1 Master thesis Psychology, specialization in Social and Organizational Psychology Institute of Psychology
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences – Leiden University Date: 2nd August 2017
Student number: 1860674
First examiner of the university: Dr. Wolfang Steinel Second examiner of the university: Dr. Jorg Gross
(Dis)honesty under payoff
uncertainty
Milly C. Muschitiello
2 Abstract
A huge amount of everyday life situations suggests that dishonest acts as cheating or lying occur frequently. Researchers developed several methods to investigate how and when cheating behaviors occur, such as the under the cup dice task paradigm. Also, several findings explain how possible gains or losses influence dishonest behavior. We hypothesized that people are willing to adopt cheating behaviors to get a desired outcome within the outcome uncertainty and that two mechanism, extrinsic attribution and uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within outcome uncertainty. The activation of one mechanism rather than another interacted with the situational frame (gain frame vs loss frame). We created a probabilistic version of under the cup dice task paradigm. Results provide that no uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the gain frame. Suggestions for further research as well as limitations are discussed.
3 (Dis)honesty under payoff uncertainty
A huge amount of everyday life situations suggests that dishonest acts as cheating or lying occur frequently. The clear majority of experimental studies that detected cheating behaviors is based on the certainty of benefits gained adopting unethical behaviors. But what happens when a lie can lead either to a convenient outcome or no results at all? Moreover, if the context is framed, will the frame influence the behavior? How? Why people behave dishonestly?
According to the Standard Economic Model of Rational and Selfish Human Behavior, when people drawn the line to decide whether lie or not, they usually take into account three aspects: how many advantages they are about to gain acting dishonestly, the likelihood of being discovered and the magnitude of sanctions if caught. The Standard Economic perspective describes the Homo Economicus in terms of a rational individual, who tend to maximize his own income. This individual knows exactly what he wants and what he does not want and the decision to be honest or not it is clearly drawn. In other words, people choose to act honestly accordingly to an evaluation of cost-befits of their actions which leads to optimize their interests (Hechter 1990; Lewicki 1984) To extend the Standard Economic Model of Rational and Selfish Human Behavior, more attention was focused on the role of individual differences in acting dishonestly. Lewis (2009) argued that individual differences could be described as the interaction of three levels: the individual level where individuals tend to maximize their profits and personal utilities defined as a personal characteristic, how people are socialized and how people differ in cultural norms.
4
Personal characteristics, socialization and cultural norms
Thomas Gabor (1994) documented the spread immorality of honest people, breaking down the stereotype that only criminal people violate the rules and the law. One way which is common in both criminal and honest people is that both create a distance between themselves and their behaviors. This mechanism is defined as moral disengagement.
Regarding the role of socialization, people within a permissive environment tend to manifest higher rates of dishonest behaviors. (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gino & Pierce, 2009a; Mazar et al., 2008). In an experiment, Mazar et al. (2005) showed how making morality salient significantly reduced dishonest behaviors. Specifically, they made morality salient manipulating the levels of self-awareness, a manipulation that is highly associated with honesty. In this, they involved participants in a recall task. Results showed that when the ethical standards are made salient, people pay more attention on their own standards and rigidity toward their violation is higher.
Regarding the role of the culture, it could affect how individual perceive dishonesty in two ways: by normalizing dishonesty in a specific context and/or by influencing the individual general tendencies towards dishonest acts. For instance, corruption influence significantly the context- specific dishonesty (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). This result was confirmed in a cross-cultural study developed by Mann et. al (2016).
The role of justification
It seems reasonable to say that people need to balance their needs, maximize their incomes through dishonest act and maintain a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir and
5 Ariely, 2008). In the Self- Concept Maintenance Theory, Mazar et al. (2008) observed that people behave dishonestly enough to profit, but honestly enough to elude a negative evaluation of the self. Incomplete cheating seems to be the balance point between the external rewards offered acting dishonestly and the maintenance of their positive self- image.
In line with this statement, interesting results were found in a study conduct within a financial firm. The banking industry is well known for promoting a business culture which is tolerant toward dishonest behaviors instead of forbidding them. Cohn, Fehr and Maréchal (2014) recruited 128 employees from a large firm to test whether their professional identity was associated to higher rates of cheating behaviors. All subjects performed a coin tossing task, which has been indicated as one of the most reliable measures to detect cheating behaviors outside of an experimental setting. Participants were asked to toss a coin ten times and report each outcome online. Depending on the outcome (head or tail) they could win up to 20$. Subjects were already aware whether head or tail were linked to the money prize gain. They framed the competitive nature of the bank business culture saying to each subject that they will be paid only if they reach a number of successful outcome equal or higher than the ones reach from an online survey. The coin toss task was performed without any supervision and each participant could win a maximum amount of 200$. Results showed that participants who were primed with their professional identity showed higher rates of cheating behaviors. Nevertheless, a significantly portion of liars did not fully cheated, reporting 6, 7 and 8 successful coin flips rather than 9 or 10. So then, participants do not take the fully advantage provided by anonymity to maintain their honest self-image.
6 Another way of lying and maintain a positive self-concept is to find justification for lying.
Kunda (1990) provided evidence that explained how people get easily to the conclusion they want to when justifications are available or providing justifications by themselves. This thesis is supported by Shalvi and al. (2011), who asserted that people change their perception of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable according with the amount self-justification available for doing it. Specifically, they used a die roll paradigm in which only the participants knew their die roll outcome and gain money accordingly with the number they specified. Specifically, to the experimental group participants were told to roll the dice three times and report the first roll die outcome while to the control group participants were told to roll the die one time and report the outcome. Results indicated a significantly higher amount of cheating behaviors in the experimental condition. So then, the more justification they had, the greater the extent to lie on the die roll outcome to gain more money.
The coin toss task and the die under the cup task were considered extremely suitable to investigate real-life dishonest behaviors in according with two reasons: firstly, they have high levels of construct validity and could be easily explained, and secondly, each subject is provided with complete anonymity.
In fact, in studies that adopted the dice under the cup paradigm (Shalvi et al., 2011), participants secretly roll a dice and are paid accordingly to what they reported. Consequently, if participants report a six, they will receive six euros for guarantee. Moreover, in accord to the Self-Concept Maintenance Theory (Mazar et al.,2008.), people limit their unethical behaviors avoiding major lies to maximize their outcome
7 while maintaining an honest self-concept through justifications for lying (Kunda, 1990; Ariely, 2012). So then, if they roll a two, reporting a 5 is conceived as more honest than reporting a six, and to justify themselves they could say that everyone else would have done the same in that situation.
But what happens if cheating does not assure a secure benefit? There are a lot of everyday life situation in which one lies even though his/her unethical act would not produce a secure outcome. If he/she adopt cheating behaviors is simply to increase the likelihood to get the most valued outcome.
In our study, our aim was to investigate whether people are more likely to adopt cheating behaviors to increase the likelihood to get the most valued outcome adopting a probabilistic cheating paradigm.
Probabilistic setting, uncertainty avoidance and extrinsic attribution
Since we wanted to highlight how adopting cheating behavior increases the likelihood to get the desired outcome within an uncertain context, we used a different version of the dice under the cup paradigm. We stated that after the dice-roll, a cash amount of 6 Euros could be obtained. Then, we introduced a new element, which was not included in the previous versions of the under the cup dice paradigm: a ball drawn. Specifically, we stated that a ball should be picked blindly, out of a container filled with six balls.
Firstly, the container should be filled with six white balls. After the dice-roll, these balls should be replaced with yellow balls depending on the report of the die roll. Every participant had to pick up randomly one ball from the container. The participant got the cash amount if he/she caught the yellow ball. If he/ she caught the white ball, he/she did
8 not receive the cash amount of six Euros. So then, if a participant reported a higher number, he/she increased the likelihood to win the cash amount.
In line with the probabilistic cheating paradigm is the notion of uncertainty. Different uncertainty definitions have been provided in the literature. A broad definition states that the uncertainty concept included several distinct phenomena such as risk, ambiguity and equivocality.
Regarding how decision makers deal with uncertainty, a procedure defined as standard in formal and behavioral decision theories is called the R.P.Q heuristic. This procedure is based on the reduction of uncertainty through the information search (Janis & Mann, 1977), the quantification of what cannot be reduced, and the plug of the results into a model that includes uncertainty. The reduction of the uncertainty levels in real life situation is often problematic: information can be unavailable, or is too ambiguous or misleading (Feldman & March, 1981; Grandori, 1984; Wohlstetter, 1962) and also, search for further information does not lead automatically to a better decision when environmental uncertainty is high (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). To deal with un uncertain event without any additional information source, three basic tactics were found: reducing uncertainty, acknowledging uncertainty and suppressing or avoiding uncertainty.
The probabilistic version of the original dice-under-the cup task highlighted two more mechanisms: uncertainty avoidance and extrinsic attribution.
Regarding the uncertainty avoidance, Argote (1982) and Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) stated that comprehensive decision-making is adopted in relatively stable situation while a more flexible response is used in more complex environments.
9 Hofstede (1980), categorized the uncertainty avoidance mechanism as something that varies across cultures. The author defined it as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede, 1991, p.113). So then, the uncertainty avoidance can be conceptualized as a cultural characteristic, when analyzed an aggregate level (e.g., Albers-Miller & Gelb, 1996; Hofstede, 1980; Nakata & Sivakumar,1996). The uncertainty avoidance has never been conceptualized in terms of personality trait (e.g., Hui, 1988; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995) but a definition at the individual level was provided. In fact, we can talk in terms of uncertainty avoidance at an individual level as the extent an individual is willing to avoid uncertainty as much as possible. So then, individuals with high levels of uncertainty avoidance or individuals who are part of a high uncertainty avoidance culture are more prone to use heuristics to face with uncertainty.
In the probabilistic cheating paradigm, when people face up with an unsecure outcome, reporting a number smaller than six will have as main implication less probability to get the desired outcome. So then, to remove completely the uncertainty they will be motivated to report a six.
Consequently, we firstly hypothesized that To avoid uncertainty, people will over-report
6 to fully remove the uncertainty and under-report all the outcomes below 6.
In the standard version of the dice-under the cup paradigm, people get a financial outcome accordingly to what they report. Thus, if one reports 5 after the die roll, he/ she will receive 5 Euros. To maintain an honest self-concept, this one could justify himself/herself in a variety of ways (“report a five is more honest than report a six”). In our version, the adoption of cheating behavior will not assure the desired outcome,
10 which is due to a random draw, but it facilitates deception. In fact, people could extrinsically attribute their result even though they are acting unethically (I won because I was lucky).
Nevertheless, the extrinsic attribution to their outcome is not suitable to justify a good result which occurs frequently in a lottery. To maximize their outcome while maintaining an honest self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008) people prefer to adopt as justification an extrinsic attribution, like luck, rather than openly admitting that their achievement is due to an unethical act. Thus, if they report a six they cannot attribute their outcome to luck. Consequently, report another number is more attractive.
Thus, we secondly hypothesized that People will under-report six because this remove
the chance to attribute extrinsically to luck their desired outcome and will over-report 5
or 4, increasing their chance to win yet leaving an extrinsic attribution as justification.
The role of the frame
The first and the second hypotheses stated two contradicting predictions: the uncertainty avoidance should lead to an increased number of reported 6 and the extrinsic attribution should lead to a lower number of reported 6. We propose that both mechanisms have a role, but the feature that determines the dominant one is the frame manipulation.
The hypothesis underlying framing is that people adopt different behaviors when the context is positively or negatively framed: there is a general tendency for risk aversion behaviors within positively framed contexts and a general tendency for risk seeking behaviors for negatively framed problems. To define these two tendencies, the term framing effect is used. Different ways can be used to manipulate framing. We could talk about framing manipulation whether the frame is manipulated through explicit gain
11 or loss words (win, asset, gain, refund, loss, payment) or by task responsive words, or in other terms, by a labelling manipulation. An example of framing labelling manipulation could be a common-sense dilemma or a public-goods situation. Another kind of manipulation could be a task manipulation (Kuhberger, 1998). So then, a context could be framed through very simple changes, such as a word or a task feature (Tversky & Kanheman, 1981) and these changes could lead to different preferences.
Most part of theories highlights how the adoption of a risk preference is dependable to the payoff amount (whether it is larger or smaller) and or the likelihood to get a desired outcome (Kunberg, 1997).
In all studies involving the framing effect, the outcome is always objectively presented, to make losses or negative framed context looks like gains or positively framed context. In line with these statements, what it plays a central role in the Prospect Theory is the perception of gain and losses.
According to the Prospect Theory (Khaneman and Tversky, 1979), people perceive differently losses and gains: a considerable amount of evidence asserted that there is higher risk seeking to avoid possible losses than to increase possible gains (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In fact, a loss has a major influence on choices and behaviors than an equivalent gain. This asymmetry occurs frequently since the pain of losing something is higher than the pleasure of gaining it (Ariely, Huber and Wertenbroch, 2005; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert, 2006; Zhang and Fishbach, 2005). Mcgraw, Larsen, Kahneman and Schkade (2010) discovered that participants distress levels were higher while they were thinking about a possible lost than the excitement levels about
12 winning the same amount of money. Further studies confirmed that whether a situation is characterized by both a potential loss (loss frame) and a potential gain (gain frame), the decision-making process results influenced.
Thus, if a situation is framed to involve a potential gain or a potential loss, people will be more motivated to avoid possible losses than to approach possible gains. Consequently, the general idea of loss aversion is supported. A loss aversion pattern is observed in a great variety of context (Camerer, 2000; Hardie, Johnson and Fader, 1993; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1985). In line with these statements, there is the concept of risk aversion provided for the first time by Daniel Bernoulli (1738), which states that the preference for a sure gain is a key feature of risk aversion.
In general, selecting a sure outcome over an uncertain situation that has equal or higher expectation is called risk aversion, and the rejection of a sure outcome in favor of an uncertain situation with lower or equal expectation is defined as risk seeking. Bernoulli asserted that people usually evaluate the expectations in terms of the subjective values of these outcomes.
Several findings explain how possible gains or losses influence dishonest behavior. Ker and Chugh (2009) in a hypothetical scenario showed that dishonest behavior is increased in the loss frame condition compare than the gain frame condition. This result was even higher under time pressure.
Cameron and Miller (2008, Study 2; also cited in Cameron and Miller, 2009) found that when the participants could cheat (they could self-report their performance on an anagram task to being paid accordingly) they pointed out higher performance rates when
13 that performance was connected to a loss reduction of the ten dollars allocated compared to gain condition performance. To exclude that these results are due only by a higher effort in the loss condition, further studies examined (Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan, in press) the loss aversion effect on lying using a cheating paradigm performance based (self-reported performance of solved matrix tasks). In addition, the tasks performance was monitored or not. Consequently, participants could cheat in the non-monitored condition. In the monitored condition, there were no significant differences between the gain frame performance and the loss frame performance, in the non-monitored condition the participants cheating likelihood was higher in the loss frame than the gain frame. As a result, the effects were not merely due to the higher effort in the loss frame.
Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017, E xperiment 1) tested whether the actual dishonest behavior was more likely to occur. Specifically, they tested it in a potential loss situation as well as in a potential gain scenario and they aimed to verity that dishonest behavior happened more frequently in a potential loss situation than the potential gain situation. To investigate their hypotheses, they used a dice-task paradigm providing anonymity (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). The results demonstrated that people showed higher rates of dishonest behavior in the loss condition compared to the gain condition. If we consider that losses are more threatening than gains it seems reasonable to assert that the reduction of uncertainty is more important in the losses domain. Thus, the uncertainty avoidance described in the first hypothesis should be more dominant in the loss frame than in the gain frame.
If we consider that people are more inclined to cheat to avoid losses, they are less in need to attribute their behavior extrinsically in the gain domain. Thus, the extrinsic
14 attribution described in the second hypothesis should be less dominant in the loss frame than the gain frame.
So then, we expect that framing influences the cheating behavior. In other words, we thirdly hypothesized the moderating effect of framing: In the loss-frame people will
over- report 6 to fully remove the uncertainty and will under-report the outcomes below
6; in the gain-frame, people will under-report 6 because this remove the chance to
attribute extrinsically the desired outcome to luck) and over-report 5 and maybe also 4.
Method General background of the experiment
To verify our hypotheses, we create a laboratory setting in which participants were randomly assigned to two framed conditions: the loss frame condition and the gain frame condition. We operationalize the uncertainty as the chance to get the money after performing two tasks: the dice under the cup task and a blindly ball drawn. The dice under the cup paradigm is a technique commonly used to investigate to what extent people lie (Moshagen and Hilbig, 2017 ). The strongest point of this tasks is that the expected value could be used as a baseline to detect honest behavior. In the most part of studies, the dice is rolled once and the probability of rolling a number from 1 to 6 is 1/6. Since the uncertainty was associated to the chance to get the money, a cash compensation for participating was not included. Participation were compensated with 1 credit. To operationalize the frame, we manipulated the money ownership. In fact, the ownership creates a link between the self and the good. So then, a money fee for participating was not included.
15 In the gain condition, participants received or not the money at the end of the experiment, in the loss condition, participants received the money immediately after reading the informed consent.
We did not calculate a sample size to detect a medium effect. In a first place, we fixed the number of participants at 120 and to get a higher effect, we increased the number of participants to 150.
Participants and Design
150 participants (103 females; 47 males; Mage = 21.41, SD = 3.01, range: 18–34) were recruited at Leiden University in four days.. Before the beginning of the experiment, all participants read the informed consent. Between 1 and 8 participants arrived for each experimental session, and in each session, either the gain or the loss condition was conducted. It was necessary to assign all participants in one experimental session to the same experimental condition, as the informed consent forms had a slightly different wording, depending on condition. We switched the condition approximately every 30 participants. Like this, participants were randomly assigned to condition.
The full procedure took nearly 20 minutes. In reason of that dishonest behaviors are unlikely to occur when detection levels are high, the dice under the cup task took place in cubicles to provide total anonymity to each participant.
Procedure and Frame Manipulation
This study was advertised at Leiden University in the Pieter de La Court building as decision making study involving uncertain events. Recruited participants were invited to laboratory to read the informed consent. To manipulate the frame, we used two different informed consent forms (see Appendix A) and two sets of instruction (see Appendix B;
16 see Appendix C) . In the gain condition, participants read on the informed consent form they could win six Euro at the end of the ball drawn task. In the loss condition, they read on the informed consent form that they would receive six Euro immediately. In both informed consent forms, we stated that the chances to kept the money were upon the ball drawn outcome. After reading the informed consent, participants were assigned to a cubicle. The experimenter explained they had to do a series of tasks and when they started the task, the cubicle door must be closed. At the end of each task performed in the cubicle, they were instructed to open the door. As first task, participants assigned to both conditions fill in a filler questionnaire providing data regarding sex, age and the number of psychology experiment they participated. Furthermore, we measured their attitudes toward free will, locus of control, determination (scientific vs fatalism). The items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (See Appendix B). When they finished to fill the questionnaire, participants opened the door. The experimenter took the questionnaire and gave to him/her a cup. On the top of the cup a hole was created. A legitimate dice was stacked within the cup. In addition to the cup they received an instruction sheet and they can choose between Dutch and English instruction sheet. In both gain and losses instruction sheets, the general framework of the experiment was explained. In the gain condition, since participants read on the informed consent that they could win six euro after the ball drawn task, in the gain condition instructions sheet, the chance to win the money salient in the text was stressed. (See Appendix C)
In the loss condition participants received the money immediately after reading the informed consent. To manipulate the frame, in the loss condition instructions sheet we make the money ownership salient in the text as well as the chance to lose that amount of
17 money after the ball drawn performance (See Appendix D). After reading the instruction, the participant performed the dice under the cup task. One dice roll was required, as well as two more rolls to verify the die legitimacy.
After rolling the die, each participant reported the dice roll result on a decision sheet. Then they opened the door again and the experimenter took him/her in a different room. The experimenter explained that in according to what they reported, they had to pick up a white ball among other balls placed in a bowl. Beforehand, the experimenter filled the bowl with six yellow balls. Once the experimenter read the decision sheet outcome, she replaced the yellow balls with the number of white balls accordingly with the number reported on the decision sheet. Then the experimenter asked to participant to drawn a ball blindly. If they caught a white ball, they could keep the money. So then, if they cheated, the likelihood to kept/win the money got higher.
Dependent Measure
The dice under the cup task is used to gather information regarding why people lie. So then, we analysed the total amount of cheating behaviours. Specifically, we compared the expected dice outcome frequency with the obtained one within the outcome uncertainty setting on the aggregate level.
To investigate the role of the extrinsic attribution on the total amount of cheating, we analysed the obtained 4 and 5 dice outcome distribution.
To investigate the role of the uncertainty avoidance on the total amount of cheating, we analysed the obtained 6 dice outcome distribution.
To investigate the moderating effect of the frame, we compare the 4 and 5 as well as the 6 dice outcome distributions in both frame conditions with the expected ones.
18 To investigate the interaction between the amount of cheating behaviors and the frame, a Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of the observed dice outcomes with the expected dice outcome frequency within the outcome uncertainty setting. A non-significant value was found (2 (5) = 2.80, p =.731). So then, there was no significant difference between the frequency of the observed dice outcomes and the expected dice outcome frequency. In other words, there was a no significant amount of cheating behaviors at a group level in both conditions.
To test the interaction between the extrinsic attribution and the frame within the outcome uncertainty setting, we analyzed the 4 and 5 dice outcome distribution in both frame conditions.
A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of 4 and 5 dice outcome in the gain and loss frame. A slightly significant interaction was found (2 (1) = 4,05 p < .05). Participants were more likely to report 4 and 5 (46,7%) in the gain frame rather than in the loss frame (38,7%). So then, the extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the gain frame condition.
To test the interaction between the role of uncertainty avoidance mechanism and the frame within the outcome uncertainty setting, we analyzed the 6dice outcome distribution.
A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of 6 dice outcome reported in the gain and loss frame. A non-significant interaction was found (2 (1) = 2,08 p = .150). Participants were more likely to report 6 (17,3 %) in the loss frame rather than in the gain frame (9,3 %). So then, the uncertainty avoidance played a role in the loss frame, but it was not significant
19 In sum, results provide evidence for the idea that people do not lie as much as expected.
Significant correlations
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the attitudes toward free will, locus of control, fatal determination, and scientific determination. A positive correlation between free will and locus of control r = 0.361, n = 148, p = 0.01 was found. Furthermore, a negative correlation between locus of control and fatal determination r = -.163, n = 148, p = 0.05 and a positive correlation between fatal determination and scientific determination r = 0.298, n = 148, p = 0.001 were found. To conclude, a slightly significant correlation between locus of control and scientific determination was found. r = 0.361, n = 148, p = 0.001.
Conclusions
The obtained results provide there are no significant differences between the expected die outcome distribution and the obtained one. Also, results provide that uncertainty avoidance did not play a significant role within outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the gain frame condition. Suggestions for further research as well as limitations are provided.
Discussion
In the current study, we did not find the expected results from our predictions.
We hypothesized that people are willing to adopt cheating behaviors to get a desired outcome within the outcome uncertainty. Specifically, we thought that two mechanism, extrinsic attribution and uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within the
20 outcome uncertainty. The activation of one mechanism rather than another interacted with the situational frame (gain frame vs loss frame).
Then, we set up a laboratory setting where recruited participants performed a probabilistic version of under the cup dice task paradigm.
Results indicated that uncertainty avoidance did not play a significant role within outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the gain frame.
To conclude, people did not cheat as much as we expected.
Limitations
In the present study, several limitations might be affected the results.
The first limitation is related to the sample size. We first fixed the sample size at 120 participants but we later decided to expand it to 150 to get a higher effect. To test the role of the sample size, a new, larger one should be recommended.
The second possible limitation concerns the role of social desirability. It would be possible that this factor might influenced the total amount of cheating behavior performed.
Dalton and Ortegren (2011) hypothesized a relation between social desirability and gender. Specifically, the gender socialization theory supports the idea that females are more prone to experience the social desirability response bias (Chung and Monroe, 2003). As main consequences of gender socialization process, women would be more concerned for the other wellbeing and would be more inclined to follow the societal norms to respond in a socially desirable way. (Barnett et al.1996; Chung and Monroe, 2003). On the other hand, Smith and Oakley (1997) found that both men and women
21 responded in a similar way to ethical tasks which involves rules violations, such as cheating paradigm. Since our sample was composed mainly by women, the role of socialization might be influenced the results.
The third possible limitation concerns how culture affects cheating behaviors in specific contexts. Our sample was mixed. We already review how culture can influence the amount of cheating behaviors in specific context situations. Also, the general tendencies toward dishonesty can be described in terms of personality traits (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). We asked participants to complete a filler questionnaire and we did not assess the individual levels of dishonesty as well as the cultural internalization of dishonest act in specific context situations.
Suggestions for future research
To test again the hypotheses, we suggest new possible scenarios.
First, a new higher sample size should be recommended. Since the under the dice cup paradigm has a high construct validity, we can keep the used experimental setting. Second, we should analyze the role of gender variable within the outcome distribution uncertainty. The effect of social desirability might interact with the extrinsic attribution and the uncertainty avoidance. Furthermore, we can also introduce a new under the dice version of the dice under the cup version to reduce the interaction between the experimenter and each participant. In the study conducted by Mann et al. (2016), they run an adopted version of the die under the cup task developed by Jiang (2013). In this version, the die task is performed through an I-pad and consist in rolling a virtual die over repeated trials. In each trial, participants were invited to choose a side of the die and then they were invited to remember their choice. Then, they were instructed to roll the die and
22 at the end of the die roll they should indicated what was the side they previously choose. Then participants are free to cheat indicated a different side of the die and gain the highest advantage. In fact, in this version the money outcome is proportional to the number of dots on the die side.
Third we should asses the role of individual differences. In the current study, before starting the task, we asked to each participant to fill in a filler questionnaire. Instead of a questionnaire, we should consider new assessments, such as the role of individual differences. That might be another explanation for the unexpected results.
Halvey et al. (2014) assessed the relationship between the individual’s self-reported dishonesty and their actual dishonest behaviors. Specifically, in the Study 1 (Halvey, 2014), they administered a lying frequency questionnaire (Serota et al., 2010) to each participant. The questionnaire did not have a high internal consistency, but due to the questionnaire nature, high internal consistency was not necessary.
Lastly, we should assess if the internalized corruption, which as stated, influences context-specific cheating. Specifically, we could run a 10 to 15 minutes survey immediately before the experiment. This survey has already been adopted in the Mann et al (2016) and in the Garcia-Rada (2016) studies. In the survey, participants filled in how much they were likely to engage in dishonest behaviors in several life domains. They gathered information regarding the demographics of interest, such as age, gender, ethnic minority, annual earnings, religiosity levels and lack of trust.
Since the individual levels of uncertainty avoidance seems to play a role within the frame, the development of a measure if the individual uncertainty avoidance level should be recommended.
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34 Appendix A
Gain Frame Informed Consent Form
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!
In this experiment, you can win six Euro. Whether you win, will depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you
draw a yellow ball, you win € 6. If you draw a white ball, you win nothing. Before the
ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire.
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated
confidentially.
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. Leiden, __________________
Loss Frame Informed Consent Form
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!
In this experiment, you get six Euro in cash. Whether you may keep this money, however, will depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you may keep the € 6. If you
draw a white ball, you lose the money. Before the ball draw you will first fill in a
questionnaire.
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated
confidentially. You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please
contact dr. W. Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. Leiden, __________________
35 Appendix B
Filler questionnaire
Experiment: Uncertain Events
Participant number: _____________
Please give us the following information about yourself
I am a □ Man □ Woman
□ Different or I don’t want to tell I am ________ years old.
How often have you participated in similar experiments at the Faculty of Social Sciences? □ Never: This is my first time
□ Once before: This is the second experiment i participate in □ Twice before: This is the third experiment i participate in
□ Three times before: This is the fourth experiment i participate in □ I have been participating in more than three experiments before
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly
strongly
disagree agree
A job is what you make of it. 1 2 3 4 5 6
On most jobs, people can pretty much accomplish whatever they set out to
accomplish. 1 2 3 4 5 6
If you know what you want out of a job, you can find a job that gives it to
you. 1 2 3 4 5 6
If employees are unhappy with a decision made by their boss, they should
do something about it. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of luck. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Making money is primarily a matter of good fortune. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Most people are capable of doing their jobs well if they make the effort. 1 2 3 4 5 6 In order to get a really good job you need to have family members or
friends in high places. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Promotions are usually a matter of good fortune. 1 2 3 4 5 6 When it comes to landing a really good job, who you know is more
important than what you know. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Promotions are given to employees who perform well on the job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 To make a lot of money you have to know the right people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 It takes a lot of luck to be an outstanding employee on most jobs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 People who perform their jobs well generally get rewarded for it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Most employees have more influence on their supervisors than they think 1 2 3 4 5 6
36 they do.
The main difference between people who make a lot of money and people
who make a little money is luck. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Please turn over.
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly
strongly
disagree agree
I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. 1 2 3 4 5 People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. 1 2 3 4 5 Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. 1 2 3 4 5 People have complete control over the decisions they make. 1 2 3 4 5 No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. 1 2 3 4 5 Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 No one can predict what will happen in this world. 1 2 3 4 5 People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. 1 2 3 4 5
Fate already has a plan for everyone. 1 2 3 4 5
Your genes determine your future. 1 2 3 4 5
Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 1 2 3 4 5 People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. 1 2 3 4 5 Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. 1 2 3 4 5 Science has shown how your past environment created your current
intelligence and personality. 1 2 3 4 5
People are unpredictable. 1 2 3 4 5
Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. 1 2 3 4 5 Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. 1 2 3 4 5 As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. 1 2 3 4 5 Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. 1 2 3 4 5
Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. 1 2 3 4 5
People have complete free will. 1 2 3 4 5
Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. 1 2 3 4 5 People are always at fault for their bad behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. 1 2 3 4 5 What happens to people is a matter of chance. 1 2 3 4 5 Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. 1 2 3 4 5
People’s futures cannot be predicted. 1 2 3 4 5
When I am in conflict with someone else, the BEST outcome for me occurs when:
37
□ We both behave cooperatively. □
When I am in conflict with someone else, the WORST outcome for me occurs when:
□ I behave cooperatively and they behave competitively. □
38 Appendix C
Instructions and decision sheet: gain frame in English
Instructions Please read the instructions entirely and carefully.
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately.
General framework of the experiment
In this experiment, you can win a prize of €6. There will be 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, which are placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which determines whether you win €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you win €6; if the ball you draw is white you win nothing. At the beginning of the experiment, there are 6 white balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll.
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice).
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the dice is legitimate.
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a “decision sheet” as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick on the “decision sheet” the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you receive €6 and sign for receiving the money. If the ball you draw is white you will receive no money.
39 Decision sheet Number displayed by the dice Number of yellow balls Number of white balls
Prize (if a yellow ball is drawn)
Tick the number rolled (X) 1 1 5 €6 2 2 4 €6 3 3 3 €6 4 4 2 €6 5 5 1 €6 6 6 0 €6
40 Instruction and decision sheet gain in dutch
Instructies Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je
vragen hebt kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden. Experiment
Tijdens dit experiment kan je €6 winnen. Er zullen 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur deze heeft. Als de bal geel is win je €6; als de bal wit is win je niks. Aan het begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen.
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken.
41 Beslissingstabel
Aantal ogen op de dobbelsteen
Aantal gele ballen Aantal witte
ballen
Als je een gele bal pakt win je:
Kruis het aantal ogen aan (X) 1 1 5 €6 2 2 4 €6 3 3 3 €6 4 4 2 €6 5 5 1 €6 6 6 0 -€6
42 Appendix D
Instruction and decision sheet: loss frame in English
Instructions Please read the instructions entirely and carefully.
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately.
General framework of the experiment
You just received €6 which is now yours. In this experiment 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you may keep your €6; if the ball you draw is white you lose your money and you need to hand in your €6. At the beginning of the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll.
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice).
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the dice is legitimate.
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a "decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you keep your €6 and sign for the money. If the ball you draw is white you will have to give your €6 to the experimenter.
