Bachelorthesis Internationale Betrekkingen & Organisaties
Universiteit Leiden
From Bullets to Ballots
A study on post-coup elections
Sacha Oosterloo, s1821970
Leiden, 17-6-2019
8036 words
Supervisor: Dr. K. Köhler
1
Table of Contents
Introduction
2
Research Design
3
Research question 3
Theoretical framework: the median voter argument 4
Hypotheses 5
Comparative case study: Thailand and Egypt 6
Literature Review
7
Military coups and democratization 7 Military coups and democratization in Thailand 9 Military coups and democratization in Egypt 10
Case Analysis
11
Thailand
Historical background and the pre-coup status quo 11 The rural majority vs. the urban elite 13
The post-coup elections 14
Egypt
Historical background and the pre-coup status quo 14
Islamists vs. secularists 17
The post-coup elections 20
Conclusion
20
Bibliography
23
2
Introduction
On the 18th of February 2010, Nigerian military troops stormed the presidential palace of President Tandja, arrested him and took over power (Derpanopolous, Frantz, Geddes, & Wright, 2016). The former president was elected through free, competitive elections but turned Nigeria into an authoritarian regime over time. The coup plotters declared that they would strive for a restoration of democracy and consequently they held free, fair and competitive elections in the beginning of 2011 (Derpanopolous, Frantz, Geddes, & Wright, 2016, p. 1). The first steps towards democracy were imposed.
This, however, is certainly not always the case. In Thailand, for example, it took five years until elections were held after the military coup of 2014. Military coups are considered to be anti-democratic (Keating, 2013). They are “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell & Thyne, 2011, p. 252). Wright, Geddes, Frantz and Derpanopolous (2016) even argued that the majority of coups which took place since the beginning of the Cold War initiated authoritarian regimes.
This thesis wants to examine the relationship between military coups and competitive elections. When studying literature on military coups and competitive elections, it seems standard procedure for military regimes to hold elections. The time frame between the coup and the elections, however, differs per case. With this thesis I aim to examine why some militaries hold elections right after launching a coup whilst other militaries refuse to return to the barracks after restoring order.
First, I will outline the design and theoretical framework on which this research is based. Then, a literature review will give a summary of all relevant research of scholars who already examined the relation between military coups, democratization and competitive elections. An analysis of the cases being used for this thesis will follow, focusing on the cases of military coups in Thailand in 2014 and Egypt in 2011. Finally, I will summarize my
findings and make a conclusion based on them. Implications and recommendations can also be found in this last part of the thesis.
3
Research Design
Research question
Generally, military coups are seen as the antithesis of the democratic process (Keating, 2013). This is because when committing a military coup, the military uses weapons instead of ballot boxes in order to gain and obtain political power (Keating, 2013). Some scholars, however, state that military coups can actually lead to democratization. I am curious to find out whether the process of democratization can be achieved through initiating a military coup. However, the concept of democracy is rather broad and needs certain limitations in view of this thesis.
A democracy is one of many methods of political organization (Schumpeter, 1942). Briefly, it is a political system in which citizens choose their government through free and fair elections. According to Schumpeter (1942), democracy means nothing more than that it provides citizens with the power to accept or refuse their rulers by means of the holding of competitive elections. More extensive, a democracy can be seen as a system in which political parties compete for power through elections. Competitive elections, therefore, can be seen as an indicator for democracy (Hilla University for Humanistic Studies, 2004). Because looking in the complex relation between military coups and democratization exceeds the framework of a concise bachelor thesis, this study will focus on the aforementioned competitive elections defined by Schumpeter (1942).The research question of this thesis will therefore be the following: ‘to what extent do post hoc competitive elections happen despite military coups in the era after the Cold War?’.
As previously mentioned, military coups are unlawful attempts by the military or other powers to eliminate the executive (Powell & Thyne, 2011, p. 252). When the military decides to commit a coup, it generally does so because it feels a need for change (Marinov &
Goemans, 2014, p. 803). It is relevant to look into the relation between military coups and competitive elections because it can show us when military coups, although defined as anti-democratic, can form a first step towards building a strong democratic state. Furthermore, this thesis will focus on the post-cold war era because scholars concluded that the ‘consequences of coups may have changed since the end of the Cold War’ (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 2). Scholars assume that this change is among other things related to the redefined international power relations after the Cold War and the pressure that this could generate on individual
4 states. In order to compare military coups as precisely as possible, this study will therefore solely look at coups committed since 1991.
Theoretical framework: the median voter argument
Looking back in history, most military coups were not followed by competitive elections during the first five years following the coup (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 800). One can, however, see a change since the end of the cold war. According to Marinov and Goemans (2014, p. 800), most coups committed since 1991 were actually followed by elections after a relatively short amount of time.
Debating whether and under what circumstances militaries will hold elections after committing a coup, Marinov and Goemans (2014) stated that this depends on the preferences of the median voter. Moreover, they explain that whether military coups may lead to
democracy and competitive elections or not, actually depends on the relationship between (a) the pre-coup policy, (b) the ‘ideal’ post-coup policy and (c) the outcomes of policy which elections would create, in other words: the outcomes of policy when the median voter decides.
The median voter can be seen as the voting citizen that sits exactly in the middle of the public opinion (Cowen, 2010). Simplified, the median voter is literally the preference of the voter in the midpoint of all voters’ preferences. Comparing this to the theory of Marinov and Goemans (2014), it implies that when the median voter prefers the pre-coup status quo policy, a military coup will most likely result in a durable military regime. Coups, as noted earlier, are initiated because of a need for change. In the case of the former example, holding elections right after the coup will only lead to the same policies of the pre-coup status quo. For example, when Franco staged a military coup in Spain back in 1936 as a reaction to the socialist electoral success of that very same year the military was not holding elections after the coup because that would only ‘produce the same ‘radical’ left-wing policy outcome’ (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 803). When elections would re-create the pre-coup status quo, Marinov and Goemans (2014) argue that chances of competitive elections, and therefore democratization, will be rather low. This, in a nutshell, is called the median voter argument.
Marinov and Goemans (2014) define ‘guardian coups’ as coups in which the ‘pre-coup status quo policy outcome moves away from the preferences of the median voter’ (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 803). The military takes away the power from a corrupt government and
5 promises to hold elections as soon as the system is reformed (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). Guardian coups, therefore, are assumed to result in post-coup elections.
At last, Marinov and Goemans (2014, p. 803) point out that according to the median
voter argument potential coup plotters with policy preferences which significantly differ from
the median voters’ preferences should be less likely to launch coups. This is because
international pressure will most likely make sure that post-coup elections are held. In such a case, elections will only result in policies unfavorable for the coup plotters (Marinov & Goemans, 2014).
Hypotheses
With the median voter argument in mind, the main argument of this thesis will be that competitive elections can happen despite military coups, and therefore the first steps towards democracy can be made, when the general political preferences of a states’ civilians are different from the policy preferences of the pre-coup regime. I hereby mean that coups will only contribute to competitive elections if the civilians themselves are in for political change or reform (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). When the political preferences of the civilians are in line with the political preferences of the pre-coup status quo government, this thesis assumes that a military coup will not contribute to the holding of competitive elections. Moreover, Marinov and Goemans (2014) even pointed out that when the preferences of the pre-coup status quo and the median voter are in line, coups will most certainly not be committed. This results in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: when the pre-coup status quo policy preferences do not match the political preferences of the median voter, chances of competitive elections after a military coup increase.
Hypothesis 1.1: when the political preferences of the median voter differ from the military coup plotters’ political preferences, the military will try to push elections as far as possible despite international pressure.
The independent variable of this thesis can be described as the distance between the preferences of the median voter and the pre-coup status quo policy. Competitive elections can be identified as the dependent variable. This thesis, therefore, is going to examine the impact of preference distributions on the likelihood of elections after military coups.
6
Comparative case study: Thailand and Egypt
To test the hypotheses, this thesis will be constructed as a comparative case study using a Most Similar Systems Design. In a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) cases are compared which are as similar as possible except for one phenomenon. The cases this study will
examine in order to find out to what extent competitive elections do happen despite military coups will be the case of Thailand after the coup of 2014 and the case of Egypt after the coup of 2011. Both of these states have always had a strong military, they both have experienced national instability and uprisings and most importantly they both have dealt with military coups which were eventually followed by elections. The two cases, however, do differ in the period of time between the military coup and the post-coup elections. It took Thailand nearly five years to hold elections after the military coup of 2014 (Laarhoven, 2018). In Egypt, on the other hand, elections were held the very same year the coup was committed (Childress, 2013).
By looking at the differences or similarities in preferences of the median voter and the preferences of the pre-coup status quo policy, it might turn out why it took Thailand so long to hold elections after the military coup of 2014 in contrast to the Egyptian case, were
elections were held the very same year. In order to gather data on median voters’ preferences this thesis will examine the levels of polarization within Egypt and Thailand because
polarization is an indicator of the policy distance between two political alternatives. When this distance is large, the losing camp will pay a relatively high price. The position of the median voter therefore depends on the relative sizes of the two polarized camps and can be determined through the levels of polarization within a country.
When it comes to Thailand, the focus in terms of polarization will lie on the divide between the urban and the rural classes. This is because the rural segment of the Thai civil society has a general feeling of being left out of the political system which causes friction and polarization with the opposed urban segment (Larocco, 2011). In the case of Egypt the focus will be on polarization related to the level of religion. Egypt, being the country with the largest amount of Christians within the Middle East, is an Islamic country. Polarization originated when citizens started to discuss the role of religion in relation to politics (Al-Khateeb, 2014). A deep divide took shape between so-called ‘Islamists’, who pursued a political role for religion within the Egyptian government, and the secularists who wanted to
7 keep religion and politics separated. This divide eventually escalated in deep religious
polarization within Egypt.
Literature Review
On the basis of this review I hope to create an overview of all relevant literature on the subject of this thesis in order to sketch out the theoretical background of this study as clearly as possible. First, this review will outline some approaches on the relation between military coups and democratization. Thereafter, this review presents relevant literature related to the cases of Thailand and Egypt.
Military coups and democratization
Thyne and Powell (2016) have investigated the impact of military coups on democratization. They argue that coups may lead to so-called ‘shocks’ which will open a ‘window of
opportunity for the promotion of democracy’ (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 194). A shock is seen by them as a change of the status quo of a state. Eventually, they argue that military coups in authoritarian regimes may move these regimes into the process of democratization.
Discussing when coups generally arise, Thyne and Powell (2016) assume that coups occur when the plotters behind the coup want to create economic prosperity and political legitimacy (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 196). Moving towards a higher level of democracy most likely will improve a states’ economic conditions and would therefore be attractive for coup plotters who aim to create economic prosperity. Moreover, Thyne and Powell (2016) state that coup leaders do not want to be overthrown themselves and therefore they will invest in political legitimacy, for example by holding competitive elections. However, their research solely focuses on the aforementioned shocks which lead to initial transitions to full
democracies (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 194). They do not just look at the holding of elections because they argue that ‘the anticoup norms adopted following the Cold War, though
successful in promoting elections, have undermined the influence of coups on democratization’ (Thyne & Powell, 2016, p. 194).
Marinov and Goemans (2014), however, do look especially at the relation between military coups and competitive elections. When looking back in history, Marinov and Goemans note that most coups committed before the end of the Cold War were not
8 than 5 years to hold elections after a military coup (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 800). Yet they note that, since 1991, that most coups committed were actually followed by elections.
As aforementioned, Marinov and Goemans (2014) explain that whether military coups lead to democracy and competitive elections depends on the relationship between (a) the pre-coup policy, (b) the ‘ideal’ post-pre-coup policy and (c) the outcomes of policy which elections would create. This means that when the median voter prefers the pre-coup status quo policy, a military coup will most likely result in a durable military regime (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). Generally, coups occur because of a need for change. In the case of the former example, according to Marinov and Goemans (2014), holding elections right after the coup will only lead to the same policies of the pre-coup status quo. When elections would re-create the pre-coup status quo, Marinov and Goemans (2014) argue that chances of competitive elections, and therefore democratization, will be rather low. The hypothesis and theoretical framework of this thesis is based on this theory of Marinov and Goemans, called the Median
Voter Argument.
There are, however, more circumstances contributing to the fact whether or not competitive elections are held after military coups according to Marinov and Goemans (2014). They note that the existence of democratic political institutions can be important because these institutions generate common norms and expectations amongst citizens. When a coup is committed in a country with these institutions, the population expects the coup
plotters to return to the barracks as soon as they have replaced the former ‘mismanaging’ government (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). Seizing power in a state with democratic institutions would then only create general dissatisfaction, which would disqualify the military. Lastly, it will depend on the rest of the world. With the West promoting democracy and free elections, countries that depend on Western aid tend to be more likely to hold elections after a military coup. However, this result is only applicable to post-Cold War coups. Countries can try and isolate themselves from foreign pressure, but when dealing with precarious domestic situations, foreign pressure may eventually undermine citizens domestic confidence (Marinov & Goemans, 2014).
At the same time, there still are some scholars who argue that there actually is no robust relation between military coups and organizing free and fair democratic elections. For example, Wright, Geddes, Frantz and Derpanopolous (2016) concluded that overall coups in
9 authoritarian regimes lead to a lot of bloodshed and military dictatorships, but unfortunately not to democratic transitions.
Military coups and democratization in Thailand
Sopranzetti (2016) investigated the relation between competitive elections and military coups in Thailand. He explains that just before both the coups of 2006 and 2014 so-called snap elections were held. During these pre-coup period Thailand was plagued by protests. The main goal of these snap elections was to check if the elections would confirm popular support for the prime minister of that time, and to shut down the protests (Sopranzetti, 2016).
Although, in 2014, prime minister Yingluck won the elections again amidst violence by the opposition, the vote was nullified by the constitutional court and Thailand lacked an elected government. The army commander in chief declared martial law and tried to host negotiations between the two main political parties and the two main social movements (Sopranzetti, 2016). On the second day of the negotiation process, however, he declared, “I am sorry. I must seize power.” (Sopranzetti, 2016, p. 299). At that very moment, the army commander in chief, Prayuth Chan-Ocha, had successfully staged the twelfth military coup in Thailand since 1932.
Furthermore, Sopranzetti (2016) argues that after the 2014 coup, people assumed that the aftermath of the coup would be the same as the aftermath of the coup of 2006. This entails a military junta which only has power for a short period of time, followed by an interim government ruled by some general or another high placed figure within Thai society,
thereafter a new constitution would be declared which would give more power to independent political institutions to eventually result in competitive elections. This process, supposedly, would not take more than a year (Sopranzetti, 2016, p. 300). This, however, did not happen. Centralized power and repression, on the other hand, did. Sopranzetti (2016) argued that a radical diversion had occurred from the post-2006 coup and noted an overall change in the behavior of the Thai army in the former decades. He states that this, among other things, depends on ‘the new administrative structure directed by military officers rather than elected politicians’ and on ‘the establishment of a new class alliance between traditional elites, military forces, and urban middle class’ (Sopranzetti, 2016, p. 300). Sopranzetti (2016)
10 eventually concludes that after the coup of 2014, Thai politics changed into dictatorial
structures and class alliances which are military-led.
In his research on the 2014 military coup in Thailand McCargo (2015) argues that it was the goal of the Thai military to depoliticize Thai life. This was because the Thai military harbored a deep distrust against all elected politicians (McCargo, 2015). Moreover, according to McCargo, the Thai military saw no other solution than to stage a repressing coup in order to dissent all disputing voices, polarized by the country’s deep seated conflicts (McCargo, 2015, p. 352). However, McCargo (2015) concludes, trying to depoliticize Thailand lays beyond the impossible.
Military coups and democratization in Egypt
Hoyle (2019) investigated post-coup military behavior in Egypt. He explains that after the military removed president Mubarak from office by staging a military coup in January 2011, the armed forces controlled government until the end of June 2012 when Egypt held its first presidential elections which were free and fair(Hoyle, 2019). Hoyle (2019) points out that the Egyptian officers did not try to obstruct the transition to competitive elections. Why did the military let elections happen? According to his research, Hoyle (2019) argues that the political, bureaucratic and economic interests of the military do matter. In 2011 this meant that in order to maximize their material and immaterial resources (corporate position) while keeping the risks minimized it was in the military’s interest to allow for a transition to civilian rule (Hoyle, 2019).
Karawan (2011) argues that the Egyptian army really craved for stability in 2011. It wanted to provide national unity. He also found that after the military obtained the power to rule from former president Hosni Mubarak and declared to hold elections after six months of ruling the country, the people of Egypt wanted the military to actually stay in power for a longer period of time (Karawan, 2011). The people, namely, argued that chances of a transition towards a stable democracy would increase if the military did stay in power for a longer period of time.
11
Case Analysis
On the basis of the median voter argument this thesis will now thoroughly examine the pre-coup status quo, the pre-coups committed and the post-pre-coup elections in both Thailand and Egypt. The median voter argument, as aforementioned, argues that when post-coup elections would re-create the pre-coup status quo, chances of competitive elections, and therefore
democratization, will be rather low (Marinov & Goemans, 2014, p. 803).
Thailand
Historical background and the pre-coup status quo
Thailand has known 18 different constitutions and has seen 12 governments unseated through military coups since the year of 1932 (Engvall, 2010). The citizens of Thailand, thus, are used to political instability. But for a very long time, politics in Thailand was something for
Bangkok’s elite. This meant that the majority of the people did not interfere nor participate in Thai politics. Military coups, therefore, overall did not evoke reactions from the majority of citizens (Engvall, 2010). The elections following these coups produced weak coalition governments because of the clientelist bonds between voters and politicians, which also limited electoral competition (Engvall, 2010).
This, however, changed in the 1970s and 1980s due to economic development
(Engvall, 2010). During this time the rising urban middle class called for democratic reforms and for more participation in politics. Periods of democratic reforms alternated with periods of reversal but when the military suppressed demonstrations in Thailand’s capital with a lot of violence in 1992, its claim to political influence was severely weakened (Engvall, 2010). Moreover, when the Asian Financial Crisis broke out in 1997, people lost their faith in the business elite and politicians leading the Thai economy and society. The new constitution of 1997 therefore strengthened civil rights and encouraged political participation. All seats of the Senate were opened for electoral competition (Engvall, 2010, p. 57). However, there were limitations on the rights of rural citizens. Only less than 5 percent of the adults living in rural areas were in possession of a higher education bachelor’s degree and the new constitution stated that in order to be qualified to take a seat in the parliament, one should have a
bachelor’s degree (Engvall, 2010). This law excluded over more than 95 percent of citizens living in the rural areas of Thailand from running for office.
12 The first elections after the adoption of the new constitution of 1997 resulted in the election of Thaksin Shinawatra as the new prime minister, who had previously worked for the police while also making a fortune through telecom licenses. His party, the Thai Rak Thai, was mainly based on business principles and implemented policies like a universal health care program, micro-credit funding and a lot of bureaucratic reforms (Engvall, 2010, p. 57). At the same time, people blamed Shinawatra for suppressing the media and independent institutions and challenging royal control while using his position as prime minister in order to benefit the Shinawatra business empire.
Eventually, massive demonstrations were held against Shinawatra by the so-called ‘yellow- shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy’ (Engvall, 2010, p. 58). The overall political instability which followed these demonstrations paved the way for a new military coup in 2006. The urban establishment, being anti-Thaksin, supported the coup. The Junta used its newly obtained power to make sure that Thaksin and his supporters could not regain their power and thereby weakened the position of the provinces. A new constitution was drafted which, among other things, introduced a new electoral system. Because of this new system fractionalization increased among political parties. This meant that parties started to dissolve, and they split up in individual, smaller parties. Eventually, this resulted in 66 political parties registering themselves at the Election Commission for the elections of 2007 (Croissant & Lorenz, 2017). The purpose of this fractionalization was to break up and oust the Thai Rak Thai (TRT). The TRT, therefore, was split up but this did not mean that it lost its supporters. The Peoples Power Party from now on was formed to be a proxy of the TRT and got almost 50 percent of the votes after the 2007 elections showing that there still was massive support for Thaksin (Engvall, 2010). A division between the North and the South manifested itself, in which the northern parts of Thailand supported Thaksin and the southern parts and Bangkok supported the ‘Democrats’.
The military, being unsatisfied with the outcomes of the 2007 elections, eventually made a deal with the pro-establishment Democrat Party through which the Democrats took office (Engvall, 2010). Pro-Thaksin citizens started to participate in demonstrations under the name of ‘the red-shirted United Democratic front against Dictatorship’ (Engvall, 2010, p. 59). Eventually in 2011, Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, got elected as the new prime minister of Thailand (Shoichet, 2014). Her proposed policies, after some time, paved the way for a new wave of massive protests by the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts’ which mainly consisted of the urban elite and the middle class. Both of these groups wanted the Thaksin family to
13 leave Thai politics for good (Shoichet, 2014). The Constitutional Court eventually removed Yingluck from office, accusing her of violating the Constitution. The pro-Thaksin ‘Red Shirts’ saw this removal as a so-called ‘judicial coup’ and started protesting and
demonstrating again.
So, on the 22nd of May 2014, the Thai military once again launched a coup. General Prayuth Chan-ocha stated that the coup was necessary in order to bring back normality and stability to the country (Hodal, 2014). Moreover, he stated that the military would reform Thai politics, economy and society. The Red Shirts, demonstrating against the coup, were calling for retaliation but eventually they were driven away by air shots of Thai soldiers (Hodal, 2014).
The rural majority vs. the urban elite
Looking back on politics in the last three decades in Thailand, a clear divide can be seen between the rural majority and the elite urban class: the countryside versus the city (McCargo, 2017).This is not only a cleavage in class, but also a regional cleavage. The rural majority mainly lives in the Northern parts of Thailand whilst the urban class mainly lives in the South. As soon as the rural majority, through Thaksin’s policies, got influence and introduced
welfare policies, urban tax payers started to oppose this. This eventually resulted in policy driven polarization and escalated in major political instability including a coup, repression and massive protests (Engvall, 2010). The urban middle class, after all, was outnumbered to such an extent that it had no chance of being able to elect a government with matching preferences (McCargo, 2017).
When the majority of the electorate, the rural class, voted for the pro-Thaksin parties, the pro-establishment urban class opposed this and started demonstrating. This, eventually, resulted in coups in 2006 and in 2014. According to the median voter argument, post-coup elections after the 2014 coup seem very unlikely because elections would have the same outcome of the post-coup elections of 2006: the so-called Red Shirts, the rural class, the majority of the Thai society, would most likely win (Engvall, 2010). Moreover, the median
voter argument argues that when the preferences of the median voter align with the
preferences of the pre-coup status quo, elections after a coup will most likely not happen. The pre-coup status quo of 2014, before Yingluck was removed from office, was the same as the median voter preference, namely that of the rural voter. Post-coup elections therefore seemed very unlikely in the Thai case.
14
The post-coup elections
Although the Thai military kept promising that elections would be held as soon as the stability returned, it seemed to be hard for them to let their power go (Ellis-Petersen, 2019). The Thai armed forces faced international pressure, but they succeeded in limiting this pressure by misleading the international community (Klaas, 2018). By promising the protection of human rights and the fast return to organizing elections, the Thai military could satisfy the
international community and ensure a situation of limited interference. Eventually, in March 2019, Thailand finally held elections. These national elections were the first over the last eight years, if you do not count the invalid elections of 2014. However, these elections took place under junta oversight.
Refusing to hand over its power to a civilian-led, democratic government, the military tried to retain its political influence through the setting up of proxy parties that, on behalf of the military, stated that they wanted General Prayut Chan-ocha to stay as the elected prime minister (Ellis-Petersen, 2019). But these proxy parties are not the only reason it was easy for the military to keep on influencing Thai politics; the newly drawn constitution of 2016 stated that the Junta from then on should be responsible for the appointment of all 250 members of the Senate. The Senate, in Thailand, has a big say in who becomes the prime minister (Ellis-Petersen, 2019).
All in all, it took polarized Thailand almost five long years to hold elections after the military coup of 2014. And although elections were held in March 2019, these were heavily controlled by the military.
Egypt
Historical background and the pre-coup status quo
Egypt has a long history of military interference within its society. Ever since the military coup of 1952, the armed forces became one of the main institutional pillars of the new regime (Holmes & Koehler, 2018, p. 5). Eventually, this resulted in the fact that every single
president in charge from the 1952 coup to the beginning of the Arab Spring was a military officer.
15 When the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by radical Islamists in 1981, Hosni Mubarak, being Sadat’s vice-president, took over the position of the Head of State (BBC, 2017). During his entire rule Mubarak kept Egypt under the so-called emergency law which he renewed every two years (Auf, 2018). Through this emergency law the freedom of expression and the freedom of political activity were ultimately restricted (BBC, 2019). Not only could the emergency law restrict civil rights, it also extended the executive powers of government. In order to justify his persistent ruling of Egypt under the emergency law, Mubarak stated that this was necessary in order to counter Islamist terrorism. The restriction of basic freedoms would, through the years, fuel a desire for regime change amongst the Egyptian people (Auf, 2018).
Mass demonstrations broke out in several Arab countries in 2010. These
demonstrations started because of deep resentment among the people of those countries with regard to the political repression, corruption and of course the poverty which raged with different levels of intensity through all these different countries (John M. Cunningham). Eventually, these demonstrations would be referred to as the Arab Spring. Throughout the Arab Spring, the militaries of the countries facing uprisings were confronted with the question whether to defect or to defend the regimes they served. After all, the military has the means to repress uprisings: to repress an uprising, the military ‘just’ has to incapacitate its protesters. Overall this meant that as soon as the citizens of a certain state started to rebel, the military had the power to decide whether or not it would help make or break regime change (Holmes & Koehler, 2018, p. 1).
One of the countries dealing with these mass demonstrations was Egypt. The popular uprising in this North African country, besides giving voice to common unease about poverty, unemployment and corruption, mostly focused protest on the rule of president Hosni Mubarak who, at the time, already was in power for more than three decades (Al Jazeera, 2011). The people protesting were mostly considered to belong to the secularist movement (Grewal, 2013). It all began on the 25th of January 2011. In Cairo’s main square, Tahrir Square, people were screaming for Mubaraks resignation. The government blamed the largest opposition party, the so-called Muslim Brotherhood, for causing the unrest. The Muslim Brotherhood eventually joined the forces of the protesting secularists (Grewal, 2013).
Meanwhile, Mubarak and his supporters tried to discourage the demonstrations by using severe violent tactics (John M. Cunningham). His police forces tried to suppress the
16 uprising by using clouds of tear gas on the Tahrir square, causing severe breathing problems amongst several protesters. Moreover, people could hear the sound of automatic weapons echoing through the streets of Cairo when the police tried to chase down hordes of protesters (Shenker, 2011). So, people protesting for freedom and democracy were treated violently by the Mubarak-supporting police forces.
During the first week of the mass protests, the military supported the violent
suppressing of the protests by the police (Holmes & Koehler, 2018). The violent suppressions of the police eventually resulted in approximately 1046 deaths over the course of 18 days. Many of these victims were killed during the first week of the protests. On the 28th of January, after one of the bloodiest days of the mass protests in Cairo, the military deployed its troops around all government buildings in the center of Egypt’s capital (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011). Police forces apparently had withdrawn from their tasks whilst the headquarters of the country’s ruling political party, the National Democratic Party, was harassed by protesters. Consequently, after the police forces quit the scene, the military took control over the civilian political institutions under the command of Mubarak. After all Mubarak served as the army’s commander in chief since the civilian political institutions of Egypt broke down due to all the unrest (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 15).
The Egyptians claiming freedom and democracy did not let themselves be chased away by the increased unrest and violence and kept on protesting throughout the whole country. On January 31st the military stated that it would not use violence against protesters, since it regarded the protests as legitimate (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011). When pro-Mubarak protestors were approaching Tahrir Square on February the 2nd, an army officer tried to stop them and eventually fired some warning shots. After this incident, the army officer was embraced by the anti-Mubarak protestors on the square while they chanted that the army and the people were ‘one hand’ (Ketchley, 2017). These incidents suggest that the military had already considered to oust the president out of his function. One should, however, keep in mind that by then the military already knew that the balance of power was now in favor of the protesting citizens, because by now they occupied the public buildings, provided themselves with so-called ‘popular security’ and they practically defeated the police forces (Holmes & Koehler, 2018, pp. 9-10). The military also was not able to stop the pro-Mubarak protesters who killed a dozen of people at the sit-in on Tahrir square on the 2nd of February, despite their declaration of January the 31st (Holmes & Koehler, 2018, p. 10). Eventually on the 10th of
17 February, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which consisted of high-ranked military officers under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, met without their
commander in chief; the president who was formally still in charge (John M. Cunningham).
So, although the motives of the military remained slightly unclear, since the 10th of February, not only Mubarak but all military officers who served Egypt’s political regime were excluded from further meetings of the SCAF. The military, from then on, officially backed out everyone who had something to do with the ancient régime and took over the direct management of Egypt’s politics (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 16). After three weeks of mass protests Mubarak officially gave up his position as president of Egypt and left the country in the hands of the military (John M. Cunningham). The military, in the meantime, had sided with the Muslim Brotherhood (Grewal, 2013).
As soon as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces took the power to rule Egypt in February 2011, it suspended the constitution and dissolved both houses of Egypt’s parliament. Despite these anti-democratic actions, the military also immediately proclaimed that it would only remain in power for six months or until new elections could be held. In the new
constitution, the so-called Constitutional Proclamation of March 30, human liberties and civil rights were highlighted in several articles. Nevertheless, the new constitution also ‘legally established military rule through article 56, which allows the SCAF overwhelming executive and legislative powers’ (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p. 17). It also acknowledged the role of the military in overall politics. However, despite these specific anti-democratic measures, the armed forces kept on emphasizing that they would hand back power to a civilian elected government as soon as it seemed possible (John M. Cunningham).
Islamists vs. secularists
Through time, a divide occurred in Egypt between Islamists and Secularists (Alterman, 2013). This divide deepened through the decades and formed a major cause for the unrest which raged through Egypt in the past couple of years. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist political party ‘which began its life as a movement of the educated middle classes’ (Masoud, 2014, p. 6). It aspired the Egyptian politics to be influenced by the religion of Islam. Back in 2011, 95% of the Egyptian citizens was believed to be Muslim (Hackett, 2011). The
18 lines. During this timeframe, the Muslim Brotherhood attracted popular support. The secular opponents, on the other hand, had a bad reputation during Mubarak’s rule.
Egypt’s liberal parties are as easy to join as the political parties in the West. Therefore, it is easy for a secularist to join a political party. Becoming a full-fledged member of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, is a process which can take 5 to 8 years (Trager, 2011). From scratch citizens who want to become a member of the Brotherhood are closely watched by other members questioning their loyalty. The Muslim Brotherhood actively recruits new members. For example, they recruit at universities in order to attract young Islamist students for their organization. When recruiting, members first try to bond with potential members through non-political activities. When a relationship takes shape the Muslim Brother will involve the potential member in the Brotherhood’s ideology. Throughout their membership the so-called Brothers are being indoctrinated by the Brotherhood’s theocratic and anti-Western curriculum (Trager, 2011). Because of the active recruitment and the high amount of social control within this organization, its members are strongly committed to the
Brotherhood.
After the mass uprisings of January 2011 and the takeover of power by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces the military sided with the Muslim Brotherhood and called for early elections. These elections would have favored the Islamist movement of the Brotherhood, since the majority of people supported the Islamists (Grewal, 2013). This has several
explanations. First, as aforementioned, the Brotherhood is an Islamist organization and 95% of the Egyptian population is believed to be Muslim. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood supported a certain economic platform which appealed to different class lines within the Egyptian society. Another explanation is the fact that after the uprisings at Tahrir square all the other opposition groups got deeply divided. This resulted in a lot of still-forming parties in the months following the revolt and the Brotherhood being the organization with the biggest network and the most committed supporters (Trager, 2011). The only group that had a network almost as big as the one of the Brotherhood was the National Democratic Party, the party that ruled under Mubarak’s leadership in the decades before the coup. This party, however, was outlawed by the military in April 2011 (Trager, 2011).
By calling for the early elections the Muslim Brotherhood officially broke with the other opposition groups which were still trying to form political parties (Trager, 2011). Among these still-forming parties were the liberal secularists. However, the Supreme Council
19 all of a sudden started to stoke suspicion between the Islamists and secular parties in order to maintain its power. It set up new constitutional principles which served the military’s own interests. The Brotherhood, expecting to win if elections were held, saw these principles as a limitation for their upcoming power and influence. The newly imposed principles also called for human rights protection and other secularist values (Grewal, 2013). Secularists therefore supported the new constitutional principles whilst the Brotherhood opposed them. Both the call for early elections by the Brotherhood and the constitutional principles supported by the secularists therefore increased the polarization between these two groups.
In the period leading up to the first parliamentary elections of the post-Mubarak era in Egypt, secularists protested against the lasting military rule (Grewal, 2013). The Brotherhood refused to join these demonstrations and stayed loyal to the military. This, again, increased tension between both sides. In November 2011, secularists started throwing stones at policemen, soldiers and other law enforcement officers during these protests against the military rule. The armed forces reacted with violence, which led up to bloody confrontations between the military and the secularists (Ketchley, 2017). Meanwhile a senior Muslim Brother was seriously challenged by the secularists. They blamed him and his party ‘for selling out the Revolution for electoral gain’ (Ketchley, 2017, p. 2).
Summarizing, when the anti-Mubarak demonstrations broke out the Muslim Brotherhood sided with the secularists protesting against Mubarak’s regime. These demonstrations, eventually, resulted in a military coup. According to the median voter
argument, post-coup elections after the 2011 coup seem likely because the majority of people
supported the Muslim Brotherhood, that opposed the pre-coup status quo. Not only had the Brotherhood sided with the armed forces during and after the demonstrations, but the
organization had also attracted many supporters during Mubarak’s rule as well as in the post-Mubarak era. The median voter argument argues that when the preferences of the median voter, which in this case consist of the preferences of the Muslim Brotherhood, differ from the pre-coup status quo (the preferences of the Mubarak regime), post-coup elections are likely to happen.
20
The post-coup elections
When the masses of Egypt started to protest against the long-lasting domination of Hosni Mubarak, they made place for the rise of Islamist hegemony (Masoud, 2014). In all Arab Spring countries, Islamists captured pluralities of votes.
President Hosni Mubarak resigned from office on the 11th of February 2011 (Al
Jazeera, 2011). When power was taken over by the military on February the 12th, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces declared that elections would be held as soon as possible. In the months following the military coup protests were held because the public opinion started to oppose the slow pace towards new democratic elections (BBC, 2019). Islamists, however, kept their distance from the turmoil. Eventually, parliamentary elections were held in November 2011 and in January 2012 it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists, had won the elections. In June 2012, presidential elections were held and Mohammed Morsi, a candidate of the Brotherhood, was installed as president of Egypt.
All in all, it took Egypt from February 2011 to November 2011 to hold elections after the resignation of president Mubarak and the takeover of power by the military.
Conclusion
Examining the levels of polarization in both Thailand as Egypt, one can argue that both states were deeply polarized. In Thailand a divide existed between the urban and the rural class, in which the rural class deeply supported the pre-coup status quo. Given the fact that the majority of people voted for the rural class, according to the hypothesis of this study post-coup elections would be unlikely. This proved to be true. It took almost 5 years for elections to happen in Thailand. In the meantime the international community did try to influence the armed forces into holding elections, but the Thai military was able to limit the foreign interference by the promise of holding elections soon. In Egypt a massive divide between Islamists and secularists caused a lot of national unrest. The majority of citizens sided with the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Given the fact that the Brotherhood opposed the pre-coup regime and sided with the military during and after the coup, according to the hypothesis of this study, post-coup elections would be likely. This also proved to be the truth. It took the military less than a year to hold parliamentary elections after the coup.
21 Looking at the outcome of this thesis the conclusion is that when the pre-coup status quo policy preferences do not match the political preferences of the median voter, chances of competitive elections after a military coup increase. This also seems to work the other way around: when the political preferences of the median voter differ from the military coup plotters’ political preferences, the military will try to push elections as far ahead as possible, despite international pressure. Thus, the question to which extent competitive elections happen despite military coups in the post-cold war era depends on the preferences of the median voter. If the median voter’s preferences differ from the preferences of the pre-coup status quo policy makers, competitive elections are very likely to happen despite the military coup. However, if the median voter’s preferences are in line with the preferences of the pre-coup status quo policy makers, pre-pre-coup elections will be unlikely and the timeframe between the coup and the post hoc elections will be large.
Still, this thesis recommends further research into the relation between military coups, competitive elections and democracy. Military coups still take place and their huge
implications should always be accurately investigated.
In April 2019 the military of Sudan staged a coup and removed President al-Bashir from office after ongoing protests against his 30 years of domination. The people of Sudan were celebrating in the streets, fulfilled because of the prospect of a democratic government for their country. However, when the armed forces announced a transitional period of military rule to free elections for at least two years, the moods of the Sudanese people changed (Jahn, 2019). When negotiating a transition from the military regime to a civilian controlled
government, tensions between the military and the citizens protesting for democracy
increased (Yuhas, 2019). Since then the military has used severe violence against its citizens. More than 100 people were killed during pro-democracy protests. This case proves that it is very important to find out exactly when military forces are willing to hold elections after they staged a coup and when they do not. Further research on this subject will hopefully result into policy recommendations which other countries can impose on military governments not willing to give up their power and return to the barracks so that atrocities like the ones happening in Sudan can be prevented in the future.
Not only is it important to do more research on this subject so the international community will know exactly when to intervene, it is also important to look further into the actual competitiveness and fairness of elections. After all, organizing competitive elections
22 does not necessarily mean that these elections are actually free and fair. This becomes very clear in the case of Thailand. When the military finally decided to hold elections in March 2019, these were still heavily controlled. These elections were neither free nor fair. One can therefore argue whether these elections were actually competitive and to what extent a country becomes democratic.
Hence, further research will hopefully result into more knowledge for the international community so that in the case of a coup it will try to influence the military to hold free
competitive elections and let the armed forces return to the barracks as soon as possible. All in all, when the military holds competitive elections, the first steps towards democracy are imposed. That is, if we stick with Schumpeter’s definition of democracy (Schumpeter, 1942).
23
Bibliography
Al Jazeera. (2011, February 14). Timeline: Egypt's revolution. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html
Albrecht, H., & Bishara, D. (2011). Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt. Middle East Law and Governance, 13-23.
Al-Khateeb, M. (2014, July 22). Conflict over religion and state in Egypt. Retrieved from Middle East Monitor: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140722-conflict-over-religion-and-state-in-egypt/
Alterman, J. B. (2013, August 20). How to Influence a Polarized Egypt. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: https://www.cfr.org/interview/how-influence-polarized-egypt
Auf, Y. (2018, February 2). The State of Emergency in Egypt: an exception or rule? Retrieved from Atlantic Council: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-state-of-emergency-in-egypt-an-exception-or-rule
BBC. (2017, March 24). Profile: Hosni Mubarak. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12301713
BBC. (2019, January 7). Egypt profile - Timeline. Retrieved from BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13315719
Childress, S. (2013, September 17). Timeline: What's Happened Since Egypt's Revolution? Retrieved from Frontline: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-whats-happened-since-egypts-revolution/
Cowen, T. (2010, February 6). Why Politics Is Stuck In The Middle. Retrieved from New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/business/economy/07view.html
Croissant, A., & Lorenz, P. (2017). Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia: an Introduction
to Governments and Political Regimes. New York City: Springer.
Derpanopolous, G., Frantz, E., Geddes, B., & Wright, J. (2016). Are coups good for democracy? Research and Politics, 1-7.
24 Ellis-Petersen, H. (2019, March 21). Thailand's first election in eight years won't be free or
fair, say democracy activists. Retrieved from The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/22/thailands-first-election-in-eight-years-not-free-or-fair-say-democracy-activists
Engvall, A. (2010). Poverty and Conflict in Southeast Asia. Stockholm: EFI The Economic Research Institute.
Grewal, S. (2013, January 29). A Look Back: Two Years of Egyptian Polarization. Retrieved from World Justice Project: https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/look-back-two-years-egyptian-polarization
Hackett, C. (2011, February 16). How many Christians are there in Egypt? Retrieved from Pew Research Center: https://www.pewresearch.org/2011/02/16/how-many-christians-are-there-in-egypt/
Hilla University for Humanistic Studies. (2004, January 21). What is Democracy? Retrieved from Stanford.edu:
https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm
Hodal, K. (2014, May 22). Thailand army chief confirms military coup and suspends
constitution. Retrieved from The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/thailand-army-chief-announces-military-coup
Holmes, A. A., & Koehler, K. (2018). Myths of military defection in Egypt and Tunisia. Retrieved from Mediterranean Politics:
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1499216
Hoyle, J. A. (2019). To govern, or not to govern? Opportunity and post-coup military behaviour in Egypt 2011-2014. DEMOCRATIZATION, 1-18.
Jahn, P. (2019, April 12). Sudan's Military Coup. Retrieved from International Politics and Society: https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/africa/article/show/sudans-military-coup-3396/
John M. Cunningham. (n.d.). Egypt Uprising of 2011. Retrieved from Encyclopaedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/event/Egypt-Uprising-of-2011
25 Karawan, I. A. (2011). Politics and the Army in Egypt. Survival Global Politics and Strategy,
43-50.
Keating, J. (2013, July 3). Can A Coup Ever Be Democratic? Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/03/can-a-coup-ever-be-democratic/
Ketchley, N. (2017). Egypt in a Time of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klaas, B. (2018, 6 February). Thailand’s generals don’t seem to be in any hurry to hold new
elections. Retrieved from DemocracyPost:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/06/thailands-
generals-dont-seem-to-be-in-any-hurry-to-hold-new-elections/?utm_term=.452eeedd0687
Laarhoven, K. v. (2018, December 11). Ruim vier jaar na de coup mag Thailand naar de
stembus. Retrieved from NRC:
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/12/11/ruim-vier-jaar-na-de-coup-mogen-de-thai-naar-de-stembus-a3060192
Larocco, T. (2011, August 5). Class Struggle in Thailand. Retrieved from Dissent Magazine: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/class-struggle-in-thailand
Marinov, N., & Goemans, H. (2014). Coups and Democracy. British Journal of Political
Science, 799-825.
Masoud, T. (2014). Counting Islam: Religion, Class and Elections in Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCargo, D. (2015). THAILAND IN 2014 The Trouble with Magic Swords. Southeast Asian
Affairs, 337-358.
McCargo, D. (2017). Thailand's urbanized villagers and political polarization. Critical Asian
Studies, 365-378.
Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2011). Global Instances of Coups from 1950-Present. Journal of
Peace Research, 249-259.
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York City: Harper & Brothers.
26 Shenker, J. (2011, January 26). Cairo protesters in violent clashes with police. Retrieved from
The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/25/egypt-protests-mubarak
Shoichet, C. E. (2014, May 23). Thailand coup: A cheat sheet to get you up to speed. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/21/world/asia/thailand-crisis-up-to-speed/index.html
Sopranzetti, C. (2016). Thailand’s Relapse: The Implications of the May 2014. The Journal of
Asian Studies, 299-316.
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2016). Coup d'etat or Coup d'autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization. Foreign Policy Analysis, 192-213.
Trager, E. (2011). The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt. Foreign Affairs, 114-127.
Wright, J., Geddes, B., Frantz, E., & Derpanopoulos, G. (2016, February 22). Are coups good
for democracy? Retrieved from The Washington Post:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/?utm_term=.b72a28f73962
Yuhas, A. (2019, June 4). 100 Killed in Sudan and Dozens of Bodies Are Pulled From Nile. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/world/africa/sudan-war-facts-history.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FSudan&action=click&contentCollecti on=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement= 6&pgtype=collection
