in the analyses that follow. The multi-item variables are recoded into a 0 to 1 scale, 0 referring to attitudes that support a less gender equal society, 1 referring to attitudes that support a more gender equal society.
Table 2. Pattern Matrix
Component 1 Component 2 Men make better business executives than
women (Q25G)
.909 Men make better political leaders than women
(Q25E) .867
University education more important for a boy
than for a girl (Q25F) .740
Child suffers with working mother (25A) .913
Family life suffers when woman has full-time
job (Q25C) .876
Women really want home and children (Q25B) .632
Man’s job is to earn money; woman’s job is to
look after home and family (Q25D) .386 .520
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 9 iterations.
To compare the scores between supporters of the PVV and FvD on attitudes towards the position of women (Y1), an independent-samples t-test was conducted. To do this, I created a new dummy variable for support for the populist right, 0 representing the PVV and 1 representing FvD. The t-test shows that there is no significant difference in scores for supporters of PVV (M = .558, SD = .215) and FvD (M = 565, SD = .194; t (67) = .129, p = .898, two-tailed). A second independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the scores on attitudes towards women beholding positions in the top of the public sphere (Y2). This test also shows that there is no significant difference between supporters of PVV (M = .747, SD = .205) and FvD (M = .731, SD = .167; t (67) = -.336, p = .738 (two-tailed). In other words, the supporters of the PVV and FvD do not have significantly different attitudes on gender relations. This confirms what was seen in table 1, and rejects H1a: PVV supporters have more supportive attitudes towards gender equality than FvD supporters, as well as H1b, FvD supporters encourage more traditional gender roles than PVV supporters. What is more, based on this independent-samples t-test, I can now analyse support for the PVV and FvD together as ‘support for right-wing populist parties’. Below, I see if support for these parties (coded as 1) vis-à-vis the other parties that currently hold seats in the Netherlands (coded as 0) has an effect on gender attitudes.
Does support for right-wing populist parties predict a person’s attitude towards gender relations? Or, in other words, is there a correlation between support for the populist right, and gender attitudes? To explore this, I conduct an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. In this analysis, partisanship is the dichotomous independent variable, and attitudes towards gender is measured in the two continuous multi-item dependent variables (Y1 and Y2).
The first model (1a) shows that if someone supports a right-wing populist party, the attitude towards women’s role in society (Y1) decreases with .073 points (p < .05). This means that the supporters of the populist right are slightly less supportive of women breaking with their traditional roles as mothers or housewives, as opposed to supporters of the other Dutch parties. This is interesting, given that gender equality is such a central part of the Dutch national identity (a national ‘achievement’ emphasized by the PVV), and, moreover, most of the supporters of nationalist parties, generally, share this stance (as is reported in table 1). However, model 1a shows that the Dutch national sense of self with regards to gender equality resonates less in the attitudes of the supporters of the nationalist right than the supporters of other political parties that currently have seats in Dutch parliament. Moreover, given that the PVV is a party that explicitly approaches gender equality as a Dutch national achievement that needs to be defended against ‘non-native’ ‘others’ (e.g. immigrants), it is even more surprising that its
supporters are a little less gender equal in their attitudes than supporters of other populists parties. However, it should be noted that the R² in model 1a is .013, which means that partisanship explains only 1,3 percent of the total variance in Y1, and that the effect of supporting a right-wing populist party on attitudes towards gender relations is, although significant, very small.Nevertheless, given the importance of gender relations in Dutch national identity specifically and right-wing populism more broadly, it is an effect worth noting. By the same line of reasoning, it is somewhat surprising that the effect is not stronger than is reported in table 3.
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares regression explaining gender attitudes Independent
Variable
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 1e
Support RWP -.073** (.029) -.071** (.030) -.068** (.029) -.049* (.029) -.029 (.028) Sex - .008 .019 .006 (.019) .012 (.019) .005 (.018) Authoritarianis m - - -.094*** (.031) -.098*** (.030) -.072** (.030) Income - - - .016*** (.003) .007** (.004) Education - - - - .070*** (.013) N 471 471 471 471 471 R² .013 .014 .032 .078 .137 Constant .639*** (.010) .625*** (.014) .710*** (.031) .606*** (.037) .493*** (.041) *p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Next, I test for control variables. As a respondent’s sex could impact his or her views on gender relations (Inglehart & Norris 2003: 18), this variable is added in the second OLS model (1b). However, this does not change much of the results, as the effect of partisanship is now -.071 (p < .05). As authoritarianism is closely connected to attitudes towards gender relations (i.e. the more authoritarian a person is, the more a person adheres to traditional gender roles), in model
1c, I add the second control variable ‘respect for authority’ measured in a dichotomous manner. I recoded this into a dummy variable, ‘0’ representing the respondents’ answer [greater respect for authority is] ‘bad’, and ‘1’ representing ‘good’. Model 1c shows that, again, the effect of partisanship does not really change (-.068, p < .05). Next to that, respect for authority, as expected, also has an effect on gender attitudes, as higher respect for authority results in a .094 point decrease in Y1 (p < .01), meaning less support for women breaking with their traditional gender roles. However, the explanatory power of the third model (1c) is still quite low (R² = .032). As socio-economic wealth is associated with egalitarian attitudes towards gender relations (Inglehart & Norris 2003: 18), I add level of income as a control variable in model 1d and level of education in model 1e. When these last control variables are added, the significant effect of support for right-wing populist parties on gender attitudes first decreases (1d: p < .10), and then disappears (1e: p > .10). This probably has to do with the fact that supporters of these parties generally come from lower socio-economic classes (Spierings & Zaslove 2015: 139) and are lower educated (Bovens 2011: 27-28). In other words, socio-economic background probably has an effect on partisanship as well as gender attitudes.
The second main dependent variable is Y2: respondents’ attitudes towards women acquiring positions in the (top of the) public sphere, e.g. as business or political leaders, or in higher education. Does support for a right-wing populist party has an effect on Y2? Running similar models as are reported in table 1 shows that there is no significant effect of partisanship on a supporter’s position on Y2. In other words, support for the PVV and/or FvD does not have a significant effect on a person’s view with regards to women figuring as business executives, political leaders, or if girls should have the same access to a university education as boys. Therefore, I decided not to report these models in this thesis.
To sum up, the second part of the empirical research shows that supporters of respectively the PVV and FvD do not differ significantly in their attitudes towards gender relations. Taken together, support for these right-wing populist parties results in a small, but significant decrease in support for women breaking with their (traditional) gender role (Y1) (an effect that disappears when level of education is added as a control variable) but no significant effect on attitudes towards women entering the (top of the) public sphere (Y2). The finding that support for the populist right in the Netherlands means being slightly less supportive of women’s emancipation is interesting given the Dutch national sense of self considering gender equality. However, by the same token, given the connectedness between gender and national identity, it is surprising that the effect of support for right-wing populist parties on Y1 is not stronger, and that there is no significant effect on Y2.
Conclusion
The main aim of this thesis was to contribute to the body of research on the role that gender plays in the ideology of right-wing populist parties. This is important for two reasons. First, gender and nationalism, which is a key feature of the populist right, are closely connected. Hence, gender should be taken into consideration when studying the populist right. Second, previous research has found asymmetries between what the political elite proclaims and what the mass wants when it comes to matters of national identity. Given that populist parties proclaim to express the general will of the people vis-à-vis ‘the corrupt elite’, it is especially relevant to examine this dynamic. Therefore, by analyzing the demand side of the political spectrum, and by seeing if the views of the supporters of the populist right are in line with the stances of the PVV and FvD on gender relations, this thesis shines light on this elite/mass-level dynamic.
So, what are the Dutch right-wing nationalist supporters’ attitudes towards the position of women? The findings show that most Dutch supporters of the populist right break away from the party’s family general neo-traditional stance, and encourage women’s emancipation and the rejection of (women’s) traditional gender roles, i.e. as mothers and housewives. These views are in line with the Dutch sense of self, i.e. as a nation that supports gender equality. Specifically, when it comes to the PVV, most of its supporters underscore the party’s modernist stance on gender relations. On the other hand, a majority of the supporters of FvD reject the party’s political leader’s neo-traditional stance. Thus, an asymmetry is found between supporters of FvD and Baudet’s view on gender relations. These results considering FvD have theoretical as well as political implications. Theoretically, when focusing on FvD, the research confirms earlier studies on the divergence between elite/macro-level and mass/micro-level conceptions on matters related to national identity (Van der Zwet 2016). Politically, in the context of gender issues, this means that Baudet does not adhere to the populist premise, e.g. to voice the wants and needs of the people he represents.
When compared to the other Dutch political parties, support for right-wing poulist parties seems to result in a (small, but significant) decrease in a person’s attitude towards gender equality (Y1). Hence, although gender equality is such a central part of the national sense of self, support for the nationalist right does not necessarily result in a stronger encouragement for gender equality as opposed to support for the other parties (that is, until level of education is added as a control variable). Moreover, no effect is found on attitudes towards women entering the top of the public sphere (Y2). That the effects are small or not even there, is surprising, given the central role that gender plays in (the Dutch) national identity. The key question, therefore,
is: is the role of gender relations in Dutch nationalist politics changing, i.e. becoming less important than one might expect considering the connectedness between gender and nationalism, or is this an issue that supporters of the populist right are less concerned with than the parties that represent them?
Discussion
The central focus of this thesis was on the attitudes of the supporters of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, respectively, the PVV and FvD. The dataset that I used for this research is part of the EVS (2018). However, since 2017 (the year in which the EVS 2018 dataset was built), the party has changed, and is in all probability still evolving. Therefore, for further research, it might be valuable to see if the attitudes of (the supporters of) the party will be the same as is found in this research, or not. Moreover, FvD’s stance on gender relations was inducted from one personal essay written by the party’s leader, Thierry Baudet. The question is whether this position is shared by the party, or that FvD will set out an official party line that differs from Baudet’s views on gender relations.
Next to that, it is important to take into consideration the limitations of measuring attitudes towards gender relations in a few quantified variables. These attitudes are, in all probability, more complex than how it is represented in this paper. Moreover, (views on) gender relations contain more than the somewhat more classical gender issues that are studied here, i.e. men and women’s ‘traditional’ gender roles considering the public/private sphere. What hasn’t been studied in this thesis, are, for example, views on (the position of) people that do not identify with being male or female (e.g. non-binary people), or persons who wish to change their gender (e.g. transgenders). Or, to give another example, what do people that vote for right-wing populist parties think about sexual abuse of power, and the current context of #MeToo? These are, too, issues that are relevant to take into consideration when studying gender. Therefore, a valuable contribution to this research would be a broader conceptualization of gender relations, as well as qualitative research, such as interviews with PVV and FvD members, voters and supporters, as well as the MPs that represent them, and ask them about their views on gender relations about and beyond the somewhat more classic gender issues studied in this thesis.
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